METHOD AND ORDER FOR PROTECTING A CHARGING STATION FROM MISUSE

Description

[0001] The invention relates to the protection of a charging station against misuse. Simple RFID cards are frequently used to identify customers in electromobility. It is known to protect these RFID cards against copying by means of suitable communication protocols between the card and the card reader.

[0002] In the current state of the art, methods for preventing the copying and imitation of identification features are continuously being developed. Using current methods can create a relatively high level of protection against unauthorized use. However, misuse by authorized users cannot be completely ruled out.

[0003] Two-factor authentication is commonly used for logging into internet accounts. This requires the user to actively provide two authentication credentials, each implemented via a different method. On the one hand, this places an additional burden on the authorized user, and on the other hand, it offers no protection against misuse of these credentials by the authorized user, as they must be granted access to both authentication credentials to manage them.

[0004] CN 107 277 033 A and US 2018 / 336551 A1 each disclose a method for protecting a charging station from misuse, in which an electric charging process is authorized by a charging station after successful two-factor authentication.

[0005] US 2016 / 059804 A1 discloses the authorization of removing a charging cable from a charging station as a manual preparatory action after verifying a first identification feature. The charging process itself is authorized after verifying a second identification feature.

[0006] US 9,270,463 B2 discloses a device for detecting unauthorized charging connections between charging stations and the batteries of electric vehicles. The device authenticates the battery.

[0007] WO 2014 / 180419 A1 discloses user authentication and vehicle authentication. After both authentications are complete, compatibility for a wireless charging connection is checked.

[0008] The present invention is intended to create an alternative to the prior art.

[0009] This problem is solved according to the invention by a device for protecting a charging station from misuse checking a first identification feature and authorizing an electrical charging process if the check was successful.

[0010] The method is characterized in that the first device or a second device verifies a second identification feature before and during, or only during, the electrical charging process. The electrical charging process continues only if the verification of the second identification feature is successful.

[0011] The arrangement for protecting a charging station from misuse includes a first device which is designed to verify a first identification feature and authorize an electric charging process upon successful verification.

[0012] The arrangement is characterized by a first device designed to verify a second identification feature before and during, or only during, the electrical charging process, or by a second device designed to verify the second identification feature before and during, or only during, the electrical charging process. The arrangement is further characterized by means for continuing the electrical charging process only if the second identification feature has been successfully verified.

[0013] The advantages mentioned below need not necessarily be achieved by the subject matter of the independent patent claims. Rather, they may also be advantages that are achieved solely by individual embodiments, variants, or further developments. The same applies to the following explanations.

[0014] The first and second components are, for example, a backend or server, a processor such as a microprocessor or microcontroller, a system-on-chip or a programmable digital component, such as a "Field Programmable Gate Array" (FPGA).

[0015] The procedure and the arrangement are based on the idea of ​​making authentication or authorization via additional authentication less burdensome by supplementing a weak identification with one or more further automatic identifications, which can also be continuously verified. This means that authorized and honest users incur no additional burden, while at the same time significantly reducing the risk of damage caused by unauthorized behavior.

[0016] The procedure and the arrangement support protection against unauthorized use of the charging station, for example, in the event that a simple RFID card, used as the primary identifier, is stolen or misused. For instance, a card belonging to a car-sharing provider could be used to initiate charging processes for other vehicles. With DC fast charging, this could quickly cause significant damage. While with AC charging, such damage would only occur over a longer period due to the lower charging power, a Y-connector, which is easy for even laypersons to manufacture, could enable the simultaneous charging of multiple vehicles. All these misuses of the primary identifier are effectively prevented by verifying the secondary identifier, provided the secondary identifier is appropriately chosen.Some of the suitable options are explained in more detail in the embodiments and further developments.

[0017] According to one embodiment, the second identification feature is automatically rechecked at predetermined intervals after the electrical charging process has begun. The electrical charging process is aborted as soon as the check of the second identification feature fails.

[0018] This prevents misuse by an authorized user. The implementation differs from typical IT procedures, particularly in that excessive trust in the strength of the authentication during the initial verification of the identification feature does not necessarily lead to significant damage, as the extent of the damage depends on the duration of the unauthorized use. The initial authentication hurdle is therefore deliberately increased only moderately (or not at all), while subsequent checks are continuously performed to detect any manipulation attempts.

[0019] In a training course, the first identification feature is an RFID card, which is verified by a backend system. The second identification feature is also verified by the backend system.

[0020] The backend, for example, is an authentication and authorization server provided by an operator of the charging infrastructure.

[0021] According to one embodiment, the second identifying feature is the location of a mobile device.

[0022] The mobile device in question is, for example, a smartphone or smartwatch that a user carries with them. Location tracking can also be implemented simply as a check for physical presence.

[0023] During a training session, the mobile device determines its location using GPS, cellular network, or Wi-Fi and transmits this information to the charging station. Alternatively, the charging station is equipped with an authentication unit that verifies the mobile device's presence on a local wireless network.

[0024] In the first case, the location is retrieved directly from the mobile device. Alternatively, the mobile device is identified, for example, using an identifier such as a MAC address, within a local Wi-Fi or Bluetooth network. Checking the location can also simply mean verifying local presence.

[0025] According to one embodiment, the second identification feature is the presence of one or more RFID cards.

[0026] These additional RFID cards are, for example, located in a wallet which a user holds in front of a reader at the charging station.

[0027] In a training course, the second identifying characteristic is the location of a vehicle.

[0028] For example, the first identifier could be a charging card assigned by a carsharing provider to a specific vehicle or fleet of vehicles. Location verification can also be implemented simply as a check for physical presence. The second identifier, therefore, would be, for example, the presence of a vehicle from the carsharing provider's fleet.

[0029] According to one embodiment, the second identifying feature is a state of charge and / or a voltage of a vehicle battery and / or a charging current.

[0030] The aforementioned characteristics can be advantageously used and verified as a second identification feature during the charging process. The charging current is an example of an identification feature that is only available after the charging process has begun. The second identification feature can also be a data set consisting of multiple features, for example, any combination of the possibilities mentioned in the embodiments, further developments, and exemplary embodiments.

[0031] In a training course, as part of the examination of the second identification feature, it is checked whether the second identification feature corresponds to comparison information provided by a charging control unit in the charging station.

[0032] This further training makes it possible, for example, to recognize whether charging current is being diverted using a Y-connector.

[0033] According to one embodiment, an additional device is installed in the motor vehicle which outputs the second identification feature.

[0034] The additional device makes it possible, for example, to check the location or presence of the vehicle even without the involvement of a vehicle manufacturer.

[0035] In a further training course, the vehicle supports vehicle power supply via a corresponding communication protocol, in particular according to ISO 15118. The charging station mediates communication between the additional device and the backend.

[0036] This advanced training enables communication to be offered as a value-added service via the charging station. This type of data transmission is particularly attractive for private users, as it reduces the costs of purchasing and operating the additional device, and these costs are not charged separately.

[0037] A computer program is stored on the computer-readable data carrier, which executes the procedure when it is processed in a processor.

[0038] The computer program is executed in a processor, carrying out the procedure.

[0039] Exemplary embodiments of the invention are explained in more detail below with reference to the figures. In the figures, identical or functionally equivalent elements are designated with the same reference numerals unless otherwise indicated. They show: Fig. 1 shows an embodiment of an arrangement for protecting a charging station LS from misuse, and Fig. 2 shows an exemplary procedure for protecting a charging station LS from misuse.

[0040] Figure 1Figure 1 shows an embodiment of an arrangement for protecting a charging station (LS) from misuse. The charging station has, as its first component, an authentication unit (AE) configured to verify a first identification feature (ID1) and authorize a charging process for a vehicle (KFZ). If the verification of the first identification feature (ID1) is successful, the authentication unit (AE) authorizes a charging control unit (LE) of the charging station (LS) to supply the charging current to a charging control unit (LE) in the vehicle (KFZ).

[0041] As a second feature, the arrangement includes a backend BE, for example a server, which is programmed to check a second identification feature ID2 before and / or during the charging process, and to continue the charging process only if the second identification feature ID2 is successfully checked.

[0042] To protect the charging station, in addition to the first identification feature ID1, at least one further identification feature is evaluated; in this case, the second identification feature ID2. The second identification feature ID2 can also comprise several different features, or a third or fourth identification feature can be checked alongside the second identification feature ID2. The second identification feature ID2 is preferably checked automatically and repeatedly by the backend BE.

[0043] In the first scenario, a user of the charging station LS is identified by presenting an RFID card as the first identification feature, ID1. The RFID card's authorization can be verified either locally by the authentication unit AE or centrally in the backend BE. The backend BE then additionally verifies a further feature, in this case, the second identification feature, ID2. If the RFID card belongs to the user, the second identification feature, ID2, can be, for example, the location of the user's smartphone or smartwatch, checked directly on the device. Furthermore, the presence of such devices can also be verified (via a corresponding receiver in the charging station LS) using their identifier in wireless networks (e.g., MAC address in WLAN, Bluetooth).It is also conceivable to capture additional RFID cards as a second identification feature ID2 in the event that the user holds an entire wallet in front of a reader of the authentication unit AE.

[0044] In a second scenario, the RFID card, as the first identification feature (ID1), is assigned to the vehicle (KFZ), which was provided to the user, for example, by a car-sharing or rental car provider. In this scenario, the location of the associated vehicle(s) can also be checked as a second identification feature (ID2). For this purpose, an additional device (ZG) may be installed in the vehicle (KFZ), allowing the process to be carried out even without the involvement of the vehicle manufacturer. The vehicle-side additional device (ZG) can also transmit further information, such as the battery's state of charge (SoC) or battery voltage, which can then be compared with values ​​transmitted by the charging control unit (LE) in the backend (BE).

[0045] In one variant, the second identification feature, ID2, is repeatedly checked after an initial verification of the identification features to protect against misuse by an authorized person. At the start of the charging process, further features such as the charging current become available, which can be checked as part of the second identification feature, ID2, or in addition to it.

[0046] In another variant, communication takes place between the backend BE and the auxiliary device ZG in the vehicle KFZ according to ISO 15118. This can be mediated as a value-added service via the charging station LS. This type of data transmission is particularly interesting for private users, as it reduces the costs for purchasing and operating the auxiliary device, eliminating these costs from the outset.

[0047] Figure 2Figure 1 shows a flowchart for protecting a charging station from misuse. First, an authentication unit (AE) reads a first identification feature (ID1), for example, an RFID card held in front of a reader. For further verification, the authentication unit (AE) sends the first identification feature (ID1) to a backend (BE). The backend (BE) then accesses and verifies a second identification feature (ID2). Examples of the second identification feature (ID2) have already been mentioned. Subsequently, the backend (BE) requests data from an auxiliary device (ZG) in a vehicle, such as the battery's state of charge (SoC) or voltage, and compares this data with information that the backend (BE) requests and receives from a charging control unit (LE) in the charging station. This allows, for example, verification that no charging current is being diverted using a Y-connector.Provided all checks are successful, the backend BE reports this back to the authentication unit AE, so that the charging process can continue through the charging station.

[0048] Ideally, these checks run largely in the background, repeatedly and fully automatically, while the charging process has already begun. This results in a relatively uninterrupted and user-friendly experience. In case of fraud, the charging process is aborted as soon as the check fails.

[0049] Although the invention has been illustrated and described in detail by the exemplary embodiments, it is not limited by the disclosed examples. Other variations can be derived from these by a person skilled in the art without departing from the scope of protection of the invention. The described exemplary embodiments, variants, configurations, and further developments can also be freely combined with one another.

Claims

1. Arrangement for protecting a charging station (LS) against improper use, having a first device that is designed to - check a first identification feature (ID1) and - authorize an electrical charging procedure if the inspection was successful, characterized by - a design of the first device to check a second identification feature (ID2) before and during or only during the electrical charging procedure, or - a second device, designed to check the second identification feature (ID2) before and during or only during the electrical charging procedure, and - means for continuing the electrical charging procedure only if the inspection of the second identification feature (ID2) was successful.

2. Arrangement according to Claim 1, wherein the arrangement is furthermore configured such that - the second identification feature (ID2) is checked again fully automatically at predefined time intervals after the electrical charging procedure has begun, and - the electrical charging procedure is terminated as soon as the inspection of the second identification feature (ID2) fails.

3. Arrangement according to either of the preceding claims, - in which the first identification feature (ID1) is an RFID card that is checked by a backend (BE), and - in which the second identification feature (ID2) is likewise checked by the backend (BE).

4. Arrangement according to one of the preceding claims, - in which the second identification feature (ID2) is a location of a mobile terminal.

5. Arrangement according to Claim 4, - in which the mobile terminal determines its location by way of GPS, mobile radio or WLAN and outputs said location to the charging station (LS), or - in which the charging station (LS) is equipped with an authentication unit (AE) that checks the presence of the mobile terminal in a wireless local area network.

6. Arrangement according to one of Claims 1 to 3, - in which the second identification feature (ID2) is the presence of one or more RFID cards.

7. Arrangement according to one of Claims 1 to 3, - in which the second identification feature (ID2) is a location of a vehicle (KFZ).

8. Arrangement according to one of Claims 1 to 3, - in which the second identification feature (ID2) is a state of charge and / or a voltage of a battery of a vehicle (KFZ) and / or a charging current.

9. Arrangement according to Claim 8, wherein the arrangement is furthermore configured such that, - in the course of the inspection of the second identification feature (ID2), it is checked whether the second identification feature (ID2) corresponds to comparison information provided by a charging control unit (LE) in the charging station (LS).

10. Arrangement according to one of Claims 7 to 9, - in which an additional device (ZG) is installed in the motor vehicle (KFZ) and outputs the second identification feature (ID2).

11. Arrangement according to Claims 3 and 10, - in which the vehicle (KFZ) supports a vehicle supply by way of a corresponding communication protocol, in particular in accordance with ISO 15118, and - in which the charging station (LS) conveys communication between the additional device (ZG) and the backend (BE).