Dispostive guidance system for rail traffic with a special control interface
The dispositive control system with a special operating interface automates routine rail traffic operations, reducing manual intervention and enhancing safety by enabling train management systems to perform automatic checks and comply with safety regulations.
Patent Information
- Authority / Receiving Office
- EP · EP
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- SIEMENS MOBILITY AG
- Filing Date
- 2024-12-04
- Publication Date
- 2026-06-10
AI Technical Summary
Current rail traffic control systems require manual operations by train dispatchers, which are prone to errors due to ambient noise and interference, especially in shunting and depot areas, leading to potential operational inefficiencies and safety risks.
A dispositive control system with a special operating interface that allows train management systems to transmit control commands directly to the control system, incorporating automatic checks and approvals based on predefined rules, reducing the need for manual intervention by the train dispatcher.
Automates routine operations, minimizing human error and enhancing safety by allowing train management systems to handle control commands autonomously, while ensuring compliance with safety regulations.
Smart Images
Figure IMGAF001_ABST
Abstract
Description
[0001] The present invention relates to a dispositive guidance system for rail traffic.
[0002] In rail transport, trains travel the railway network along routes requested by a control system at the level of operational train control (also called train routing). This request can be triggered automatically when trains are operating according to schedule, thus following a sequence of previously planned routes. In case of deviations from the timetable or other interventions, the routes are requested manually by the train dispatcher. Each requested route is set by a control unit, such as an interlocking system, centrally or decentrally, only when the route elements, such as points, signals, block occupancy detection, and moving blocks in ETCS, are available for that route and can be set accordingly and locked against other use by competing routes. After the route has been traversed, the route is then...Once the roadway elements located within it are closed, this closure will be lifted and the roadway elements will be available again for setting new routes.
[0003] Thus, signal boxes or virtual control instances are currently operated either manually by a train dispatcher at an operator workstation of a control system, such as Iltis Netz of Siemens Mobility AG, Wallisellen, Switzerland, or, if available (as in the case of Iltis Netz), by the automation of the control system.
[0004] Many railway companies operate so-called train management systems (Traffic Management Systems, TMS) that further automate operational processes in productive rail traffic and are designed to operate the control system like a virtual train dispatcher. Emergency operations are generally excluded and are still to be carried out manually by the train dispatcher at a workstation.
[0005] As mentioned above, there are still numerous applications today where certain operations of the interlocking system must be carried out manually by the train dispatcher at a workstation of the operational control system. This procedure often carries a certain potential for errors, because, for example, route settings in the shunting and depot areas must be requested by telephone from the shunting and depot personnel to the train dispatcher, and the transmissions can sometimes be inadequate due to ambient noise or other sources of interference, and thus misinterpreted by the train dispatcher.
[0006] The present invention is therefore based on the objective of providing a control system for rail traffic with which it is possible to make certain operations of the control system safer with and without operation of the signal box and thereby relieve the train dispatcher at the operating workstation of the control system.
[0007] This problem is solved according to the invention by a dispositive control system for rail traffic, which comprises the following components: a) at least one control system cell intended for train control within a predetermined area of a rail network, wherein the control system cell comprises the following components: b) a computer infrastructure for executing cell software, wherein the cell software comprises designed train protection rules for train control;c) comprises an operator workstation for a train dispatcher, wherein the cell software provides a timetable-compliant automatic handling of train traffic within the area with a corresponding output of route requests to an interlocking system and a display of an overview image of the status of the track elements arranged in the area and the trains passing through the area at the operator workstation, and wherein the cell software provides a series of manual operations for train control for the train dispatcher, which he is authorized to perform within the framework of the train protection rules available in the cell software according to a separate operating situation, such as deviation from the timetable due to delays and / or malfunctions of track elements; characterized by the fact that A special operating interface is provided for the control system cell, via which an instance for train control management transmits a separate request for a train dispatcher-independent operation of the control system cell to the control system cell, whereby the cell software is capable of checking this operation according to specially designed rules and allowing it if the check is successful or rejecting it if the check is unsuccessful.
[0008] In this way, the present invention ensures that a railway company can further automate operational processes in train production with its train management system (Traffic Management System TMS) and operate the control system like a virtual train dispatcher. Thus, the number of operations that must be performed manually by a train dispatcher at an operator workstation of the operational control system can be significantly reduced through appropriate design of the special operating interface of the operational control system. However, exceptions to this include, for example, emergency operations, which are safety-critical and therefore, in compliance with current railway safety regulations, must continue to be performed manually by the train dispatcher at the operator workstation.
[0009] In a suitable embodiment of the present invention, the separate requirement can be classified as critical operation or as standard operation according to the specifically designed rules and the configuration of the special operating interface. Thus, different requirements relating to safety, track and trace of operation, and similar railway-related criteria can be defined and assigned to the separate requirement.
[0010] In a preferred embodiment of the present invention, it may be provided that a control operation can be transmitted to the control system cell via the special operating interface in a single channel and / or that a critical operation can be transmitted to the control system cell via the special operating interface in a two-channel manner.
[0011] In an equally advantageous embodiment of the present invention, a control operation, if it includes a signal box operation, can be output to the signal box via a single channel and / or a critical operation, if it includes a signal box operation, can be output to the signal box via two channels.
[0012] A special field of previously impossible operations (because the train dispatcher is bypassed) can now be provided if the separate requirement can be classified as an operation according to the specially designed rules, which either disables operations designed within the cell software or makes operations designed within the cell software impossible to disable.
[0013] Further advantageous embodiments of the present invention can be found in the remaining dependent claims.
[0014] Advantageous embodiments of the present invention are explained in more detail with reference to the drawing. The figure shows a schematic view of a solution concept for operating a control system 2 and, optionally, an interlocking system 4 via a special interface 6 of the control system 2. In a manner not shown here, the interlocking system 6 is located in a section of a railway network, in a manner not shown in detail here, and is equipped with the control units for track elements such as points, signals, block occupancy detection, and axle counting systems. The control system 2 controls the train movements carried out in this section.
[0015] With the inventive implementation of the special operating interface 6 for the control system 2, for example, a control operation command in control engineering jargon, such as "switch (WU)", can be transmitted from an external system, such as a Traffic Management System (TMS), to the control system 2 via a single channel using the special operating interface 6, which is provided on a process interface (PSS). In the control system cell 2a, the external operation command is first converted into a control system-internal operation command in an operation converter (not shown in the diagram). The operation converter sends the control system-internal operation command to an operation processor. In this part, the approval check takes place first. During the approval check, element states in the process image are queried. Which elements are checked and which states they must have are defined in the project configuration for this control operation command.After successful testing, the appropriate command output is initiated, depending on the type of interlocking system. The necessary commands are then issued to interlocking system 4 via an interlocking system connection.
[0016] In control engineering jargon, a critical operation, such as "Shunting Route Dissolution (BAR)," is transmitted by the external system to control system 2 via the special operating interface 6 in two channels. Because the operations received via special operating interface 6 are not processed on the process interface (PSS), separate PSS instances are not required for the two-channel transmission of critical operations. Subsequently, however, the two-channel operations are fully processed in two channels by control system cell 2a and also output in two channels to interlocking 4. To ensure that the operation is output to interlocking 4 simultaneously (synchronized), the operation processing on the mirror computer (redundant computer) is synchronized with the operation processing on the main computer. For synchronization, the operator ID (operator and order number) of the operation is exchanged and compared.If a match is found within a small time window, the critical operation is (simultaneously) issued via the interlocking connection to interlocking 4.
[0017] During critical operation "BAR," the approval check verifies not only the internal element states of the control system but also states from the external system (Traffic Management System TMS), such as "Stop message from TMS present." It's worth noting that the approval check is also performed in two channels (once on the main computer and once on the mirror computer). This is indicated by the dashed lines / frames in the diagram. The stop message is transmitted via a message interface (labeled S4MLD.TPD in the diagram) to the process image in control system cell 2a, which is also present in two channels.
[0018] Using the solution concept described above, the Traffic / Train Management System 12 (e.g., the railway operator's system) can now transmit desired control commands, such as "switch points," via the special operating interface 6 to the control system 2, i.e., to control system cell 2a responsible for this area of the railway network. In control system 2, i.e., in the cell software of control system cell 2a, a simple approval check, designed according to the applicable operating regulations, is then performed before processing. The term "simple approval check" used here could refer, for example, to checks of the element states (point position) of the controlled element (points). If the control command involves an interlocking operation, it is also transmitted to interlocking 4 after successful verification.
[0019] Critical operations, such as "Shunting Route Disconnection," are transmitted to Control System 2 via the new special operating interface 6 using two channels. In Control System 2 (Control System Cell 2a with the rules configured for special interface 6), the defined approval checks are performed before processing the operation. The term "defined approval checks" refers, for example, to checks such as "Standstill message from TMS 12 present," "Start and destination dwarf signals displaying "STOP," etc. If the critical operation involves an interlocking control, the operation is output to Interlocking 4 via two channels after successful verification.
[0020] The specific tests to be carried out in the approval test of each of the enabled operating modes are defined in the project planning of the special operating interface 6.
[0021] Operating instructions are generally acknowledged with an operating receipt. If an operation is not carried out, the reason for the error can be stated in the operating receipt, such as "switching points is not possible because the desired points are locked in their current position and therefore cannot be operated."
[0022] The functions that are possible via the new special operating interface 6 can be assigned to the following categories: i) Controls can be switched off ii) Controls cannot be switched off
[0023] The term "controls that can be switched off" refers to controls that simplify operational processes (e.g., 'switching points') or automatic controls (e.g., 'disabling train route'), which, according to regulations of a railway authority, such as the BAV (Federal Office of Transport, CH) or the Federal Railway Authority (DE), must be predictable and switchable.
[0024] The term "Operatings NOT switchable" refers to operating functions that serve to avert danger and / or are supportive and / or cannot directly lead to additional hazards (e.g., "Switch off automatic signal operation"). The assignment of operating functions to the relevant category is also defined in the configuration of the special operating interface 6.
[0025] The train dispatcher can activate / deactivate the execution of the switchable controls via the special operating interface 6 at their workstation 8. The status "External controls OFF" is displayed to the train dispatcher in the magnified view 14 at workstation 8. This also allows the train dispatcher to deactivate the following automatic functions with an (emergency) control (similar to a red buzzer): i) Train steering ii) Shunting steering iii) Operating interface
[0026] This quick-access control allows, for example, compliance with relevant regulations of the railway authority, which require that the operator be able to switch off or cancel automatic processes.
[0027] Within the scope of the present invention, the following operating conditions are provided as exemplary embodiments: i) Switching points: Currently, maintenance staff must contact the train dispatcher by phone to request that points be switched. This results in waiting times on the phone until the train dispatcher can answer the call. The communication process is time-consuming and prone to errors. With the special operating interface 6, the TMS can now send the "switch points" command to the control system 2, thus providing the maintenance staff with relevant additional information, such as the reason why the points were not switched. Upon successful completion of the test, the points can then be switched by the interlocking system in response to the maintenance staff's command.ii) Deactivating Automatic Signal Operation: With the currently available exchange between the TMS and the control system, it is possible to prevent trains from being automatically routed on a specific section by entering a command at the TMS. This is achieved by setting a disposition stop (Diskri D) in the train routing data. However, this measure is always linked to a specific train and therefore requires prior calculations in the TMS to determine which train will next travel the section in question. With the new special operating interface 6, it is now possible for the TMS to send the command "Deactivate automatic signal operation" to the control system, so that no train automatically receives a proceed aspect at the relevant signal section. iii) Route Operation Cancellation: Route operation cancellation allows residual train routes to be cancelled under certain circumstances.In order for a train dispatcher to perform this action today, they must ensure that all dependent driving elements (points, level crossings) have been traversed or that the train has come to a complete stop. With the new special operating interface 6, the TMS can now send the "Route Cancellation" command to the control system 2. This capability allows, for example, the following scenarios to be covered in conjunction with shunting control: A train arrives and terminates at the relevant station; the train is then moved away in the opposite direction of travel using a shunting movement. A train arrives and terminates at the relevant station; subsequently, shunting is to be carried out against the direction of travel of the arriving train (e.g., to add weight to a train). iv) Route Cancellation: The Route Cancellation function allows shunting routes to be cancelled.Here too, the train dispatcher must currently verify beforehand that all dependent track elements have been traversed (points, level crossings) or that the train has stopped (communication with the shunting supervisor). With the new special operating interface 6 according to the invention, it is now also possible for the Traffic Management System (TMS) to send the command "Shunting Route Disconnection" to the control system. This command is also related to shunting control. The shunting setting process can only be fully automated if shunting routes can also be disconnected via an operating interface of the control system. v) Emergency Stop Signal for Shunting Route: With the Emergency Stop Signal for Shunting Route, a dwarf signal can be immediately set to stop. Currently, this command is operated exclusively manually by the train dispatcher at the control system 2 operator workstation.With the new special operating interface, the TMS can now also send the "Emergency Stop Signal Shunting Route" command to the control system. This allows the operator of a TMS user interface to immediately set a dwarf signal to stop in the event of reported hazards. Furthermore, the TMS can initiate the cancellation process in the event of a disruption to a shunting movement reported by the shunting locomotive driver. vi) Moving Forward to Dwarf Signal Currently, there is no explicit safety measure for the "moving forward to dwarf signal" maneuver. No route exists for this in the interlocking system, as the movement forward only takes place within a section that is not subdivided by further dwarf signals. In the current process, the train dispatcher verbally grants the shunting supervisor permission to move forward to the dwarf signal.The train dispatcher alone is responsible for ensuring that neither the control system's automatic system sets a train route against the approaching shunting movement, nor that the dispatcher themselves sets a shunting or train route against the approaching shunting movement. With the new special operating interface 6, approach movements to the dwarf signal are now secured, so that neither train routes nor shunting routes are automatically set for this section of the approach to the dwarf signal. The safety measure is activated and deactivated via the TMS (Train Management System) using a control panel. However, the safety measure can also be manually deactivated by the train dispatcher.
[0028] The solution concept according to the invention allows the aforementioned use cases to be automated via special operating interface 6. This solution can also be easily adapted to the needs of other railway operators. Which operations are permitted / possible via special operating interface 6 can be fully defined in the design of the special operating interface 6. To ensure railway safety, limitations on certain operations, such as those involving interlocking bypass, can be implemented.
[0029] The solution concept described above is therefore suitable for simplifying operational processes in rail transport and reducing costs. A typical distinguishing feature of the invention presented here is the (documented) special operating interface 6, via which an external system, such as the TMS 12, can transmit regular and critical operating commands to the control system 2.
[0030] The present invention can thus be seen, among other things, as another important piece of the puzzle for a new automated shunting setup process. However, numerous other operational processes can also be simplified and automated with this invention. Furthermore, the present invention involves corresponding, sometimes extensive, tests (approximately the same ones that the train dispatcher currently has to perform manually), with the aim of automating frequently occurring operational processes and simultaneously minimizing potential sources of error. Thus, the creation of the special operating interface and its corresponding design provides a way to automate certain standard and critical operations without having to first transmit the entire requirement for such operation to the train dispatcher and have them check its feasibility.
Claims
1. Dispositive control system (2) for rail-bound traffic, comprising: a) at least one control system cell (2a) intended for train control within a predetermined area of a rail network, wherein the control system cell (2a) comprises the following components: b) a computer infrastructure for executing cell software, wherein the cell software comprises projected train protection rules for train control;c) comprises an operator workstation for a train dispatcher, wherein the cell software provides a timetable-compliant automatic handling of train traffic within the area with a corresponding output of route requests to an interlocking system and a display of an overview image of the status of the track elements arranged in the area and the trains passing through the area at the operator workstation, and wherein the cell software provides a series of manual operations for train control for the train dispatcher, which he is authorized to perform within the framework of the train protection rules available in the cell software according to a separate operating situation, such as deviation from the timetable due to delays and / or malfunctions of track elements; characterized by the fact thata special operating interface (6) is provided for the control system cell (2a) via which an instance for train control management transmits a separate request for a train dispatcher-independent operation of the control system cell to the control system cell, wherein the cell software is capable of checking this operation according to specially designed rules and allowing it if the check is successful or rejecting it if the check is unsuccessful.
2. Dispositive guidance system according to claim 1, characterized by the fact that The separate requirement can be classified as critical operation or as regular operation according to the specially designed rules, as per the design of the special operating interface.
3. Dispositive guidance system according to claim 2, characterized by the fact thatA regular operation can be transferred to the control system cell via the special operating interface in a single channel and / or a critical operation can be transferred to the control system cell via the special operating interface in a two-channel manner.
4. Dispositive guidance system according to claim 2 or 3, characterized by the fact that A standard operation, insofar as it includes interlocking operation, can be output to the interlocking via a single channel and / or a critical operation, insofar as it includes interlocking operation, can be output to the interlocking via two channels.
5. Dispositive guidance system according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by the fact that The separate requirement can be classified as an operation according to the specifically designed rules, which either switches off operations designed within the cell software or makes operations designed within the cell software impossible to switch off.