Communication method and user device
By encrypting NSSAI using AS security context, the 5G system addresses security concerns and congestion issues, ensuring secure and efficient network slice-based resource allocation.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- JP2023002193
- Authority / Receiving Office
- JP · JP
- Patent Type
- Patents
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2018-11-02
- Filing Date
- 2023-01-11
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-06
- Estimated Expiration
- 2039-10-28
AI Technical Summary
The 5G system faces security concerns due to the inability to encrypt Network Slice Selection Assistance Information (NSSAI) at the RRC layer, leading to issues with network slice-based congestion control and initial AMF selection, resulting in excessive traffic and signaling overhead.
Implementing an Access Stratum (AS) security context to encrypt NSSAI, allowing secure transmission and decryption by the UE and RAN node, ensuring privacy and enabling RAN-based resource allocation.
Enhances network security by protecting NSSAI, reducing congestion and signaling overhead, and facilitating effective RAN-based resource allocation.
Smart Images

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Abstract
Description
[Technical field]
[0001] The present disclosure relates to a mobile communication system, a user equipment, a RAN node, and a communication method. [Background technology]
[0002] The 5G System (5GS) introduces a network slicing function. (Single) Network Slice Selection Assistance Information (S-NSSAI) is used as an identifier to identify a network slice, and the (S-)NSSAI is used between a user equipment (UE), a 5G access network (5G-AN) and a 5G core network (5GC) to comply with a service-level agreement (SLA) involving a network operator. The processing of the (S-)NSSAI is specified in 3GPP TS 23.501 (Non-Patent Document 2), TS 23.502 (Non-Patent Document 3) and TS 38.331 (Non-Patent Document 6). [Prior art documents] [Non-patent literature]
[0003] [Non-Patent Document 1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications" [Non-Patent Document 2] 3GPP TS 23.501: "System Architecture for the 5G System; Stage 2" [Non-Patent Document 3] 3GPP TS 23.502: "Procedures for the 5G System; Stage 2" V15.2.0 (2018-06) [Non-Patent Document 4] 3GPP TS 24.501: "Non-Access-Stratum (NAS) protocol Stage 3" V15.0.0 (2018-06) [Non-Patent Document 5] 3GPP TS 38.413: "NG Application Protocol (NGAP)" V15.0.0 (2018-06) [Non-Patent Document 6] 3GPP TS 38.331": "Radio Resource Control (RRC) protocol specification" V15.3.0 (2018-09) Summary of the Invention [Problem to be solved by the invention]
[0004] Although 3GPP TS 38.331 (Non-Patent Document 6) describes that an RRC message can carry a list of (S-)NSSAI from the UE to the NG-RAN, the 3GPP SA3 group has expressed security concerns that it is unacceptable to send the (S-)NSSAI in clear text at the RRC layer, as user privacy cannot be guaranteed.
[0005] If, for security reasons, the NSSAI information cannot be transmitted from the UE to the 5G-AN, network slice-based congestion control, or initial AMF selection of the requested NSSAI, or RAN-based resource allocation in the 5G-AN will not work.
[0006] As a result, a large amount of traffic in the congested network slice may reach the AMF, causing the AMF to become uncontrollable as the AMF may not be able to withstand such large traffic.
[0007] To overcome such failure scenarios, the 5G-AN should regulate such traffic in front of the AMF when the network slice is congested. The requested NSSAI is used for initial AMF selection. If the correct AMF is not selected during AS connection establishment, AMF reallocation is performed in many registration procedures. This generates signaling overhead in the network. The requested NSSAI is used to apply RAN-based allocation of slicing resources to the UE. If the requested NSSAI is not available in the RAN, the RAN cannot perform RAN-based allocation of resources during AS signaling connection establishment.
[0008] In view of the above-mentioned problems, the present disclosure aims to provide a solution for solving at least one of the various problems. [Means for solving the problem]
[0009] In a first aspect of the present disclosure, a mobile communication system is provided, comprising: a user equipment (UE) UE that acquires an access stratum (AS) security context of the UE, encrypts a first message or an information element (IE) included in the first message, the first message including Network Slice Selection Assistance Information (NSSAI), using the AS security context, and transmits the first message; and a radio access network (RAN) node that acquires the AS security context, receives the first message from the UE, decrypts the first message or the sensitive IE using the AS security context, and acquires the NSSAI.
[0010] In a second aspect of the present disclosure, a mobile communication system is provided, the mobile communication system comprising: a user equipment (UE) UE that acquires an access stratum (AS) security context of the UE and encrypts a first message or an information element (IE) included in the first message, the first message including Network Slice Selection Assistance Information (NSSAI), using the AS security context; a first core network node that receives the first message from the UE, decrypts the first message or the sensitive IE using the AS security context, and transmits a second message including the AS security context and a decrypted portion of the first message or the decrypted first message; and a radio access network (RAN) node that receives the second message from the first core network node and acquires the AS security context and the NSSAI.
[0011] In a third aspect of the present disclosure, a communication method for a user equipment (UE) is provided, the communication method including: receiving an access stratum (AS) security context of the UE from a radio access network (RAN) node; encrypting a first message or a sensitive information element (IE) included in the first message, the first message including Network Slice Selection Assistance Information (NSSAI), using the AS security context; and transmitting the first message to the RAN node.
[0012] In a fourth aspect of the present disclosure, a communication method for a Radio Access Network (RAN) node is provided, the communication method including: transmitting, to a UE, an access stratum (AS) security context of the UE; and receiving, from the UE, a first message, or a sensitive information element (IE) included in the first message, the first message including encrypted Network Slice Selection Assistance Information (NSSAI) by using the AS security context.
[0013] In a fifth aspect of the present disclosure, a user equipment (UE) is provided, the UE including a transceiver circuit and a controller, the controller receiving an access stratum (AS) security context of the UE from a radio access network (RAN) node, encrypting a first message including Network Slice Selection Assistance Information (NSSAI) or a sensitive information element (IE) included in the first message using the AS security context, and transmitting the first message to the RAN node.
[0014] In a sixth aspect of the present disclosure, a radio access network (RAN) node is provided, the RAN node including a transceiver circuit and a controller, the controller transmitting an access stratum (AS) security context of a user equipment (UE) of the UE, and receiving a first message including encrypted Network Slice Selection Assistance Information (NSSAI) or a sensitive information element (IE) included in the first message from the UE by using the AS security context. [Brief description of the drawings]
[0015] [Figure 1] FIG. 1 shows a signaling flow according to a first aspect.
[0016] [Diagram 2] FIG. 2 shows a signaling flow according to the second aspect.
[0017] [Diagram 3] FIG. 3 shows a signaling flow according to the third aspect.
[0018] [Figure 4] FIG. 4 shows a signaling flow according to the fourth aspect.
[0019] [Diagram 5] FIG. 5 shows a signaling flow according to the fifth aspect.
[0020] [Figure 6] FIG. 6 is a block diagram showing an example of the configuration of a UE.
[0021] [Figure 7] FIG. 7 is a block diagram showing an example of the configuration of an (R)AN.
[0022] [Figure 8] FIG. 8 is a block diagram showing an example of the configuration of AMF. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS
[0023] Abbreviation For the purposes of this disclosure, 3GPP TR 21.905 and the abbreviations given below apply. Abbreviations defined in this disclosure take precedence over definitions in 3GPP TR 21.905 if the same abbreviations exist. 5GC 5G Core Network 5GS 5G System 5G-AN 5G Access Network 5G-GUTI 5G Globally Unique Temporary Identifier 5G S-TMSI 5G S-Temporary Mobile Subscription Identifier 5QI 5G QoS Identifier AF Application Function AMF Access and Mobility Management Function AN Access Node AS Access Stratum AUSF Authentication Server Function CM Connection Management CP Control Plane CSFB Circuit Switched (CS) Fallback DL Downlink DN Data Network DNAI DN Access Identifier DNN Data Network Name EDT Early Data Transmission EPS Evolved Packet System EPC Evolved Packet Core FQDN Fully Qualified Domain Name GFBR Guaranteed Flow Bit Rate GMLC Gateway Mobile Location Centre GPSI Generic Public Subscription Identifier GUAMI Globally Unique AMF Identifier HR Home Routed (roaming) I-RNTI I-Radio Network Temporary Identifier LADN Local Area Data Network LBO Local Break Out (roaming) LMF Location Management Function LRF Location Retrieval Function MAC Medium Access Control MFBR Maximum Flow Bit Rate MICO Mobile Initiated Connection Only MME Mobility Management Entity N3IWF Non-3GPP Inter Working Function NAI Network Access Identifier NAS Non-Access Stratum NEF Network Exposure Function NF Network Function NG-RAN Next Generation Radio Access Network NR New Radio NRF Network Repository Function NSI ID Network Slice Instance Identifier NSSAI Network Slice Selection Assistance Information NSSF Network Slice Selection Function NSSP Network Slice Selection Policy NWDAF Network Data Analytics Function PCF Policy Control Function PEI Permanent Equipment Identifier PER Packet Error Rate PFD Packet Flow Description PLMN Public land mobile network PPD Paging Policy Differentiation PPI Paging Policy Indicator PSA PDU Session Anchor QFI QoS Flow Identifier QoE Quality of Experience (R)AN (Radio) Access Network RLC Radio Link Control RM Registration Management RQA Reflective QoS Attribute RQI Reflective QoS Indication RRC Radio Resource Control SA NR Standalone New Radio SBA Service Based Architecture SBI Service Based Interface SD Slice Differentiator SDAP Service Data Adaptation Protocol SEAF Security Anchor Functionality SEPP Security Edge Protection Proxy SMF Session Management Function S-NSSAI Single Network Slice Selection Assistance Information SSC Session and Service Continuity SST Slice / Service Type SUCI Subscription Concealed Identifier SUPI Subscription Permanent Identifier UAC Unified Access Control UDSF Unstructured Data Storage Function UL Uplink UL CL Uplink Classifier UPF User Plane Function UDR Unified Data Repository URSP UE Route Selection Policy SMS Short Message Service SMSF SMS Function MT Mobile Terminated UAC Unified Access Control ODACD Operator Defined Access Category Definitions Operating System MO Mobile Originated MT Mobile Terminated USIM Universal Subscriber Identity Module UICC Universal integrated circuit card SIB System Information Block
[0024] definition For the purposes of this disclosure, the terms and definitions given in 3GPP TR 21.905 (Non-Patent Document 1) and Non-Patent Documents 2 to 6 apply. Terms defined in this disclosure take precedence over definitions in 3GPP TR 21.905 (Non-Patent Document 1) if the same terms exist therein.
[0025] First aspect (Solution 1 to solve the problem statement): The first aspect involves the NG-RAN fetching AS security parameters from the core network and sending them to the UE to encrypt sensitive information.
[0026] FIG. 1 shows the signaling flow of solution 1. To execute solution 1, the UE needs to know the NG-RAN capability that supports the procedures of solution 1. This can be achieved in two ways: -NG-RAN broadcasts its capabilities via BCCH. The NG-RAN broadcasts information indicating support for AS security as described in Solution 1. -NG-RAN indicates its capability in a PRACH response message via PRACH. Before step 1 is performed, the NG-RAN sends information indicating support for AS security as described in solution 1 as a response to the PRACH preamble message from the UE.
[0027] The detailed steps of Solution 1 are given below. 0. The UE successfully performs the registration procedure for normal service to the network. The UE and the network establish a 5G Non-Access Stratum (NAS) security context. The network optionally establishes a 5G Access Stratum security context.
[0028] A UE in 1.5GMM-IDLE state initiates a NAS signaling connection establishment procedure. As part of the NAS signaling connection procedure, the UE first initiates the establishment of an AS signaling connection (e.g., an RRC Connection) by sending an unciphered first RRC message including at least one of a UE temporary identity, an AMF identity identifying a registered AMF, or an RRC establishment cause. The inclusion of the UE temporary identifier, or the AMF identifier, or the RRC establishment cause may be interpreted by the NG-RAN as needing to contact the AMF to obtain the AS security context. In one example, the UE temporary identifier may be 5G-S-TMSI. The AMF identifier may include at least one of a registered PLMN identifier (MCC and MNC) or an AMF identifier. The AMF identifier may be an AMF Region ID, an AMF Set ID, and an AMF Pointer.
[0029] In one example, when the NG-RAN is a gNB connected to 5GC, the first RRC message may be an RRC Setup Request message, an RRC Reestablishment Request message, or an RRC Resume Request message.
[0030] In one example, when the NG-RAN is an NG-RAN connected to 5GC, the first RRC message may be an RRC Connection Request message, an RRC Connection Reestablishment Request message, or an RRC Connection Resume Request message.
[0031] 2. Upon receiving the first RRC message, the NG-RAN sends a first NGAP message to the registered AMF (e.g., the AMF identified by the registered PLMN identifier + the AMF identifier received from the UE), requesting the AMF to send the UE's AS security context to the NG-RAN.
[0032] If the NG-RAN is not reachable to the AMF received for the UE as the registered AMF, the NG-RAN may select an arbitrary AMF and send the first NGAP message.
[0033] In one example, the first NGAP message may be an Initial UE message or a known NGAP message or a new NGAP message.
[0034] 3. According to the value of registered PLMN identifier+AMF identifier received in the first NGAP message, AMF1 sends a UE security context request message to AMF2 to fetch the 5G AS security context. The UE security context request message includes the 5G S-TMSI received in message number 2. AMF2 is selected by AMF1 based on the content of the 5G S-TMSI or the registered AMF identifier and the registered PLMN identifier. This message can be Namf_Communication_UEContextTransfer, or Nudsf_Unstructured Data Management_Query, or a new message.
[0035] 4. AMF2 sends a UE security context response message to AMF1. The UE security context response message includes the 5G AS security context. This message can be a response to Namf_Communication_UEContextTransfer, or a response to Nudsf_Unstructured Data Management_Query, or a new message.
[0036] 5. When AMF1 receives the UE security context response message including the 5G-S-TMSI, it identifies the UE security context in AMF2 corresponding to the UE temporary identifier (e.g., 5G-S-TMSI). Or, AMF1 obtains the 5G AS security context by receiving message number 4.
[0037] The AMF1 sends a second NGAP message to the NG-RAN, which includes the UE's 5G AS security context.
[0038] In one example, the second NGAP message may be an Initial Context Setup message or a known NGAP message.
[0039] 6. The NG-RAN stores the 5G AS security context of the UE.
[0040] 7. The NG-RAN sends the 5G AS security context and radio bearer configuration for SRB1 to the UE in a second RRC message. The second RRC message is sent in one of the following ways: i) The second RRC message is transmitted encrypted. The 5G AS security context is not encrypted. ii) The second RRC message is sent unciphered.
[0041] In one example, when the NG-RAN is a gNB connected to 5GC, the second RRC message may be an RRC Setup message, an RRC Reestablishment message, or an RRC Resume message.
[0042] In one example, when the NG-RAN is an ng-eNB connected to 5GC, the second RRC message may be an RRC Connection Setup message, an RRC Connection Reestablishment message, or an RRC Connection Resume message.
[0043] 8. When the UE receives the second RRC message, the UE stores the 5G AS security context.
[0044] 9. The UE sends a third RRC message, the information elements in the third RRC message being encrypted.
[0045] The RRC layer of the UE may inform higher layers that the third RRC message of solution 1 is AS security enabled. With this indication, the higher layers of the UE may construct a NAS message with parameters that need to be protected. For example, the NAS message of the third RRC message may include SUPI, (S-)NSSAI, MSISDN, or IMEISV.
[0046] In one example, the UE encrypts the third RRC message using 5G AS security.
[0047] In one example, the UE encrypts only sensitive information elements (eg, S-NSSAI and other IEs).
[0048] In one example, if the NG-RAN is a gNB connected to 5GC, the third RRC message may be an RRC Setup Complete message, an RRC Reestablishment Complete message, or an RRC Resume Complete message.
[0049] In one example, when the NG-RAN is an ng-eNB connected to a 5GC, the third RRC message may be an RRC Connection Setup Complete message, an RRC Connection Reestablishment Complete message, or an RRC Connection Resume Complete message.
[0050] 10. The NG-RAN uses the stored 5G AS security context to decrypt the IE. After the IE is decrypted, the NG-RAN acts according to the decrypted IE and the current status of the NG-RAN.
[0051] When the RRC connection is released, the UE and the NG-RAN delete the 5G AS security context, i.e., the UE and the NG-RAN do not use the stored security context.
[0052] 11. NG-RAN sends a third NGAP message to AMF1.
[0053] In one example, the third NGAP message may be an Initial Context Setup message or a known NGAP message.
[0054] If a new RRC connection establishment procedure is initiated, the UE and the network follow steps 1 to 11.
[0055] In one example, the UE and the NG-RAN maintain a 5G AS security context, which the UE and the NG-RAN use to encrypt and decrypt RRC messages during subsequent RRC establishment procedures.
[0056] In one example, the 5G AS security context may include at least one of the following elements: AS level with their identifiers, Next Hop parameter (NH), Next Hop Chaining Counter parameter (NCC) used for next hop access key derivation, identifiers of selected AS level cryptographic algorithms, network side UP Security Policy and counters used for replay protection.
[0057] In one example, the 5G NAS security context may include at least one of a key KAMF with an associated keyset identifier, UE security capabilities, or uplink and downlink NAS COUNT values.
[0058] In one example, if the UE has a valid 5G-GUTI, the NAS layer always provides the 5G-GUTI to the AS layer, which uses the 5G-GUTI to derive the 5G-S-TMSI and the registered AMF identifier.
[0059] Alternatively, in one example, the NG-RAN may broadcast an AMF list including one or more AMF identifiers and indicating a list of AMFs to which the NG-RAN should or may transmit the first NGAP message. In this case, the UE may receive the broadcasted AMF list, set one or more AMF identifiers in the AMF list to the first RRC message, and transmit the first RRC message to the NG-RAN. The NG-RAN transmits the first NGAP message to the AMF indicated by the one AMF identifier included in the first RRC message. In this example, the above-mentioned step 0 may not be required. In other words, in this example, the AMF identifier may not identify the registered AMF.
[0060] Here, the AMF list may be broadcast by Minimum SI (System Information). Minimum SI includes at least one of MIB (Master Information Block) and SIB1 (System Information Block type 1). Alternatively or in addition to this, the AMF list may be broadcast by other SI (e.g., SIB2, SIB3, SIB4, ... SIB9). Therefore, the AMF list may be broadcast in response to a request from the UE.
[0061] Second aspect (Solution 2 to solve the problem statement): The second aspect involves fetching the AS security parameters from the core network by the NG-RAN and using it to decrypt the encrypted Access Stratum Information Element.
[0062] FIG. 2 shows the signaling flow of solution 2. To execute solution 2, the UE needs to know the NG-RAN capability to support the procedures of solution 2. This can be achieved in two ways: - The NG-RAN broadcasts its capabilities via BCCH. The NG-RAN broadcasts information indicating support for AS security as described in solution 2. - The NG-RAN indicates its capabilities via the PRACH in a PRACH response message. Before step 1 is performed, the NG-RAN sends information indicating support for AS security as described in solution 2 in response to the PRACH preamble message from the UE.
[0063] The detailed steps of Solution 2 are given below. 0. The UE successfully performs the registration procedure for normal service to the network. The UE and the network establish a 5G Non-Access Stratum (NAS). The network optionally establishes a 5G Access Stratum security context.
[0064] A UE in 1.5GMM IDLE state initiates a NAS signaling connection establishment procedure. As part of the NAS signaling connection procedure, the UE initiates the establishment of an AS signaling connection by sending an unencrypted first RRC message that includes a UE temporary identifier.
[0065] In one example, the UE temporary identifier may be a 5G-S-TMSI.
[0066] In one example, when the NG-RAN is a gNB connected to 5GC, the first RRC message may be an RRC Setup Request message, an RRC Reestablishment Request message, or an RRC Resume Request message.
[0067] In one example, when the NG-RAN is an ng-eNB connected to 5GC, the first RRC message may be an RRC Connection Request message, an RRC Connection Reestablishment Request message, or an RRC Connection Resume Request message.
[0068] 2. The NG-RAN sends a second RRC message to the UE including a radio bearer setup for SRB1.
[0069] In one example, when the NG-RAN is a gNB connected to 5GC, the second RRC message may be an RRC Setup message, an RRC Reestablishment message, or an RRC Resume message.
[0070] In one example, when the NG-RAN is an ng-eNB connected to 5GC, the second RRC message may be an RRC Connection Setup message, an RRC Connection Reestablishment message, or an RRC Connection Resume message.
[0071] 3. The UE sends a third RRC message in response to the second RRC message. The third RRC message does not include a sensitive IE (e.g., S-NSSAI). The third RRC message includes a UE temporary identifier or an AMF identifier of the registered AMF. The inclusion of the UE temporary identifier, AMF identifier, or RRC establishment cause may be interpreted by the NG-RAN as needing to contact the AMF to obtain the AS security context.
[0072] In one example, the UE temporary identifier may be 5G-S-TMSI. The AMF identifier may include at least one of a registered PLMN identifier (MCC and MNC) or an AMF identifier. The AMF identifier may be an AMF Region ID, an AMF Set ID, and an AMF Pointer.
[0073] In one example, if the NG-RAN is a gNB connected to 5GC, the third RRC message may be an RRC Setup Complete message, an RRC Reestablishment Complete message, or an RRC Resume Complete message.
[0074] In one example, when the NG-RAN is an ng-eNB connected to 5GC, the third RRC message may be an RRC Connection Setup Complete message, an RRC Connection Reestablishment Complete message, or an RRC Connection Resume Complete message.
[0075] 4. Upon receiving the third RRC message, the NG-RAN sends a first NGAP message to the registered AMF, requesting the AMF to send the UE's AS security context to the NG-RAN.
[0076] If the NG-RAN is not reachable to the AMF received for the UE as the registered AMF, the NG-RAN may select an arbitrary AMF and send the first NGAP message.
[0077] In one example, the first NGAP message may be an Initial UE message or a known NGAP message.
[0078] 5. Depending on the value of the 5G S-TMSI received in the first NGAP message, the AMF1 may send a UE security context request message to the AMF2 to fetch the 5G AS security context. The UE security context request message includes the 5G S-TMSI received in message number 2. The AMF2 is selected by the AMF1 based on the 5G S-TMSI or the content of the registered AMF identifier and the registered PLMN. This message can be Namf_Communication_UEContextTransfer or Nudsf_Unstructured Data Management_Query.
[0079] 6. AMF2 sends a UE security context response message to AMF1. The UE security context response message includes the 5G AS security context. This message may be a response to Namf_Communication_UEContextTransfer or a response to Nudsf_Unstructured Data Management_Query.
[0080] 7. When AMF1 receives the UE security context response message including the 5G-S-TMSI, it identifies the UE security context in AMF2 corresponding to the UE temporary identifier (e.g., 5G-S-TMSI). Or, AMF1 obtains the 5G AS security context by receiving message number 6. The AMF1 sends a second NGAP message to the NG-RAN, which includes the UE's 5G AS security context.
[0081] In one example, the second NGAP message may be an Initial Context Setup message or a known NGAP message.
[0082] 8. The NG-RAN stores the UE's 5G AS security context.
[0083] 9. The NG-RAN sends a fourth RRC message to the UE including the 5G AS security context.
[0084] 10. The UE stores the 5G AS security context.
[0085] The RRC layer of the UE may inform higher layers that the third RRC message of solution 2 is AS security enabled. With this indication, the higher layers of the UE may construct a NAS message with parameters that need to be protected. For example, the NAS message of the third RRC message may include SUPI, (S-)NSSAI, MSISDN, or IMEISV.
[0086] 11. The UE sends a third RRC message to the NG-RAN. The UE performs one of the following steps: i) Encrypt the fifth RRC message and send it to the NG-RAN. ii) Encrypt only the sensitive IEs (eg, S-NSSAI) and send the encrypted sensitive IEs in the fifth RRC message.
[0087] 12. Upon receiving the fifth RRC message, the NG-RAN performs one of the following steps: i) If the RRC message is encrypted, decrypt the fifth RRC message and obtain the sensitive IEs. ii) If the sensitive IE is encrypted, decrypt the encrypted IE.
[0088] 13. NG-RAN sends a third NGAP message to AMF1.
[0089] In one example, the third NGAP message may be an Initial Context Setup message or a known NGAP message.
[0090] When the UE enters the 5GMM-IDLE state, i.e., when the RRC connection is released, the UE and NG-RAN remove the 5G AS security.
[0091] If a new RRC connection establishment procedure is initiated, the UE and the network follow steps 1 to 13.
[0092] In one example, the UE and the NG-RAN maintain a 5G AS security context, which the UE and the NG-RAN use to encrypt and decrypt RRC messages during subsequent RRC establishment procedures.
[0093] The fourth RRC message is a SECURITY MODE COMMAND message, or an existing RRC message, or a new RRC message. The fifth RRC message is a SECURITY MODE COMPLETE message, or an existing RRC message, or a new RRC message.
[0094] In one example, the 5G AS security context may include at least one of the following elements: AS level with their identifiers, Next Hop parameter (NH), Next Hop Chaining Counter parameter (NCC) used for next hop access key derivation, identifiers of selected AS level cryptographic algorithms, network side UP Security Policy and counters used for replay protection.
[0095] In one example, the 5G NAS security context may include at least one of a key KAMF with an associated keyset identifier, UE security capabilities, or uplink and downlink NAS COUNT values.
[0096] In one example, if the UE has a valid 5G-GUTI, the NAS layer always provides the 5G-GUTI to the AS layer, which uses the 5G-GUTI to derive the 5G-S-TMSI and the registered AMF identifier.
[0097] Alternatively, in one example, the NG-RAN may broadcast or transmit an AMF list including one or more AMF identifiers and indicating a list of AMFs to which the NG-RAN should or may transmit the first NGAP message by dedicated signaling. In this case, the UE may receive the AMF list, set one or more AMF identifiers in the AMF list to a third RRC message, and transmit the third RRC message to the NG-RAN. The NG-RAN transmits the first NGAP message to the AMF indicated by the one AMF identifier included in the third RRC message. In this example, the above-mentioned step 0 may not be required. In other words, in this example, the AMF identifier may not identify a registered AMF.
[0098] Here, the AMF list may be broadcast by Minimum SI (System Information). Minimum SI includes at least one of MIB (Master Information Block) and SIB1 (System Information Block type 1). Alternatively or in addition to this, the AMF list may be broadcast by other SI (e.g., SIB2, SIB3, SIB4, ... SIB9). Therefore, the AMF list may be broadcast in response to a request from the UE.
[0099] Third aspect (Solution 3 to solve the problem statement): In a third aspect, the core network provides the AS security context to the UE, and the NG-RAN fetches the security context from the core network during the RRC connection establishment procedure.
[0100] FIG. 3 shows the signaling flow of solution 3. To execute solution 3, the UE needs to know the NG-RAN capability to support the procedures of solution 3. This can be achieved in two ways: - NG-RAN broadcasts its capabilities via BCCH. NG-RAN broadcasts information indicating support for AS security as described in solution 3. - The NG-RAN indicates its capabilities via the PRACH in a PRACH response message. Before step 2 is performed, the NG-RAN sends information indicating support for AS security as described in solution 3 in response to the PRACH preamble message from the UE.
[0101] The detailed steps of Solution 3 are given below. 0. The UE successfully performs a registration procedure for normal service to the network. The UE and the network establish a 5G Non-Access Stratum (NAS) security context and a 5G Access Stratum security context. The UE and the network establish a 5G Non-Access Stratum (NAS) AS security context. The network provides the UE with an AS security context during the registration procedure.
[0102] The 5G AS security context is provided to the UE in one of the following NAS messages: i) in the registration accept message; ii) In the Security Mode Command message; iii) in an existing NAS message; or iv) In a new NAS message.
[0103] 1. The UE stores the 5G AS security context.
[0104] A UE in 2.5GMM IDLE state initiates a NAS signaling connection establishment procedure. The UE initiates the establishment of an AS signaling connection by sending an unencrypted first RRC message containing a UE temporary identifier or an AMF identifier of a registered AMF. The inclusion of the UE temporary identifier, AMF identifier, or RRC establishment cause may be interpreted by the NG-RAN as needing to contact the AMF to obtain the AS security context.
[0105] In one example, the UE temporary identifier consists of the 5G-S-TMSI.
[0106] 3. Upon receiving the first RRC message, the NG-RAN sends a first NGAP message including the UE temporary identifier 5G-S-TMSI to the registered AMF of the UE, requesting the AMF to send the AS security context of the UE to the NG-RAN. The AMF identifies the registered AMF of the UE using the AMF identifier received in the first RRC message.
[0107] If the NG-RAN is not reachable to the AMF received for the UE as the registered AMF, the NG-RAN may select any AMF (e.g., a default AMF) and send the first NGAP message.
[0108] In one example, the first NGAP message may be an Initial UE message or a known NGAP message or a new NGAP message.
[0109] 4. Depending on the received 5G S-TMSI or the registered AMF identifier and the registered PLMN value in the first NGAP message, AMF1 may send a UE security context request message to AMF2 to fetch the 5G AS security context. The UE security context request message includes the 5G S-TMSI received in message number 3. AMF2 selects AMF1 based on the content of the 5G S-TMSI or the registered PLMN and the registered AMF identifier. This message can be Namf_Communication_UEContextTransfer or Nudsf_Unstructured Data Management_Query or a new message.
[0110] 5. AMF2 sends a UE security context response message to AMF1. The UE security context response message includes the 5G AS security context. This message may be a response to Namf_Communication_UEContextTransfer, a response to Nudsf_Unstructured Data Management_Query, or a new message.
[0111] 6. When AMF1 receives the UE security context response message including the 5G-S-TMSI, it identifies the UE security context in AMF2 corresponding to the UE temporary identifier (e.g., 5G-S-TMSI). Or, AMF1 obtains the 5G AS security context by receiving message number 5.
[0112] The AMF1 sends a second NGAP message to the NG-RAN, which includes the UE's 5G AS security context.
[0113] In one example, the second NGAP message may be an Initial Context Setup message or a known NGAP message.
[0114] 7. The NG-RAN stores the UE's 5G AS security context.
[0115] 8. The NG-RAN sends a second RRC message including the radio bearer setup for SIB1.
[0116] 9. Upon receiving the second RRC message, the UE performs one of the following steps: i) In step 1, encrypt a third RRC message including a sensitive IE (S-NSSAI) or a non-sensitive IE (non-sensitive IE) using the stored 5G AS security context. ii) In step 1, only sensitive IEs (e.g., S-NSSAI) are encrypted using the stored 5G AS security context.
[0117] 10. The UE sends a third RRC message to the NG-RAN. The information elements in the third RRC message are encrypted as described in step 9.
[0118] 11. Upon receiving the third RRC message, the NG-RAN performs one of the following steps: i) If the third RRC message is encrypted, decrypt the third RRC message and obtain the sensitive IEs. ii) If only sensitive IEs are encrypted, decrypt the encrypted IEs of the third RRC message.
[0119] 12. NG-RAN sends a third NGAP message to AMF1.
[0120] In one example, the third NGAP message may be an Initial Context Setup message or a known NGAP message or a new NGAP message.
[0121] When the UE enters 5GMM IDLE mode, i.e., the RRC connection is released, the NG-RAN removes the 5G AS security and retains the 5G AS security context.
[0122] The UE and the network follow steps 2 to 12 when a new RRC connection establishment procedure is initiated.
[0123] In one example, the UE and the NG-RAN maintain a 5G AS security context, which the UE and the NG-RAN use to encrypt and decrypt RRC messages during subsequent RRC establishment procedures.
[0124] When the NG-RAN is an ng-eNB connected to 5GC, the first RRC message is an RRC Connection Request message, the second RRC message is an RRC Connection setup message, and the third RRC message is an RRC Connection setup complete message.
[0125] In one example, the 5G AS security context consists of at least one of the following elements: AS level with their identifiers, Next Hop parameter (NH), Next Hop Chaining Counter parameter (NCC) used for next hop access key derivation, identifiers of selected AS level cryptographic algorithms, network side UP Security Policy and counters used for replay protection.
[0126] In one example, the 5G NAS security context is configured with at least one of a key KAMF with an associated keyset identifier, UE security capabilities, or uplink and downlink NAS COUNT values.
[0127] In one example, if the UE has a valid 5G-GUTI, the NAS layer always provides the 5G-GUTI to the AS layer, which uses the 5G-GUTI to derive the 5G-S-TMSI and the registered AMF identifier.
[0128] Fourth aspect (Solution 4 to solve the problem statement): In a fourth aspect, the 5GC provides the AS security context to the UE, and the NG-RAN sends the encrypted RRC IE or RRC message to the AMF to decrypt the encrypted RRC IE or RRC message.
[0129] FIG. 4 shows the signaling flow of solution 4. To execute solution 4, the UE needs to know the NG-RAN capability to support the procedures of solution 4. This can be achieved in two ways: - NG-RAN broadcasts its capabilities via BCCH. NG-RAN broadcasts information indicating support for AS security as described in solution 4. - The NG-RAN indicates its capabilities via the PRACH in a PRACH response message. Before step 2 is performed, the NG-RAN sends information indicating support for AS security as described in solution 4 in response to the PRACH preamble message from the UE. - NG-RAN will demonstrate its capabilities in step 3.
[0130] Detailed steps of Solution 4 are shown below. 0. The UE successfully performs a registration procedure for normal service to the network. The UE and the network establish a 5G Non-Access Stratum (NAS) security context during the registration procedure. The network provides the UE with an AS security context during the registration procedure.
[0131] The 5G AS security context is provided to the UE in one of the following NAS messages: i) in the registration accept message; ii) In the Security Mode Command message; iii) in an existing NAS message; or iv) In a new NAS message.
[0132] 1. The UE stores the 5G AS security context. A UE in 2.5GMM-IDLE state initiates a NAS signaling connection establishment procedure. As part of the NAS signaling connection procedure, the UE initiates the establishment of an AS signaling connection by sending an unencrypted first RRC message that includes a UE temporary identifier.
[0133] In one example, the UE temporary identifier consists of the 5G-S-TMSI.
[0134] 3. Upon receiving the first RRC message, the NG-RAN sends a second RRC message including the radio bearer configuration for SIB1.
[0135] 4. Upon receiving the second RRC message, the UE performs one of the following steps: i) Encrypt a third RRC message that includes a sensitive IE (e.g., (S-NSSAI) or other IE) using the 5G AS security context. ii) Encrypt only sensitive IEs (e.g., S-NSSAI) using the 5G AS security context.
[0136] In one example, the NG-RAN also includes the 5G-S-TMSI in the second NGAP message.
[0137] 5. The UE sends a third RRC message to the network, the third RRC message including at least one of the encrypted sensitive IE (eg, S-NSSAI), the NAS PDU, and the non-sensitive IE.
[0138] 6. Upon receiving the third RRC message, the NG-RAN performs one of the following steps: i) Send a first NGAP message to AMF1, including the 5G-S-TMSI and the third message received in step 5. ii) Send a first NGAP message to AMF1, including 5G-S-TMSI and the encrypted IE received in the third RRC message.
[0139] 7. Depending on the value of the received 5G-S-TMSI in the first NGAP message, AMF1 sends a UE security context request message to AMF2 to fetch the 5G AS security context. The UE security context request message includes the 5G S-TMSI received in message number 2. AMF2 is selected by AMF1 based on the content of the 5G S-TMSI or the registered AMF identifier and the registered PLMN. This message can be Namf_Communication_UEContextTransfer or Nudsf_Unstructured Data Management_Query or a new message.
[0140] 8. AMF2 sends a UE security context response message to AMF1. The UE security context response message includes the 5G AS security context. This message can be a response to Namf_Communication_UEContextTransfer, or a response to Nudsf_Unstructured Data Management_Query, or a new message.
[0141] 9. When AMF1 receives the UE security context response message including the 5G-S-TMSI, it identifies the UE security context in AMF2 corresponding to the UE temporary identifier (e.g., 5G-S-TMSI). Or, AMF1 obtains the 5G AS security context by receiving message number 8.
[0142] AMF1 performs one of the following steps: i) Decrypt the encrypted portion of the first NGAP message. ii) Decode the third RRC message.
[0143] 10. AMF1 sends the second NGAP message having the decoded portion of the first NGAP message or the decoded third RRC message to the NG-RAN.
[0144] In one example, the second NGAP message may be an Initial Context Setup message or a known NGAP message or a new NGAP message.
[0145] 11. The NG-RAN stores the 5G AS security context of the UE. The NG-RAN uses the decrypted IE to perform NG-RAN procedures, e.g., network slice overload control, as specified in the 3GPP specifications.
[0146] When the UE enters 5GMM IDLE mode, i.e. the RRC connection is released, the NG-RAN removes the 5G AS security and the UE retains the 5G AS security context.
[0147] If a new RRC connection establishment procedure is initiated, the UE and the network follow steps 2 to 11.
[0148] When the NG-RAN is an ng-eNB connected to 5GC, the first RRC message is an RRC Connection Request message or an RRC Connection Reestablishment Request message or an RRC Resume Request message, the second RRC message is an RRC Connection setup message or an RRC Connection Reestablishment, and the third RRC message is an RRC Connection setup complete message or an RRC Connection Reestablishment complete message.
[0149] When the NG-RAN is a gNB connected to 5GC, the first RRC message is an RRC SETUP REQUEST or an RRC Reestabishment Request, the second RRC message is an RRC SETUP or an RRC Reestablishment message, and the third RRC message is an RRC SETUP COMPLETE message or an RRC reestablishment complete message.
[0150] In one example, the 5G AS security context consists of at least one of the following elements: AS level with their identifiers, Next Hop parameter (NH), Next Hop Chaining Counter parameter (NCC) used for next hop access key derivation, identifiers of selected AS level cryptographic algorithms, network side UP Security Policy and counters used for replay protection.
[0151] In one example, the 5G NAS security context consists of at least one of a key KAMF with an associated keyset identifier, UE security capabilities, or uplink and downlink NAS COUNT values.
[0152] In one example, if the UE has a valid 5G-GUTI, the NAS layer always provides the 5G-GUTI to the AS layer, which uses the 5G-GUTI to derive the 5G-S-TMSI and the registered AMF identifier.
[0153] Fifth aspect (Solution 5 to solve the problem statement): In a fifth aspect, the core network provides the AS security context to the UE and the NG-RAN during the registration procedure. FIG. 5 shows the signaling flow of solution 5.
[0154] The detailed steps of Solution 5 are given below. 0. The UE successfully performs the registration procedure for normal services to the network. The UE and the network establish a 5G Non-Access Stratum (NAS) security context. The network provides the AS security context to the UE and the NG-RAN during the registration procedure.
[0155] The 5G AS security context is provided to the UE in one of the following NAS messages: i) in the registration accept message; ii) In the Security Mode Command message; iii) in an existing NAS message; or iv) In a new NAS message.
[0156] The 5G-AS security context is provided to the NG-RAN in one of the following NAS messages: i) an existing NGAP message; or ii) New NGAP messages.
[0157] 1a. The UE stores the 5G AS security context. 1b. The NG-RAN stores the 5G AS security context.
[0158] A UE in 2.5GMM IDLE state initiates a NAS signaling connection establishment procedure. As part of the NAS signaling connection procedure, the UE initiates the establishment of an AS signaling connection by sending an unencrypted first RRC message that includes a UE temporary identifier.
[0159] In one example, the UE temporary identifier consists of the 5G-S-TMSI.
[0160] 3. Upon receiving the first RRC message, the NG-RAN sends a second RRC message including the radio bearer configuration for SIB1.
[0161] 4. Upon receiving the second RRC message, the UE performs one of the following steps: i) Encrypt a third RRC message including an IE (S-NSSAI or other IE) using the 5G AS security context stored in step 1a. ii) Encrypt only sensitive IEs (e.g., S-NSSAI) using the 5G AS security key stored in step 1a.
[0162] 5. The UE sends a third RRC message to the NG-RAN.
[0163] 6. Upon receiving the third RRC message, the NG-RAN performs one of the following steps: i) If the RRC message is encrypted, decrypt the third RRC message using the 5G AS security context stored in step 1b. ii) Decrypting the encrypted IEs in the third RRC message using the 5G AS security context stored in step 1b.
[0164] The NG-RAN uses the decoded IE to perform NG-RAN procedures, e.g., network slice overload control, as specified in the 3GPP specifications.
[0165] When the RRC connection is released, the UE and NG-RAN maintain the UE 5G AS security context.
[0166] When the NG-RAN is an ng-eNB connected to 5GC, the first RRC message is an RRC Connection Request message, an RRC Reestablishment Request message, or an RRC Resume message, the second RRC message is an RRC Connection setup message, an RRC Reestablishment message, or an RRC Resume message, and the third RRC message is an RRC Connection setup complete message, an RRC Reestablishment Complete message, or an RRC Resume Complete message.
[0167] When the NG-RAN is a gNB connected to 5GC, the first RRC message is an RRC SETUP REQUEST message, an RRC Reestablishment Request message, or an RRC Resume Request message, the second RRC message is an RRC SETUP message, an RRC Reestablishment message, or an RRC Resume message, and the third RRC message is an RRC SETUP COMPLETE message, an RRC Resume Complete message, or an RRC Reestablishment Complete message.
[0168] In one example, the 5G AS security context consists of at least one of the following elements: AS level with their identifiers, Next Hop parameter (NH), Next Hop Chaining Counter parameter (NCC) used for next hop access key derivation, identifiers of selected AS level cryptographic algorithms, network side UP Security Policy and counters used for replay protection.
[0169] In one example, the 5G NAS security context consists of at least one of a key KAMF with an associated keyset identifier, UE security capabilities, or uplink and downlink NAS COUNT values.
[0170] In one example, if the UE has a valid 5G-GUTI, the NAS layer always provides the 5G-GUTI to the AS layer, which uses the 5G-GUTI to derive the 5G-TMSI and the registered AMF identifier.
[0171] Sixth aspect (Solution 6 to solve the problem statement): 1) In the case of solutions 1 to 5, if the current cell where the UE is camped belongs to a registration area other than the last registration area, the NG-RAN sends 5G-GUTI (5G-S-TMSI and AMF identifier) to the default AMF or any AMF serving the current cell (e.g., the default AMF) and requests the default AMF or any AMF to fetch the 5G AS security context from the registered AMF. In addition to the 5G AS security context, the NG-RAN may also request to fetch additional context of the UE (e.g., access and mobility related parameters, NAS security parameters, ESM parameters).
[0172] 2) The default AMF identifies the registered AMF based on the 5G-GUTI, sends a message including the 5G-GUTI to the registered AMF, and requests the AMF to send the UE 5G AS security context and, optionally, other parameters mentioned in step 1).
[0173] 3) The registered AMF identifies the UE context using 5G-GUTI and sends the 5G AS security context and, optionally, other UE parameters in a message to the default AMF.
[0174] 4) After obtaining the UE 5G AS security context, the default AMF sends it to the UE or NG-RAN according to the procedures defined in Solutions 1 to 5.
[0175] In Solutions 1 to 5, in one example, the UE may use the 5G NAS security context (e.g., if the UE only has a 5G NAS security context) to encrypt an RRC message that includes a sensitive IE (e.g., the third RRC message in all Solutions 1 to 5) or the sensitive IE itself in the RRC message (e.g., the third RRC message in all Solutions 1 to 5).
[0176] In solutions 1 to 5, the 5G AS security context consists of at least a home network public key, a home network public key identifier, and a protection scheme identifier, i.e., parameters used to calculate a SUCI from a SUPI.
[0177] The registered AMF identifier is the AMF identifier of the latest AMF for which the UE has successfully performed the registration procedure.
[0178] The registered PLMN is the most recent PLMN with which the UE has successfully performed the registration procedure.
[0179] In one example, Solutions 1-5 override operator policies that prohibit the UE from sending sensitive information (e.g., S-NSSAI) without security protection (e.g., without integrity or encryption). That is, if an operator policy specifies not to send sensitive information during RRC connection establishment or not to send sensitive information without security protection, and the UE and network support Solutions 1-5, the UE and network follow Solutions 1-5 and ignore the operator policy sent to the network.
[0180] In one example, if the network and the UE support any one of solutions 1 to 6, the network does not send an operator policy to the NG-RAN during the RRC connection establishment procedure requesting the UE not to send sensitive IEs.
[0181] In all the above solutions 1 to 6, the UE optionally sends its capabilities or 5G NAS security context to the NG-RAN and two AMFs during the NAS procedure (e.g., during the registration procedure) or during the RRC procedure (e.g., during the RRC connection establishment procedure) to support AS level security protection using the 5G AS security context. In one example, the UE sends the following capabilities to the NG-RAN or the AMF separately: i) The UE uses the 5G AS security context to support security protection for sensitive information during RRC connection establishment. ii) The UE uses the 5G NAS security context to support security protection for sensitive information during RRC connection establishment. iii) The UE supports security protection for sensitive information during RRC connection establishment using at least a home network public key, a home network public key identifier and a protection scheme identifier.
[0182] In one example, in all solutions 1 to 5, encryption means ciphering.
[0183] In all solutions 1 to 5, sensitive information elements refer to user information or UE capabilities that are to be protected from unauthorized disclosure. Access to sensitive information should be protected. Protection of sensitive information may be necessary for legal or ethical reasons, issues related to personal privacy, or proprietary considerations. Examples of this are information related to the user permanent identity (e.g. SUPI) or the service the user is accessing (e.g. S-NSSAI).
[0184] Other Aspects In this disclosure, a user equipment (or "UE", "mobile station", "mobile device" or "wireless device") is an entity that is connected to a network via a radio interface.
[0185] It should be noted that the UE in this specification is not limited to a dedicated communication device, but can apply to any device having communication capabilities as a UE as described in this specification, as described in the following paragraphs.
[0186] The terms "user equipment" or "UE" (as the term is used by 3GPP), "mobile station", "mobile device", and "wireless device" are generally intended to be synonymous with each other and may include standalone mobile stations such as terminals, mobile phones, smartphones, tablets, cellular IoT terminals, IoT devices, machines, etc.
[0187] It will be understood that the terms "UE" and "wireless device" also encompass devices that remain stationary for extended periods of time.
[0188] The UE may be, for example, production or manufacturing equipment and / or items of energy related machinery (including, by way of example only, boilers, engines, turbines, solar panels, wind turbines, hydroelectric generators, thermal generators, nuclear generators, batteries, nuclear systems, nuclear related equipment, heavy electrical equipment, pumps including vacuum pumps, compressors, fans, blowers, hydraulic equipment, pneumatic equipment, metal processing machinery, manipulators, robots, robot application systems, tools, dies, rolls, conveying equipment, lifting equipment, cargo handling equipment, textile machinery, sewing machinery, printing presses, printing related machinery, paper converting machinery, chemical machinery, mining machinery, mining related machinery, construction machinery, construction related machinery, agricultural machinery and / or implements, forestry machinery and / or implements, fishing machinery and / or implements, safety and / or environmental protection equipment, tractors, bearings, precision bearings, chains, cogwheels, power transmissions, lubrication equipment, valves, fittings, and / or application systems of any of the equipment or machinery mentioned above).
[0189] A UE may be, for example, an item of transportation equipment (by way of example only, a vehicle, automobile, motorcycle, bicycle, train, bus, cart, rickshaw, ship and other watercraft, airplane, rocket, satellite, drone, balloon, etc.).
[0190] A UE may be, for example, an item of information and communication equipment (eg, electronic computers and related equipment, communications equipment and related equipment, electronic components, etc.).
[0191] The UE may be, for example, a refrigerator, a refrigerator application product and device, commercial and service equipment, a vending machine, an automatic service machine, an office machine and device, or a consumer electric or electronic machine (e.g., audio equipment, a speaker, a radio, a video equipment, a television, an oven range, a rice cooker, a coffee maker, a dishwasher, a washing machine, a dryer, an electric fan, a ventilation fan and related products, a vacuum cleaner, etc.).
[0192] The UE may be, for example, an electronic application system or device (eg, an x-ray device, a particle accelerator device, a radioactive material application device, a sonic application device, an electromagnetic application device, a power application device, etc.).
[0193] The UE may be, for example, a light bulb, a light, a measuring machine, an analytical instrument, a testing machine and a measuring machine (some examples include smoke alarms, occupancy alarm sensors, motion sensors, radio tags, etc.), a watch or clock, a scientific instrument, an optical instrument, a medical instrument and / or a medical system, a weapon, a sharp object, or a hand tool.
[0194] The UE may be, for example, a personal digital assistant or device with wireless communication capabilities (e.g., an electronic device (e.g., a personal computer, electronic measuring instrument, etc.) configured to accommodate or accept a wireless card, wireless module, etc.).
[0195] The UE may be, or may be part of, a device that provides the following applications, services, and solutions in the Internet of Things (IoT) using wired and / or wireless communication technologies:
[0196] Internet of Things devices (or Things) are equipped with appropriate electronics, software, sensors, network connections, etc. that enable the devices to collect and exchange data with each other and with other communicating devices. IoT devices may be automated devices that follow stored software instructions in their internal memory. IoT devices may operate without the need for human supervision or attention. IoT devices may be stationary devices and / or may remain inactive for long periods of time. IoT devices may be implemented as part of (typically) stationary devices. IoT devices may be embedded in non-stationary devices (such as vehicles) or attached to animals or people being monitored / tracked.
[0197] It will be appreciated that IoT technologies may be implemented in any communication device that can connect to a communication network to transmit and receive data, regardless of whether such communication device is controlled by human input or by software instructions stored in a memory.
[0198] It will be appreciated that an IoT device may also be referred to as a Machine Type Communication (MTC) device, or a Machine to Machine (M2M) communication device, or a Narrowband-IoT UE (NB-IoT UE). It will be appreciated that a UE may support one or more IoT or MTC applications. Some examples of MTC applications are listed in the following table (Source: 3GPP TS 22.368 V14.0.1 (2017-08) Annex B, the contents of which are incorporated herein by reference). This list is not exhaustive but is intended to provide example machine type communication applications. [Table 1]
[0199] The applications, services, and solutions may be MVNO (Mobile Virtual Network Operator) services, emergency wireless communication systems, PBX (Private Branch eXchange) systems, PHS / digital cordless telecommunications systems, POS (Point of sale) systems, advertised calling systems, MBMS (Multimedia Broadcast and Multicast Service), V2X (Vehicle to Everything) systems, train radio systems, location-related services, disaster / emergency wireless communication services, community services, video streaming services, femtocell application services, VoLTE (Voice over LTE) services, charging services, radio on-demand services, roaming services, activity monitoring services, telecommunications carrier / communication network selection services, function restriction services, PoC (Proof of Concept) services, personal information management services, ad hoc networks / DTN (Delay Tolerant Networking) services, etc.
[0200] Furthermore, the above UE categories are merely examples of applications of the technical ideas and exemplary aspects described in this document. Needless to say, these technical ideas and aspects are not limited to the above UEs and may be modified in various ways.
[0201] User Equipment (UE) Figure 6 is a block diagram illustrating the main components of a UE. As shown, the UE 10 includes transceiver circuitry 11 operable to transmit signals to and receive signals from connected nodes via one or more antennas 12. Although not necessarily shown in Figure 6, the UE 10 of course has all the usual functionality of a conventional mobile device (such as a user interface 13), which may be provided by any one or any combination of hardware, software, and firmware, as appropriate. The software may be pre-installed in memory or downloaded over a telecommunications network or, for example, from a removable data storage device (RMD).
[0202] The controller 14 controls the operation of the UE 10 according to software stored in the memory 15. For example, the controller 14 may be realized by a central processing unit (CPU). The software includes, among other things, an operating system 16 and a communication control module 17 having at least a transceiver control module 18. The communication control module 17 (with its transceiver control submodule) is responsible for signaling and processing (generating / sending / receiving) uplink / downlink data packets between the UE 10 and other nodes such as base stations / (R)AN nodes, MME, AMF (and other core network nodes). Such signaling may include, for example, appropriately formatted signaling messages related to connection establishment and maintenance (e.g. RRC messages), periodic location update related messages (e.g. tracking area update, paging area updates, location area update).
[0203] (R)AN Node FIG. 7 is a block diagram illustrating the main components of an exemplary (R)AN node, such as a base station ('eNB' in LTE, 'ng-eNB', 'gNB' in 5G). As shown, the (R)AN node 20 includes a transceiver circuit 21 operable to transmit signals to and receive signals from connected UEs via one or more antennas 22, and is configured to transmit signals to and receive signals from other network nodes (directly or indirectly) via a network interface 23. A controller 24 controls the operation of the (R)AN node 20 according to software stored in a memory 25. For example, the controller 24 may be implemented by a central processing unit (CPU). The software may be pre-installed in the memory 25 and / or may be downloaded, for example, via a telecommunications network or from a removable data storage device (RMD). The software includes, among other things, an operating system 26 and a communications control module 27 having at least a transceiver control module 28.
[0204] The communication control module 27 (using the transceiver control sub-module) is responsible for handling (generating / sending / receiving) signaling between the (R)AN node 20 and other nodes, such as (e.g., directly or indirectly) UEs, MMEs, AMFs, etc. The signaling includes, for example, suitably formatted signaling messages related to radio connectivity and (for a particular UE) location procedures, in particular for connection establishment and maintenance (e.g., RRC connection establishment and other RRC messages), periodic location update related messages (e.g., tracking area update, paging area updates, location area update), S1 AP messages and NG AP messages (i.e., messages according to the N2 reference point), etc. Such signaling also includes, for example, broadcast information in the transmission case (e.g., master information and system information).
[0205] The controller 24, if implemented, is also configured (by software or hardware) to handle UE mobility estimation and / or related tasks such as motion trajectory estimation.
[0206] AMF FIG. 8 is a block diagram illustrating the main components of the AMF. The AMF 30 is included in the 5GC. As shown, the AMF 30 includes a transceiver circuit 31 operable to transmit signals to and receive signals from other nodes (including UEs) via a network interface 32. A controller 33 controls the operation of the AMF 30 according to software stored in a memory 34. For example, the controller 33 may be implemented by a central processing unit (CPU). The software may be pre-installed in the memory 34 and / or downloaded via a telecommunications network or, for example, from a removable data storage device (RMD). The software includes, among other things, an operating system 35 and a communication control module 36 having at least a transceiver control module 37.
[0207] The communications control module 36 (using the transceiver control sub-module) is responsible for handling (generating / sending / receiving) signaling between (directly or indirectly) the AMF and other nodes such as UEs, base stations / (R)AN nodes (e.g., "gNBs" or "eNBs"). Such signaling may include, for example, appropriately formatted signaling messages related to the procedures described herein, such as NAS messages from the UE and NG AP messages (i.e., messages over the N2 reference point) for conveying NAS messages to the UE.
[0208] As will be appreciated by those skilled in the art, the present disclosure may be embodied as a method and a system, and therefore may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, a software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects.
[0209] It will be understood that each block of the block diagrams can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, or other programmable data processing apparatus to generate a machine such that the instructions, executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, generate means for performing the functions / operations specified in the flowchart and / or block diagram blocks. A general purpose processor may be a microprocessor, but alternatively, the processor may be any conventional processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine. The processor may be implemented, for example, by a combination of computing devices such as multiple microprocessors, one or more microprocessors, or any other such configuration.
[0210] The methods or algorithms described in connection with the examples disclosed herein may be embodied directly in hardware, in a software module executed by a processor, or in a combination of the two. The software module may reside in RAM memory, flash memory, ROM memory, EPROM memory, EEPROM memory, registers, a hard disk, a removable disk, a CD-ROM, or any other form of storage medium known in the art. The storage medium may be coupled to the processor such that the processor can read information from, and write information to, the storage medium. Alternatively, the storage medium may be integral to the processor. The processor and the storage medium may reside in an ASIC.
[0211] The previous description of the disclosed examples is provided to enable any person skilled in the art to make or use the present disclosure. Various modifications to these examples will be apparent to those skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein may be applied to other examples without departing from the spirit or scope of the present disclosure. Thus, the present disclosure is not intended to be limited to the examples shown herein but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the principles and novel features disclosed herein.
[0212] For example, some or all of the above embodiments can be described as follows, but are not limited to the following. (Appendix 1) A user equipment (UE), the UE acquiring an access stratum (AS) security context of the UE, encrypting a first message or a sensitive information element (IE) included in the first message, the first message including Network Slice Selection Assistance Information (NSSAI), using the AS security context, and transmitting the first message; A radio access network (RAN) node that acquires the AS security context, receives the first message from the UE, decrypts the first message or the sensitive IE using the AS security context, and acquires the NSSAI. (Appendix 2) Further comprising a first core network node, the UE sends a UE identifier of the UE to the first core network node via the RAN node, and obtains the AS security context included in a second message received from the RAN node; The first core network node fetches the AS security context based on the UE identifier and sends a third message to the RAN node including the AS security context; The mobile communication system of claim 1, wherein the RAN node obtains the AS security context included in the third message and sends the second message including the AS security context to the UE. (Appendix 3) a second core network node configured to receive the UE identifier from the first core network node, fetch the AS security context based on the UE identifier, and transmit the obtained AS security context; The mobile communication system described in Supplementary Note 2, wherein the AS security context included in the third message is fetched by the first core network node and the second core network node. (Appendix 4) The mobile communication system of claim 1, wherein the UE obtains the AS security context provided by a core network. (Appendix 5) The mobile communication system of claim 4, wherein the RAN node obtains the AS security context provided by the core network. (Appendix 6) A user equipment (UE), the UE acquiring an access stratum (AS) security context of the UE, and encrypting a first message or a sensitive information element (IE) included in the first message, the first message including network slice selection assistance information (NSSAI), using the AS security context; a first core network node that receives the first message from the UE, decrypts the first message or the sensitive IE using the AS security context, and transmits a second message including the AS security context and the decrypted portion of the first message or the decrypted first message; A radio access network (RAN) node that receives the second message from the first core network node and obtains the AS security context and the NSSAI. (Appendix 7) The UE transmits a UE identifier of the UE to the first core network node via the RAN node; The mobile communication system of claim 6, wherein the first core network node fetches the AS security context based on the UE identifier. (Appendix 8) a second core network node configured to receive the UE identifier from the first core network node, fetch the AS security context for the UE based on the UE identifier, and transmit the obtained AS security context; The mobile communication system described in Supplementary Note 7, wherein the AS security context included in the second message is fetched by the first core network node and the second core network node. (Appendix 9) The mobile communication system according to any one of Supplementary Note 5 to 8, wherein the UE obtains the AS security context provided by a core network. (Appendix 10) A communication method for a user equipment (UE), the communication method comprising: receiving an access stratum (AS) security context for the UE from a radio access network (RAN) node; encrypting a first message or a sensitive information element (IE) included in the first message, the first message including Network Slice Selection Assistance Information (NSSAI), using the AS security context; and transmitting the first message to the RAN node. (Appendix 11) 11. The mobile communication system of claim 10, further comprising: transmitting an identifier of a last registered core network node to the RAN node, the RAN node using the identifier to obtain an AS security context. (Appendix 12) 1. A communication method for a Radio Access Network (RAN) node, the communication method comprising: sending, to a user equipment (UE), an access stratum (AS) security context of the UE; and A communication method comprising: receiving from the UE a first message, or a sensitive information element (IE) included in the first message, the first message including encrypted Network Slice Selection Assistance Information (NSSAI) by using the AS security context. (Appendix 13) receiving from the UE an identifier of a last registered core network node; transmitting said identifier to a core network node; and 13. The communication method of claim 12, further comprising receiving, from the core network node, the AS context associated with the identifier. (Appendix 14) A user equipment (UE), A transceiver circuit and a controller, The controller: receiving an access stratum (AS) security context for the UE from a radio access network (RAN) node; Using the AS security context, encrypt a first message or a sensitive information element (IE) included in the first message, the first message including Network Slice Selection Assistance Information (NSSAI); The UE transmits the first message to the RAN node. (Appendix 15) 1. A Radio Access Network (RAN) node, comprising: A transceiver circuit and a controller, The controller: Sending an access stratum (AS) security context of the UE to a user equipment (UE); A RAN node that receives a first message or a sensitive information element (IE) included in the first message from the UE by using the AS security context, the first message including encrypted Network Slice Selection Assistance Information (NSSAI).
[0213] This application claims the benefit of priority to Indian Patent Application No. 201811041578 filed on November 2, 2018, the disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. [Explanation of symbols]
[0214] 10UE 11 Transceiver Circuits 12 Antenna 13 User Interface 14 Controller 15 Memory 16 Operating Systems 17 Communication Control Module 18 Transceiver Control Module 20 (R)AN nodes 21 Transceiver Circuit 22 Antenna 23 Network Interface 24 Controller 25 Memory 26 Operating Systems 27 Communication Control Module 28 Transceiver Control Module 30 AMF 31 Transceiver Circuit 32 Network Interface 33 Controller 34 Memory 35 Operating Systems 36 Communication Control Module 37 Transceiver Control Module
Claims
1. A communication method for a user equipment (UE), comprising: Send a first message to a base station having a Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) for initiating a radio resource configuration procedure, the first message having no security; A communication method, wherein after a second message including the TMSI and the first security-related parameter is sent from the base station to a core network device, the radio resource configuration procedure protected by the second security-related parameter is performed.
2. A user equipment communication method according to claim 1, comprising: A communication method, comprising: the user equipment transmitting the first message without security to the base station for allowing the base station to identify the core network device based on the TMSI.
3. A communication method for a user device according to claim 1 or 2, comprising: The communication method, wherein the first message is a Radio Resource Control (RRC) connection re-establishment request message, and the second message is a NGAP (NG Application Protocol) message.
4. A user equipment (UE), A transceiver circuit and a controller, The controller: Send a first message to a base station having a Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) for initiating a radio resource configuration procedure, the first message having no security; After a second message including the TMSI and the first security-related parameters is sent from the base station to a core network device, the radio resource configuration procedure protected by the second security-related parameters is performed, user equipment.
5. A user device according to claim 4, The user equipment transmits the first message without security to the base station for allowing the base station to identify the core network device based on the TMSI.
6. A user device according to claim 4 or 5, The user equipment, wherein the first message is a Radio Resource Control (RRC) connection re-establishment request message, and the second message is a NGAP (NG Application Protocol) message.
Citation Information
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