Non-NAS device authentication over non-3GPP access
Patent Information
- Application Number
- PCT/EP2024/062899
- Authority / Receiving Office
- WO · WO
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2023-05-12
- Filing Date
- 2024-05-10
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-21
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Figure EP2024062899_21112024_PF_FP_ABST
Abstract
Description
[0001] NON-NAS DEVICE AUTHENTICATION OVER NON-3GPP ACCESS
[0002] TECHNICAL FIELD
[0003] At least some example embodiments relate to a technique of authenticating a non-NAS device over non-3GPP access.
[0004] BACKGROUND
[0005] WLAN UEs that do not support 5GC NAS (N5CW) are able to register to a cellular communication network via trusted non-3GPP access. Those N5CW devices are able to authenticate to the cellular communication network with 3GPP credentials and register with the help of an interworking function (TWIF) that provides a 5GC NAS protocol stack towards an AM F of a core network of the cellular communication network.
[0006] Further, there is an authentication procedure, using EAP-TLS as an example, for Non-5G Capable (N5GC) devices behind Residential Gateways (RGs) in private networks or in isolated deployment scenarios (i.e., roaming is not considered) with wireline access.
[0007] LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
[0008] 3GPP Third Generation Partnership Project
[0009] 5G Fifth Generation
[0010] 5GC 5G Core
[0011] 5WWC Wireless and Wireline Convergence for 5G System
[0012] AAA Authentication, Authorization and Accounting
[0013] AGF Access Gateway Function
[0014] AKA Authentication and Key Agreement
[0015] AMF Access and Mobility management Function
[0016] AN Access Network
[0017] AUN3 Authenticable Non-3GPP devices
[0018] AUSF Authentication Server Function
[0019] EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol gNB 5G NodeB GUTI Globally Unique Temporary Identifier
[0020] HMAC Hashed Message Authentication
[0021] KDF Key Derivation Function
[0022] N3IWF Non-3GPP access Interworking Function
[0023] N5CW Non-5G-Capable over WLAN
[0024] NAI Network Access Identity
[0025] NAS Non-Access Stratum
[0026] NAUN3 Non-Authenticable Non-3GPP devices
[0027] PLMN Public Land Mobile Network
[0028] PMK Pairwise Master Key
[0029] PPP Point-to-Point Protocol
[0030] RG Residential Gateway
[0031] SEAF Security Anchor Function
[0032] SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
[0033] SUCI Subscriber Concealed Identifier
[0034] TNAP Trusted Non-3GPP Access Point
[0035] TNGF Trusted Non-3GPP Gateway Function
[0036] TWAP Trusted WLAN Access Point
[0037] TWIF Trusted Interworking Function
[0038] UDM Unified Data Management
[0039] UE User Equipment
[0040] W-AGF Wireline AGF
[0041] WLAN Wireless Local Access Network
[0042] CITATION LIST
[0043] 3GPP TS 23.501 V18.1.0, also referred to as TS 23.501 in the following
[0044] 3GPP TS 33.501 V18.1.0, also referred to as TS 33.501 in the following
[0045] 3GPP TS 23.502 V17.6.0, also referred to as TS 23.502 in the following
[0046] 3GPP TS 23.003
[0047] SUMMARY
[0048] At least some example embodiments aim at providing key freshness for a device that is capable of registering to a core network of a cellular communication network with credentials of the cellular communication network but does not support non-access stratum over an access which is different from an access over an access network of the cellular communication network, and at avoiding potential security vulnerability due to lack of forward secrecy.
[0049] According to at least some example embodiments, methods, apparatuses and non-transitory computer-readable storage media are provided as specified by the appended claims.
[0050] In the following, an explanatory example and example embodiments will be described with reference to the accompanying drawings.
[0051] BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0052] Figs. 1A and IB show a signaling diagram illustrating an authentication procedure for an N5CW device according to an explanatory example.
[0053] Fig. 2 shows flowcharts illustrating processes for non-NAS device authentication over non-3GPP access according to at least some example embodiments.
[0054] Figs. 3A and 3B show a signaling diagram illustrating an authentication procedure for an N5CW device according to at least some example embodiments.
[0055] Figs. 4A and 4B show a signaling diagram illustrating an authentication procedure for an AUN3 device according to at least some example embodiments.
[0056] Fig. 5 shows a signaling diagram illustrating another authentication procedure for an N5CW device according to at least some example embodiments. Fig. 6 shows a schematic block diagram illustrating a configuration of control units in which at least some example embodiments are implementable.
[0057] Fig. 7 illustrates Fig. 7A.2.4-1 : Authentication Procedure for N5CW of TS 33.501.
[0058] Fig. 8 illustrates Figure 7B.Y-1 : Authentication Procedure for AUN3 devices supporting 5G key hierarchy (i.e. N5CW devices) using EAP-AKA' according to a change request for TS 33.501.
[0059] DESCRIPTION OF THE EMBODIMENTS
[0060] As mentioned beforehand, an N5CW device is capable to register to 5GC with 3GPP credentials and to establish 5GC connectivity via a trusted WLAN access network. The reference architecture is captured in clause 4.2.8.5.2 of TS 23.501. The 3GPP credentials are stored as defined in clause 6.1.1.1 of TS 33.501. The Trusted WLAN Interworking Function (TWIF) provides interworking functionality that enables connectivity with 5GC and implements the NAS protocol stack and exchanges NAS messages with the AMF on behalf of the N5CW device. A single EAP-AKA' authentication procedure is executed for connecting the N5CW device both to the trusted WLAN access network and to the 5G core network.
[0061] Before giving a description of example embodiments, an explanatory example will be described with reference to Figs. 1A and IB illustrating an authentication procedure for an N5CW device according to the explanatory example.
[0062] First, the N5CW device selects a PLMN and a trusted WLAN that supports "5G connectivity-without-NAS" to this PLMN by using the procedure specified in TS 23.501, clause 6.3.12a, "Access Network selection for devices that do not support 5GC NAS over WLAN". Then, in steps S101 to S110 illustrated in Figs. 1A and IB, an initial registration to 5GC is performed.
[0063] In particular, in S101, the N5CW device associates with the trusted WLAN network and the EAP-AKA' authentication procedure is initiated.
[0064] In S102a, S102b and S102c, the N5CW device provides its Network Access Identity (NAI). The Trusted WLAN Access Point (TWAP) selects a Trusted WLAN Interworking Function (TWIF), e.g. based on the received realm, and sends an AAA request to the selected TWIF.
[0065] If the N5CW device registers to 5GC over 3GPP access for the first time when the above procedure is initiated, then the NAI includes the SUCI. The SUCI is constructed as specified in clause 6.12.2 of TS 23.501.
[0066] If the N5CW device has registered to 5GC over 3GPP access when the above procedure is initiated, then the NAI includes the 5G-GUTI assigned to the N5CW device over 3GPP access. This enables the TWIF in step S104a below to select the same AMF as the one serving the N5CW device over 3GPP access.
[0067] In S103, the TWIF creates a 5GC Registration Request message on behalf of the N5CW device. The TWIF uses default values to populate the parameters in the Registration Request message, which are the same for all N5CW devices that do not support 5G NAS. The Registration type indicates "Initial Registration".
[0068] In S104a and S104b, the TWIF selects an AMF (e.g. by using the 5G-GUTI in the NAI, if provided by the N5CW device) and sends an N2 message to the AMF including the Registration Request, the User Location and an AN Type. In S105, in case the AMF triggers an authentication procedure, it sends a request to AUSF by sending Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message. The Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message contains SUCI or SUPI (in case of a valid 5G-GUTI is received by the AMF). The request message contains also an indication that the request is from a N5CW device.
[0069] In S106, the AUSF sends Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request to the UDM including SUCI or SUPI and the N5CW indication.
[0070] In S107, upon reception of the Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request, the UDM invokes SIDF if a SUCI is received. SIDF de-conceals SUCI to gain SUPI before UDM can process the request. The UDM may select an authentication method based on the "realm" part of the SUPI, the N5CW device indicator, a combination of the "realm" part and the N5CW device indicator, or the UDM local policy.
[0071] In S108, the EAP-AKA' procedure will be trigged to perform mutual authentication between the N5CW device and the home network as specified in clause 6.1.3.1 of TS 33.501.
[0072] EAP-AKA' takes place between the N5CW device and AUSF. Over the N2 interface, the EAP messages are encapsulated within NAS Authentication messages. The EAP-AKA' messages exchanged between the N5CW device and the TWIF are encapsulated into the layer-2 packets, e.g. into IEEE 802.3 / 802. lx packets, into IEEE 802.11 / 802. lx packets, into PPP packets, etc.
[0073] In S109, the NAS security context is not be required in this scenario. The AMF derives a KTWIF key from the received KAMF key as specified in Annex A.9 of TS 33.501. NAS security between AMF and TWIF is established similar to unauthenticated emergency calls, i.e. with NULL encryption and NULL integrity protection. In SllOa, the AMF sends NAS Security Mode Command to the TWIF. The NAS Security Mode Command contains the EAP-Success message and the NULL security algorithms.
[0074] In SI 10b, the TWIF does not forward the EAP-Success to the N5CW directly, instead, it stores the EAP-Success message and waits for KrwiF key generation and reception from AMF.
[0075] In SI 10c, the TWIF sends the NAS Security Mode Complete message to the AMF.
[0076] Then, in Sill, the AMF sends an N2 Initial Context Setup Request and provides the KTWIF key to TWIF.
[0077] In steps SI 12a to S112f, the TWIF derives a TNAP key, KTNAP, from the KTNGF key as specified in Appendix A.22 of TS 33.501 and sends the TNAP key and the EAP-Success message to the Trusted WLAN Access Point, which forwards the EAP-Success to the N5CW device. The TNAP key corresponds to the PMK (Pairwise Master Key) which is used to secure the WLAN airinterface communication according to IEEE 802.11. A layer-2 or layer-3 connection is established between the Trusted WLAN Access Point and the TWIF for transporting all user-plane traffic of the N5CW device to TWIF. This connection is later bound to an N3 connection that is created for this N5CW device.
[0078] In S113, the TWIF shall send N2 Initial Context Setup Response message to the AMF.
[0079] As indicated by SI 14, the following steps are captured after step 9h in clause 4.12b.2 of TS 23.502. As mentioned above, the N5CW device or an AUN3 (N5GC) device does not support NAS over non-3GPP access.
[0080] Further, N5GC devices are not able to derive 5G key hierarchy. Those devices exist in wireline networks and need to be able to access the converged 5G core. It is noted that the authentication of N5GC devices can be based on additional EAP methods other than EAP-AKA'.
[0081] As N5CW and AUN3 devices do not support NAS over non-3GPP access, it is not standardized and not clear what parameters should be used in key generation for AUN3 / N5CW devices.
[0082] In 5GS, NAS Count is used as an input parameter PO to a Key Derivation Function (KDF) according to A.9 of TS 33.501. However, NAS Count is not available for AUN3 / N5CW devices since they do not support NAS protocol.
[0083] For example, generating a KTWIF key ( KWAGF1key) without NAS count according to related work will not fully solve the problem of key generation, because there will not be any freshness in the key generation. Thus, each time an AUN3 / N5CW device goes out of WLAN / TWIF (WLAN / W-AGF) connectivity and connects again, the TWIF (W-AGF) sends a request to AMF. Because the AMF already has a security context, it will generate the same KTWIF ( KWAGF1) again, resulting in potential security vulnerability due to lack of forward secrecy.
[0084] In the following, example embodiments will be described with reference to Figs. 2 to 6.
[0085] First, reference is made to Fig. 2 which illustrates processes 1 and 2 for non-NAS device authentication over non-3GPP access according to at least some example embodiments. It is to be noted that non-3GPP access is an example for an access which is different from an access over an access network of a cellular communication network.
[0086] According to at least some example embodiments, process 1 is executed by a device such as an N5CW device, an N5GC device, or an AUN3 device, each of which may be formed as User Equipment (UE), and each of which is capable of registering to a core network of a cellular communication network with credentials of the cellular communication network (e.g. 3GPP credentials) but does not support non-access stratum over an access which is different from an access over an access network of the cellular communication network.
[0087] In step S211, a registration procedure is initiated in order to register to a core network of a cellular communication network and establish connectivity with the core network via a local access network. Then, process 1 advances to step S213.
[0088] The local access network may comprise at least one of a trusted WLAN AP or RG (RG (WLAN AP), 5G-RG).
[0089] According to at least some example embodiments, S211 corresponds to S301 of Fig. 3A, S401a of Fig. 4A, and S501 of Fig. 5, which will be described later on.
[0090] In step S213, with respect to an authentication procedure associated with the registration procedure, based on a first key which is a key of a core network function, a second key which is a key of a connectivity enabling function enabling the connectivity with the core network is calculated by inputting the first key and specific input parameters to a key derivation function used to calculate the second key. Then, process 1 advances to step S215. According to at least some example embodiments, the core network function comprises AMF and the first key comprises key KAMF, and the connectivity enabling function comprises TWIF and the second key comprises key KTWIF. Further, the first key may comprise the key KTWIF, and the second key may comprise key PMK. Still further, the first key may comprise the key PMK, and the second key may comprise WLAN keys.
[0091] Further, according to at least some example embodiments, the core network function comprises AMF and the first key comprises key KAMF, and the connectivity enabling function comprises W-AGF or 5G-R.G and the second key comprises key KwAGF or key KRG . Further, the first key may comprise the key KwAGF or key KRG, and the second key may comprise key PMK. Still further, the first key may comprise the key PMK, and the second key may comprise WLAN keys.
[0092] In step S215, the connectivity with the core network is established via the connectivity enabling function and the core network function, based on the second key. Then, process 1 ends.
[0093] According to at least some example embodiments, S215 corresponds to S312e of Fig. 3B, and S409 of Fig. 4B, which will be described later on.
[0094] According to at least some example embodiments, the first key is acquired via an authentication and key agreement process performed between the device, the local access network and the core network in association with the registration procedure which is associated with the authentication procedure which is a primary authentication procedure (S404 of Fig. 4A).
[0095] According to at least some example embodiments, the authentication and key agreement process is performed for each registration procedure initiated by the device, as will be described in more detail later on in Solution 3 illustrated by Fig. 5. According to at least some example embodiments, the specific input parameters comprise a non-access stratum, NAS, count (uplink NAS COUNT) PO. The specific input parameters may further comprise a parameter FC, a length LO of the uplink NAS COUNT, an access type distinguisher Pl and a length LI of the access type distinguisher.
[0096] The key derivation function may comprise HMAC-SHA-256 (Key, S), wherein "Key" is the first key and input S is formed by S = FC 1 1 PO 1 1 LO 11 Pl 11 LI. Then, the second key is calculated as derived key = HMAC-SHA-256 (Key, S).
[0097] According to at least some example embodiments, the NAS count is a fixed constant value, as described in more detail later on in Solution 1, for example.
[0098] According to at least some example embodiments, the NAS count is determined from at least one of a random value or a counter value, as described in more detail later on in Solution 2 illustrated in Figs. 3A and 3B and Solution 2b illustrated in Figs. 4A and 4B.
[0099] According to at least some example embodiments, at least one of the random value or an initial value of the counter value is acquired from the core network function via payload associated with the authentication procedure (cf. e.g. S312c of Fig. 3B).
[0100] According to at least some example embodiments, the counter value is incremented upon a request to provide an identity of the device in association with the registration procedure which is associated with the authentication procedure which is not a primary authentication procedure (cf. e.g. upon S302a of Fig. 3A). According to at least some example embodiments, the random value is acquired via payload associated with the registration procedure which is associated with the authentication procedure which is not a primary authentication procedure (cf. e.g. S312c of Fig. 3B).
[0101] Process 2 illustrated in Fig. 2 may be executed by a core network function such as AMF and SEAF.
[0102] In step S221, with respect to an authentication procedure associated with a registration procedure initiated by a device (e.g. the registration procedure initiated in S211), based on a first key which is a key of the core network function, a second key which is a key of a connectivity enabling function enabling connectivity of the device with the core network via a local access network is calculated by inputting the first key and specific input parameters to a key derivation function used to calculate the second key. Then, process 2 advances to step S223.
[0103] According to at least some example embodiments, S221 corresponds to S309 of Fig. 3A, and S405 of Fig. 4B.
[0104] In step S223, the connectivity of the device with the core network via the connectivity enabling function, based on the second key.
[0105] According to at least some example embodiments, S223 corresponds to S313 of Fig. 3B.
[0106] The description with respect to process 1 regarding the first key, the second key, the core network function, the connectivity enabling function, the specific input parameter and the key derivation function also applies for process 2.
[0107] According to at least some example embodiments, the first key is provided via an authentication and key agreement process performed between the device, the local access network and the core network in association with the registration procedure which is associated with the authentication procedure which is a primary authentication procedure (cf. S405 of Fig. 4A).
[0108] According to at least some example embodiments, the authentication and key agreement process is performed for each registration procedure initiated by the device, as will be described in more detail below in Solution 3 illustrated in Fig. 5.
[0109] According to at least some example embodiments, the NAS count is a fixed constant value, as described above with respect to process 1.
[0110] According to at least some example embodiments, the NAS count is determined from at least one of a random value or a counter value, as described above with respect to process 1.
[0111] According to at least some example embodiments, at least one of the random value or an initial value of the counter value is provided to the connectivity enabling function via payload associated with the authentication procedure (cf. S310a of Fig. 3B).
[0112] According to at least some example embodiments, the counter value is incremented upon a request to register the device in association with the registration procedure which is associated with the authentication procedure which is not a primary authentication procedure (cf. S309 of Fig. 3A).
[0113] According to at least some example embodiments, the random value is provided to the connectivity enabling function via payload associated with the registration procedure which is associated with the authentication procedure which is not a primary authentication procedure (cf. S310a of Fig. 3B). In the following, above-mentioned Solutions 1, 2, 2b and 3 will be described in more detail. First, a brief summary of the Solutions is given below:
[0114] Solution 1 (without key freshness in N5CW device): The NAS Count value used as parameter PO for the Key Derivation Function (KDF) in A.9 of TS 33.501 is set to a constant value, such as 0x00 or Oxff. In other words, UE (the N5CW device) and AMF can generate the same key defined by standard (00 or FF or any other agreed constant).
[0115] Solution 2 (targeting key freshness in N5CW device): After primary authentication, N5CW device and AMF start using the same initial value of a counter. The counter value is incremented with each authentication, and used as input parameter P0 of the KDF. The initial value may be generated by AMF, for example based on a generated random number, and sent to UE via EAP, or a constant value such as 0x00 or OxFF could be used as the initial value by both UE and AMF. A constant initial value may be pre-shared or well known to the UE and AMF. Further, a changing initial value can also be generated without randomness, for example based on a sequence. In other words, N5CW device and AMF generate the same counter value or AMF provides the counter value to UE via EAP payload. This counter value will be incremented each time to keep the freshness, for example, N5CW device increments the counter when it is asked to provide UE identity. The AMF shall increment the counter when AMF has a security context already available.
[0116] Solution 2b (targeting key freshness in AUN3 device connected via R.G): Same operation as in solution 2, now for an AUN3 device.
[0117] Solution 3 (full authentication): When an N5CW device re-connects via TWIF and there is already an AMF security context, the AMF initiates primary authentication resulting in generation of fresh keys. In this way, each time N5CW device reattaches, primary authentication is performed.
[0118] Solution 1
[0119] In case of N5CW device, the NAS count value (P0) can be set to "0x00" or "OxFF" or any fixed constant value. So that UE and AMF can generate the same key defined by standard (00 or FF or any other agreed constant). As specified in Annex A.9 of TS 33.501, when deriving keys K9NB, KWAGF, KTNGF, KTWIF and KNSIWF from KAMF and the uplink NAS COUNT in the UE and the AMF the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF (key derivation function).
[0120] FC = 0x6E
[0121] P0 = Uplink NAS COUNT
[0122] L0 = length of uplink NAS COUNT (i.e. 0x00 0x04)
[0123] Pl = Access type distinguisher
[0124] LI = length of Access type distinguisher (i.e. 0x00 0x01)
[0125] The values for the access type distinguisher are defined in Table 1 below. The values 0x00 and 0x03 to OxfO are reserved for future use, and the values Oxfl to Oxff are reserved for private use.
[0126] The access type distinguisher shall be set to the value for 3GPP (0x01) when deriving K9NB. The access type distinguisher shall be set to the value for non-3GPP (0x02) when deriving KNSIWF, KWAGF, KTWIF or KTNGF.
[0127] Table 1 : Access type distinguishers
[0128] For generating KTWIF, the input key KEY is the 256-bit key KAMF.
[0129] This function is applied when cryptographically protected 5G radio bearers are established and when a key change on-the-fly is performed.
[0130] As the N5CW device does not support NAS over non-3GPP access, therefore, for N5CW devices, for generating KTWIF, P0 is set to 0, and L0 contains the length of the PO in KTWIF key generation. Alternatively, the NAS count PO can be set to "0x00" or "OxFF" or any fixed constant value.
[0131] Solution 2
[0132] Figs. 3A and 3B show a signaling diagram illustrating Solution 2. Steps S301 to S304b of Fig. 3A are similar to steps S101 to S104b of Fig. 1A.
[0133] Upon receipt of the N2 message of S304b, the AMF detects that a security context exists, and generates a fresh key via new RAND / COUNT. In this context, the NAS count is determined from the new RAND / COUNT, and KTWIF is derived from KAMF using the fresh NAS count.
[0134] In S310a of Fig. 3B, the AMF provides the new RAND / COUNT to the TWIF in N2 message NAS Security Mode Command.
[0135] Steps S310b to S312a of Fig. 3B are similar to steps SllOb to S112a of Fig. IB.
[0136] In S312b of Fig. 3B, the TWIF provides the new RAND / COUNT to the trusted WLAN AP in AAA response.
[0137] In S312c of Fig. 3B, the trusted WLAN AP provides the new RAND / COUNT to the N5CW device in message EAP-Success.
[0138] The N5CW device then uses the new RAND / COUNT for determining a fresh NAS count PO for calculating KTWIF from KAMF.
[0139] The rest of steps S312d and steps S312e to S314 are similar to steps S112d to S114 of Fig. IB.
[0140] According to Solution 1, after the primary authentication, N5CW and AMF generate the same counter value (e.g. =0) or AMF provides the counter value (COUNT) (e.g. an initial value of the counter value) or newly generated Random number (RAND) (also referred to in this specification as random value) to UE via EAP payload. This counter value will be incremented each time to keep the freshness. N5CW device may increment the counter value when it is asked to provide UE identity. The AMF increments the counter when it has a security context already available.
[0141] The generation of KTWIF is similar to that described above with respect to Solution 1.
[0142] Solution 2, Option A
[0143] When deriving the keys K9NB, KWAGF, KTNGF, KTWIF and KNSIWF from KAMF and the uplink NAS COUNT in the UE and the AMF the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF.
[0144] FC = 0x6E
[0145] PO = COUNTER received from AMF
[0146] LO = length of COUNTER (i.e. 0x00 0x04)
[0147] Pl = Access type distinguisher
[0148] LI = length of Access type distinguisher (i.e. 0x00 0x01)
[0149] The values for the access type distinguisher are defined in above Table 1. The values 0x00 and 0x03 to OxfO are reserved for future use, and the values Oxfl to Oxff are reserved for private use.
[0150] The access type distinguisher shall be set to the value for 3GPP (0x01) when deriving K9NB. The access type distinguisher shall be set to the value for non-3GPP (0x02) when deriving KNSIWF, KWAGF, KTWIF or KTNGF..
[0151] For generating KTWIF, the input key KEY shall be the 256-bit KAMF.
[0152] This function is applied when cryptographically protected 5G radio bearers are established and when a key change on-the-fly is performed. According to Solution 2, Option A, the counter value will be incremented for every key refresh.
[0153] Solution 2, Option B
[0154] When deriving the keys K9NB, KWAGF, KTNGF, KTWIF and KNSIWF from KAMF and the uplink NAS COUNT in the UE and the AMF the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF.
[0155] FC = 0x6E
[0156] PO = RAND received from AMF
[0157] LO = length of RAND (i.e. 0x00 0x04)
[0158] Pl = Access type distinguisher
[0159] LI = length of Access type distinguisher (i.e. 0x00 0x01)
[0160] The values for the access type distinguisher are defined in above Table 1. The values 0x00 and 0x03 to OxfO are reserved for future use, and the values Oxfl to Oxff are reserved for private use.
[0161] The access type distinguisher shall be set to the value for 3GPP (0x01) when deriving K9NB. The access type distinguisher shall be set to the value for non-3GPP (0x02) when deriving KNSIWF, KWAGF, KTWIF or KTNGF.
[0162] For generating KTWIF, the input key KEY shall be the 256-bit KAMF.
[0163] This function is applied when cryptographically protected 5G radio bearers are established and when a key change on-the-fly is performed.
[0164] As illustrated in Fig. 3B, RAND value will be provided by AMF to UE.
[0165] Solution 2b
[0166] Figs. 4A and 4B show a signaling diagram illustrating an authentication procedure for AUN3 devices supporting 5G key hierarchy (i.e. N5CW devices) using EAP-AKA'. In step S401a, the AUN3 device establishes a WLAN connection with the WLAN Access Network (AN), using procedures specified in IEEE 802.11.
[0167] In steps S401b, S401C, L2 connection and EAP identity retrieval are performed. AUN3 device sends back EAP Response / Identity message. The AUN3 device uses SUCI in NAI format (i.e., username@realm format as specified in clause 28.7.3 of TS 23.003).
[0168] In steps S402b, S403b, S403c, if the RG is a 5G-RG, the 5G-RG sends a NAS Registration Request message to the AMF, including the received SUCI and the new indicator for encryption required for AUN3 device.
[0169] In S404, authentication procedure for EAP-AKA' is performed as defined in the section 6.1.3.1 of TS 33.501.
[0170] In S405, based on the indication in step S403b, AMF derives the RG key as defined below.
[0171] In S406, the AMF sends NAS Security Mode Command mode and provides the RG key (KRG) to RG.
[0172] In step S407a, 5G-RG derives the PMK key from the RG key (KRG).
[0173] In S408a, S408b, RG and AUN3 device will derive WLAN keys from PMK.
[0174] In S409, the AUN3 device performs a 4-way handshake to establish a secure connection with the WLAN AN.
[0175] When deriving the keys K9NB, KWAGF, KTNGF, KTWIF and KNSIWF from KAMF and the uplink NAS COUNT in the UE and the AMF the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF.
[0176] FC = 0x6E PO = Uplink NAS COUNT
[0177] LO = length of uplink NAS COUNT (i.e. 0x00 0x04)
[0178] Pl = Access type distinguisher
[0179] LI = length of Access type distinguisher (i.e. 0x00 0x01)
[0180] The values for the access type distinguisher are defined in Table 2. The values 0x00 and 0x03 to OxfO are reserved for future use, and the values Oxfl to Oxff are reserved for private use.
[0181] The access type distinguisher shall be set to the value for 3GPP (0x01) when deriving K9NB. The access type distinguisher shall be set to the value for non-3GPP (0x02) when deriving KNSIWF, KWAGF, KTWIF or KTNGF..
[0182] Table 2: Access type distinguishers
[0183] The input key KEY shall be the 256-bit KAMF.
[0184] This function is applied when cryptographically protected 5G radio bearers are established and when a key change on-the-fly is performed.
[0185] As AUN3 device supporting 5G key hierarchy (i.e. N5CW devices) does not support NAS over non-3GPP access, therefore, for N5CW devices, P0 is set to 0, and L0 contains the length of the P0 in KWAGF key or KRG generation
[0186] Solution 3
[0187] Fig. 5 shows a signaling diagram illustrating solution 3.
[0188] Steps S501 to S504b correspond to steps S301 to S304b of Fig. 3A. In step S504c, the AMF detects that it already has a security context identified by GUTI. However, as the request of S504b is coming from TWIF and key refresh is not supported, the AMF performs full authentication. Hence, the rest of the procedure is the same as defined in section 7A.2.4-1 of TS 33.501. In other words, the rest of the procedure corresponds to steps S105 to S113 of Figs. 1A and IB.
[0189] According to Solution 3, when TWIF asks AMF to provide the Ktwif key and the AMF already has the security context, the AMF shall initiate the primary authentication. In this way, each time the N5CW device reattaches, primary authentication is performed.
[0190] Now reference is made to Fig. 6 illustrating a simplified block diagram of control units 610 and 620 that are suitable for use in practicing at least some example embodiments. According to an implementation example, process 1 of Fig. 2 is implemented by the control unit 610, and process 2 of Fig. 2 is implemented by the control unit 620.
[0191] The control units 610, 620 comprises processing resources (e.g. processing circuitry) 611, 621, memory resources (e.g. memory circuitry) 612, 622 and interfaces (e.g. interface circuitry) 613, 623, which are coupled via a wired or wireless connection 614, 624.
[0192] The control units 610, 620 may be coupled to each other via connection 63 representing a connection via several entities, e.g. WLAN AP (R.G) and TWIF (W-AGF).
[0193] According to an example implementation, the memory resources 612, 622 are of any type suitable to the local technical environment and are implemented using any suitable data storage technology, such as semiconductor based memory devices, magnetic memory devices and systems, optical memory devices and systems, fixed memory and removable memory. The processing resources 611, 621 are of any type suitable to the local technical environment, and include one or more of general purpose computers, special purpose computers, microprocessors, digital signal processors (DSPs) and processors based on a multi core processor architecture, as non-limiting examples.
[0194] According to an implementation example, the memory resources 612, 622 comprise one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media which store one or more programs that when executed by the processing resources 611, 621 cause the control units 610, 620 to function as a UE (e.g. N5CW device, AUN3 device) and an AMF, respectively, as described above.
[0195] According to at least some example embodiments, the AMF is hardware that includes software, or simply software that is executable by at least one processor of one or more computers, e.g., a distributed computing system or a cloud computing system.
[0196] According to an example, control unit 610 is or is comprised in the apparatus performing process 1 of Fig. 2. For example, the control unit 610 may be or may be comprised in a user equipment.
[0197] According to an example, control unit 620 is or is comprised in the apparatus performing process 2 of Fig. 2. For example, the control unit 620 may be or may be comprised in a core network of a cellular communication network.
[0198] UEs may comprise cellular phones, smart phones, laptop's, handhelds, tablets, vehicles, or the like. The UE may be fixed shape or it may be used in different form factors.
[0199] Further, as used in this application, the term "circuitry" may refer to one or more or all of the following: (a) hardware-only circuit implementations (such as implementations in only analog and / or digital circuitry) and
[0200] (b) combinations of hardware circuits and software, such as (as applicable):
[0201] (i) a combination of analog and / or digital hardware circuit(s) with software / firmware and
[0202] (ii) any portions of hardware processor(s) with software (including digital signal processor(s)), software, and memory(ies) that work together to cause an apparatus, such as a mobile phone or server, to perform various functions) and
[0203] (c) hardware circuit(s) and or processor(s), such as a microprocessor(s) or a portion of a microprocessor(s), that requires software (e.g., firmware) for operation, but the software may not be present when it is not needed for operation.
[0204] This definition of circuitry applies to all uses of this term in this application, including in any claims. As a further example, as used in this application, the term circuitry also covers an implementation of merely a hardware circuit or processor (or multiple processors) or portion of a hardware circuit or processor and its (or their) accompanying software and / or firmware. The term circuitry also covers, for example and if applicable to the particular claim element, a baseband integrated circuit or processor integrated circuit for a mobile device or a similar integrated circuit in a server, a cellular network device, or other computing or network device.
[0205] The term "non-transitory", as used herein, is a limitation of the medium itself (i.e., tangible, not a signal) as opposed to a limitation on data storage persistency (e.g., RAM vs. ROM).
[0206] It is noted that, as used herein, "at least one of the following: " and "at least one of " and similar wording, where the list of two or more elements are joined by "and" or "or", mean at least any one of the elements, or at least any two or more of the elements, or at least all the elements. In an embodiment, an apparatus carrying out at least some of the embodiments described comprises at least one processor and at least one memory including instructions that, when executed with the at least one processor, cause the apparatus to carry out the functionalities according to any one of the embodiments described. According to an aspect, when the at least one processor executes the instructions, the instructions cause the apparatus to carry out the functionalities according to any one of the embodiments described. According to another embodiment, the apparatus carrying out at least some of the embodiments comprises the at least one processor and at least one memory including instructions, wherein the at least one processor and the instructions perform at least some of the functionalities according to any one of the embodiments described. Accordingly, the at least one processor, the memory, and the instructions form processing means for carrying out at least some of the embodiments described. According to yet another embodiment, the apparatus carrying out at least some of the embodiments comprises a circuitry including at least one processor and at least one memory instructions. When activated, the circuitry causes the apparatus to perform the at least some of the functionalities according to any one of the embodiments described.
[0207] It is to be understood that the above description is illustrative and is not to be construed as limiting. Various modifications and applications may occur to those skilled in the art without departing from the true spirit and scope as defined by the appended claims.
[0208] In the following, change requests for TS 33.501 are indicated:
[0209] 7A.2.4 Authentication for devices that do not support 5GC NAS over WLAN access
[0210] A N5CW device is capable to register to 5GC with 3GPP credentials and to establish 5GC connectivity via a trusted WLAN access network. The reference architecture is captured in clause 4.2.8.5.2 of TS 23.501[2]. The 3GPP credentials are stored as defined in clause 6.1.1.1. The Trusted WLAN Interworking Function (TWIF) provides interworking functionality that enables connectivity with 5GC and implements the NAS protocol stack and exchanges NAS messages with the AMF on behalf of the N5CW device. A single EAP-AKA' authentication procedure is executed for connecting the N5CW device both to the trusted WLAN access network and to the 5G core network.
[0211] Referring to Fig. 7:
[0212] 0. The N5CW device selects a PLMN and a trusted WLAN that supports "5G connectivity-without-NAS" to this PLMN by using the procedure specified in TS 23.501 [2] clause 6.3.12a, "Access Network selection for devices that do not support 5GC NAS over WLAN".
[0213] Steps 1-10: Initial registration to 5GC.
[0214] 1. The N5CW device associates with the trusted WLAN network and the EAP-AKA' authentication procedure is initiated.
[0215] 2. The N5CW device shall provide its Network Access Identity (NAI) The Trusted WLAN Access Point (TWAP) selects a Trusted WLAN Interworking Function (TWIF), e.g. based on the received realm, and sends an AAA request to the selected TWIF.
[0216] If the N5CW device registers to 5GC over 3GPP access for the first time when the above procedure is initiated, then the NAI shall include the SUCI. The SUCI shall be constructed as specified in clause 6.12.2.
[0217] If the N5CW device has registered to 5GC over 3GPP access when the above procedure is initiated, then the NAI includes the 5G-GUTI assigned to the N5CW device over 3GPP access. This enables the TWIF in step 4a below to select the same AMF as the one serving the N5CW device over 3GPP access.
[0218] 3. The TWIF shall create a 5GC Registration Request message on behalf of the N5CW device. The TWIF shall use default values to populate the parameters in the Registration Request message, which are the same for all N5CW device that do not support 5G NAS. The Registration type indicates "Initial Registration". 4. The TWIF shall select an AMF (e.g. by using the 5G-GUTI in the NAI, if provided by the N5CW device) and shall send an N2 message to the AMF including the Registration Request, the User Location and an AN Type.
[0219] 5. In case the AMF triggers an authentication procedure, it sends a request to AUSF by sending Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message. The Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message contains SUCI or SUPI (in case of a valid 5G-GUTI is received by the AMF). The request message contains also an indication that the request is from a N5CW device.
[0220] In this release of specification, even if AMF already has a security context identified by 5G-GUTI, the AMF shall initiate the primary authentication. In this way, each time N5CW device reattach, primary authentication is performed and KTWIF keys at the UE will refreshed.
[0221] 6. The AUSF shall send Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request to the UDM including SUCI or SUPI and the N5CW indication.
[0222] 7. Upon reception of the Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request, the UDM shall invoke SIDF if a SUCI is received. SIDF shall de-conceal SUCI to gain SUPI before UDM can process the request. The UDM may select an authentication method based on the "realm" part of the SUPI, the N5CW device indicator, a combination of the "realm" part and the N5CW device indicator, or the UDM local policy.
[0223] 8. The EAP-AKA' procedure will be trigged to perform mutual authentication between the N5CW device and the home network as specified in clause
[0224] 6.1.3.1.
[0225] EAP-AKA' takes place between the N5CW device and AUSF. Over the N2 interface, the EAP messages are encapsulated within NAS Authentication messages. The EAP-AKA' messages exchanged between the N5CW Device and the TWIF shall be encapsulated into the layer-2 packets, e.g. into IEEE 802.3 / 802. lx packets, into IEEE 802.11 / 802. lx packets, into PPP packets, etc.
[0226] 9. The NAS security context is not required in this scenario. The AMF shall derive an KTWIF key from the received KAMF key as specified in Annex A.9. NAS security between AMF and TWIF is established similar to unauthenticated emergency calls, i.e. with NULL encryption and NULL integrity protection.
[0227] NOTE: N5CW devices does not support NAS; therefore, using the NAS counter is not possible in N5CW devices.
[0228] 10a. The AMF shall send NAS Security Mode Command to the TWIF. The NAS Security Mode Command shall contain the EAP-Success message and the NULL security algorithms.
[0229] 10b. The TWIF shall not forward the EAP-Success to the N5CW directly, instead, it shall store the EAP-Success message and wait for KTWIF.
[0230] 10c. The TWIF shall send the NAS Security Mode Complete message to the AMF.
[0231] 11. The AMF sends an N2 Initial Context Setup Request and provides the KTWIF key to TWIF.
[0232] 12. The TWIF shall derive a TNAP key, KTNAP, from the KTNGF key as specified in Appendix A.22 and send the TNAP key and the EAP-Success message to the Trusted WLAN Access Point, which forwards the EAP- Success to the N5CW device. The TNAP key corresponds to the PMK (Pairwise Master Key) which is used to secure the WLAN air-interface communication according to IEEE 802.11
[0080] . A layer-2 or layer-3 connection is established between the Trusted WLAN Access Point and the TWIF for transporting all user-plane traffic of the N5CW device to TWIF. This connection is later bound to an N3 connection that is created for this N5CW device.
[0233] 13. The TWIF shall send N2 Initial Context Setup Response message to the AMF.
[0234] 14. The following steps are captured in clause 4.12b.2 of TS 23.502[8].
[0235] A.9 KQNB, KWAGF, KTNGF, KTWIF and KNSIWF derivation function
[0236] When deriving the keys K9NB, KWAGF, KTNGF, KTWIF and KNSIWF from KAMF and the uplink NAS COUNT in the UE and the AMF the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF.
[0237] FC = 0x6E PO = Uplink NAS COUNT
[0238] LO = length of uplink NAS COUNT (i.e. 0x00 0x04)
[0239] Pl = Access type distinguisher
[0240] LI = length of Access type distiguisher (i.e. 0x00 0x01)
[0241] The values for the access type distinguisher are defined in table A.9-1. The values 0x00 and 0x03 to OxfO are reserved for future use, and the values Oxfl to Oxff are reserved for private use.
[0242] The access type distinguisher shall be set to the value for 3GPP (0x01) when deriving KgNB. The access type distinguisher shall be set to the value for non-3GPP (0x02) when deriving KNSIWF, KWAGF, KTWIF or KTNGF..
[0243] Table A.9-1: Access type distinguishers
[0244] The input key KEY shall be the 256-bit KAMF.
[0245] This function is applied when cryptographically protected 5G radio bearers are established and when a key change on-the-fly is performed.
[0246] As N5CW device does not support NAS over non-3GPP access, therefore, for N5CW devices, P0 must be set to 0, and L0 contains the length of the P0 in KTWIF key generation.
[0247] 7B.Y Authentication for AUN3-supporting 5G key heirarchy(i.e. N5CW) - devices behind 5G-RG
[0248] AUN3 devices supporting 5G key hierarchy is also called N5CW devices.
[0249] The AUN3 device supporting 5G key hierarchy (i.e. N5CW devices) behind 5G-RG is registered to the 5GC by the 5G-RG and is authenticated by 5GC using EAP-AKA', as specified in RFC 5448
[0012] .
[0250] Editor's Note: Authentication of AUN3 devices behind FN-RG is FFS and to be aligned with SA2.
[0251] Referring to Fig. 8: la. The AUN3 device establishes a WLAN connection with the WLAN Access Network (AN), using procedures specified in IEEE 802.11. lb, lc. L2 connection and EAP identity retrieval are performed. AUN3 device sends back EAP Response / Identity message. The AUN3 device uses SUCI in NAI format (i.e., username@realm format as specified in clause 28.7.3 of TS 23.003).
[0252] 2b, 3b, 3c. If the RG is a 5G-RG, the 5G-RG sends a NAS Registration Request message to the AMF, including the received SUCI and the new indicator for encryption required for AUN3 device.
[0253] 4. Authentication procedure for EAP-AKA' is performed as defined in the section 6.1.3.1 of TS 33.501[4].
[0254] 5. Based on the indication in step 3, AMF derives the RG key as defined in A.9.
[0255] 6. The AMF sends NAS Security Mode Command mode and provides the RG key (KRG) to RG.
[0256] 7. 5G-RG derive the PMK key from the RG key (KRG).
[0257] 8. RG and AUN3 device will derive WLAN keys from PMK.
[0258] 9. The AUN3 device performs a 4-way handshake to establish a secure connection with the WLAN AN.
[0259] A.9 KQNB, KWAGF, KTNGF, KTWIF , KNSIWF , KRG derivation function
[0260] When deriving the keys K9NB, KWAGF, KTNGF, KTWIF and KNSIWF from KAMF and the uplink NAS COUNT in the UE and the AMF the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF.
[0261] FC = 0x6E
[0262] P0 = Uplink NAS COUNT
[0263] L0 = length of uplink NAS COUNT (i.e. 0x00 0x04)
[0264] Pl = Access type distinguisher
[0265] LI = length of Access type distiguisher (i.e. 0x00 0x01)
[0266] The values for the access type distinguisher are defined in table A.9-1. The values 0x00 and 0x03 to OxfO are reserved for future use, and the values Oxfl to Oxff are reserved for private use. The access type distinguisher shall be set to the value for 3GPP (0x01) when deriving KgNB. The access type distinguisher shall be set to the value for non-3GPP (0x02) when deriving KNSIWF, KWAGF, KTWIF or KTNGF..
[0267] Table A.9-1: Access type distinguishers
[0268] The input key KEY shall be the 256-bit KAMF.
[0269] This function is applied when cryptographically protected 5G radio bearers are established and when a key change on-the-fly is performed.
[0270] As AUN3 device supporting 5G key hierarchy (i.e. N5CW devices) does not support NAS over non-3GPP access, therefore, for N5CW devices, P0 must be set to 0, and L0 contains the length of the P0 in KWAGF key or KRG generation.
Claims
CLAIMS1. A method used by a device, the method comprising: initiating a registration procedure in order to register to a core network of a cellular communication network and establish connectivity with the core network via a local access network; with respect to an authentication procedure associated with the registration procedure, calculating, based on a first key which is a key of a core network function, a second key which is a key of a connectivity enabling function enabling the connectivity with the core network, by inputting the first key and specific input parameters to a key derivation function used to calculate the second key; and establishing the connectivity with the core network via the connectivity enabling function and the core network function, based on the second key.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the device is capable of registering to the core network with credentials of the cellular communication network but does not support non-access stratum over an access which is different from an access over an access network of the cellular communication network.
3. The method of claim 1 or 2, further comprising: acquiring the first key via an authentication and key agreement process performed between the device, the local access network and the core network in association with the registration procedure which is associated with the authentication procedure which is a primary authentication procedure .
4. The method of claim 3, wherein the authentication and key agreement process is performed for each registration procedure initiated by the device.
5. The method of any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the specific input parameters comprise a non-access stratum, NAS, count.
6. The method of claim 5, wherein the NAS count is a fixed constant value.
7. The method of claim 5, further comprising: determining the NAS count from at least one of a random value or a counter value.
8. The method of claim 7, further comprising: acquiring at least one of the random value or an initial value of the counter value from the core network function via payload associated with the authentication procedure.
9. The method of claim 7 or 8, further comprising: incrementing the counter value upon a request to provide an identity of the device in association with the registration procedure which is associated with the authentication procedure which is not a primary authentication procedure.
10. The method of claim 7 or 8, further comprising: acquiring the random value via payload associated with the registration procedure which is associated with the authentication procedure which is not a primary authentication procedure.
11. A method used by a core network function of a core network of a cellular communication network, the method comprising: with respect to an authentication procedure associated with a registration procedure initiated by a device, calculating, based on a first key which is a key of the core network function, a second key which is a key of a connectivity enabling function enabling connectivity of the device with the core network via a local access network, by inputting the first key and specific input parameters to a key derivation function used to calculate the second key; andestablishing the connectivity of the device with the core network via the connectivity enabling function, based on the second key.
12. The method of claim 11, further comprising: providing the first key via an authentication and key agreement process performed between the device, the local access network and the core network in association with the registration procedure which is associated with the authentication procedure which is a primary authentication procedure.
13. The method of claim 12, wherein the authentication and key agreement process is performed for each registration procedure initiated by the device.
14. The method of claim 11 or 12, wherein the specific input parameters comprise a non-access stratum, NAS, count.
15. The method of claim 14, wherein the NAS count is a fixed constant value.
16. The method of claim 14, further comprising: determining the NAS count from at least one of a random value or a counter value.
17. The method of claim 16, further comprising: providing at least one of the random value or an initial value of the counter value to the connectivity enabling function via payload associated with the authentication procedure.
18. The method of claim 16 or 17, further comprising: incrementing the counter value upon a request to register the device in association with the registration procedure which is associated with the authentication procedure which is not a primary authentication procedure.
19. The method of claim 16 or 17, further comprising: providing the random value to the connectivity enabling function via payload associated with the registration procedure which is associated with the authentication procedure which is not a primary authentication procedure.
20. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing a program that, when executed by a computer, causes the computer at least to: initiate a registration procedure in order to register to a core network of a cellular communication network and establish connectivity with the core network via a local access network; with respect to an authentication procedure associated with the registration procedure, calculate, based on a first key which is a key of a core network function, a second key which is a key of a connectivity enabling function enabling the connectivity with the core network, by inputting the first key and specific input parameters to a key derivation function used to calculate the second key; and establish the connectivity with the core network via the connectivity enabling function and the core network function, based on the second key.
21. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing a program that, when executed by a computer, causes the computer at least to: with respect to an authentication procedure associated with a registration procedure initiated by a device, calculate, based on a first key which is a key of a core network function of a core network of a cellular communication network, a second key which is a key of a connectivity enabling function enabling connectivity of the device with the core network via a local access network, by inputting the first key and specific input parameters to a key derivation function used to calculate the second key; and establish the connectivity of the device with the core network via the connectivity enabling function, based on the second key.
22. An apparatus comprising at least one processor and at least one memory including computer program code, the at least one memory and the computer program code configured to, with the at least one processor, cause the apparatus at least to: initiate a registration procedure in order to register to a core network of a cellular communication network and establish connectivity with the core network via a local access network; with respect to an authentication procedure associated with the registration procedure, calculate, based on a first key which is a key of a core network function, a second key which is a key of a connectivity enabling function enabling the connectivity with the core network, by inputting the first key and specific input parameters to a key derivation function used to calculate the second key; and establish the connectivity with the core network via the connectivity enabling function and the core network function, based on the second key.
23. The apparatus of claim 22, wherein the apparatus is capable of registering to the core network with credentials of the cellular communication network but does not support non-access stratum over an access which is different from an access over an access network of the cellular communication network.
24. The apparatus of claim 22 or 23, wherein the at least one memory and the computer program code are configured to, with the at least one processor, cause the apparatus further to: acquire the first key via an authentication and key agreement process performed between the apparatus, the local access network and the core network in association with the registration procedure which is associated with the authentication procedure which is a primary authentication procedure.
25. The apparatus of claim 24, wherein the authentication and key agreement process is performed for each registration procedure initiated by the device.
26. The apparatus of any one of claims 22 to 24, wherein the specific input parameters comprise a non-access stratum, NAS, count.
27. The apparatus of claim 26, wherein the NAS count is a fixed constant value.
28. The apparatus of claim 27, wherein the at least one memory and the computer program code are configured to, with the at least one processor, cause the apparatus further to: determine the NAS count from at least one of a random value or a counter value.
29. The apparatus of claim 28, wherein the at least one memory and the computer program code are configured to, with the at least one processor, cause the apparatus further to: acquire at least one of the random value or an initial value of the counter value from the core network function via payload associated with the authentication procedure.
30. The apparatus of claim 28 or 29, wherein the at least one memory and the computer program code are configured to, with the at least one processor, cause the apparatus further to: increment the counter value upon a request to provide an identity of the apparatus in association with the registration procedure which is associated with the authentication procedure which is not a primary authentication procedure.
31. The apparatus of claim 28 or 29, wherein the at least one memory and the computer program code are configured to, with the at least one processor, cause the apparatus further to: acquire the random value via payload associated with the registration procedure which is associated with the authentication procedure which is not a primary authentication procedure.
32. An apparatus comprising at least one processor and at least one memory including computer program code, the at least one memory and the computer program code configured to, with the at least one processor, cause the apparatus at least to: with respect to an authentication procedure associated with a registration procedure initiated by a device, calculate, based on a first key which is a key of a core network function of a core network of a cellular communication network, a second key which is a key of a connectivity enabling function enabling connectivity of the device with the core network via a local access network, by inputting the first key and specific input parameters to a key derivation function used to calculate the second key; and establish the connectivity of the device with the core network via the connectivity enabling function, based on the second key.
33. The apparatus of claim 32, wherein the at least one memory and the computer program code are configured to, with the at least one processor, cause the apparatus further to: provide the first key via an authentication and key agreement process performed between the device, the local access network and the core network in association with the registration procedure which is associated with the authentication procedure which is a primary authentication procedure.
34. The apparatus of claim 33, wherein the authentication and key agreement process is performed for each registration procedure initiated by the device.
35. The apparatus of claim 32 or 33, wherein the specific input parameters comprise a non-access stratum, NAS, count.
36. The apparatus of claim 35, wherein the NAS count is a fixed constant value.
37. The apparatus of claim 35, wherein the at least one memory and the computer program code are configured to, with the at least one processor, cause the apparatus further to: determine the NAS count from at least one of a random value or a counter value.
38. The apparatus of claim 37, wherein the at least one memory and the computer program code are configured to, with the at least one processor, cause the apparatus further to: provide at least one of the random value or an initial value of the counter value to the connectivity enabling function via payload associated with the authentication procedure.
39. The apparatus of claim 37 or 38, wherein the at least one memory and the computer program code are configured to, with the at least one processor, cause the apparatus further to: increment the counter value upon a request to register the device in association with the registration procedure which is associated with the authentication procedure which is not a primary authentication procedure.
40. The apparatus of claim 37 or 38, wherein the at least one memory and the computer program code are configured to, with the at least one processor, cause the apparatus further to:provide the random value to the connectivity enabling function via payload associated with the registration procedure which is associated with the authentication procedure which is not a primary authentication procedure.
Citation Information
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Methods providing non-3GPP access using access network keys and related wireless terminals and network nodes
US20200178076A1
