Method and system for generating assistance information for accurate risk identification and monitoring of and early warning for amphibious aircraft

Abstract

Disclosed in the present invention are a method and system for generating assistance information for accurate risk identification and monitoring of and early warning for an amphibious aircraft. The method comprises the following steps: collecting several typical risk cases related to flight, and sorting same to obtain several pieces of case information; constructing a risk analysis model; classifying the several typical risk cases into different categories, analyzing commonality and features, and performing comprehensive evaluation by means of the risk analysis model; selecting representative typical risk cases on the basis of a comprehensive evaluation result, using the risk analysis model to obtain possible risk factors, and determining main risk factors under different categories by means of empirical research and complexity analysis; and on the basis of the main risk factors, formulating accurate risk standards, and then classifying same to obtain classified risk standards. The present invention achieves the aim of improving the safety and reliability of test flight activity of an amphibious aircraft.

Description

Auxiliary information generation method and system for accurate risk identification and monitoring and early warning of amphibious aircraft Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of flight safety and risk management technology, and in particular to a method and system for generating auxiliary information for accurate risk identification, monitoring and early warning of amphibious aircraft. Background Art

[0002] With the continuous development of the aviation industry and the increase in the number of flights, flight safety has gradually become a global concern. Research on accurate risk identification methods is a key task for both aviation operators and manufacturers in the field of flight safety. Through systematic analysis and assessment of various flight safety risk factors, accurate identification and prediction of flight safety risks can be achieved, enabling appropriate measures to mitigate risks and ultimately reduce costs and improve quality.

[0003] Over the past decade, domestic and international scholars have used methods such as fuzzy hierarchical analysis, gray correlation analysis, fuzzy comprehensive evaluation, Bayesian network models, and cluster analysis to assess flight safety risks, and have validated these methods through real-world case studies. Wang Fei et al. applied fuzzy hierarchical analysis to evaluate flight safety and analyzed and summarized various risk factors during flight tests. Wang Xiaohong et al. used a Bayesian network model to assess flight safety and validated the method through real-world case studies. These studies have provided a theoretical foundation and practical guidance for flight safety. Using various methods, they have analyzed aviation accidents and incidents, identified the primary factors leading to them, and proposed corresponding early warning measures.

[0004] In summary, accurate risk identification, monitoring, and early warning methods have broad application prospects and research value in the field of flight safety. However, for amphibious aircraft, due to the lack of maturity of domestically developed amphibious aircraft, there are not yet enough unsafe incidents. The aforementioned qualitative and quantitative methods require a sufficient number of events for analysis to achieve accurate identification. Therefore, there is a lack of effective technical means for accurate risk identification, monitoring, and early warning for amphibious aircraft.

[0005] Summary of the Invention

[0006] In order to overcome the shortcomings of the existing technology, the present invention provides a method and system for generating auxiliary information for accurate risk identification and monitoring and early warning of amphibious aircraft, which is used to solve the technical problem of lack of effective technical means in accurate risk identification and monitoring and early warning of amphibious aircraft, thereby achieving the purpose of improving the safety and reliability of amphibious aircraft test flight activities.

[0007] In order to solve the above problems, the technical solutions adopted by the present invention are as follows:

[0008] A method for generating auxiliary information for accurate risk identification and monitoring and early warning of amphibious aircraft includes the following steps:

[0009] Collect several typical risk cases related to flight, and systematically organize the typical risk cases to obtain several case information;

[0010] Construct risk analysis models suitable for classification case analysis;

[0011] Based on the collated case data, the typical risk cases are divided into different categories, the commonalities and characteristics of the typical risk cases in different categories are analyzed respectively, and a comprehensive assessment of the typical risk cases in different categories is conducted using the risk analysis model;

[0012] Based on the comprehensive assessment results, representative risk cases are selected from each category, and the risk analysis model is used to obtain the possible risk factors under different categories;

[0013] Based on the possible risk factors described, and through empirical research and complexity analysis, identify the main risk factors under different categories;

[0014] Based on the main risk factors under the different categories, precise risk standards are formulated, and they are classified according to the degree of risk and the scope of impact to obtain classified risk standards.

[0015] As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, when the typical risk cases are divided into different categories, it includes:

[0016] The typical risk cases are divided into system-level assessment, equipment-level assessment and operation-level assessment.

[0017] As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, when analyzing the commonalities and characteristics of typical risk cases under different categories and conducting a comprehensive assessment, the following steps are included:

[0018] In the system-level assessment, the fault tree analysis method is used to divide the typical risk cases in the system-level assessment into different stages, and various possibilities are analyzed in detail; the event tree analysis method is used to quantitatively evaluate and optimize the design of typical risk cases in the system-level assessment.

[0019] As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, when analyzing the commonalities and characteristics of typical risk cases under different categories and conducting a comprehensive assessment, the following steps are included:

[0020] In the equipment-level assessment, the failure mode and effects analysis method is used to analyze the equipment hazard level of typical risk cases in the equipment-level assessment to determine the hazard level of the equipment;

[0021] In the operational level assessment, the flight simulation equipment verification method is used to simulate and evaluate the pilot's operational behavior in typical risk cases in the operational level assessment, and to formulate the risk level of the operation.

[0022] As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, when constructing a risk analysis model, it includes:

[0023] Selecting the HAZOP analysis method as the risk analysis model;

[0024] When getting the possible risk factors under different categories, including:

[0025] Analyze different components, systems, and procedures through the HAZOP analysis method to obtain abnormal patterns and potential risks in different safety aspects;

[0026] The possible risk factors include the abnormal mode and the potential risks.

[0027] As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the method further includes:

[0028] Based on a comprehensive assessment of typical risk cases under different categories and the possible risk factors under different categories, a HAZOP-risk matrix model is obtained by combining the HAZOP analysis method with a risk matrix, and potential risks are further assessed based on the HAZOP-risk matrix model.

[0029] As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, when further evaluating potential risks according to the HAZOP-risk matrix model, it includes:

[0030] Determine the research object: determine the system process to be analyzed and determine the theme of the HAZOP analysis;

[0031] Forming a HAZOP team: Forming a HAZOP team with different professional backgrounds, including flight crew, designers, manual compilers, and safety experts;

[0032] Develop a HAZOP plan: The HAZOP plan includes the timeline, scope, and objectives of the analysis;

[0033] Define HAZOP nodes: Divide typical risk cases into different parts and define a HAZOP node for each part;

[0034] Select HAZOP vocabulary: Use HAZOP-specific vocabulary and terminology to describe possible changes or deviations at each HAZOP point;

[0035] Perform HAZOP analysis: Select NIA diagram or NIC diagram to perform HAZOP analysis on each HAZOP node;

[0036] Analyze HAZOP results: Analyze various aspects of the system according to the HAZOP analysis method to identify potential risks, and organize the HAZOP analysis results into a list or table to record the severity and likelihood of each potential risk;

[0037] Determine risk level: Use the risk matrix to evaluate the HAZOP analysis results and determine the risk level of each potential risk.

[0038] As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, when performing HAZOP analysis on each HAZOP node, it includes:

[0039] Determine the HAZOP nodes to be analyzed and their functions;

[0040] Define the input, output and control parameters of the HAZOP node;

[0041] List possible deviations or anomalies;

[0042] Define the severity and likelihood of each deviation or anomaly;

[0043] Identify causes and consequences and assess their risks;

[0044] Propose control measures for each risk;

[0045] Summarize all risks and determine a comprehensive control strategy.

[0046] As a preferred embodiment of the present invention, when obtaining the classified risk criteria, it includes:

[0047] Obtain risk criteria for developing flight procedures;

[0048] Obtain risk criteria for simulating various risk situations in flight training;

[0049] Obtain risk criteria for developing appropriate standards and procedures for inspecting the condition of each aircraft component;

[0050] Obtain risk criteria for various parameters of monitored aircraft.

[0051] An auxiliary information generation system for accurate risk identification, monitoring and early warning of amphibious aircraft, comprising:

[0052] Collection unit: used to collect several typical risk cases related to flight, and systematically organize the several typical risk cases to obtain several case information;

[0053] Analysis model building unit: used to build a risk analysis model suitable for classification case analysis;

[0054] Comprehensive evaluation unit: used to classify the typical risk cases into different categories based on the sorted case data, analyze the commonalities and characteristics of the typical risk cases in different categories, and conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the typical risk cases in different categories using the risk analysis model;

[0055] Risk factor determination unit: used to select representative typical risk cases from each category based on the comprehensive assessment results, and use the risk analysis model to obtain possible risk factors under different categories; based on the possible risk factors, and through empirical research and complexity analysis, determine the main risk factors under different categories;

[0056] Risk Standard Development Unit: This unit is used to develop precise risk standards based on the main risk factors under different categories, and classify them according to the risk level and impact scope to obtain classified risk standards;

[0057] Early warning unit: used to identify the risks of current unsafe events according to the classified risk standards, and provide response plans and early warning measures.

[0058] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0059] (1) The present invention constructs a risk analysis model by analyzing existing typical risk cases of amphibious aircraft, and generates auxiliary information (risk criteria) based on the risk analysis model, so that analysts can accurately identify and monitor and warn of possible future risks of amphibious aircraft based on the risk criteria;

[0060] (2) The present invention aims to discover the risk patterns and characteristics of amphibious aircraft flight test activities, improve the scientificity and objectivity of amphibious aircraft flight test risk assessment, provide a scientific basis and decision-making support for amphibious aircraft flight test activities, and at the same time, provide manufacturers with effective risk management tools to help them better understand the risk situation of amphibious aircraft flight test activities, take effective measures to prevent and respond to risks, and ensure the safe and smooth progress of flight test activities;

[0061] (3) The present invention can analyze and evaluate various risk factors during the flight test of amphibious aircraft to obtain corresponding auxiliary information, and use the auxiliary information to accurately identify the risks existing in the flight test, control and manage the risk factors existing in the flight test, formulate corresponding risk control measures and emergency plans, optimize the flight test plan and process, and improve the efficiency and quality of the flight test;

[0062] (4) The present invention abstracts various risk factors in the amphibious aircraft flight test process into features, establishes a feature library, and uses machine learning and other technologies to analyze and mine the features, thereby establishing a risk analysis model and obtaining auxiliary information. During the flight test process, through real-time monitoring and analysis of the flight test data, the flight test data is matched with the corresponding auxiliary information, potential risks are discovered in a timely manner, and early warnings and interventions are carried out, thereby effectively improving the safety of amphibious aircraft flight tests.

[0063] The present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0064] FIG1 is a flow chart of a method for generating auxiliary information for accurate risk identification and monitoring and early warning of amphibious aircraft according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0065] FIG2 is a process diagram of a fault tree analysis method for hydraulic pressure source failure in an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0066] The auxiliary information generation method for accurate risk identification and monitoring and early warning of amphibious aircraft provided by the present invention, as shown in FIG1 , includes the following steps:

[0067] Step 1: Collect several typical risk cases related to flight and systematically organize them to obtain some case information;

[0068] Step 2: Construct a risk analysis model suitable for classification case analysis;

[0069] Step 3: Based on the collated case data, several typical risk cases are divided into different categories. The commonalities and characteristics of the typical risk cases in different categories are analyzed respectively. Finally, a comprehensive assessment of the typical risk cases in different categories is conducted using the risk analysis model.

[0070] Step 4: Based on the comprehensive assessment results, select representative risk cases from each category and use the risk analysis model to identify possible risk factors in different categories. Based on these possible risk factors, and through empirical research and complexity analysis, determine the main risk factors in different categories.

[0071] Step 5: Develop precise risk standards based on the main risk factors under different categories, and classify them according to the degree of risk and scope of impact to obtain classified risk standards.

[0072] Analysts can use the classified risk standards (auxiliary information) obtained by the present invention to identify the risks of current unsafe events and provide response plans and early warning measures to prevent and control the occurrence of risks.

[0073] In the above step 1, the case information includes information on failure causes, impact assessment, conclusions, etc.

[0074] In the above step 2, the risk analysis model constructed includes risk sources, risk factors, risk assessment and risk prediction.

[0075] In step 3 above, when classifying several typical risk cases into different categories, they include:

[0076] Several typical risk cases are divided into system-level assessment, equipment-level assessment and operation-level assessment.

[0077] In step 3 above, when analyzing the commonalities and characteristics of typical risk cases under different categories and conducting a comprehensive assessment, the following should be considered:

[0078] In the system-level assessment, the fault tree analysis method is used to divide the typical risk cases in the system-level assessment into different stages, and various possibilities are analyzed in detail; the event tree analysis method is used to quantitatively evaluate and optimize the design of typical risk cases in the system-level assessment.

[0079] In step 3 above, when analyzing the commonalities and characteristics of typical risk cases under different categories and conducting a comprehensive assessment, the following should be considered:

[0080] In the equipment-level assessment, the failure mode and effects analysis method is used to analyze the equipment hazard level of typical risk cases in the equipment-level assessment to determine the hazard level of the equipment;

[0081] In the operational level assessment, the flight simulation equipment verification method is used to simulate and evaluate the pilot's operational behavior in typical risk cases in the operational level assessment, and to formulate the risk level of the operation.

[0082] In step 2 above, when building the risk analysis model, the following should be included:

[0083] The HAZOP analysis method is selected as the risk analysis model.

[0084] Specifically, the HAZOP analysis method (Hazard and Operability Study) is selected as the risk analysis model. The HAZOP analysis method is a method commonly used in risk assessment and accident prevention.

[0085] In step 4 above, when obtaining possible risk factors under different categories, they include:

[0086] Analyze different components, systems, and procedures through HAZOP analysis methods to obtain abnormal patterns and potential risks in different safety aspects;

[0087] Among them, possible risk factors include abnormal patterns and potential risks.

[0088] Furthermore, the method provided by the present invention further includes:

[0089] Based on a comprehensive assessment of typical risk cases in different categories and the possible risk factors in different categories, the HAZOP analysis method and the risk matrix are combined to obtain the HAZOP-risk matrix model, and potential risks are further evaluated based on the HAZOP-risk matrix model.

[0090] Specifically, combining the HAZOP analysis method with the risk matrix can assess potential risks more comprehensively and systematically.

[0091] Furthermore, when further evaluating potential risks according to the HAZOP-risk matrix model, including:

[0092] Determine the research object: determine the system process to be analyzed and determine the theme of the HAZOP analysis;

[0093] Forming a HAZOP team: Forming a HAZOP team with different professional backgrounds, including flight crew, designers, manual compilers, and safety experts;

[0094] Develop a HAZOP plan: The HAZOP plan includes the timeline, scope, and objectives of the analysis;

[0095] Define HAZOP nodes: Divide typical risk cases into different parts and define a HAZOP node for each part;

[0096] Select HAZOP vocabulary: Use HAZOP-specific vocabulary and terminology to describe possible changes or deviations at each HAZOP point;

[0097] Perform HAZOP analysis: Select NIA diagram or NIC diagram to perform HAZOP analysis on each HAZOP node;

[0098] Analyze HAZOP results: Analyze all aspects of the system according to the HAZOP analysis method to identify potential risks, and organize the HAZOP analysis results into a list or table to record the severity and likelihood of each potential risk;

[0099] Determine risk level: Use the risk matrix to evaluate the HAZOP analysis results and determine the risk level of each potential risk.

[0100] Furthermore, when conducting a HAZOP analysis for each HAZOP node, include:

[0101] Determine the HAZOP nodes to be analyzed and their functions;

[0102] Define the input, output and control parameters of the HAZOP node;

[0103] List possible deviations or anomalies;

[0104] Define the severity and likelihood of each deviation or anomaly;

[0105] Identify causes and consequences and assess their risks;

[0106] Propose control measures for each risk;

[0107] Summarize all risks and determine a comprehensive control strategy.

[0108] In step 6 above, when the classified risk criteria are obtained, they include:

[0109] Obtain risk criteria for developing flight procedures;

[0110] Obtain risk criteria for simulating various risk situations in flight training;

[0111] Obtain risk criteria for developing appropriate standards and procedures for inspecting the condition of each aircraft component;

[0112] Obtain risk criteria for various parameters of monitored aircraft.

[0113] Specifically, flight procedures: Flight procedures are the basis of flight safety, which include various regulations and standards. When formulating flight procedures, various risk factors must be considered, such as weather, mechanical failure, etc., and corresponding standards and procedures must be formulated. Manufacturers generally reflect this in the Flight Crew Operations (FCOM) manual.

[0114] Training: Various risk situations need to be simulated during flight training so that the flight crew can understand how to deal with different risks.

[0115] Maintenance: Maintenance personnel need to regularly check the condition of each aircraft component and develop corresponding standards and procedures.

[0116] Monitoring: Flight monitoring is one of the important means to ensure flight safety. By monitoring various aircraft parameters, potential risks can be discovered in a timely manner and corresponding measures can be taken to reduce the risks.

[0117] The auxiliary information generation system for accurate risk identification and monitoring and early warning of amphibious aircraft provided by the present invention includes: a collection unit, an analysis model construction unit, a comprehensive evaluation unit, a risk factor determination unit, a risk standard formulation unit and an early warning prompt unit.

[0118] Collection unit: used to collect several typical risk cases related to flight, and systematically organize several typical risk cases to obtain several case information.

[0119] Analysis model building unit: used to build risk analysis models suitable for classification case analysis.

[0120] Comprehensive assessment unit: used to classify several typical risk cases into different categories based on the sorted case data, analyze the commonalities and characteristics of typical risk cases in different categories, and conduct comprehensive assessments of typical risk cases in different categories through risk analysis models.

[0121] Risk factor determination unit: used to select representative typical risk cases from each category based on the comprehensive assessment results, and use the risk analysis model to obtain the possible risk factors under different categories; based on the possible risk factors, and through empirical research and complexity analysis, determine the main risk factors under different categories.

[0122] Risk Standard Development Unit: Used to develop precise risk standards based on the main risk factors under different categories, and classify them according to the risk level and impact scope to obtain classified risk standards.

[0123] Early warning unit: used to identify the risks of current unsafe events based on the classified risk standards, and provide response plans and early warning measures to prevent and control the occurrence of risks.

[0124] The following examples are provided to further illustrate the present invention, but the scope of the present invention is not limited thereto.

[0125] This embodiment analyzes the unsafe event of low pressure at the center right hydraulic source, extracts risk features, and uses these features to establish a risk analysis model to identify and warn of potential risks during the flight test. The specific process is as follows:

[0126] Collect flight-related events and organize them systematically to obtain information on failure causes, impact assessments, conclusions, etc.

[0127] During flight, low pressure in the center-right hydraulic source is a common risk factor that can lead to aircraft system malfunction or failure. Since there are relatively few typical flight-related risk cases collected from domestically developed amphibious aircraft, we analyzed the risk analysis model for "center-right hydraulic source failure" by combining it with other aircraft models. The following typical risk cases are shown in Table 1.

[0128] Table 1 Typical risk cases of right hydraulic source failure for each model

[0129] Construct a risk analysis model suitable for classified case analysis, including risk sources, risk factors, risk assessment and risk prediction.

[0130] In this embodiment, a risk analysis model is constructed based on the unsafe event of "failure of the center right hydraulic source" of an amphibious aircraft under development, as shown in Table 2.

[0131] Table 2 Risk analysis model

[0132] Based on the collated case data, cases of different events are divided into different categories, and the commonalities and characteristics under each category are analyzed respectively, and a comprehensive evaluation is performed through the risk analysis model.

[0133] The different categories can be divided into the following aspects: system level, equipment level, and operation level assessment.

[0134] (1) System: The system-level assessment focuses on the safety of the entire flight system, including the airframe structure, power system, control system, avionics system, etc. After the "center right hydraulic source low pressure" alarm occurs, the entire hydraulic system needs to be evaluated to confirm whether there is a system failure or damage, and whether it will affect other systems.

[0135] (2) Equipment: The equipment level assessment is mainly aimed at the equipment that affects flight safety, including hydraulic pumps, hydraulic lines, hydraulic valves, etc. After the "low pressure of the center right hydraulic source" alarm occurs, it is necessary to evaluate the working status of the hydraulic pump, the connection status of the hydraulic lines, the opening and closing status of the hydraulic valves during maintenance work, etc., to confirm whether there is any equipment failure or damage, and whether it will affect flight safety, so as to determine the hazard level.

[0136] (3) Operation: The evaluation of the operation level mainly focuses on the evaluation of the pilot's operational behavior, including the response speed and correctness of the alarm, as well as the accuracy of the operation. After the "low pressure of the center right hydraulic source" alarm occurs, it is necessary to evaluate the pilot's response ability to confirm whether he can correctly identify the alarm information and take the correct measures to deal with it, so as to determine the risk level of flight safety.

[0137] Different decision rules and risk assessment algorithms can be developed based on the different levels of the aforementioned assessment classification. For example, in a system-level assessment, a fault tree analysis method can be used to troubleshoot and analyze possible faults in the hydraulic system, thereby determining the system's safety risk level. In an equipment-level assessment, a failure mode and effects analysis method can be used to analyze the failure modes and potential impacts of hydraulic equipment, thereby determining the equipment's safety risk level. In an operational-level assessment, a simulation method can be used to simulate and evaluate pilot operational behavior, thereby determining the operational safety risk level.

[0138] In summary, for the low pressure alarm of the center-right hydraulic source, it is necessary to conduct a risk assessment by comprehensively considering the three aspects of system, equipment and operation, and formulate corresponding judgment rules and risk assessment algorithms to clarify the risk assessment standards and processes to ensure flight safety.

[0139] Different decision rules and risk assessment algorithms can be developed based on the different levels of assessment classification described above. At the system level, fault tree analysis can be used. This method divides events into different stages and analyzes various possibilities. This method can be used to analyze various risk events, quantitatively evaluate them, and optimize the design to improve flight safety.

[0140] Therefore, we conducted a classification analysis and risk factor screening for the failure of the center right hydraulic source on a domestically developed amphibious aircraft. First, we conducted a system-level assessment, using a detailed fault tree analysis for the failure of the center hydraulic source, as shown in Figure 2. Since the impact of the failure of the right hydraulic source is similar, we will not elaborate on it further.

[0141] Table 3 Impact assessment of various aircraft systems

[0142] In the equipment-level assessment, the failure mode and effects analysis method can be used to determine the hazard level of the equipment. From Table 3 above, it can be seen that the "failure of the center right hydraulic source" may have an impact on the flight control system. Therefore, the hazard level of the relevant equipment is further identified as shown in Table 4.

[0143] Table 4 Safety level assessment of flight control system related equipment

[0144] During the flight test and development phase, operational level assessments are typically conducted using flight simulator verification methods. This method simulates and evaluates pilot operational behavior, resulting in a Class II operational risk level. During operational verification, it should be noted that the flight simulator must meet the requirements for maintaining a minimum operating surface for the primary flight control system. In the event that the combined 12 tons of water cannot be dropped, it should be determined whether the pilot can control the aircraft to land at a descent speed of 1.8 m / s under these conditions, minimizing the impact of a hard landing. If the pilot is unable to complete this emergency procedure, further assessment of the impact of a hard landing under these conditions may be necessary.

[0145] The HAZOP method (Hazard and Operability Study) was selected as a risk analysis model. It is a method commonly used for risk assessment and accident prevention. HAZOP analysis can identify abnormal patterns and potential risks in different safety aspects by analyzing different components, systems, and procedures.

[0146] Based on case classification analysis and risk factor screening, combining HAZOP analysis with a risk matrix can help assess potential risks more comprehensively and systematically. "HAZOP + Risk Matrix" risk assessment is a combined analysis method that builds on traditional HAZOP analysis and utilizes a risk matrix to assess risk. In this method, HAZOP analysis results determine the risk level based on the severity of accident consequences and the likelihood of an accident occurring. Appropriate countermeasures are then implemented to ensure that risks remain within acceptable limits.

[0147] The steps of the HAZOP-risk matrix model are shown in Table 5 below.

[0148] Table 5 HAZOP-risk matrix model steps

[0149] The general steps for conducting a HAZOP analysis for each node include but are not limited to: 1) determining the node to be analyzed and its function; 2) defining the input, output, and control parameters of the node; 3) listing possible deviations or abnormalities; 4) defining the severity and likelihood of each deviation or abnormality; 5) determining the causes and consequences and assessing their risks; 6) proposing control measures for each risk; and 7) summarizing all risks and determining a comprehensive control strategy.

[0150] The accident consequence classification system commonly used by civil aviation at home and abroad is the "Accident Severity Classification Table" of ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization).

[0151] The table divides the accident consequences into the following 5 levels:

[0152] Catastrophic: Causing the death of so many people and / or the destruction of aircraft that repair is impossible.

[0153] Serious: Dozens or more dead and / or aircraft destroyed, possibly beyond repair.

[0154] Major: Several or more fatalities and / or serious damage to the aircraft, requiring major repairs or replacement.

[0155] Minor: Minor casualties and / or minor damage to the aircraft that can be repaired.

[0156] No damage: No casualties and / or no damage to the aircraft.

[0157] Aircraft equipment risk standards and associated values ​​established by different countries may differ. Here are some common examples: The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) stipulates a maximum risk probability of one accident per hour, corresponding to a risk index of 10-9. This standard is considered one of the strictest in the world. The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) requires that new aircraft have a risk index of less than 10-7, while older aircraft must meet even stricter standards. The Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) has similarly established standards, requiring new aircraft to have a risk index of less than 10-7, while older aircraft must meet even stricter standards.

[0158] Therefore, a risk matrix table is constructed on this basis, as shown in Table 6.

[0159] Table 6 Risk Matrix

[0160] Acceptable risk A represents 1 event per 1 million flight hours; pending risk B represents 1 event per 100 million flight hours; and unacceptable risk C represents 1 event per 1 billion flight hours. It should be noted that these figures are for reference only; actual figures may be affected by various factors, such as the operator's safety management, pilot skill level, and aircraft performance parameters.

[0161] The deviation analysis results of the external leakage in the low-pressure HAZOP of the middle right hydraulic source are shown in Table 7.

[0162] Table 7 Leakage HAZOP analysis results

[0163] Furthermore, the risk standard determination involves the following aspects:

[0164] 1) Flight procedures: Flight procedures are the basis of flight safety, which include various regulations and standards. When formulating flight procedures, various risk factors must be considered, such as weather and mechanical failures, and corresponding standards and procedures must be formulated. Manufacturers generally reflect these in the Flight Crew Operations (FCOM) manual.

[0165] 2) Training: Various risk situations need to be simulated during flight training so that the flight crew can understand how to deal with different risks.

[0166] 3) Maintenance: Maintenance personnel need to regularly check the condition of each aircraft component and establish corresponding standards and procedures.

[0167] 4) Monitoring: Flight monitoring is one of the important means to ensure flight safety. By monitoring various aircraft parameters, potential risks can be discovered in a timely manner and corresponding measures can be taken to reduce the risks.

[0168] It's important to note that these standards are based on universal flight safety considerations for a domestically developed amphibious aircraft. Of course, in actual implementation, different aircraft models may differ due to differences in systems, principles, and operational requirements, requiring different implementation details and monitoring measures.

[0169] Therefore, combined with the above risk criteria, the following four aspects are involved:

[0170] 1) Characteristics of aircraft models and hydraulic systems: Hydraulic systems of different aircraft models may have different working principles and failure manifestations, and corresponding risk standards need to be formulated based on specific circumstances.

[0171] 2) Flight environment and flight mission: Different flight environments and missions may have different impacts on the operation of the hydraulic system, and the impact of these factors on risks needs to be considered.

[0172] 3) Maintenance and servicing: The aircraft maintenance and servicing status has a significant impact on the normal operation and failure rate of the hydraulic system, and the maintenance and servicing status needs to be evaluated.

[0173] 4) Skills and experience of pilots and maintenance personnel: Skills and experience have a significant impact on the ability to cope with hydraulic system failures, and their training and evaluation need to be monitored and quality controlled.

[0174] The above embodiments are only preferred embodiments of the present invention and cannot be used to limit the scope of protection of the present invention. Any non-substantial changes and replacements made by technicians in this field on the basis of the present invention fall within the scope of protection required by the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for generating auxiliary information for accurate risk identification and monitoring and early warning of amphibious aircraft, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: Collect several typical risk cases related to flight, and systematically organize the typical risk cases to obtain several case information; Construct risk analysis models suitable for classified case analysis; According to the collated case data, the typical risk cases are divided into different categories, the commonalities and characteristics of the typical risk cases in different categories are analyzed respectively, and the typical risk cases in different categories are comprehensively evaluated through the risk analysis model; According to the comprehensive evaluation results, representative typical risk cases are selected from each category, and the risk analysis model is used to obtain the possible risk factors under different categories; Based on the possible risk factors described, determine the main risk factors under different categories through empirical research and complexity analysis; Based on the main risk factors under the different categories, precise risk standards are formulated, and they are classified according to the degree of risk and the scope of impact to obtain classified risk standards.

2. The auxiliary information generation method for accurate risk identification and monitoring and early warning of amphibious aircraft according to claim 1 is characterized in that: When classifying the several typical risk cases into different categories, they include: The several typical risk cases are divided into system-level assessment, equipment-level assessment and operation-level assessment.

3. The auxiliary information generation method for accurate risk identification and monitoring and early warning of amphibious aircraft according to claim 2 is characterized in that: When analyzing the commonalities and characteristics of typical risk cases under different categories and conducting a comprehensive assessment, the following should be included: In the system-level assessment, the fault tree analysis method is used to analyze the typical risks in the system-level assessment. The cases are divided into different stages, and various possibilities are analyzed in detail; the event tree analysis method is used to quantitatively evaluate and optimize the design of typical risk cases in system-level assessments.

4. The auxiliary information generation method for accurate risk identification and monitoring and early warning of amphibious aircraft according to claim 2 is characterized in that: When analyzing the commonalities and characteristics of typical risk cases under different categories and conducting a comprehensive assessment, the following should be included: In the equipment-level assessment, the failure mode and effect analysis method is used to analyze the equipment hazard level of typical risk cases in the equipment-level assessment to determine the hazard level of the equipment; In the assessment of the operational level, the flight simulation equipment verification method is used to simulate and evaluate the pilot's operational behavior in typical risk cases in the assessment of the operational level, and to formulate the risk level of the operation.

5. The auxiliary information generation method for accurate risk identification and monitoring and early warning of amphibious aircraft according to claim 1 is characterized in that: When building a risk analysis model, include: Selecting the HAZOP analysis method as the risk analysis model; When getting the possible risk factors under different categories, including: Analyze different components, systems, and programs through the HAZOP analysis method to obtain abnormal modes and potential risks in different safety aspects; The possible risk factors include the abnormal mode and the potential risks.

6. The auxiliary information generation method for accurate risk identification and monitoring and early warning of amphibious aircraft according to claim 5 is characterized in that: The method further comprises: Based on a comprehensive evaluation of typical risk cases under different categories and the possible risk factors under different categories, a HAZOP-risk matrix model is obtained by combining the HAZOP analysis method with the risk matrix, and potential risks are further evaluated based on the HAZOP-risk matrix model.

7. The auxiliary information generation method for accurate risk identification and monitoring and early warning of amphibious aircraft according to claim 6 is characterized in that: When further evaluating potential risks according to the HAZOP-risk matrix model, include: Determine the research object: determine the system process to be analyzed and determine the theme of the HAZOP analysis; Formation of HAZOP team: Formation of HAZOP team with different professional backgrounds, including flight crew, designers, manual compilers, and safety experts; Develop a HAZOP plan: The HAZOP plan includes the timeline, scope, and objectives of the analysis; Define HAZOP nodes: Divide typical risk cases into different parts and define a HAZOP node for each part; Select HAZOP vocabulary: Use HAZOP-specific vocabulary and terminology to describe possible changes or deviations at each HAZOP point; Conduct HAZOP analysis: Select NIA diagram or NIC diagram to conduct HAZOP analysis on each HAZOP node; Analyze HAZOP results: According to the HAZOP analysis method, analyze various aspects of the system to identify potential risks, and organize the HAZOP analysis results into a list or table to record the severity and likelihood of each potential risk; Determine risk level: Use the risk matrix to evaluate the HAZOP analysis results and determine the risk level of each potential risk.

8. The auxiliary information generation method for accurate risk identification and monitoring and early warning of amphibious aircraft according to claim 7 is characterized in that: When conducting a HAZOP analysis for each HAZOP node, include: Determine the HAZOP nodes to be analyzed and their functions; Define the input, output and control parameters of the HAZOP node; List possible deviations or anomalies; Define the severity and likelihood of each deviation or anomaly; Identify causes and consequences and assess their risks; Propose control measures for each risk; Summarize all risks and determine comprehensive control strategies.

9. The auxiliary information generation method for accurate risk identification and monitoring and early warning of amphibious aircraft according to claim 1 is characterized in that: When the classified risk criteria are obtained, they include: Obtain risk criteria for developing flight procedures; Obtain risk criteria for simulating various risk situations in flight training; Obtain risk criteria for developing appropriate standards and procedures for inspecting the condition of each aircraft component; Get the risk criteria for various parameters of the monitored aircraft.

10. An auxiliary information generation system for accurate risk identification and monitoring and early warning of amphibious aircraft, characterized in that: include: Collection unit: used to collect several typical risk cases related to flight, and systematically organize the several typical risk cases to obtain several case information; Analysis model building unit: used to build a risk analysis model suitable for classification case analysis; Comprehensive evaluation unit: used to classify the typical risk cases into different categories according to the sorted case data, analyze the commonalities and characteristics of the typical risk cases in different categories respectively, and conduct comprehensive evaluation on the typical risk cases in different categories through the risk analysis model; Risk factor determination unit: used to select representative typical risk cases from each category according to the comprehensive evaluation results, and obtain possible risk factors under different categories using the risk analysis model; Based on the possible risk factors described, determine the main risk factors under different categories through empirical research and complexity analysis; Risk Standards Development Unit: used to develop precise risk standards based on the main risk factors under different categories. The risk standards are determined and classified according to the risk degree and impact scope to obtain the classified risk standards.

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