Network node, terminal, and communication method

Abstract

A network node according to the present invention comprises a reception unit that receives a trust evaluation request message that includes a trust certificate for a terminal or a user from a specific network node that has received a message that includes the trust certificate from the terminal, a control unit that executes trust evaluation processing that uses the trust certificate, and a transmission unit that transmits trust evaluation results to the specific network node.

Description

Network node, terminal, and communication method

[0001] The present invention relates to a network node, a terminal, and a communication method in a communication system.

[0002] 3GPP (registered trademark) (3rd Generation Partnership Project) has introduced a wireless communication system called 5G or NR (New Radio) (hereinafter, the wireless communication system will be referred to as "5G" or "NR") in order to achieve a larger system capacity, a higher data transmission speed, and a lower latency in wireless sections. 5G introduces various wireless technologies to meet the requirement of achieving a throughput of 10 Gbps or more while reducing latency in wireless sections to 1 ms or less. Furthermore, 6G, a future communication system, is also being studied.

[0003] Furthermore, a roaming service is provided in which a telecommunications carrier's network (network) provides a network to users / UEs with whom the carrier has no direct contractual relationship. A network that is not the user's original contracted network is called a VPLMN / Visited NW. Network connection authentication during roaming in a VPLMN is performed in the user's original contracted network (HPLMN / Home NW) using a key shared between the SIM card installed in the user's UE and the HPLMN, and the VPLMN trusts the result.

[0004] 3GPP TS 23.502 V18.3.0 (2023-09)W3C Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0, https: / / www.w3.org / TR / did-core / W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model v1.1, https: / / www.w3.org / TR / vc-data-model /

[0005] However, in the conventional technology, the network side does not perform highly reliable trust verification for the user / UE. Furthermore, the UE side does not perform highly reliable trust verification for the network. Therefore, there is a problem that a highly reliable VPLMN connection cannot be achieved. This problem can occur not only in VPLMN connections. For example, it can also occur in HPLMN connections, service provision after connection, etc.

[0006] The present invention has been made in view of the above points, and has an object to provide a technology for performing highly reliable trust verification in a network or a terminal.

[0007] According to the disclosed technology, a network node is provided that includes: a receiving unit that receives a trust evaluation request message including a trust certificate of a terminal or a user from a specific network node that has received a message including the trust certificate from the terminal; a control unit that executes a trust evaluation process using the trust certificate; and a transmitting unit that transmits a trust evaluation result to the specific network node.

[0008] The disclosed technology provides a technology for performing highly reliable trust verification in a network or a terminal.

[0009] FIG. 1 is a diagram for explaining an example of a communication system. FIG. 1 is a diagram for explaining an example of a communication system in a roaming environment. FIG. 2 is a diagram for explaining a system configuration example A. FIG. 3 is a diagram for explaining a system configuration example B. FIG. 4 is a diagram for explaining a system configuration example C. FIG. 5 is a diagram for explaining a trust certificate issuance form 1. FIG. 6 is a diagram for explaining a trust certificate issuance form 2. FIG. 7 is a diagram for explaining an embodiment a. FIG. 8 is a diagram for explaining an embodiment b. FIG. 9 is a diagram for explaining an embodiment c. FIG. 10 is a diagram for explaining a user / UE trust evaluation process. FIG. 11 is a diagram for explaining a NW trust evaluation process. FIG. 12 is a diagram for explaining an example of a functional configuration of a network node 100 in an embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 13 is a diagram for explaining an example of a hardware configuration of a terminal 20 and a network node 100 in an embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 14 is a diagram for explaining an example of a configuration of a vehicle 2001 in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0010] Hereinafter, an embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings. Note that the embodiment described below is an example, and the embodiment to which the present invention is applied is not limited to the following embodiment.

[0011] In operation of the wireless communication system according to the embodiment of the present invention, existing technologies are used as appropriate. The existing technologies include, but are not limited to, the existing LTE or the existing NR.

[0012] In addition, in this specification, unless otherwise clearly indicated from the context, "A / B" means "A or B." Furthermore, "A or B" includes A only, B only, and "A and B."

[0013] In the following, we will first explain an example configuration of a 5G core network, which is an example of a network in which trust verification is performed based on trust certificates in this embodiment, and then explain the configuration and operation related to this embodiment.

[0014] Fig. 1 is a diagram illustrating an example of a communication system corresponding to a core network. As shown in Fig. 1, this communication system is composed of a UE (terminal 20) and multiple network nodes. Hereinafter, it is assumed that one network node corresponds to each function, but multiple functions may be realized by one network node, or multiple network nodes may realize one function. Furthermore, the "connection" described below may be a logical connection or a physical connection.

[0015] The (R)AN (Radio) Access Network) 10 is a network node 30 having a radio access function, which may include a base station 10, and is connected to a UE 20, an AMF (Access and Mobility Management Function) 30, and a UPF (User plane function). The AMF 30 is a network node having functions such as terminating the RAN interface, terminating the NAS (Non-Access Stratum), registration management, connection management, reachability management, and mobility management. The UPF is a network node having functions such as a PDU (Protocol Data Unit) session point to the outside that interconnects with a DN (Data Network), packet routing and forwarding, and user plane QoS (Quality of Service) handling. The UPF and DN constitute a network slice.

[0016] The AMF 30 is connected to the UE 20, the (R)AN 10, an SMF (Session Management function), an NSSF (Network Slice Selection Function), an NEF (Network Exposure Function), an NRF (Network Repository Function), an UDM (Unified Data Management), an AUSF (Authentication Server Function), a PCF (Policy Control Function), and an AF (Application Function). The AMF 30, the SMF, the NSSF, the NEF, the NRF, the UDM 40, the AUSF 80, the PCF, and the AF are network nodes connected to each other via interfaces, Namf, Nsmf, Nnssf, Nnef, Nnrf, Nudm, Nausf, Npcf, and Naf, based on their respective services.

[0017] The SMF is a network node having functions such as session management, UE IP (Internet Protocol) address allocation and management, DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol) function, ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) proxy, and roaming function. The NEF is a network node having a function of notifying other NFs (Network Functions) of capabilities and events. The NSSF is a network node having functions such as selecting a network slice to which the UE 20 connects, determining the allowed NSSAI (Network Slice Selection Assistance Information), determining the NSSAI to be set, and determining the AMF set to which the UE 20 connects. The PCF is a network node having a function of controlling network policies. The AF is a network node having a function of controlling application servers. The NRF is a network node having a function of discovering NF instances that provide services. The UDM 40 is a network node that manages subscriber data and authentication data. The UDM 40 is connected to a UDR (User Data Repository) that stores the data.

[0018] 2 is a diagram for explaining an example of a communication system in a roaming environment. As shown in Fig. 2, the network is made up of a UE, which is a terminal 20, and a plurality of network nodes.

[0019] The SEPP is a non-transparent proxy that filters control plane messages between PLMNs (Public Land Mobile Networks). The vSEPP shown in Figure 2 is a SEPP in a visited network, and the hSEPP is a SEPP in a home network.

[0020] As shown in Fig. 2, the UE 20 is in a roaming environment connected to an (R)AN and an AMF 30 in a Visited PLMN (VPLMN). The VPLMN and the Home PLMN (HPLMN) are connected via a vSEPP and an hSEPP. The UE 20 can communicate with the UDM of the HPLMN via the AMF 30 of the VPLMN, for example.

[0021] (Regarding the Issues) As mentioned above, currently, roaming services are being provided in the networks of telecommunications carriers, which provide networks to users / UEs with whom the carriers have no direct contractual relationship. A network that is not the user's original contracted network is called a VPLMN / Visited NW.

[0022] Network connection authentication during roaming in a VPLMN is performed in the user's original contract network (HPLMN / Home NW) by using a key common to the SIM card installed in the user's UE and the HPLMN, and the VPLMN trusts the result. However, this authentication method has the following problems (1) and (2).

[0023] (1) There is a high dependency on the HPLMN, and the user's trust depends on how the HPLMN verifies the user's identity at the time of signing the contract. In addition, the VPLMN's trust verification policy cannot be reflected.

[0024] (2) When connecting to a VPLMN, only the possession of a shared key is verified, and sufficient trust verification is not performed to trust the user / UE. For example, if a fraudulent user or a compromised UE uses the network, the VPLMN or the network administrator may suffer a disadvantage. Furthermore, from the user / UE's perspective, sufficient trust verification is not performed to trust the network they use or its administrator.

[0025] Due to the issues (1) and (2) above, when a UE connects to a VPLMN, it is desirable to perform mutual trust verification from the perspectives of both the user / UE and the NW / NW administrator to determine whether or not the UE can connect to the NW. However, there are issues such as the unreliability of self-reported information exchanged between the user / UE and the NW.

[0026] Meanwhile, in recent years, W3C Decentralized Identifiers (DID), W3C Verifiable Credentials (VC), etc. have been considered as technologies for realizing Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI), a new concept of identity management. In the world of SSI, there are three parties: Holders, such as users who manage / hold their own digital identities; Issuers, who issue attribute / credential certificates (VCs) to users after verifying their attribute information (such as name, age, address, etc.) and qualification information (such as being an employee of a certain company or being a member of a certain service, etc.); and Verifiers, who verify the attributes and qualifications of Holders by requesting and receiving attribute / credential certificates (VCs) necessary for providing services to Holders, and make decisions on providing services.

[0027] The use of technology such as VC has the following advantages (1) to (5), for example.

[0028] (1) It is possible to distribute highly reliable information that has been certified by an issuer such as a government, rather than by a self-declaration by users or the like.

[0029] (2) The public key-based mechanism allows the recipient (verifier) ​​of a VC to quickly and online verify that the certificate is legitimate without having to inquire with the issuer.

[0030] (3) There is no need for advance preparation such as sharing a common key between the verifier and the holder.

[0031] (4) By utilizing mechanisms such as blockchain, the tamper-resistance of VC can be improved.

[0032] (5) It can be used across multiple parties, such as the user (holder), the certificate issuer (issuer), and the certificate user (verifier).

[0033] However, in the prior art, there is no mechanism for determining whether or not a network connection can be established by mutual trust verification in combination with the above-mentioned technology.

[0034] This embodiment describes a technique for solving the above-mentioned problem. That is, this embodiment describes a mechanism for determining whether or not a network connection is possible based on mutual trust verification between a user / UE and a network using reliable information utilizing a technique such as DID / VC (applicable to both HPLMN connection and VPLMN connection).

[0035] The scope of application of the trust verification technique in this embodiment is not limited to determining whether or not to allow network connection. For example, the trust verification technique in this embodiment may be applied to determining whether or not to allow network service provision. In this case, for example, if the trust verification of the user / UE is successful, the network determines that it is permitted to provide the network service to the user / UE, and if the trust verification of the network is successful, the user / UE determines that it is permitted to receive the network service from the network.

[0036] (Outline of the embodiment) First, an outline of the embodiment will be described. In this embodiment, a trust evaluation function using trust certificates realized by DID / VC or the like is added to each of the 3GPP NW and the UE. Also, a trust certificate issuing system that issues trust certificates for "users, UEs, NW administrators, and NW equipment" is added. In this embodiment, two patterns are assumed for the trust evaluation function: one in which it is defined as a new NF (Network Function) and one in which the authentication system functions of AUSF or the like are extended.

[0037] The "3GPP NW" may be called a core network defined by 3GPP (registered trademark). In addition, in this embodiment, the "3GPP NW" is taken as the "network" for description, but the technology according to the present invention is applicable to networks not limited to the "3GPP NW."

[0038] In this embodiment, a trust evaluation-related interface (C-Plane) using a trust certificate between a UE and a 3GPP network is added to an existing 3GPP network. Specifically, the following (1) and (2) are described.

[0039] (1) An interface for transmitting a trust certificate from a UE to a 3GPP network via C-Plane communication is added. There are two patterns: one is defined as a new interface, and the other is added as transmission information for an existing interface such as a Registration Request.

[0040] (2) An interface for notifying the result from the trust evaluation function to the UE and an interface for sending the NW trust certificate to the UE are added. There are two patterns: one is defined as a new interface, and the other is an extension of an existing interface.

[0041] Furthermore, control of the decision on whether to allow or deny network connection after trust evaluation on the UE side and the network side is added.

[0042] Below, system configuration examples A to C will be described as examples of the system configuration according to this embodiment.

[0043] (System Configuration Example A) Fig. 3 shows system configuration example A. System configuration example A is a configuration assuming a case where UE 20 accesses the HPLMN.

[0044] As shown in FIG. 3 , the communication system according to system configuration example A includes a UE 20, an (R)AN 10, an AMF 30, a trust evaluation function 60, a UDM / UDR (40), a VDR (VDR: Verifiable Data Registry) 70, a UE trust certificate issuing system 80, a user trust certificate issuing system 90, a trust certificate management function 210, and a NW trust certificate issuing system 220.

[0045] The UE 20 includes a trust evaluation function 22, a NW connection function 21, and a trust certificate management function 23. The trust certificate management function 23 is, for example, an ID wallet.

[0046] As shown in FIG. 3, the UDM / UDR ( 40 ) includes a network information DB (database) 41 , a trust certificate DB 42 , and a policy DB 43 .

[0047] The NW information DB 41 stores the NW identifier, the NW public key, the NW private key, etc. The trust certificate DB 42 stores trust certificates. The policy DB 43 stores policy information related to trust certificates. Note that the above NW is a 3GPP NW, and for example, in the case of a "NW identifier" (the same applies to the NW public key and the NW private key), it may be an identifier common to multiple network nodes in the 3GPP NW, or it may be an identifier used for a specific network node in the 3GPP NW.

[0048] In this embodiment, the VDR 70 is arranged outside the 3GPP network. However, the present invention is not limited to a configuration in which the VDR 70 is arranged outside the 3GPP network, and the VDR 70 may be provided within the 3GPP network.

[0049] The VDR 70 is a device that can be realized by a web server, a distributed ledger, etc. The VDR 70 includes an information DB 71, an issuer information DB 72, a definition information DB 73, and a management information DB 74.

[0050] The information DB 71 stores "identifiers and public key information" of "users / UEs / NW administrators / NW equipment." The issuer information DB 72 stores "identifiers and public key information" of issuers of trust certificates. The definition information DB 73 stores schemas and definition information of trust certificates. The management information DB 74 stores management information indicating the validity / revocation of trust certificates.

[0051] The VDR 70 may be held within the network and provided to a user / UE / trust certificate issuing system or the like via an API or the like provided by the network.

[0052] The trust evaluation function 60 may also be configured by adding a trust evaluation processing function to an existing authentication function (for example, AUSF).

[0053] The UE trust certificate issuing system 80 and the user trust certificate issuing system 90 correspond to an Issuer in W3C VC. Furthermore, there may be one or more UE trust certificate issuing systems 80 and one or more user trust certificate issuing systems 90 for each certificate issuing authority.

[0054] The trust certificate management function 210 is, for example, an ID wallet, etc. Furthermore, for the NW trust certificate issuing system 220, there may be one or more issuers / systems of trust certificates for each of the trust evaluation of the NW administrator and the trust evaluation of the NW equipment.

[0055] 3, the network is a 3GPP network, but is not limited to this, and may be any network such as a WLAN or a fixed network.

[0056] (System Configuration Example B) Fig. 4 shows system configuration example B. System configuration example B is a configuration assuming a case where UE 20 accesses a visited PLMN (i.e., during roaming). When accessing a VPLMN, the authentication function of the HPLMN is used.

[0057] Fig. 4 shows a system configuration of the UE 20 and the visited network that is similar to that shown in Fig. 3. Here, only the parts that are different from the configuration in Fig. 3 will be described.

[0058] 4, the visited network includes a vSEPP 260. The home network includes an authentication function 230 (for example, AUSF), a UDM 240, and an hSEPP 250.

[0059] (System Configuration Example C) Fig. 5 shows system configuration example C. System configuration example C is a configuration assuming a case where UE 20 uses the SIM authentication function of the HPLMN as well as the trust evaluation function and trust evaluation policy of the HPLMN when accessing a visited PLMN (i.e., during roaming). Differences from system configuration example B will be explained below. Note that the Home NW also includes a trust certificate management function and the like required for trust evaluation, although this is not shown.

[0060] The HPLMN's UDM 240 also holds the "network identifier, public key, private key information, trust certificate, and trust evaluation policy" used in trust evaluation. The HPLMN's authentication function 230 includes a trust evaluation function and accesses the VDR 70 during trust evaluation. The authentication function (trust evaluation function) 230 also performs trust evaluation based on the HPLMN's trust evaluation policy and notifies the VPLMN of the result.

[0061] The VPLMN trust evaluation function 60 transmits the VPLMN's NW trust certificate as the NW trust certificate when the user / UE performs NW trust evaluation. In addition, when D-Plane communication is transferred via the HPLMN, the trust evaluation function 60 may also evaluate the HPLMN's trust certificate.

[0062] (Examples of Information Used in Trust Evaluation and Issuers of Trust Certificates) Here, examples of information used in trust evaluation and issuers of trust certificates will be described.

[0063] <In the case of user trust evaluation> Information used for trust evaluation includes government- or local-government-issued identification documents (passport, My Number card, resident registration, etc.), company-issued employee identification, proof of possession of some kind of official qualification (such as a medical license), information proving ability to make payments, etc. (asset information, tax payment certificate, etc.), and proof of service usage history.

[0064] Trust certificates are issued by governments, local governments, financial institutions, telecommunications carriers, companies where users work, certification bodies, and so on.

[0065] <In the case of device trust evaluation> Information used for trust evaluation includes proof that the latest patches have been applied, proof that security measures are enabled, proof that security checks have been conducted by security vendors etc. and that there are no problems, and system logs for hardware and software.

[0066] The issuer of the trust certificate is a device vendor, a security vendor, or the like.

[0067] <Network: In the case of a network administrator trust evaluation> Information used for trust evaluation includes government registration certificates, seal registration certificates, tax payment certificates, certificates of sustainability, SDGs, system certification, etc., and network operation track record (no security breaches for x years, etc.).

[0068] Trust certificates are issued by governments, local governments, various corporate certification / accreditation organizations, etc.

[0069] <Network: Trust evaluation of network equipment> Information used in trust evaluation includes the results of security checks on network equipment (hardware and software), delivery certificates that show that communications have been received correctly, and system logs for hardware and software.

[0070] The issuer of the trust certificate may be a device vendor, a security vendor, a service provider with which the UE communicates, or the like.

[0071] (Examples of Trust Certificate Issuance Forms) Next, examples of trust certificate issuance forms will be described. In this embodiment, pull type (form 1) and push type (form 2) are assumed.

[0072] An example of pull-type trust certificate issuance will be described with reference to Fig. 6. In S1, a trust certificate management function provided in a UE / NW accesses a service counter such as a brick-and-mortar store or a website and submits a trust certificate issuance application to a trust certificate issuing system. More specifically, in S1, the trust certificate management function presents to the trust certificate issuing system the identifiers of the user / UE / NW administrator / NW equipment to be included in the certificate as the subjects of the trust certificate issuance (equivalent to subjects in W3C VC).

[0073] In S2, the trust certificate issuing system issues a trust certificate and registers validity / revocation management information for the newly issued trust certificate in the VDR. If a certificate of the same type has been issued in the past, the system registers the certificate information as having been revoked.

[0074] In S3, the trust certificate issuing system transfers the trust certificate to the trust certificate management function of the UE / NW using a remote communication means such as a network or a short-range communication means such as Bluetooth.

[0075] An example of push-type trust certificate issuance will be described with reference to Fig. 7. Here, it is assumed that the identifiers of the user / UE / NW administrator / NW equipment to be included in the certificate as the subjects of the trust certificate issuance (equivalent to subjects in W3C VC) have been provided to the trust certificate issuing system in advance.

[0076] In S1, the trust certificate issuing system periodically checks the system status of UE / NW equipment, the status of security measures, etc., for the trust certificate management function.

[0077] In S2, the trust certificate issuing system registers validity / revocation management information for the newly issued trust certificate in the VDR. If a certificate of the same type has been issued in the past, the system registers the certificate information as having been revoked.

[0078] In S3, the trust certificate issuance system issues a trust certificate based on the inspection results to the trust certificate management function at any time. The trust certificate issuance process may be performed in advance of the trust evaluation process described below, or may be performed on demand when a trust certificate is required in the trust evaluation process.

[0079] Hereinafter, embodiments a to c will be described as specific processing examples.

[0080] (Embodiment A) First, embodiment a will be described with reference to the sequence diagram shown in Fig. 8. Embodiment a is an embodiment for "a case where the authentication function and the trust evaluation function are separate and authentication and trust evaluation are performed independently." Embodiment a can be implemented in any of system configuration examples A to C. The processing is premised on the following:

[0081] A user has a public key / private key pair corresponding to his / her own identifier, and stores his / her own identifier and public key in association with each other in a VDR 70 located in a place accessible by the 3GPP NW.

[0082] A user holds a user trust certificate and a UE trust certificate issued by an arbitrary entity (such as a company or another user), and a network holds a network trust certificate issued by an arbitrary entity.

[0083] The certificate issuer holds a public key / private key pair corresponding to its own identifier, and stores the identifier and public key in association with each other in a VDR 70 located in a location accessible to the user / UE and the 3GPP NW.

[0084] The certificate issuer stores the format (scheme and definition) of the certificate it issues and information for verifying the validity of the certificate in the VDR 70 that exists in a location accessible to the user / UE and the 3GPP NW. The sequence will be described below.

[0085] 8, at any timing such as a user operation, the UE 20 transmits a trust evaluation request message including at least one of a user trust certificate and a UE trust certificate to the (R)AN 10 of the 3GPP NW. Note that in this embodiment, the trust evaluation process is started based on a request from the user / UE, but this is not limitative, and the trust evaluation may be started based on a request from the NW side.

[0086] In S102, the (R)AN 10 forwards the trust evaluation request message to the AMF 30.

[0087] In S103, the AMF 30 sends a trust evaluation request message including the trust certificate to the trust evaluation function 60. In S104, the trust evaluation function 60 executes a trust evaluation process for the user / UE. The trust evaluation process will be described in detail later.

[0088] In S105, the trust evaluation function 60 sends a response including the trust evaluation result (success / failure) to the AMF 30.

[0089] In S106, if the trust evaluation result is successful, the AMF 30 transmits a trust permission message including the NW trust certificate to the (R)AN 10. If the trust evaluation result is unsuccessful, the AMF 30 executes a NW-led NW disconnection process for the UE 20.

[0090] The NW trust certificate includes at least one of a trust certificate of a NW facility and a trust certificate of a NW administrator.

[0091] At S107, the (R)AN 10 transfers a trust authorization message to the UE 20.

[0092] In S108, the UE 20 executes a trust evaluation process for the NW. In S109, if the trust evaluation is successful, the UE 20 transmits a trust evaluation completion message to the (R)AN 10. If the trust evaluation is unsuccessful, the UE 20 initiates a process for disconnecting from the NW.

[0093] In S110, the (R)AN 10 forwards a trust evaluation completion message to the AMF 30. In S111, the AMF 30 continues providing the network to the user / UE.

[0094] The trust certificate included in the message of S101 is assumed to be in the W3C VC format, for example. The trust certificate includes at least an "identifier for uniquely identifying the certificate itself," an "identifier of the certificate issuer and a signature using a private key associated with the issuer identifier," an "identifier of the subject to which the certificate is issued," and "basis information for trust evaluation."

[0095] For a message containing a VC that lists a user's identifier (e.g., DID) as information about the subject of the certificate, a message is sent in W3C VP format signed with a private key corresponding to the same user's identifier, and the recipient verifies the signature with the public key based on the private key, making it possible to verify that the subject of the certificate and the sender are the same.

[0096] Similarly, in the case of certificates for UEs and networks, the sending UE or network signs the certificate containing those identifiers as information about the person to whom the certificate is issued using the private key corresponding to each identifier, allowing the receiving party to verify that the person to whom the certificate is issued is the same as the sender.

[0097] According to embodiment a, authentication and trust evaluation can be performed independently, which allows flexible processing, such as performing authentication and trust evaluation at any timing.

[0098] (Embodiment B) Next, embodiment B will be described with reference to the sequence diagram shown in FIG. 9. Embodiment B is a form in which "authentication function and trust evaluation function are separate + authentication and trust evaluation are performed in cooperation." Embodiment B can be implemented in any of system configuration examples A to C. When accessing the VPLMN, the authentication function 230 of the HPLMN is used. The processing premise is the same as embodiment A.

[0099] In S201, the UE 20 starts a NW connection process when triggered by a user's operation of a NW connection application or by turning on the power of the UE.

[0100] In S202, the UE 20 transmits a network connection request message to the (R)AN 10 of the 3GPP network.

[0101] At this time, the UE 20 may include at least one of a user trust certificate and a UE trust certificate in the NW connection request message. The user trust certificate is signed with a private key corresponding to the user's identifier, and the UE trust certificate is signed with a private key corresponding to the UE's identifier.

[0102] The contents to be included in this message, other than the information used for trust evaluation, are the same as those in the Registration Request message, which is the existing message for requesting network connection authentication.

[0103] The NW connection request message sent in S202 may be an extension of an existing message such as a Registration Request message, or may be a new message.

[0104] S203 to S206 are existing processes, so only an outline will be explained. In S203, (R)AN 10 transfers a NW connection request message to AMF 30, and in S204, AMF 30 sends an authentication request to authentication function 230. In S205, authentication function 230 executes authentication processing. This authentication processing corresponds to 3GPP TS 23.502 4.2.2.2 Registration Procedure, step 9. In S206, authentication function 230 sends a response message including the authentication result (success / failure) to AMF 30.

[0105] If the trust certificate is not held because the trust certificate is not included in the message in S202, or if the trust certificate is held but the latest certificate is to be reacquired, the processes of S207-1 to S207-4 are executed.

[0106] In S207-1, the AMF 30 transmits a trust certificate request message to the (R)AN 10. This message may be an extension of an existing message such as an Identity Request message, or may be a new message.

[0107] At S207-2, the (R)AN 10 forwards the trust certificate request message to the UE 20.

[0108] In S207-3, the UE 20 transmits a response message including at least one of the user trust certificate and the UE trust certificate to the (R)AN 10. In S207-4, the (R)AN 10 forwards the response message to the AMF 30.

[0109] At S208, the AMF 30 sends a trust evaluation request message including the trust certificate to the trust evaluation function 60.

[0110] In S209, the trust evaluation function 60 executes a trust evaluation process for the user / UE 20. In S210, the trust evaluation function 60 sends a response message including the trust evaluation result (success / failure) to the AMF 30.

[0111] If the trust evaluation is successful, the connection process from S211 onwards is executed, whereas if the trust evaluation is unsuccessful, the NW connection process is aborted.

[0112] In S211, the NW registration process is completed by executing the processes from 3GPP TS 23.502 4.2.2.2 Registration Procedure step 10 onwards. As part of the NW registration process, S211-1 to S211-6 are executed.

[0113] In S211-1, the AMF 30 transmits a trust authorization message including the NW trust certificate to the (R)AN 10. In S211-2, the (R)AN 10 forwards the trust authorization message to the UE 20.

[0114] In S211-3, the UE 20 executes the NW trust evaluation process. In S211-4, if the process is successful, the UE 20 transmits a trust evaluation completion message to the (R)AN 10. If the process is unsuccessful, the UE 20 stops the NW connection process.

[0115] In S211-5, the (R)AN 10 transfers the trust evaluation completion message to the AMF 30. In S211-6, the AMF 30 continues providing the NW to the user / UE 20.

[0116] According to embodiment b, authentication and trust evaluation can be performed in conjunction with each other, enabling efficient processing.

[0117] (Embodiment c) Next, embodiment c will be described with reference to the sequence diagram shown in Fig. 10. Embodiment c is an embodiment in which "trust evaluation processing is added to the authentication function and authentication and trust evaluation are performed in cooperation with each other." It is assumed that embodiment c will be performed in the configuration of system configuration example A or C. The premise of the processing is the same as embodiments a and b.

[0118] In S301, the UE 20 starts a NW connection process when triggered by a user's operation of a NW connection application or by turning on the power of the UE.

[0119] In S302, the UE 20 transmits a NW connection request message including at least one of a user trust certificate and a UE trust certificate to the (R)AN 10 of the 3GPP network.

[0120] The user trust certificate is signed with a private key corresponding to the user's identifier, and the UE trust certificate is signed with a private key corresponding to the UE's identifier. Except for the information used for trust evaluation, the contents to be included in this message are the same as those in the Registration Request message, which is the existing message for a network connection authentication request.

[0121] The NW connection request message sent in S302 may be an extension of an existing message such as a Registration Request message, or may be a new message.

[0122] In S303, the (R)AN 10 transfers the NW connection request message to the AMF 30, and in S304, the AMF 30 sends an authentication and trust evaluation request message including the trust certificate to the authentication function 230. In S305, the authentication function 230 executes authentication processing. This authentication processing corresponds to step 9 of 3GPP TS 23.502 4.2.2.2 Registration Procedure.

[0123] At S306, the authentication function 230 performs a trust evaluation process for the user / UE 20.

[0124] In S307, the authentication function 230 transmits a response message including the authentication result (success / failure) and the trust evaluation result (success / failure) to the AMF 30. The authentication function 230 may check the authentication result and the trust evaluation result, and if both are successful, may notify the response as success, or otherwise as failure.

[0125] If both the authentication result and the trust evaluation result are successful, the connection process from S308 onwards is executed. If either one fails, the NW connection process is aborted.

[0126] In S308, the NW registration process is completed by executing the processes from 3GPP TS 23.502 4.2.2.2 Registration Procedure step 10 onwards. As part of the NW registration process, S308-1 to S308-6 are executed.

[0127] In S308-1, the AMF 30 sends a trust authorization message including the NW trust certificate to the (R)AN 10. In S308-2, the (R)AN 10 forwards the trust authorization message to the UE 20.

[0128] In S308-3, the UE 20 executes the NW trust evaluation process. In S308-4, if the process is successful, the UE 20 transmits a trust evaluation completion message to the (R)AN 10. If the process is unsuccessful, the UE 20 stops the NW connection process.

[0129] In S308-5, the (R)AN 10 forwards the trust evaluation completion message to the AMF 30. In S308-6, the AMF 30 continues providing the NW to the user / UE 20.

[0130] According to embodiment c, authentication and trust evaluation can be performed in conjunction with each other, enabling efficient processing.

[0131] (User / UE Trust Evaluation Process) Next, a specific example of user / UE trust evaluation process in the NW, which is common to the embodiments a to c, will be described with reference to FIG.

[0132] As an example of user / UE trust evaluation logic, we consider the verification of trust certificates in the W3C DID / VC / VP format.

[0133] When the trust evaluation process using a trust certificate is started, in S1, the trust evaluation function 60 / authentication function 230 requests from the VDR 70 a public key corresponding to the identifier of the certificate issuer (issuer), a public key corresponding to the identifier of the user, and a public key corresponding to the identifier of the UE 20. In S2, the VDR 70 responds with these public keys to the trust evaluation function 60 / authentication function 230.

[0134] In S3, the trust evaluation function 60 / authentication function 230 verifies the validity of the certificate issuer's signature, the user's signature, and the UE's signature, and verifies that the message has not been tampered with.

[0135] Note that communication between the trust evaluation function 60 / authentication function 230 in the 3GPP network and the VDR 70 outside the 3GPP network may be via a node (e.g., NEF, SCEF) that mediates communication between the trust evaluation function 60 / authentication function 230 in the 3GPP network and the VDR 70 outside the 3GPP network.

[0136] Regarding S1 to S3, in more detail, in S1 and S2, the trust evaluation function 60 / authentication function 230 inputs DID0 (certificate issuer identifier), DID1 (user identifier), and DID2 (UE 20 identifier) ​​included in the received VP / VC, and uses an arbitrary DID Method to obtain (resolve) the DID Document (public key) corresponding to DID0, the DID Document (public key) corresponding to DID1, and the DID Document (public key) corresponding to DID2 from the VDR 70. In S3, the trust evaluation function 60 / authentication function 230 verifies that the signature of the VP source user, the signature of the VP source UE, and the VC issuer signature are each signatures issued by private keys linked to the corresponding public keys (validity of the signatures, no tampering with the message).

[0137] In S4, the trust evaluation function 60 / authentication function 230 requests information regarding the certificate format and status (such as revocation status) from the VDR 70. In S5, the VDR 70 responds with the certificate format and status information. In S6, the trust evaluation function 60 / authentication function 230 verifies the validity of the certificate.

[0138] Regarding S4 to S6, in more detail, the trust evaluation function 60 / authentication function 230 acquires the VC schema, definition information, etc. from the VDR 70 and verifies that the VC syntax, etc. is correct. The trust evaluation function 60 / authentication function 230 also acquires the VC validity information / revocation information from the VDR 70 and verifies that the received VC is valid.

[0139] In S7, the trust evaluation function 60 / authentication function 230 requests trust evaluation policy information from the UDM / UDR (40), and in S8, the UDM / UDR (40) responds with the trust evaluation policy information. In S9, the trust evaluation function 60 / authentication function 230 performs eligibility verification of the certificate. More specifically, the trust evaluation function 60 / authentication function 230 verifies that the contents of the certificate satisfy the trust evaluation policy in the network.

[0140] An example of a trust evaluation policy in the NW is as follows:

[0141] - In the case of a user's trust evaluation: If the trust certificate is a My Number VC issued by the government, the trust evaluation is successful. - In the case of a UE's trust evaluation: If the trust certificate is a VC that proves that the UE has passed the security check by the security vendor, the trust evaluation is successful. Note that the My Number VC is assumed to be information equivalent to the current My Number converted into VC format.

[0142] If the trust evaluation function 60 / authentication function 230 determines that all of the above verification results are OK, it determines that the trust evaluation is successful.

[0143] The trust evaluation logic is not limited to the above, and a trust evaluation logic other than the above may be used.

[0144] In addition, the trust evaluation form can be either "a form in which the network side considers the trust evaluation of the user or UE to be successful if the certificate issuer includes information that the trust of the user or UE has been evaluated and there are no problems" or "a form in which the network side evaluates whether the user or UE can be trusted by checking the evidence information for trust evaluation included in the certificate (e.g., user asset information, information on whether a medical license is held, UE system information and security logs, etc.) against the network side's trust evaluation policy," but either form can be used.

[0145] If both a user trust certificate and a UE trust certificate are received, trust evaluation can be performed using a combination of both pieces of information, or separately on the user side and the UE side, and if there are no NGs, the trust evaluation can be determined to be successful.

[0146] Furthermore, regarding the trust evaluation policy when connecting to a VPLMN, the policy on the VPLMN side or the policy on the HPLMN side may be used.

[0147] (NW Trust Evaluation Process) Next, a specific example of NW trust evaluation process in the UE, which is common to the embodiments a to c, will be described with reference to FIG.

[0148] Here, as an example of the NW trust evaluation logic, verification of a trust certificate in the W3C DID / VC / VP format is assumed.

[0149] When trust processing using a trust certificate is started, in S1, the trust evaluation function 22 requests a public key corresponding to the identifier of the certificate issuer (issuer), a public key corresponding to the identifier of the NW administrator, and a public key corresponding to the identifier of the NW equipment from the VDR 70. In S2, the VDR 70 responds with these public keys to the trust evaluation function 22.

[0150] In S3, the trust evaluation function 22 verifies the validity of the signature of the certificate issuer, the signature of the NW administrator, and the signature of the NW equipment, and verifies that the message has not been tampered with.

[0151] Note that communication between the trust evaluation function 22 and the VDR 70 outside the 3GPP network may be via a node (e.g., NEF, SCEF) that mediates communication between the trust evaluation function 22 in the 3GPP network and the VDR 70 outside the 3GPP network.

[0152] Regarding S1 to S3, in more detail, in S1 and S2, the trust evaluation function 22 inputs DID3 (certificate issuer identifier), DID4 (network administrator identifier), and DID5 (network equipment identifier) ​​included in the received VP / VC, and uses an arbitrary DID Method to obtain (resolve) the DID Document (public key) corresponding to DID3, the DID Document (public key) corresponding to DID4, and the DID Document (public key) corresponding to DID5 from the VDR 70. In S3, the trust evaluation function 22 verifies that the signature of the VP source network administrator, the signature of the source network equipment, and the VC issuer signature are each signatures issued by private keys linked to the corresponding public keys (validity of the signature, no tampering of the message).

[0153] In S4, the trust evaluation function 22 requests information about the certificate format and status (such as revocation status) from the VDR 70. In S5, the VDR 70 responds with the certificate format and status information. In S6, the trust evaluation function 22 verifies the validity of the certificate.

[0154] Regarding S4 to S6, in more detail, the trust evaluation function 22 acquires the VC schema, definition information, etc. from the VDR 70 and verifies that the VC syntax, etc. is correct. The trust evaluation function 22 also acquires the VC validity information / revocation information from the VDR 70 and verifies that the received VC is valid.

[0155] In S7, the trust evaluation function 22 requests trust evaluation policy information from the UE database or the like, and in S8, the UE database or the like responds with the trust evaluation policy information. In S9, the trust evaluation function 22 performs eligibility verification of the certificate. More specifically, the trust evaluation function 22 verifies that the contents of the certificate satisfy the trust evaluation policy of the UE 20.

[0156] An example of the trust evaluation policy in the UE 20 is as follows:

[0157] - In the case of a trust evaluation of a network administrator: If the trust certificate is a registration certificate VC issued by the government, the trust evaluation is successful. - In the case of a trust evaluation of network equipment: If the trust certificate is a VC that proves that the security check of the network equipment by the security vendor is problem-free, the trust evaluation is successful. The trust evaluation function 22 determines that the trust evaluation is successful if it determines that all of the above verification results are OK.

[0158] The trust evaluation logic is not limited to the above, and a trust evaluation logic other than the above may be used.

[0159] In addition, the trust evaluation form may be either "a form in which the user / UE side considers the trust evaluation of the NW administrator or NW equipment to be successful if the certificate issuer includes information that the trust of the NW administrator or NW equipment has been evaluated and found to be problem-free" or "a form in which the UE side evaluates whether the UE side can trust the evidence information for trust evaluation contained in the certificate (e.g., information contained in the registration certificate, system information and security logs of the NW equipment, etc.) by comparing it with the trust evaluation policy on the UE side," but either form may be used.

[0160] (Additional Information) When the user / UE 20 needs to obtain information necessary for the trust evaluation of the NW (public key corresponding to the identifier of the issuer / NW administrator / NW equipment on the VDR, certificate schema, revocation information, evaluation policy) before registration with the NW, the following (1) to (4) are considered as possible means for realizing this.

[0161] (1) At the time of processing, the UE 20 uses other available networks to access the VDR and policies for trust evaluation.

[0162] (2) When some network has been used in the past, an evaluation policy or the like is downloaded into the UE 20 (in the case of VDR, synchronized with the VDR node on the UE 20).

[0163] (3) Information necessary for trust evaluation is pre-installed in the UE 20 or a SIM card or the like mounted on the UE 20.

[0164] (4) Access to systems necessary for trust evaluation, such as VDR, via the network is permitted even before network registration.

[0165] (Device Configuration) Next, a functional configuration example of the "trust evaluation function 60, authentication function 230, AMF 30, etc." and the terminal 20 (UE 20) that perform the processes and operations described above will be described. Hereinafter, the network nodes such as the trust evaluation function 60, authentication function 230, and AMF 30 will be collectively referred to as the "network node 100."

[0166] <Network Node 100> FIG. 13 is a diagram illustrating an example of the functional configuration of the network node 100. As shown in FIG.

[0167] As shown in Fig. 13, the network node 100 includes a transmitting unit 110, a receiving unit 120, a setting unit 130, and a control unit 140. The functional configuration shown in Fig. 13 is merely an example. The names of the functional divisions and functional units may be any names as long as they can perform the operations according to the embodiment of the present invention.

[0168] The transmitter 110 has a function of generating a signal to be transmitted to the terminal 20 or another network node and transmitting the signal via a wired or wireless connection. The receiver 120 has a function of receiving various signals transmitted from the terminal 20 or another network node and acquiring, for example, information of a higher layer from the received signal. A communication unit including the transmitter 110 and the receiver 120 may be configured.

[0169] The setting unit 130 stores pre-set setting information and various setting information to be transmitted to the terminal 20 in a storage device, and reads out the information from the storage device as needed. The control unit 140 controls the network node 100. The function unit related to signal transmission in the control unit 140 may be included in the transmitting unit 110, and the function unit related to signal reception in the control unit 140 may be included in the receiving unit 120. The transmitting unit 110 and the receiving unit 120 may be called a transmitter and a receiver, respectively.

[0170] <Terminal 20> Fig. 14 is a diagram showing an example of the functional configuration of the terminal 20. As shown in Fig. 14, the terminal 20 has a transmitting unit 310, a receiving unit 320, a setting unit 330, and a control unit 340. The functional configuration shown in Fig. 14 is merely an example. The names of the functional divisions and functional units may be any as long as they can perform the operations related to the embodiment of the present invention.

[0171] The transmitter 310 creates a transmission signal from transmission data and transmits the transmission signal wirelessly. The receiver 320 receives various signals wirelessly and acquires higher layer signals from the received physical layer signals. The receiver 320 also has a function of receiving NR-PSS, NR-SSS, NR-PBCH, DL / UL control signals, reference signals, and the like transmitted from a network node. A communication unit including the transmitter 310 and the receiver 320 may be configured.

[0172] The setting unit 330 stores various setting information received from the network node by the receiving unit 320 in a storage device, and reads it out from the storage device as needed. The setting unit 330 also stores setting information that is set in advance.

[0173] The control unit 340 controls the terminal 20. The functional unit in the control unit 340 related to signal transmission may be included in the transmitting unit 310, and the functional unit in the control unit 340 related to signal reception may be included in the receiving unit 320. The transmitting unit 310 and the receiving unit 320 may be called a transmitter and a receiver, respectively.

[0174] (Hardware Configuration) The block diagrams (FIGS. 13 and 14) used to explain the above embodiments show functional blocks. These functional blocks (components) are realized by any combination of at least one of hardware and software. Furthermore, the method for realizing each functional block is not particularly limited. That is, each functional block may be realized using a single device that is physically or logically coupled, or may be realized using two or more physically or logically separated devices that are directly or indirectly connected (for example, using wires, wirelessly, etc.) and these multiple devices. The functional block may be realized by combining software with the single device or the multiple devices.

[0175] Functions include, but are not limited to, judgment, determination, assessment, calculation, computation, processing, derivation, investigation, search, confirmation, reception, transmission, output, access, resolution, selection, selection, establishment, comparison, assumption, expectation, consideration, broadcasting, notifying, communicating, forwarding, configuring, reconfiguring, allocating, mapping, and assignment. For example, a functional block (component) that performs transmission is called a transmitting unit or transmitter. As mentioned above, there are no particular limitations on how these functions are implemented.

[0176] For example, the network node 100 and the terminal 20 according to an embodiment of the present disclosure may function as a computer that performs processing of the communication method of the present disclosure. Fig. 15 is a diagram illustrating an example of the hardware configuration of the network node 100 and the terminal 20 according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. The above-described EES 30 and the terminal 20 may be physically configured as a computer device including a processor 1001, a storage device 1002, an auxiliary storage device 1003, a communication device 1004, an input device 1005, an output device 1006, a bus 1007, etc.

[0177] In the following description, the term "apparatus" can be read as a circuit, a device, a unit, etc. The hardware configuration of the network node 100 and the terminal 20 may be configured to include one or more of the apparatuses shown in the figure, or may be configured to exclude some of the apparatuses.

[0178] Each function in the network node 100 and the terminal 20 is realized by loading specified software (programs) onto hardware such as the processor 1001, the memory device 1002, etc., so that the processor 1001 performs calculations, controls communication via the communication device 1004, and controls at least one of reading and writing data in the memory device 1002 and the auxiliary memory device 1003.

[0179] The processor 1001 controls the entire computer by running, for example, an operating system. The processor 1001 may be configured as a central processing unit (CPU) including an interface with peripheral devices, a control device, an arithmetic unit, a register, etc. For example, the above-mentioned control unit 140, control unit 340, etc. may be realized by the processor 1001.

[0180] Furthermore, the processor 1001 reads programs (program codes), software modules, data, etc. from at least one of the auxiliary storage device 1003 and the communication device 1004 into the storage device 1002 and executes various processes in accordance with the programs. The programs used are those that cause a computer to execute at least some of the operations described in the above-described embodiments. For example, the control unit 140 of the network node 100 shown in FIG. 13 may be implemented by a control program stored in the storage device 1002 and running on the processor 1001. Furthermore, for example, the control unit 340 of the terminal 20 shown in FIG. 14 may be implemented by a control program stored in the storage device 1002 and running on the processor 1001. While the above-described various processes have been described as being executed by one processor 1001, they may also be executed simultaneously or sequentially by two or more processors 1001. The processor 1001 may be implemented by one or more chips. The programs may also be transmitted from a network via a telecommunications line.

[0181] The storage device 1002 is a computer-readable recording medium and may be configured, for example, by at least one of a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), a random access memory (RAM), etc. The storage device 1002 may also be called a register, a cache, a main memory, etc. The storage device 1002 can store executable programs (program codes), software modules, etc. for implementing a communication method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0182] The secondary storage device 1003 is a computer-readable recording medium, and may be, for example, at least one of an optical disk such as a CD-ROM (Compact Disc ROM), a hard disk drive, a flexible disk, a magneto-optical disk (e.g., a compact disk, a digital versatile disk, a Blu-ray (registered trademark) disk), a smart card, a flash memory (e.g., a card, a stick, a key drive), a floppy (registered trademark) disk, a magnetic strip, etc. The above-mentioned storage medium may be, for example, a database, a server, or other appropriate medium including at least one of the storage device 1002 and the secondary storage device 1003.

[0183] The communication device 1004 is hardware (transmission / reception device) for communicating between computers via at least one of a wired network and a wireless network, and is also referred to as, for example, a network device, a network controller, a network card, a communication module, etc. The communication device 1004 may be configured to include a high-frequency switch, a duplexer, a filter, a frequency synthesizer, etc. to realize at least one of frequency division duplex (FDD) and time division duplex (TDD). For example, a transmission / reception antenna, an amplifier unit, a transmission / reception unit, a transmission path interface, etc. may be realized by the communication device 1004. The transmission / reception unit may be implemented as a transmission unit and a reception unit that are physically or logically separated.

[0184] The input device 1005 is an input device (e.g., a keyboard, a mouse, a microphone, a switch, a button, a sensor, etc.) that receives input from the outside. The output device 1006 is an output device (e.g., a display, a speaker, an LED lamp, etc.) that outputs to the outside. Note that the input device 1005 and the output device 1006 may be integrated into one device (e.g., a touch panel).

[0185] Furthermore, each device such as the processor 1001 and the storage device 1002 is connected by a bus 1007 for communicating information. The bus 1007 may be configured using a single bus, or may be configured using different buses between each device.

[0186] Furthermore, the network node 100 and the terminal 20 may be configured to include hardware such as a microprocessor, a digital signal processor (DSP), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a programmable logic device (PLD), or a field programmable gate array (FPGA), and some or all of the functional blocks may be realized by the hardware. For example, the processor 1001 may be implemented using at least one of these pieces of hardware.

[0187] 16 shows an example configuration of a vehicle 2001. As shown in FIG. 16, the vehicle 2001 includes a drive unit 2002, a steering unit 2003, an accelerator pedal 2004, a brake pedal 2005, a shift lever 2006, front wheels 2007, rear wheels 2008, an axle 2009, an electronic control unit 2010, various sensors 2021 to 2029, an information service unit 2012, and a communication module 2013. Each aspect / embodiment described in the present disclosure may be applied to a communication device mounted on the vehicle 2001, and may be applied to the communication module 2013, for example. For example, the network node 100 or the terminal 20 may be included in the communication module 2013.

[0188] The drive unit 2002 is configured, for example, by an engine, a motor, or a hybrid of an engine and a motor. The steering unit 2003 includes at least a steering wheel (also called a handle) and is configured to steer at least one of the front wheels and the rear wheels based on the operation of the steering wheel operated by the user.

[0189] The electronic control unit 2010 is composed of a microprocessor 2031, a memory (ROM, RAM) 2032, and a communication port (IO port) 2033. Signals are input to the electronic control unit 2010 from various sensors 2021 to 2029 provided in the vehicle 2001. The electronic control unit 2010 may also be called an ECU (Electronic Control Unit).

[0190] The signals from the various sensors 2021 to 2029 include a current signal from a current sensor 2021 that senses the current of the motor, a rotation speed signal of the front and rear wheels obtained by a rotation speed sensor 2022, an air pressure signal of the front and rear wheels obtained by an air pressure sensor 2023, a vehicle speed signal obtained by a vehicle speed sensor 2024, an acceleration signal obtained by an acceleration sensor 2025, an accelerator pedal depression amount signal obtained by an accelerator pedal sensor 2029, a brake pedal depression amount signal obtained by a brake pedal sensor 2026, a shift lever operation signal obtained by a shift lever sensor 2027, and a detection signal for detecting obstacles, vehicles, pedestrians, etc. obtained by an object detection sensor 2028.

[0191] The information service unit 2012 is composed of various devices, such as a car navigation system, an audio system, speakers, a television, and a radio, for providing (outputting) various types of information, such as driving information, traffic information, and entertainment information, and one or more ECUs for controlling these devices. The information service unit 2012 uses information acquired from external devices via the communication module 2013 or the like to provide various types of multimedia information and multimedia services to the occupants of the vehicle 2001. The information service unit 2012 may include input devices (e.g., a keyboard, a mouse, a microphone, a switch, a button, a sensor, a touch panel, etc.) that accept input from the outside, and may also include output devices (e.g., a display, a speaker, an LED lamp, a touch panel, etc.) that output information to the outside.

[0192] The driving assistance system unit 2030 is composed of various devices that provide functions for preventing accidents and reducing the driving burden on the driver, such as millimeter-wave radar, LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging), cameras, positioning locators (e.g., GNSS, etc.), map information (e.g., high-definition (HD) maps, autonomous vehicle (AV) maps, etc.), gyro systems (e.g., IMU (Inertial Measurement Unit), INS (Inertial Navigation System), etc.), AI (Artificial Intelligence) chips, and AI processors, as well as one or more ECUs that control these devices. In addition, the driving assistance system unit 2030 transmits and receives various information via the communication module 2013 to realize the driving assistance function or the autonomous driving function.

[0193] The communication module 2013 can communicate with the microprocessor 2031 and components of the vehicle 2001 via the communication port. For example, the communication module 2013 transmits and receives data via the communication port 2033 to and from the drive unit 2002, steering unit 2003, accelerator pedal 2004, brake pedal 2005, shift lever 2006, front wheels 2007, rear wheels 2008, axle 2009, microprocessor 2031 and memory (ROM, RAM) 2032 in the electronic control unit 2010, and sensors 2021 to 29, which are provided in the vehicle 2001.

[0194] The communication module 2013 is a communication device that can be controlled by the microprocessor 2031 of the electronic control unit 2010 and can communicate with an external device. For example, it transmits and receives various information to and from the external device via wireless communication. The communication module 2013 may be located either inside or outside the electronic control unit 2010. The external device may be, for example, a base station, a terminal, a network node, or the like.

[0195] The communication module 2013 may transmit, via wireless communication, to an external device at least one of signals from the various sensors 2021-2028 input to the electronic control unit 2010, information obtained based on the signals, and information based on input from the outside (user) obtained via the information service unit 2012. The electronic control unit 2010, the various sensors 2021-2028, the information service unit 2012, etc. may be referred to as input units that accept input.

[0196] The communication module 2013 receives various information (traffic information, traffic signal information, vehicle-to-vehicle information, etc.) transmitted from external devices and displays it on an information service unit 2012 provided in the vehicle 2001. The information service unit 2012 may be called an output unit that outputs information (for example, outputs information to a device such as a display or speaker based on the PDSCH (or data / information decoded from the PDSCH) received by the communication module 2013). The communication module 2013 also stores the various information received from external devices in a memory 2032 that can be used by the microprocessor 2031. Based on the information stored in the memory 2032, the microprocessor 2031 may control the drive unit 2002, steering unit 2003, accelerator pedal 2004, brake pedal 2005, shift lever 2006, front wheels 2007, rear wheels 2008, axles 2009, sensors 2021 to 2029, etc. provided in the vehicle 2001.

[0197] Furthermore, when the communication module 2013 includes the network node 100 (or the terminal 20), the communication module 2013 can perform the operations of the network node 100 (or the terminal 20) described above.

[0198] This specification discloses at least the configurations described in the appendices below.

[0199] <Additional Notes> (Additional Item 1) A network node comprising: a receiving unit that receives a trust evaluation request message including a trust certificate of a terminal or a user from a specific network node that has received a message including the trust certificate from the terminal, a control unit that performs trust evaluation processing using the trust certificate, and a transmitting unit that transmits a trust evaluation result to the specific network node. (Additional Item 2) The network node according to Additional Item 1, wherein the control unit performs authentication processing and the trust evaluation processing, and the transmitting unit transmits the authentication result and the trust evaluation result to the specific network node, or transmits a message indicating success to the specific network node if both the authentication result and the trust evaluation result are successful. (Additional Item 3) A terminal comprising: a receiving unit that receives a message including a trust certificate of a network from a specific network node, a control unit that performs trust evaluation processing using the trust certificate, and a transmitting unit that transmits a trust evaluation completion message to the specific network node if the trust evaluation result is successful. (Supplementary Item 4) The terminal according to Supplementary Item 3, wherein the receiving unit receives the message including the trust certificate when trust evaluation for the terminal or user is successful on the network side. (Supplementary Item 5) A communication method executed by a network node, comprising the steps of receiving a trust evaluation request message including the trust certificate of a terminal or user from a specific network node that has received a message including the trust certificate from the terminal, performing trust evaluation processing using the trust certificate, and transmitting a trust evaluation result to the specific network node. (Supplementary Item 6) A communication method executed by a terminal, comprising the steps of receiving a message including a trust certificate of a network from a specific network node, performing trust evaluation processing using the trust certificate, and transmitting a trust evaluation completion message to the specific network node if the trust evaluation result is successful.

[0200] Any of Supplementary Items 1 to 6 provides a technique for performing highly reliable trust verification in a network or a terminal. Supplementary Item 2 enables control using both authentication results and trust evaluation results. Supplementary Item 3 enables trust evaluation in a UE based on trust evaluation in the network.

[0201] (Supplementary Notes on the Embodiments) Although the embodiments of the present invention have been described above, the disclosed invention is not limited to such embodiments, and those skilled in the art will understand various modifications, alterations, alternatives, and substitutions. While specific numerical examples have been used to facilitate understanding of the invention, unless otherwise specified, these numerical values ​​are merely examples, and any appropriate values ​​may be used. The division of items in the above description is not essential to the present invention; matters described in two or more items may be used in combination as needed, and matters described in one item may apply to matters described in another item (as long as there is no contradiction). Boundaries between functional units or processing units in functional block diagrams do not necessarily correspond to boundaries between physical components. The operations of multiple functional units may be performed physically by a single component, or the operations of a single functional unit may be performed physically by multiple components. The order of processing procedures described in the embodiments may be reversed as long as there is no contradiction. For convenience of processing description, the network node 100 and the terminal 20 have been described using functional block diagrams. However, such devices may be realized by hardware, software, or a combination thereof. The software operated by the processor of the EES 30 in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention and the software operated by the processor of the terminal 20 in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention may each be stored in random access memory (RAM), flash memory, read-only memory (ROM), EPROM, EEPROM, registers, hard disk (HDD), removable disk, CD-ROM, database, server, or any other suitable storage medium.

[0202] Furthermore, the notification of information is not limited to the aspects / embodiments described in the present disclosure, and may be performed using other methods. For example, the notification of information may be performed by physical layer signaling (e.g., Downlink Control Information (DCI), Uplink Control Information (UCI)), higher layer signaling (e.g., Radio Resource Control (RRC) signaling, Medium Access Control (MAC) signaling), broadcast information (Master Information Block (MIB), System Information Block (SIB)), other signals, or a combination thereof. Furthermore, the RRC signaling may be referred to as an RRC message, and may be, for example, an RRC Connection Setup message, an RRC Connection Reconfiguration message, or the like.

[0203] Each aspect / embodiment described in the present disclosure may be implemented using any of the following standards: LTE (Long Term Evolution), LTE-Advanced (LTE-A), SUPER 3G, IMT-Advanced, 4G (4th generation mobile communication system), 5G (5th generation mobile communication system), 6th generation mobile communication system (6G), xth generation mobile communication system (xG) (xG (x is, for example, an integer or a decimal number)), FRA (Future Radio Access), NR (new Radio), New radio access (NX), Future generation radio access (FX), W-CDMA (registered trademark), GSM (registered trademark), CDMA2000, UMB (Ultra Mobile Broadband), IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.16 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.17 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.19 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.20 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.21 (Wi-Fi (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.22 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.23 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.24 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.25 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.26 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.27 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.28 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.29 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.30 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.31 (Wi-Fi (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.32 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.33 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), IEEE 802.34 ( The present invention may be applied to at least one of systems using 802.20, UWB (Ultra-Wide Band), Bluetooth (registered trademark), or other suitable systems, and next-generation systems that are extended, modified, created, or defined based on these systems. The present invention may also be applied to a combination of multiple systems (e.g., a combination of LTE and / or LTE-A with 5G).

[0204] The order of the procedures, sequences, flowcharts, etc. of each aspect / embodiment described herein may be rearranged unless it is consistent. For example, the methods described in this disclosure present elements of various steps using an example order and are not limited to the particular order presented.

[0205] In this specification, a specific operation described as being performed by the base station 10 ((R)AN 10) may also be performed by its upper node in some cases. In a network consisting of one or more network nodes having a base station 10, it is clear that various operations performed for communication with a terminal 20 may be performed by at least one of the base station 10 and another network node other than the base station 10 (such as, but not limited to, an MME or an S-GW). Although the above example illustrates a case where there is one other network node other than the base station 10, the other network node may be a combination of multiple other network nodes (for example, an MME and an S-GW).

[0206] The information, signals, etc. described in the present disclosure may be output from a higher layer (or a lower layer) to a lower layer (or a higher layer), or may be input / output via multiple network nodes.

[0207] Input and output information may be stored in a specific location (for example, memory) or may be managed using a management table. Input and output information may be overwritten, updated, or added to. Output information may be deleted. Input information may be transmitted to another device.

[0208] In the present disclosure, the determination may be made by a value represented by one bit (0 or 1), by a Boolean value (true or false), or by a comparison of numerical values ​​(e.g., comparison with a predetermined value).

[0209] Software shall be construed broadly to mean instructions, instruction sets, code, code segments, program code, programs, subprograms, software modules, applications, software applications, software packages, routines, subroutines, objects, executable files, threads of execution, procedures, functions, etc., whether referred to as software, firmware, middleware, microcode, hardware description language, or otherwise.

[0210] Software, instructions, information, etc. may also be transmitted or received over a transmission medium. For example, if software is transmitted from a website, server, or other remote source using wired technologies (such as coaxial cable, fiber optic cable, twisted pair, Digital Subscriber Line (DSL)), and / or wireless technologies (such as infrared, microwave), then these wired and / or wireless technologies are included within the definition of transmission media.

[0211] The information, signals, etc. described in this disclosure may be represented using any of a variety of different technologies. For example, data, instructions, commands, information, signals, bits, symbols, chips, etc. that may be referred to throughout the above description may be represented by voltages, currents, electromagnetic waves, magnetic fields or magnetic particles, optical fields or photons, or any combination thereof.

[0212] Note that terms described in this disclosure and terms necessary for understanding this disclosure may be replaced with terms having the same or similar meanings. For example, at least one of a channel and a symbol may be a signal (signaling). Furthermore, a signal may be a message. Furthermore, a component carrier (CC) may be called a carrier frequency, a cell, a frequency carrier, etc.

[0213] As used in this disclosure, the terms "system" and "network" are used interchangeably.

[0214] Furthermore, the information, parameters, etc. described in the present disclosure may be expressed using absolute values, may be expressed using relative values ​​from a predetermined value, or may be expressed using other corresponding information. For example, a radio resource may be indicated by an index.

[0215] The names used for the above-described parameters are not intended to be limiting in any way. Furthermore, the mathematical expressions using these parameters may differ from those explicitly disclosed in this disclosure. The various channels (e.g., PUCCH, PDCCH, etc.) and information elements may be identified by any suitable names, and therefore the various names assigned to these various channels and information elements are not intended to be limiting in any way.

[0216] In the present disclosure, terms such as "base station (BS)," "radio base station," "base station device," "fixed station," "NodeB," "eNodeB (eNB)," "gNodeB (gNB)," "access point," "transmission point," "reception point," "transmission / reception point," "cell," "sector," "cell group," "carrier," and "component carrier" may be used interchangeably. A base station may also be referred to by terms such as a macrocell, a small cell, a femtocell, and a picocell.

[0217] A base station can accommodate one or more (e.g., three) cells. When a base station accommodates multiple cells, the overall coverage area of ​​the base station can be partitioned into multiple smaller areas, and each smaller area can also be provided with communication services by a base station subsystem (e.g., a small indoor base station (RRH: Remote Radio Head)). The terms "cell" or "sector" refer to part or all of the coverage area of ​​a base station and / or base station subsystem that provides communication services within that coverage.

[0218] In the present disclosure, the base station transmitting information to a terminal may be interpreted as the base station instructing the terminal to control or operate based on the information.

[0219] In this disclosure, the terms "Mobile Station (MS)," "user terminal," "User Equipment (UE)," "terminal," and the like may be used interchangeably.

[0220] A mobile station may also be referred to by those skilled in the art as a subscriber station, mobile unit, subscriber unit, wireless unit, remote unit, mobile device, wireless device, wireless communication device, remote device, mobile subscriber station, access terminal, mobile terminal, wireless terminal, remote terminal, handset, user agent, mobile client, client, or some other suitable terminology.

[0221] At least one of the base station and the mobile station (terminal 20) may be referred to as a transmitting device, a receiving device, a communication device, etc. At least one of the base station and the mobile station may be a device mounted on a mobile object, the mobile object itself, etc. The mobile object refers to a movable object, and may move at any speed. Naturally, this also includes cases where the mobile object is stationary. Examples of the mobile object include, but are not limited to, vehicles, transport vehicles, automobiles, motorcycles, bicycles, connected cars, excavators, bulldozers, wheel loaders, dump trucks, forklifts, trains, buses, handcars, rickshaws, ships and other watercraft, airplanes, rockets, satellites, drones (registered trademark), multicopters, quadcopters, balloons, and objects mounted thereon. The mobile object may also be a mobile object that travels autonomously based on an operational command. The mobile object may be a vehicle (e.g., a car, an airplane, etc.), an unmanned mobile object (e.g., a drone, an autonomous vehicle, etc.), or a robot (manned or unmanned). At least one of the base station and the mobile station may be a device that does not necessarily move during communication operations. For example, at least one of the base station and the mobile station may be an IoT (Internet of Things) device such as a sensor.

[0222] Furthermore, a base station in the present disclosure may be read as a user terminal. For example, the aspects / embodiments of the present disclosure may be applied to a configuration in which communication between a base station and a user terminal is replaced with communication between multiple terminals 20 (which may be called, for example, Device-to-Device (D2D) or Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X)). In this case, the terminal 20 may be configured to have the functions of the base station 10 described above. Furthermore, terms such as "uplink" and "downlink" may be read as terms corresponding to terminal-to-terminal communication (for example, "side"). For example, terms such as an uplink channel and a downlink channel may be read as a side channel.

[0223] Similarly, the user terminal in the present disclosure may be read as a base station, in which case the base station may be configured to have the functions of the user terminal described above.

[0224] As used in this disclosure, the terms "determining" and "determining" may encompass a wide variety of actions. "Determining" and "determining" may include, for example, judging, calculating, computing, processing, deriving, investigating, looking up, searching, inquiring (e.g., searching in a table, database, or other data structure), ascertaining, and the like. "Determining" and "determining" may also include receiving (e.g., receiving information), transmitting (e.g., sending information), input, output, accessing (e.g., accessing data in memory), and the like. Furthermore, "judgment" and "decision" can include regarding resolving, selecting, choosing, establishing, comparing, etc. as having been "judged" or "decided." In other words, "judgment" and "decision" can include regarding some action as having been "judged" or "decided." Furthermore, "judgment (decision)" can be interpreted as "assuming," "expecting," "considering," etc.

[0225] The terms "connected," "coupled," or any variation thereof, refer to any direct or indirect connection or coupling between two or more elements, and may include the presence of one or more intermediate elements between two elements that are "connected" or "coupled" to each other. The coupling or connection between elements may be physical, logical, or a combination thereof. For example, "connected" may be read as "access." As used in this disclosure, two elements may be considered to be "connected" or "coupled" to each other using one or more wires, cables, and / or printed electrical connections, as well as electromagnetic energy having wavelengths in the radio frequency range, microwave range, and optical (both visible and invisible) range, as some non-limiting and non-exhaustive examples.

[0226] The reference signal may be abbreviated as RS (Reference Signal) or may be called a pilot depending on the applicable standard.

[0227] As used in this disclosure, the phrase "based on" does not mean "based only on," unless expressly stated otherwise. In other words, the phrase "based on" means both "based only on" and "based at least on."

[0228] As used in this disclosure, any reference to an element using a designation such as "first," "second," etc. does not generally limit the quantity or order of those elements. These designations may be used in this disclosure as a convenient method of distinguishing between two or more elements. Thus, a reference to a first and a second element does not imply that only two elements may be employed or that the first element must in some way precede the second element.

[0229] The "means" in the configuration of each of the above devices may be replaced with "part," "circuit," "device," etc.

[0230] When the terms "include," "including," and variations thereof are used in this disclosure, these terms are intended to be inclusive, similar to the term "comprising." Furthermore, when the term "or" is used in this disclosure, it is not intended to be an exclusive or.

[0231] In this disclosure, where articles are added by translation, such as a, an, and the in English, the disclosure may include that the nouns following these articles are in the plural form.

[0232] In the present disclosure, the term "A and B are different" may mean "A and B are different from each other." The term may also mean "A and B are each different from C." Terms such as "separate" and "coupled" may also be interpreted in the same way as "different."

[0233] The aspects / embodiments described in this disclosure may be used alone, in combination, or switched depending on the implementation. Notification of predetermined information (e.g., notification that "X is true") is not limited to explicit notification, but may be implicit (e.g., not notifying the predetermined information).

[0234] Although the present disclosure has been described in detail above, it is clear to those skilled in the art that the present disclosure is not limited to the embodiments described herein. The present disclosure can be implemented in modified and altered forms without departing from the spirit and scope of the present disclosure as defined by the claims. Therefore, the description of the present disclosure is intended to be illustrative and does not have any limiting meaning on the present disclosure.

[0235] DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 10 Base station ((R)AN) 20 Terminal (UE) 21 NW connection function 22, 60 Trust evaluation function 30 AMF 40, 240 UDM 41 NW information DB 42 Trust certificate DB 43 Policy DB 70 VDR 71 User information DB 72 Issuer information DB 73 Definition information DB 74 Management information DB 80 AUSF 100 Network node 110 Transmission unit 120 Reception unit 130 Setting unit 140 Control unit 230 Authentication function 310 Transmission unit 320 Reception unit 330 Setting unit 340 Control unit 1001 Processor 1002 Storage device 1003 Auxiliary storage device 1004 Communication device 1005 Input device 1006 Output device

Claims

1. A network node comprising: a receiving unit that receives a trust evaluation request message including a trust certificate of a terminal or user from a specific network node that has received a message including the trust certificate from the terminal; a control unit that executes a trust evaluation process using the trust certificate; and a transmitting unit that transmits a trust evaluation result to the specific network node.

2. The network node according to claim 1, wherein the control unit executes the authentication process and the trust evaluation process, and the transmission unit transmits the authentication result and the trust evaluation result to the specific network node, or, if both the authentication result and the trust evaluation result are successful, transmits a message indicating success to the specific network node.

3. A terminal comprising: a receiving unit that receives a message including a network trust certificate from a specific network node; a control unit that executes a trust evaluation process using the trust certificate; and a transmitting unit that sends a trust evaluation completion message to the specific network node if the trust evaluation result is successful.

4. The terminal according to claim 3, wherein the receiving unit receives the message including the trust certificate when trust evaluation of the terminal or user on the network side is successful.

5. A communication method executed by a network node, comprising the steps of: receiving a trust evaluation request message including a trust certificate of a terminal or user from a specific network node that has received a message including the trust certificate from the terminal; performing a trust evaluation process using the trust certificate; and transmitting a trust evaluation result to the specific network node.

6. A communication method executed by a terminal, comprising: receiving a message including a network trust certificate from a specific network node; performing a trust evaluation process using the trust certificate; and, if the trust evaluation result is successful, sending a trust evaluation completion message to the specific network node.

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