Communication method and apparatus

Abstract

A communication method and apparatus. The method is applicable to data transmission using an LP-WUS. The method comprises: on the basis of a first key, a network device performing security processing on first data at a first protocol layer, and sending to a terminal device a first LP-WUS comprising the first data; and the terminal device receiving the first LP-WUS, and on the basis of the first key, performing decryption and / or verification on the first data at the first protocol layer, wherein the first protocol layer is an upper protocol layer of a physical layer. By means of the method, security protection at layers above a physical layer can be implemented for data transmitted using an LP-WUS, thereby improving the security of data transmission using the LP-WUS.

Description

A communication method and apparatus

[0001] Cross-reference to related applications

[0002] This application claims priority to Chinese Patent Application No. 202411748690.9, filed on November 28, 2024, entitled "A Communication Method and Apparatus", the entire contents of which are incorporated herein by reference. Technical Field

[0003] This application relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to a communication method and apparatus. Background Technology

[0004] In wireless communication, data leakage or tampering can have adverse consequences. For security reasons, the transmitting end performs security processing on the information to be transmitted (such as encryption and / or integrity protection). For example, for user plane information, security processing is introduced at the Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) layer.

[0005] To reduce the power consumption of terminal devices, a low-power wake-up signal (LP-WUS) is introduced. The terminal device wakes up the high-power receiver only when it detects LP-WUS. When LP-WUS is not detected, the high-power receiver can remain in sleep mode, thereby reducing the power consumption of the terminal device.

[0006] However, terminal devices that incorporate LP-WUS may lack a PDCP layer. Ensuring security for data transmission using LP-WUS remains a challenge. Summary of the Invention

[0007] This application provides a communication method and apparatus to improve the security of data transmission using LP-WUS.

[0008] To achieve the above objectives, the embodiments of this application adopt the following technical solutions:

[0009] Firstly, a communication method is provided, which can be applied to a transmitting device (hereinafter referred to as the transmitting device). Unless otherwise specified in this application, the transmitting device can be the transmitting equipment itself, or a module or unit used to perform some functions of the transmitting equipment, such as circuits or chip / chip systems in the transmitting equipment, or the transmitting device can be a logic node, logic module, or software that implements all or part of the functions of the transmitting equipment. In one example, the transmitting device is a terminal device, which can be a terminal device or circuits or chip / chip systems in the terminal device (e.g., a modem chip, also known as a baseband chip, or a system-on-chip (SoC) chip or system-in-package (SIP) chip containing a modem core).

[0010] The method includes: receiving a first LP-WUS, the first LP-WUS including first data; and decrypting and / or verifying the first data at a first protocol layer according to a first key, wherein the first protocol layer is a protocol layer above the physical layer. This method enables security protection of data transmitted using LP-WUS above the physical layer, thereby improving the security of data transmission using LP-WUS.

[0011] In one implementation, the terminal device includes a main link and a secondary link. A first key is generated based on a second key, which is different from a third key. This third key is used for secure processing of the main link of the terminal device. In this implementation, the main link and the secondary link each have their own dedicated keys. Compared to the main link and the secondary link sharing a single key, this reduces the risk of being cracked due to the same key being used multiple times during data transmission on both the main link and the secondary link.

[0012] In one implementation, the method further includes: obtaining security processing parameters, which include a second key. The security processing parameters can be used to generate a first key; the terminal device obtains the security processing parameters to generate the first key before decrypting and / or verifying the first data.

[0013] In one implementation, the first LP-WUS is received via a secondary link; wherein the second key is derived from the primary link, or the second key is derived from the secondary link. This application does not restrict whether the second key is derived from the primary or secondary link, allowing for flexible implementation.

[0014] In one implementation, the security processing parameters further include a first count value. This first count value can be dynamically sent to the terminal device by the network device, preventing the reuse of the first key generated based on the first count value, reducing the risk of replay attacks, and improving the security of the first data. Alternatively, the first count value can be predefined to save signaling overhead. When the first data is small data transmitted via a secondary link and does not involve multiple repeated transmissions, the key for protecting the first data is used only once. Even if the first count value is a predefined value, there is no risk of replay attacks.

[0015] In one implementation, the first count value is the sequence number (SN) assigned to the first data. This SN can be reused from the SN assigned to the data by the PDCP layer in the main link, thus eliminating the need to separately introduce the SN in the header of the first LP-WUS packet, saving header overhead. Alternatively, the SN can also be the SN assigned to the first data by the first protocol layer of the secondary link. For example, if the first protocol layer is the MAC layer, the first count value can be the SN assigned to the first data by the MAC layer. This allows for security across different protocol layers, not limited to the PDCP layer, and offers greater flexibility.

[0016] In one implementation, the security processing parameters further include a bearer identifier, which can be: a first value, predefined by the protocol; information used to determine the data radio bearer (DRB) identifier; an identifier of the terminal device; or a part of the identifier of the communication device terminal device. This implementation uses the bearer identifier as an input parameter for calculating the first key, increasing the computational complexity of the first key and reducing the risk of the first key being cracked. Furthermore, this implementation provides multiple implementation forms for the bearer identifier, offering greater flexibility. For example, the bearer identifier can be a predefined first value, facilitating maintenance. Alternatively, the bearer identifier can be information used to determine the DRB identifier; the bearer identifier can be determined based on the DRB identifier, which is beneficial for compatibility with existing protocols. Another example is that the bearer identifier can be the identifier of the terminal device or a part of the terminal device identifier, facilitating the management and determination of the bearer resources of the user equipment (UE). For instance, in a network, each UE typically establishes multiple bearers; by mapping the bearer ID and the UE ID, it is easy to determine the bearer resources of each UE. For example, if it is necessary to find the bearer information of a certain UE, the relevant bearer ID can be found directly through the UE ID.

[0017] In one implementation, the method further includes: receiving first indication information, which indicates a second value of the next hop chaining count (NCC), used to deduce the first key. This implementation provides an access stratum (AS) based protection mechanism, whereby the network device indicates the NCC value used to deduce the first key to the terminal device, thereby enabling the terminal device to deduce the first key used by the network device and achieve decryption and / or verification of the first data.

[0018] In one implementation, the first indication information is carried on a first LP-WUS. In this implementation, the first indication information is carried through the LP-WUS to clearly indicate that the NCC indicated by the first indication information is for the secondary link. By setting up dedicated NCCs for the primary and secondary links respectively, compared to sharing an NCC between the primary and secondary links, the risk of cracking due to the same NCC being used multiple times in key deduction can be reduced.

[0019] Secondly, a communication method is provided, which can be applied to a receiving device (hereinafter referred to as the receiving device). Unless otherwise specified in this application, the receiving device can be the receiving device itself, or a module or unit used to perform some of the functions of the receiving device, such as a circuit or chip / chip system in the receiving device. Alternatively, the receiving device can be a logical node, logical module, or software module that implements all or part of the functions of the receiving device. In one example, the receiving device is a network device, which can be a network device, a component in the network device (e.g., a circuit, chip, or chip system), or a module or unit used to perform some or all of the functions of the network device, such as a central unit (CU), a distributed unit (DU), or a radio unit (RU).

[0020] The method includes: performing secure processing on first data at a first protocol layer according to a first key, and sending a first LP-WUS. The first protocol layer is a protocol layer above the physical layer. The first LP-WUS includes the first data.

[0021] In one implementation, the first key is generated based on the second key, which is different from the third key. The third key is used for the security processing of the main link of the terminal device.

[0022] In one implementation, the first LP-WUS further includes a security processing parameter, which includes a first count value.

[0023] In one implementation, the first count value is the SN assigned to the first data.

[0024] In one implementation, the security processing parameters further include a bearer identifier, which is: a first value, which is predefined by the protocol; or information used to determine the DRB identifier; or the identifier of the terminal device; or a part of the identifier of the terminal device.

[0025] In one implementation, the method further includes: sending first indication information, which indicates a second value of the NCC, and the second value is used to deduce the first key.

[0026] In one implementation, the first instruction information is carried in the first LP-WUS.

[0027] The beneficial effects of the second aspect and its various implementation methods can be found in the aforementioned beneficial effects of the second aspect and its various implementation methods, and will not be repeated here.

[0028] Thirdly, embodiments of this application provide a communication device that has the functionality to implement the behaviors described in the first or second aspect of the method examples. The beneficial effects can be found in the relevant descriptions of the first or second aspect and will not be repeated here. For example, the communication device can be a transmitting device as described in the first aspect, or it can be a device capable of supporting the transmitting device to implement the functions required by the method provided in the first aspect; for example, the communication device can be a chip or chip system in the transmitting device. The transmitting device can be a terminal device. As another example, the communication device can be a receiving device as described in the second aspect, or it can be a device capable of supporting the receiving device to implement the functions required by the method provided in the second aspect; for example, the communication device can be a chip or chip system in the receiving device. The receiving device can be a network device.

[0029] In one possible design, the communication device includes a baseband device and a radio frequency device.

[0030] In one possible design, the communication device includes corresponding means, modules, or units for performing the methods of the first or second aspect. These modules, units, or means can be implemented in software, hardware, or a combination of both. For example, the communication device includes a processing unit (sometimes also called a processing module or processor) and / or input / output interfaces. Input / output interfaces include input interfaces and / or output interfaces, which can be interface circuits, output circuits, input circuits, pins, or related circuits. Optionally, the communication device also includes a transceiver unit (sometimes also called a transceiver module or transceiver). The transceiver unit is capable of both transmitting and receiving functions. When the transceiver unit performs the transmitting function, it can be called a transmitting unit (sometimes also called a transmitting module), and when it performs the receiving function, it can be called a receiving unit (sometimes also called a receiving module). The transmitting unit and the receiving unit can be the same functional unit, referred to as the transceiver unit, which performs both transmitting and receiving functions; or, the transmitting unit and the receiving unit can be different functional units, with the transceiver unit being a collective term for these functional units. These input / output interfaces and units (modules) can perform the corresponding functions in the method examples of the first or second aspect above. For details, please refer to the detailed description in the method examples, which will not be repeated here.

[0031] For example, the communication device is used to implement the corresponding function in the method example of the first aspect. Accordingly, the transceiver unit is used to receive a first LP-WUS, which includes first data; the processing unit is used to decrypt and / or verify the first data at a first protocol layer according to a first key, the first protocol layer being a protocol layer above the physical layer. See the detailed description in the method example for further details, which will not be repeated here.

[0032] For example, the communication device is used to implement the corresponding function in the method example of the second aspect. Accordingly, the processing unit is used to perform secure processing on the first data at a first protocol layer according to the first key, the first protocol layer being a protocol layer above the physical layer; the transceiver unit is used to send a first LP-WUS, the first LP-WUS including the first data. See the detailed description in the method example for further details, which will not be repeated here.

[0033] Fourthly, embodiments of this application provide a communication device, which includes a communication interface and a processor. The processor is configured to execute the methods of the first aspect or the second aspect and any of their implementations. This application does not limit the specific type of processor. For example, the processor can be a baseband device, a central processing unit (CPU), or other specific integrated circuits. As another example, the processor can be other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSPs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, or discrete hardware components.

[0034] Optionally, the communication device further includes a memory for storing computer programs (also referred to as code or instructions), data, etc. The processor is coupled to the memory and the communication interface. When the processor reads the computer program, data, etc., from the memory, the methods in the first or second aspect and any of their implementations are executed.

[0035] In one design, the memory is located outside the communication device.

[0036] In one design, the memory is located within the communication device.

[0037] In one design, the processor and memory are integrated together.

[0038] Fifthly, embodiments of this application provide a chip system including a processor and a communication interface for implementing the methods described in the first or second aspect. Optionally, the chip system further includes a memory. The memory stores computer programs (also referred to as code or instructions). The processor retrieves and executes the computer program from the memory, causing a device equipped with the chip system to perform the methods in the first or second aspect and any possible implementation thereof. The chip system may be composed of chips or may include chips and other discrete devices.

[0039] Sixthly, embodiments of this application provide a communication device including an input / output interface and logic circuitry. The input / output interface is used for inputting and / or outputting information. The input / output interface may be an interface circuit, an output circuit, an input circuit, pins, or related circuits, etc. The logic circuitry is used to execute the methods described in the first or second aspect.

[0040] The communication device in the sixth aspect can be a chip, the input circuit can be an input pin, the output circuit can be an output pin, and the logic circuit can be a transistor, gate circuit, flip-flop, and various other logic circuits. The input signal received by the input circuit can be received and input by, for example, but not limited to, a receiver, and the signal output by the output circuit can be, for example, but not limited to, output to a transmitter and transmitted by the transmitter. Furthermore, the input circuit and the output circuit can be the same circuit, which is used as both the input circuit and the output circuit at different times. This application does not limit the specific implementation of the input / output interface and the logic circuit.

[0041] In one implementation of the sixth aspect, when the communication device is a terminal device, the interface circuit can be a radio frequency processing chip in the terminal device, and the processing circuit can be a baseband processing chip in the terminal device. When the communication device is a network device, the interface circuit can be a radio frequency processing chip in the network device, and the processing circuit can be a baseband processing chip in the network device.

[0042] In specific implementation, the aforementioned communication device can be the transmitting device in the first aspect. Alternatively, the communication device can be a device capable of supporting the transmitting device to implement the functions required by the method provided in the first aspect. For example, the communication device can be a chip or chip system in a transmitting device, which may include the transmitting device. Alternatively, the communication device can be the receiving device in the second aspect. Alternatively, the communication device can be a device capable of supporting the receiving device to implement the functions required by the method provided in the second aspect. For example, the communication device can be a chip or chip system in a receiving device, which may include the transmitting device. The chip can be a baseband chip and / or a radio frequency chip, and the chip system can be composed of chips or may include chips and other discrete devices.

[0043] In a seventh aspect, embodiments of this application provide a communication system, which includes a terminal device and a network device. The terminal device is used to implement the functions described in the first aspect, and the network device is used to implement the functions described in the second aspect.

[0044] Eighthly, embodiments of this application provide a computer-readable storage medium for storing a computer program or instructions that, when executed, cause the methods described in the first or second aspect and any of their implementations to be implemented.

[0045] Ninthly, embodiments of this application also provide a computer program product containing instructions that, when run on a computer, cause the methods described in the first or second aspect and any of their implementations to be implemented.

[0046] The beneficial effects of the third to ninth aspects and their implementation methods mentioned above can be referenced to the beneficial effects of the first or second aspect and any of their implementation methods. Attached Figure Description

[0047] Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of the architecture of the communication system provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0048] Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of the transmission of downlink data between layers provided in the embodiments of this application;

[0049] Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of the current process of integrity protection / verification based on NIA;

[0050] Figure 4 is a schematic diagram of the current encryption process based on NEA;

[0051] Figure 5 is a schematic diagram of the working mode of the main link and the auxiliary link provided in the embodiment of this application;

[0052] Figure 6 is a schematic diagram of the key deduction process provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0053] Figure 7 is a schematic diagram of the key deduction process provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0054] Figure 8 is a flowchart illustrating the communication method provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0055] Figure 9 is a schematic diagram of the integrity protection / verification process based on NIA provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0056] Figure 10 is a schematic diagram of the encryption process based on NEA provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0057] Figure 11 is a schematic diagram of a communication device provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0058] Figure 12 is a schematic diagram of another structure of the communication device provided in the embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0059] The technical solutions provided in the embodiments of this application can be applied to various communication systems, such as long term evolution (LTE) communication systems, the sixth generation (5G) mobile communication systems / new radio (NR) communication systems, or they can also be applied to future mobile communication systems, or other similar communication systems. Other similar communication systems may include wireless fidelity (WIFI), vehicle-to-everything (V2X), internet of things (IoT) systems, non-terrestrial network (NTN) communication systems, and so on.

[0060] Please refer to Figure 1, which illustrates a communication system applicable to an embodiment of this application. The communication system includes a wireless access network 100 and a core network 200. Optionally, the communication system may also include the Internet (Figure 1 uses this as an example).

[0061] The wireless access network 100 may include at least one network device and at least one terminal device. For example, the wireless access network 100 includes two network devices, 110a and 110b, and terminal devices 120a to 120j. The network architecture shown in Figure 1 is only schematic; the number of terminal devices and / or network devices may be fewer or more. The communication system described in the embodiments of this application is for the purpose of more clearly illustrating the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application and does not constitute a limitation on the communication system to which the embodiments of this application are applicable. For example, the communication system may also include other devices, such as wireless relay devices and wireless backhaul devices, which are not shown in Figure 1. As those skilled in the art will know, with the evolution of network architecture, the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of this application are also applicable to similar technical problems. When applying the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application to other communication systems, the devices, components, modules, etc. in the embodiments can be replaced with corresponding devices, components, modules in other communication systems without limitation.

[0062] In this embodiment, network equipment refers to (radio)access network ((R)AN) equipment / RAN node. In this embodiment, (R)AN and RAN are interchangeable; for ease of description, RAN is used as an example below. RAN can be a cellular system related to the 3rd generation partnership project (3GPP), such as a 5G / NR mobile communication system or a future-oriented evolution system. RAN can also be an open RAN (O-RAN or ORAN), a cloud radio access network (CRAN), a virtualized RAN (vRAN), NTN, etc. RAN can also be a communication system that integrates two or more of the above systems. RAN equipment can also be called a RAN node, RAN entity, or access node, etc.

[0063] In one possible scenario, a RAN node can be a base station, an evolved NodeB (eNodeB), an access point (AP), a transmission reception point (TRP), a next-generation NodeB (gNB), or a base station in a future mobile communication system. RAN nodes can also be macro base stations, micro base stations, indoor stations, relay nodes, donor / host nodes, or radio controllers. RAN nodes can also be servers, wearable devices, vehicles, or in-vehicle equipment. For example, in V2X technology, the RAN node can be a roadside unit (RSU).

[0064] In another possible scenario, the RAN node can be a module or unit that performs some of the functions of the base station; or multiple RAN nodes can cooperate to assist terminal equipment in achieving wireless access, with different RAN nodes performing some of the functions of the base station. For example, the RAN node can be a CU, DU, or RU. The function of the CU can be implemented by a single entity or by different entities. For example, the function of the CU can be further divided, that is, the control plane and the user plane can be separated and implemented by different entities, namely the control plane CU entity (i.e., CU-control plane (CP) entity) and the user plane CU entity (i.e., CU-user plane (UP) entity). The CU-CP entity and the CU-UP entity can be coupled with the DU to jointly complete the function of the RAN node. The CU and DU can be set up separately or included in the same network element, such as in the baseband unit (BBU). Any of the units among the CU (or CU-CP, CU-UP), DU, and RU in this application can be implemented by software modules, hardware modules, or a combination of software modules and hardware modules.

[0065] In different systems, CU (or CU-CP and CU-UP), DU, or RU may have different names, but those skilled in the art will understand their meaning. For example, in an ORAN system, CU can also be called O-CU (open CU), DU can also be called O-DU, CU-CP can also be called O-CU-CP, CU-UP can also be called O-CU-UP, and RU can also be called O-RU. For ease of description, this application uses CU, CU-CP, CU-UP, DU, and RU as examples.

[0066] The CU and DU can be configured according to the protocol layer functions of the wireless network they implement: for example, the CU can be configured to implement the functions of the PDCP layer and above (such as the radio resource control (RRC) layer and / or the service data adaptation protocol (SDAP) layer); the DU can be configured to implement the functions of the protocol layers below the PDCP layer (such as the radio link control (RLC) layer, the medium access control (MAC) layer, and / or the physical (PHY) layer). For specific descriptions of the above protocol layers, please refer to the relevant 3GPP technical specifications or the technical specifications of other applicable communication protocols.

[0067] The above division of the processing functions of CU and DU according to protocol layers is merely an example; other division methods are also possible, and this application does not limit this. For example, in one design, CU or DU can be further divided into processing functions with protocol layers. In one design, some functions of the RLC layer and the functions of the protocol layer above the RLC layer are located in the CU, while the remaining functions of the RLC layer and the functions of the protocol layer below the RLC layer are located in the DU.

[0068] In another possible design, the DU and RU collaborate to implement the PHY layer functionality, or, more specifically, a portion of the PHY layer functionality of the DU can be moved to the RU. A DU can be connected to one or more RUs. The functions of the DU and RU can be configured in various ways depending on the design. For example, the DU may be configured to implement baseband functions, and the RU may be configured to implement mid-RF functions. Alternatively, the DU may be configured to implement higher-level functions in the PHY layer, and the RU may be configured to implement lower-level functions in the PHY layer, or both lower-level and RF functions. Higher-level functions in the physical layer may include a portion of the physical layer's functionality closer to the MAC layer, and lower-level functions may include another portion of the physical layer's functionality closer to the mid-RF side. This application does not limit the specific functions of the DU and RU. The interface between the DU and RU can be called a fronthaul interface. In one design, the CU may not have a PDCP layer; for example, the CU may only include an RRC layer. The CU-CP may not have PDCP-C. The CU-UP may not have PDCP-U, or may not have a CU-UP. In one design, the DU may not have an RLC layer; for example, the DU may only have a MAC and a higher PHY layer.

[0069] When the RAN is O-RAN, it can also have artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities. For example, O-RAN includes an intelligent controller. The intelligent controller can be a non-real-time RAN intelligent controller (RIC / non-RT RIC / NRT RIC) or a near-real-time RAN intelligent controller (RIC / near-RT RIC / nRT RIC). A non-real-time RIC can be used to implement non-real-time intelligent management of RAN functions, enabling workflows including model training and model updates, and guiding applications / functions in the nRT RIC based on policies. A near-real-time RIC can be used to implement near-real-time intelligent management of the RAN. Through data collection and related operations on the E2 interface, near-real-time control and optimization of O-RAN modules and resources are achieved.

[0070] In the embodiments of this application, the device for implementing the functions of the network device can be the terminal device itself, or it can be a device that supports the network device in implementing the functions, such as a chip system or a combination of devices or components that can implement the functions of the network device. This device can be installed in the network device. The embodiments of this application do not limit the specific technology or specific device form used in the network device.

[0071] In this application embodiment, anything capable of data communication with a base station can be considered a terminal device. A terminal device is also called a terminal, terminal apparatus, UE, user device, mobile station, or mobile terminal, etc. Terminal devices can be widely used in various scenarios. For example, a terminal device can be: a mobile phone, computer, mobile internet device (MID), wearable device, virtual reality (VR) device, augmented reality (AR) device, station (STA), robotic arm, camera, robot, vehicle, drone, helicopter, airplane, ship, or smart home device (e.g., television, air conditioner, robot vacuum cleaner, speaker, set-top box), relay, customer premises equipment (CPE), etc.

[0072] Furthermore, in this embodiment, the terminal device can also be a terminal device in an IoT system, such as a water meter or electricity meter. IoT is an important component of future information technology development. Its main technical characteristic is connecting objects to networks through communication technology, thereby realizing an intelligent network that enables human-machine interconnection and object-to-object interconnection.

[0073] When the terminal device is applied to V2X, it can also be called a V2X device, such as a smart car, an unmanned car, a driverless car, a pilotless car, or an automobile, or a roadside unit (RSU). All the terminal devices described above, if located on a vehicle (e.g., placed / installed inside the vehicle), can be considered in-vehicle terminal devices. In-vehicle terminal devices can be built into a vehicle's on-board module, on-board unit, on-board component, on-board chip, or on-board unit as one or more components or units. The vehicle can implement the methods of this application through the built-in on-board module, on-board unit, on-board component, on-board chip, or on-board unit. In-vehicle terminal devices can be vehicle equipment, on-board modules, vehicles, on-board units (OBU), RSUs, in-vehicle infotainment systems (or on-board transmitting units) (telematics boxes, T-boxes), chips, or SoCs, etc., and the aforementioned chips or SoCs can be installed in the vehicle, OBU, RSU, or T-box.

[0074] In the embodiments of this application, the device for implementing the functions of the terminal device can be the terminal device itself, or a device capable of supporting the terminal device in implementing the functions, such as a chip system or a combination of devices or components capable of implementing the functions of the terminal device. This device can be installed in the terminal device. The embodiments of this application do not limit the specific technology or specific device form used in the terminal device.

[0075] The communication system applicable to the embodiments of this application has been described above. To facilitate understanding of the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of this application, the relevant terms and other information involved in the embodiments of this application will be explained below.

[0076] (1) Protocol layer structure between access network equipment and terminal equipment

[0077] Communication between access network equipment and terminal equipment follows a specific protocol layer structure. For example, the control plane protocol layer structure may include the RRC layer, PDCP layer, RLC layer, MAC layer, and PHY layer; the user plane protocol layer structure may include the PDCP layer, RLC layer, MAC layer, and PHY layer. In one possible implementation, an SDAP layer may also be included above the PDCP layer. The SDAP layer, PDCP layer, RLC layer, MAC layer, and PHY layer can all be collectively referred to as the access layer. For detailed descriptions of each of these protocol layers, please refer to the relevant technical specifications of the 3GPP (Third Generation Partnership Project).

[0078] Taking data transmission between access network devices and terminal devices as an example, data transmission needs to pass through user plane protocol layers, such as SDAP, PDCP, RLC, MAC, and PHY layers. For example, please refer to Figure 2, which illustrates the transmission of downlink data between these layers. Downlink data refers to the data sent from the access network device to the terminal device. In Figure 2, downward arrows represent data transmission, and upward arrows represent data reception.

[0079] After receiving data from the upper layer, the SDAP layer entity maps the data to the corresponding PDCP layer entity. The PDCP layer entity then delivers the data to at least one RLC layer entity corresponding to that PDCP layer entity. This RLC layer entity then delivers the data to the corresponding MAC layer entity, which generates a transport block (TB) and transmits it wirelessly through the corresponding PHY layer entity. Data is encapsulated at each layer. Data received by a layer from its upper layer is considered a Service Data Unit (SDU) for that layer. After layer encapsulation, it becomes a PDU and is then passed to the next layer. For example, data received by a PDCP layer entity from its upper layer is called a PDCP SDU, and data sent by the PDCP layer entity to its lower layer is called a PDCP PDU; similarly, data received by an RLC layer entity from its upper layer is called an RLC SDU, and data sent by the RLC layer entity to its lower layer is called an RLC PDU. Different layers can transmit data through corresponding channels. For instance, RLC layer entities and MAC layer entities can transmit data through a logical channel (LCH), and MAC layer entities and physical layer entities can transmit data through a transport channel.

[0080] Similar to access network equipment, terminal equipment also has an access layer consisting of SDAP, PDCP, RLC, MAC, and physical layers. Terminal equipment also has an application layer and a non-access layer. The application layer provides services to applications installed on the terminal equipment. For example, downlink data received by the terminal equipment can be sequentially transmitted from the physical layer to the application layer, and then provided to the application. Alternatively, the application layer can acquire data generated by applications (such as videos recorded by users using applications) and sequentially transmit the data to the physical layer for transmission to other communication devices. The non-access layer forwards user data, such as forwarding uplink data received from the application layer to the SDAP layer or forwarding downlink data received from the SDAP layer to the application layer.

[0081] (2) User plane transmission

[0082] Wireless communication transmission is divided into user plane transmission and control plane transmission. User plane transmission can be used to transmit user plane data and user plane control information, while control plane transmission can be used to transmit control plane signaling, which may include RRC signaling, etc.

[0083] User plane data refers to user plane data PDUs, which are used to carry communication content data. User plane data PDUs can include data PDUs from various protocol layers, such as SDAP data PDUs, PDCP data PDUs, RLC data PDUs, etc.

[0084] User plane control information refers to user plane control PDUs, which carry control information to support the transmission of user plane data PDUs, such as status reports, robust header compression (RoHC) feedback, and Ethernet header compression (EHC) feedback. User plane control PDUs can include control PDUs from various protocol layers, such as SDAP control PDUs, PDCP control PDUs, and RLC control PDUs. Besides the user plane control PDUs mentioned above, other control information exists, such as MAC control element (CE) PDUs and control PDUs for new protocol layers that may be defined in future communication systems.

[0085] (3) Security processing, also known as security protection, includes encryption processing and / or integrity protection processing.

[0086] For security during communication, the sending and receiving ends can perform security processing on user plane data and control plane signaling. Currently, access layer security processing can be performed at the PDCP layer. That is, the sending end performs security processing on user plane data or control plane signaling at the PDCP layer, such as encryption and / or integrity protection; the receiving end also performs corresponding security processing on user plane data or control plane signaling at the PDCP layer, such as decryption and / or integrity verification. Integrity verification can also be called integrity check. In the embodiments of this application, "integrity protection" can also be called integrity verification, or simply integrity protection verification / integrity check / integrity protection. "Encryption" and "integrity protection" can be independent algorithms. Alternatively, "encryption" may also include "integrity protection." In other words, "encryption" includes both encryption and integrity protection.

[0087] Encryption refers to the process by which the sending end uses an algorithm to convert plaintext data into ciphertext based on input parameters such as a key. Decryption refers to the process by which the receiving end uses an algorithm to convert the ciphertext back into plaintext based on input parameters such as a key. When the input parameters used by the sending end and the receiving end are the same, it is possible for information encrypted at the sending end to be successfully decrypted at the receiving end.

[0088] Integrity protection processing refers to the sending end calculating integrity protection parameters (e.g., parameter A) using an algorithm based on input parameters such as data packets and keys. Integrity verification refers to the receiving end calculating parameter B using an algorithm based on input parameters such as data packets and keys. If parameters A and B match, integrity verification succeeds; otherwise, it fails. When the input parameters used by the sending end and the receiving end are the same, information that has undergone integrity protection at the sending end can be successfully verified for integrity by the receiving end.

[0089] For example, please refer to Figure 3, which illustrates the process of integrity protection / authentication using the integrity algorithm for 5G (NIA). As shown in Figure 3, the input parameters for integrity protection / authentication include a count, a key, a message (such as the message itself to be protected / authenticated), a transmission direction (such as uplink or downlink transmission), and a bearer identifier. The output parameters obtained from the integrity protection process (i.e., parameter A) include the message authentication code-integrity (MAC-I), and the output parameters obtained from the integrity authentication process (i.e., parameter B) include the expected message authentication code-integrity (XMAC-I). If parameters MAC-I and XMAC-I match, the integrity authentication is successful; if parameters MAC-I and XMAC-I do not match, the integrity authentication fails.

[0090] The encryption protection process for the air interface is similar to the integrity protection process for the air interface. For example, please refer to Figure 4, which illustrates the encryption process using the 5G encryption algorithm (NEA). As shown in Figure 4, the input parameters for air interface encryption include the key, counter value, bearer identifier, transmission direction, and key stream length. When the transmitting end performs encryption, it generates a key stream (KEYSTREAMBLOCK) based on the input parameters. This key stream is XORed with the input plaintext (PLAINTEXTBLOCK) to generate the ciphertext (CIPHERTEXTBLOCK). At the receiving end, the same key stream is generated using the same input parameters, and the plaintext is XORed with the ciphertext to recover the plaintext.

[0091] It should be noted that the above integrity protection is based on MAC-I. This application does not limit the means of integrity protection employed. For example, cyclic redundancy check (CRC), hash function (HASH), or digital signature can also be used to implement integrity protection. MAC-I can be considered a keyed hash function. Taking integrity protection through CRC as an example, the sending and receiving ends can agree on the CRC generator polynomial P before communication. The length of P is R+1. The sending end adds R zeros to the original K-bit data, which is equivalent to shifting the original K-bit data left by R bits, resulting in K+R bits of data. Then, it performs modulo-2 division (i.e., XOR operation), dividing the K+R bits of data by P, and repeating the calculation until the order of the remainder is less than R. This remainder has a length of R and is an additional CRC checksum. If the length is less than R bits, it is padded with leading zeros. The sending end appends the R-bit checksum to the original K-bit data and sends it to the receiving end. After receiving the data, the receiving end divides the data by the divisor P using modulo-2 division. If there is no remainder, it means that no error occurred during transmission; otherwise, it means that an error occurred.

[0092] (4) LP-WUS

[0093] Whether the UE is performing a paging process in RRC idle or inactive mode, or receiving data in RRC connected mode, it uses the same receiving module. This receiving module can be referred to as the main radio (MR), main receiver (MR), or main link. The UE operating in the main radio, main receiver, or main link can also be described as the UE operating on a 5G NR link.

[0094] To further reduce power consumption, the UE can also use a circuit independent of the MR to receive signals, for example, referred to as circuit A. Circuit A can be implemented using a simple circuit or chip with low power consumption. The specific form of circuit A is not limited in this application embodiment. Circuit A can also be called a wake-up radio, a wake-up receiver (WUR), a wake-up circuit, a wake-up receiver module, a low-power radio (LR), a low-power wake-up receiver (LP-WUR), or an auxiliary link, etc. The name of circuit A is not limited in this application embodiment. Circuit A can receive a wake-up signal (WUS) from the network device, which is also referred to as LP-WUS. To reduce the power consumption of the WUR circuit, the wake-up signal typically uses simple modulation methods such as on-off keying (OOK) or Manchester OOK. Correspondingly, circuit A in the UE can use envelope detection to receive the wake-up signal.

[0095] The main link is primarily used for sending and / or receiving data / signaling. If there is no need for sending and / or receiving data / signaling, the main link can be shut down or placed in a sleep state or sleep mode. Typically, the main link's state can include on, off, and different levels of sleep states (deep sleep state, ultra-deep sleep state). The energy and time required to transition to the on state vary depending on the state. The secondary link is mainly used to wake up the main link from its sleep state. For example, when there is a need for sending and / or receiving data / signaling, or when the secondary link detects / receives a low-power signal, it can wake up the main link from its sleep state. This design reduces the power consumption of the terminal device.

[0096] Please refer to Figure 5, which illustrates the operation of the main link (MR) and the secondary link (circuit A). In Figure 5, the secondary link is an example of a low-power circuit. After the low-power circuit is activated, if the UE detects LP-WUS, it can trigger the activation of the main link to receive paging or initiate random access, etc. If the UE does not detect LP-WUS, it does not need to trigger the activation of the main link, and the main link can remain off (or remain in sleep mode). This reduces the operating time of the main link, thereby saving the UE's power consumption.

[0097] Compared to the main link, the secondary link has lower complexity, lower power consumption, and lower processing capabilities (such as demodulation and computation). The protocol stack of the secondary link may also be simpler. For example, the protocol layer structure of the secondary link includes a PHY layer and a first protocol layer, which is a protocol layer above the PHY layer, or a protocol layer above the PHY layer. The first protocol layer can be one protocol layer or multiple protocol layers. The following examples illustrate the possible structures of the first protocol layer.

[0098] In Example 1, the first protocol layer is the MAC layer.

[0099] In Example 2, the first protocol layer includes the MAC layer and the RLC layer, but not the PDCP layer. The MAC layer and the RLC layer can be a single protocol layer, or they can be two independent protocol layers.

[0100] In Example 3, the first protocol layer includes a MAC layer, an RLC layer, and a PDCP layer. The MAC layer, RLC layer, and PDCP layer can be a single protocol layer, or they can be multiple protocol layers. For example, the MAC layer and RLC layer can be a single layer, and the PDCP layer can be a single layer. Another example is that the MAC layer can be a single layer, and the RLC layer and PDCP layer can be a single layer.

[0101] In Example 4, the first protocol layer is a NAS layer, or the first protocol layer includes a NAS layer, or the first protocol layer is a higher layer similar to a NAS layer, or the first protocol layer is a higher layer that has the function of a NAS layer.

[0102] When the first protocol layer includes multiple layers, the security processing of the first data in the first protocol layer can be performed by one layer of the first protocol layer or by multiple layers of the first protocol layer.

[0103] (5) Key derivation process

[0104] To ensure secure data transmission between the terminal and the network, both sides need to perform the same key derivation to ensure that they use the same key. "Network side" can include network devices (such as access network devices or gNBs). "Derivation" can also be replaced with "derived" or other descriptions, without limitation.

[0105] Key derivation is essentially the exchange of portions of information used to generate a shared key, creating a shared key that can be used for encryption and / or integrity verification. The communicating parties then use this shared key to encrypt and / or ensure the integrity of the information they wish to exchange.

[0106] Please refer to Figure 6, which is a schematic diagram of the key derivation process provided in an embodiment of this application. Figure 6 takes the UE and gNB as examples of the two communicating parties. Figure 6 also involves the derivation of the key for the initial access stratum (AS) and the key for the NAS.

[0107] (5-1) Derivation of the AS key

[0108] As shown in Figure 6, when the initial AS security context is established between the UE and the gNB, the access and mobility management function (AMF) and the UE-derived K_GNB (also known as KgNB) are involved. K_GNB is the gNodeB encryption key (gNB encryption key), generated by the gNB through a key negotiation process. For example, K_GNB is generated by the gNB through interactions with core network elements such as the AMF. K_GNB is used to generate keys for AS security, such as the user plane encryption key (K_UPENC), the user plane integrity key (K_UPint), the RRC integrity key (K_RRCint), and the RRC signaling encryption key (K_RRCenc). K_UPENC is also called K... UPENC K_UPENC is a key derived from K_GNB by the ME and gNB, or K_UPENC is a key derived from K_GNB, used to protect user plane (UP) services between the ME and gNB using a specific encryption algorithm. K_UPint is a key derived from the ME and the transmission function gNB (TF GNB) from K (key), used to protect UP services between the ME and gNB using a specific integrity algorithm. K_RRCint is also called K_UPENC. RRCint , is a key derived from the ME and gNB of K_GNB, used to protect RRC signaling using a specific integrity algorithm. K_RRCenc is also known as K RRCenc The key, derived from the ME and the gNB from the K GNB, is used to protect RRC signaling using a specific encryption algorithm.

[0109] Information between the UE and the gNB / ng-eNB can be protected using a KgNB. If the UE switches cells or switches from an inactive state to a connected state, the key KgNB used to protect the information between the UE and the target gNB / ng-eNB can be generated based on K_GNB* (also known as KNG-RAN*). In other words, when the UE switches cells or switches from an inactive state to a connected state, the key used to protect the information between the UE and the target gNB / ng-eNB is based on K_GNB* (also known as KNG-RAN*).

[0110] When the initial AS security context is established between the UE and gNB, the AMF and UE can derive the next hop (NH). The NH can be understood as an intermediate key, derived from the root key KAMF. K_GNB* can be derived from K_GNB; in this case, K_GNB* is called horizontal key derivation. Alternatively, K_GNB* can be derived from NCC; in this case, K_GNB* is called vertical key derivation. The NCC is associated with each KgNB and NH parameter. Each KgNB is associated with the NCC of the NH value derived from that KgNB. One NCC uniquely identifies one NH. Specifically, the NH is obtained by the terminal and AMF network elements using chained derivation; that is, the NH generated in this step will be used to generate the next NH. The AMF network can send the derived NH and NCC to network devices to enable secure communication between the network devices and the terminal based on the NH. The root key KAMF can be understood as the core network key.

[0111] KgNB and NH are from K AMF From this, the AMF can calculate the {NH,NCC} pairs to be used by the target gNB / ng-eNB. The first {NH,NCC} pair serves as the initial value for the NH chain and is not used to derive the KgNB. The NH parameters can be provided to the target gNB / ng-eNB by the AMF. During initial setup, the KgNB is directly derived from the KAMF, and the KgNB is considered to be associated with the NH parameter where the NCC value is equal to zero. During initial setup, the derived NH value is associated with the NCC value of 1. Specifically, the generation process of K_GNB* is shown in Figure 7.

[0112] Horizontal key derivation process:

[0113] The currently active KgNB (or initial key (KgNB(initial KgNB))) is derived from the initial value of the KgNB. K_GNB* is calculated based on parameters (e.g., cell identifier, frequency) and the currently active KgNB. Then, a KgNB is generated based on K_GNB*, and so on. Understandably, in the case of horizontal key derivation, NCC = 0. In handover with horizontal key derivation, before the currently active KgNB is used as the KgNB in ​​the target gNB / ng-eNB, it is bound to the target physical cell identifier (PCI) and the downlink frequency channel number (ARFCN-DL) of the frequency corresponding to that target PCI.

[0114] In other words, during initial access, the network device can deduce the initial key KgNB (KgNB) based on the root key (KAMF), and then deduce KgNB1 based on the initial key KgNB. Subsequently, if horizontal derivation is to be performed, the network device deduces key KgNB2 based on KgNB1, the PCI of the cell where the terminal is currently camped, and the frequency point, such as the downlink frequency point. If horizontal derivation continues, the network device can deduce key KgNB3 based on key KgNB2, the PCI of the cell where the terminal is currently camped, and the frequency point. This process continues, iteratively updating the key KgNB to ensure communication security.

[0115] Vertical key derivation process:

[0116] Before using NH as the KgNB in ​​the target gNB / ng-eNB, NH is bound to the target PCI and the ARFCN-DL of the frequency corresponding to that target PCI. AMF uses the K of the currently active AS security context. AMFThe process begins by calculating a new NH, then calculating K_GNB* based on the NH and parameters (e.g., PCI and frequency), and finally generating a KgNB from the K_GNB*, and so on. The NH used in each derivation process can be determined based on the NCC. Additionally, if the source gNB / ng-eNB has unused {NH, NCC} pairs, it should perform vertical key derivation. The source gNB / ng-eNB first calculates KNG-RAN* from the target PCI and ARFCN-DL / EARFCN-DL. Then, the AMF can send the calculated {NH, NCC} pairs to the target gNB / ng-eNB in ​​a Next Generation Application Protocol (NGAP) path handover request confirmation message. The target gNB / ng-eNB stores the received {NH, NCC} pairs for subsequent handovers and deletes any unused stored {NH, NCC} pairs.

[0117] This can also be understood as follows: This deduction method is a vertical deduction for NH. The AMF network element can update NCC (for example, when a path switch occurs during handover, the AMF network element can update NCC). If NCC1 is updated to NCC2, the AMF network element will deduce NH2 based on KAMF and NCC2. NH2 and NCC2 are associated as a new pair {NH2, NCC2}. The AMF network element can send {NH2, NCC2} to the network device. Then, after receiving {NH2, NCC2}, the network device can perform vertical deduction when it needs to deduce the key, that is, deduce the key KgNB4 based on NH2, the PCI of the cell where the terminal is currently camped, and the frequency point, and so on.

[0118] The number of vertical deductions can be determined by the difference between the NCC value before and after the update. For example, if the NCC value is updated from NCC0 to NCC1, one vertical deduction can be performed based on NH0 associated with NCC0 to obtain NH1 associated with NCC1. If the NCC value is updated from NCC0 to NCC2, two vertical deductions can be performed based on NH0 associated with NCC0 to obtain NH2 associated with NCC2. If the NCC value is updated from NCC2 to NCC3, one vertical deduction can be performed based on NH2 associated with NCC2 to obtain NH3 associated with NCC3.

[0119] It should be noted that on the UE, the NH derivation associated with NCC=1 can be delayed until the first handover when vertical key derivation is performed. The AMF should not send the NH value to the gNB / ng-eNB during initial connection establishment. After receiving the NGAP Initial Context Establishment Request message, the gNB / ng-eNB should initialize the NCC value to zero. Furthermore, since the AMF does not send the NH value to the gNB / ng-eNB during initial connection establishment, the NH value associated with NCC value 1 cannot be used in the next Xn handover or the next Intra-gNB / in-ng-eNB-CU handover. Horizontal key derivation can be used for the next Xn handover or the next Intra-gNB-CU / intra-ng-eNB handover.

[0120] (5-2) Derivation of NAS Keys

[0121] In NAS, the keys used to protect NAS signaling are managed by the AMF. These keys include the NAS integrity key (K_NASint) and the NAS encryption key (K_NASenc). K_NASint, also known as KNASint, is used to protect NAS signaling using a specific integrity algorithm. K_NASint is generated and derived by the key agreement management function (KAMF), and is obtained through the combined action of mobile equipment (ME) and the AMF. K_NASenc, also known as KNASenc, is used to protect NAS signaling using a specific encryption algorithm. K_NASenc is also generated and derived by the KAMF, and is obtained through the combined action of the ME and the AMF.

[0122] In NAS, the keys used to protect NAS signaling are dynamically updated to avoid potential security risks caused by using the same key for an extended period. Counters play a crucial role in the secure processing of NAS, primarily to prevent replay attacks. Counters are typically reset with each new session, ensuring message uniqueness and security.

[0123] The NAS security context created during the registration of the first access type for NAS COUNTs contains NAS integrity and encryption keys. The selected NAS algorithm is common to all NAS connections. Furthermore, each NAS connection should have: a unique NAS connection identifier, a specific pair of NAS COUNTs, one NAS COUNT for the uplink and one NAS COUNT for the downlink. Within the NAS security context, the NAS connection identifier is a distinguisher for connection-specific parameters. The NAS COUNT for a specific K AMF is reset to its initial value (i.e., when a new K AMF is generated, the NAS COUNT only has its initial value). This prevents security issues such as key stream reuse, where the UE uses the same NAS COUNT with the same NAS key when moving back and forth between two AMFs and re-deriving the same NAS key.

[0124] In AMF, within the same 5G NAS security context, all different NAS COUNT pairs are set to the initial value under the following conditions:

[0125] (a) A partial native 5GC NAS security context created for successful primary authentication on a NAS connection established between the same AMF and UE;

[0126] (b) For the mapped 5G security context generated when the UE moves from the mobility management entity (MME) to the AMF during idle and connected mode mobility;

[0127] (c) For new KAMFs used in the target AMF during mobility registration updates or handovers, the initial value of NAS COUNT should be zero (0).

[0128] (d) UE replaces AMF.

[0129] Normally, the AMF generates a NAS Container, which adds K_AMF_change_falg to indicate that the UE's NAS changes K_AMF. In this way, the UE is aware of the change in AMF and regenerates the NAS key according to the new K_AMF.

[0130] (7) In the embodiments of this application, "transmission" includes "sending" and / or "receiving". "Sending" and "receiving" indicate the direction of signal transmission. For example, "sending information to XX" can be understood as the destination of the information being XX, which may include direct transmission via the air interface or indirect transmission by other units or modules via the air interface. "Receiving information from YY" can be understood as the source of the information being YY, which may include direct reception from YY via the air interface or indirect reception from YY by other units or modules via the air interface. "Sending" can also be understood as the "output" of the chip interface, and "receiving" can also be understood as the "input" of the chip interface. In other words, sending and receiving can occur between devices, such as between access network devices and terminal devices, or within a device, such as between components, modules, chips, software modules, or hardware modules within the device via a bus, wiring, or interface.

[0131] In this application embodiment, the number of nouns, unless otherwise specified, refers to "singular nouns or plural nouns," that is, "one or more." "At least one" means one or more, and "more than one" means two or more. "And / or" describes the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, A and / or B can mean: A exists alone, A and B exist simultaneously, or B exists alone, where A / B can be singular or plural. The character " / " generally indicates that the related objects before and after are in an "or" relationship. For example, A / B means: A or B. "At least one of the following" or similar expressions refer to any combination of these items, including any combination of single or plural items. For example, at least one of a, b, and / or c means the following combinations: a exists alone, b exists alone, c exists alone, a and b exist simultaneously, a and c exist simultaneously, b and c exist simultaneously, or a, b, and c exist simultaneously, where a, b, and c can be single or multiple.

[0132] In the embodiments of this application, "when," "if," and "if" all refer to the device taking corresponding actions under certain objective circumstances, and are not time-limited, nor do they require the device to perform a judgment action, nor do they imply any other limitations. Unless otherwise specified, "if" and "if" can be substituted, and "when" and "in the case of" can be substituted. "When" and "if" / "if" can be substituted.

[0133] In the embodiments of this application, the terms "exemplary" or "for example" are used to indicate that something is an example, illustration, or description. Any embodiment or design that is described as "exemplary" or "for example" in this application should not be construed as being more preferred or advantageous than other embodiments or designs. Specifically, the use of the terms "exemplary" or "for example" is intended to present the relevant concepts in a specific manner.

[0134] In this application, the ordinal numbers such as "first" and "second" are used to distinguish multiple objects, and are not used to limit the size, content, order, timing, priority, or importance of the multiple objects. For example, the first key and the second key refer to two different keys, and do not indicate a difference in priority or importance between the two keys.

[0135] In the embodiments of this application, the solutions in each embodiment can be used in a reasonable combination, and the explanations or descriptions of various terms, similar operations, or steps appearing in the embodiments can be referenced or explained to each other in the embodiments, without limitation.

[0136] The above describes some terms used in the embodiments of this application. The following describes the technical problems to be solved by the embodiments of this application.

[0137] During wireless communication, data leakage or tampering may occur, leading to adverse consequences. For example, critical user plane information (such as user plane data and / or user plane control information) may be exploited by malicious base stations or terminal devices to forge or monitor this information, posing a significant security risk to wireless communication. Therefore, for security reasons, both the transmitting and receiving ends can perform security processing on user plane information. For instance, the transmitting end can encrypt the data, and the receiving end can decrypt it to prevent third parties from reading the data; the transmitting end can perform integrity protection processing on the data, and the receiving end can perform integrity verification processing to prevent third parties from tampering with the data.

[0138] The security processing introduced at the PDCP layer for user plane PDUs (e.g., user plane data PDUs) is not applicable to data transmission without a PDCP layer. How to achieve secure processing for data transmission without a PDCP layer is a pressing issue. For example, terminal devices using LP-WUS can utilize LP-WUS for data transmission; however, the protocol stack of these devices may lack a PDCP layer. Ensuring security for data transmission using LP-WUS remains to be addressed.

[0139] To address the aforementioned technical problems, this application provides a solution based on its embodiments. For the first data transmitted using LP-WUS, a first key can be used for secure processing at the first protocol layer. Since the first protocol layer is an upper protocol layer than the PHY layer, secure protection of the first data above the PHY layer can be achieved.

[0140] The solutions provided in the embodiments of this application are described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0141] In the following description, taking the communication method provided in this application embodiment applied to the network architecture shown in Figure 1 as an example, the communication method provided in this application embodiment can be executed by a first communication device and a second communication device. In the following description, the first communication device is a network device and the second communication device is a terminal device as an example. The steps executed by the network device can be implemented by the RAN device itself, or by components in the RAN device (such as a baseband chip, or other processing units or processor modules), or by components that complete some or all of the functions of the RAN device (such as CU, DU, or RU). The steps executed by the terminal device can be implemented by the terminal device itself, or by components in the terminal device (such as a baseband chip, or other processing units or processor modules). There are no restrictions on the specific form of the network device and the terminal device; for example, the network device can be a chip, and the terminal device can be a device; or, both the network device and the terminal device can be chips or devices. In possible scenarios, the terminal device can be terminal device 120a as shown in Figure 1, or it can be the chip (system) in terminal device 120a in Figure 1; the network device can be network device 110a as shown in Figure 1, or it can be the chip (system) in network device 110a in Figure 1. In addition, the processing performed by a single execution entity can also be divided into multiple execution entities, which can be logically and / or physically separated.

[0142] In the embodiments of this application, "perform security processing on the first data at the first protocol layer" can be replaced with "enable the security processing function at the first protocol layer" or "enable the security policy at the first protocol layer".

[0143] Please refer to Figure 8, which is a flowchart illustrating the communication method provided in an embodiment of this application. Figure 8 describes the method from the perspective of interaction between network devices and terminal devices. It should be understood that the communication method can also be implemented by other devices, such as a chip or communication device with communication functions. As shown in Figure 8, the flow of this communication method 8 includes the following steps.

[0144] S801. The network device performs secure processing on the first data at the first protocol layer based on the first key.

[0145] The first data is the data that the network device is about to send to the terminal device. In this embodiment, the first data can be sent using LP-WUS. Considering that the first data includes important content, in order to prevent this important content from being leaked or tampered with, the network device can perform security processing on the first data before sending it. For example, the network device performs security processing on the first data at the first protocol layer to achieve security above the PHY layer. The relevant descriptions of the first protocol layer can be found in the foregoing terminology introduction, and will not be repeated here.

[0146] The first key can be used to perform secure processing on the first data. When the secure processing is encryption, the first key is also called the keystream; when the secure processing is integrity protection, the first key is also called the integrity message authentication code. The first key can be generated based on the second key. Relatively speaking, the second key can be considered as the initial key, and the first key is a key derived from the initial key.

[0147] In this embodiment, the security processing of the secondary link can adopt either AS (Automatic Security Layer) or NAS (Neural Network Attached Layer) security processing. Even if the secondary link does not have a NAS layer, NAS security processing can still be used. The derivation process of the first key differs for AS and NAS security processing. The derivation process of the first key is described below for both AS and NAS security processing.

[0148] (1) The security processing of AS can be applied to terminal devices in RRC connected state or RRC inactive state.

[0149] As an example, the second key is dedicated to the security processing of the secondary link. In other words, there are two sets of keys, one for the secondary link and the other for the primary link, and these two sets of keys are different. Here, a set of keys refers to a set of keys. From this perspective, there are two sets of keys, one for the secondary link and the other for the primary link, and these two sets of keys are different. Assuming the third key is used for the primary link's security processing, then the second and third keys are different. Setting dedicated keys for the primary and secondary links, compared to using a single key for both, reduces the risk of being compromised due to the same key being used multiple times by both the primary and secondary links.

[0150] As another example, the second key can be reused from the key used for secure processing on the main link. For instance, the second key could be a key used for secure processing at the PDCP layer, and security above the PHY layer can be achieved by reusing the key used for secure processing at the PDCP layer. Reusing the key used for secure processing at the PDCP layer to achieve security above the PHY layer can reduce the number of keys that need to be managed between different layers, thereby reducing the complexity of key updates and distribution.

[0151] It should be understood that the generation of the first key considers other parameters besides the first key itself. For ease of description, this article will uniformly refer to the parameters used for secure processing of the first data as security processing parameters. The security processing parameters vary depending on the specific security processing method, as illustrated by the examples below.

[0152] For example, when the security processing is integrity protection processing, the security processing parameters include one or more of the following: a second key, a first count value, first data, a transmission direction, or a bearer identifier. Alternatively, for integrity protection processing, the parameters for generating the first key (or integrity message authentication code) include the second key, the first count value, the first data, the transmission direction, and the bearer identifier. For example, please refer to Figure 9, which is a schematic diagram of the integrity protection / verification process via 5G NIA provided in an embodiment of this application. Figure 9 shows the security processing parameters for integrity protection. The difference between Figure 9 and Figure 3 is that the first data in Figure 9 is similar to the information in Figure 3. Furthermore, the bearer in Figure 9 can be defaulted, or Figure 9 may not include the bearer; Figure 9 is indicated by dashed lines. Figure 9 can be referred to in conjunction with the relevant description in Figure 3; repeated details will not be repeated.

[0153] For example, when the security processing is encryption protection / encryption processing, the security processing parameters include one or more of the following: a second key, a first count value, a bearer identifier, a transmission direction, or the length of the key stream. Alternatively, for integrity protection processing, the parameters for generating the first key (or encryption key stream) include the second key, the first count value, the bearer identifier, the transmission direction, and the length of the key stream. For example, please refer to Figure 10, which is a schematic flowchart of encryption protection using a 5G encryption algorithm provided in an embodiment of this application. Figure 10 can be referenced to the relevant description in Figure 4 above; overlapping details will not be repeated. The difference between Figure 10 and Figure 4 is that the bearer in Figure 10 can be defaulted, or Figure 10 may not include a bearer.

[0154] The implementation forms of the first counter value and the carrier ID are introduced below.

[0155] (1-1) First count value

[0156] As an example 1, the first count value can be predefined or agreed upon by the protocol. Considering that the first data might be small data transmitted via a secondary link, not involving multiple repeated transmissions, the key for securing the first data is used only once. Even if the first count value is a predefined value, there is no risk of a replay attack. A replay attack is a network security attack where attackers record or repeat information in network communication to deceive the system. Replay attacks typically target systems requiring authentication; attackers can intercept messages in communication and repeatedly send them to the server, thus deceiving the server into believing it is a legitimate request.

[0157] As an example 2, the first count value is the SN assigned to the first data. This SN can be reused from the SN assigned to the data by the PDCP layer in the main link, or it can be the SN assigned to the first data by the first protocol layer of the secondary link. For example, if the first protocol layer is the MAC layer, the first count value can be the SN assigned to the first data by the MAC layer. As another example, if the first protocol layer is a single protocol layer composed of the MAC layer, RLC layer, and PDCP layer, the first count value is the SN assigned to the first data by this protocol layer. In this case, the SN assigned to the first data by this protocol layer can also be reused from the SN assigned to the data by the PDCP layer in the main link.

[0158] (1-2) Bearer ID

[0159] As an example 1, the bearer ID can be predefined. For example, the bearer ID can be a first value predefined by the protocol, such as 1.

[0160] As an example 2, the bearer ID can reuse the DRB number used for secure data transmission in the PDCP layer of the primary link. This can be understood as the bearer ID used for secure processing on the secondary link being the same as the bearer ID used for secure processing on the primary link. Thus, only one set of wireless bearer IDs needs to be maintained, facilitating management.

[0161] As an example 3, the bearer ID can also be determined based on the DRB ID, for example, the bearer ID is DRB ID-1.

[0162] As an example 4, the bearer ID can be the ID of the terminal device receiving the first data (referred to as the UE ID). Alternatively, the bearer ID can be a part of the UE ID receiving the first data.

[0163] Binding / mapping the radio bearer ID to a portion of the UE ID facilitates the management and determination of UE bearer resources. For example, in a network, each UE typically establishes multiple bearers. Mapping the bearer ID to the UE ID makes it easier to determine the bearer resources for each UE. For instance, if you need to find the bearer information for a specific UE, you can directly look up the relevant bearer ID using the UE ID. Furthermore, the UE ID can serve as the bearer ID, allowing for dynamic allocation of different bearer IDs to each UE as needed. As the number of UEs increases, the network can flexibly allocate resources to each UE without requiring a pre-defined bearer ID allocation strategy.

[0164] As one implementation, the network device can acquire security processing parameters and generate a first key based on these parameters before sending the first data. The first data is then processed securely using this first key. For example, when the security processing is integrity protection, the network device calculates a MAC-I based on the security processing parameters (e.g., a second key, a first count value, the first data, the transmission direction, and the bearer ID), and uses the MAC-I to protect the integrity of the first data. Alternatively, when the security processing is encryption protection / encryption, the network device generates a keystream (KEYSTREAMBLOCK) based on the security processing parameters (e.g., a second key, a first count value, the bearer identifier, the transmission direction, and the length of the keystream). This keystream is XORed with the first data to generate ciphertext (CIPHERTEXTBLOCK), thus providing encryption protection for the first data.

[0165] As another implementation, when the network device performs secure processing on the first data, it can deduce a second key, generate a first key based on the second key, and then perform secure processing on the first data based on the first key. The derivation of the second key includes horizontal key derivation and / or vertical key derivation, as shown in Figure 6 above. The network device can calculate K_GNB* (or the second key) based on the currently active KgNB, parameters (such as cell identifier, frequency, etc.), and then generate the KgNB (or the first key) based on K_GNB*, and perform secure processing on the first data based on the first key.

[0166] It should be understood that the first key used between network devices and terminal devices (such as the aforementioned KgNB) is derived from K_GNB*. In the embodiments of this application, a separate set of {NH, NCC} pairs is maintained for the primary link and the secondary link. In other words, there are two sets of {NH, NCC} pairs, one set used for security processing of the secondary link and the other set used for security processing of the primary link. These two sets of {NH, NCC} pairs are different. Setting up dedicated {NH, NCC} pairs for the primary link and the secondary link respectively reduces the risk of cracking due to the multiple uses of {NH, NCC} compared to the primary link and the secondary link sharing a single set of {NH, NCC} pairs.

[0167] (2) NAS security processing is applicable to terminal devices in RRC connected state, RRC inactive state or RRC idle state.

[0168] As an example, the second key could be a dedicated security processing mechanism for the secondary link, derived from AMF. As mentioned earlier, there are two sets of keys: one for the secondary link and another for the primary link, and these two sets of keys are different. For example, a third key is used for the primary link, and the second and third keys are different. Setting dedicated keys for the primary and secondary links, compared to using a single key for both, reduces the risk of key reuse and subsequent cracking.

[0169] As another example, the second key can reuse the NAS security key used for the primary link (or NR link). For instance, the second key is a NAS security key used for the primary link (or NR link). Thus, security above the PHY layer can be achieved by reusing the NAS security key from the primary link. By applying the NAS security key from the primary link to security above the PHY layer, the number of keys maintained by the terminal device can be reduced, thereby reducing the complexity of key maintenance by the terminal device and reducing power consumption.

[0170] As mentioned earlier, in the NAS security process, key updates are achieved through the maintenance of counters (COUNTs), thereby ensuring message uniqueness and security. For details, please refer to the relevant description in the aforementioned terminology section "Key Organization and Derivation Process," which will not be repeated here.

[0171] S802, the network device sends the first LP-WUS.

[0172] A network device may send a first LP-WUS to a terminal device, and the terminal device accordingly receives the first LP-WUS from the network device. The LP-WUS includes first data, or the first data is carried within the first LP-WUS. Specifically, the network device performs security processing on the first data before sending the LP-WUS, or the network device performs security processing on the first data during the transmission of the LP-WUS.

[0173] As mentioned earlier, the network device performs secure processing on the first data at the first protocol layer. This first protocol layer can be an AS (Application Server), a NAS (Network Attached Server), or a higher layer that functions as a NAS. Depending on the first protocol layer, the implementation of sending the first LP-WUS by the network device will vary, as will be described below.

[0174] (1) The first protocol layer is AS

[0175] In implementation method 1, the first key is generated based on security processing parameters.

[0176] Regarding the security processing of AS (Autonomous System), the security processing parameters used by the network device are unknown to the terminal device. In order for the terminal device to decrypt and / or verify the first data, the network device needs to notify the terminal device of the security processing parameters used. For example, the first LP-WUS may also include one or more parameters from the security processing parameters. The terminal device, upon receiving the first LP-WUS, can obtain the security processing parameters and then decrypt and / or verify the first data according to the security processing parameters. It should be noted that the security processing parameters carried by the first LP-WUS do not include the second key. In other words, the network device will not send the second key to the terminal device through the first LP-WUS. The terminal device can obtain the second key from its locally stored keys.

[0177] One or more parameters in the security processing parameters may be predefined by the protocol, therefore, these parameters do not need to be sent to the terminal device via the first LP-WUS. The following examples illustrate the possible parameters included in the security processing parameters of the first LP-WUS.

[0178] In Example 1, the first count value and bearer ID can be predefined. When the security processing is integrity protection, the security processing parameters included in the first LP-WUS may include the transmission direction. When the security processing is encryption protection / encryption, the security processing parameters included in the first LP-WUS may include the length of the key stream. Optionally, the security processing parameters may also include the transmission direction.

[0179] In Example 2, the bearer ID can be predefined. When the security processing is integrity protection, the security processing parameters included in the first LP-WUS may include a first count value and a transmission direction. When the security processing is encryption protection / encryption, the security processing parameters included in the first LP-WUS may include a first count value and the length of the key stream. Optionally, the security processing parameters may also include the transmission direction.

[0180] In Example 3, when the security processing is integrity protection, the security processing parameters included in the first LP-WUS may include the bearer ID, a first count value, and the transmission direction. When the security processing is encryption protection / encryption, the security processing parameters included in the first LP-WUS may include the bearer ID, the first count value, and the length of the key stream. Optionally, the security processing parameters may also include the transmission direction.

[0181] When the security processing parameters include a first count value, a new count value is added to the first LP-WUS. For example, the first LP-WUS includes a first field that carries the first count value. This first field can be the header of the first LP-WUS. Alternatively, the first LP-WUS includes a counter whose value is the first count value. If the secondary link's protocol stack includes a PDCP layer, then the first field and counter of the first LP-WUS can reuse the PDCP layer SN design. If the secondary link's protocol stack only has a PHY layer and a first protocol layer, then the first LP-WUS can add a count value to the first protocol layer.

[0182] In implementation method 2, the first key is obtained based on the derived second key.

[0183] The first key used between the network device and the terminal device (such as the aforementioned KgNB) is derived from K_GNB*. The terminal device is unaware of the NCC associated with K_GNB*. Alternatively, the terminal device is unaware of the {NH, NCC} pair used by the network device to derive the first key. Therefore, the network device needs to inform the terminal device of the {NH, NCC} pair used so that the terminal device can derive the first key. Since NCC and NH correspond, or NCC can be determined from NH, the network device only needs to inform the terminal device of the value of the NCC used. For example, the network device also sends a first indication message to the terminal device, which indicates a second value for the NCC used in deriving the first key.

[0184] As mentioned earlier, a separate set of {NH, NCC} pairs is maintained for the primary link and the secondary link. For the secondary link, the network device carries the NCC value through the first LP-WUS; for example, the first indication information is carried in the first LP-WUS. For the primary link, the network device indicates the NCC value through an RRC release message. For the terminal device, the NCC obtained from the first LP-WUS is used for the derivation of the first key for the secondary link; the NCC value obtained from the RRC release message is used for the derivation of the key for the primary link.

[0185] (2) The first protocol layer is NAS, or a higher layer that has NAS function.

[0186] For NAS security processing, network devices can encapsulate the first data as a NAS PDU. During the encapsulation process, the first data is encrypted using a first key, and then the NAS PDU is sent to the terminal device via a first LP-WUS. Since the first LP-WUS includes the first data, it is equivalent to the first LP-WUS including the NAS PDU, which contains the first data encrypted using the first key.

[0187] When the security processing is integrity protection processing, the network device can obtain the NAS integrity key from the NAS context, perform integrity protection on the first data based on the NAS integrity key, encapsulate the integrity-protected first data into a NAS PDU, and send the NAS PDU to the terminal device via the first LP-WUS. It should be understood that, for NAS integrity protection, the first key in this document refers to the NAS integrity key used here.

[0188] When the security processing is encryption, the network device can obtain the NAS encryption key from the NAS context, encrypt the first data according to the NAS encryption key, and encapsulate the integrity-protected first data into a NAS PDU. The NAS PDU is then sent to the terminal device via the first LP-WUS. It should be understood that, for NAS encryption, the first key in this document refers to the NAS encryption key used here.

[0189] S803. The terminal device decrypts and / or verifies the first data at the first protocol layer based on the first key.

[0190] The terminal device receives the first LP-WUS, can determine the first key based on the first LP-WUS, and then decrypt and / or verify the first data at the first protocol layer based on the first key.

[0191] The first key can be derived from the auxiliary link of the terminal device. Alternatively, the first key can be derived from the main link of the terminal device, and the main link sends the first key to the auxiliary link. The following details how the terminal device decrypts and / or verifies the first data using AS and NAS.

[0192] (1) Decryption and / or verification of AS

[0193] The terminal device receives the first LP-WUS via the secondary link and obtains security processing parameters. Before determining the first key, the terminal device needs to obtain all the security processing parameters used to generate the first key. For example, the security processing parameters carried by the first LP-WUS include a first count value, and the terminal device also needs to obtain the bearer ID and the second key defined by the protocol. After obtaining all the security processing parameters used to generate the first key, the terminal device's secondary link deduces the first key based on all the security processing parameters. Alternatively, the terminal device receives the first LP-WUS via the secondary link, obtains all the security processing parameters used to generate the first key, and sends all the obtained security processing parameters to the main link. The terminal device's main link deduces the first key based on all the security processing parameters. The terminal device's main link then transmits the deduced first key to the secondary link.

[0194] When the security processing is integrity protection processing, the terminal device calculates XMAC-I based on security processing parameters (such as the second key, the first count value, the first data, the transmission direction, and the bearer ID), and verifies the first data based on XMAC-I. If the parameters XMAC-I and MAC-I match, the integrity verification is successful; if the parameters XMAC-I and MAC-I do not match, the integrity verification fails.

[0195] When the security processing is encryption protection / encryption processing, the terminal device generates a key stream (KEYSTREAMBLOCK) based on the security processing parameters (such as the second key, the first count value, the bearer identifier, the transmission direction, and the length of the key stream), and XORs the ciphertext (CIPHERTEXTBLOCK) (or the encrypted first data) according to the key stream to recover the first data.

[0196] If the terminal device receives the first indication information from the network device, the terminal device can determine the second value of the NCC used to deduce the first key, and then deduce the first key based on the second value. The deduction of the first key includes a horizontal key and / or a vertical key. The deduction of the first key can be performed by the secondary link, or it can be performed by the primary link and then transmitted to the secondary link.

[0197] It should be understood that if the first indication information is carried in the first LP-WUS, the terminal device determines the second value of the NCC for key deduction of the secondary link. If the terminal device obtains the value of the NCC from the RRC release message sent by the network device, then the terminal device determines that the value of the NCC is used for key deduction of the primary link. The process by which the terminal device deduces the first key based on the value of the NCC can be referred to the relevant description in Figure 6 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0198] (2) NAS decryption and / or verification

[0199] The terminal device receives a first LP-WUS and obtains the NAS PDU from it. The terminal device can obtain a NAS integrity key from the NAS context and verify the NAS PDU using this key to verify the integrity of the first data. Alternatively, the terminal device can obtain a NAS encryption key from the NAS context and decrypt the NAS PDU using this key to decrypt the first data.

[0200] In this embodiment, a method for securely processing the first data transmitted using LP-WUS at a first protocol layer (or a protocol layer above the PHY layer) is provided, enabling security protection of the first data above the PHY layer. Furthermore, if LP-WUS does not support / does not have an AS layer, the NAS security processing mechanism can be used to achieve security protection of the first data.

[0201] The methods provided in the embodiments of this application above are described using terminal devices and network devices as examples. In this application, each embodiment can be implemented independently or in combination based on certain inherent connections; in each embodiment, different implementation methods can be implemented in combination or independently. To achieve the functions of the methods provided in the embodiments of this application above, the steps executed by the terminal device can be implemented by the terminal device itself, or by a functional entity including the terminal device, or by different functional entities constituting the terminal device. The steps executed by the network device can be implemented by the network device itself, or by different functional entities constituting the network device, or by a functional entity including the network device. For example, the network device is an access network device, which can be a CU-DU-RU architecture, where the DU can generate a first LP-WUS, and the RU can send the first LP-WUS. To achieve the functions of the methods provided in the embodiments of this application above, the terminal device and network device can include hardware structures and / or software modules, implementing the above functions in the form of hardware structures, software modules, or hardware structures plus software modules. Whether a particular function among the above functions is executed through hardware structure, software module, or a combination of hardware structure and software module depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution.

[0202] Based on the same inventive concept as the method embodiments, this application provides a communication device. The communication device used to implement the above method in the embodiments of this application is described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. The content above can be used in subsequent embodiments, and repeated content will not be repeated.

[0203] Figure 11 is a schematic block diagram of a communication device 1100 provided in an embodiment of this application. The communication device 1100 can correspondingly implement the functions or steps implemented by the terminal device in the various method embodiments described above. For example, the communication device 1100 can be the terminal device in Figure 1; or, the communication device 1100 can be a chip (system) in the terminal device; or, the communication device 1100 can be a software module of the terminal device. Alternatively, the communication device 1100 can correspondingly implement the functions or steps implemented by the network device in the various method embodiments described above. For example, the communication device 1100 can be the network device in Figure 1; or, the communication device 1100 can be a chip (system) in the network device; or, the communication device 1100 can be a software module of the network device. The communication device 1100 may include a processing module 1110 and a transceiver module 1120. Optionally, it may also include a storage module, which can be used to store instructions (code or program) and / or data. The storage module may be, for example, a memory. The processing module 1110 and the transceiver module 1120 may be coupled to the storage module. For example, processing module 1110 can read instructions (code or program) and / or data from the storage module to implement the corresponding method. When the communication device 1100 is a chip in a terminal device, the storage module can be a storage module within the chip, such as a register or cache. For example, the storage module can also be a storage module located outside the chip within the terminal device, such as read-only memory (ROM) or other types of static storage devices that can store static information and instructions, random access memory (RAM), etc. The above-mentioned units can be set independently, or partially or completely integrated.

[0204] Processing module 1110 may be a processor or controller, such as a CPU, general-purpose processor, DSP, ASIC, FPGA, or other programmable logic device, transistor logic device, hardware component, or any combination thereof. It may implement or execute the various exemplary logic blocks, modules, and circuits described in conjunction with the disclosure of this application. The processor may also be a combination that implements computing functions, such as a combination of one or more microprocessors, a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, etc. Transceiver module 1120 is a transceiver, interface circuit, bus, pin, or other possible communication interface for receiving signals from other devices. For example, when the device is implemented as a chip, transceiver module 1120 is an interface circuit for the chip to receive signals from other chips or devices, or an interface circuit for the chip to send signals to other chips or devices.

[0205] In one implementation, the communication device 1100 can correspondingly implement the behavior and functions of the terminal device in the above method embodiments. The communication device 1100 can be the terminal device itself, a component (e.g., a chip or circuit) within the terminal device, a part of a chip or chipset in the terminal device used to execute the relevant method functions, or a software module in the terminal device capable of implementing the above communication method; no limitation is imposed. For details, please refer to the relevant content of the foregoing method embodiments, which will not be repeated here.

[0206] For example, transceiver module 1120 is used to receive a first LP-WUS, which includes first data. Processing module 1110 is used to decrypt and / or verify the first data at a first protocol layer based on a first key, where the first protocol layer is a protocol layer above the physical layer.

[0207] As an optional implementation, the communication device 1100 includes a main link and a secondary link. The first key is generated based on the second key, which is different from the third key. The third key is used for the security processing of the main link of the communication device 1100.

[0208] As an optional implementation, the processing module 1110 is also used to obtain security processing parameters, which include a second key.

[0209] As an optional implementation, the first LP-WUS is received via a secondary link; wherein the second key is derived from the primary link, or the second key is derived from the secondary link.

[0210] As an optional implementation, the first LP-WUS also includes a security processing parameter, which includes a second key.

[0211] As an optional implementation, the security processing parameters also include a first count value.

[0212] As an optional implementation, the first count value is the SN assigned to the first data.

[0213] As an optional implementation, the security processing parameters also include a bearer identifier, which is: a first value, which is predefined by the protocol; or information used to determine the DRB identifier; or an identifier of the communication device 1100; or a part of the identifier of the communication device 1100.

[0214] As an optional implementation, the transceiver module 1120 is also used to receive first indication information, which is used to indicate a second value of NCC, and the second value is used to deduce the first key.

[0215] As an optional implementation, the first instruction information is carried in the first LP-WUS.

[0216] In one implementation, the communication device 1100 can correspondingly implement the behavior and functions of the network device in the above method embodiments. The communication device 1100 can be a network device, a component (e.g., a chip or circuit) within the network device, a part of a chip or chipset in the network device used to execute the relevant method functions, or a software module in the network device capable of implementing the above communication method; there are no limitations. For details, please refer to the relevant content of the foregoing method embodiments, which will not be repeated here.

[0217] For example, processing module 1110 is used to perform secure processing on first data at a first protocol layer based on a first key, the first protocol layer being a protocol layer above the physical layer. Transceiver module 1120 is used to transmit a first LP-WUS, the first LP-WUS including the first data.

[0218] As an optional implementation, the first key is generated based on the second key, which is different from the third key. The third key is used for the security processing of the main link of the terminal device.

[0219] As an optional implementation, the first LP-WUS also includes a security processing parameter, which includes a first count value.

[0220] As an optional implementation, the first count value is the SN assigned to the first data.

[0221] As an optional implementation, the security processing parameters also include a bearer identifier, which is: a first value, which is predefined by the protocol; or information used to determine the DRB identifier; or the identifier of the terminal device; or a part of the identifier of the terminal device.

[0222] As an optional implementation, the transceiver module 1120 is also used to send first indication information, which is used to indicate a second value of NCC, and the second value is used to deduce the first key.

[0223] As an optional implementation, the first instruction information is carried in the first LP-WUS.

[0224] When the communication device 1100 is a chip-based device or circuit, the transceiver module can be an input / output circuit and / or a communication interface; the processing module is an integrated processor, microprocessor, or integrated circuit.

[0225] Figure 12 is a schematic block diagram of a communication device 1200 provided in an embodiment of this application. The communication device 1200 can be a terminal device or a network device as described in the above embodiments. For example, the communication device 1200 can be the terminal device in Figure 1 or a chip (system) within a terminal device. As another example, the communication device 1200 can be the network device in Figure 1 or a chip (system) within a network device. In this embodiment, the chip system can be composed of chips or may include chips and other discrete devices. Specific functions can be found in the descriptions of the above method embodiments.

[0226] The communication device 1200 includes one or more processors 1201, used to implement or support the communication device 1200 in implementing the functions of the terminal device or network device in the methods provided in the embodiments of this application. For details, please refer to the detailed description in the method examples, which will not be repeated here. The processor 1201 can also be called a processing unit or processing module, and can implement certain control functions to control the communication device 1200. The processor 1201 can be a general-purpose processor or a dedicated processor, etc. For example, it includes: a baseband processor, a central processing unit, an application processor, a modem processor, a graphics processor, an image signal processor, a digital signal processor, a video codec processor, a controller, a memory, and / or a neural network processor, etc. The baseband processor can be used to process communication protocols and communication data. The central processing unit can be used to control the communication device 1200 (e.g., a terminal device or a network device), execute software programs, and / or process data. Different processors can be independent devices or integrated into one or more processors, for example, integrated on one or more application-specific integrated circuits.

[0227] In one design, processor 1201 may include program 1203 (sometimes also referred to as code or instructions) that can be executed on processor 1201 to cause communication device 1200 to perform the methods described in the embodiments below. In yet another possible design, communication device 1200 includes circuitry (not shown in FIG12) for implementing the functions of the terminal device or network device in the above embodiments.

[0228] In one design, the communication device 1200 may include one or more memories 1202 storing a program 1204 (sometimes referred to as code or instructions), which can be run on the processor 1201 to cause the communication device 1200 to perform the methods described in the above method embodiments.

[0229] In one design, the processor 1201 and / or memory 1202 may include an AI module for implementing AI-related functions. The AI ​​module may be implemented through software, hardware, or a combination of both. For example, the AI ​​module may include a RIC module. For instance, the AI ​​module may be a near real-time RIC or a non-real-time RIC.

[0230] In one possible design, the processor 1201 and / or memory 1202 may also store data. The processor and memory may be configured separately or integrated together.

[0231] In one possible design, the communication device 1200 may further include a communication interface 1205. This communication interface 1205 may be a transceiver and / or antenna, or a circuit or pin, etc. The transceiver, sometimes also referred to as a transceiver unit, transceiver, transceiver circuit, or simply a transceiver, is used to implement the transmission and reception functions of the communication device 1200 via an antenna.

[0232] In one possible design, the communication device 1200 may further include one or more of the following components: a wireless communication module, an audio module, an external memory interface, internal memory, a universal serial bus (USB) interface, a power management module, an antenna, a speaker, a microphone, an input / output module, a sensor module, a motor, a camera, or a display screen, etc. It is understood that in some embodiments, the communication device 1200 may include more or fewer components, or some components may be integrated, or some components may be separated. These components may be implemented in hardware, software, or a combination of software and hardware.

[0233] The communication device in the above embodiments can be a terminal device or a network device, a circuit, a chip applied in a terminal device or network device, or other combined devices or components having the aforementioned terminal device or network device. When the communication device is a terminal device, the transceiver module can be a transceiver, which may include an antenna and radio frequency circuits, etc., and the processing module can be a processor, such as a CPU. When the communication device is a chip system, the communication device can be an FPGA, a dedicated ASIC, a SoC, a CPU, a network processor (NP), a DSP, a microcontroller unit (MCU), a programmable logic device (PLD), or other integrated chips. The processing module can be the processor of the chip system. The transceiver module or communication interface can be the input / output interface or interface circuit of the chip system. For example, the interface circuit can be a code / data read / write interface circuit. The interface circuit can be used to receive code instructions (the code instructions are stored in memory and can be read directly from memory or through other devices) and transmit them to the processor; the processor can be used to run the code instructions to execute the methods in the above method embodiments. For example, the interface circuit can also be a signal transmission interface circuit between the communication processor and the transceiver.

[0234] This application also provides a communication system, which includes at least one terminal device and at least one network device. The terminal device is a terminal device used to implement the functions related to the above-described communication method, and the network device is a network device used to implement the functions related to the above-described communication method.

[0235] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium including instructions that, when run on a computer, cause the method executed by the terminal device or network device in the above-described communication method to be executed.

[0236] This application also provides a computer program product, including computer program code, which, when executed, causes the method executed by the terminal device or network device in the above-described communication method to be executed.

[0237] This application provides a chip system including a processor and potentially a memory, for implementing the functions of a terminal device or network device in the aforementioned communication method. The chip system can be composed of chips or may include chips and other discrete components.

[0238] To achieve the functions of the communication devices shown in Figures 11 and 12, this application embodiment also provides a chip, including a processor, for supporting the communication device in implementing the functions involved in the terminal device or network device in the above method embodiments. In one possible design, the chip is connected to a memory or the chip includes a memory for storing necessary computer programs, instructions, and data for the communication device.

[0239] It should be understood that in the various embodiments of this application, the order of the above-mentioned processes does not imply the order of execution. The execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of this application.

[0240] Those skilled in the art will recognize that the various illustrative logical blocks and steps described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementations should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.

[0241] Those skilled in the art will understand that, for the sake of convenience and brevity, the specific working processes of the systems, devices, and units described above can be referred to the corresponding processes in the foregoing method embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0242] In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed systems, apparatuses, and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are merely illustrative; for instance, the division of units is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be through some interfaces; the indirect coupling or communication connection between apparatuses or units may be electrical, mechanical, or other forms.

[0243] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0244] If the aforementioned functions are implemented as software functional units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the essential contributing part of the technical solution of this application, or a portion of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of this application. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as USB flash drives, portable hard drives, ROM, RAM, magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0245] Obviously, those skilled in the art can make various modifications and variations to this application without departing from the scope of this application. Therefore, if such modifications and variations fall within the scope of the claims of this application and their equivalents, this application also intends to include such modifications and variations.

Claims

1. A communication method characterized by comprising: The method includes: Receive a first low-power wake-up signal LP-WUS, wherein the first LP-WUS includes first data; The first data is decrypted and / or verified at a first protocol layer based on a first key, where the first protocol layer is a protocol layer above the physical layer.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, The method is applied to a terminal device, which includes a main link and a secondary link. The first key is generated based on a second key, which is different from the third key. The third key is used for the security processing of the main link.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein, The method further includes: Obtain security processing parameters, including the second key.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein, The first LP-WUS is received via the secondary link; wherein the second key is derived from the primary link, or the second key is derived from the secondary link.

5. The method of claim 3 or 4, wherein, The security processing parameters also include a first count value, and the first LP-WUS also includes the first count value.

6. The method of claim 5, wherein, The first count value is the sequence number SN assigned to the first data.

7. The method of any one of claims 3-6, wherein, The security processing parameters also include a bearer identifier, which is: The first value is predefined by the protocol. Information used to determine the DRB identifier of the data radio bearer; The identifier of the terminal device; or Part of the identifier of the terminal device.

8. The method of claim 1, wherein, The method further includes: Receive first indication information, the first indication information is used to indicate a second value of the next-hop NH link counter NCC, the second value is used to deduce the first key.

9. The method of claim 8, wherein, The first indication information is carried in the first LP-WUS.

10. A communication method characterized by comprising: The method includes: The first data is securely processed at the first protocol layer based on the first key, where the first protocol layer is the protocol layer above the physical layer. Send a first low-power wake-up signal LP-WUS, wherein the first LP-WUS includes the first data.

11. The method of claim 10, wherein, The first key is generated based on the second key, which is different from the third key. The third key is used for the security processing of the main link of the terminal device.

12. The method of claim 11, wherein, The first LP-WUS also includes security processing parameters, which include a first count value.

13. The method of claim 12, wherein, The first count value is the sequence number SN assigned to the first data.

14. The method of claim 12 or 13, wherein, The security processing parameters also include a bearer identifier, which is: The first value is predefined by the protocol. Information used to determine the DRB identifier of the data radio bearer; The identifier of the terminal device; or Part of the identifier of the terminal device.

15. The method of claim 10, wherein, The method further includes: Send a first indication message, which is used to indicate a second value of the next-hop NH link counter NCC, and the second value is used to deduce the first key.

16. The method of claim 15, wherein, The first indication information is carried in the first LP-WUS.

17. A communications device, characterized by include: The transceiver unit is used to receive a first low-power wake-up signal LP-WUS, wherein the first LP-WUS includes first data; The processing unit is configured to decrypt and / or verify the first data at a first protocol layer based on a first key, wherein the first protocol layer is a protocol layer above the physical layer.

18. The apparatus of claim 17, wherein, The communication device is a terminal device, which includes a main link and an auxiliary link. The first key is generated based on the second key, which is different from the third key. The third key is used for the security processing of the main link.

19. The apparatus of claim 18, wherein, The processing unit is also used for: Obtain security processing parameters, including the second key.

20. The apparatus of claim 19, wherein, The first LP-WUS is received via the secondary link; wherein the second key is derived from the primary link, or the second key is derived from the secondary link.

21. The apparatus of claim 19 or 20, wherein, The security processing parameters also include a first count value, and the first LP-WUS also includes the first count value.

22. The apparatus of claim 21, wherein, The first count value is the sequence number SN assigned to the first data.

23. The apparatus of any one of claims 19-22, wherein, The security processing parameters also include a bearer identifier, which is: The first value is predefined by the protocol. Information used to determine the DRB identifier of the data radio bearer; The identifier of the terminal device; or Part of the identifier of the terminal device.

24. The apparatus of claim 17, wherein, The transceiver unit is also used for: Receive first indication information, the first indication information is used to indicate a second value of the next-hop NH link counter NCC, the second value is used to deduce the first key.

25. The apparatus of claim 24, wherein, The first indication information is carried in the first LP-WUS.

26. A communications device, characterized by include: The processing unit is configured to perform secure processing on the first data at a first protocol layer based on a first key, wherein the first protocol layer is a protocol layer above the physical layer. The transceiver unit is used to send a first low-power wake-up signal LP-WUS, wherein the first LP-WUS includes the first data.

27. The apparatus of claim 26, wherein, The first key is generated based on the second key, which is different from the third key. The third key is used for the security processing of the main link of the terminal device.

28. The apparatus of claim 27, wherein, The first LP-WUS also includes security processing parameters, which include a first count value.

29. The apparatus of claim 28, wherein, The first count value is the sequence number SN assigned to the first data.

30. The apparatus of claim 28 or 29, wherein, The security processing parameters also include a bearer identifier, which is: The first value is predefined by the protocol. Information used to determine the DRB identifier of the data radio bearer; The identifier of the terminal device; or Part of the identifier of the terminal device.

31. The apparatus of claim 26, wherein, The transceiver unit is also used for: Send a first indication message, which is used to indicate a second value of the next-hop NH link counter NCC, and the second value is used to deduce the first key.

32. The apparatus of claim 31, wherein, The first indication information is carried in the first LP-WUS.

33. A communications device, characterized by The communication device includes at least one processor, the at least one processor being configured to cause the method of any one of claims 1-9 to be executed by the communication device, or the at least one processor being configured to cause the communication device to execute the method of any one of claims 10-16.

34. A communication system, characterized by It includes the communication device as described in any one of claims 17-25 and the communication device as described in any one of claims 26-32.

35. A chip or chip system, characterized by The chip or chip system includes: At least one processor and an interface, the at least one processor being configured to call and execute instructions from the interface, such that when the at least one processor executes the instructions, the method as claimed in any one of claims 1-9 is executed, or the method as claimed in any one of claims 10-16 is executed.

36. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium is used to store a computer program or instructions that, when executed on a computer, cause the method as described in any one of claims 1-9 to be performed, or cause the method as described in any one of claims 10-16 to be performed.

37. A computer program product, characterised in that, The computer program product includes one or more computer programs or instructions that, when read and executed by a computer, cause the computer to perform the method as described in any one of claims 1-9, or cause the computer to perform the method as described in any one of claims 10-16.

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