Nuclear power plant unit operation control method and apparatus, and electronic device and storage medium

Abstract

A nuclear power plant unit operation control method and apparatus, and an electronic device and a storage medium, which relate to the technical field of nuclear power plant safety. The nuclear power plant unit operation control method comprises: first, acquiring operating condition information of a nuclear power plant unit (S101); in response to the operating condition information indicating a fault operating condition, acquiring device fault information (S102); then, on the basis of the device fault information and preset fault association reference information, determining a unit fault type (S103); next, on the basis of the unit fault type, determining a target control strategy (S104); subsequently, executing the target control strategy, and updating the device fault information (S105); and finally, on the basis of the updated device fault information and preset conditions for restoring normal operation, determining to control the nuclear power plant unit according to a preset normal operation procedure (S106). Therefore, the fault operating time of a unit is reduced.

Description

Nuclear power plant unit operation control methods and devices, electronic equipment and storage media Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of nuclear power plant safety technology, and in particular to a method and apparatus for controlling the operation of a nuclear power plant unit, electronic equipment and storage medium. Background Technology

[0002] In the field of nuclear power plant safety technology, nuclear power plants handle normal operating events according to normal operating procedures and related accident events according to accident operating procedures. However, nuclear power plants may experience equipment or functional failures that cause the unit to deviate from normal operating conditions; this state is called a unit failure operating condition. At this time, the nuclear power plant has not yet met the conditions for automatically triggering accident operating procedures, but it also cannot guarantee the long-term stable operation of the unit by operating normal operating procedures.

[0003] In related technologies, when faced with a unit malfunction, a unit retraction operation is performed to manually reduce power or perform a reactor skipping operation. However, this approach can easily lead to excessive retraction, increasing the time required for the unit to return to normal operation after the fault is resolved.

[0004] Therefore, reducing the downtime of generator units has become an urgent problem to be solved. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The main objective of this application is to provide a nuclear power plant unit operation control method and device, electronic equipment and storage medium, which aims to reduce the unit's downtime.

[0006] To achieve the above objectives, a first aspect of this application proposes a nuclear power plant unit operation control method, the method comprising:

[0007] Obtain the operating status information of the nuclear power plant unit;

[0008] In response to the operating condition information indicating a faulty operating condition, obtain equipment fault information;

[0009] The unit fault type is determined based on the equipment fault information and the preset fault association reference information;

[0010] Determine the target control strategy based on the type of unit failure;

[0011] Execute the target control strategy and update the equipment fault information;

[0012] Based on the updated equipment fault information and the preset conditions for restoring normal operation, the nuclear power plant unit is controlled according to the preset normal operation procedure.

[0013] In some embodiments, determining the unit fault type based on the equipment fault information and preset fault association reference information includes:

[0014] Based on the fault association reference information, the equipment fault information is analyzed for fault type to obtain fault risk analysis results;

[0015] In response to the failure risk analysis results indicating that the nuclear power plant unit has at least one of the following risks: radioactive leakage risk, heat exhaust function failure risk, and circulation function failure risk, the failure type of the unit is determined as the first failure type.

[0016] In some embodiments, determining the target control strategy based on the unit fault type includes:

[0017] In response to the unit fault type being the first fault type, an emergency fault operation procedure corresponding to the first fault type is determined from the preset accident operation procedures;

[0018] The target control strategy is determined based on the emergency failure operation procedure and the preset nuclear reaction power threshold.

[0019] In some embodiments, determining the unit fault type based on the equipment fault information and preset fault association reference information includes:

[0020] In response to the fault risk analysis results indicating that the nuclear power plant unit does not have the risk of radioactive leakage, the risk of heat exhaust function failure, and the risk of circulation function failure, a stability assessment is performed on the equipment fault information based on the fault association reference information to obtain the stability assessment results.

[0021] In response to the stability assessment results indicating that the nuclear power plant unit interrupts stable operation within a preset time period, or that an anomaly occurs when the nuclear power plant unit enters the withdrawal mode, the unit fault type is determined as the second fault type.

[0022] or,

[0023] In response to the stability assessment results indicating that the nuclear power plant unit maintains stable operation within a preset time period, or that the nuclear power plant unit normally enters the withdrawal mode, the fault type of the unit is determined to be the third fault type.

[0024] In some embodiments, the nuclear power plant unit includes a primary cooling system, a waste heat removal system, a reactor, and control rods for insertion into the reactor; determining the target control strategy based on the unit's fault type includes:

[0025] In response to the unit fault type being the second fault type, the movement control strategy of the control rod is determined based on the preset target power and preset power threshold of the reactor.

[0026] The heat dissipation start-up conditions of the waste heat removal system are determined based on the preset boric acid concentration, preset temperature data and preset pressure data of the primary cooling system.

[0027] The target control strategy is determined based on the movement control strategy and the heat dissipation start-up conditions.

[0028] In some embodiments, executing the target control strategy and updating the device fault information includes:

[0029] Obtain the initial power of the reactor;

[0030] The control rod is moved according to the preset power threshold, the initial power, and the movement control strategy until the initial power reaches the preset target power;

[0031] The primary cooling system is subjected to borying, cooling, and pressure reduction operations, and the equipment fault information is updated.

[0032] When the current boric acid concentration, current temperature data, and current pressure data of the primary cooling system meet the heat discharge start-up conditions, the waste heat discharge system is activated.

[0033] In some embodiments, moving the control rod according to the preset power threshold, the initial power, and the movement control strategy until the initial power reaches the preset target power includes:

[0034] When the initial power is greater than the preset power threshold, an automatic load reduction operation is performed until the initial power reaches the preset power threshold, and the equipment fault information is updated.

[0035] When the initial power is less than or equal to the preset power threshold, the control rod is moved according to the movement control strategy until the initial power reaches the preset target power.

[0036] In some embodiments, before executing the target control strategy and updating the device fault information, the method further includes:

[0037] A warning display interface is generated based on the unit fault type, the equipment fault information, and the target control strategy;

[0038] In response to a confirmation operation performed by the target object on the warning display interface, the target control strategy is determined to be executed; wherein the target object is the operator of the nuclear power plant unit.

[0039] In some embodiments, before determining the unit fault type based on the equipment fault information and preset fault association reference information, the following steps are included:

[0040] Obtain equipment functional fault information of the nuclear power plant unit;

[0041] System fault risk analysis is performed on the device functional fault information to obtain subsystem-level risk information;

[0042] Based on the subsystem-level risk information, a unit failure risk analysis is performed to obtain unit-level risk information;

[0043] The fault association reference information is determined based on the equipment functional fault information, the subsystem-level risk information, and the unit-level risk information.

[0044] In some embodiments, after obtaining the operating condition information of the nuclear power plant unit, the method further includes:

[0045] If the operating condition information indicates normal operating condition, then the nuclear power plant unit is controlled according to the normal operating procedure.

[0046] or,

[0047] If the operating condition information indicates an accident operation condition, the nuclear power plant unit will be controlled according to the preset accident operation procedure.

[0048] To achieve the above objectives, a second aspect of this application provides a nuclear power plant unit operation control device, the device comprising:

[0049] The first acquisition module is used to acquire the operating condition information of the nuclear power plant unit;

[0050] The second acquisition module is used to acquire equipment fault information in response to the operating condition information being a fault operating condition.

[0051] The fault type determination module is used to determine the unit fault type based on the equipment fault information and preset fault association reference information;

[0052] The control strategy formulation module is used to determine the target control strategy based on the unit fault type.

[0053] The control strategy execution module is used to execute the target control strategy and update the equipment fault information;

[0054] The normal operation recovery module is used to determine, based on the updated equipment fault information and preset normal operation recovery conditions, to control the nuclear power plant unit according to the preset normal operation procedures.

[0055] To achieve the above objectives, a third aspect of the present application provides an electronic device, the electronic device including a memory and a processor, the memory storing a computer program, and the processor executing the computer program to implement the method described in the first aspect.

[0056] To achieve the above objectives, a fourth aspect of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the method described in the first aspect.

[0057] The nuclear power plant unit operation control method, device, electronic equipment, and storage medium proposed in this application accurately acquire the operating conditions and equipment fault information of the nuclear power plant unit, and implement targeted control strategies to help the unit quickly return to normal operation. First, by acquiring the unit's operating condition information, when a faulty operating condition is confirmed, the specific fault type is further analyzed using equipment fault information and preset fault correlation reference information. Then, corresponding target control strategies are formulated based on different fault types. The control strategies are then executed, while dynamically responding and continuously updating equipment fault information, adjusting the strategy according to the fault recovery progress to avoid unnecessary operational delays. Finally, based on changes in fault information, when the unit reaches the preset recovery conditions, it can return to normal operating conditions and operate according to normal operating procedures. This solution, through faster fault location and strategy adjustment, effectively reduces the problem of excessive retreat caused by improper handling of accident operating procedures, reduces the frequency of unit shutdown transients, and thus reduces the difficulty of restoring the unit to normal operation, thereby reducing the unit's fault operating time. Attached Figure Description

[0058] Figure 1 is a flowchart of a nuclear power plant unit operation control method provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0059] Figure 2 is another flowchart of the nuclear power plant unit operation control method provided in the embodiment of this application;

[0060] Figure 3 is a flowchart of step S103 in Figure 1;

[0061] Figure 4 is a flowchart of step S104 in Figure 1;

[0062] Figure 5 is another flowchart of step S104 in Figure 1;

[0063] Figure 6 is another flowchart of the nuclear power plant unit operation control method provided in the embodiment of this application;

[0064] Figure 7 is a schematic diagram of an early warning display interface provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0065] Figure 8 is a schematic diagram of another warning display interface provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0066] Figure 9 is a schematic diagram of another warning display interface provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0067] Figure 10 is a flowchart of step S105 in Figure 1;

[0068] Figure 11 is a schematic diagram of the structure of the nuclear power plant unit operation control device provided in the embodiment of this application;

[0069] Figure 12 is a schematic diagram of the hardware structure of the electronic device provided in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0070] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this application clearer, the following detailed description is provided in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative and not intended to limit the scope of this application.

[0071] It should be noted that although functional modules are divided in the device schematic diagram and a logical order is shown in the flowchart, in some cases, the steps shown or described may be performed in a different order than the module division in the device or the order in the flowchart. The terms "first," "second," etc., in the specification, claims, and the aforementioned drawings are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence.

[0072] Unless otherwise defined, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this application belongs. The terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing embodiments of this application only and is not intended to limit this application.

[0073] First, let's analyze some of the terms used in this application:

[0074] Unit: In the field of nuclear power plants, a unit is a basic power generation unit consisting of a reactor and its associated steam turbine generator set, as well as the systems and facilities required to maintain their normal operation and ensure safety. It typically includes a nuclear reactor, steam generator, primary cooling system, and waste heat removal system.

[0075] Backstop mode: Backstop mode refers to the emergency operation of rapidly terminating a nuclear chain reaction in a nuclear reactor. It is typically initiated automatically or manually when the reactor exhibits potential hazards or exceeds normal operating parameters. Backstop mode involves rapidly inserting all control rods into the reactor core to stop the nuclear fission reaction and ensure the safety of the nuclear power plant.

[0076] Operating Procedures: Written documents used to guide nuclear power plant operators in various operations and monitoring of the unit system, handling system and equipment failures and accidents. They consist of general operating procedures, system operating procedures, refueling and overhaul operating procedures, system alarm manuals, fault handling procedures, accident handling procedures, administrative isolation procedures, and periodic testing procedures.

[0077] In the field of nuclear power plant safety technology, operating procedures are guidelines for operators to operate the plant's systems or equipment. Regardless of whether the nuclear power plant is in normal operation or an accident state, there are clear operating documents to guide operators in controlling the unit and ensuring the safety of the nuclear power plant. Based on different operating conditions of the nuclear power plant, the currently adopted digital operating document system can be divided into normal operation procedures and accident operation procedures. Normal operation procedures guide the operation of the unit during steady-state operation, startup, and shutdown, as well as handling some transient events during normal operation. Normal operation procedures include normal start-up and shutdown procedures, alarm cards, system fault operation procedures, and abnormal unit operation procedures. Accident operation procedures are used to handle anticipated operating events, design basis condition accidents, and design extended condition accidents that cannot be handled by normal operation procedures.

[0078] However, nuclear power plants may experience equipment or functional failures that cause the unit to deviate from normal operation. In this situation, the unit does not trip and the dedicated protection equipment does not activate; this state is called a unit fault operation condition. At this time, reactor protection and dedicated safety functions in the nuclear power plant may not be automatically triggered, thus not meeting the conditions for automatically triggering the accident operation procedure. However, it may also be impossible to ensure the long-term stable operation of the unit by running the normal operation procedure.

[0079] In the relevant technologies of third-generation nuclear power plants, there are two existing solutions when the unit equipment of a nuclear power plant is in a faulty operating condition. In the first solution, the normal operation procedures of a third-generation nuclear power plant include General Operating Procedures (GOP), Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOP), System Operating Procedures (SOP), and Alarm Response Procedures (ARP). Accident operating procedures include Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP), 72-hour post-accident operating procedures, and Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG), etc. In the early stage of an event or accident, when the unit has not tripped and the dedicated protection equipment has not been activated, the nuclear power plant is in a faulty operating condition. At this time, it is handled through the general operating procedures or abnormal operating procedures. However, as the severity of the fault and the degree of impact on the unit further deepen, it triggers the unit to trip or the dedicated protection equipment to automatically activate, and the operation switches to the accident operating procedures.

[0080] During the execution of the Abnormal Operation Procedure (AOP), specific operations on system equipment are performed by calling the System Operation Procedure (SOP), and unit retreat operations are performed by calling the General Operation Procedure (GOP). This means that all accident conditions, fault conditions, and disasters that do not trigger a reactor trip are handled within the AOP. The broad scope of conditions covered by the AOP results in a large AOP file structure. Furthermore, the frequent inter-calls between the AOP, GOP, and SOP during execution increase human error risks.

[0081] In the second scheme, the normal operation procedures for third-generation nuclear power plants include General Operating Procedures (GOPs), Procedures for Operating under Restricted Conditions (PORs), System Operating Procedures (SOPs), and Alarm Response Procedures (ARPs). Accident operation procedures include Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs). In this scheme, the Emergency Operating Procedures cover both accident and incident handling when the unit has not tripped and dedicated protection equipment has not been activated, and unit evacuation when normal operating functions are unavailable. Therefore, this scheme manages most fault operating conditions through accident operating procedures. When operators are unable to maintain stable unit operation through normal operating functions, they can invoke the accident operating procedures for unit control through the technical specifications or technical requirements manual. The accident operation procedure stipulates that the procedure can only be terminated and the unit can return to normal operation once the unit's condition has returned to a safe and stable state and the reactor's thermal-hydraulic and nuclear parameters meet the requirements of the technical specifications or technical requirements manual. Furthermore, the accident handling process within the procedure is relatively complex and cumbersome, requiring manual reactor tripping during power reduction operations, which increases the transient time of shutdown. Additionally, the extended retreat period of the accident operation procedure increases the unit's recovery time after fault handling is completed.

[0082] Therefore, reducing the downtime of generator units has become an urgent problem to be solved.

[0083] Based on this, embodiments of this application provide a nuclear power plant unit operation control method and apparatus, electronic equipment and storage medium, aimed at reducing unit downtime.

[0084] The nuclear power plant unit operation control method, device, electronic equipment, and storage medium provided in this application are specifically described through the following embodiments. First, the nuclear power plant unit operation control method in this application embodiment is described.

[0085] The nuclear power plant unit operation control method provided in this application relates to the field of nuclear power plant safety technology. The nuclear power plant unit operation control method provided in this application can be applied to a terminal, a server, or software running on either a terminal or a server. In some embodiments, the terminal can be a smartphone, tablet, laptop, desktop computer, etc.; the server can be configured as an independent physical server, a server cluster or distributed system composed of multiple physical servers, or a cloud server providing basic cloud computing services such as cloud services, cloud databases, cloud computing, cloud functions, cloud storage, network services, cloud communication, middleware services, domain name services, security services, CDN, and big data and artificial intelligence platforms; the software can be an application that implements the nuclear power plant unit operation control method, but is not limited to the above forms.

[0086] This application can be used in a wide variety of general-purpose or special-purpose computer system environments or configurations. Examples include: personal computers, server computers, handheld or portable devices, tablet devices, multiprocessor systems, microprocessor-based systems, set-top boxes, programmable consumer electronics, network PCs, minicomputers, mainframe computers, and distributed computing environments including any of the above systems or devices. This application can be described in the general context of computer-executable instructions executed by a computer, such as program modules. Generally, program modules include routines, programs, objects, components, data structures, etc., that perform specific tasks or implement specific abstract data types. This application can also be practiced in distributed computing environments where tasks are performed by remote processing devices connected via a communication network. In distributed computing environments, program modules can reside in local and remote computer storage media, including storage devices.

[0087] Figure 1 is an optional flowchart of a nuclear power plant unit operation control method provided in an embodiment of this application. The method in Figure 1 may include, but is not limited to, steps S101 to S106.

[0088] Step S101: Obtain the operating status information of the nuclear power plant unit.

[0089] Step S102: In response to the operating condition information being a faulty operating condition, obtain equipment fault information.

[0090] Step S103: Determine the unit fault type based on the equipment fault information and the preset fault association reference information.

[0091] Step S104: Determine the target control strategy based on the type of unit failure.

[0092] Step S105: Execute the target control strategy and update the equipment fault information.

[0093] Step S106: Based on the updated equipment fault information and the preset conditions for restoring normal operation, determine to control the nuclear power plant unit according to the preset normal operation procedures.

[0094] Steps S101 to S106 of this embodiment accurately acquire the operating conditions and equipment fault information of the nuclear power plant unit, and implement targeted control strategies to help the unit quickly return to normal operation. First, by acquiring the unit's operating condition information, when a faulty operating condition is confirmed, the specific fault type is further analyzed using equipment fault information and preset fault association reference information. Then, corresponding target control strategies are formulated based on different fault types. The control strategies are then executed, while dynamically responding and continuously updating equipment fault information. The strategies can be adjusted according to the fault recovery progress, avoiding unnecessary operational delays. Finally, based on changes in fault information, when the unit reaches the preset recovery conditions, it can return to normal operating conditions and operate according to normal operating procedures. This solution, through faster fault location and adjustment strategies, effectively reduces the problem of excessive retreat caused by improper handling of accident operating procedures, reduces the frequency of unit shutdown transients, and thus reduces the difficulty of restoring the unit to normal operation, thereby reducing the unit's fault operating time.

[0095] In step S101 of some embodiments, the operating condition information can be normal operating condition, accident operating condition, and fault operating condition. Specifically, normal operating condition refers to all systems and equipment operating according to normal design specifications, with relevant parameters controlled within safe ranges. Routine operations such as reactor steady-state operation, startup, and shutdown all fall under normal operating condition. Accident operating condition occurs when a nuclear power plant design-basis accident or non-design-basis accident occurs, or equipment fails, reactor power runs out of control, or serious problems arise in system operation. Fault operating condition refers to a nuclear power plant unit deviating from normal operating conditions due to equipment or functional failure, but not yet developing to the severity of an accident. In this case, reactor protection and safety functions may not be automatically triggered, and the unit can continue to operate.

[0096] Different operating conditions of a nuclear power plant require different operating procedures. In some embodiments, after step S101, the nuclear power plant unit operation control method provided in this application may further include: responding to the operating condition information as normal operating condition, controlling the nuclear power plant unit according to the normal operating procedure; or, responding to the operating condition information as accident operating condition, controlling the nuclear power plant unit according to a preset accident operating procedure. It is understood that the above-mentioned normal operating procedure and accident operating procedure are pre-written before the nuclear power plant is put into operation and can be directly imported and called in actual application scenarios.

[0097] In step S102 of some embodiments, the fault operation condition refers to a situation where a nuclear power plant experiences equipment or functional failures that cause the unit to deviate from normal operation. Equipment fault information refers to equipment information that has failed during the fault operation condition of the nuclear power plant unit, as well as information related to the functional impairment of the unit, such as: loss of a main pump, abnormal boron concentration in the primary coolant circuit, unavailability of normal boronizing function, and unavailability of the high-pressure relief function of the primary coolant chemical and volume control system (RCV). The specific content that the equipment fault information may include may vary depending on the structure of the nuclear power plant, and the embodiments of this application do not strictly limit it in this regard.

[0098] It should be noted that, after confirming that the nuclear power plant unit has entered a fault operation condition, this application embodiment requires further classification of the fault operation condition. This process needs to consider the impact of equipment fault information on unit operation. In this application embodiment, the type of fault operation condition is the unit fault type. Fault association reference information refers to the impact and risk on the unit's operating status and safety when a specific piece of equipment fails, including equipment functional fault information, subsystem-level risk information, and unit-level risk information. Fault association reference information can be obtained through human experience or pre-trained artificial intelligence models.

[0099] The determination of fault association reference information will be described in detail below with reference to the following embodiments. Referring to Figure 2, in some embodiments, before step S103, the nuclear power plant unit control and operation method provided in this application may include, but is not limited to, steps S201 to S204:

[0100] Step S201: Obtain equipment functional fault information of nuclear power plant units.

[0101] Step S202: Perform system fault risk analysis on the equipment functional fault information to obtain subsystem-level risk information.

[0102] Step S203: Perform unit failure risk analysis based on subsystem-level risk information to obtain unit-level risk information.

[0103] Step S204: Determine fault association reference information based on equipment functional fault information, subsystem-level risk information, and unit-level risk information.

[0104] In step S201 of some embodiments, the equipment functional failure information refers to potential equipment or functional failures within the nuclear power plant unit. Typically, equipment to be analyzed is first selected from the unit, such as main pumps, the primary coolant chemistry and volume control system, and spent fuel pool cooling pumps. Fault analysis is then performed on these devices to determine the probability of failure for each device, such as the loss of one main pump, the loss of two main pumps, the unavailability of the high-pressure relief function of the primary coolant chemistry and volume control system, the failure of the spent fuel pool cooling pump to shut down, and the unavailability of the normal borosilicate function. The embodiments of this application do not strictly limit the specific content of the equipment functional failure information. The equipment to be analyzed can be selected from the nuclear power plant units based on experience feedback or the specific needs of the nuclear power plant.

[0105] In step S202 of some embodiments, for each device malfunction information, its impact on the system's function is first analyzed, and the resulting risk information is the subsystem-level risk information. For example, the impact of losing a main pump on the system is a reduction in the primary coolant circulation flow rate.

[0106] In step S203 of some embodiments, after determining the system-level impact corresponding to each device functional failure information, the impact of the failure on the normal operation of the unit and the potential risks are analyzed based on the subsystem-level risk information, and the resulting risk information is the unit-level risk information.

[0107] In step S204 of some embodiments, the equipment functional fault information, subsystem-level risk information, and unit-level risk information are mapped one-to-one and then integrated into fault association reference information and stored in a database, which can be stored in tabular form. In some embodiments, the fault association reference information can be as shown in Table 1.

[0108] Table 1

[0109] Steps S201 to S204, as illustrated in the embodiments of this application, enable more rapid identification and response to faults through systematic fault information acquisition and risk analysis, thereby significantly improving the safety and reliability of nuclear power plants.

[0110] In step S103 of some embodiments, the unit fault type includes a first fault type, a second fault type, and a third fault type. Referring to Figure 3, step S103 may include, but is not limited to, steps S301 to S302:

[0111] Step S301: Based on the fault association reference information, analyze the fault type of the equipment fault information to obtain the fault risk analysis result.

[0112] Step S302: In response to the failure risk analysis results indicating that the nuclear power plant unit has at least one of the following risks: radioactive leakage risk, heat exhaust function failure risk, and circulation function failure risk, the unit failure type is determined as the first failure type.

[0113] In step S301 of some embodiments, the equipment fault information is compared and queried according to the fault association reference information to obtain the subsystem-level risk information and unit-level risk information corresponding to the equipment fault information, which is the fault risk analysis result.

[0114] In step S302 of some embodiments, the first fault type is a fault operating condition with a relatively high degree of severity. When the unit fault type is determined to be the first fault type operating condition, the accident operation procedure needs to be introduced for handling. It is understood that the risk of radioactive leakage refers to the risk that may cause radioactive consequences, which may be caused by leakage in the primary loop or other pipelines containing coolant. The risk of heat removal function failure refers to the risk of the waste heat removal system failing to operate, or the risk that although the waste heat removal system is operating, a unit equipment failure prevents the system from meeting the waste heat removal requirements. The risk of circulation function failure refers to the risk of loss of forced circulation in the primary loop system, usually a situation where all main pumps stop operating but do not cause the unit to automatically trip.

[0115] In other embodiments, in response to the fault risk analysis results indicating that the nuclear power plant unit does not have the risk of radioactive leakage, heat exhaust function failure, or circulation function failure, a stability assessment is performed on the equipment fault information based on fault association reference information to obtain a stability assessment result. Specifically, the stability assessment includes determining whether the unit can maintain stable operation within a preset time under the fault operating condition, and whether the normal operation function can be used to withdraw. It should be noted that in this embodiment, the preset time refers to the length of time required for the equipment to complete fault repair from the time the fault is detected.

[0116] In some embodiments, in response to a stability assessment result indicating that the nuclear power plant unit has interrupted stable operation for a preset period of time, or an anomaly occurs when the nuclear power plant unit enters a shutdown mode, the unit failure type is determined as a second failure type. Specifically, the second failure type is a failure operating condition that poses a moderate risk to the safe operation of the unit. This failure type indicates that some critical functions of the unit are impaired, but not to the point of immediately leading to serious safety consequences.

[0117] In other embodiments, in response to the stability assessment results indicating that the nuclear power plant unit maintains stable operation within a preset time period, or that the nuclear power plant unit normally enters the withdrawal mode, the unit fault type is determined to be a third fault type. Specifically, the third fault type is a fault operation condition with a relatively low degree of impact, which can maintain stable operation of the unit for a certain period of time.

[0118] Steps S301 to S302 shown in the embodiments of this application, by classifying and processing the fault operation conditions, can help nuclear power plants allocate resources more effectively, and can also provide a basis for formulating corresponding response strategies in the future.

[0119] In some steps, S104, different control strategies are formulated based on different fault operating conditions. Specifically, please refer to Figure 4. Step S104 may include, but is not limited to, steps S401 to S402:

[0120] Step S401: In response to the unit fault type being the first fault type, determine the emergency fault operation procedure corresponding to the first fault type from the preset accident operation procedures.

[0121] Step S402: Determine the target control strategy based on the emergency fault operation procedure and the preset nuclear reaction power threshold.

[0122] In step S401 of some embodiments, the fault operation condition of the first fault type needs to be imported into the accident operation procedure for processing. It is necessary to quickly retrieve and confirm the emergency fault operation procedure corresponding to the fault type from the preset accident operation procedure.

[0123] In step S402 of some embodiments, if the emergency failure operation procedure indicates that the unit needs to perform a shutdown operation, the target control strategy is as follows: when the current power of the reactor is greater than the nuclear reaction power threshold, an automatic load reduction operation is performed. When the current power of the reactor reaches the nuclear reaction power threshold, a manual shutdown operation is performed, followed by boronizing, cooling, or depressurization operations, until the unit enters the shutdown mode required by the operation procedure. The nuclear reaction power threshold can be 10% of the reactor's full power, or other values, and is not limited to these.

[0124] In other embodiments, if the emergency failure operation procedure indicates that the unit does not need to be withdrawn, the target control strategy is to maintain unit stability within the accident operation range while operators handle the failure.

[0125] Steps S401 to S402 shown in the embodiments of this application improve the response efficiency to serious faults and enhance the systematic nature of fault handling, thereby ensuring the safe operation of nuclear power plants.

[0126] Referring to Figure 5, in some embodiments, the nuclear power plant unit includes a primary cooling system, a residual heat removal system, a reactor, and control rods. The control rods are inserted into the reactor and are typically made of materials capable of absorbing neutrons. By changing the position of the control rods within the reactor, the reactor's power and temperature can be adjusted. When the fault operation condition is classified as a second fault type, an abnormal operation procedure needs to be implemented, requiring the unit to perform a backoff operation and exit power operation. Specifically, step S104 may also include, but is not limited to, steps S501 to S503:

[0127] In step S501, in response to the unit fault type being the second fault type, the preset target power and preset power threshold of the reactor are used to determine the control rod movement control strategy.

[0128] Step S502: Determine the heat dissipation start-up conditions of the waste heat discharge system based on the preset boric acid concentration, preset temperature data and preset pressure data of the primary cooling system.

[0129] Step S503: Determine the target control strategy based on the movement control strategy and the heat dissipation start-up conditions.

[0130] In step S501 of some embodiments, the preset target power is a power value that reflects the reactor's exit from full power operation, and the preset power threshold is an intermediate power value required to perform automatic load reduction operation, which can be set to 10% of the reactor's full power. The movement control strategy can be: when the reactor's current power is greater than the preset power threshold, the unit performs automatic load reduction operation, including automatically adjusting the position of the control rods. When the reactor's current power equals the preset power threshold, manual rod insertion operation begins.

[0131] In step S502 of some embodiments, the heat dissipation start-up condition is the basis for determining whether to start the waste heat dissipation system. The preset boric acid concentration can be a preset concentration range, and the preset temperature data can be a preset temperature range. For example, the heat dissipation start-up condition may include: the boric acid concentration in the primary cooling system is within the preset boric acid concentration range, the average temperature value of the primary cooling system is within the preset temperature data, and the pressure of the primary cooling system is below the preset pressure data.

[0132] In step S503 of some embodiments, the target control strategy is set as follows: first execute the movement control strategy, then execute the boronizing, temperature adjustment, and pressure adjustment operations to ensure that the relevant parameters of the unit meet the heat discharge start-up conditions, thereby starting the waste heat discharge system. If, during the automatic load reduction operation and the execution of the boronizing, temperature adjustment, and pressure adjustment operations, the equipment or functional failure is repaired and put into operation, or the waste heat discharge system is successfully put into operation, then the normal operation procedure is returned.

[0133] Steps S501 to S503, as illustrated in the embodiments of this application, formulate a comprehensive safety control strategy by comprehensively considering the control rod movement strategy and the activation conditions of the residual heat removal system. This method helps improve the nuclear power plant's response capability to faults and ensures safe operation under various fault conditions.

[0134] In some embodiments, step S104 may further include: in response to the unit fault type being the third fault type, maintaining the current operating procedures of the unit is sufficient, without changing the operating state of the unit.

[0135] Understandably, by specifically categorizing faulty operating conditions, an accident operation procedure is imported for the first fault type, an abnormal operation procedure for the second fault type, and a normal operation procedure for the third fault type. This avoids the operational complexity and human error risks associated with frequently calling other procedures (such as the overall operation procedure and system operation procedure) within the abnormal operation procedure (AOP) in the first existing solution. Simultaneously, it allows for faster fault location and adjustment strategies, effectively reducing the problem of excessive rollback due to improper handling of accident operation procedures.

[0136] It should be noted that in this embodiment of the application, different interface types are set for different fault operating conditions, so that different warning information is displayed on the interactive interface used for early warning. Operators need to confirm the fault based on the displayed warning information in order to determine the appropriate target control strategy to be executed.

[0137] Specifically, please refer to Figure 6. In some embodiments, steps S601 to S602 are included, but are not limited to, before step S105:

[0138] Step S601: Generate an early warning display interface based on the unit fault type, equipment fault information, and target control strategy.

[0139] Step S602: In response to the confirmation operation performed by the target object on the warning display interface, determine to execute the target control strategy.

[0140] In step S601 of some embodiments, the unit fault type, equipment fault information, and target control strategy are displayed on the early warning display interface, and relevant descriptive text matching the unit fault type is added to the early warning display interface. For example, as shown in FIG7, FIG7 is a schematic diagram of an early warning display interface provided in an embodiment of this application. When the unit experiences a fault of low primary coolant 18B concentration, which belongs to the first fault type, the text information "After confirming the primary coolant has been mistakenly diluted, execute the Emergency Operation Procedure (EOP)" is added to the operation bar of the early warning display interface. In the nuclear power plant related field, some first fault type fault operating conditions need to be monitored and discovered through periodic testing procedures. An adaptive description of "execute the Emergency Operation Procedure" after detecting a functional fault is added to the testing procedure, as shown in FIG8, FIG8 is another schematic diagram of an early warning display interface provided in an embodiment of this application.

[0141] In other embodiments, when the unit experiences a second type of fault operation, a descriptive message is added to the operation bar of the warning display interface: "After confirming the fault condition and other conditions for entering the abnormal operation procedure, execute the abnormal operation procedure." For example, as shown in Figure 9, which is a schematic diagram of another warning display interface provided in this application embodiment, when the unit experiences a low flow rate in the drain header, which is a second type of fault, the following text is added to the operation bar of the warning display interface: "After checking that the RCV high-pressure drain is unavailable, if the unit cannot stabilize in the current state or there is a need for primary circuit cooling, call abnormal operation procedure I04 (using RBS retreat), applicable to modes 1, 2, 3 and mode 4 where the residual heat removal system (RIS-RHR) is not connected." Here, mode 1 refers to the reactor being in power operation with nuclear power greater than or equal to 2% of full power. Mode 2 refers to the reactor being in power operation with nuclear power less than 2% of full power. Mode 3 refers to the reactor being in a subcritical state and using a steam generator to achieve heat exchange of the primary circuit coolant. Mode 4 refers to a reactor in a subcritical state where the primary loop system is cooled by a residual heat removal system.

[0142] In step S602 of some embodiments, the target is the operator of the nuclear power plant unit. The corresponding target control strategy is only executed on the unit after the operator performs a confirmation operation; otherwise, the cause of the warning is found based on the information displayed on the warning screen.

[0143] Steps S601 to S602, as illustrated in the embodiments of this application, combined with operator confirmation, improve the nuclear power plant's response capability and handling efficiency in the event of a fault. This not only enhances the safety and reliability of accident handling but also strengthens the overall safety assurance system of the nuclear power plant.

[0144] Please refer to Figure 10. In some embodiments, step S105 may include, but is not limited to, steps S1001 to S1004:

[0145] Step S1001: Obtain the initial power of the reactor.

[0146] Step S1002: Move the control rod according to the preset power threshold, initial power and movement control strategy until the initial power reaches the preset target power.

[0147] Step S1003: Perform boronizing, cooling and depressurization operations on the primary cooling system, and update the equipment fault information.

[0148] Step S1004: When the current boric acid concentration, current temperature data and current pressure data of the primary cooling system meet the heat discharge start-up conditions, determine to start the waste heat discharge system.

[0149] In step S1001 of some embodiments, the initial power can be acquired through the monitoring and control systems of the nuclear power plant, which are capable of monitoring the reactor power level in real time.

[0150] In step S1002 of some embodiments, if the initial power is greater than a preset power threshold, an automatic load reduction operation is performed until the initial power reaches the preset power threshold, and the equipment fault information is updated. If, during this period, the equipment or functional fault has been repaired and put into operation, the unit directly returns to normal operating conditions and operates according to the normal operating procedures.

[0151] If the initial power is less than or equal to the preset power threshold, the control rod is moved according to the movement control strategy, that is, the operation of manually inserting the control rod is performed until the initial power reaches the preset target power.

[0152] In step S1003 of some embodiments, if the equipment or functional failure has been repaired and put into operation during the boronizing operation, cooling operation and depressurization operation of the primary cooling system, the system directly returns to normal operating conditions and operates the unit according to the normal operating procedures.

[0153] In some embodiments, the specific details of the heat dissipation start-up conditions in step S1004 have been described in detail in the relevant embodiments of step S502, and will not be repeated here. When the current boric acid concentration, current temperature data, and current pressure data of the primary cooling system meet the heat dissipation start-up conditions, the waste heat removal system is started. If the waste heat removal system is successfully put into operation, the unit returns to normal operating conditions and operates according to the normal operating procedures.

[0154] Steps S1001 to S1004, as illustrated in the embodiments of this application, improve the adaptability and responsiveness of nuclear power plants to various operating conditions by precisely controlling reactor power and the state of the primary loop system, enhance accident prevention and response measures, and thus ensure the safe and stable operation of nuclear power plants.

[0155] In step S106 of some embodiments, updating equipment fault information is a crucial process as the fault is repaired, ensuring that nuclear power plant operators have access to the latest and most accurate equipment status information. The relationship between equipment fault information and fault repair is dynamic and complementary; a reduction in equipment fault information directly reflects the progress and effectiveness of fault repair. When equipment fault information decreases to zero, it means that all equipment or functional faults have been repaired and the unit can be safely restored to normal operating conditions. A preset condition for restoring normal operation can be that the equipment fault information is reset to zero.

[0156] The conditions for restoring normal operation according to the above embodiments can also be: during the automatic load reduction of the unit, when the equipment or functional failure has been repaired and put into use; during the cooling and pressure reduction of the unit, when the equipment or functional failure has been repaired and put into use; and the waste heat removal system is successfully put into operation.

[0157] Please refer to Figure 11. This application embodiment also provides a nuclear power plant unit operation control device, which can implement the above-described nuclear power plant unit operation control method. The device includes:

[0158] The first acquisition module is used to acquire the operating condition information of nuclear power plant units;

[0159] The second acquisition module is used to acquire equipment fault information in response to the operating condition information indicating a faulty operating condition.

[0160] The fault type determination module is used to determine the unit fault type based on equipment fault information and preset fault association reference information;

[0161] The control strategy formulation module is used to determine the target control strategy based on the type of unit failure.

[0162] The control strategy execution module is used to execute the target control strategy and update equipment fault information;

[0163] The normal operation recovery module is used to determine the control of the nuclear power plant unit according to the preset normal operation procedures based on the updated equipment fault information and preset normal operation recovery conditions.

[0164] The specific implementation method of the nuclear power plant unit operation control device is basically the same as the specific implementation method of the above-mentioned nuclear power plant unit operation control method, and will not be described again here.

[0165] This application also provides an electronic device, which includes a memory and a processor. The memory stores a computer program, and the processor executes the computer program to implement the aforementioned nuclear power plant unit operation control method. This electronic device can be any smart terminal, including tablet computers, in-vehicle computers, etc.

[0166] Please refer to Figure 12, which illustrates the hardware structure of an electronic device according to another embodiment. The electronic device includes:

[0167] The processor 1201 can be implemented using a general-purpose CPU (Central Processing Unit), microprocessor, application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or one or more integrated circuits, and is used to execute relevant programs to implement the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of this application.

[0168] The memory 1202 can be implemented as a read-only memory (ROM), static storage device, dynamic storage device, or random access memory (RAM). The memory 1202 can store the operating system and other application programs. When the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of this specification are implemented through software or firmware, the relevant program code is stored in the memory 1202 and is called and executed by the processor 1201 to execute the nuclear power plant unit operation control method of the embodiments of this application.

[0169] The input / output interface 1203 is used to implement information input and output;

[0170] The communication interface 1204 is used to enable communication and interaction between this device and other devices. Communication can be achieved through wired means (such as USB, network cable, etc.) or wireless means (such as mobile network, WIFI, Bluetooth, etc.).

[0171] Bus 1205 transmits information between various components of the device (e.g., processor 1201, memory 1202, input / output interface 1203, and communication interface 1204);

[0172] The processor 1201, memory 1202, input / output interface 1203 and communication interface 1204 are connected to each other within the device via bus 1205.

[0173] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the above-described nuclear power plant unit operation control method.

[0174] Memory, as a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, can be used to store non-transitory software programs and non-transitory computer-executable programs. Furthermore, memory may include high-speed random access memory, and may also include non-transitory memory, such as at least one disk storage device, flash memory device, or other non-transitory solid-state storage device. In some embodiments, memory may optionally include memory remotely located relative to the processor, and these remote memories can be connected to the processor via a network. Examples of such networks include, but are not limited to, the Internet, intranets, local area networks, mobile communication networks, and combinations thereof.

[0175] The nuclear power plant unit operation control method, device, electronic equipment, and storage medium provided in this application accurately acquire the operating conditions and equipment fault information of the nuclear power plant unit, and implement targeted control strategies to help the unit quickly return to normal operation. First, by acquiring the unit's operating condition information, when a faulty operating condition is confirmed, the specific fault type is further analyzed using equipment fault information and preset fault association reference information. Then, corresponding target control strategies are formulated based on different fault types. The control strategies are then executed, while dynamically responding and continuously updating equipment fault information. The strategies can be adjusted according to the fault recovery progress, avoiding unnecessary operational delays. Finally, based on changes in fault information, when the unit reaches the preset recovery conditions, it can return to normal operating conditions and operate according to normal operating procedures. This solution, through faster fault location and strategy adjustment, effectively reduces the problem of excessive retreat caused by improper handling of accident operating procedures, reduces the frequency of unit shutdown transients, and thus reduces the difficulty of restoring the unit to normal operation, thereby reducing the unit's fault operating time.

[0176] The embodiments described in this application are for the purpose of more clearly illustrating the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application, and do not constitute a limitation on the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of this application. As those skilled in the art will know, with the evolution of technology and the emergence of new application scenarios, the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of this application are also applicable to similar technical problems.

[0177] Those skilled in the art will understand that the technical solutions shown in the figures do not constitute a limitation on the embodiments of this application, and may include more or fewer steps than shown, or combine certain steps, or different steps.

[0178] The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative. The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the modules can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0179] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or some of the steps in the methods disclosed above, as well as the functional modules / units in the systems and devices, can be implemented as software, firmware, hardware, or suitable combinations thereof.

[0180] The terms “first,” “second,” “third,” “fourth,” etc. (if present) in the specification and accompanying drawings of this application are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that such data can be interchanged where appropriate so that the embodiments of this application described herein can be implemented in orders other than those illustrated or described herein. Furthermore, the terms “comprising” and “having,” and any variations thereof, are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion; for example, a process, method, system, product, or apparatus that comprises a series of steps or units is not necessarily limited to those steps or units explicitly listed, but may include other steps or units not explicitly listed or inherent to such processes, methods, products, or apparatus.

[0181] It should be understood that in this application, "at least one (item)" means one or more, and "more than" means two or more. "And / or" is used to describe the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, "A and / or B" can represent three cases: only A exists, only B exists, and both A and B exist simultaneously, where A and B can be singular or plural. The character " / " generally indicates that the preceding and following related objects are in an "or" relationship. "At least one (item) of the following" or similar expressions refer to any combination of these items, including any combination of single or plural items. For example, at least one (item) of a, b, or c can represent: a, b, c, "a and b", "a and c", "b and c", or "a and b and c", where a, b, and c can be single or multiple.

[0182] In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are merely illustrative; for instance, the division of the units described above is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be through some interfaces; the indirect coupling or communication connection between apparatuses or units may be electrical, mechanical, or other forms.

[0183] The units described above as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0184] Furthermore, the functional units in the various embodiments of this application can be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit. The integrated unit can be implemented in hardware or as a software functional unit.

[0185] If the integrated unit is implemented as a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of this application, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or all or part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes multiple instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods of the various embodiments of this application. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing programs, such as USB flash drives, portable hard drives, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0186] The preferred embodiments of the present application have been described above with reference to the accompanying drawings, but this does not limit the scope of the claims of the present application. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, and improvements made by those skilled in the art without departing from the scope and substance of the embodiments of the present application shall be within the scope of the claims of the present application.

Claims

1. A method for controlling the operation of a nuclear power plant unit, characterized in that, The method includes: Obtain the operating status information of the nuclear power plant unit; In response to the operating condition information indicating a faulty operating condition, obtain equipment fault information; The unit fault type is determined based on the equipment fault information and the preset fault association reference information; Determine the target control strategy based on the type of unit failure; Execute the target control strategy and update the equipment fault information; Based on the updated equipment fault information and the preset conditions for restoring normal operation, the nuclear power plant unit is controlled according to the preset normal operation procedure.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of determining the unit fault type based on the equipment fault information and preset fault association reference information includes: Based on the fault association reference information, the equipment fault information is analyzed for fault type to obtain fault risk analysis results; In response to the failure risk analysis results indicating that the nuclear power plant unit has at least one of the following risks: radioactive leakage risk, heat exhaust function failure risk, and circulation function failure risk, the failure type of the unit is determined as the first failure type.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The step of determining the target control strategy based on the unit fault type includes: In response to the unit fault type being the first fault type, an emergency fault operation procedure corresponding to the first fault type is determined from the preset accident operation procedures; The target control strategy is determined based on the emergency failure operation procedure and the preset nuclear reaction power threshold.

4. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The step of determining the unit fault type based on the equipment fault information and preset fault association reference information includes: In response to the fault risk analysis results indicating that the nuclear power plant unit does not have the risk of radioactive leakage, the risk of heat exhaust function failure, and the risk of circulation function failure, a stability assessment is performed on the equipment fault information based on the fault association reference information to obtain the stability assessment results. In response to the stability assessment results indicating that the nuclear power plant unit interrupts stable operation within a preset time period, or that an anomaly occurs when the nuclear power plant unit enters the withdrawal mode, the unit fault type is determined as the second fault type. or, In response to the stability assessment results indicating that the nuclear power plant unit maintains stable operation within a preset time period, or that the nuclear power plant unit normally enters the withdrawal mode, the fault type of the unit is determined to be the third fault type.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The nuclear power plant unit includes a primary cooling system, a waste heat removal system, a reactor, and control rods, the control rods being inserted into the reactor; determining the target control strategy based on the unit's fault type includes: In response to the unit fault type being the second fault type, the movement control strategy of the control rod is determined based on the preset target power and preset power threshold of the reactor. The heat dissipation start-up conditions of the waste heat removal system are determined based on the preset boric acid concentration, preset temperature data and preset pressure data of the primary cooling system. The target control strategy is determined based on the movement control strategy and the heat dissipation start-up conditions.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The execution of the target control strategy and the updating of the equipment fault information include: Obtain the initial power of the reactor; The control rod is moved according to the preset power threshold, the initial power, and the movement control strategy until the initial power reaches the preset target power; The primary cooling system is subjected to borying, cooling, and pressure reduction operations, and the equipment fault information is updated. When the current boric acid concentration, current temperature data, and current pressure data of the primary cooling system meet the heat discharge start-up conditions, the waste heat discharge system is activated.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The step of moving the control rod according to the preset power threshold, the initial power, and the movement control strategy until the initial power reaches the preset target power includes: When the initial power is greater than the preset power threshold, an automatic load reduction operation is performed until the initial power reaches the preset power threshold, and the equipment fault information is updated. When the initial power is less than or equal to the preset power threshold, the control rod is moved according to the movement control strategy until the initial power reaches the preset target power.

8. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, characterized in that, Before executing the target control strategy and updating the device fault information, the method further includes: A warning display interface is generated based on the unit fault type, the equipment fault information, and the target control strategy; In response to a confirmation operation performed by the target object on the warning display interface, the target control strategy is determined to be executed; wherein the target object is the operator of the nuclear power plant unit.

9. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, characterized in that, Before determining the unit fault type based on the equipment fault information and preset fault association reference information, the process includes: Obtain equipment functional fault information of the nuclear power plant unit; System fault risk analysis is performed on the device functional fault information to obtain subsystem-level risk information; Based on the subsystem-level risk information, a unit failure risk analysis is performed to obtain unit-level risk information; The fault association reference information is determined based on the equipment functional fault information, the subsystem-level risk information, and the unit-level risk information.

10. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, characterized in that, After obtaining the operating condition information of the nuclear power plant unit, the method further includes: If the operating condition information indicates normal operating condition, then the nuclear power plant unit is controlled according to the normal operating procedure. or, If the operating condition information indicates an accident operation condition, the nuclear power plant unit will be controlled according to the preset accident operation procedure.

11. A nuclear power plant unit operation control device, characterized in that, The device includes: The first acquisition module is used to acquire the operating condition information of the nuclear power plant unit; The second acquisition module is used to acquire equipment fault information in response to the operating condition information being a fault operating condition. The fault type determination module is used to determine the unit fault type based on the equipment fault information and preset fault association reference information; The control strategy formulation module is used to determine the target control strategy based on the unit fault type. The control strategy execution module is used to execute the target control strategy and update the equipment fault information; The normal operation recovery module is used to determine, based on the updated equipment fault information and preset normal operation recovery conditions, to control the nuclear power plant unit according to the preset normal operation procedures.

12. An electronic device, characterized in that, The electronic device includes a memory and a processor, the memory storing a computer program, and the processor executing the computer program to implement the method according to any one of claims 1 to 10.

13. A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by a processor, it implements the method of any one of claims 1 to 10.

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