Electronic signature system, device, method, and program
By decomposing isogenies into specific degree isomorphisms, the method addresses the long computation times in SQIsign2D-West and SQIsign2D-East, enabling faster signature generation without compromising verification speed.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- PCT/JP2025/016844
- Authority / Receiving Office
- WO · WO
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2025-05-08
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-12
AI Technical Summary
Existing quantum-resistant signature schemes like SQIsign2D-West and SQIsign2D-East suffer from long computation times during signature generation due to the need to calculate many two-dimensional isomorphisms.
The proposed method optimizes signature generation by decomposing the isogeny into isomorphisms of specific degrees, using an isogeny of degree d(2α-d) and an auxiliary isomorphism of degree 2α-d, reducing the number of calculations required.
This approach achieves faster signature generation while maintaining the same verification speed as existing schemes, making it more efficient for practical use.
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Figure JP2025016844_12112026_PF_FP_ABST
Abstract
Description
Electronic signature systems, devices, methods, and programs
[0001] This disclosure relates to electronic signature systems, apparatus, methods, and programs.
[0002] Cryptographic schemes considered to be quantum-resistant are called post-quantum cryptography. One known candidate for post-quantum cryptography is isomorphism cryptography. For example, SQIsign2D-West (Non-Patent Literature 1) and SQIsign2D-East (Non-Patent Literature 2) are known signature schemes that utilize high-dimensional isomorphisms, which were used in attacks on SIDH.
[0003] Andrea Basso, Pierrick Dartois, Luca De Feo, Antonin Leroux, Luciano Maino, Giacomo Pope, Damien Robert, Benjamin Wesolowski. "SQIsign2DWest:The Fast, the Small, and the Safer." ASIACRYPT 2024: International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security. pp.339-370. (2024).Kohei Nakagawa, Hiroshi Onuki, Wouter Castryck, Mingjie Chen, Riccardo Invernizzi, Gioella Lorenzon, Frederik Vercauteren. "SQIsign2DEast:A new signature scheme using 2-dimensional isogenies." ASIACRYPT2024: International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security. pp.272-303. (2024).
[0004] However, SQIsign2D-West and SQIsign2D-East have the problem of long computation time for signature generation because they require the computation of many 2D isomorphisms during signature generation.
[0005] This disclosure aims to realize efficient electronic signatures using two-dimensional isomorphisms.
[0006] An electronic signature system according to one aspect of the present disclosure includes a key generation unit that generates a secret key consisting of a first ideal corresponding to a random first isomorphism and a point image of the first isomorphism with respect to a generator of a twist subgroup of an elliptic curve, and a range of the first isomorphism as a verification key, and a key generation unit that generates an odd number d (where a is an integer, 0 < d < 2) obtained from the hash value of the first electronic document based on the secret key and the first electronic document. a ) as, 2 3b d(2 a -d) (where b: integer) A signature generator that creates a first signature which includes the following second isomorphism.
[0007] This enables the creation of efficient digital signatures using two-dimensional isomorphisms.
[0008] This figure shows an example of a commutative diagram of isomorphisms. This figure shows an example of the relationship between two isomorphisms. This figure shows an example of a partition of isomorphisms. This figure shows an example of the overall configuration of an electronic signature system according to one embodiment. This figure shows an example of the functional configuration of a signer device according to one embodiment. This figure shows an example of the functional configuration of a verifier device according to one embodiment. This is a sequence diagram showing an example of signature creation and verification processing according to one embodiment. This figure shows an example of the computer hardware configuration.
[0009] One embodiment of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the drawings.
[0010] <Conventional Technology> Electronic signatures are a technology that applies public-key cryptography and are a mechanism that guarantees the authorship of an electronic document and that an electronic document has not been tampered with. Electronic signatures include three algorithms: a key generation algorithm, a signature algorithm, and a verification algorithm. The key generation algorithm outputs two keys called a private key and a verification key. Of these, the private key is the information needed to create the signature, and the verification key is the information needed to verify the signature. Signer A creates a signature from the private key and electronic document m using the signature algorithm and sends it together with electronic document m to verifier B. Verifier B then uses the verification algorithm and the verification key to verify whether the signature is legitimate or not.
[0011] Currently, three widely used electronic signature methods include RSA, DSA, and ECDSA. However, it is known that the security of all these methods can be compromised using quantum computers, and there is an urgent need to establish quantum-resistant electronic signatures.
[0012] One known candidate for post-quantum cryptography is isogeneic cryptography. This is a general term for systems that base their security on the difficulty of a mathematical problem called the isogeneic mapping problem. Representative examples of digital signatures based on isogeneic mapping include SeaSign (Reference 1) and SQISign (Reference 2). SQISign, in particular, is attracting attention because the data sizes of the secret key, verification key, and signature are all smaller compared to other systems.
[0013] SQISign is a method that utilizes the correspondence between elliptic curves and quaternion algebras, known as the Deuring correspondence. A brief explanation of the Deuring correspondence follows. For details on the Deuring correspondence, please refer to, for example, reference 2.
[0014] The Deuring correspondence establishes a relationship between a hypersingular elliptic curve E and a maximal algebra O of a quaternion algebra isomorphic to the endohomomorphism ring End(E). That is, the Deuring correspondence establishes a relationship between a hypersingular elliptic curve E and a maximal algebra O of a quaternion algebra satisfying the following conditions:
[0015]
[0016] In addition, the Deuring correspondence maps the isogeny φ: E 1 →E 2 to O 1 , O 2 's connecting ideal I φ . Here, O 1 , O 2 are the maximal orders corresponding to E 1 , E 2 respectively, and the connecting ideal refers to an ideal that is a left ideal of O 1 and a right ideal of O 2 . Further, the norm of the ideal I φ matches the degree of the isogeny φ, that is, deg(φ) = n(I φ ). Furthermore, the dual isogeny of the isogeny φ corresponds to the conjugate of the ideal I φ . Hereinafter, the dual isogeny of a certain isogeny is represented by adding a hat symbol "^" directly above the isogeny. For example, the dual isogeny of the isogeny φ is expressed as follows.
[0017]
[0018] In addition, the conjugate of a certain ideal or its element is represented by adding a bar symbol "-" directly above the ideal or its element. For example, the conjugate of the ideal I φ is expressed as follows.
[0019]
[0020] Finally, different isogenies φ 1 : E→F and φ 2 : E→F that connect the same elliptic curves respectively correspond to ideals I 1 and I 2 that are equivalent ideals. Here, that ideals I and J are equivalent means that there exists a quaternion β such that I = Jβ, and is expressed as I ~ J. Hereinafter, an overview of SQISign will be described.
[0021] ≪Overview of SQISign≫ Let p be a huge prime number satisfying p≡3 mod 4 (for security parameter λ, p>2 2λLet p be a prime number such that . 2 The finite field of is denoted as follows.
[0022]
[0023] The above values, such as p, are called system parameters.
[0024] The key generation algorithm, signature algorithm, and verification algorithm of SQISign are shown below. While the key generation algorithm, signature algorithm, and verification algorithm also take system parameters as input, these are omitted below. The algorithm used to set the system parameters is called the setup algorithm, and is executed, for example, by a system administrator.
[0025] • Key generation algorithm: SQISign's key generation algorithm outputs a private key sk and a verification key vk according to the following steps a-1 to a-2.
[0026] Procedure a-1: Elliptic curve E 0 The following applies:
[0027]
[0028] In other words, E 0 is of order p 2 Elliptic curve y over a finite field 2 = x 3 It is +x.
[0029] Procedure a-2: Random isomorphism τ: E 0 →E A private key sk, elliptic curve E A Let vk be the verification key.
[0030] The signature algorithm of SQISign takes an electronic document m and a private key sk as input and outputs a signature sig according to the following steps b-1 to b-7.
[0031] Procedure b-1: Random isomorphism ψ: E 0 →E 1 Take it.
[0032] Procedure b-2: Hash value H(m, j(E) 1A unique isomorphism φ: E from )) 1 →E 2 We will find j(E). 1 ) is E 1 This represents the j-invariant.
[0033] Procedure b-3: Find the ideal I corresponding to the following isomorphisms.
[0034]
[0035] That is, we find the following ideal I corresponding to the above isomorphism.
[0036]
[0037] Step b-4: For a certain integer L which is a system parameter determined according to the value of the prime number p, n(α) = n(I) * 2 L We find the element α∈I that satisfies this condition using an algorithm called GeneralizedKLPT.
[0038] Step b-5: Let J be as follows. Then J ~ I and n(J) = 2 L This is the result.
[0039]
[0040] Procedure b-6: Let σ be the isomorphism corresponding to J. Then, by the Deuring correspondence, σ: E A →E 2 Therefore, deg(σ) = 2 L This is the result.
[0041] Procedure b-7: Kerσ (more precisely, the kernels of multiple isomorphisms obtained by appropriately partitioning σ) and the elliptic curve E 1 The signature will be sig.
[0042] Verification Algorithm The SQISign verification algorithm takes an electronic document m, a signature sig, and a verification key vk as input and outputs either accept or reject according to the following steps c-1 to c-2.
[0043] Procedure c-1: Hash value H(m, j(E) 1 A unique isomorphism φ: E from )) 1 →E 2 We seek.
[0044] Step c-2: Calculate σ from Kerσ using Velu's formula, and if σ is E A From E 2 This function verifies whether the mapping is of the same kind to the given target. If the verification is successful, it outputs "accept"; otherwise, it outputs "reject".
[0045] Furthermore, since 2023, several new signature schemes utilizing high-dimensional isomorphisms, as used in attacks on SIDH (References 3 and 4), have been proposed. For example, SQIsign2D-West (Non-Patent Literature 1) and SQIsign2D-East (Non-Patent Literature 2) both utilize two-dimensional isomorphisms for verification, resulting in smaller signature lengths and shorter verification times compared to SQIsign.
[0046] The following explains an important theorem concerning two-dimensional isomorphisms.
[0047] Theorem: d 1 d 2 Let D = d be relatively prime natural numbers. 1 +d 2 Let's assume that E, E 1 , E 2 Let F be an elliptic curve connected by the commutative diagram shown in Figure 1. Here, ψ 1 ψ 1 ' is d 1 -Isogeneic mapping, ψ 2 ψ 2 ' is d 2 - Let it be an isogeneic mapping. That is, ψ 1 ψ 1 ' is degree d 1 A one-dimensional isomorphism of ψ 2 ψ 2 ' is degree d 2 Let g be a one-dimensional isomorphism of . Also, let g be as follows:
[0048]
[0049] In this case, the mapping Φ shown in equation (1) below is a (D, D)-isogeneic mapping (that is, a 2-dimensional isogeneic mapping of degree (D, D)).
[0050]
[0051] Furthermore, the mapping Φ shown in equation (1) above holds as follows:
[0052]
[0053] Here, E 1 Base P of [D] 1 Q 1 In contrast, d 1 d 2 - Point image g(P) of the isomorphism g 1 ), g(Q 1 Assuming that ) is obtained, kerΦ can be obtained from it, and a (D,D)-isogeneic map Φ with such a kernel can be found. From the above theorem, the Φ obtained in this way should be of the form of equation (1), so by looking at each component, ψ 1 The dual map of or ψ 2 An isomorphism of the dual map (and therefore any point image of g) can be obtained (and thus any point image of g can also be obtained). In particular, D=2 a When that happens, that is, degψ 1 +degψ 2 = 2 a In that case, (2 a ,2 a ) - This involves calculating isogeneic maps, which are known to be efficiently computable.
[0054] <Challenges of SQIsign2D-West and SQIsign2D-East> SQIsign2D-West and SQIsign2D-East have the problem of long computation time for signature generation because they require the computation of many 2D isomorphisms during signature generation.
[0055] In order to widely adopt new digital signatures, it is important to reduce the time required for signature generation. Therefore, it is necessary to reduce the number of calculations required for the two-dimensional isomorphism and realize faster digital signatures.
[0056] <Proposed Method> <Overview> In SQIsign2D-West and SQIsign2D-East, in addition to the isogeneic map σ, degω = 2 is used as the signature. a We seek an auxiliary isomorphism ω that is -degσ, but in order to find this isomorphism ω, we need to compute the most 2D isomorphisms.
[0057] Hereinafter, a method is proposed for simultaneously obtaining the composite mapping of the isogeny σ and the isogeny ω in SQIsign2D-West and SQIsign2D-East, by finding an isogeny whose degree can be expressed in the form of d(2 using a certain integer d a −d). That is, degσ=d, degω=2 a −d. More precisely, 2 3b An isogeny of degree d(2 a −d) is used, and the details will be described later.
[0058] Thereby, the proposed method achieves faster signature generation while maintaining the same verification speed as SQIsign2D-West and SQIsign2D-East.
[0059] <<Preliminaries>> Let λ be a security parameter. At this time, let a and b be integers satisfying 2 a , 2 b >2 λ . Further, let f be a small integer, and p be a prime number expressed as p=2 a+b f−1. Furthermore, let E 0 be an elliptic curve expressed as follows, and O 0 be a maximal order corresponding to the elliptic curve E 0 .
[0060]
[0061] At this time, the maximal order O 0 is as follows.
[0062]
[0063] Also, E 0 [2 a+b =⟨P 0 , Q 0 ⟩, that is, the generators of the 2 0 -torsion subgroup of the elliptic curve E a+b are P 0 , Q 0 .
[0064] With the above preparations in place, the following section will describe an algorithm for finding isomorphisms of a specified degree, followed by a detailed explanation of the proposed method.
[0065] <<Algorithm for finding isomorphisms of a specified degree>> First, consider the relationship between the two isomorphisms shown in Figure 2. Here, degφ A = degφ B Let N be a prime number. Let d be 0 < d < 2 a Let M = 2 be an odd number. 3b d(2 a Let -d). Also, φ A 、φ B The left O corresponding to 0 - I for each ideal A , I B Let's set it far. Here, φ A (P 0 ), φ A (Q 0 ), φ B (P 0 ), φ B (Q 0 ), I A , I B Using E as input, A From E B We propose an algorithm for finding isomorphic maps ψ of degree M to .
[0066] Algorithm1:R A :=φ A (P 0 ), S A :=φ A (Q 0 ), R B :=φ B (P 0 ), S B :=φ B (Q 0 ), I A , I B As input, the M-isogeneic map ψ: E A →E B An algorithm that outputs (a certain expression of).
[0067] In Algorithm1, steps 1-1 to 1-18 are executed.
[0068] Step 1-1: IA = O 0 <α A ,N〉,I B = O 0 <α B α such that N〉 A ∈I A , α B ∈I B Take it.
[0069] Step 1-2: Find C and D such that the following conditions are met.
[0070]
[0071] Note α A The conjugate of is obtained by reversing the signs of the coefficients i, j, and k.
[0072] Steps 1-3: α ← StrongApproximation M (N, C, D) Step 1-4: Let J be the ideal corresponding to ψ as follows.
[0073]
[0074] Step 1-5: J=J 1 J 2 Divide into J'. However, n(J 1 ) = n(J 2 ) = 2 b n(J') = 2 b d(2 a -d)
[0075] Steps 1-6: α(2 a (up 0 +vQ 0 Find integers u and v such that )) = 0.
[0076] Steps 1-7: K A = 2 a (ur A +vS A Let's assume that.
[0077] Step 1-8: (E 1 , β 1 , R 1 , S 1 )←ShortIdealToIsogenyIQO(E A , I A , J 1 , RA , S A ) Steps 1-9: α 1 , N 1 , I 1 Let the following be the terms:
[0078]
[0079] Steps 1-10: α 1 (2 a (up 0 +vQ 0 Find integers u and v such that )) = 0.
[0080] Step 1-11: K 1 = 2 a (ur 1 +vS 1 Let's assume that.
[0081] Step 1-12: (E 2 , β 2 , R 2 , S 2 )←ShortIdealToIsogenyIQO(E 1 , I 1 , J 2 , R 1 , S 1 ) Steps 1-13: α 2 , N 2 , I 2 Let the following be the terms:
[0082]
[0083] Steps 1-14: α 2 (2 a (up 0 +vQ 0 Find integers u and v such that )) = 0.
[0084] Steps 1-15: K 2 = 2 a (ur 2 +vS 2 Let's assume that.
[0085] Step 1-16: E 0 [2 a+b Base P of ] 2 Q 2 Take (P 2 Q 2 ) t= X(R) 2 , S 2 ) t Find the basis transformation matrix X such that . Note that t is the symbol for transpose.
[0086] Step 1-17: (U B , V B ) t = N 2 X (R B , S B ) t Far away.
[0087] Step 1-18: (K A , K 1 , U B , V B ) Output.
[0088] In the algorithm described above, the M-isogeneic map ψ is decomposed as shown in Figure 3, and kerψ 1 ,kerψ 2 Base K A , K 1 And P due to ψ' 2 Q 2 The statue U B , V B This is what is being sought. In this case, StrongApproximatin proposed in Reference 2 and ShortIdealToIsogeneIQO proposed in Reference 5 are being used.
[0089] Furthermore, StrongApproximatin M (N, C, D) is a function where α∈O, with a prime number N, integers C and D, and a parameter M as input, and whose norm is divisible by M. 0 This is an algorithm that outputs [the output].
[0090] Furthermore, ShortIdealToIsogenenyIQO(E,I,J,R,S) is an elliptic curve E and left O 0 - Ideal I and right-hand ring O with respect to ideal I R (I) - Ideal J and R = φ(P 0 ) and S = φ(Q 0This algorithm takes ) as input and outputs an elliptic curve E' such that ψ: E → E', β ∈ IJ, and points P and Q that generate a certain skew subgroup of the elliptic curve E', where φ is an isomorphism corresponding to the ideal I, and P 0 Q 0 is a point that generates a certain skew subgroup of the elliptic curve E.
[0091] ≪Details of the Proposed Method≫ The proposed method includes the key generation algorithm KeyGen, the signature algorithm Sign, and the verification algorithm Verfy. In the following, H: {0, 1} * →[0,2 a-1 Let [-1] be the hash function. λ is a security parameter. Note that the key generation algorithm KeyGen, the signature algorithm Sign, and the verification algorithm Verify can take all or part of the system parameters as input, but the system parameters are omitted below. The algorithm used to set the system parameters is called a setup algorithm and is executed, for example, by a system administrator. System parameters include, for example, the security parameter λ, a prime number N, the hash function H, integers a and b, an integer f, a prime number p, and an elliptic curve E. 0 , maximal alkaline O 0 , 2 a+b - Twisted subgroup E 0 [2 a+b ] = <P 0 Q 0 This includes things like >.
[0092] KeyGen (1 λ ) → (sk, vk) KeyGen is 1 λ Using the input, the following steps 2-1 to 2-3 will output a key pair (sk, vk) consisting of a private key sk and a verification key vk.
[0093] Step 2-1: Random N-isomorphism φ sk : E 0 →E pk Corresponding ideal I sk We seek.
[0094] Step 2-2: R pk = φ sk(P 0 ) and S pk = φ sk (Q 0 ) and find the result.
[0095] Step 2-3: sk = (R pk , S pk , I sk ) and vk = E pk It outputs the following.
[0096] - Sign(sk,m) → sig Sign takes the private key sk and the electronic document m as input and outputs the signature sig according to steps 3-1 to 3-6 below.
[0097] Step 3-1: Random N-isomorphism φ com : E 0 →E com Corresponding ideal I com We seek.
[0098] Step 3-2: R com = φ com (P 0 ) and S com = φ com (Q 0 ) and find the result.
[0099] Step 3-3: d=2・H(m,j(E com Let )) + 1. Note that in this case, 0 < d < 2 a And d is an odd number.
[0100] Step 3-4: M = 2 3b d(2 a Let -d).
[0101] Step 3-5: (K pk , K 1 , U com , V com )←Algorithm1(R pk , S pk , R com , S com , I sk , I com ) Step 3-6: sig = (E com , K pk , K 1 , U com , V com ) Output.
[0102] Verfy(m, sig, vk) → accept / reject Verfy takes an electronic document m, a signature sig, and a verification key vk as input and outputs either accept or reject according to steps 4-1 to 4-8 below.
[0103] Step 4-1: d=2・H(m,j(E com Let it be )) + 1.
[0104] Step 4-2: <2 a U com ,2 a V com The basis of > is K com Far away.
[0105] Step 4-3: 2 b - homogeneous map φ 1 : E pk →E 1 :=E pk / 〈K pk To find out >.
[0106] Step 4-4: 2 b - homogeneous map φ 2 : E 1 →E 2 :=E 1 / 〈K 1 To find out >.
[0107] Steps 4-5: 2 b - homogeneous map φ 3 ': E com →E 3 :=E com / 〈K com > to find R 3 = φ 3 '(U com ), S 3 = φ 3 '(V com )
[0108] Step 4-6: E 2 [2 a+b Base P of ] 2 Q 2 We seek.
[0109] Step 4-7: <(d2 b P 2 , R 3 ), (d2b Q 2 , S 3 )〉⊆(E 2 ×E 3 ) [2 a ] has as its core (2 a ,2 a ) - Find the isogeneic map Φ, and find that its components are the same as the d-isogeneic map (2 a -d) - Verify whether it is constructed from isogeneic mappings. Note that, by the theorem above, (2 a ,2 a ) - The isogeneic mapping Φ is of the form of equation (1) above. Also, (2 a ,2 a ) - It is known that the isogeneic mapping Φ can be computed efficiently.
[0110] Steps 4-8: (2 a ,2 a ) - The components of the isogeneic map Φ are d - isogeneic map and (2 a -d) - Output accept if it is composed of isomorphisms, otherwise output reject.
[0111] The following describes the electronic signature system 1 that realizes signature creation and verification using the proposed method described above.
[0112] <Example of Overall Configuration of Electronic Signature System 1> Figure 4 is a diagram showing an example of the overall configuration of an electronic signature system 1 according to one embodiment. As shown in Figure 4, the electronic signature system 1 according to one embodiment includes a signer device 10 and a verifier device 20. The signer device 10 and the verifier device 20 are connected to communicate via a communication network 30, for example, the Internet.
[0113] The signer device 10 is various devices, equipment, terminals, etc. that act as signers of electronic signatures. The verifier device 20 is various devices, equipment, terminals, etc. that act as verifiers of electronic signatures.
[0114] The signer device 10 and the verifier device 20 can be implemented using various devices, equipment, terminals, etc., such as PCs (personal computers), smartphones, tablet terminals, wearable devices, general-purpose servers, IoT devices, industrial equipment, etc.
[0115] Furthermore, for example, the electronic signature system 1 may include an administrator device that acts as the system administrator executing the setup algorithm Setup.
[0116] <Example of Functional Configuration> <Signer Device 10> Figure 5 is a diagram showing an example of the functional configuration of a signer device 10 according to one embodiment. As shown in Figure 5, the signer device 10 according to one embodiment has a communication unit 101, a key generation unit 102, and a signature creation unit 103. Each of these units is realized, for example, by a process in which one or more programs installed in the signer device 10 are executed by a processor such as a CPU (Central Processing Unit). The signer device 10 according to one embodiment also has a storage unit 104. The storage unit 104 is realized, for example, by the storage area of various storage devices such as an HDD (Hard Disk Drive), SSD (Solid State Drive), or flash memory.
[0117] The communication unit 101 transmits a verification key vk to the verifier device 20, and also transmits a pair of an electronic document m and its signature sig (m, sig) to the verifier device 20.
[0118] The key generation unit 102 executes the KeyGen key generation algorithm according to the proposed method and generates a key pair (sk, vk) consisting of a secret key sk and a verification key vk.
[0119] The signature generation unit 103 executes the signature algorithm Sign related to the proposed method and generates the signature sig.
[0120] The memory unit 104 stores various types of data (for example, electronic documents m, key pairs (sk, vk), etc.).
[0121] ≪Verifier Device 20≫ Figure 6 is a diagram showing an example of the functional configuration of a verifier device 20 according to one embodiment. As shown in Figure 6, the verifier device 20 according to one embodiment has a communication unit 201 and a signature verification unit 202. Each of these units is realized, for example, by a process in which one or more programs installed on the verifier device 20 are executed by a processor such as a CPU. The verifier device 20 according to one embodiment also has a storage unit 203. The storage unit 203 is realized, for example, by the storage area of various storage devices such as HDDs, SSDs, and flash memory.
[0122] The communication unit 201 receives a verification key vk from the signer device 10, and also receives a pair of electronic document m and signature sig (m, sig) from the signer device 10.
[0123] The signature verification unit 202 executes the Verify verification algorithm related to the proposed method and outputs either accept or reject as the verification result of the signature sig.
[0124] The memory unit 203 stores various data (for example, verification key vk).
[0125] <Signature Creation and Verification Process> Figure 7 is a sequence diagram showing an example of the signature creation and verification process according to one embodiment. In the following, it is assumed that the system parameters have already been set. Steps S101 to S103 are performed in advance before signature creation and verification. On the other hand, steps S104 to S107 are performed whenever signature creation and verification are necessary.
[0126] The key generation unit 102 of the signer device 10 executes the KeyGen key generation algorithm according to the proposed method and generates a key pair (sk, vk) consisting of a private key sk and a verification key vk (step S101). That is, the key generation unit 102 outputs the private key sk and the verification key vk according to the above steps 2-2 to 2-3. The private key sk and the verification key vk are stored in the storage unit 104.
[0127] The communication unit 101 of the signer device 10 transmits the verification key vk generated in step S101 to the verifier device 20 (step S102).
[0128] The communication unit 201 of the verifier device 20 receives the verification key vk from the signer device 10 (step S103). The verification key vk is stored in the storage unit 203.
[0129] The signature creation unit 103 of the signer device 10 executes the key generation algorithm Sign according to the proposed method and creates a signature sig (step S104). That is, the signature creation unit 103 takes the private key sk and the electronic document m as input and outputs a signature sig for the electronic document m according to the above steps 3-1 to 3-6.
[0130] The communication unit 101 of the signer device 10 transmits the pair of electronic document m and signature sig (m, sig) to the verifier device 20 (step S105).
[0131] The communication unit 201 of the verifier device 20 receives (m, sig) from the signer device 10 (step S106).
[0132] The signature verification unit 202 of the verifier device 20 executes the verification algorithm Verify according to the proposed method and outputs either accept or reject as the verification result of the signature sig (step S107). That is, the signature verification unit 202 takes the electronic document m, the signature sig, and the verification key vk as input and outputs either accept or reject as the verification result of the signature according to the above steps 4-1 to 4-8.
[0133] <Hardware Configuration Example> The signer device 10 and the verifier device 20 according to one embodiment are realized by the hardware configuration of the computer 500 shown in Figure 8.
[0134] The computer 500 shown in Figure 8 includes an input device 501, a display device 502, an external interface 503, a communication interface 504, a RAM (Random Access Memory) 505, a ROM (Read Only Memory) 506, an auxiliary storage device 507, and a processor 508. Each of these hardware components is connected to the others via a bus 509 for communication.
[0135] The input device 501 is, for example, a keyboard, mouse, touch panel, physical buttons, etc. The display device 502 is, for example, a display, display panel, etc. Note that the computer 500 does not necessarily have to have at least one of the input device 501 and the display device 502.
[0136] The external I / F 503 is an interface with external devices such as the recording medium 503a. Examples of the recording medium 503a include CD (Compact Disc), DVD (Digital Versatile Disk), SD memory card (Secure Digital memory card), and USB (Universal Serial Bus) memory card.
[0137] The communication interface 504 is an interface for connecting to a communication network. The RAM 505 is a volatile semiconductor memory (storage device) that temporarily holds programs and data. The ROM 506 is a non-volatile semiconductor memory (storage device) that can retain programs and data even when the power is turned off. The auxiliary storage device 507 is a non-volatile storage device such as an HDD, SSD, or flash memory. The processor 508 is a type of arithmetic unit such as a CPU.
[0138] Note that the hardware configuration shown in Figure 8 is just one example, and the hardware configuration of computer 500 is not limited to this. For example, computer 500 may have multiple auxiliary storage devices 507 and multiple processors 508, it may not have some of the hardware shown, or it may have various other hardware components besides the hardware shown.
[0139] <Summary> As described above, the electronic signature system 1 according to one embodiment can achieve faster electronic signature generation while maintaining the same verification speed as the conventional technologies SQIsign2D-West and SQIsign2D-East.
[0140] <Supplement> The functions of the elements disclosed herein may be implemented using circuits or processing circuits that include general-purpose processors, special-purpose processors, integrated circuits, ASICs (Application Specific Integrated Circuits), FPGAs (Field Programmable Gate Arrays), conventional circuits, and / or combinations thereof that are programmed using one or more programs stored in one or more memories, or otherwise configured to perform the disclosed functions. A processor is considered a circuit or processing circuit because it includes transistors and other circuits. A processor may be a programmed processor that executes programs stored in memory. In this disclosure, a circuit, unit, or means is hardware that performs the enumerated functions, or hardware programmed to perform the enumerated functions. Hardware may be any hardware disclosed herein that is programmed or configured to perform the enumerated functions.
[0141] There is a memory for storing a computer program that includes computer instructions. These computer instructions provide logic and routines that enable hardware (e.g., circuits or processing circuits) to perform the methods disclosed herein. This computer program can be implemented in commonly known forms as a computer-readable storage medium, a computer program product, a memory device, a recording medium such as a CD-ROM or DVD, and / or memory of an FPGA or ASIC.
[0142] The following additional information is disclosed regarding the embodiments described above.
[0143] (Note 1) The system includes a memory and at least one processor connected to the memory, the processor generating a first ideal corresponding to a random first isomorphism and a point image of the first isomorphism for a generator of a twist subgroup of an elliptic curve as a secret key and the range of the first isomorphism as a verification key, and based on the secret key and the first electronic document, an odd number d obtained from the hash value of the first electronic document (where a: integer, 0 < d < 2 a ) as, 2 3b d(2 a -d) (where b: integer) An electronic signature system that creates a first signature which includes the following second isomorphism. (Note 2) The processor, based on the second electronic document, the verification key, and the second signature, takes an odd number obtained from the hash value of the second electronic document as d, (2 a ,2 a ) The components of the third isogeneic map in the following 2D are the same as the isogeneic map of degree d and (2 a -d) The electronic signature system according to Appendix 1, which verifies whether it consists of the following isomorphisms. (Appendix 3) The electronic signature system according to Appendix 1 or 2, wherein the processor uses the point image of the first isomorphism, the point image of a random fourth isomorphism with respect to the generator, the first ideal, and the second ideal corresponding to the fourth isomorphism to find the second isomorphism from the range of the first isomorphism to the range of the fourth isomorphism, and creates the first signature which includes the second isomorphism. (Appendix 4) The electronic signature system according to Appendix 3, wherein the processor creates the first signature which includes the range of the second isomorphism and the second isomorphism. (Note 5) The system includes a memory and at least one processor connected to the memory, the processor generating a first ideal corresponding to a random first isomorphism and a point image of the first isomorphism with respect to a generator of a twist subgroup of an elliptic curve as secret keys and the range of the first isomorphism as verification keys, and based on the secret key and the first electronic document, an odd number d obtained from the hash value of the first electronic document (where a: integer, 0 < d < 2 a ) as, 2 3b d(2a -d) (where b: integer) A device for creating a first signature which includes the following second isomorphism: (Note 6) A device including memory and at least one processor connected to the memory, wherein the processor determines an odd number obtained from the hash value of the electronic document based on the electronic document, a verification key and the signature, d (where a: integer, 0 < d < 2 a ) as, (2 a ,2 a ) The components of the following 2D isomorphisms are the same as the d-degree isomorphism (2 a -d) A device for verifying whether a map consists of the following isomorphisms. (Note 7) A non-temporary storage medium storing a program capable of performing electronic signature processing by a computer, wherein the electronic signature processing generates a first ideal corresponding to a random first isomorphism and a point image of the first isomorphism with respect to a generator of a twist subgroup of an elliptic curve as a secret key, and the range of the first isomorphism as a verification key, and based on the secret key and the first electronic document, an odd number obtained from the hash value of the first electronic document is d (where a: integer, 0 < d < 2 a ) as, 2 3b d(2 a -d) (where b: integer) A non-temporary storage medium that creates a first signature containing the following second isomorphism.
[0144] The present invention is not limited to the embodiments specifically disclosed above, and various modifications, changes, and combinations with known technologies are possible without departing from the spirit of the claims.
[0145] [References] Reference 1: Luca De Feo and Steven D. Galbraith. "SeaSign: compact isogeny signatures from class group actions." EUROCRYPT 2019: Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, pp.759-789. (2019). Reference 2: Luca De Feo, David Kohel, Antonin Leroux, Christophe Petit, Benjamin Wesolowski. "SQISign: compact post-quantum signatures from quaternions and isogenies." ASIACRYPT 2020: International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, pp.64-93. (2020). Reference 3: Wouter Castryck and Thomas Decru. "An efficient key recovery attack on SIDH." EUROCRYPT 2023: Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, pp.423-447. (2023). Reference 4: Damien Robert. "Breaking SIDH in polynomial time." EUROCRYPT 2023: Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, pp.472-503. (2023). Reference 5: Kohei Nakagawa and Hiroshi Onuki."Ideal-to-isogeny algorithm using 2-dimensional isogenies and its application to SQIsign". ASIACRYPT 2024: International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security. pp.243-271. (2024).
[0146] 1 Electronic Signature System 10 Signer Device 20 Verifier Device 30 Communication Network 101 Communication Unit 102 System Parameter Setting Unit 103 Key Generation Unit 104 Signature Creation Unit 105 Storage Unit 201 Communication Unit 202 Signature Verification Unit 203 Storage Unit 500 Computer 501 Input Device 502 Display Device 503 External I / F 503a Recording Medium 504 Communication I / F 505 RAM 506 ROM 507 Auxiliary Storage Device 508 Processor 509 Bus
Claims
1. A key generation unit that generates a first ideal corresponding to a random first isomorphism and the point image of the first isomorphism with respect to the generator of the twist subgroup of the elliptic curve as the secret key, and the range of the first isomorphism as the verification key. Based on the secret key and the first electronic document, a key generation unit generates an odd number d obtained from the hash value of the first electronic document (where a is an integer, 0 < d < 2 a ) as, 2 3b d(2 a An electronic signature system having: a signature creation unit that creates a first signature containing the following second isomorphism (-d) (where b: integer); 2. Based on the second electronic document, the verification key, and the second signature, let d be an odd number obtained from the hash value of the second electronic document, (2 a ,2 a ) The components of the following 2D third isomorphism are the same as the d-th isomorphism (2 a -d) The electronic signature system according to claim 1, further comprising a verification unit for verifying whether or not it is composed of the following isomorphisms.
3. The electronic signature system according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the signature creation unit uses the point image of the first isomorphism, the point image of a random fourth isomorphism with respect to the generator, the first ideal, and the second ideal corresponding to the fourth isomorphism to find the second isomorphism from the range of the first isomorphism to the range of the fourth isomorphism, and creates the first signature which includes the second isomorphism.
4. The electronic signature system according to claim 3, wherein the signature creation unit creates the range of the second isomorphism and the first signature which includes the second isomorphism.
5. A key generation unit configured to generate, as a secret key, a first ideal corresponding to a random first isogeny and a point image of the first isogeny with respect to a generator of a torsion subgroup of an elliptic curve, and generate a codomain of the first isogeny as a verification key; and a signature generation unit configured to create a first signature including a second isogeny of degree 2 a ), where d is an odd number determined from a hash value of a first electronic document based on the secret key and the first electronic document (provided that a is an integer, 0 < d < 2 3b d(2 a -d) (provided that b is an integer), the apparatus comprising:
6. Based on the electronic document, the verification key, and the signature, an odd number d is obtained from the hash value of the electronic document (where a is an integer, 0 < d < 2 a ) as, (2 a ,2 a ) The components of the following 2D isomorphisms are the same as the d-degree isomorphism (2 a -d) A device having a verification unit that verifies whether or not it is composed of the following isomorphisms.
7. A key generation procedure for generating a first ideal corresponding to a random first isomorphism and the point image of the first isomorphism with respect to the generators of the twist subgroup of the elliptic curve as the secret key, and the range of the first isomorphism as the verification key; and generating an odd number d (where a is an integer, 0 < d < 2) obtained from the hash value of the first electronic document based on the secret key and the first electronic document. a ) as, 2 3b d(2 a -d) (where b: integer) A signature creation procedure to create a first signature that contains the following second isomorphism, and a method by which a computer can perform this.
8. A key generation procedure for generating a first ideal corresponding to a random first isomorphism and the point image of the first isomorphism with respect to the generators of the twist subgroup of the elliptic curve as the secret key, and the range of the first isomorphism as the verification key; and generating an odd number d (where a is an integer, 0 < d < 2) obtained from the hash value of the first electronic document based on the secret key and the first electronic document. a ) as, 2 3b d(2 a -d) (where b: integer) A signature creation procedure for creating a first signature that contains the following second isomorphism, and a program that causes a computer to execute this procedure.
