Vehicle-mounted network security authentication method and system

Abstract

The application provides a vehicle-mounted network security authentication method and system, comprising: in response to a user's OTA upgrade operation, sending an upgrade request for a vehicle end to a cloud; receiving a quantum key generated by the cloud in response to the upgrade request based on a quantum communication channel; collecting real-time palmprint information of the user, and generating a dynamic key based on dynamic characteristics of the real-time palmprint information; combining the dynamic key with the quantum key and generating a fused quantum key, encrypting and digitally signing an upgrade data packet based on the fused quantum key, and sending the encrypted upgrade data packet to the cloud for verification of the digital signature; in response to an authorization instruction sent from the cloud that the digital signature verification is passed, decrypting the upgrade data packet based on the quantum key and the dynamic key, and performing the OTA upgrade operation. The non-reproducibility of the fused quantum key and the uniqueness of the dynamic key eliminate the possibility of key cracking, and improve the security of vehicle-mounted software during the OTA upgrade process.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to a vehicle network security authentication method and system. Background Technology

[0002] Vehicle software systems and applications are being updated and iterated at an increasingly rapid pace, and user demands are constantly increasing. Software systems need to be upgraded and maintained regularly to increase functional compatibility with different devices and software and to resolve other fault issues.

[0003] In existing technologies, OTA (Over-the-Air) technology is commonly used to allow cars to undergo online upgrades without visiting the manufacturer, enabling them to enjoy manufacturer-driven upgrade packages and improve the driving experience. OTA technology enables remote management of mobile terminal devices and SIM card data through the air interface of mobile communication. However, OTA has also become a prime target for hackers, leading to attacks such as eavesdropping, malicious upgrades, rollback attacks, and DDoS attacks, posing multi-dimensional security challenges to vehicle OTA upgrades.

[0004] Current OTA authentication methods involve a server sending digitally signed data packets, which the vehicle then decrypts and verifies using a pre-set fixed key to complete authentication and software upgrade authentication. Because the vehicle system requires a pre-set fixed key, which is highly vulnerable to theft, secure storage measures are necessary (e.g., storing it in a secure area of ​​the system or in a secure chip). However, since the key remains fixed, it can still be leaked during transmission and use due to lax security controls, posing a significant security risk. Summary of the Invention

[0005] In view of this, the purpose of this invention is to provide a vehicle network security authentication method and system, which solves the problem that in the prior art, during the OTA upgrade authentication process, the key is leaked due to lax security control during transmission and use, posing a significant security risk.

[0006] Firstly, this application provides a vehicle-mounted network security authentication method for use on a vehicle-side device, the method comprising:

[0007] In response to the user's OTA upgrade operation, an upgrade request for the vehicle is sent to the cloud and a quantum communication channel is established with the cloud.

[0008] Receive a quantum key generated by the cloud in response to the upgrade request via the quantum communication channel;

[0009] Collect the user's real-time palmprint information and generate a dynamic key based on the dynamic features of the real-time palmprint information; the dynamic key is only used in the current session of the upgrade request;

[0010] The dynamic key is combined with the quantum key to generate a fused quantum key. The upgrade data packet is encrypted and digitally signed based on the fused quantum key, and the encrypted upgrade data packet is sent to the cloud for verification of the digital signature.

[0011] In response to the authorization instruction sent from the cloud confirming the digital signature verification, the upgrade data packet is decrypted based on the quantum key and the dynamic key, and an OTA upgrade operation is performed.

[0012] In one embodiment, the generation of a dynamic key based on the dynamic features of the real-time palmprint information specifically includes:

[0013] The real-time palmprint information is processed using the SM3 hash algorithm to generate a hash value for the first digit.

[0014] The first two digits of the hash value are taken as the SM4 symmetric key, and the dynamic key is generated based on the SM4 symmetric key; the second digit is half of the first digit.

[0015] In one embodiment, the step of processing real-time palmprint information using the SM3 hash algorithm to generate a hash value for the first digit specifically includes:

[0016] The total length of the real-time palmprint information is filled to M×N bits to obtain filled palmprint data; the value of M is twice the value of the first number of bits; and N is a positive integer.

[0017] The filled palm print data is divided into N M-bit message blocks;

[0018] Initialize the intermediate hash value by taking the message block as input and iteratively updating the intermediate hash value according to a preset compression function;

[0019] When the iteration is complete, the intermediate hash value of the final iteration is concatenated to form the hash value of the first bit.

[0020] In one embodiment, the step of combining the dynamic key with the quantum key to generate a fused quantum key, and encrypting and digitally signing the upgrade data packet based on the fused quantum key, specifically includes:

[0021] The dynamic key is combined with the quantum key based on the key derivation function to generate a fused quantum key with a third bit; the value of the third bit is equal to that of the first bit.

[0022] The fused quantum key is split into a fourth-digit encryption key and a fifth-digit signature key, the sum of the values ​​of the fourth and fifth digits being equal to the third digit;

[0023] The upgrade data packet is encrypted using the encryption key, and the upgrade data packet is digitally signed using the signing key.

[0024] In one embodiment, after performing the OTA upgrade operation, the method further includes:

[0025] Once the OTA upgrade operation is completed, the quantum key, the dynamic key, and the fused quantum key are destroyed.

[0026] Secondly, this application provides a vehicle network security authentication method for use in the cloud, the method comprising:

[0027] Receive upgrade requests from the vehicle and establish a quantum communication channel with the vehicle;

[0028] In response to the upgrade request, a quantum key is generated and distributed to the vehicle terminal via the quantum communication channel;

[0029] The system receives upgrade data packets sent by the vehicle and verifies the digital signature of the upgrade data packets based on a fused quantum key and a pre-stored biometric template. The fused quantum key is a combination of the quantum key and a dynamic key. The dynamic key is generated based on the dynamic features of the user's real-time palmprint information and is only used in the current session of the upgrade request. The upgrade data packets are encrypted with the fused quantum key and digitally signed.

[0030] If the digital signature is verified, an authorization instruction is sent to the vehicle terminal; the authorization instruction allows the vehicle terminal to decrypt the upgrade data packet and perform OTA upgrade operations based on the quantum key and the dynamic key.

[0031] In one embodiment, before establishing a quantum communication channel with the vehicle end, the method further includes:

[0032] Obtain the vehicle identification information corresponding to the vehicle terminal, and perform vehicle identity authentication on the vehicle terminal based on the identification information;

[0033] When the vehicle terminal fails to authenticate its vehicle identity, the establishment of a quantum communication channel with the vehicle terminal is cancelled.

[0034] In one embodiment, after verifying the digital signature of the upgrade data packet based on the fused quantum key and a pre-stored biometric template, the method further includes:

[0035] The timestamp and random number factor of the upgrade data packet are validated for validity.

[0036] If the upgrade data packet fails the validity verification, the authorization command sent to the vehicle will be cancelled.

[0037] Thirdly, this application provides an in-vehicle network security authentication system, including a processor and a memory; wherein the memory stores a computer program, the computer program being loaded by the processor and executed as described in any one of the first aspects and / or as described in any one of the second aspects of the in-vehicle network security authentication method.

[0038] Fourthly, this application provides a computer-readable storage medium storing instructions for being loaded by a processor and executing the vehicle network security authentication method as described in any one of the first aspects and / or any one of the second aspects.

[0039] In the vehicle network security authentication method and system of this embodiment, quantum key distribution technology is used to generate an uncopyable quantum key, which is combined with a unique dynamic key generated from a palm print to generate a fused quantum key. Based on the uncopyability of the fused quantum key and the uniqueness of the dynamic key, the possibility of the key being cracked is fundamentally eliminated, improving the security of vehicle software during OTA upgrades. Furthermore, by binding the OTA upgrade operation to the user's dynamic palm print information through the fused quantum key, unauthorized personnel are prevented from remotely controlling the vehicle upgrade process, ensuring the security of vehicle and user data and effectively resisting common network attack methods such as replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks. Attached Figure Description

[0040] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the accompanying drawings used in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. It should be understood that the following drawings only show some embodiments of the present invention and should not be regarded as a limitation on the scope. For those skilled in the art, other related drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0041] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the in-vehicle network security authentication method provided in the first embodiment of this application.

[0042] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating the vehicle network security authentication method provided in the second embodiment of this application.

[0043] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in one embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0044] The specific embodiments of the present invention will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are merely some, not all, of the embodiments of the present invention. Based on the description of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without inventive effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0045] In the description of this invention, unless otherwise explicitly specified and limited, the terms "set," "install," "connect," etc., should be interpreted broadly. For example, they can refer to a fixed connection, a detachable connection, or an integral connection; they can refer to a mechanical connection or an electrical connection; they can refer to a direct connection or an indirect connection through an intermediate medium. Those skilled in the art can understand the specific meaning of the above terms according to the specific circumstances.

[0046] The terms “upper,” “lower,” “left,” “right,” “front,” “back,” “top,” “bottom,” “inner,” and “outer,” etc., indicate the orientation or positional relationship based on the orientation or positional relationship shown in the accompanying drawings, or the orientation or positional relationship commonly used when the product of the invention is in use. They are only for the convenience of description and simplification, and do not indicate or imply that the device or element referred to must have a specific orientation, or be constructed and operated in a specific orientation. Therefore, they should not be construed as limitations on the present invention.

[0047] The terms “first,” “second,” “third,” etc., are used merely to distinguish elements with similar properties, not to indicate or imply relative importance or a specific order.

[0048] The terms “include,” “comprising,” or any other variation thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, which includes not only the elements listed but also other elements not expressly listed.

[0049] First Embodiment

[0050] like Figure 1 As shown, this embodiment provides a vehicle network security authentication method for use on a vehicle-side device. The method includes:

[0051] Step S10: In response to the user's OTA upgrade operation, send an upgrade request for the vehicle to the cloud and establish a quantum communication channel with the cloud;

[0052] Step S20: Receive the quantum key generated by the cloud in response to the upgrade request via the quantum communication channel;

[0053] Step S30: Collect the user's real-time palmprint information and generate a dynamic key based on the dynamic features of the real-time palmprint information; the dynamic key is only used in the current session of the upgrade request;

[0054] Step S40: Combine the dynamic key with the quantum key to generate a fused quantum key, encrypt and digitally sign the upgrade data packet based on the fused quantum key, and send the encrypted upgrade data packet to the cloud for verification of the digital signature;

[0055] Step S50: In response to the authorization instruction sent from the cloud indicating that the digital signature verification has passed, the upgrade data packet is decrypted based on the quantum key and the dynamic key, and an OTA upgrade operation is performed.

[0056] In the vehicle network security authentication method of this embodiment, a non-replicable quantum key is generated using quantum key distribution technology. This is combined with a unique dynamic key generated from a palm print to generate a fused quantum key. Based on the non-replicability of the fused quantum key and the uniqueness of the dynamic key, the possibility of the key being cracked is fundamentally eliminated, improving the security of vehicle software during OTA upgrades. Furthermore, by binding the OTA upgrade operation to the user's dynamic palm print information through the fused quantum key, unauthorized personnel are prevented from remotely controlling the vehicle upgrade process, ensuring the security of vehicle and user data and effectively resisting common network attack methods such as replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks.

[0057] Step S10: In response to the user's OTA upgrade operation, send an upgrade request for the vehicle to the cloud and establish a quantum communication channel with the cloud.

[0058] Users can complete OTA (Over-The-Air) upgrades via the vehicle's central control screen, a mobile app, or physical buttons. The system software can send an authentication request to the central control screen or mobile app. Only after verifying the user's identity as the vehicle owner through biometrics such as palm print, facial recognition, or iris scans will the system software respond to the user's OTA upgrade request and update the software, ensuring the security and legality of the OTA upgrade operation. If the user fails authentication, the system software will not respond to the user's OTA upgrade request.

[0059] The upgrade request includes vehicle identification information (such as Vehicle Identification Number, security chip ID), the current software version, hardware configuration information, and other information, configured into an upgrade data packet. This upgrade data packet can be sent to the cloud via a quantum channel to request the new firmware version of the software, thus completing the upgrade request.

[0060] Quantum communication channels are secure communication links established based on quantum key distribution (QKD) technology. They utilize the quantum properties of photons to generate and distribute keys, ensuring unconditional security. By deploying quantum transmitters in the cloud and installing quantum receivers in vehicles, a quantum communication channel is established using QKD technology, leveraging the quantum properties of photons for key generation and distribution. Vehicles can send OTA (Over-The-Air) upgrade requests to the cloud via a 5G network, along with the vehicle's unique quantum chip identifier. After verifying the vehicle's identity using the unique quantum chip identifier, the cloud can establish a quantum communication channel with the vehicle.

[0061] By establishing a quantum communication channel, physical layer security can be provided for quantum keys, resisting quantum computing attacks. Furthermore, quantum communication channels are naturally immune to environmental noise, have a low error rate, and possess high resistance to external signals, ensuring the safe and stable execution of OTA (Over-The-Air) upgrades.

[0062] Step S20: Receive the quantum key generated by the cloud in response to the upgrade request based on the quantum communication channel.

[0063] The cloud receives upgrade requests from the vehicle, verifies the vehicle's identity, and then responds to the upgrade request by generating a quantum key K. Q The key is then sent to the vehicle via a quantum communication channel.

[0064] Quantum keys are session keys generated through quantum communication channels, possessing a one-time pad property, and are generated from quantum random numbers. Quantum keys are tamper-proof and unforgeable; any third-party eavesdropping will interfere with the quantum state and be detected by both communicating parties. Furthermore, the quantum state cannot be precisely copied, ensuring that the key is only legitimately held by the vehicle and the cloud. As long as key generation and use adhere to the principles of information theory, theoretically absolute security can be guaranteed.

[0065] Step S30: Collect the user's real-time palmprint information and generate a dynamic key based on the dynamic features of the real-time palmprint information; the dynamic key is only used in the current session of the upgrade request.

[0066] The vehicle's central control screen is equipped with an in-vehicle palmprint module, which can collect the user's real-time palmprint information. The real-time palmprint information includes static geometric features such as line breakpoints and bifurcation points, as well as dynamic features such as pressure distribution, temperature field changes, and contact time series. Based on the dynamic features of the real-time palmprint information, a dynamic key is generated.

[0067] Dynamic features refer to the biometric characteristics of palm prints that change over time during pressure application, including pressure temporal characteristics, temperature field distribution, and palm print deformation characteristics. Pressure temporal characteristics refer to the curve showing the pressure value gradually increasing from 0 to 5 N within 0.5 seconds from initial contact to full pressure application; temperature field distribution refers to the gradient distribution of palm temperature between the palm and its edges; and palm print deformation characteristics refer to the elastic deformation coefficient of the palm print lines during pressure application. It is understandable that the acquisition duration and pressure change threshold for pressure temporal characteristics can be adaptively adjusted according to requirements.

[0068] The vehicle-mounted palmprint module integrates a pressure sensor array, an infrared temperature sensor, and a capacitive palmprint detector. The pressure sensor array collects the pressure value when the user presses the screen in real time and records the duration of pressure contact between the palmprint and the sensor array. The pressure timing characteristics can be obtained based on the pressure duration and pressure value. The infrared sensor acquires the temperature field distribution of the palmprint area in real time. The capacitive palmprint detector accurately obtains the palmprint's geometric information by sensing the capacitance changes formed between the palmprint and the detector surface. Since different palmprint patterns cause different capacitance changes when in contact with the detector, the palmprint deformation characteristics can be extracted by analyzing and processing these capacitance changes.

[0069] The dynamic key is a one-time session key generated based on real-time palmprint dynamic features. It is 256 bits long and is only valid in the current OTA upgrade session. Each time the user presses the key, different keys can be generated due to changes in the duration of the press, the location of the press, and the temperature of the palm. The generation process is unpredictable and unreproducible.

[0070] To effectively prevent the risk of biometric data leakage, this embodiment uses a combination of SM3 hashing and SM4 encryption to convert the dynamic features of palm prints into a high-strength symmetric key.

[0071] Furthermore, the dynamic key generation based on the dynamic features of the real-time palmprint information specifically includes: processing the real-time palmprint information using the SM3 hash algorithm to generate a hash value for the first digit; taking the first two digits of the hash value as an SM4 symmetric key, and generating the dynamic key based on the SM4 symmetric key; the second digit is half of the first digit.

[0072] The SM3 hash algorithm is a cryptographic hash algorithm released by the State Cryptography Administration of China. It can output a 32-byte (256-bit) hash value based on real-time palmprint information. That is, the first digit is 256 and the second digit is 128. It is understandable that the values ​​of the first and second digits can be adaptively adjusted according to industry standards.

[0073] Before processing real-time palmprint information using the SM3 hash algorithm, the pressure time series features, temperature field distribution, and palmprint deformation features need to be encoded into a unified byte stream. Then, the data from the unified byte stream are fused to obtain the processed real-time palmprint information.

[0074] The process of using the SM3 hash algorithm to process real-time palmprint information and generate a hash value for the first digit specifically includes: filling the total length of the real-time palmprint information to M×N bits to obtain filled palmprint data; the value of M is twice the value of the first digit; the value of N is a positive integer; dividing the filled palmprint data into N M-bit message blocks; initializing intermediate hash values, using the message blocks as input, and iteratively updating the intermediate hash values ​​according to a preset compression function; when the iteration is complete, taking the final iteration of the intermediate hash values ​​and concatenating them to form the hash value of the first digit.

[0075] Because the length of the real-time palmprint information collected each time varies, to ensure the consistency and compatibility of the hash results, the real-time palmprint information needs to be padded. This process converts real-time palmprint information of any length into a standard block size, thereby avoiding boundary vulnerabilities. For example, if the original length of the real-time palmprint information is L bits, it needs to be padded with one 1 bit and k 0 bits, making the total number of bits after padding 512 (M = 512). The padded palmprint data with a total length of 512 × N bits is obtained by representing it using 64-bit binary. Then, the padded data is divided into n 64-byte (512-bit) message blocks M1, M2, ..., M n Initialize the intermediate hash value V0 for each message block M. i The compression function performs 64 iterations, updating the intermediate hash value in each round and taking the last intermediate hash value V. n The concatenation of these 32 bytes yields the final 256-bit SM3 hash value. The expression for the compression function is:

[0076] V i =CF(V i-1 M i )

[0077] Among them, V i V is the intermediate hash value of the i-th iteration. i-1 V is the intermediate hash value of the (i-1)th iteration. When i = 1, V i-1 =V0, CF represents the compression function, M i This represents the i-th message block.

[0078] The second-to-first digit of the hash value is used as the SM4 symmetric key. For example, the SM3 algorithm is used to hash the preprocessed feature data, generating a 256-bit hash value H, which is a 32-byte array: [h0, h1, ..., h 31Then, the first 128 bits (16 bytes) of the hash value are taken as the SM4 symmetric key: K SM4 =[h0,h1,…,h 15 ], Dynamic key K SM4 Directly used as dynamic key K B Used for encryption.

[0079] The hash value obtained using the SM3 hash algorithm provides 256 bits of collision resistance, with a collision probability of approximately 2. -128 It offers high security and ensures the integrity of feature data. By truncating 128 bits as the SM4 key, it conforms to the national standard algorithm.

[0080] Step S40: Combine the dynamic key with the quantum key to generate a fused quantum key, encrypt and digitally sign the upgrade data packet based on the fused quantum key, and send the encrypted upgrade data packet to the cloud for verification of the digital signature.

[0081] The fusion of quantum keys has the characteristics of dynamic keys that cannot be copied and quantum keys that are unpredictable. Attackers cannot forge new session data by intercepting old keys, which fundamentally eliminates the possibility of keys being cracked and improves the security of in-vehicle software during OTA upgrades.

[0082] When encrypting and digitally signing upgrade data packets, encryption and signing use separate encryption and signing keys. The leakage of encryption keys does not affect the validity of the signature, and the leakage of signing keys does not jeopardize data confidentiality. This disperses the risk and strongly guarantees the security of in-vehicle software during OTA upgrades.

[0083] Furthermore, the step of combining the dynamic key with the quantum key to generate a fused quantum key, and encrypting and digitally signing the upgrade data packet based on the fused quantum key, specifically includes: combining the dynamic key with the quantum key based on a key derivation function to generate a third-digit fused quantum key; the value of the third digit is equal to the value of the first digit; splitting the fused quantum key into a fourth-digit encryption key and a fifth-digit signature key, the sum of the values ​​of the fourth digit and the fifth digit being equal to the third digit; encrypting the upgrade data packet based on the encryption key, and digitally signing the upgrade data packet based on the signature key.

[0084] The key derivation function is an algorithm used to mix dynamic keys and quantum keys to generate high-strength fused quantum keys. This embodiment uses the HMAC-SM3 algorithm. The specific expression of the key derivation function is as follows:

[0085] Where K FusionFor fusion of quantum keys; HMAC-SM3 indicates the HMAC-SM3 algorithm; K Q For quantum keys; K B Y is the dynamic key; Y is the salt value, determined by the hash value of the vehicle's VIN. This represents the XOR operation, ensuring that dynamic keys and quantum keys contribute equally and avoiding the dominance of a single key.

[0086] A 256-bit (third bit) fused quantum key K can be generated using the HMAC-SM3 algorithm. Fusion Then, the first 128 bits (the fourth bit) of the fused quantum key are taken as the encryption key, and the last 128 bits (the fifth bit) of the fused quantum key are taken as the signature key.

[0087] When encrypting upgrade data packets, CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode is used to encrypt the packets using an encryption key, with an initial intermediate hash value V0 appended to ensure that the same plaintext generates different ciphertexts. In CBC mode, each plaintext block is XORed with the previous ciphertext block before encryption, and the first plaintext block is XORed with an initial intermediate hash value. This process makes each ciphertext block dependent not only on the current plaintext block but also on previous plaintext blocks, increasing the difficulty of cryptanalysis.

[0088] When signing the upgrade data packet, a signature key is used as the private key, and the signature function in the SM2 algorithm is used to generate a digital signature conforming to the SM2 standard format. This digital signature can be used to verify the integrity of the data and the authenticity of its origin. In subsequent verification, the cloud uses the public key corresponding to this private key, combined with the received data and the signature, to verify the validity of the digital signature. If the verification passes, it indicates that the data has not been tampered with during transmission and indeed originated from the vehicle holding the corresponding private key.

[0089] The HMAC-SM3 algorithm is used to mix the two to generate a 256-bit fused quantum key. Its total entropy is close to the theoretical upper limit of 256 bits, theoretically capable of withstanding brute-force attacks requiring 2256 operations and quantum attacks requiring 2128 operations. When encrypting upgrade data packets, the encryption key and signature key are generated independently. Even if one key is leaked, the other remains secure. Leakage of the encryption key does not affect the validity of the signature, and leakage of the signature key does not compromise data confidentiality, ensuring the security of the vehicle software during OTA upgrades.

[0090] Furthermore, the signal transmission delay between different ECUs (Electronic Control Units) on the CAN / LIN bus is affected by physical parameters such as wiring harness length and connector impedance, and exhibits slight dynamic fluctuations with vehicle vibration and temperature changes. In response to a user's OTA upgrade, a topology delay measurement session can be initiated. The main controller sends synchronization pulses to each ECU, records the time difference of the returned responses, and generates a topology delay fingerprint K. T Based on the key derivation function, the dynamic key K is... B Quantum key K Q and topological delay fingerprint K T Combine and generate the fused quantum key K Fusion At this point, the specific expression for the key derivation function is: By leveraging the inherent physical characteristics of vehicle hardware to generate dynamic topology delay fingerprints, ECU spoofing attacks can be resisted. Furthermore, as wiring harnesses age and other factors are used, the topology delay can slowly change with the vehicle's usage cycle and automatically trigger a key update mechanism, thus adapting to long-term security requirements.

[0091] When generating the topological delay fingerprint, the topological delay between each pair of ECUs is collected to form a delay matrix. Then, the mean of the delay matrix is ​​used as the initial value (x0, y0). The initial value is input into a chaotic mapping function and iterated 16 times to generate a 256-bit chaotic sequence. The chaotic sequence is then binary-encoded to obtain the topological delay fingerprint. The expression for the chaotic mapping function is as follows:

[0092]

[0093] Among them, (x n+1 y n+1 ) represents the chaotic sequence value of the (n+1)th iteration, (x) n y n Let be the chaotic sequence value of the nth iteration, and let a and b be the sequence parameters, where a = 1.4 and b = 0.3.

[0094] Step S50: In response to the authorization instruction sent from the cloud indicating that the digital signature verification has passed, the upgrade data packet is decrypted based on the quantum key and the dynamic key, and an OTA upgrade operation is performed.

[0095] After receiving the encrypted and signed upgrade data packet, the cloud also decrypts the upgrade data packet using CBC mode and verifies the digital signature using the SM2 algorithm. Upon successful verification, it sends an authorization command to the vehicle, allowing the vehicle to decrypt the upgrade data packet and perform an OTA upgrade of the in-vehicle software.

[0096] To prevent the authorization command from being altered, the vehicle verifies the digital signature of the authorization command using the cloud public key pre-stored in the vehicle's security chip after receiving it, ensuring that the authorization command has not been tampered with and originates from a legitimate cloud source. Furthermore, to ensure the command matches the current upgrade session, the vehicle also verifies the timestamp and session ID in the authorization command to prevent external replay attacks. The session ID is a specific number assigned by the cloud to each update request received from the vehicle according to the order in which the update requests are sent to the server.

[0097] During OTA (Over-The-Air) upgrades, the decrypted upgrade package is written to a dedicated upgrade partition of the vehicle's ECU to avoid affecting the running vehicle system. A mechanism is employed where the upgrade is written to the new partition first, followed by switching the boot pointer. If the upgrade process is interrupted, it can automatically boot from the backup partition, preventing the vehicle system from failing due to data errors. After the software upgrade is complete, a copy of the old firmware is retained for 72 hours. If any anomalies are detected during this period, the system automatically rolls back to the previous firmware version to prevent the vehicle system from malfunctioning.

[0098] After performing the OTA upgrade operation, the process also includes: destroying the quantum key, the dynamic key, and the fused quantum key once the OTA upgrade operation is complete. After the vehicle software upgrade is finished, the security chip erases and destroys all memory copies of the quantum key, the dynamic key, and the fused quantum key via hardware instructions, ensuring that the key for each session is only used for the current session. The key is regenerated for each subsequent upgrade, generating a completely new key combination. Attackers cannot use historical keys or biometric templates to forge data, ensuring vehicle and user data security and effectively resisting common network attack methods such as replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks.

[0099] In summary, the vehicle network security authentication method in this embodiment, on the one hand, utilizes quantum key distribution technology to generate an uncopyable quantum key, and combines it with a unique dynamic key generated from a palm print to generate a fused quantum key. Based on the uncopyability of the fused quantum key and the uniqueness of the dynamic key, the possibility of key cracking is fundamentally eliminated, improving the security of vehicle software during OTA upgrades. On the other hand, after the vehicle software upgrade is completed, all memory copies of the quantum key, dynamic key, and fused quantum key are erased and destroyed, ensuring that the key for each session is only used for the current session. This ensures that attackers cannot use historical keys or biometric templates to forge data, protecting vehicle and user data security and effectively resisting common network attack methods such as replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks.

[0100] Second Embodiment

[0101] like Figure 2 As shown, corresponding to the vehicle network security authentication method in the first embodiment, this embodiment also provides a vehicle network security authentication method for use in the cloud, the method comprising:

[0102] Step S10: Receive an upgrade request from the vehicle and establish a quantum communication channel with the vehicle;

[0103] Step S20: In response to the upgrade request, generate a quantum key and distribute the quantum key to the vehicle terminal through the quantum communication channel;

[0104] Step S30: Receive the upgrade data packet sent by the vehicle terminal, and verify the digital signature of the upgrade data packet based on the fused quantum key and the pre-stored biometric template; the fused quantum key is a combination of the quantum key and the dynamic key; the dynamic key is generated based on the dynamic features of the user's real-time palmprint information, and the dynamic key is only used in the current session of the upgrade request; the upgrade data packet is encrypted with the fused quantum key and digitally signed.

[0105] Step S40: If the digital signature passes verification, an authorization instruction is sent to the vehicle terminal; the authorization instruction allows the vehicle terminal to decrypt the upgrade data packet and perform OTA upgrade operations based on the quantum key and the dynamic key.

[0106] In the vehicle network security authentication method of this embodiment, a non-replicable quantum key is generated using quantum key distribution technology. This is combined with a unique dynamic key generated from a palm print to generate a fused quantum key. Based on the non-replicability of the fused quantum key and the uniqueness of the dynamic key, the possibility of the key being cracked is fundamentally eliminated, improving the security of vehicle software during OTA upgrades. Furthermore, by binding the OTA upgrade operation to the user's dynamic palm print information through the fused quantum key, unauthorized personnel are prevented from remotely controlling the vehicle upgrade process, ensuring the security of vehicle and user data and effectively resisting common network attack methods such as replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks.

[0107] Step S10: Receive an upgrade request from the vehicle and establish a quantum communication channel with the vehicle.

[0108] After receiving the vehicle-side upgrade request, the cloud negotiates quantum communication parameters with the vehicle-side via a classical communication channel and establishes a quantum communication channel. The specific steps for establishing the quantum communication channel can be found in the first embodiment.

[0109] To verify the legitimacy of the vehicle-mounted device, its identity needs to be further confirmed before establishing a quantum communication channel with it in order to filter out illegal requests.

[0110] Before establishing a quantum communication channel with the vehicle, the method further includes: obtaining the vehicle identification information corresponding to the vehicle, and performing vehicle identification authentication on the vehicle based on the identification information; if the vehicle identification authentication fails, canceling the establishment of the quantum communication channel with the vehicle.

[0111] The vehicle identification information (VIN) is a unique identifier for the vehicle. The authenticity and legitimacy of the identification information are verified by checking whether the VIN length, character set, and checksum algorithm match the vehicle profile stored in the cloud. If vehicle authentication fails, the establishment of a quantum communication channel with the vehicle is cancelled, filtering out illegal requests before the quantum channel is established.

[0112] Step S20: In response to the upgrade request, generate a quantum key and distribute the quantum key to the vehicle terminal through the quantum communication channel.

[0113] The cloud randomly generates a polarization state sequence through a single-photon emitter, exchanges basis selection information with the vehicle through a classical channel, retains only the photon data with consistent basis to form the original key, performs error correction coding and privacy amplification on the original key, generates a quantum key and distributes it to the vehicle.

[0114] Step S30: Receive the upgrade data packet sent by the vehicle terminal, and verify the digital signature of the upgrade data packet based on the fused quantum key and the pre-stored biometric template.

[0115] The upgrade data packet contains upgrade content encrypted using a fused quantum key, a digital signature generated using a fused quantum key, and a session ID associated with the current OTA session.

[0116] When the vehicle sends an upgrade data packet, it simultaneously collects the dynamic features of the user's palm print and extracts static features, generating a static feature hash value. The cloud receives the static feature hash value sent by the vehicle and compares it with the pre-stored biometric template hash value. If the similarity is higher than a threshold, the user is deemed legitimate and allowed to generate a dynamic key; otherwise, it is not allowed. The vehicle's identity information is verified again using the biometric template to ensure that the operator is a legitimate user and to prevent identity forgery.

[0117] When verifying the digital signature of the upgrade data packet, the upgrade data packet must be decrypted using the CBC mode with the fused quantum key, and the digital signature must be verified using the SM2 algorithm. See the first embodiment for details.

[0118] After verifying the digital signature of the upgrade data packet based on the fused quantum key and the pre-stored biometric template, the method further includes: validating the timestamp and random number factor of the upgrade data packet; if the upgrade data packet fails the validity verification, the authorization instruction sent to the vehicle is cancelled.

[0119] The timestamp is the system time recorded by the vehicle when generating the upgrade data packet, used to identify the moment the data was generated. The timestamp field is extracted from the metadata of the upgrade data packet, converted to a local time format timestamp, and then the difference between the current system time and the local time format timestamp is calculated. When the difference is greater than a preset threshold (e.g., 300 seconds), the timestamp is deemed invalid, and the authorization command sent to the vehicle is canceled, thereby rejecting the vehicle's upgrade request.

[0120] The random number factor is a unique random value generated in each communication session to prevent replay attacks and ensure that the same plaintext generates different ciphertexts. A random number segment is extracted from the upgrade data packet as the random number factor. Its length and format are verified for compliance, and the local random number cache is queried to check if the random number factor has already been used. If the random number factor already exists, it is considered a replay attack, and the authorization command sent to the vehicle is canceled, thus rejecting the vehicle's upgrade request. If the random number factor does not exist, it is stored in the local random number cache, and an expiration time is set. If the random number factor remains unused beyond its expiration time, it is considered to have already existed.

[0121] Step S40: If the digital signature passes verification, an authorization instruction is sent to the vehicle terminal; the authorization instruction allows the vehicle terminal to decrypt the upgrade data packet and perform OTA upgrade operations based on the quantum key and the dynamic key.

[0122] If the digital signature verification is successful, the cloud generates an authorization instruction containing session authorization information, performs SM2 signing using the cloud private key, and sends the authorization instruction to the vehicle via the quantum communication channel.

[0123] In summary, the vehicle network security authentication method in this embodiment, on the one hand, utilizes quantum key distribution technology to generate an uncopyable quantum key, and combines it with a unique dynamic key generated from a palm print to generate a fused quantum key. Based on the uncopyability of the fused quantum key and the uniqueness of the dynamic key, the possibility of key cracking is fundamentally eliminated, improving the security of vehicle software during OTA upgrades. On the other hand, before establishing a quantum communication channel with the vehicle, the identity of the vehicle is further confirmed through identity identification information to filter out illegal requests.

[0124] Based on the same inventive concept as the above embodiments, this embodiment also provides an in-vehicle network security authentication system, including a processor and a memory; wherein, the memory stores a computer program, the computer program being loaded by the processor and executed as in any one of the first embodiments and / or as in any one of the second embodiments of the in-vehicle network security authentication method.

[0125] like Figure 3As shown, based on the same inventive concept as the above embodiments, this embodiment also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing instructions for loading and executing the vehicle network security authentication method as described above by a processor.

[0126] The embodiments of the mobile terminal and computer-readable storage medium provided in this application include all the technical features of the embodiments of the above control method. The extended and explanatory content of the specification is basically the same as that of the embodiments of the above method, and will not be repeated here.

[0127] This application also provides a computer program product, which includes computer program code. When the computer program code is run on a computer, it causes the computer to perform the methods described in the various possible implementations above.

[0128] This application also provides a chip, including a memory and a processor. The memory is used to store a computer program, and the processor is used to call and run the computer program from the memory, so that a device with the chip installed performs the methods described in the various possible implementations above.

[0129] The sequence numbers of the embodiments in this application are for descriptive purposes only and do not represent the superiority or inferiority of the embodiments.

[0130] In this application, the same or similar terms, concepts, technical solutions and / or application scenario descriptions are generally described in detail only when they appear for the first time. When they appear again, they are generally not repeated for the sake of brevity. When understanding the technical solutions and other contents of this application, the same or similar terms, concepts, technical solutions and / or application scenario descriptions that are not described in detail later can be referred to their previous relevant detailed descriptions.

[0131] In this application, the descriptions of the various embodiments have different focuses. For parts that are not described in detail or recorded in a certain embodiment, please refer to the relevant descriptions of other embodiments.

[0132] The technical features of the present application can be combined in any way. For the sake of brevity, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of the present application.

[0133] Through the above description of the embodiments, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that the methods of the above embodiments can be implemented by means of software plus necessary general-purpose hardware platforms. Of course, they can also be implemented by hardware, but in many cases the former is a better implementation method. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of this application, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in the above-mentioned storage medium and includes several instructions to cause a terminal device to execute the methods of each embodiment of this application. The above are only preferred embodiments of this application and do not limit the patent scope of this application. Any equivalent structural or procedural transformations made based on the content of this application's specification and drawings, or direct or indirect applications in other related technical fields, are similarly included within the patent protection scope of this application.

[0134] It should be noted that the various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner, with each embodiment focusing on the differences from other embodiments. The same or similar parts between the various embodiments can be referred to each other.

[0135] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any variations or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed in the present invention should be included within the scope of protection of the present invention. Therefore, the scope of protection of the present invention should be determined by the appended claims.

Claims

1. A method for authenticating vehicle network security, characterized in that, For use on a vehicle, the method includes: In response to the user's OTA upgrade operation, an upgrade request for the vehicle is sent to the cloud and a quantum communication channel is established with the cloud. Receive a quantum key generated by the cloud in response to the upgrade request via the quantum communication channel; Collect the user's real-time palmprint information and generate a dynamic key based on the dynamic features of the real-time palmprint information; the dynamic key is only used in the current session of the upgrade request; The dynamic key is combined with the quantum key to generate a fused quantum key. The upgrade data packet is encrypted and digitally signed based on the fused quantum key, and the encrypted upgrade data packet is sent to the cloud for verification of the digital signature. In response to the authorization instruction sent from the cloud confirming the digital signature verification, the upgrade data packet is decrypted based on the quantum key and the dynamic key, and an OTA upgrade operation is performed. Specifically, the step of combining the dynamic key with the quantum key to generate a fused quantum key, and encrypting and digitally signing the upgrade data packet based on the fused quantum key, includes: The dynamic key and the quantum key are combined based on the key derivation function to generate a third-digit fused quantum key; the key derivation function is an algorithm used to mix the dynamic key and the quantum key to generate a high-strength fused quantum key; The fused quantum key is split into a fourth-digit encryption key and a fifth-digit signature key, the sum of the values ​​of the fourth and fifth digits being equal to the third digit; The upgrade data packet is encrypted using the encryption key, and the upgrade data packet is digitally signed using the signing key.

2. The vehicle network security authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The generation of a dynamic key based on the dynamic features of the real-time palmprint information specifically includes: The real-time palmprint information is processed using the SM3 hash algorithm to generate a hash value for the first digit. The first two digits of the hash value are taken as the SM4 symmetric key, and the dynamic key is generated based on the SM4 symmetric key; the second digit is half of the first digit.

3. The vehicle network security authentication method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The process of using the SM3 hash algorithm to process real-time palmprint information and generate a hash value for the first digit specifically includes: The total length of the real-time palmprint information is filled to M×N bits to obtain filled palmprint data; the value of M is twice the value of the first number of bits; and N is a positive integer. The filled palm print data is divided into N M-bit message blocks; Initialize the intermediate hash value by taking the message block as input and iteratively updating the intermediate hash value according to a preset compression function; When the iteration is complete, the intermediate hash value of the final iteration is concatenated to form the hash value of the first bit.

4. The vehicle network security authentication method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The third digit is equal to the value of the first digit.

5. The vehicle network security authentication method according to any one of claims 1-4, characterized in that, After performing an OTA upgrade, the following is also included: Once the OTA upgrade operation is completed, the quantum key, the dynamic key, and the fused quantum key are destroyed.

6. A method for vehicle-mounted network security authentication, characterized in that, For use in the cloud, the method includes: Receive upgrade requests from the vehicle and establish a quantum communication channel with the vehicle; In response to the upgrade request, a quantum key is generated and distributed to the vehicle via the quantum communication channel; The system receives upgrade data packets sent by the vehicle and verifies the digital signature of the upgrade data packets based on a fused quantum key and a pre-stored biometric template. The fused quantum key is a combination of the quantum key and a dynamic key. The dynamic key is generated based on the dynamic features of the user's real-time palmprint information and is only used in the current session of the upgrade request. The upgrade data packets are encrypted with the fused quantum key and digitally signed. If the digital signature is verified, an authorization command is sent to the vehicle terminal; the authorization command allows the vehicle terminal to decrypt the upgrade data packet and perform OTA upgrade operations based on the quantum key and the dynamic key. The fused quantum key is formed by combining the quantum key and the dynamic key, specifically including: The dynamic key and the quantum key are combined based on the key derivation function to generate a third-digit fused quantum key; the key derivation function is an algorithm used to mix the dynamic key and the quantum key to generate a high-strength fused quantum key; The fused quantum key is split into a fourth-digit encryption key and a fifth-digit signature key, the sum of the values ​​of the fourth and fifth digits being equal to the third digit; The upgrade data packet is encrypted using the encryption key, and the upgrade data packet is digitally signed using the signing key.

7. The vehicle network security authentication method according to claim 6, characterized in that, Before establishing a quantum communication channel with the vehicle, the following steps are also included: Obtain the vehicle identification information corresponding to the vehicle terminal, and perform vehicle identity authentication on the vehicle terminal based on the identification information; When the vehicle fails to authenticate its identity, the quantum communication channel with the vehicle is cancelled.

8. The vehicle network security authentication method according to claim 6 or 7, characterized in that, After verifying the digital signature of the upgrade data packet based on the fused quantum key and the pre-stored biometric template, the process further includes: The timestamp and random number factor of the upgrade data packet are validated for validity. If the upgrade data packet fails the validity verification, the authorization command sent to the vehicle will be cancelled.

9. A vehicle-mounted network security authentication system, characterized in that, It includes a processor and a memory; wherein the memory stores a computer program for being loaded by the processor and executed as described in any one of claims 1-5 and / or any one of claims 6-8, the in-vehicle network security authentication method.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium stores instructions for being loaded by a processor and executed as described in any one of claims 1-5 and / or any one of claims 6-8, of the in-vehicle network security authentication method.

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