TPCM-based operating system security update solution

Abstract

The invention discloses a TPCM (Trusted Platform Control Module)-based operating system security update solution, which comprises the following steps that: when an operating system is started, a TPCM performs self-inspection, and after the self-inspection is passed, the TPCM generates a pair of public and private keys; the method comprises the following steps: an operating system supplier signs an update packet by using a private key before issuing the update packet, and generates a hash value of the update packet after the update packet is signed; after the user equipment receives the update package, the TPCM verifies the signature of the update package by using the public key of the operating system supplier, and after the signature verification is passed, the TPCM calculates the hash value of the update package and compares the hash value with the hash value in the signature; after the comparison is passed, the TPCM transmits the update package to an operating system for installation, and in the update package installation process, the TPCM monitors the update progress in real time; after updating is completed, the TPCM generates an updating log, and the TPCM sends the generated updating log to an operating system supplier. By introducing the trusted platform control module, the security and efficiency of the updating process of the operating system are improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of computer operating system security, and in particular to a TPCM-based operating system security update solution. Background Art

[0002] Operating system security updates are an important means of ensuring computer system security. However, traditional operating system security update methods have the following problems: Insufficient security: Existing update mechanisms are vulnerable to malware and hacker attacks, resulting in tampering with the update process. Trust issues: Users find it difficult to verify the authenticity and reliability of the update source, which creates the risk of accepting malicious updates. Low update efficiency: Traditional update methods typically take a long time and may affect the normal operation of the system during the update process. The shortcomings of existing technologies:

[0003] (1) Insufficient security: Traditional operating system update mechanisms are vulnerable to malware and hacker attacks, and update packages may be tampered with during transmission and installation.

[0004] (2) Trust issue: It is difficult for users to confirm the authenticity and reliability of the update source, and there is a risk of accepting malicious updates.

[0005] (3) Low update efficiency: Traditional update methods usually take a long time and may affect the normal operation of the system during the update process. Summary of the Invention

[0006] The present invention aims to solve one of the technical problems in the related art at least to a certain extent.

[0007] The present invention proposes a solution for operating system security update based on TPCM, which aims to solve the problems of insufficient security, trust issues and low update efficiency in the operating system security update process in the prior art.

[0008] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention proposes a solution for operating system security updates based on TPCM, including:

[0009] When the operating system starts, the Trusted Platform Control Module (TPCM) performs a self-test. After the self-test passes, the TPCM generates a pair of public and private keys.

[0010] Before releasing the update package, the operating system vendor uses the private key to sign the update package. After the update package is signed, a hash value of the update package is generated;

[0011] After the user device receives the update package, TPCM verifies the signature of the update package using the public key of the operating system vendor. After the signature verification is successful, TPCM calculates the hash value of the update package and compares it with the hash value in the signature;

[0012] After the comparison is passed, TPCM passes the update package to the operating system for installation. During the update package installation process, TPCM monitors the update progress in real time;

[0013] After the update is completed, TPCM generates an update log, and TPCM sends the generated update log to the operating system vendor.

[0014] The TPCM-based operating system security update solution according to the embodiment of the present invention may also have the following additional technical features:

[0015] In one embodiment of the present invention, the trusted platform control module TPCM performs a self-check including:

[0016] Check that the physical components of the TPCM are intact and use the built-in hardware detection mechanism to confirm that all hardware parts work as expected to perform hardware integrity verification;

[0017] Calculate the hash value of the firmware code running in the TPCM and compare it with the preset security value to verify the hardware integrity;

[0018] Perform functional testing on the core functions of TPCM.

[0019] In one embodiment of the present invention, the TPCM generates a pair of public and private keys, including:

[0020] After the TPCM completes its self-test and confirms that the hardware, firmware, and core functions are normal and have not been tampered with, the TPCM initiates the key generation process;

[0021] TPCM uses a built-in random number generator and encryption algorithm to generate a unique pair of public and private keys;

[0022] The private key is stored inside the TPCM and is used to decrypt update package information and verify signatures. The public key is released to the operating system vendor for signature verification of the update package.

[0023] In one embodiment of the present invention, the operating system vendor signs the update package using a private key before releasing the update package. After the update package is signed, a hash value of the update package is generated, including:

[0024] Read all the data in the update package and calculate a fixed-length hash value using a secure hash algorithm;

[0025] The generated hash value is used as input data, and the input data is encrypted and signed using the supplier's private key to generate a digital signature;

[0026] After signing is complete, the vendor recalculates the hash of the update package and publishes it.

[0027] In one embodiment of the present invention, after a user device receives an update package, the TPCM verifies the signature of the update package using the public key of the operating system vendor. After the signature verification passes, the TPCM calculates a hash value for the update package and compares it with the hash value in the signature, including:

[0028] After receiving the update package, the user device extracts the digital signature and the content of the update package from the update package;

[0029] TPCM calls the securely stored public key and uses it to decrypt the signature of the update package to obtain the hash value calculated by the vendor.

[0030] Calculate a new hash value using the same hash algorithm for the contents of the update package;

[0031] Compare the two hash values. If the two hash values are consistent, the content of the update package has not been tampered with. If the two hash values are inconsistent, the update package has been tampered with or the source is untrustworthy, and the verification fails.

[0032] In one embodiment of the present invention, after the comparison is successful, the TPCM passes the update package to the operating system for installation. During the update package installation process, the TPCM monitors the update progress in real time, including:

[0033] After verifying the signature and hash value of the update package, TPCM passes the update package to the operating system, authorizing it to start the installation process;

[0034] During the update package installation process, TPCM monitors the update progress in real time, including monitoring key operations, verifying intermediate status, and recording logs.

[0035] When the update package is installed, TPCM verifies the status of the entire system. If the verification passes, TPCM will include the newly installed update package and related files in the system's trust chain.

[0036] In one embodiment of the present invention, after the update is completed, the TPCM generates an update log, and the TPCM sends the generated update log to the operating system vendor, including:

[0037] After the update is completed, TPCM generates an update log and signs the log content;

[0038] TPCM sends the generated update log to the operating system vendor through a secure channel, and the operating system vendor verifies the log signature using the public key provided by TPCM.

[0039] In one embodiment of the present invention, the update log includes: identification information of the update package, installation timestamp, key operations involved in the installation process, system status changes, and installation results.

[0040] The TPCM-based operating system security update solution of the embodiment of the present invention improves the security and efficiency of the operating system update process by introducing a trusted platform control module.

[0041] Additional aspects and advantages of the present invention will be set forth in part in the description which follows and, in part, will be obvious from the description which follows, or may be learned through practice of the present invention. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0042] The above and / or additional aspects and advantages of the present invention will become apparent and readily understood from the following description of the embodiments in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, in which:

[0043] Figure 1 is a flow chart of a solution for operating system security update based on TPCM according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0044] Figure 2 4 is a schematic diagram of the architecture of a TPCM-based operating system security update solution according to an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0045] It should be noted that, in the absence of conflict, the embodiments and features of the embodiments of the present invention can be combined with each other. The present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and in combination with the embodiments.

[0046] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the solutions of the present invention, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the embodiments described are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative efforts should fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0047] The following describes a solution for operating system security update based on TPCM according to an embodiment of the present invention with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0048] Figure 1 FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a solution for operating system security update based on TPCM according to an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 1 As shown, the method includes:

[0049] S1, when the operating system starts, the trusted platform control module TPCM performs a self-test. After the self-test passes, the TPCM generates a pair of public and private keys;

[0050] S2, before releasing the update package, the operating system vendor uses the private key to sign the update package. After the update package is signed, a hash value of the update package is generated;

[0051] S3: After the user device receives the update package, the TPCM verifies the signature of the update package using the public key of the operating system vendor. After the signature verification is successful, the TPCM calculates the hash value of the update package and compares it with the hash value in the signature.

[0052] S4, after the comparison is successful, TPCM passes the update package to the operating system for installation. During the update package installation process, TPCM monitors the update progress in real time;

[0053] S5, after the update is completed, TPCM generates an update log, and TPCM sends the generated update log to the operating system vendor.

[0054] It is understandable that Figure 2 It is a schematic diagram of the overall structure of the present invention, as shown in FIG. Figure 2 As shown:

[0055] 1. Initialization phase, including:

[0056] TPCM self-test: When the system starts, TPCM performs a self-test to ensure that its hardware and software functions properly. This step is to confirm that TPCM can work properly and provide basic support for subsequent operations.

[0057] Specifically, the TPCM self-test is designed to confirm that the TPCM hardware has not been physically tampered with or damaged. It also verifies the integrity and correctness of the TPCM's internal firmware and software to prevent the injection of malicious code. It also ensures that the TPCM's core functions (such as encryption, decryption, and signature verification) are functioning properly.

[0058] Hardware integrity checks include checking that the physical components of the TPCM are intact, including circuits, memory, and other hardware elements. Built-in hardware detection mechanisms are used to confirm that all hardware components are working as expected.

[0059] Firmware integrity verification involves calculating the hash value of the firmware code running in the TPCM and comparing it with a pre-stored security value. The authenticity of the firmware is usually verified through a digital signature to ensure it has not been tampered with.

[0060] Functional testing involves executing a series of predefined functional tests to verify that the key functions of the TPCM (such as random number generation and encryption algorithm execution) are functioning properly. These tests are designed to simulate actual usage scenarios to ensure that the TPCM can operate stably in real-world environments.

[0061] If the self-test is successful, the TPCM will enter normal operation and prepare to perform tasks such as key generation and update package signature verification. If any anomalies are found during the self-test, the TPCM will report an error and may prevent the system from continuing to boot, thereby avoiding potential security risks.

[0062] Through the self-check process described above, TPCM ensures that it is in a trustworthy state, thus providing a solid foundation for the system's secure startup and subsequent operations. This step is crucial to maintaining the overall security of the system, as it directly affects the effectiveness and reliability of all subsequent security operations that rely on TPCM.

[0063] Key Generation: After the self-check passes, TPCM generates a public-private key pair. The public key is distributed to the operating system vendor for signature verification of update packages, while the private key is stored by TPCM itself for decrypting update package information and verifying signatures.

[0064] Specifically, the TPCM utilizes its built-in random number generator (RNG) and an encryption algorithm (such as RSA or ECC) to generate a unique public-private key pair. The private key is strictly stored in a secure storage area within the TPCM and cannot be directly accessed or exported externally, ensuring its confidentiality. The public key can be securely exported and provided to operating system vendors or other trusted entities for subsequent encryption, signature verification, and other operations.

[0065] TPCM sends the generated public key to the operating system vendor for use in the following scenarios: Update package signature verification: The operating system vendor uses the public key provided by TPCM to verify the digital signature of the update package, ensuring that the update package comes from a trusted source and has not been tampered with. Communication encryption: In some cases, the public key can also be used to encrypt data sent to TPCM, ensuring that the data cannot be stolen or tampered with during transmission.

[0066] The private key is stored only within the TPCM and is never exported or exposed to external systems, ensuring its security. The primary uses of the private key include: Decrypting update package information: Upon receiving an encrypted update package, the TPCM uses the private key to decrypt it and retrieve the update package's contents. Verifying the signature: The TPCM uses the private key to verify the update package's signature, ensuring its legitimate origin and integrity.

[0067] 2. Update package preparation: Before releasing an update package, the OS vendor signs it using their private key. This signature ensures the update package's authenticity and prevents tampering. After the update package is signed, a hash value is generated for the update package. This hash value is used to verify the integrity of the update package, ensuring it has not been tampered with during transmission.

[0068] First, the operating system vendor selects a secure hash algorithm (such as SHA-256) to calculate the hash value of the update package. All data in the update package is hashed to produce a fixed-length string, the hash value. This hash value is a unique digital fingerprint of the update package's contents; any modification to the update package's contents will result in a change in the hash value. The vendor then cryptographically signs the calculated hash value using its private key. This signature method verifies that the update package originates from the legitimate vendor and has not been tampered with. This is because only the entity with the corresponding private key can generate a correct signature, and anyone using the corresponding public key can verify the validity of this signature.

[0069] After signing, although the signature itself already contains information about the original hash value, a separate hash value of the update package is usually provided. This step helps the recipient quickly check the integrity of the update package: the recipient also uses the same hash algorithm to calculate the hash value of the received update package.

[0070] In this way, OS vendors can not only guarantee the authenticity of the update package (via private key signature) but also ensure the integrity of the update package (via hash value verification). This is crucial for preventing man-in-the-middle attacks and ensuring system security. The TPCM or other verification mechanisms on the user's device can verify the safety and authenticity of the update package by checking these signatures and hash values, thus deciding whether to install the update.

[0071] 3. Update Package Verification Phase: After the user device receives the update package, TPCM verifies the update package's signature using the OS vendor's public key. If the signature verification passes, the update package is issued by a trusted source. After the signature verification passes, TPCM calculates a hash value for the update package and compares it with the hash value in the signature. If the comparison results match, the update package is intact and has not been tampered with during transmission. If the signature verification passes, TPCM proceeds to the next step of hash value comparison and update package installation. If the signature verification fails, the update process is terminated and the system issues a warning to the user, notifying them that the update package may have been tampered with or that the source is untrustworthy.

[0072] Specifically, the user device first receives the update package and its associated digital signature from the operating system vendor. The TPCM decrypts the digital signature of the update package using the public key provided by the operating system vendor to extract the original hash value. This step verifies that the update package is indeed from the legitimate vendor and has not been tampered with. If the signature verification passes, the update package is issued by a trusted source, and the next step of the check can be continued. If the signature verification fails, it indicates that the update package may have been tampered with or the source is untrustworthy. In this case, the TPCM will terminate the update process and issue a warning to the user regarding the potential security risk.

[0073] Calculating the update package's hash value: If the signature verification passes, TPCM recalculates the hash value of the received update package using the same hashing algorithm. TPCM then compares the newly calculated hash value with the original hash value extracted from the signature. If the two match, the update package remains intact and unaltered during transmission and can be safely installed. If the hash values do not match, the update package contents have been altered, possibly due to a transmission error or malicious tampering. In this case, the update process is terminated and the user is notified.

[0074] Once both signature verification and hash value comparison pass, TPCM confirms that the update package is both from a trusted source and has not been tampered with, allowing the operating system to continue the update installation process. Monitoring the installation process (optional): As previously discussed, TPCM may also monitor the progress of the update package installation in real time to ensure that the entire installation process is as expected, further enhancing system security.

[0075] 4. Update Package Application Phase: After verification, TPCM passes the update package to the operating system for installation. This step applies new system patches or features to the operating system. During the update package installation process, TPCM monitors the update progress in real time to ensure that the update process is not interfered with. This step prevents malware or hackers from attacking during the update process.

[0076] Specifically, TPCM passes verified update packages to the operating system and authorizes it to begin the installation process. This step ensures that only strictly verified update packages are installed. Through TPCM's verification mechanism, any update packages that fail verification are blocked, preventing malware or unauthorized updates from entering the system.

[0077] Installation process: After receiving the update package, the operating system follows the predefined installation process, performing operations such as decompression, file writing, and configuration modification to apply new system patches or features to the operating system. Key examples include: decompressing the update package and extracting files; overwriting old files with new ones or adding new functional modules; and modifying system configuration files to adapt to the new version or fix vulnerabilities.

[0078] To ensure the security of the update process, TPCM monitors the update progress in real time during the installation process to prevent external interference or malicious attacks. Specifically, it includes the following: (1) Monitoring key operations: TPCM tracks and records key operations involved in the installation process (such as file writing, registry modification, system service startup, etc.). If any abnormal behavior is found (such as writing to an unauthorized file path or modifying an unexpected system configuration), TPCM will immediately interrupt the installation process. (2) Verifying intermediate states: At different stages of the installation, TPCM may recalculate the hash values of related files or systems to ensure that the intermediate results generated during the installation process are consistent with expectations. If it is detected that the file has been tampered with or the system status has changed, TPCM will terminate the installation and report an error. (3) Recording logs: TPCM records key events and status changes during the installation process and generates reliable log information. These logs can be used for subsequent audits or troubleshooting, while providing system administrators with transparent operation records.

[0079] During the update process, malware or hackers may attempt to inject malicious code or tamper with installation files. TPCM detects and prevents such attacks through real-time monitoring and verification. TPCM ensures that the system's chain of trust is not broken after the update package is installed. For example, critical files (such as bootloaders and kernel modules) must maintain integrity; otherwise, the system could be compromised.

[0080] 5. Update Completion Phase: After the update is complete, TPCM generates a detailed update log, recording each step and status of the entire update process. The update log is used for subsequent review and analysis. After the update is complete, TPCM generates a detailed update log, recording each step and status of the entire update process. The update log is used for subsequent review and analysis.

[0081] Specifically, the update log generated by TPCM usually includes the following: Update package information: version number, release time, vendor ID, etc. of the update package. Timestamp: start time and end time of the update process, used to track the time range of the update. Update step record: record the execution of each key step, such as file writing, configuration modification, service restart, etc. System status change: comparison of system status before and after the update, such as hash values of key files, system boot status, changes in kernel modules, etc. Operation results: success or failure status of each step, and the specific reason for failure (if applicable). Security event record: If abnormal behavior or potential threats are detected during the update process, TPCM will record it in the log.

[0082] To ensure the authenticity and integrity of the update log, TPCM signs and protects the log content: (1) Signature mechanism: TPCM uses its private key to encrypt and sign the hash value of the log content, generating a digital signature and appending it to the log. This signature mechanism ensures that the log content has not been tampered with and can verify the authenticity of the log source. (2) Secure storage: The update log is stored in a secure storage area within TPCM to prevent unauthorized access or tampering. In some cases, the log can also be encrypted and stored on an external device to further enhance security.

[0083] The generated update log has the following important functions: (1) Subsequent audit: The update log provides system administrators or auditors with a complete update history, helping them understand whether the update process meets expectations. The log content can be used to verify whether the update package is installed correctly and whether the system status remains reliable. (2) Troubleshooting: If the system encounters an abnormality after the update, the update log can help quickly locate the cause of the problem. For example, by checking the error records or abnormal events in the log, it can be determined whether the problem is caused by the update package itself or other external factors.

[0084] Operating system vendors can analyze update logs to optimize future update package designs and release strategies. Log data can also be used to improve system security and stability.

[0085] The beneficial effects of the present invention are:

[0086] 1. Introducing a Trusted Platform Control Module (TPCM) for hardware-level security. Using a public-private key mechanism, the OS vendor signs the update package with their private key, and the user device's TPCM verifies the signature with their public key. Based on signature verification, a hash value comparison is performed to ensure the update package has not been tampered with.

[0087] 2. Prevent malware and hacker attacks, ensuring the integrity and security of update packages during transmission and installation. The dual verification mechanism (signature verification and hash value comparison) greatly improves the security of the update process and prevents update packages from being tampered with.

[0088] 3. A public-private key mechanism ensures the authenticity of update packages. TPCM monitors the entire update process in real time to prevent external interference. Users can verify the authenticity and integrity of update packages through TPCM. This real-time monitoring mechanism ensures transparency and security during the update process, enhancing user trust in the operating system update process.

[0089] 4. TPCM manages and monitors the update process, reducing human intervention and external interference. After the update is complete, a detailed update log is generated for suppliers to analyze and improve. This significantly reduces update time and the impact on system operation, improving the user experience. By analyzing the update log, suppliers can promptly identify and resolve issues during the update process, continuously optimizing the update mechanism.

[0090] This invention's TPCM-based operating system security update solution effectively addresses the security deficiencies, trust issues, and low update efficiency of existing operating system update processes by introducing TPCM and a series of security measures. A dual verification mechanism and real-time monitoring ensure the integrity of update packages and the security of the update process. Users can verify the source and integrity of update packages through hardware and encryption mechanisms, enhancing trust in the update process. TPCM efficiently manages and monitors the update process, reducing update time and system downtime, improving update efficiency and user experience.

[0091] In summary, traditional operating system update mechanisms mostly rely on software-level security measures. However, the present invention, by introducing the TPCM, achieves hardware-level security. The TPCM can perform self-checks during system startup and updates, ensuring the integrity and authenticity of itself and the update package, significantly improving system security. The present invention utilizes a public-private key pair encryption mechanism. The operating system vendor signs the update package with a private key, while the TPCM on the user device verifies the signature using a pre-stored public key. This mechanism effectively prevents tampering and forgery of the update package during transmission, ensuring the reliability and authenticity of the update source. In addition to signature verification, the present invention also incorporates a hash value verification mechanism. Upon receiving the update package, the TPCM calculates the hash value of the update package and compares it with the hash value in the signature to further ensure that the update package has not been tampered with during transmission. This dual verification mechanism significantly enhances the security of the update process. The TPCM of the present invention performs real-time monitoring during the update package installation process, ensuring that the update process is not subject to external interference. This real-time monitoring mechanism effectively prevents malware and hacker attacks during the update process, ensuring smooth system updates and stable system operation. After the update is completed, TPCM generates a detailed update log and sends it to the operating system vendor. By analyzing the update log, the vendor can better understand the system's update status and possible problems, thereby continuously improving the update mechanism and system security. The solution of the present invention manages and monitors the update process through TPCM, reducing the update time and the impact on the system. Compared with traditional update methods, the present invention can significantly improve update efficiency and reduce system downtime caused by updates. Through hardware-level security protection, public-private key mechanism, dual verification mechanism and real-time monitoring, the present invention greatly enhances users' trust in the operating system update process. Users can accept updates with greater confidence, reduce the situation of rejecting updates due to distrust of the update source, and improve the overall security of the operating system.

[0092] In the description of this specification, the reference terms "one embodiment", "some embodiments", "example", "specific example", or "some examples" mean that the specific features, structures, materials or characteristics described in conjunction with the embodiment or example are included in at least one embodiment or example of the present invention. In this specification, the schematic representations of the above terms do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Moreover, the specific features, structures, materials or characteristics described can be combined in any one or more embodiments or examples in a suitable manner. In addition, those skilled in the art can combine and combine different embodiments or examples described in this specification and features of different embodiments or examples without contradiction.

[0093] Furthermore, the terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly specifying the number of the technical features being referred to. Thus, a feature defined as "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include at least one such feature. In the description of the present invention, "plurality" means at least two, such as two, three, etc., unless otherwise specifically defined.

Claims

1. A solution for operating system security update based on TPCM, characterized in that: include: When the operating system starts, the Trusted Platform Control Module (TPCM) performs a self-test. After the self-test passes, the TPCM generates a pair of public and private keys. Before releasing the update package, the operating system vendor uses the private key to sign the update package. After the update package is signed, a hash value of the update package is generated; After the user device receives the update package, TPCM verifies the signature of the update package using the public key of the operating system vendor. After the signature verification is successful, TPCM calculates the hash value of the update package and compares it with the hash value in the signature; After the comparison is passed, TPCM passes the update package to the operating system for installation. During the update package installation process, TPCM monitors the update progress in real time; After the update is completed, TPCM generates an update log, and TPCM sends the generated update log to the operating system vendor.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The Trusted Platform Control Module (TPCM) performs self-tests, including: Check that the physical components of the TPCM are intact and use the built-in hardware detection mechanism to confirm that all hardware parts work as expected to perform hardware integrity verification; Calculate the hash value of the firmware code running in the TPCM and compare it with the preset security value to verify the hardware integrity; Perform functional testing on the core functions of TPCM.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that TPCM generates a pair of public and private keys, including: After the TPCM completes its self-test and confirms that the hardware, firmware, and core functions are normal and have not been tampered with, the TPCM initiates the key generation process; TPCM uses a built-in random number generator and encryption algorithm to generate a unique pair of public and private keys; The private key is stored inside the TPCM and is used to decrypt update package information and verify signatures. The public key is released to the operating system vendor for signature verification of the update package.

4. The method according to claim 1, wherein Before releasing an update package, the operating system vendor signs the update package with a private key. After the update package is signed, a hash value of the update package is generated, including: Read all the data in the update package and calculate a fixed-length hash value using a secure hash algorithm; The generated hash value is used as input data, and the input data is encrypted and signed using the supplier's private key to generate a digital signature; After signing is complete, the vendor recalculates the hash of the update package and publishes it.

5. The method according to claim 1, wherein After the user device receives the update package, TPCM uses the OS vendor's public key to verify the signature of the update package. After the signature is verified, TPCM calculates the hash value of the update package and compares it with the hash value in the signature, including: After receiving the update package, the user device extracts the digital signature and the content of the update package from the update package; TPCM calls the securely stored public key and uses it to decrypt the signature of the update package to obtain the hash value calculated by the vendor. Calculate a new hash value using the same hash algorithm for the contents of the update package; Compare the two hash values. If the two hash values are consistent, the content of the update package has not been tampered with. If the two hash values are inconsistent, the update package has been tampered with or the source is untrustworthy, and the verification fails.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that After the comparison is successful, TPCM passes the update package to the operating system for installation. During the update package installation process, TPCM monitors the update progress in real time, including: After verifying the signature and hash value of the update package, TPCM passes the update package to the operating system, authorizing it to start the installation process; During the update package installation process, TPCM monitors the update progress in real time, including monitoring key operations, verifying intermediate status, and recording logs. When the update package is installed, TPCM verifies the status of the entire system. If the verification passes, TPCM will include the newly installed update package and related files in the system's trust chain.

7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that After the update is complete, TPCM generates an update log, which TPCM sends to the operating system vendor. The log includes: After the update is completed, TPCM generates an update log and signs the log content; TPCM sends the generated update log to the operating system vendor through a secure channel, and the operating system vendor verifies the log signature using the public key provided by TPCM.

8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that Update logs include: update package identification information, installation timestamp, key operations involved in the installation process, system status changes, and installation results.

Images