Block chain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage method and apparatus, and electronic device

Abstract

The invention discloses an airport operation and maintenance data storage method and device based on a block chain and electronic equipment, and relates to the field of airport operation and maintenance data security management.The method comprises the steps that a first hash value is calculated for collected original operation and maintenance data, and a probe private key is used for conducting double-layer digital signature, transmitting the signed operation and maintenance data packet to an intelligent operation and maintenance system by adopting a preset encryption communication channel, calling a block chain intelligent contract through the intelligent operation and maintenance system under the condition that the integrity verification of the single piece of original operation and maintenance data is passed, and verifying the legality of the double-layer digital signature; and performing structured processing on the original operation and maintenance data passing the signature verification, and storing the original operation and maintenance data to a block chain network. According to the method and the device, the technical problems that data among multi-source heterogeneous systems is insufficient in credibility in a management process of airport operation and maintenance data, the security of data transmission cannot be guaranteed, and data leakage is easily caused in related technologies are solved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the fields of airport operation and maintenance data security management technology, blockchain technology or other related fields, and specifically to a blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage method and device, and electronic equipment. Background Art

[0002] With the aviation industry's growing demand for efficiency and safety, the concept of smart airports has become increasingly popular. Airports are widely implementing a variety of systems, including production operations systems, intelligent security systems, baggage tracking systems, and flight display systems. While these systems improve security efficiency, they also generate large amounts of complex operational data.

[0003] Despite the continuous advancement of airport information technology, the current operations and maintenance management system still faces significant shortcomings in ensuring data integrity. First, weak connectivity between systems makes it difficult to quickly and accurately identify the source of problems and the responsible party when business anomalies or system failures occur. This makes data susceptible to malicious internal or external tampering, especially during data transmission and storage, where effective tamper-proofing measures are lacking. This not only compromises the authenticity and integrity of data but can also lead to erroneous decisions. Second, due to the independent deployment of various business systems, the evidence chain for key events is stored in a decentralized manner, lacking a unified and reliable data aggregation mechanism. This makes it difficult to support efficient and transparent operations and maintenance audits and accountability. When system failures or anomalies occur, the decentralized data distribution and lack of a unified evidence chain make it difficult to quickly identify the root cause and determine the responsible party, thus delaying problem resolution and incident analysis. Furthermore, existing business systems and smart operations and maintenance systems generally utilize a centralized database architecture, which presents a single point of failure risk and is vulnerable to external attacks and internal tampering, failing to ensure the security and immutability of data throughout its lifecycle. In addition, in multi-source heterogeneous systems, data collaboration often relies on manual or simple automated scripts, which is not only inefficient but also error-prone and not conducive to building a seamless operation and maintenance data flow.

[0004] To address the above-mentioned problems, no effective solutions have been proposed so far. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The embodiments of the present invention provide a blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage method, device, and electronic device to at least solve the technical problems in related technologies of insufficient data credibility between multi-source heterogeneous systems during the management process of airport operation and maintenance data, inability to ensure the security of data transmission, and easy data leakage.

[0006] According to one aspect of an embodiment of the present invention, a blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage method is provided, comprising: calculating a first hash value for collected original operation and maintenance data, and performing a double-layer digital signature using a probe private key, wherein the double-layer digital signature includes a first-layer signature and a second-layer signature, the first-layer signature including signing the first hash value of each piece of the original operation and maintenance data, and the second-layer signature including performing an overall digital signature on the overall summary of the operation and maintenance data packet, the operation and maintenance data packet being generated by packaging the collected original operation and maintenance data and the first-layer signature; transmitting the signed operation and maintenance data packet to a smart operation and maintenance system using a preset encrypted communication channel, wherein, after receiving the operation and maintenance data packet, the smart operation and maintenance system recalculates a second hash value for the original operation and maintenance data in the operation and maintenance data packet, and compares the second hash value with the first hash value to verify the integrity of the single piece of the original operation and maintenance data; if the integrity check of the single piece of the original operation and maintenance data passes, the blockchain smart contract is called by the smart operation and maintenance system to verify the legitimacy of the double-layer digital signature; the original operation and maintenance data that passes the signature verification is structured and stored in the blockchain network.

[0007] Optionally, the steps of calculating a first hash value for the collected original operation and maintenance data and performing a double-layer digital signature using a probe private key include: using a preset national secret algorithm and the probe private key to sign the first hash value to obtain a first-layer signature; packaging each piece of the original operation and maintenance data and the corresponding first hash value, first-layer signature, and timestamp to generate a structured operation and maintenance data packet; calculating the overall summary of the operation and maintenance data packet, and digitally signing the overall summary of the operation and maintenance data packet.

[0008] Optionally, before calculating the first hash value for the collected original operation and maintenance data and performing a double-layer digital signature using the probe private key, it also includes: pre-deploying a data collection probe in the airport infrastructure server or airport operation and maintenance equipment; after detecting that the data collection probe is started, starting the initialization process, calling the device driver interface to collect device hardware feature information, wherein the device hardware feature information includes: the motherboard serial number, the CPU serial number and the MAC address hash value of the network interface; based on the collected device hardware feature information, generating a globally unique device identifier; when confirming that the data collection probe is started for the first time using a file marking strategy, controlling the airport infrastructure server or airport operation and maintenance equipment to run in a trusted execution environment or a trusted platform module TPM, and using a preset key generation algorithm to generate a pair of asymmetric key pairs, wherein the asymmetric key pairs The key pair includes: the probe public key and the probe private key; the probe private key is bound to the device fingerprint and then securely stored, and the probe public key and the globally unique device identifier are written into the blockchain network; when the file marking strategy is adopted to confirm that the data acquisition probe is not started for the first time, the device is double-authenticated; when both double authentications are passed, the normal data acquisition process is entered; when any re-authentication fails, a data acquisition blocking instruction is output, the security recovery mechanism is switched on, and an alarm is triggered, wherein the data acquisition blocking instruction is used to stop the data acquisition probe from continuing to collect the operation and maintenance data of the airport infrastructure server or the airport operation and maintenance equipment. When the data acquisition blocking instruction is received, the probe certificate revocation list in the blockchain network is updated, and the data acquisition probe is stopped from accessing the smart operation and maintenance system.

[0009] Optionally, the steps of performing dual authentication processing of the device include: in the device identity authentication stage, generating a device signature based on the probe private key, the mainboard serial number and the CPU serial number of the target hardware device; sending the globally unique device identifier, the device signature and the timestamp to the blockchain smart contract; performing device identity authentication through the blockchain smart contract, and when the device identity authentication passes, confirming that the target hardware device is an authorized registered device; in the probe integrity verification stage, extracting the key program file of the target hardware device, and calculating a third hash value based on the key program file; generating a probe signature based on the third hash value and the hardware probe private key, sending the probe identifier of the data acquisition probe, the third hash value and the probe signature to the blockchain smart contract, and performing probe integrity verification through the blockchain smart contract.

[0010] Optionally, the step of using a preset encrypted communication channel to transmit the signed operation and maintenance data packet to the smart operation and maintenance system includes: constructing the preset encrypted communication channel using a preset encryption protection protocol; packaging the signed operation and maintenance data packet as well as the session key, random number and timestamp through the preset encrypted communication channel; transmitting the packaged data file to the smart operation and maintenance system, and the smart operation and maintenance system performing session key verification and timestamp verification. If both verifications pass, the signed operation and maintenance data packet is obtained.

[0011] Optionally, the step of calling the blockchain smart contract through the intelligent operation and maintenance system to verify the legitimacy of the double-layer digital signature includes: using the probe public key to verify the legitimacy of the signature of the first layer signature and the first hash value, and performing an integrity check on the overall summary of the operation and maintenance data packet; when the legitimacy of the signature of the first layer signature and the first hash value, as well as the integrity check of the overall summary of the operation and maintenance data packet are passed, the transmission time of the operation and maintenance data packet is counted to obtain the transmission time difference; when the transmission time difference meets the real-time constraint condition, the operation and maintenance data packet is subjected to a structural integrity check and a sequence consistency check; when the structural integrity check and the sequence consistency check of the operation and maintenance data packet are passed, the blockchain smart contract is called to perform a probe ID check and a timestamp check; when the probe ID check and the timestamp check are passed, the original operation and maintenance data that has passed the signature verification is structured using Merkle tree technology and stored in the blockchain network.

[0012] Optionally, the steps of structuring the original operation and maintenance data that has passed the signature verification and storing it in the blockchain network include: for each batch of the original operation and maintenance data, using the Merkle tree technology to construct a root node corresponding to the current data batch; using the Merkle tree technology to use each piece of the original operation and maintenance data and the corresponding first hash value as a leaf node; based on the device interaction relationship and generation timestamp of each piece of the original operation and maintenance data time, recursively processing all first hash values ​​to obtain the link relationship from the root node to each leaf node, and constructing a Merkle tree corresponding to the current data batch; generating a blockchain transaction corresponding to the current data batch based on the constructed Merkle tree, wherein the blockchain transaction includes the probe identifier of the data acquisition probe corresponding to the current data batch, the timestamp, the overall summary of the operation and maintenance data packet, the overall digital signature, the root node of the Merkle tree, the off-chain storage index pointer and the original operation and maintenance data; calculating the hash value of the transaction summary of the blockchain transaction to obtain a fourth hash value, and after signing the fourth hash value, storing the signed fourth hash value and the transaction summary of the blockchain transaction in the blockchain network.

[0013] Optionally, after using Merkle tree technology to structure the original operation and maintenance data that has passed the signature verification and storing it in the blockchain network, it also includes: when the signature of the blockchain transaction is verified by the blockchain smart contract and the data is passed, generating a transaction evidence record and writing the transaction evidence record into the status database.

[0014] According to another aspect of an embodiment of the present invention, a blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage device is also provided, including: a data signature unit, used to calculate a first hash value for the collected original operation and maintenance data, and use a probe private key to perform a double-layer digital signature, wherein the double-layer digital signature includes a first-layer signature and a second-layer signature, the first-layer signature includes signing the first hash value of each piece of the original operation and maintenance data, and the second-layer signature includes performing an overall digital signature on the overall summary of the operation and maintenance data packet, and the operation and maintenance data packet is generated by packaging the collected original operation and maintenance data and the first-layer signature; a data transmission unit, used to transmit the signature to the data packet through a preset encrypted communication channel. The operation and maintenance data packet with the name is transmitted to the intelligent operation and maintenance system, wherein, after receiving the operation and maintenance data packet, the intelligent operation and maintenance system recalculates the second hash value of the original operation and maintenance data in the operation and maintenance data packet, and compares the second hash value with the first hash value to verify the integrity of the single original operation and maintenance data; the signature verification unit is used to call the blockchain smart contract through the intelligent operation and maintenance system to obtain the probe public key when the integrity verification of the single original operation and maintenance data passes, and use the probe public key to verify the legitimacy of the double-layer digital signature; the data storage unit is used to structure the original operation and maintenance data that has passed the signature verification and store it in the blockchain network.

[0015] Optionally, the data signature unit includes: a first signature module, used to sign the first hash value using a preset national secret algorithm and the probe private key to obtain a first-layer signature; a data packaging module, used to package each piece of the original operation and maintenance data and the corresponding first hash value, first-layer signature, and timestamp to generate a structured operation and maintenance data packet; a second signature module, used to calculate the overall summary of the operation and maintenance data packet, and digitally sign the overall summary of the operation and maintenance data packet.

[0016] Optionally, the blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage device also includes: a probe deployment unit, which is used to pre-deploy a data collection probe in an airport infrastructure server or airport operation and maintenance equipment before calculating a first hash value for the collected original operation and maintenance data and using a probe private key for a double-layer digital signature; a device hardware feature collection unit, which is used to start an initialization process after detecting that the data collection probe is started, and call a device driver interface to collect device hardware feature information, wherein the device hardware feature information includes: a mainboard serial number, a CPU serial number, and a MAC address hash value of a network interface; a device unique identifier generation unit, which is used to generate a globally unique device identifier based on the collected device hardware feature information; a device operating environment control unit, which is used to control the airport infrastructure server or airport operation and maintenance equipment to run in a trusted execution environment or a trusted platform module TPM when confirming that the data collection probe is started for the first time using a file marking strategy, and use a preset key generation algorithm to generate a pair of asymmetric key pairs. , wherein the asymmetric key pair includes: the probe public key and the probe private key; a device unique identifier writing unit, which is used to bind the probe private key to the device fingerprint for secure storage, and write the probe public key and the globally unique device identifier into the blockchain network; a device dual authentication unit, which is used to perform device dual authentication processing when a file marking strategy is adopted to confirm that the data acquisition probe is not started for the first time; a normal data acquisition entry unit, which is used to enter the normal data acquisition process when both dual authentications are passed; a data acquisition blocking unit, which is used to output a data acquisition blocking instruction when any re-authentication fails, cut into the security recovery mechanism, and trigger an alarm prompt, wherein the data acquisition blocking instruction is used to stop the data acquisition probe from continuing to collect the operation and maintenance data of the airport infrastructure server or the airport operation and maintenance equipment. When the data acquisition blocking instruction is received, the probe certificate revocation list in the blockchain network is updated to stop the data acquisition probe from accessing the smart operation and maintenance system.

[0017] According to another aspect of an embodiment of the present invention, a computer-readable storage medium is further provided, wherein the computer-readable storage medium includes a stored computer program, wherein when the computer program is running, the device where the computer-readable storage medium is located is controlled to execute any one of the above-mentioned blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage methods.

[0018] According to another aspect of an embodiment of the present invention, an electronic device is also provided, comprising one or more processors and a memory, wherein the memory is used to store one or more programs, wherein when the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the one or more processors implement any one of the above-mentioned blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage methods.

[0019] According to another aspect of an embodiment of the present invention, a computer program product is also provided, including a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of any one of the above-mentioned blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage methods.

[0020] In the present disclosure, a first hash value is calculated for the collected original operation and maintenance data, and a double-layer digital signature is performed using a probe private key, wherein the double-layer digital signature includes a first-layer signature and a second-layer signature, the first-layer signature includes signing the first hash value of each original operation and maintenance data, and the second-layer signature includes digitally signing the overall summary of the operation and maintenance data packet as a whole, and the operation and maintenance data packet is generated by packaging the collected original operation and maintenance data and the first-layer signature; a preset encrypted communication channel is used to transmit the signed operation and maintenance data packet to the smart operation and maintenance system, wherein after receiving the operation and maintenance data packet, the smart operation and maintenance system recalculates the second hash value of the original operation and maintenance data in the operation and maintenance data packet, and compares the second hash value with the first hash value to verify the integrity of a single piece of original operation and maintenance data; if the integrity check of a single piece of original operation and maintenance data passes, the blockchain smart contract is called by the smart operation and maintenance system to verify the legitimacy of the double-layer digital signature; the original operation and maintenance data that passes the signature verification is structured and stored in the blockchain network.

[0021] Based on the above public content, after collecting operation and maintenance data, the hash algorithm and double-layer digital signature can be combined to ensure the originality and integrity of the data. Then, the blockchain smart contract can be called through the intelligent operation and maintenance system to store the evidence on the chain. Distributed ledger technology is used to ensure the decentralization and security of data storage, prevent single point failures, and effectively improve the safety and reliability of airport operations, thereby solving the technical problems in related technologies such as insufficient data credibility between multi-source heterogeneous systems in the management process of airport operation and maintenance data, inability to guarantee the security of data transmission, and easy data leakage. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0022] The drawings described herein are used to provide a further understanding of the present invention and constitute a part of this application. The exemplary embodiments of the present invention and their descriptions are used to explain the present invention and do not constitute an improper limitation of the present invention. In the drawings:

[0023] Figure 1 is a flowchart of an optional blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage method according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0024] Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of an optional blockchain-based end-to-end trusted airport operation and maintenance data management method according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0025] Figure 3is a flow chart of an optional anti-tampering operation of a data acquisition system according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0026] Figure 4 is a schematic diagram of an optional blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage device according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0027] Figure 5 This is a hardware structure block diagram of an electronic device (or mobile device) that executes a blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage method according to an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0028] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the solutions of the present invention, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the embodiments described are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative efforts should fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0029] It should be noted that the terms "first", "second", etc. in the description and claims of the present invention and the above-mentioned drawings are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that the numbers used in this way can be interchanged where appropriate, so that the embodiments of the present invention described herein can be implemented in an order other than those illustrated or described herein. In addition, the terms "including" and "having" and any variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusions. For example, a process, method, system, product or device that includes a series of steps or units is not necessarily limited to those steps or units clearly listed, but may include other steps or units that are not clearly listed or inherent to these processes, methods, products or devices.

[0030] To facilitate those skilled in the art to understand the present invention, some of the terms or nouns involved in the embodiments of the present invention are explained below:

[0031] Blockchain, or BC, is a decentralized, distributed database technology that records transaction information through block links, ensuring data immutability and traceability. In this application, it is used to ensure the secure and transparent storage of airport operations and maintenance data, supporting trusted verification and auditing of data.

[0032] Smart contracts, or SCs, are automated programs running on the blockchain that automatically verify, execute, and enforce contract terms according to predefined rules. In this paper, smart contracts are responsible for verifying the source and content of data and automatically enforcing data on-chain storage and access control policies.

[0033] A Merkle Tree (MT) is a binary tree structure used to efficiently verify the integrity and consistency of large-scale data. In this paper, it is used to process and verify large-scale operational data. By constructing a Merkle root, it reduces the amount of data directly uploaded to the chain and improves system performance.

[0034] A Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) is a hardware security mechanism that creates an isolated, secure area within the processor for running sensitive tasks and storing data such as keys, protecting data and code from external malware attacks. In this paper, the TEE is used to protect the private keys and signature operations of the probe device, ensuring the trustworthiness of the data collection source.

[0035] A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a dedicated hardware chip used to enhance computer security, store and manage keys, and perform functions such as secure boot and integrity measurement. In this application, the TPM is used for device identity authentication during startup, ensuring the integrity of the device during operation and preventing malicious tampering.

[0036] Transport Layer Security / Secure Sockets Layer (TLS / SSL) is a security protocol used to provide data encryption and authentication in internet communications, protecting data security during transmission. In this invention, TLS / SSL is used to establish a secure transmission channel between the probe and the intelligent operation and maintenance system, preventing data from being eavesdropped or tampered with during transmission.

[0037] Secure Hash Algorithm, referred to as SHA, in the present invention, SHA-256 is used to calculate the hash summary of data in order to verify the originality and integrity of the data.

[0038] A Message Authentication Code (MAC) is used to verify the integrity of data and the identity of the sender, and is typically used in conjunction with a shared key. In this invention, it is used to increase data integrity verification during transmission, preventing data tampering during transmission.

[0039] A hash algorithm (HA) converts an input of arbitrary length into a fixed-length output. The output, called a hash value, is used to uniquely identify and verify the integrity of data. In this invention, HA is used to generate hash digests of different types of operation and maintenance data for subsequent signing and verification.

[0040] Digital Signature (DS) is a security technology based on public-key cryptography that verifies the integrity and authenticity of electronic documents while preventing data forgery and tampering. In this invention, DS is used to perform a double-layer signature on data, ensuring non-repudiation during data collection, transmission, and processing.

[0041] Dual-Level Digital Signature, abbreviated as DLDS, refers to the process of signing data twice. The first signature is used to verify the originality of the data, and the second signature is used to verify the integrity of the overall data package, ensuring the credibility of the data at every stage after collection.

[0042] A Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is a string of characters used to identify the location of a resource on the internet. It can be part of a URL or URN. In this paper, a URI is used to point to the specific location of off-chain data storage, making it easier to find the actual content of the corresponding data on the blockchain.

[0043] It should be noted that the blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage method and device disclosed in the present invention can be used in the field of blockchain technology to achieve end-to-end trusted airport operation and maintenance data management based on blockchain technology, and can also be used in any field other than the field of blockchain technology to achieve end-to-end trusted airport operation and maintenance data management based on blockchain technology.

[0044] It should be noted that the information (including but not limited to user device information, user personal information, etc.) and data (including but not limited to data used for analysis, stored data, displayed data, etc.) collected by this disclosure are information and data authorized by the user or fully authorized by all parties, and the collection, storage, use, processing, transmission, provision, disclosure and application of relevant data comply with the relevant laws, regulations and standards of the relevant regions, take necessary confidentiality measures, do not violate public order and good morals, and provide corresponding operation portals for users to choose to authorize or refuse. For example, an interface is set up between this system and relevant users or institutions. Before obtaining relevant information, it is necessary to send an acquisition request to the aforementioned user or institution through the interface, and obtain relevant information after receiving the consent information fed back by the aforementioned user or institution.

[0045] It should be noted that in this disclosure, when collecting and analyzing customer information, the corresponding operation entrance is provided for users to choose to agree or reject the automated decision-making results; if the user chooses to reject, the expert decision-making process will be entered.

[0046] The following embodiments of the present invention can be applied to various blockchain-based airport operations data storage systems, applications, and devices. This invention is applicable to smart airport operations data management scenarios, as well as multi-system data integration and trusted sharing. For example, this can be implemented in end-to-end trusted airport operations data management systems enabled by blockchain technology. Alternatively, it can be used to seamlessly integrate and securely share data across heterogeneous systems, such as airport production operations systems, intelligent security systems, baggage tracking systems, and flight display systems. Blockchain technology ensures the authenticity and integrity of data during transmission and exchange, promoting cross-departmental collaboration and decision support.

[0047] The present invention combines hardware fingerprints with digital signature mechanisms to ensure that data is tamper-free and pollution-free from the source of data collection to the final storage of the data. Through the automated verification of smart contracts, the non-repudiation of data submission behavior is guaranteed, and the transparency and fairness of data governance are enhanced. It solves technical problems such as insufficient data credibility between multi-source heterogeneous systems, difficulty in event tracing, unclear responsibility definition, and security risks of centralized architecture in existing airport operation and maintenance data management, and provides an end-to-end trusted airport operation and maintenance data management system based on blockchain and its implementation method, so as to achieve authenticity, integrity, traceability and non-repudiation of airport operation and maintenance data from collection, transmission, processing to storage.

[0048] Furthermore, this invention leverages Merkle tree technology and a hybrid on-chain and off-chain storage architecture to effectively address the performance bottlenecks and cost issues associated with uploading large amounts of data onto the blockchain, optimizing data processing and query efficiency. Furthermore, a unified blockchain-based data governance framework facilitates data collaboration and trust building across multiple departments and systems, enhancing the coordination and flexibility of the overall operations and maintenance system. Through smart contracts and on-chain data storage, it provides a transparent and traceable audit mechanism for airport operations and maintenance, facilitating compliance review and responsibility delineation, and reducing legal and operational risks.

[0049] This paper proposes an end-to-end trusted data management architecture based on blockchain. This architecture combines trusted computing, cryptographic signatures, smart contracts, edge collaborative data collection, and multi-source data fusion and uploading to the blockchain to ensure data integrity across all key links, including collection, processing, transmission, and storage. Probe devices deployed throughout airport infrastructure encrypt and collect key data in real time, and a hash algorithm and double-layer digital signatures are used to ensure data authenticity and integrity. After data collection, it is immediately uploaded to the blockchain for evidence storage, and smart contracts verify the data source and content, ensuring its immutability. Furthermore, this paper utilizes Merkle tree technology to efficiently store and verify massive amounts of data while ensuring data integrity and verifiability. The system also employs distributed ledger technology to ensure decentralized and secure data storage and prevent single points of failure. Ultimately, this system establishes a transparent, efficient, and traceable airport operations and maintenance data management system, effectively improving the safety and reliability of airport operations and enhancing cross-system data collaboration and event tracing efficiency.

[0050] The present invention will be described in detail below with reference to various embodiments.

[0051] Example 1

[0052] According to an embodiment of the present invention, an embodiment of a blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage method is provided. It should be noted that the steps shown in the flowchart of the accompanying drawings can be executed in a computer system such as a set of computer-executable instructions, and although a logical order is shown in the flowchart, in some cases, the steps shown or described may be executed in an order different from that shown here.

[0053] It should be noted that the airport operations and maintenance system architecture involved in this embodiment of the present invention comprises three core components: data collection probes deployed on airport infrastructure servers; a central intelligent operations and maintenance system for data aggregation, processing, and analysis; and a permissioned blockchain network providing tamper-proof storage capabilities. These components are interconnected via secure communication channels, and trust policies are embedded at every stage of the data chain, ensuring that data is trustworthy throughout its lifecycle.

[0054] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of an optional blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage method according to an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 1 As shown, the method includes the following steps:

[0055] To ensure the security and reliability of data collection, this invention first implements two-way identity authentication on the probe device, such as through digital certificates, to prevent forgery and unauthorized access. The probe device uses hardware-based unique identification and implements a trusted startup mechanism to ensure that the software remains trusted during startup and operation. Furthermore, code signing and runtime integrity verification further safeguard the probe device's software security, preventing malicious tampering and data leakage. Blockchain smart contracts verify device identity, ensuring that only authenticated devices are authorized to collect data, further enhancing the probe device's credibility.

[0056] Optionally, before calculating the first hash value for the collected original operation and maintenance data and performing a double-layer digital signature using the probe private key, it also includes: pre-deploying a data collection probe in the airport infrastructure server or airport operation and maintenance equipment; after detecting that the data collection probe is started, starting the initialization process, calling the device driver interface to collect the device hardware feature information, wherein the device hardware feature information includes: the motherboard serial number, the CPU serial number and the MAC address hash value of the network interface; generating a globally unique device identifier based on the collected device hardware feature information; when confirming that the data collection probe is started for the first time using a file marking strategy, controlling the airport infrastructure server or airport operation and maintenance equipment to run in a trusted execution environment or a trusted platform module TPM, and using a preset key generation algorithm to generate a pair of asymmetric keys Key pair, wherein the asymmetric key pair includes: a probe public key and a probe private key; the probe private key is bound to the device fingerprint and stored securely, and the probe public key and the globally unique device identifier are written into the blockchain network; when the file marking strategy is used to confirm that the data collection probe is not started for the first time, the device is double-authenticated; when both double authentications are passed, the normal data collection process is entered; when any re-authentication fails, a data collection blocking instruction is output, the security recovery mechanism is switched on, and an alarm is triggered, wherein the data collection blocking instruction is used to stop the data collection probe from continuing to collect operation and maintenance data of the airport infrastructure server or airport operation and maintenance equipment. When the data collection blocking instruction is received, the probe certificate revocation list in the blockchain network is updated, and the data collection probe is stopped from accessing the smart operation and maintenance system.

[0057] A data collection probe is pre-deployed in the airport infrastructure server or airport operation and maintenance equipment. This probe is responsible for real-time monitoring and collecting equipment operation data, including monitoring indicators, log information, and link tracking data, to support subsequent operation and maintenance decisions and troubleshooting. When the data collection probe is detected to be activated, the initialization process is automatically started, and the device driver interface is called to collect the device hardware feature information. It should be noted that the hardware feature information mentioned in this embodiment may include the motherboard serial number (MBID), the CPU serial number (CPUID), and the MAC (Media Access Control Address, device LAN address / device physical address) address hash value (MAC_Hash) of the network interface, which is used to construct a unique hardware fingerprint of the device to ensure the source credibility of subsequent data collection. Among them, the motherboard serial number can uniquely identify the motherboard of the electronic device, the CPU (Central Processing Unit) serial number identifies the specific model and serial number of the processor, and the MAC address hash value of the network interface ensures the uniqueness of the network connection device. By combining these hardware feature information to generate a device identifier, a hardware fingerprint that is difficult to forge can be formed, providing a solid physical layer basis for device authentication. Then, based on the collected device hardware feature information, a globally unique device identifier (Device_ID) may be generated through a hash algorithm. For example, the globally unique device identifier (Device_ID) may be generated through the following formula: Device_ID=Hash(MBID||CPUID||MAC_Hash).

[0058] If the file marking strategy is used to determine that the current data collection probe is started for the first time, this embodiment controls the airport infrastructure server or airport operation and maintenance equipment to run in a trusted execution environment (TEE) or a trusted platform module (TPM) (TEE provides an isolated and protected operating environment. Even if other parts of the device are compromised, the information and operations in the TEE are difficult to tamper with or monitor. TPM is a special security chip that can physically protect sensitive information such as keys to prevent software attacks or malicious tampering. In the data collection probe that is started for the first time, this embodiment uses the TEE or TPM environment to ensure the security of the asymmetric key pair generation and the non-extractability of the private key). In the secure environment of the TEE or TPM, a preset key generation algorithm (such as RSA-3072) is used to generate an asymmetric key pair, including a probe public key (PK) and a probe private key (SK). The probe private key will be securely bound to the device fingerprint and stored, and the probe public key and the globally unique device identifier will be written to the blockchain network as the basis for subsequent data authentication and evidence storage.

[0059] In a situation where it is not the first startup, this embodiment performs dual authentication processing on the device. Optionally, the steps for performing dual authentication processing on the device include: in the device identity authentication stage, generating a device signature based on the probe private key, the motherboard serial number and the CPU serial number of the target hardware device; sending the globally unique device identifier, the device signature and the timestamp to the blockchain smart contract; performing device identity authentication through the blockchain smart contract, and when the device identity authentication passes, confirming that the target hardware device is an authorized registered device; in the probe integrity verification stage, extracting the key program files of the target hardware device, and calculating the third hash value based on the key program files; generating a probe signature based on the third hash value and the hardware probe private key, sending the probe identifier, the third hash value and the probe signature of the data acquisition probe to the blockchain smart contract, and performing probe integrity verification through the blockchain smart contract.

[0060] During the device authentication phase, this embodiment first uses the hardware probe's private key to encrypt the target hardware device's core characteristics to generate a device signature. This involves using the target hardware device's motherboard serial number (MBID) and CPU serial number (CPUID) as input and digitally signing it with the private key (SK). The device signature generation algorithm ensures uniqueness and irreproducibility, providing a solid foundation for subsequent device identity verification.

[0061] The generated device signature, along with the globally unique device identifier (Device_ID) and a high-precision timestamp (Timestamp), is sent to the blockchain smart contract via a secure channel. Upon receiving this data, the smart contract executes a series of verification logic. During the device authentication phase, the smart contract verifies the device signature using the device's public key registered on the blockchain. This verification process involves comparing the device signature with the original hardware characteristics (MBID||CPUID) and checking whether the globally unique device identifier (Device_ID) is consistent with the information registered on the blockchain. Through this verification process, only legally registered devices are confirmed as authorized devices, ensuring the device's trustworthiness. During the probe integrity verification phase, this embodiment further ensures that the operating environment of the data acquisition tool (probe) has not been tampered with or contaminated. The probe extracts key program files from the target hardware device and hashes them to generate a third hash value (Probe_Hash), using a secure hash algorithm such as SHA-256. Subsequently, the third hash value is signed using the hardware probe's private key (SK_Probe) to generate the probe signature (Sig_Probe).

[0062] Through this dual authentication mechanism, this embodiment achieves dual security protection for both hardware devices and software probes at the source of data collection. Device identity authentication ensures the legitimacy of the hardware device, while probe integrity verification further verifies the trustworthiness of the software environment, creating a tamper-resistant and non-repudiable data collection environment.

[0063] If both authentications are successful, the data collection probe enters the normal data collection process and begins collecting real-time operational data from airport infrastructure or equipment. However, if a failure is detected during any reauthentication process, this embodiment will output a data collection blocking instruction, immediately halting the data collection probe's collection activities, engaging the security recovery mechanism, and triggering an alarm. Upon receiving the blocking instruction, the system updates the probe's certificate revocation list in the blockchain network, thereby blocking all subsequent access requests from the probe and preventing unauthorized or tampered devices from continuing to input data into the smart operation and maintenance system, effectively ensuring the security of the airport's operation and maintenance data ecosystem.

[0064] Step S101, calculate the first hash value of the collected original operation and maintenance data, and use the probe private key to perform a double-layer digital signature, wherein the double-layer digital signature includes a first-layer signature and a second-layer signature, the first-layer signature includes signing the first hash value of each original operation and maintenance data, and the second-layer signature includes digitally signing the entire summary of the operation and maintenance data packet. The operation and maintenance data packet is generated by packaging the collected original operation and maintenance data and the first-layer signature.

[0065] Optionally, the steps of calculating a first hash value for the collected original operation and maintenance data and performing a double-layer digital signature using the probe private key include: using a preset national secret algorithm and the probe private key to sign the first hash value to obtain a first-layer signature; packaging each piece of original operation and maintenance data and the corresponding first hash value, first-layer signature, and timestamp to generate a structured operation and maintenance data packet; calculating the overall summary of the operation and maintenance data packet, and digitally signing the overall summary of the operation and maintenance data packet.

[0066] In the very initial stage of data collection, this embodiment performs preprocessing on each piece of original operation and maintenance data, including operations such as unifying the format, removing outliers, and standardizing timestamps. Subsequently, this embodiment uses a national secret algorithm (such as SM3) or similar technology to calculate the first hash value for the processed data. The first hash value can capture the content of the original data. Then, this embodiment uses the private key built into the probe to sign each generated first hash value to obtain a first-layer signature (defined as Sig1). This process ensures the authenticity and integrity of each piece of data at the source, which is equivalent to giving each piece of data an unforgeable "digital fingerprint". Even if the data is modified in the subsequent circulation process, its first-layer signature will no longer match, making it easy to identify whether the data has been tampered with.

[0067] On the basis of the first-layer signature, this embodiment further ensures the integrity and tamper-proofness at the data packet level. This embodiment packages the original operation and maintenance data (Data1, Sig11) that has passed the first-layer signature, the first hash value (defined as Hash11) and the corresponding timestamp (defined as Timestamp11) and other information to form a structured operation and maintenance data packet (defined as DataPacket). The construction of this data packet ensures the structuring and standardization of the data during the transmission process, which is convenient for subsequent processing and verification. Subsequently, this embodiment again uses the national secret algorithm or other security algorithms to calculate the summary of the entire operation and maintenance data packet (defined as Summary), and uses the probe's private key to sign the summary to generate a second-layer signature (defined as Sig2). Through the second-layer signature, this embodiment ensures the integrity of the entire data packet structure and the aggregation effect of the data. Even if the signature of a single piece of data passes, if the data packet is reorganized or modified during transmission, the second-layer signature will fail verification, thereby ensuring the credibility of the data from collection to packaging.

[0068] In step S102, the signed operation and maintenance data packet is transmitted to the intelligent operation and maintenance system using a preset encrypted communication channel. After receiving the operation and maintenance data packet, the intelligent operation and maintenance system recalculates a second hash value for the original operation and maintenance data in the operation and maintenance data packet, and compares the second hash value with the first hash value to verify the integrity of the single original operation and maintenance data.

[0069] Optionally, step S102 includes: using a preset encryption protection protocol to construct a preset encrypted communication channel; packaging the signed operation and maintenance data packet as well as the session key, random number and timestamp through the preset encrypted communication channel; transmitting the packaged data file to the intelligent operation and maintenance system, and the intelligent operation and maintenance system performs session key verification and timestamp verification. If all verifications are passed, a signed operation and maintenance data packet is obtained.

[0070] Before transmitting the operation and maintenance data packet, this embodiment further adds a packaging step involving a session key, a random number, and a timestamp. This mechanism improves the security of the transmitted data. The session key ensures that each communication in the channel is independently encrypted, preventing subsequent data from being decrypted even if the previous communication key is intercepted. The random number is used to prevent replay attacks. A new random number is generated for each data transmission and signed and packaged together with the session key and timestamp to ensure the uniqueness and freshness of the data packet. The timestamp is used to verify the timeliness of the data packet and prevent the injection of outdated data. The packaged operation and maintenance data packet is transmitted to the intelligent operation and maintenance system via a pre-set encrypted communication channel. After receiving the data packet, the intelligent operation and maintenance system first decrypts the data using the session key and then verifies the session key to ensure the integrity of the channel and the reliability of the data. Next, the timestamp is verified to ensure the real-time and validity of the data and avoid misjudgments caused by data aging or delay. Furthermore, the intelligent operation and maintenance system recalculates a second hash value for the original operation and maintenance data in the operation and maintenance data packet and compares it with the first hash value carried in the data packet to verify the integrity of the single original operation and maintenance data. If the second hash value is consistent with the first hash value, it proves that the original operation and maintenance data has not been tampered with during the transmission process, maintaining the originality and authenticity of the data.

[0071] In step S103, if the integrity check of a single piece of original operation and maintenance data passes, the blockchain smart contract is called through the intelligent operation and maintenance system to verify the legitimacy of the double-layer digital signature.

[0072] Optionally, the step of calling the blockchain smart contract through the intelligent operation and maintenance system to verify the legitimacy of the double-layer digital signature includes: using the probe public key to verify the legitimacy of the signature of the first layer and the first hash value, and performing an integrity check on the overall summary of the operation and maintenance data packet; when the legitimacy of the signature of the first layer and the first hash value, as well as the integrity check of the overall summary of the operation and maintenance data packet are passed, the transmission time of the operation and maintenance data packet is counted to obtain the transmission time difference; when the transmission time difference meets the real-time constraint condition, the operation and maintenance data packet is subjected to a structural integrity check and a sequence consistency check; when the structural integrity check and the sequence consistency check of the operation and maintenance data packet are passed, the blockchain smart contract is called to perform a probe ID check and a timestamp check; when the probe ID check and the timestamp check are passed, the original operation and maintenance data that has passed the signature verification is structured using Merkle tree technology and stored in the blockchain network.

[0073] It should be noted that after both layers of signature verification are passed, this embodiment calculates the transmission time difference (defined as ΔTi) from the completion of data packet collection by the probe to the receipt by the intelligent operation and maintenance system, and determines whether it meets the pre-set real-time constraint ΔTi≤ΔTmax, ensuring that the data in the data packet is transmitted and arrives within a reasonable time to prevent data delay or replay attacks.

[0074] As for executing structural integrity and sequence consistency checks, structural integrity checks involve the content layout and format of the data packet, while sequence consistency checks focus on whether the order of the data is correct. These two checks together ensure that the data packet has not been damaged or reassembled in any form.

[0075] Step S104: The original operation and maintenance data that has passed the signature verification is structured and stored in the blockchain network.

[0076] This embodiment aims to structure raw operation and maintenance data that has passed signature verification and store it on the blockchain network, ensuring the data's immutability and verifiability. The specific process involves constructing a Merkle tree and generating on-chain transactions to achieve efficient data storage and rapid verification.

[0077] Optionally, step S104 includes: for each batch of original operation and maintenance data, using the Merkle tree technology to construct a root node corresponding to the current data batch; using the Merkle tree technology to use each original operation and maintenance data and the corresponding first hash value as a leaf node; based on the device interaction relationship and generation timestamp of each original operation and maintenance data time, recursively processing all first hash values ​​to obtain the link relationship from the root node to each leaf node, and constructing a Merkle tree corresponding to the current data batch; based on the constructed Merkle tree, generating a blockchain transaction corresponding to the current data batch, wherein the blockchain transaction includes the probe identifier of the data acquisition probe corresponding to the current data batch, the timestamp, the overall summary of the operation and maintenance data packet, the overall digital signature, the root node of the Merkle tree, the off-chain storage index pointer and the original operation and maintenance data; calculating the hash value of the transaction summary of the blockchain transaction to obtain a fourth hash value, and after signing the fourth hash value, storing the signed fourth hash value and the transaction summary of the blockchain transaction to the blockchain network.

[0078] This embodiment uses Merkle tree technology to first construct a corresponding root node for each batch of raw operation and maintenance data. This node represents the hash summary of the entire batch of data and is the top of the Merkle tree. Then, each piece of raw operation and maintenance data that has passed the signature verification and its corresponding first hash value are defined as leaf nodes. These leaf nodes are the bottom layer of the Merkle tree and are directly associated with the raw operation and maintenance data. Based on the device interaction relationship and the data generation timestamp, this embodiment recursively processes all first hash values ​​to generate a link relationship from the root node to each leaf node to form a Merkle tree structure. The recursive process ensures that the hash value of each piece of data is involved in the calculation until the hash value of the root node is generated, thereby achieving data integrity and traceability.

[0079] Based on the constructed Merkle tree, this embodiment then generates a blockchain transaction corresponding to the current data batch. The transaction content includes, but is not limited to, the probe identifier of the data acquisition probe, the data generation timestamp, the overall summary of the operation and maintenance data package, the overall digital signature, the root node of the Merkle tree, the off-chain storage index pointer, and the original operation and maintenance data, ensuring complete tracking of the data from source to storage. After generating the blockchain transaction, this embodiment hashes the transaction summary to obtain a fourth hash value. This fourth hash value is then signed to ensure the integrity and source authenticity of the transaction. The signed fourth hash value is stored on the blockchain network along with the blockchain transaction summary, forming an unalterable data record.

[0080] Optionally, after using Merkle tree technology to structure the original operation and maintenance data that has passed the signature verification and store it in the blockchain network, it also includes: when the signature of the blockchain transaction is verified through the blockchain smart contract and the data is passed, a transaction evidence record is generated and the transaction evidence record is written into the status database.

[0081] When the blockchain smart contract verifies the signature and data of the blockchain transaction, this embodiment further generates a transaction evidence record. The transaction evidence record includes, but is not limited to, key metadata such as the transaction hash value, timestamp, data summary, device identification, signature information, etc., and is written to the state database to provide a basis for subsequent audits or data verification.

[0082] Through the above steps, the first hash value of the collected original operation and maintenance data can be calculated, and the probe private key can be used for double-layer digital signature, wherein the double-layer digital signature includes a first-layer signature and a second-layer signature, the first-layer signature includes signing the first hash value of each original operation and maintenance data, and the second-layer signature includes signing the overall summary of the operation and maintenance data packet as a whole. The operation and maintenance data packet is generated by packaging the collected original operation and maintenance data and the first-layer signature; a preset encrypted communication channel is used to transmit the signed operation and maintenance data packet to the smart operation and maintenance system, wherein, after receiving the operation and maintenance data packet, the smart operation and maintenance system recalculates the second hash value of the original operation and maintenance data in the operation and maintenance data packet, and compares the second hash value with the first hash value to verify the integrity of a single piece of original operation and maintenance data; if the integrity check of a single piece of original operation and maintenance data passes, the blockchain smart contract is called through the smart operation and maintenance system to verify the legitimacy of the double-layer digital signature; the original operation and maintenance data that passes the signature verification is structured and stored in the blockchain network. In this embodiment, after collecting operation and maintenance data, the hash algorithm and double-layer digital signature can be combined to ensure the originality and integrity of the data. Then, the blockchain smart contract can be called through the intelligent operation and maintenance system to store the evidence on the chain. Distributed ledger technology is used to ensure the decentralization and security of data storage, prevent single point failures, and effectively improve the safety and reliability of airport operations, thereby solving the technical problems in related technologies of insufficient data credibility between multi-source heterogeneous systems in the management process of airport operation and maintenance data, inability to guarantee the security of data transmission, and easy data leakage.

[0083] The following describes in detail another optional specific implementation.

[0084] Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of an optional end-to-end trusted airport operation and maintenance data management method based on blockchain according to an embodiment of the present invention, such as Figure 2 As shown, through hardware binding and digital signature technology, the credibility of the data collection source is ensured, illegal tampering is prevented, and data integrity is guaranteed. The specific implementation process is as follows:

[0085] Step S1: After the probe is started, it obtains the hardware unique identifier (i.e., generates a globally unique device identifier). By automatically starting the initialization process, the device driver interface is called to collect hardware inherent feature information, including the motherboard serial number (MBID), CPU serial number (CPUID), and the MAC address hash value (MAC_Hash) of the network interface. The globally unique device identifier (Device_ID) is generated using the following formula:

[0086] Device_ID=Hash(MBID||CPUID||MAC_Hash).

[0087] The present invention proposes an end-to-end trusted airport operation and maintenance data management method based on blockchain, which can realize the full-process trusted collection and management of airport operation and maintenance data. By realizing real-time data collection, structured encapsulation and double-layer digital signature mechanism on the probe side, combined with the tamper-proof and traceable characteristics of blockchain technology, end-to-end trusted protection of operation and maintenance data is achieved throughout the entire process of its generation, transmission, processing and storage.

[0088] Then, a file marking method is used to determine whether it is the first startup. If so, step S2 is executed; if not, step S3 is executed.

[0089] Step S2: If this is the first boot, the device generates an asymmetric key pair (PK, SK) in the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) or Trusted Platform Module (TPM) using the RSA-3072 algorithm. The private key is bound to the device fingerprint and securely stored. The public key PK is then encapsulated with the Device_ID to form a registration information block, which is then written to the blockchain via the chaincode interface.

[0090] The embodiments of the present invention implement an anti-tampering protection mechanism for the probe device through TEE technology to ensure the credibility of the data collection source. As a collection tool, the probe device integrates a trusted execution environment (TEE) or a trusted platform module (TPM) at the hardware level. All private key storage and signing operations are completed in an isolated environment, with anti-tampering and non-extractable security properties. The device completes identity registration during the manufacturing and deployment phase, and combined with the device public key and unique identifier registered on the blockchain, it supports continuous verification of the device integrity and authentication status during system operation.

[0091] Step S3: If it is determined not to be the first startup, the system enters the two-factor authentication process based on the smart contract:

[0092] First level authentication: device identity authentication.

[0093] The system collects the current hardware unique identifier and generates a signature Sig_HID using the TPM built-in private key SK:

[0094] Sig_HID=Sign(SK,MBID||CPUID).

[0095] The following data is sent to the blockchain smart contract for verification: {Device_ID, Sig_HID, Timestamp}.

[0096] The contract verification process is: Verify(PK_onchain, Sig_HID, MBID||CPUID)∧(Device_ID==Device_ID_onchain).

[0097] If the verification is successful, the device is identified as an authorized registered device.

[0098] Second level of authentication: Probe integrity verification.

[0099] The system calculates the hash value Probe_Hash for the key program file: Probe_Hash = SHA-256 (Probe_Code), and then uses the local probe private key SK_Probe to generate the signature Sig_Probe: Sig_Probe = Sign (SK_Probe, Probe_Hash).

[0100] Upload the probe identifiers ID_Probe, Probe_Hash, and Sig_Probe to the smart contract for verification:

[0101] Verify(PK_Probe_onchain,Sig_Probe,Probe_Hash)∧(Probe_Hash==Probe_Hash_onchain).

[0102] Step S4: If both authentications are successful, the system enters the normal data collection process. The system will periodically perform verification and key updates to ensure the probe's credibility and data integrity are not affected.

[0103] Step S5: If any authentication fails, the system further analyzes the cause of the failure. Signature verification failure may indicate that the probe's operating environment has been tampered with or replaced, posing a security risk. In this case, the system immediately blocks data collection and initiates a security recovery mechanism, executing step S7.

[0104] Step S6: If the authentication failure is due to other issues (such as network delay, key expiration, etc.), the system will trigger the corresponding processing mechanism. For network delay, the system will initiate a retry mechanism to ensure successful data transmission; for key expiration, the system will automatically generate a new key and update the public key record on the chain.

[0105] If the processing is successful, the system will resume the normal collection process; if the processing fails, the system will record the fault information and trigger an alarm to facilitate subsequent analysis and improvement.

[0106] Step S7: Invalid signatures are included in the security audit and an alert is issued. The probe is then put into sleep mode and the security team is notified to investigate. Simultaneously, the on-chain certificate revocation list is updated to prevent the tampered probe from continuing to access the system.

[0107] Figure 3 FIG. 1 is a flowchart of an optional anti-tampering operation of a data acquisition system according to an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 3The figure shows in detail the interaction logic and security mechanisms of each link (business system (already deployed on data collection probes on airport infrastructure servers and other equipment), alliance chain (a permissioned blockchain network that provides tamper-proof storage capabilities), and intelligent operation and maintenance system) to ensure the efficiency and security of the data collection process. The specific implementation steps include:

[0108] Step S1: The probe collects data. Based on the preset collection strategy, the probe collects raw operation and maintenance data from the target server or device in real time, including monitoring indicators (CPU utilization, memory usage, disk I / O, network traffic, etc.), system and business logs (syslog, application operation logs, error logs) and link tracking data (distributed call chain information based on SkyWalking). Taking into account the high frequency of data collection, rich data dimensions and strict timeliness requirements in the operation and maintenance environment, the probe will perform multi-dimensional preprocessing while collecting data, covering processes such as format unification, outlier removal, timestamp standardization and data structure conversion. The system introduces a data quality assessment model Q = f(v, c, d, s), where v represents data validity, c represents collection integrity, d represents time delay, and s represents structural consistency. The comprehensive score Q is used for subsequent data credibility assessment and dynamic scheduling decisions.

[0109] Step S2: Device Authentication Signature. The probe calculates a hash value Hi = Hash(Di) for each piece of preprocessed data Di. Using the national secret algorithm SM3, it signs the hash value with the private key SK from the built-in trusted module: Sig1 i = Sign(SK,Hi), ensuring the data's originality and integrity. The corresponding public key PKi is registered to the blockchain contract during device initialization for subsequent verification. This signature ensures tamper-proofing and traceability of individual data entries.

[0110] Step S3: Data packet structure encapsulation and second-layer digital signature. The probe packages multiple pieces of collected data {D1,...Dn} within a set time window, along with their corresponding hashes {H1,...Hn}, first-layer signatures {Sig11,...Sig1 n}, and timestamps {T1,...Tn}, to generate a structured data packet P. The overall data packet digest HP = Hash(P) is calculated, and then the overall data packet is digitally signed: Sig2 = Sign(SK,HP) to ensure packet-level integrity. This structure preserves authentication data at the original granularity while improving transmission and verification efficiency.

[0111] This embodiment enables the establishment of a tamper-proof and originality verification mechanism for collected data. The collected monitoring indicators, log information, and link tracking data undergo standardized local preprocessing, a hash algorithm is used to generate a data digest, which is then bound to the probe device identity and a high-precision timestamp. This digest is then digitally signed twice. The first signature verifies the originality of the data content, while the second signature protects the integrity of the entire package structure. By utilizing device information registered on the blockchain and the smart contract mechanism, triple verification of data source, time, and content is achieved, comprehensively enhancing the data's credibility.

[0112] Step S4: Transmit to the Smart Operation and Maintenance System. The probe uses a TLS / SSL encrypted channel to transmit the data packet to the Smart Operation and Maintenance System, incorporating a transmission integrity check mechanism V = HMAC(K, P||R||T), where K is the session key, R is a random number, and T is a timestamp. Through mechanisms such as sequence number control, anti-replay caching, and fragmentation verification, network man-in-the-middle attacks and data packet tampering are effectively prevented, ensuring link security.

[0113] Step S5: The intelligent operation and maintenance system performs a data packet integrity check. After receiving the data packet, the intelligent operation and maintenance system recalculates the hash value H'i = Hash(D'i) for each data item and compares the hash value Hi to verify the integrity of the individual data transmission. The blockchain smart contract is then called to obtain the corresponding public key PKi of the probe, verify the legitimacy of the signatures Sig1i and Hi, and simultaneously verify the signature Sig2 of the overall data packet digest HP. The system evaluates whether the time difference ΔTi = |Ti - Trecv| satisfies the real-time constraint ΔTi ≤ ΔTmax, and checks the packet structure integrity and sequence consistency to preliminarily confirm the legitimacy and compliance of the data packet.

[0114] Step S6: The smart contract verifies the validity of the signature. The system performs a second round of verification by invoking the on-chain smart contract: Verify(PK, Sig2, HP) = True for Sig2 and HP, and further verifies the logical consistency of the probe ID, algorithm identifier, and timestamp. If the verification passes, the system generates a verification event record and authorizes off-chain storage. If it fails, an exception log is recorded and an alarm is issued. This process implements end-to-end multi-factor authentication and dynamic authorization policy control.

[0115] Step S7: Off-chain storage and batch data processing. The system writes the verified raw data to HDFS, a high-performance time series and log database. Based on this, a Merkle tree is constructed in batches: Let the dataset {D1,...Dn} have its corresponding hash {H1,...Hn} as the leaf node. Internal nodes are recursively generated using Hp = Hash(Hl||Hr), ultimately resulting in a Merkle Root M. M can be used for subsequent rapid verification, supporting the restoration of the verification path for any data using Merkle Proof = {Hsibling,...}, avoiding recalculation of the entire data.

[0116] This embodiment introduces a hybrid on-chain and off-chain storage architecture and Merkle Tree technology to effectively address the performance and cost bottlenecks associated with on-chain storage of massive operational data. By utilizing the Merkle root for on-chain storage, combined with off-chain data storage pointers and Merkle Proof verification mechanisms, system storage and query efficiency is significantly improved while ensuring verifiability and integrity.

[0117] Step S8: The smart operation and maintenance system submits the data to the blockchain. The system constructs an on-chain transaction, Ttx = {ID, T, HP, Sig2, M, StoragePtr, Meta}, where M represents the Merkle root of the current data batch and StoragePtr is the off-chain storage index pointer. The system then signs the transaction digest, Hash (Ttx), and submits it to the blockchain smart contract interface, ensuring data non-repudiation and structural traceability.

[0118] Step S9: Blockchain Smart Contract Verification and Evidence Storage. The contract invokes verification logic to verify the validity of the signature Sig2, the correspondence between the Merkle root and the data, the legitimacy of the timestamp, and the submitter's permissions. If verification passes, an unalterable evidence record E = {ID, M, T, HP, Sig2} is generated and written to the state database. If any anomalies are detected, the error status is immediately recorded for subsequent audit analysis, problem location, and defense strategy adjustment.

[0119] This embodiment uses smart contracts to achieve automated control of the entire process of data verification, chain evidence storage and auditing. Smart contracts perform automatic verification of multiple dimensions such as signature legitimacy, timestamp validity, submission permissions, etc. according to policy rules, and record all operation events to build a complete audit tracking path.

[0120] Step S10: Subsequent operation and maintenance processing and transparent query. On-chain evidence storage constitutes a trusted source. The intelligent operation and maintenance system supports on-demand pulling or subscription of relevant data. Combined with off-chain log query and on-chain verification mechanisms, it supports SLA auditing, problem location, and compliance analysis. The query process uses Merkle Proof to quickly verify the legitimacy of off-chain data. That is, the Merkle root M is read from the chain and the proof path is used to verify whether the Hash (Di) is included in M, achieving structural integrity and source traceability requirements. All access processes and verification events are automatically recorded and uploaded to the chain by the smart contract, ensuring the strong security and high availability of the system, and achieving traceability throughout the entire process, building a trusted operation and maintenance data system.

[0121] In order to improve the efficiency of large-scale operation and maintenance data processing while ensuring system credibility, the present invention adopts an on-chain and off-chain collaborative storage architecture, and formulates a unified data classification and processing strategy through smart contracts to achieve verifiability, traceability and efficient management of data throughout its life cycle.

[0122] Table 1 below illustrates the classification of data on and off the blockchain network.

[0123] Table 1 Overview of on-chain and off-chain data classification

[0124]

[0125] Among them, data with high requirements for system security and compliance must be stored on the chain:

[0126] 1. Probe identity and registration information: including device unique identifier, public key summary, registration time, etc., used to trace the device source and authentication status;

[0127] 2. Hash summary and signature of original operation and maintenance data: records information such as collection timestamp and double-layer signature, which is used to verify data integrity and originality on the chain;

[0128] 3. Probe access authentication and submission behavior log: records data submission behavior, authentication status, verification results, etc., as system behavior audit evidence;

[0129] 4. Summary of key abnormal events: Such as illegal device access, high-risk operations, etc., can be used to quickly issue alerts and conduct subsequent accountability through summary information.

[0130] 5. High-frequency or large-volume data is stored off-chain and bound to a trusted mapping relationship through on-chain hashing: Full raw operation and maintenance data, such as CPU utilization, memory read / write, network traffic, and other indicators, is stored in an encrypted database, and only the hash summary is retained on-chain;

[0131] 6. System log and report data: such as periodic status reports, system operation logs, etc., to support subsequent query and analysis;

[0132] 7. Auxiliary analysis of intermediate results: such as model input features, algorithm snapshots, etc., mainly used for performance tuning and trend analysis.

[0133] Furthermore, this embodiment provides an open and transparent storage strategy smart contract, which pre-sets the types of logs, indicators and link tracking data, and uniformly sets the collection frequency, field requirements and storage methods to ensure consistent processing specifications. The contract limits the on-chain fields to the allowed list range to prevent illegal data from being written, and sets the data submission frequency and capacity upper limit to prevent brushing. Abnormal submissions will be intercepted and reported. In addition, the smart contract sets the collection equipment to register the identity and public key, configures permissions according to roles, requires signature verification for data submission, and verifies the hash, timestamp and summary after receiving the data to ensure that it has not been tampered with. At the same time, the smart contract of this embodiment determines whether the data is compliant, generates on-chain transactions for compliant data and writes them into the blockchain, provides a unified interface standard, ensures the consistency of data structures of various business systems, and facilitates collaborative governance.

[0134] Through the above-mentioned on-chain and off-chain coordination mechanism, combined with the data batch hash encapsulation and verification realized by Merkle tree technology, the system effectively improves data storage performance and multi-system coordination capabilities without sacrificing trustworthy guarantees.

[0135] Through the above-mentioned embodiments, the credibility, security and transparency of the data can be significantly improved. The monitoring indicators, log information and link tracking data collected by the system are processed by double-layer signatures, timestamp binding and on-chain verification mechanisms, and their integrity and non-repudiation are guaranteed, providing a highly reliable data input foundation for the airport operation and maintenance system. The end-to-end trusted data management capability provided by the present invention effectively makes up for the key shortcomings of traditional airport operation and maintenance systems in data tamper-proofing, non-repudiation and cross-departmental collaboration credibility, and has good versatility, scalability and industry adaptability.

[0136] This invention has built a complete set of high-security and high-reliability data processing mechanisms in terms of trusted collection, structured processing, on-chain verification and cross-system secure sharing of operation and maintenance data, effectively enhancing the business system's fault location and responsibility tracing capabilities, and laying a solid technical foundation for building an auditable and accountable smart airport operation and maintenance system.

[0137] The following describes it in detail with reference to another embodiment.

[0138] Example 2

[0139] A blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage device provided in this embodiment includes multiple implementation units, each implementation unit corresponding to each implementation step in the above-mentioned embodiment one.

[0140] Figure 4 is a schematic diagram of an optional blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage device according to an embodiment of the present invention, such as Figure 4 As shown, the blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage device may include: a data signature unit 41, a data transmission unit 42, a signature verification unit 43, and a data storage unit 44.

[0141] Among them, the data signature unit 41 is used to calculate the first hash value of the collected original operation and maintenance data, and use the probe private key to perform a double-layer digital signature, wherein the double-layer digital signature includes a first-layer signature and a second-layer signature, the first-layer signature includes signing the first hash value of each original operation and maintenance data, and the second-layer signature includes digitally signing the overall summary of the operation and maintenance data packet. The operation and maintenance data packet is generated by packaging the collected original operation and maintenance data and the first-layer signature.

[0142] The data transmission unit 42 is used to transmit the signed operation and maintenance data packet to the intelligent operation and maintenance system using a preset encrypted communication channel. After receiving the operation and maintenance data packet, the intelligent operation and maintenance system recalculates the second hash value of the original operation and maintenance data in the operation and maintenance data packet, and compares the second hash value with the first hash value to verify the integrity of the single original operation and maintenance data.

[0143] The signature verification unit 43 is used to obtain the probe public key by calling the blockchain smart contract through the intelligent operation and maintenance system when the integrity verification of a single piece of original operation and maintenance data passes, and use the probe public key to verify the legitimacy of the double-layer digital signature.

[0144] The data storage unit 44 is used to structure the original operation and maintenance data that has passed the signature verification and store it in the blockchain network.

[0145] Through the above-mentioned implementation units, after collecting operation and maintenance data, the hash algorithm and double-layer digital signature can be combined to ensure the originality and integrity of the data. Then, the blockchain smart contract can be called through the intelligent operation and maintenance system to store evidence on the chain. Distributed ledger technology is used to ensure the decentralization and security of data storage, prevent single point failures, and effectively improve the safety and reliability of airport operations, thereby solving the technical problems in related technologies such as insufficient data credibility between multi-source heterogeneous systems in the management process of airport operation and maintenance data, inability to guarantee the security of data transmission, and easy data leakage.

[0146] Optionally, the data signature unit includes: a first signature module, used to sign the first hash value using a preset national secret algorithm and the probe private key to obtain a first-layer signature; a data packaging module, used to package each piece of original operation and maintenance data and the corresponding first hash value, first-layer signature, and timestamp to generate a structured operation and maintenance data packet; a second signature module, used to calculate the overall summary of the operation and maintenance data packet, and digitally sign the overall summary of the operation and maintenance data packet.

[0147] Optionally, the blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage device also includes: a probe deployment unit, which is used to pre-deploy the data collection probe in the airport infrastructure server or airport operation and maintenance equipment before calculating the first hash value of the collected original operation and maintenance data and using the probe private key for double-layer digital signature; a device hardware feature collection unit, which is used to start the initialization process after detecting that the data collection probe is started, and call the device driver interface to collect the device hardware feature information, wherein the device hardware feature information includes: the mainboard serial number, the CPU serial number and the MAC address hash value of the network interface; a device unique identifier generation unit, which is used to generate a globally unique device identifier based on the collected device hardware feature information; a device operating environment control unit, which is used to control the airport infrastructure server or airport operation and maintenance equipment to run in a trusted execution environment or a trusted platform module TPM when confirming that the data collection probe is started for the first time using a file marking strategy, and use a preset key generation algorithm Generate an asymmetric key pair, wherein the asymmetric key pair includes: a probe public key and a probe private key; a device unique identifier writing unit, which is used to bind the probe private key to the device fingerprint for secure storage, and write the probe public key and the globally unique device identifier into the blockchain network; a device dual authentication unit, which is used to perform device dual authentication processing when a file marking strategy is adopted to confirm that the data collection probe is not started for the first time; a normal data collection entry unit, which is used to enter the normal data collection process when both dual authentications are passed; a data collection blocking unit, which is used to output a data collection blocking instruction when any re-authentication fails, enter the security recovery mechanism, and trigger an alarm prompt, wherein the data collection blocking instruction is used to stop the data collection probe from continuing to collect operation and maintenance data of the airport infrastructure server or airport operation and maintenance equipment. When the data collection blocking instruction is received, the probe certificate revocation list in the blockchain network is updated, and the data collection probe is stopped from accessing the smart operation and maintenance system.

[0148] Optionally, the device dual authentication unit includes: a device signature generation module, which is used to generate a device signature based on the probe private key, the motherboard serial number and the CPU serial number of the target hardware device during the device identity authentication stage; an information sending module, which is used to send the globally unique device identifier, device signature and timestamp to the blockchain smart contract; a device identity authentication module, which is used to perform device identity authentication through the blockchain smart contract, and if the device identity authentication passes, confirm that the target hardware device is an authorized registered device; in the probe integrity verification stage, extract the key program files of the target hardware device, and calculate the third hash value based on the key program files; a smart contract integrity verification module, which is used to generate a probe signature based on the third hash value and the hardware probe private key, send the probe identifier, third hash value and probe signature of the data acquisition probe to the blockchain smart contract, and perform probe integrity verification through the blockchain smart contract.

[0149] Optionally, the data transmission unit includes: an encrypted communication channel construction module, which is used to construct a preset encrypted communication channel using a preset encryption protection protocol; a channel packaging module, which is used to package the signed operation and maintenance data packet as well as the session key, random number and timestamp through the preset encrypted communication channel; a file transfer module, which is used to transmit the packaged data file to the intelligent operation and maintenance system, and the intelligent operation and maintenance system performs session key verification and timestamp verification. If all verifications are passed, the signed operation and maintenance data packet is obtained.

[0150] Optionally, the signature verification unit includes: a signature legitimacy verification module, which is used to use the probe public key to verify the legitimacy of the signature of the first-layer signature and the first hash value, and perform integrity verification on the overall summary of the operation and maintenance data packet; a transmission time difference statistics module, which is used to count the transmission time of the operation and maintenance data packet to obtain the transmission time difference when the legitimacy of the signature of the first-layer signature and the first hash value, as well as the integrity verification of the overall summary of the operation and maintenance data packet are passed; a data packet verification module, which is used to perform structural integrity verification and sequence consistency verification on the operation and maintenance data packet when the transmission time difference meets the real-time constraint condition; a contract verification module, which is used to call the blockchain smart contract to perform probe ID verification and timestamp verification when the structural integrity verification and sequence consistency verification of the operation and maintenance data packet are passed; a data structuring module, which is used to execute the step of using Merkel tree technology to structure the original operation and maintenance data that has passed the signature verification and store it in the blockchain network when the probe ID verification and timestamp verification are passed.

[0151] Optionally, the data storage unit includes: a root node construction module, which is used to construct a tree root node corresponding to the current data batch for each batch of original operation and maintenance data using Merkle tree technology; a leaf node determination module, which is used to use Merkle tree technology to use each original operation and maintenance data and the corresponding first hash value as a leaf node; a recursive module, which is used to recursively process all first hash values ​​based on the device interaction relationship and generated timestamp of each original operation and maintenance data time, obtain the link relationship from the root node to each leaf node, and construct a Merkle tree corresponding to the current data batch; a transaction generation module, which is used to generate a blockchain transaction corresponding to the current data batch based on the constructed Merkle tree, wherein the blockchain transaction includes the probe identifier, timestamp, overall summary of the operation and maintenance data packet, overall digital signature, root node of the Merkle tree, off-chain storage index pointer and original operation and maintenance data of the data acquisition probe corresponding to the current data batch; and an on-chain module, which is used to calculate the hash value of the transaction summary of the blockchain transaction to obtain a fourth hash value, and after signing the fourth hash value, store the signed fourth hash value and the transaction summary of the blockchain transaction to the blockchain network.

[0152] Optionally, the blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage device also includes: a transaction existence record generation unit, which is used to structure the original operation and maintenance data that has passed the signature verification using Merkle tree technology, and store it in the blockchain network. After the signature of the blockchain transaction and the data are verified through the blockchain smart contract, a transaction evidence record is generated and the transaction evidence record is written into the status database.

[0153] The above-mentioned blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage device may also include a processor and a memory. The above-mentioned data signature unit 41, data transmission unit 42, signature verification unit 43, data storage unit 44, etc. are all stored in the memory as program units, and the processor executes the above-mentioned program units stored in the memory to realize the corresponding functions.

[0154] The processor includes a kernel, which retrieves the corresponding program unit from the memory. One or more kernels can be configured, and kernel parameters can be adjusted to achieve end-to-end trusted airport operation and maintenance data management based on the blockchain network.

[0155] The above-mentioned memory may include non-permanent memory in a computer-readable medium, random access memory (RAM) and / or non-volatile memory, such as read-only memory (ROM) or flash RAM, and the memory includes at least one memory chip.

[0156] According to another aspect of an embodiment of the present invention, a computer-readable storage medium is further provided, wherein the computer-readable storage medium includes a stored computer program, wherein when the computer program is running, the device where the computer-readable storage medium is located is controlled to execute any one of the blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage methods in the above-mentioned embodiment 1.

[0157] According to another aspect of an embodiment of the present invention, an electronic device is also provided, comprising one or more processors and a memory, wherein the memory is used to store one or more programs, wherein when the one or more programs are executed by one or more processors, the one or more processors implement the blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage method of any one of the above-mentioned embodiments.

[0158] The present application also provides a computer program product, including a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage method described in each embodiment of the present application.

[0159] The present application also provides a computer program product, including a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium, wherein the non-volatile computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage method described in each embodiment of the present application are implemented.

[0160] Figure 5 This is a hardware structure diagram of an electronic device (or mobile device) that executes a blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage method according to an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 5 As shown, the electronic device may include one or more ( Figure 5 (As shown in the figure, 502a, 502b, ..., 502n are used) processor 502 (processor 502 may include but is not limited to a processing device such as a microprocessor MCU or a programmable logic device FPGA), memory 504 for storing data. In addition, it may also include: a display, an input / output interface (I / O interface), a universal serial bus (USB) port (which may be included as one of the ports of the I / O interface), a network interface, a keyboard, a power supply and / or a camera. It will be understood by those skilled in the art that Figure 5 The structure shown is only for illustration and does not limit the structure of the above electronic device. Figure 5 More or fewer components than shown, or with Figure 5 Different configurations shown.

[0161] The serial numbers of the above embodiments of the present invention are for description only and do not represent the advantages or disadvantages of the embodiments.

[0162] In the above embodiments of the present invention, the description of each embodiment has its own focus. For parts that are not described in detail in a certain embodiment, reference can be made to the relevant descriptions of other embodiments.

[0163] In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed technical content can be implemented in other ways. Among them, the device embodiments described above are only exemplary. For example, the division of the units can be a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be other division methods, such as multiple units or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. Another point is that the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed can be through some interfaces, indirect coupling or communication connection of units or modules, which can be electrical or other forms.

[0164] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the present embodiment.

[0165] In addition, the functional units in the various embodiments of the present invention may be integrated into a single processing unit, each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into a single unit. The aforementioned integrated units may be implemented in the form of hardware or software functional units.

[0166] If the integrated unit is implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or all or part of the technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product. The computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions for enabling a computer device (which can be a personal computer, server or network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the method described in each embodiment of the present invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes: U disk, read-only memory (ROM, Read-Only Memory), random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), mobile hard disk, magnetic disk or optical disk, etc. Various media that can store program codes.

[0167] The above is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention. It should be pointed out that for ordinary technicians in this technical field, several improvements and modifications can be made without departing from the principles of the present invention. These improvements and modifications should also be regarded as the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage method, characterized in that: include: Calculate a first hash value for the collected original operation and maintenance data, and use the probe private key to perform a double-layer digital signature, wherein the double-layer digital signature includes a first-layer signature and a second-layer signature, the first-layer signature includes signing the first hash value of each piece of the original operation and maintenance data, and the second-layer signature includes performing an overall digital signature on the entire summary of the operation and maintenance data packet, and the operation and maintenance data packet is generated by packaging the collected original operation and maintenance data and the first-layer signature; The signed operation and maintenance data packet is transmitted to the intelligent operation and maintenance system using a preset encrypted communication channel. After receiving the operation and maintenance data packet, the intelligent operation and maintenance system recalculates a second hash value for the original operation and maintenance data in the operation and maintenance data packet, and compares the second hash value with the first hash value to verify the integrity of the single piece of the original operation and maintenance data. If the integrity check of a single piece of the original operation and maintenance data passes, the blockchain smart contract is called by the intelligent operation and maintenance system to verify the legitimacy of the double-layer digital signature; The original operation and maintenance data that has passed the signature verification is structured and stored in the blockchain network.

2. The airport operation and maintenance data storage method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The steps of calculating the first hash value of the collected original operation and maintenance data and performing a double-layer digital signature using the probe private key include: Sign the first hash value using a preset national secret algorithm and the probe private key to obtain a first-layer signature; Packaging each piece of the original operation and maintenance data and the corresponding first hash value, first-layer signature, and timestamp to generate a structured operation and maintenance data packet; Calculate the overall summary of the operation and maintenance data packet, and perform an overall digital signature on the overall summary of the operation and maintenance data packet.

3. The airport operation and maintenance data storage method according to claim 2, characterized in that: Before calculating the first hash value of the collected raw operation and maintenance data and performing a double-layer digital signature using the probe private key, the following steps are also included: Pre-deploy data collection probes in airport infrastructure servers or airport operation and maintenance equipment; After detecting that the data acquisition probe is started, an initialization process is started, and a device driver interface is called to collect device hardware feature information, wherein the device hardware feature information includes: a motherboard serial number, a CPU serial number, and a MAC address hash value of a network interface; Generate a globally unique device identifier based on the collected device hardware feature information; When the data collection probe is confirmed to be started for the first time by adopting a file marking strategy, the airport infrastructure server or the airport operation and maintenance device is controlled to run in a trusted execution environment or a trusted platform module (TPM), and a preset key generation algorithm is used to generate an asymmetric key pair, wherein the asymmetric key pair includes: the probe public key and the probe private key; Binding the probe private key to the device fingerprint for secure storage, and writing the probe public key and the globally unique device identifier into the blockchain network; When the file marking strategy is adopted to confirm that the data collection probe is not started for the first time, a double authentication process of the device is performed; If both double authentications are passed, the normal data collection process will begin; In the event of any re-authentication failure, a data collection blocking instruction is output, the security recovery mechanism is switched on, and an alarm is triggered, wherein the data collection blocking instruction is used to stop the data collection probe from continuing to collect the operation and maintenance data of the airport infrastructure server or the airport operation and maintenance equipment. When the data collection blocking instruction is received, the probe certificate revocation list in the blockchain network is updated to stop the data collection probe from accessing the smart operation and maintenance system.

4. The method for storing airport operation and maintenance data according to claim 3, characterized in that: The steps for performing two-factor authentication on a device include: During the device identity authentication phase, a device signature is generated based on the probe private key, the motherboard serial number, and the CPU serial number of the target hardware device; Sending the globally unique device identifier, the device signature, and the timestamp to a blockchain smart contract; Perform device identity authentication through the blockchain smart contract, and if the device identity authentication passes, confirm that the target hardware device is an authorized registered device; In the probe integrity verification phase, extracting a key program file of the target hardware device, and calculating a third hash value based on the key program file; A probe signature is generated based on the third hash value and the hardware probe private key, and the probe identifier of the data acquisition probe, the third hash value, and the probe signature are sent to the blockchain smart contract, and the probe integrity verification is performed through the blockchain smart contract.

5. The airport operation and maintenance data storage method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step of transmitting the signed operation and maintenance data packet to the intelligent operation and maintenance system using a preset encrypted communication channel includes: Constructing the preset encrypted communication channel using a preset encryption protection protocol; Packaging the signed operation and maintenance data packet, session key, random number and timestamp through the preset encrypted communication channel; The packaged data file is transmitted to the intelligent operation and maintenance system, which performs session key verification and timestamp verification. If both verifications pass, the signed operation and maintenance data packet is obtained.

6. The method for storing airport operation and maintenance data according to claim 1, characterized in that: The steps of calling the blockchain smart contract through the intelligent operation and maintenance system to verify the legitimacy of the double-layer digital signature include: Using the probe public key to verify the validity of the signature of the first layer and the first hash value, and performing an integrity check on the overall summary of the operation and maintenance data packet; If the validity of the signature of the first-layer signature and the first hash value, as well as the integrity check of the overall summary of the operation and maintenance data packet, are all passed, statistics are collected on the transmission time of the operation and maintenance data packet to obtain the transmission time difference; When the transmission time difference satisfies the real-time constraint condition, performing a structure integrity check and a sequence consistency check on the operation and maintenance data packet; If the structure integrity check and sequence consistency check of the operation and maintenance data packet are both passed, the blockchain smart contract is called to perform probe ID verification and timestamp verification; When both the probe ID verification and the timestamp verification are passed, the steps of using the Merkle tree technology to structure the original operation and maintenance data that has passed the signature verification are performed and stored in the blockchain network.

7. The method for storing airport operation and maintenance data according to claim 1, characterized in that: The steps of structuring the original operation and maintenance data that has passed the signature verification and storing it in the blockchain network include: For each batch of the raw operation and maintenance data, a tree root node corresponding to the current data batch is constructed using Merkle tree technology; Using Merkle tree technology, each piece of the original operation and maintenance data and the corresponding first hash value are used as leaf nodes; Based on the device interaction relationship and generation timestamp of each piece of the original operation and maintenance data, recursively process all first hash values ​​to obtain the link relationship between the root node and each leaf node, and construct a Merkle tree corresponding to the current data batch; Generate a blockchain transaction corresponding to the current data batch based on the constructed Merkle tree, wherein the blockchain transaction includes a probe identifier of the data acquisition probe corresponding to the current data batch, a timestamp, an overall summary of the operation and maintenance data packet, an overall digital signature, a root node of the Merkle tree, an off-chain storage index pointer, and the original operation and maintenance data; Calculate a hash value for the transaction summary of the blockchain transaction to obtain a fourth hash value, sign the fourth hash value, and store the signed fourth hash value and the transaction summary of the blockchain transaction in the blockchain network.

8. The method for storing airport operation and maintenance data according to claim 7, characterized in that: After the original operation and maintenance data that has passed the signature verification is structured using the Merkle tree technology and stored in the blockchain network, the following steps are also included: When the signature and data of the blockchain transaction are verified by the blockchain smart contract, a transaction evidence record is generated and written into the status database.

9. A blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage device, characterized in that: include: a data signature unit, configured to calculate a first hash value for the collected original operation and maintenance data, and perform a double-layer digital signature using a probe private key, wherein the double-layer digital signature includes a first-layer signature and a second-layer signature, the first-layer signature including a signature for the first hash value of each piece of the original operation and maintenance data, and the second-layer signature including a digital signature for the entire summary of the operation and maintenance data packet, the operation and maintenance data packet being generated by packaging the collected original operation and maintenance data and the first-layer signature; a data transmission unit, configured to transmit the signed operation and maintenance data packet to the intelligent operation and maintenance system using a preset encrypted communication channel, wherein, after receiving the operation and maintenance data packet, the intelligent operation and maintenance system recalculates a second hash value for the original operation and maintenance data in the operation and maintenance data packet, and compares the second hash value with the first hash value to verify the integrity of the single piece of the original operation and maintenance data; A signature verification unit is configured to, when the integrity verification of a single piece of the original operation and maintenance data passes, obtain a probe public key by invoking a blockchain smart contract through the intelligent operation and maintenance system, and verify the legitimacy of the double-layer digital signature using the probe public key; The data storage unit is used to structure the original operation and maintenance data that has passed the signature verification and store it in the blockchain network.

10. An electronic device, characterized in that: The method comprises one or more processors and a memory, wherein the memory is used to store one or more programs, wherein when the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the one or more processors implement the blockchain-based airport operation and maintenance data storage method as described in any one of claims 1 to 8.

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