Method for dispersedly generating private key in asymmetric algorithm

Abstract

The invention discloses a method for dispersedly generating private keys in an asymmetric algorithm, and relates to the technical field of cryptography and information security. The method comprises the following steps: acquiring entropy values of various system indexes, and extracting and expanding to obtain an initial seed; generating a complete private key based on the seed, and splitting the complete private key into a plurality of sub-private key segments by adopting threshold secret sharing; after integrity verification, the fragment registers a position and a reconstruction path by means of a virtual mapping structure, is distributed to distributed computing nodes through an encryption channel, and is confirmed and stored by a signature receipt. When a signature request arrives, a path combination meeting a threshold is selected according to a mapping structure to reconstruct a temporary private key, and verification and unrecoverable destruction are carried out in a trusted environment after completion; and if detecting that the node is abnormal, isolating and starting a standby path to replace the fragment. According to the method, integrated management of private key generation, scattered storage, dynamic reconstruction and safe destruction is realized, and the security and the anti-attack capability of an asymmetric algorithm are remarkably improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the fields of cryptography and information security technology, and in particular to a method for private key distribution generation in an asymmetric algorithm. Background Technology

[0002] In modern information security systems, asymmetric cryptography algorithms are widely used in data encryption, digital signatures, and identity authentication. Their security largely depends on the secure generation and management of private keys. Existing private key generation and storage mechanisms typically suffer from the following problems:

[0003] Traditional random number generators often rely on a single entropy source, such as a system clock or a pseudo-random number generator. Because the entropy source is singular and its randomness is limited, the generated initial seed is subject to prediction risks, thus weakening the security of the private key. In existing technologies, the complete private key is often generated and centrally stored by a single device or module. Once this device is attacked or leaked, attackers may directly obtain the complete private key, causing the entire cryptographic system to fail. Even with fragmentation or distributed storage, existing technologies typically lack mechanisms for verifying the integrity of fragments and for dynamic tracking, making it difficult to detect tampering or loss risks in a timely manner during fragment transmission, storage, and retrieval. In a distributed environment, some nodes may become unavailable due to downtime, abnormal access, or malicious attacks. Existing solutions generally lack isolation mechanisms for abnormal nodes and alternative paths, meaning the private key may not be reconstructed in time when needed. Even if the complete private key can be reconstructed in existing technologies, it often remains in memory or storage for extended periods without timely destruction, increasing the risk of theft. Summary of the Invention

[0004] To address the problems of insufficient entropy sources, risks of centralized storage, lack of integrity verification and tracking mechanisms, insufficient anti-anomaly capabilities, and security risks during the usage phase in existing technologies, the present invention aims to propose a method for decentralized private key generation in asymmetric algorithms. This method aims to improve the randomness of private key generation, enhance the security of decentralized storage and dynamic management, and thereby improve the reliability and anti-attack capabilities of the entire asymmetric cryptographic system.

[0005] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention employs the following technical solution:

[0006] A method for private key distribution generation in an asymmetric algorithm includes:

[0007] Step 1: Obtain entropy information of various system indicators, and randomly extract and expand the entropy information to generate an initial seed;

[0008] Step 2: Generate a complete private key based on the initial seed, and split the complete private key into multiple sub-private key fragments through a secret sharing mechanism;

[0009] Step 3: Perform fragment integrity verification on the sub-private key fragment, and after successful verification, construct a virtual mapping structure to track the storage location of the sub-private key fragment and determine the private key reconstruction path;

[0010] Step 4: Distribute the sub-private key fragment to the distributed computing nodes through an encrypted channel and receive storage confirmation feedback;

[0011] Step 5: Based on the storage confirmation feedback, determine the success status of the sub-private key fragment storage distribution. If the verification fails, trigger the sub-private key fragment reallocation and virtual mapping path update.

[0012] Step 6: Upon receiving a digital signature request, select a path combination from the virtual mapping structure, integrate the sub-private key fragments using a merging algorithm, and obtain a temporary complete private key;

[0013] Step 7: If abnormal access based on node behavior is detected, isolate the sub-private key fragment in the abnormal node and obtain a backup sub-private key fragment through the backup path to form a new path combination;

[0014] Step 8: Based on the new path combination, perform a merging operation on the sub-private key fragments to reconstruct the temporary complete private key; perform overall integrity verification on the temporary complete private key, destroy the temporary complete private key after verification, and synchronously update the path information in the virtual mapping structure.

[0015] Preferably, the random extraction and expansion of the entropy information to generate the initial seed includes:

[0016]

[0017] Where: S0 represents the initial seed, m represents the number of system index types, and w i H(X) represents the weight coefficient of the i-th system index. i ) represents the entropy value of the i-th system index, n i p represents the number of states for the i-th index. ij The probability distribution of the j-th state of the i-th index is represented; the entropy value, after fusion, is expanded into a binary seed by a key derivation function or a deterministic random number generator.

[0018] Preferably, the secret sharing mechanism is a threshold scheme, in which the complete private key is split into multiple sub-private key fragments, and the complete private key can be reconstructed when no less than a preset number of sub-private key fragments are obtained; each sub-private key fragment is attached with an integrity tag, which is generated by a message authentication code or digital signature and is used for fragment integrity verification.

[0019] Preferably, the sub-private key fragment is subjected to fragment integrity verification, and a virtual mapping structure is constructed after the verification is successful. The virtual mapping structure is defined as follows:

[0020] V map ={(f k ,L k N k )|k=1,2,...,t};

[0021] Where: f k L represents the identifier information of the k-th sub-private key fragment; k Indicates the storage location of the fragment in the distributed nodes; N k The distributed computing node number is represented by t; t represents the total number of sub-private key fragments.

[0022] The virtual mapping structure is used to track the storage location of sub-private key fragments and determine the private key reconstruction path.

[0023] Preferably, the step of distributing the sub-private key fragment to the distributed computing nodes through an encrypted channel and receiving storage confirmation feedback includes:

[0024] An encrypted channel is established using an end-to-end secure transmission protocol based on certificate authentication. When the distributed computing node receives the sub-private key fragment, it completes the identity verification through certificate authentication and generates and sends a digitally signed receipt when returning storage confirmation feedback.

[0025] Preferably, the preset verification criteria for storing confirmation feedback in the step include: receiving confirmation receipts from all nodes within a preset time window; the verification code contained in the receipts being consistent with expectations; and the node signature being verified.

[0026] Preferably, the reconstruction of the temporary complete private key is performed in an executable environment and destroyed within a preset time after the digital signature is generated; the path combination must meet a threshold condition, and no less than a preset number of sub-private key fragments are selected from multiple sub-private key fragments to complete the reconstruction.

[0027] Preferably, forming a new path combination includes: when abnormal access based on node behavior is detected during the generation of a digital signature, isolating the sub-private key fragment in the abnormal computing node, and obtaining a backup sub-private key fragment from other distributed computing nodes through a backup path to form a new reconstructed path combination.

[0028] Preferably, the process of performing a merging operation on the sub-private key fragments to reconstruct a temporary complete private key based on the new path combination includes:

[0029] The cryptographic value C of each sub-private key fragment in the path combination k Based on fragment hash value hk The key K is obtained through the key derivation function. k Perform an inverse transform on the reversible protected transform G to obtain the bright state segment:

[0030] D k =G -1 (C k ;K k );

[0031] The set R of fragments that meet the threshold condition is then merged to obtain a temporary complete private key; when the merge is an XOR threshold, the temporary complete private key is obtained by the following formula:

[0032]

[0033] Where: P temp R represents the temporary complete private key; R is the set of indices of selected sub-private key fragments that satisfy the threshold conditions; C represents the temporary complete private key. k G represents the cryptographic value of the k-th sub-private key fragment; -1 This represents the inverse mapping of a reversible protected transformation; Represents the XOR operator; D k Indicated by the dense state value C k The sub-private key fragment obtained through inverse transformation.

[0034] The beneficial effects of this invention are as follows: By introducing multiple system operation indicators as entropy sources and performing weighted fusion and expansion, this invention significantly improves the randomness and unpredictability of the initial seed, thereby enhancing the security of private key generation. The complete private key is split into multiple sub-fragments through a secret sharing mechanism and stored in a distributed manner, effectively avoiding the risk of single-point leakage and improving the security and resistance to attacks of private key storage. Each sub-fragment is attached with an integrity tag, which is verified during distribution and storage. A virtual mapping structure is used to dynamically track the location and path of the sub-fragments, ensuring the controllability and traceability of subsequent reconstruction. The sub-fragment distribution process is based on a certificate-authenticated encrypted channel, combined with a signature receipt storage confirmation mechanism, ensuring the security and non-repudiation of transmission and storage. When a node exhibits abnormal access behavior, the system can promptly isolate the abnormal node and obtain a backup sub-fragment through an alternative path, achieving fault tolerance and robustness in private key reconstruction. During the signature invocation phase, the temporary complete private key is only reconstructed in a trusted execution environment and promptly destroyed after use, avoiding long-term exposure risks and further enhancing the security guarantee capabilities throughout the entire lifecycle of the private key. Attached Figure Description

[0035] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings used in the following description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0036] in:

[0037] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of the method of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0038] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some, not all, of the embodiments of the present invention. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the described embodiments of the present invention are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0039] like Figure 1 As shown, this is an embodiment of the present invention, which provides a method for private key distribution generation in an asymmetric algorithm, the method comprising:

[0040] Step 1: Obtain entropy information of various system indicators, and randomly extract and expand the entropy information to generate an initial seed;

[0041] In practical implementation, the system metrics may include, but are not limited to, operating parameters such as CPU utilization, cache hit rate, network latency, process scheduling time, and storage I / O jitter. These metrics exhibit certain random fluctuations at different times and under different operating conditions, which can serve as entropy source inputs to improve the unpredictability of the initial random seed.

[0042] Randomly extracting and expanding the entropy information to generate an initial seed includes:

[0043]

[0044] Where: S0 represents the initial seed, m represents the number of system index types, and w i H(X) represents the weight coefficient of the i-th system index. i ) represents the entropy value of the i-th system index, n i p represents the number of states for the i-th index. ij The probability distribution of the j-th state of the i-th index is represented; the entropy value, after fusion, is expanded into a binary seed by a key derivation function or a deterministic random number generator.

[0045] Specifically, the entropy fusion process first calculates the weighted entropy values ​​of various indicators, and then calculates the weighted entropy values ​​using the weighting coefficient w. i The global entropy value is formed under the regulation of the key; then the global entropy value is stretched and balanced through the key derivation function (KDF) to obtain a random number stream that meets the length and distribution requirements, which is then used as the initial seed input for subsequent private key generation.

[0046] In a preferred implementation, the weighting coefficient w i The weighting can be set according to the importance of various indicators in their contribution to randomness. For example, CPU jitter and network latency contribute relatively highly to randomness and can be given greater weight, while the fluctuation of storage I / O is relatively small, so its weight can be appropriately reduced. Through this weighting mechanism, the overall randomness can be guaranteed while also taking into account the balance of system operation.

[0047] Step 2: Generate a complete private key based on the initial seed, and split the complete private key into multiple sub-private key fragments through a secret sharing mechanism;

[0048] In a specific implementation, the complete private key can be obtained based on the initial random seed obtained in step 1 using an elliptic curve key generation algorithm (such as the key generation function in the SM2 algorithm). The obtained private key satisfies the uniform distribution characteristic over the large integer field.

[0049] The secret sharing mechanism is a threshold scheme, in which the complete private key is split into multiple sub-private key fragments. When a minimum of a preset number of sub-private key fragments are obtained, the complete private key can be reconstructed. Each sub-private key fragment is attached with an integrity tag, which is generated by a message authentication code or digital signature and is used for fragment integrity verification.

[0050] In a specific embodiment, the threshold scheme can be the Shamirt-of-n secret sharing algorithm, where n represents the number of sub-private key fragments and t represents the minimum number of fragments required to reconstruct the complete private key. When the system collects fewer than t fragments, it cannot reconstruct the private key, thus ensuring the security of the key.

[0051] The integrity tag can be a Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) based on a hash function, or it can use existing digital signature algorithms (such as SM2 signatures or ECDSA signatures) to sign the fragments to prevent them from being tampered with during transmission and storage. Each sub-private key fragment is stored or distributed together with its corresponding integrity tag for verification before reconstruction.

[0052] In a preferred embodiment, the sub-private key fragment can be temporarily cached after generation, and a correspondence can be established between the fragment index number and the position identifier in the mapping structure, providing support for path management and integrity verification in subsequent steps.

[0053] Step 3: Perform fragment integrity verification on the sub-private key fragment, and after successful verification, construct a virtual mapping structure to track the storage location of the sub-private key fragment and determine the private key reconstruction path;

[0054] In practice, each sub-private key fragment is accompanied by an integrity tag after generation, such as an HMAC checksum or digital signature. Upon receiving the fragment, the system first verifies the integrity tag using the corresponding verification key to ensure that the fragment has not been tampered with or replaced during transmission and storage. Only after the integrity verification is successful is the fragment allowed to be included in the subsequent mapping management process.

[0055] The fragment integrity of the sub-private key fragment is verified, and a virtual mapping structure is constructed after the verification is successful. The virtual mapping structure is defined as follows:

[0056] V map ={(f k ,L k N k )|k=1,2,...,t};

[0057] Where: f k L represents the identifier information of the k-th sub-private key fragment; k Indicates the storage location of the fragment in the distributed nodes; N k The distributed computing node number is represented by t; t represents the total number of sub-private key fragments.

[0058] The virtual mapping structure is used to track the storage location of sub-private key fragments and determine the private key reconstruction path.

[0059] In a preferred embodiment, the fragment identification information f k A combination of fragment index number and hash digest can be used to ensure uniqueness and collision resistance; storage location L k This can be a physical storage address, logical partition number, or cloud storage index; distributed computing node number N k Nodes can be identified by their unique IDs to support unified management across platforms.

[0060] Through this virtual mapping structure, the system can maintain a logical mapping table to record the correspondence between each sub-private key fragment and its storage node. When performing private key reconstruction, the system can quickly select the set of fragments that meet the threshold conditions based on the mapping table and determine the optimal path combination, thereby improving reconstruction efficiency and reducing the risk of errors caused by inconsistent paths.

[0061] Step 4: Distribute the sub-private key fragment to the distributed computing nodes through an encrypted channel and receive storage confirmation feedback;

[0062] In practice, the encrypted channel can employ Transport Layer Security (TLS), IPSec, or other end-to-end encrypted communication mechanisms based on public key certificate authentication to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the sub-private key fragment during cross-network transmission.

[0063] The steps of distributing the sub-private key fragment to the distributed computing nodes through an encrypted channel and receiving storage confirmation feedback include:

[0064] An encrypted channel is established using an end-to-end secure transmission protocol based on certificate authentication. When the distributed computing node receives the sub-private key fragment, it completes the identity verification through certificate authentication and generates and sends a digitally signed receipt when returning storage confirmation feedback.

[0065] The identity verification process can be completed through two-way certificate authentication, whereby the distributor verifies the legitimacy of the node's certificate, and the node simultaneously verifies the distributor's certificate, ensuring that both communicating parties are trusted entities. The digital signature receipt serves as proof that the node has indeed received and successfully stored the corresponding sub-private key fragment, and that its content has not been tampered with.

[0066] In a preferred embodiment, the receipt message may include a fragment index number, a storage timestamp, and a unique node identifier, and is signed with the node's private key. Upon receiving the receipt, the system can verify the signature using the node's public key to confirm the authenticity and non-repudiation of the storage activity.

[0067] Through the above methods, the present invention not only ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the fragment distribution process, but also establishes a traceable storage confirmation mechanism, thereby enabling accurate determination of which sub-private key fragments are in a valid state during subsequent reconstruction.

[0068] Step 5: Based on the storage confirmation feedback, determine the success status of the sub-private key fragment storage distribution. If the verification fails, trigger the sub-private key fragment reallocation and virtual mapping path update.

[0069] In practice, after receiving storage confirmation receipts from each distributed node, the system performs consistency and validity checks on the receipt messages. Only when all expected nodes return confirmation receipts within the specified time, and the receipt content meets the integrity and signature verification requirements, is the storage distribution of the sub-private key fragment considered successful. If any node fails to return on time, or if the receipt content is abnormal, the system will initiate a fragment reallocation mechanism, migrating the fragment to a backup node and updating the corresponding storage path in the virtual mapping structure to ensure that the private key can still be reconstructed subsequently.

[0070] The preset verification criteria for storing confirmation feedback in the steps mentioned above include: receiving confirmation receipts from all nodes within a preset time window; the verification code contained in the receipts being consistent with expectations; and the node signature being verified.

[0071] In the preferred implementation, the preset time window can be dynamically set according to the system's operating requirements, such as a time interval of 5 seconds, 10 seconds, or longer; the verification code can be calculated using a hash function, such as a SHA-256 hash digest, to verify that the fragment content has not changed; the verification of the node signature can be completed based on the node's public key certificate, thereby ensuring the authenticity and non-repudiation of the feedback result source.

[0072] In this way, the present invention establishes a strict feedback verification mechanism in the storage stage, which can not only detect node anomalies or data tampering in a timely manner, but also quickly perform fragment redistribution and path update when anomalies occur, ensuring the stability and robustness of the entire distributed key management system.

[0073] Step 6: Upon receiving a digital signature request, select a path combination from the virtual mapping structure, integrate the sub-private key fragments using a merging algorithm, and obtain a temporary complete private key;

[0074] In the specific implementation process, when product P1 receives a digital signature request, the system will first search the virtual mapping structure, select a set of sub-private key fragments that meet the threshold conditions based on the path information, and call a preset merging algorithm (such as polynomial interpolation in the Shamir threshold algorithm or a threshold scheme based on XOR) to integrate them and generate a temporary complete private key.

[0075] The reconstruction of the temporary complete private key is performed in an executable environment and destroyed within a preset time after the digital signature is generated; the path combination must meet a threshold condition, and no less than a preset number of sub-private key fragments are selected from multiple sub-private key fragments to complete the reconstruction.

[0076] In a preferred implementation, the reconstruction operation can be performed in a protected Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) or a Hardware Security Module (HSM) to prevent the temporary private key from being stolen by external processes during reconstruction. The preset destruction time can be set from several seconds to several minutes according to application requirements. Within this time frame, the temporary private key is only used to complete the digital signature operation and must not be persistently stored or exported.

[0077] Furthermore, the path combination selection strategy can be dynamically optimized based on node status, network latency, and security level to ensure the selection of the optimal combination from multiple available fragment sets, thereby improving signature response speed while ensuring security.

[0078] Step 7: If abnormal access based on node behavior is detected, isolate the sub-private key fragment in the abnormal node and obtain a backup sub-private key fragment through the backup path to form a new path combination;

[0079] In practice, the system can use behavior monitoring mechanisms to determine whether nodes are experiencing abnormal access. For example, if a distributed node is detected frequently attempting to access sub-private key fragments during unauthorized times, returning abnormal responses, or experiencing an abnormal increase in communication latency, it can be determined that the node poses a potential risk. In this case, the system will immediately mark the node as an abnormal node and prevent its sub-private key fragments from participating in the subsequent reconstruction process.

[0080] The formation of a new path combination includes: when abnormal access based on node behavior is detected during the generation of a digital signature, isolating the sub-private key fragment in the abnormal computing node, and obtaining a backup sub-private key fragment from other distributed computing nodes through a backup path to form a new reconstructed path combination.

[0081] In a preferred embodiment, multiple backup paths can be pre-configured, or the system can dynamically select one based on node availability and network status during operation. Backup sub-fragments can be generated simultaneously with the main fragment and stored on different nodes for replacement when the main fragment becomes unavailable. In this way, even if some nodes are attacked or fail, the system can still guarantee the availability of the private key and the integrity of the reconstruction.

[0082] Through this mechanism, the present invention can not only isolate potential malicious nodes in a timely manner to prevent them from interfering with the reconstruction process, but also use backup paths to achieve fault tolerance and robustness of private key reconstruction, thereby enhancing the security and continuous availability of the overall system.

[0083] Step 8: Based on the new path combination, perform a merging operation on the sub-private key fragments to reconstruct the temporary complete private key; perform overall integrity verification on the temporary complete private key, destroy the temporary complete private key after verification, and synchronously update the path information in the virtual mapping structure.

[0084] In practice, reconstructing the temporary complete private key requires decrypting or reversing the selected sub-private key fragments one by one, and then performing a merging operation under certain threshold conditions to obtain the final temporary complete private key. To ensure the correctness and integrity of the reconstruction result, the system performs an overall integrity verification on the reconstructed temporary complete private key. Only after passing the verification can it be used for subsequent operations. After completing the digital signature or encryption operation, the temporary complete private key is destroyed irreversibly within a preset time window, and the path state in the virtual mapping structure is updated to reflect the new combination of sub-private key fragments.

[0085] Based on the new path combination, the process of performing a merging operation on the sub-private key fragments to reconstruct a temporary complete private key includes:

[0086] The cryptographic value C of each sub-private key fragment in the path combination k Based on fragment hash value h k The key K is obtained through the key derivation function. k Perform an inverse transform on the reversible protected transform G to obtain the bright state segment:

[0087] D k =G -1 (C k ;K k );

[0088] The set R of fragments that meet the threshold condition is then merged to obtain a temporary complete private key; when the merge is an XOR threshold, the temporary complete private key is obtained by the following formula:

[0089]

[0090] Where: P temp R represents the temporary complete private key; R is the set of indices of selected sub-private key fragments that satisfy the threshold conditions; C represents the temporary complete private key. k G represents the cryptographic value of the k-th sub-private key fragment; -1 This represents the inverse mapping of a reversible protected transformation; Represents the XOR operator; D k Indicated by the dense state value C k The sub-private key fragment obtained through inverse transformation.

[0091] In a preferred embodiment, the reversible protection transformation G can be a symmetric encryption algorithm (such as AES) or a lightweight cryptographic algorithm, and the inverse transformation G... -1 Corresponds to the decryption operation; key K k The security of a single fragment can be compromised by inputting a fragment hash and a random salt value into a Key Derivation Function (KDF). Overall integrity verification can be performed using hash verification of the temporary complete private key or by comparing its digital signature to ensure the reconstructed result matches expectations.

[0092] In summary, this invention constructs a complete solution covering private key generation, distributed storage, path management, dynamic reconstruction, and secure destruction, achieving systematic protection of asymmetric algorithm private keys throughout their entire lifecycle. This solution not only overcomes the security vulnerabilities of centralized private key storage and single-point attacks in existing technologies, but also demonstrates strong fault tolerance and recovery capabilities when dealing with node anomalies and malicious attacks, significantly improving the overall security and reliability of cryptographic systems. This invention has good practical value and application prospects, and can be widely applied to digital signatures, identity authentication, secure communication, blockchain, and other high-security cryptographic application scenarios.

[0093] In the description of this specification, the references to terms such as "one embodiment," "some embodiments," "example," "specific example," or "some examples," etc., indicate that a specific feature, structure, material, or characteristic described in connection with that embodiment or example is included in at least one embodiment or example of this application. Furthermore, the specific features, structures, materials, or characteristics described may be combined in any suitable manner in one or more embodiments or examples. Moreover, without contradiction, those skilled in the art can combine and integrate the different embodiments or examples described in this specification, as well as the features of those different embodiments or examples.

[0094] Any process or method description in the flowchart or otherwise herein can be understood as representing a module, segment, or portion of code comprising one or more executable instructions for implementing a particular logical function or process. Furthermore, the scope of the preferred embodiments of this application includes additional implementations in which functions may be performed not in the order shown or discussed, including substantially simultaneously or in reverse order depending on the functionality involved.

[0095] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of this application, but the scope of protection of this application is not limited thereto. Any person skilled in the art can easily conceive of various variations or substitutions within the technical scope disclosed in this application, and these should all be included within the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be determined by the scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A method for private key distributed generation in an asymmetric algorithm, characterized in that, The method comprises: acquiring entropy value information of multiple system indicators, and performing randomness extraction and expansion on the entropy value information to generate an initial seed; generating a complete private key according to the initial seed, and splitting the complete private key into multiple sub-private key segments through a secret sharing mechanism; performing segment integrity verification on the sub-private key segments, and constructing a virtual mapping structure after verification to track storage locations of the sub-private key segments and determine a private key reconstruction path; distributing the sub-private key segments to distributed computing nodes through an encrypted channel, and receiving storage confirmation feedback; determining a success state of storage dispersion of the sub-private key segments according to the storage confirmation feedback, and triggering sub-private key segment re-distribution and virtual mapping path update if verification fails; when receiving a digital signature request, selecting a path combination from the virtual mapping structure, integrating the sub-private key segments through a merging algorithm to obtain a temporary complete private key; if an abnormal access based on node behavior is detected, isolating the sub-private key segments in the abnormal node, and obtaining a backup sub-private key segment through a backup path to form a new path combination; based on the new path combination, performing merging operation on the sub-private key segments to reconstruct a temporary complete private key, performing overall integrity verification on the temporary complete private key, destroying the temporary complete private key after verification is completed, and synchronously updating path information in the virtual mapping structure.

2. The state-driven privacy computing method according to claim 1, wherein, The randomness extraction and expansion on the entropy value information to generate an initial seed comprises: wherein: S0 represents an initial seed, m represents the number of types of system indicators, w i represents the weight coefficient of the i-th system indicator, H(X i ) represents the entropy value of the i-th system indicator, n i represents the number of states of the i-th indicator, p ij represents the probability distribution of the j-th state of the i-th indicator; the entropy value is expanded into a binary seed after fusion by a key derivation function or a deterministic random number generator.

3. The method for private key dispersal generation in an asymmetric algorithm according to claim 1, characterized in that, The secret sharing mechanism is a threshold scheme, the complete private key is split into multiple sub-private key segments, and the complete private key can be reconstructed when no less than a preset number of sub-private key segments are obtained; each sub-private key segment is attached with an integrity tag, and the integrity tag is generated by a message authentication code or a digital signature for segment integrity verification.

4. The method for private key dispersal generation in an asymmetric algorithm of claim 1, wherein, The virtual mapping structure is constructed after the segment integrity verification of the sub-private key segments is passed, and is defined as: V map = {(f k , L k , N k ) | k = 1, 2,..., t}; wherein: f k represents the identification information of the kth sub-private key segment; L k represents the storage location of the segment in the distributed node; N k represents the number of the distributed computing node; t represents the total number of sub-private key segments; The virtual mapping structure is used to track storage locations of the sub-private key segments and determine a private key reconstruction path.

5. The method for private key dispersal generation in an asymmetric algorithm of claim 1, wherein, The step of distributing the sub-private key segments to distributed computing nodes through an encrypted channel and receiving storage confirmation feedback comprises: an encrypted channel is established by using an end-to-end secure transmission protocol based on certificate authentication, identity verification is completed by certificate authentication when the distributed computing nodes receive the sub-private key segments, and a digitally signed receipt is generated and sent when returning the storage confirmation feedback.

6. The method for private key dispersal generation in an asymmetric algorithm of claim 1, wherein, The preset verification standard of the storage confirmation feedback comprises: receiving confirmation receipts of all nodes within a preset time window; the verification code contained in the receipt is consistent with the expected one; and the node signature is verified to be passed.

7. The method for private key dispersal generation in an asymmetric algorithm of claim 1, wherein, The reconstruction to obtain a temporary complete private key is performed in an executable environment, and is destroyed within a preset time after digital signature generation is completed; the path combination needs to meet a threshold condition, and no less than a preset number of sub-private key segments are selected from multiple sub-private key segments to complete the reconstruction.

8. The method for private key dispersal generation in an asymmetric algorithm of claim 1, wherein, The forming of the new path combination comprises: when an abnormal access based on node behavior is detected in a generation digital signature process, isolating a sub-private key fragment in the abnormal computing node, and obtaining a backup sub-private key fragment from other distributed computing nodes through a backup path to form a new reconstruction path combination.

9. The method for private key dispersal generation in an asymmetric algorithm of claim 1, wherein, The process of performing a merging operation on the sub-private key fragments to reconstruct a temporary complete private key based on the new path combination comprises: Ciphertext value C for each sub-private key segment in the path combination k Based on segment hash value h k Obtain key K through key derivation function k Perform inverse transformation on reversible protection transformation G to obtain plaintext segment: D k = G -1 (C k ; K k ); and merging the fragment set R satisfying the threshold condition to obtain a temporary complete private key; when the merging is an XOR type threshold, the temporary complete private key is obtained according to the following formula: wherein: P temp represents a temporary complete private key; R is a selected set of sub-private key fragment indexes satisfying a threshold condition; C k represents a ciphertext value of the kth sub-private key fragment; G -1 represents an inverse mapping of the reversible protection transformation; represents an exclusive OR operator; D k represents a ciphertext value C k sub-private key fragment obtained by inverse transformation.

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