Encryption technology-based maintenance data storage method

Abstract

The invention provides a maintenance data storage method based on an encryption technology, and relates to the technical field of industrial equipment maintenance data security. The method comprises the following steps that: terminal equipment acquires maintenance data, constructs an original data packet, and calculates an initial trust score of each transmission node; encrypting the original data packet and generating a digital signature, and constructing a security data unit; the transmission node performs verification and encrypted transmission in sequence to form an encrypted data link; the server calculates a dynamic trust score after receiving the data, verifies data integrity and updates a node trust score; generating a unique full-link traceability label for the verified data, and storing the unique full-link traceability label to the block chain; if verification fails, triggering an alarm and generating a responsibility definition report; and the authorized user can query full-link data through the traceability label. According to the method, the full-link credible traceability and tamper-proof protection of the maintenance data from generation to storage are realized, and the problem that the tamper link cannot be positioned and the responsibility cannot be defined by a traditional afterward verification mechanism is effectively solved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of industrial equipment maintenance data security technology, specifically to a maintenance data storage method based on encryption technology. Background Technology

[0002] In the process of industrial equipment maintenance, the use of encryption technology to store and protect maintenance data can ensure that the data has anti-tampering characteristics. Even if transmitted in an insecure network environment, its source and authenticity can be verified through cryptography, laying a technical foundation for realizing trusted digital management of the maintenance process.

[0003] However, existing maintenance data storage methods largely rely on post-event verification mechanisms, such as hash value verification after data is uploaded to a central database to determine if it has been tampered with. This method has significant limitations in practical applications: when verification detects data inconsistencies, it cannot accurately identify the specific stage at which the tampering occurred—that is, it cannot distinguish whether forgery occurred during terminal device generation, man-in-the-middle tampering during wireless transmission, or malicious modification during server storage. Regardless of which stage the tampering occurred at, it results in the same verification failure, making it difficult for maintenance personnel to pinpoint the responsible party and hindering end-to-end reliable traceability from data generation to storage. Therefore, there is an urgent need for an encrypted storage solution that provides continuous security protection throughout the data generation, transmission, and storage stages to address the responsibility determination challenges posed by post-event verification mechanisms. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide a maintenance data storage method based on encryption technology, so as to solve the problems raised in the prior art.

[0005] To solve the above-mentioned technical problems, the technical solution adopted by the present invention is as follows: A maintenance data storage method based on encryption technology includes the following steps: Step 1: The terminal device collects maintenance data of industrial equipment and constructs the original data packet; loads the basic information of all transmission nodes in the current data transmission link, calculates the initial trust score of each transmission node, and stores the initial trust score in association with the original data packet. Step 2: Encrypt the original data packet, generate a digital signature, and construct a secure data unit; Step 3: The terminal device sends the secure data unit to the first transmission node, which then judges the secure data unit. For secure data units that are judged to be valid, they are encrypted and transmitted sequentially according to the priority of each transmission node in the data transmission link to form an encrypted data chain. Step 4: After receiving the final secure data unit, the server calculates the dynamic trust score; verifies the data based on the dynamic trust score, and updates the initial trust score of each transmission node. Step 5: The server generates a unique end-to-end traceability tag for the verified data and stores the traceability tag in the blockchain; Step 6: If data verification fails, the server will automatically trigger an alarm and generate a responsibility delineation report; Step 7: Authorized users can query maintenance data through the full-chain traceability label.

[0006] The specific steps in Step 1 above include: Step 1.1: The terminal device collects maintenance data from industrial equipment through a manual input interface. This maintenance data includes basic equipment information, fault detection data, maintenance operation records, and component replacement information. The collected maintenance data is bound according to the format {unique equipment identifier, maintenance timestamp, data type} to form the original data packet Data0. The unique equipment identifier is a string combining the equipment's factory serial number and MAC address. The data type is distinguished by a two-digit code. The two-digit code includes: 01 for basic equipment information, 02 for fault detection data, 03 for maintenance operation records, and 04 for component replacement information. Step 1.2: Obtain the transmission link topology map. The terminal device loads the basic information of all transmission nodes in the current data transmission link through the transmission link topology map. The basic information includes node IP address, hardware model, historical transmission success rate, and historical tampering count. Set the weight coefficients for each dimension of the basic information. Step 1.3: Calculate the initial trust score for each transmission node. The calculation formula is as follows: ; Where T0 represents the initial trust score of the transmission node, S represents the historical transmission success rate of the transmission node, F represents the number of historical tampering records of each transmission node, N represents the total number of historical tampering records of all transmission nodes, M represents the hardware model compatibility, and a, b, and c are weighting coefficients. Step 1.4: Establish a mapping table between the original data packet and the initial trust score. The structure of the mapping table includes the original data packet ID, the transmission node IP, the initial trust score T0, and the loading timestamp. The mapping table is then stored in the local encrypted cache of the terminal device.

[0007] The specific steps in Step 2 above include: Step 2.1: The terminal device uses an encryption algorithm to encrypt the original data packet Data0, generating encrypted data Data0. 1During encryption, the key is generated by the hardware encryption module of the terminal device, and the initialization vector IV is randomly generated and combined with Data0. 1 Associated storage; Step 2.2: The terminal device generates a digital signature using an asymmetric encryption algorithm. The signing process is as follows: perform a hash operation on the original data packet Data0 to obtain a hash value Hash0, encrypt the hash value Hash0 using the terminal device's private key, and generate a digital signature Sig1. Step 2.3: Encrypt the data Data0 1 Digital signature Sig1, initial trust score list of the next transmission node [T] 01 ,T 02 ,…,T 0n The data is combined into a secure data unit, denoted as Unit1={Data0}. 1 ,Sig1,[T 01 ,T 02 ,…,T 0n ],Time1}; where Time1 is the timestamp generated by the first secure data unit, T 0n It is the nth transmission node contained in the 0th level of the data transmission link.

[0008] The specific steps in Step 3 above include: Step 3.1: The first transmission node is denoted as Node1. After receiving the secure data unit Unit1, the transmission node Node1 loads the environmental characteristics of the terminal device through the node basic information database. The terminal device is denoted as Node0. The environmental characteristics include real-time CPU utilization U, content occupancy M, and network bandwidth fluctuation value B. Step 3.2: Decrypt the digital signature Sig1 using Node0's public key to obtain the hash value Hash0. ; For Data0 in Unit1 1 Decryption yields the original data packet Data0. For Data0 Perform a hash operation to obtain Hash0 The digital signature is verified based on the calculated hash value.

[0009] The above-mentioned verification of digital signatures based on the calculated hash value includes: If Hash0 ≠Hash0 The signature verification was immediately deemed to have failed. If Hash0 =Hash0 Then, to verify the rationality of the environmental characteristics, the CPU utilization rate U, content occupancy rate M, and network bandwidth fluctuation value B are compared with preset thresholds; if U≤U th And M≤M th And B≤B th If the environmental characteristics are deemed reasonable for digital signature verification, then the verification is deemed unreasonable.

[0010] The above-mentioned verification of digital signatures based on the calculated hash value includes the following verification results: If the verification is successful, Node1 embeds its own identifier ID1 and received timestamp Time1 into Unit1; and uses an encryption algorithm to encrypt Data0 in Unit1. 1 Perform secondary encryption to generate secondary encrypted data Data0 2 ; For Data0 2 Perform a hash operation to obtain Hash1, and use Node1's private key to pair Data0. 2 Generate a second digital signature Sig2; update Unit1 to a secure data unit Unit2 = {Data0} 2 ,[Sig1,Sig2],ID1,Time1,[T 11 ,T 12 ,…,T 1n Record the transmission status of Node1, including data reception time, data packet size, and packet loss rate; If the verification is invalid, extract the initial trust score list [T] carried in Unit1. 11 ,T 12 ,…,T 1n Sort the data by score from highest to lowest, and select the transmission node with the highest score as the next transmission node; record the path switching information, including the original transmission node ID, switching reason, switching timestamp, and new transmission node ID; embed the switching information into the path change field of the secure data unit, and transmit the secure data unit to the next transmission node for encryption until it is transmitted to the server, forming an encrypted data chain.

[0011] The specific steps in Step 4 above include: Step 4.1: The server receives the final secure data unit, denoted as Unit. k Where k is the number of transmission nodes; according to the transmission order from Unit k Extract all digital signatures [Sig1, Sig2, ..., Sig k The corresponding digital signature is decrypted sequentially using the public keys of each transmission node to obtain the hash value sequence [Hash0, Hash1, ..., Hash2]. k-1]; For Unit k The encrypted data in the sequence is decrypted step by step to obtain the original data packet sequence [Data0]. 1 Data0 2 ,…,Data0 k [Hash0] is obtained by performing a hash operation on the original data packet sequence. Hash1 ,…,Hash k-1 If Hashj ≠ Hashj If the value is 0, then the corresponding transmission node is determined to have been tampered with; where j is any integer from 0 to k-1; Step 4.2: The server analyzes the environmental characteristics of each transmission node on the encrypted data chain and calculates a dynamic trust score. The dynamic trust score calculation dimensions include: environmental characteristic compliance, signature verification result, transmission time, and packet loss rate. The calculation formula is: ; Among them, T d This represents the dynamic trust score, where C is the environmental feature compliance, V is the signature verification result, and T is the signature verification result. 实 T represents the actual transmission time of the node. 标 L represents the standard transmission time of a node, and L is the node packet loss rate. , , , The weights are respectively for environmental feature compliance, signature verification result, transmission time, and packet loss rate; Step 4.3: Update the initial trust score by combining the dynamic trust scores of each transmission node during data transmission. The update formula is as follows: ; Among them, T new This represents the updated trust score, where T0 is the initial trust score, and T... d For dynamic trust scoring; , These are the weights corresponding to the initial trust score and the dynamic trust score, respectively.

[0012] The specific steps in Step 5 above include: Step 5.1: The server generates a unique full-link traceability tag based on the verified data. The tag is represented by a string format consisting of the blockchain block height, the unique data ID, and the verification timestamp. The blockchain block height is the latest block height of the blockchain at the time of data storage, and the unique data ID is the first n bits of the hash value of the original data packet Data0. Here, n is less than or equal to the number of bits in the hash value of the original data packet Data0. Step 5.2: Establish an associated storage structure, which includes: a traceability tag, decrypted maintenance data, and an updated transmission path [Node1, Node2, ... Node]. k ], Node Trust Score List [T new1 ,T new2 ,…,T newk ] , Store timestamps; Write the associated storage structure into the blockchain.

[0013] Step 6 above includes: If data verification fails or dynamic trust score T d If the data is below the threshold, the system automatically triggers multi-level alarms; records the tampering process information, including the tampering node ID and the timestamp of the tampering; and generates a responsibility determination report based on the recorded tampering process information, including the tampering process location result, responsible node information, the scope of data damage, and rectification suggestions.

[0014] The specific steps in Step 7 above include: Step 7.1: Authorized users input the full-chain traceability tag through the blockchain query interface, and the system verifies user permissions; Step 7.2: After successful authorization verification, the system returns the query results, which include: a list of encryption signatures for each transmission node [Sig1, Sig2, ..., Sig...]. k The following data is required: 1. Transmission node IDs; 2. Transmission timestamps for each transmission node; 3. Signature verification results; 4. Environmental compliance status; 5. Number of path switches; 6. Original transmission node ID, 7. New transmission node ID, 8. Reason for switch, and 9. Switch time for each switch; 10. Initial trust score T0 and dynamic trust score T1 for each transmission node. d Updated Trust Score T new .

[0015] The present invention provides a maintenance data storage method based on encryption technology. The beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows: 1. Achieve end-to-end trusted traceability: Through step-by-step encryption, digital signatures, and dynamic trust assessment, accurately locate the data tampering links and clarify the responsible parties.

[0016] 2. Enhance data transmission security: Combine environmental feature verification and dynamic path switching mechanisms to enhance the data's resistance to attacks during transmission.

[0017] 3. Enhance data storage reliability: Utilize the immutability of blockchain to store traceability tags, ensuring the long-term reliability and auditability of maintenance data.

[0018] 4. Supports intelligent alarms and responsibility definition: Automatically triggers alarms and generates detailed reports when data is abnormal, improving operation and maintenance response efficiency and decision-making basis. Attached Figure Description

[0019] The present invention will be further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments: Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the method flow for the maintenance data storage method based on encryption technology of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0020] The technical solutions in the embodiments of this application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the embodiments of this application. Obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of this application, and not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in this application, all other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0021] Example: like Figure 1 As shown, the present invention provides a technical solution, a maintenance data storage method based on encryption technology, the data storage method comprising: Step S1: The terminal device collects maintenance data of industrial equipment and constructs the original data packet; loads the basic information of all transmission nodes in the current data transmission link, calculates the initial trust score of each transmission node, and associates and stores the initial trust score with the original data packet; Step S2: Encrypt the original data packet, generate a digital signature, and construct a secure data unit; Step S3: The terminal device sends the secure data unit to the first transmission node, and the first transmission node judges the secure data unit; for the secure data units that are judged to be reasonable, they are encrypted and transmitted in sequence according to the priority of each transmission node in the data transmission link to form an encrypted data chain; Step S4: After receiving the final secure data unit, the server calculates the dynamic trust score; verifies the data based on the dynamic trust score, and updates the initial trust score of each transmission node. Step S5: The server generates a unique end-to-end traceability tag for the verified data and stores the traceability tag in the blockchain; Step S6: If data verification fails, the server will automatically trigger an alarm and generate a responsibility delineation report; Step S7: Authorize users to query maintenance data through the full-link traceability tag; Step S1 includes: Step S1.1: The terminal device collects maintenance data of industrial equipment through a manual input interface; the maintenance data includes basic equipment information, fault detection data, maintenance operation records, and component replacement information; the collected maintenance data is bound according to the format {unique equipment identifier, maintenance timestamp, data type} to form an original data packet Data0; wherein, the unique equipment identifier is a string combining the equipment's factory serial number and MAC address, and the data type is distinguished by a two-digit code; the two-digit code includes: 01 for basic equipment information, 02 for fault detection data, 03 for maintenance operation records, and 04 for component replacement information; Step S1.2: Obtain the transmission link topology map. The terminal device loads the basic information of all transmission nodes in the current data transmission link through the transmission link topology map. The basic information includes node IP address, hardware model, historical transmission success rate, and historical tampering count. Set the weight coefficients for each dimension of the basic information. Step S1.3: Calculate the initial trust score for each transmission node. The calculation formula is as follows: ; Where T0 represents the initial trust score of the transmission node, S represents the historical transmission success rate of the transmission node, F represents the number of historical tampering records of each transmission node, N represents the total number of historical tampering records of all transmission nodes, M represents the hardware model compatibility, and a, b, and c are weighting coefficients. Step S1.4: Establish a mapping table between the original data packet and the initial trust score. The structure of the mapping table includes the original data packet ID, the transmission node IP, the initial trust score T0, and the loading timestamp. The mapping table is then stored in the local encrypted cache of the terminal device. Step S2 includes: Step S2.1: The terminal device uses an encryption algorithm to encrypt the original data packet Data0, generating encrypted data Data0. 1 During encryption, the key is generated by the hardware encryption module of the terminal device, and the initialization vector IV is randomly generated and combined with Data0. 1 Associated storage; Step S2.2: The terminal device generates a digital signature using an asymmetric encryption algorithm; the signing process is as follows: perform a hash operation on the original data packet Data0 to obtain a hash value Hash0, encrypt the hash value Hash0 using the terminal device's private key, and generate a digital signature Sig1; Step S2.3: Encrypt the data Data0 1 Digital signature Sig1, initial trust score list of the next transmission node [T] 01 ,T 02 ,…,T 0n The data is combined into a secure data unit, denoted as Unit1={Data0}. 1 ,Sig1,[T 01 ,T 02 ,…,T 0n ],Time1}; where Time1 is the timestamp generated by the first secure data unit, T 0n It is the nth transmission node contained in level 0 of the data transmission link; Step S3 includes: Step S3.1: The first transmission node is denoted as Node1. After receiving the secure data unit Unit1, the transmission node Node1 loads the environmental characteristics of the terminal device through the node basic information database. The terminal device is denoted as Node0. The environmental characteristics include real-time CPU utilization U, content occupancy M, and network bandwidth fluctuation value B. Step S3.2: Decrypt the digital signature Sig1 using Node0's public key to obtain the hash value Hash0. ; For Data0 in Unit1 1 Decryption yields the original data packet Data0. For Data0 Perform a hash operation to obtain Hash0 The digital signature is verified based on the calculated hash value. Verifying the digital signature based on the calculated hash value includes: If Hash0 ≠Hash0 The signature verification was immediately deemed to have failed. If Hash0 =Hash0 Then, to verify the rationality of the environmental characteristics, the CPU utilization rate U, content occupancy rate M, and network bandwidth fluctuation value B are compared with preset thresholds; if U≤U th And M≤M th And B≤B th If the environmental characteristics and digital signature verification are deemed reasonable, then the verification is deemed unreasonable. The determination of the reasonableness of environmental characteristics and digital signature verification includes: If the verification is successful, Node1 embeds its own identifier ID1 and received timestamp Time1 into Unit1; and uses an encryption algorithm to encrypt Data0 in Unit1. 1 Perform secondary encryption to generate secondary encrypted data Data0 2 ; For Data0 2 Perform a hash operation to obtain Hash1, and use Node1's private key to pair Data0. 2 Generate a second digital signature Sig2; update Unit1 to a secure data unit Unit2 = {Data0} 2 ,[Sig1,Sig2],ID1,Time1,[T 11 ,T 12 ,…,T 1n Record the transmission status of Node1, including data reception time, data packet size, and packet loss rate; If the verification is invalid, extract the initial trust score list [T] carried in Unit1. 11 ,T 12 ,…,T 1n Sort the data by score from highest to lowest, and select the transmission node with the highest score as the next transmission node; record the path switching information, including the original transmission node ID, switching reason, switching timestamp, and new transmission node ID; embed the switching information into the path change field of the secure data unit, and transmit the secure data unit to the next transmission node for encryption until it is transmitted to the server, forming an encrypted data chain; Step S4 includes: Step S4.1: The server receives the final secure data unit, denoted as Unit. k Where k is the number of transmission nodes; according to the transmission order from Unit k Extract all digital signatures [Sig1, Sig2, ..., Sig k The corresponding digital signature is decrypted sequentially using the public keys of each transmission node to obtain the hash value sequence [Hash0, Hash1, ..., Hash2]. k-1 ]; For Unit k The encrypted data in the sequence is decrypted step by step to obtain the original data packet sequence [Data0]. 1 Data0 2 ,…,Data0 k [Hash0] is obtained by performing a hash operation on the original data packet sequence. Hash1 ,…,Hash k-1 If Hashj ≠ Hashj If the value is 0, then the corresponding transmission node is determined to have been tampered with; where j is any integer from 0 to k-1; Step S4.2: The server analyzes the environmental characteristics of each transmission node on the encrypted data chain and calculates a dynamic trust score; the dynamic trust score calculation dimensions include: environmental characteristic compliance, signature verification result, transmission time, and packet loss rate; the calculation formula is: ; Among them, T d This represents the dynamic trust score, where C is the environmental feature compliance, V is the signature verification result, and T is the signature verification result. 实 T represents the actual transmission time of the node. 标 L represents the standard transmission time of a node, and L is the node packet loss rate. , , , The weights are respectively for environmental feature compliance, signature verification result, transmission time, and packet loss rate; Step S4.3: Update the initial trust score by combining the dynamic trust scores of each transmission node during data transmission. The update formula is as follows: ; Among them, T new This represents the updated trust score, where T0 is the initial trust score, and T... d For dynamic trust scoring; , These are the weights corresponding to the initial trust score and the dynamic trust score, respectively. Step S5 includes: Step S5.1: The server generates a unique end-to-end traceability tag based on the verified data. The tag is represented by a string format consisting of the blockchain block height, the unique data ID, and the verification timestamp. The blockchain block height is the latest block height of the blockchain at the time of data storage, and the unique data ID is the first n bits of the hash value of the original data packet Data0. Here, n is less than or equal to the number of bits in the hash value of the original data packet Data0. Step S5.2: Establish an associated storage structure, which includes: a traceability tag, decrypted maintenance data, and an updated transmission path [Node1, Node2, ... Node]. k ], Node Trust Score List [T new1 ,T new2 ,…,T newk ] Storing timestamps; writing the associated storage structure into the blockchain; Step S6 includes: If data verification fails or dynamic trust score T d If the data is below the threshold, the system automatically triggers multi-level alarms; records the tampering process information, including: tampering node ID and tampering timestamp; generates a responsibility determination report based on the recorded tampering process information, including the tampering process location result, responsibility node information, data damage range, and rectification suggestions; Step S7 includes: Step S7.1: Authorized users input the full-chain traceability tag through the blockchain query interface, and the system verifies user permissions; Step S7.2: After successful authorization verification, the system returns the query results, which include: a list of encryption signatures for each transmission node [Sig1, Sig2, ..., Sig...]. k The following data is required: 1. Transmission node IDs; 2. Transmission timestamps for each transmission node; 3. Signature verification results; 4. Environmental compliance status; 5. Number of path switches; 6. Original transmission node ID, 7. New transmission node ID, 8. Reason for switch, and 9. Switch time for each switch; 10. Initial trust score T0 and dynamic trust score T1 for each transmission node. d Updated Trust Score T new ; In an embodiment of the present invention, during the maintenance of wind turbines in a large wind farm, maintenance personnel use handheld terminal devices to collect vibration data, abnormal temperature records, and maintenance operation records of changing lubricating oil from the wind turbine gearbox. The terminal device uses the above maintenance data as a unique identifier according to "equipment number + MAC address", binds the timestamp and data type code (such as 02 to indicate fault detection data) to form the original data packet Data0. The terminal device loads the basic information of the three transmission nodes in the current transmission link: edge gateway, 5G base station, and cloud gateway, calculates the initial trust score of each node, and stores it in association with Data0; then, the terminal encrypts Data0 and generates a digital signature, constructs a secure data unit Unit1, and sends it to the edge gateway. After receiving Unit1, the edge gateway verifies the digital signature and detects the real-time environmental characteristics of the terminal device, such as CPU usage, memory usage, and bandwidth fluctuations. After successful verification, the gateway performs secondary encryption on the data and adds its own signature, updates it to Unit2, and continues to transmit it to the 5G base station. This process is repeated until an encrypted data chain is finally formed and transmitted to the cloud server. After receiving the final Unit3, the server verifies the signature and data integrity level by level, calculates the dynamic trust score of each node, and updates its initial trust score. After successful verification, the server generates a full-link traceability tag and writes the data and path information into the consortium blockchain. If the signature verification of a node fails, the system automatically locates the tampering link and generates a responsibility report, which facilitates the traceability and handling by operation and maintenance personnel. Authorized users can use traceability tags to query the complete transmission path, trust scores of each node, and verification status on the blockchain platform, enabling trusted traceability and transparent management of maintenance data.

[0022] Finally, it should be noted that the above descriptions are merely preferred embodiments of the present invention and are not intended to limit the present invention. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art can still modify the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments or make equivalent substitutions for some of the technical features. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A maintenance data storage method based on encryption technology, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: Step 1: The terminal device collects maintenance data of industrial equipment and constructs the original data packet; loads the basic information of all transmission nodes in the current data transmission link, calculates the initial trust score of each transmission node, and stores the initial trust score in association with the original data packet. Step 2: Encrypt the original data packet, generate a digital signature, and construct a secure data unit; Step 3: The terminal device sends the secure data unit to the first transmission node, which then judges the secure data unit. For secure data units that are judged to be valid, they are encrypted and transmitted sequentially according to the priority of each transmission node in the data transmission link to form an encrypted data chain. Step 4: After receiving the final security data unit, the server calculates the dynamic trust score. The data is verified based on the dynamic trust score, and the initial trust score of each transmission node is updated. Step 5: The server generates a unique end-to-end traceability tag for the verified data and stores the traceability tag in the blockchain; Step 6: If data verification fails, the server will automatically trigger an alarm and generate a responsibility delineation report; Step 7: Authorized users can query maintenance data through the full-chain traceability label.

2. The maintenance data storage method based on encryption technology according to claim 1, characterized in that, The specific steps of Step 1 include: Step 1.1: The terminal device collects maintenance data from industrial equipment through a manual input interface. This maintenance data includes basic equipment information, fault detection data, maintenance operation records, and component replacement information. The collected maintenance data is bound according to the format {unique equipment identifier, maintenance timestamp, data type} to form the original data packet Data0. The unique equipment identifier is a string combining the equipment's factory serial number and MAC address. The data type is distinguished by a two-digit code. The two-digit code includes: 01 for basic equipment information, 02 for fault detection data, 03 for maintenance operation records, and 04 for component replacement information. Step 1.2: Obtain the transmission link topology map. The terminal device loads the basic information of all transmission nodes in the current data transmission link through the transmission link topology map. The basic information includes node IP address, hardware model, historical transmission success rate, and historical tampering count. Set the weight coefficients for each dimension of the basic information. Step 1.3: Calculate the initial trust score for each transmission node. The calculation formula is as follows: ； Where T0 represents the initial trust score of the transmission node, S represents the historical transmission success rate of the transmission node, F represents the number of historical tampering records of each transmission node, N represents the total number of historical tampering records of all transmission nodes, M represents the hardware model compatibility, and a, b, and c are weighting coefficients. Step 1.4: Establish a mapping table between the original data packet and the initial trust score. The structure of the mapping table includes the original data packet ID, the transmission node IP, the initial trust score T0, and the loading timestamp. The mapping table is then stored in the local encrypted cache of the terminal device.

3. The maintenance data storage method based on encryption technology according to claim 1, characterized in that, The specific steps in Step 2 include: Step 2.1: The terminal device uses an encryption algorithm to encrypt the original data packet Data0, generating encrypted data Data0. 1 During encryption, the key is generated by the hardware encryption module of the terminal device, and the initialization vector IV is randomly generated and combined with Data0. 1 Associated storage; Step 2.2: The terminal device generates a digital signature using an asymmetric encryption algorithm. The signing process is as follows: perform a hash operation on the original data packet Data0 to obtain a hash value Hash0, encrypt the hash value Hash0 using the terminal device's private key, and generate a digital signature Sig1. Step 2.3: Encrypt the data Data0 1 Digital signature Sig1, initial trust score list of the next transmission node [T] 01 ,T 02 ,…,T 0n The data is combined into a secure data unit, denoted as Unit1={Data0}. 1 ,Sig1,[T 01 ,T 02 ,…,T 0n ],Time1}; where Time1 is the timestamp generated by the first secure data unit, T 0n It is the nth transmission node contained in the 0th level of the data transmission link.

4. The maintenance data storage method based on encryption technology according to claim 1, characterized in that, The specific steps in Step 3 include: Step 3.1: The first transmission node is denoted as Node1. After receiving the secure data unit Unit1, the transmission node Node1 loads the environmental characteristics of the terminal device through the node basic information database. The terminal device is denoted as Node0. The environmental characteristics include real-time CPU utilization U, content occupancy M, and network bandwidth fluctuation value B. Step 3.2: Decrypt the digital signature Sig1 using Node0's public key to obtain the hash value Hash0. ; For Data0 in Unit1 1 Decryption yields the original data packet Data0. For Data0 Perform a hash operation to obtain Hash0 The digital signature is verified based on the calculated hash value.

5. A maintenance data storage method based on encryption technology according to claim 4, characterized in that, The verification of digital signatures based on the calculated hash value includes: If Hash0 ≠Hash0 The signature verification was immediately deemed to have failed. If Hash0 =Hash0 Then, to verify the rationality of the environmental characteristics, the CPU utilization rate U, content occupancy rate M, and network bandwidth fluctuation value B are compared with preset thresholds; if U≤U th And M≤M th And B≤B th If the environmental characteristics are deemed reasonable for digital signature verification, then the verification is deemed unreasonable.

6. The maintenance data storage method based on encryption technology according to claim 5, characterized in that, The verification of the digital signature based on the calculated hash value includes the following results: If the verification is successful, Node1 embeds its own identifier ID1 and received timestamp Time1 into Unit1; and uses an encryption algorithm to encrypt Data0 in Unit1. 1 Perform secondary encryption to generate secondary encrypted data Data0 2 ; For Data0 2 Perform a hash operation to obtain Hash1, and use Node1's private key to pair Data0. 2 Generate a second digital signature Sig2; update Unit1 to a secure data unit Unit2 = {Data0} 2 ,[Sig1,Sig2],ID1,Time1,[T 11 ,T 12 ,…,T 1n Record the transmission status of Node1, including data reception time, data packet size, and packet loss rate; If the verification is invalid, extract the initial trust score list [T] carried in Unit1. 11 ,T 12 ,…,T 1n Sort the data by score from highest to lowest, and select the transmission node with the highest score as the next transmission node; record the path switching information, including the original transmission node ID, switching reason, switching timestamp, and new transmission node ID; embed the switching information into the path change field of the secure data unit, and transmit the secure data unit to the next transmission node for encryption until it is transmitted to the server, forming an encrypted data chain.

7. The maintenance data storage method based on encryption technology according to claim 1, characterized in that, The specific steps in Step 4 include: Step 4.1: The server receives the final secure data unit, denoted as Unit. k Where k is the number of transmission nodes; according to the transmission order from Unit k Extract all digital signatures [Sig1, Sig2, ..., Sig k The corresponding digital signature is decrypted sequentially using the public keys of each transmission node to obtain the hash value sequence [Hash0, Hash1, ..., Hash2]. k-1 ]; For Unit k The encrypted data in the sequence is decrypted step by step to obtain the original data packet sequence [Data0]. 1 Data0 2 ,…,Data0 k [Hash0] is obtained by performing a hash operation on the original data packet sequence. Hash1 ,…,Hash k-1 If Hashj ≠ Hashj If the value is 0, then the corresponding transmission node is determined to have been tampered with; where j is any integer from 0 to k-1; Step 4.2: The server analyzes the environmental characteristics of each transmission node on the encrypted data chain and calculates a dynamic trust score. The dynamic trust score calculation dimensions include: environmental characteristic compliance, signature verification result, transmission time, and packet loss rate. The calculation formula is: ； Among them, T d This represents the dynamic trust score, where C is the environmental feature compliance, V is the signature verification result, and T is the signature verification result. 实 T represents the actual transmission time of the node. 标 L represents the standard transmission time of a node, and L is the node packet loss rate. , , , The weights are respectively for environmental feature compliance, signature verification result, transmission time, and packet loss rate; Step 4.3: Update the initial trust score by combining the dynamic trust scores of each transmission node during data transmission. The update formula is as follows: ； Among them, T new This represents the updated trust score, where T0 is the initial trust score, and T... d For dynamic trust scoring; , These are the weights corresponding to the initial trust score and the dynamic trust score, respectively.

8. A maintenance data storage method based on encryption technology according to claim 1, characterized in that, The specific steps in Step 5 include: Step 5.1: The server generates a unique full-link traceability tag based on the verified data. The tag is represented by a string format consisting of the blockchain block height, the unique data ID, and the verification timestamp. The blockchain block height is the latest block height of the blockchain at the time of data storage, and the unique data ID is the first n bits of the hash value of the original data packet Data0. Here, n is less than or equal to the number of bits in the hash value of the original data packet Data0. Step 5.2: Establish an associated storage structure, which includes: a traceability tag, decrypted maintenance data, and an updated transmission path [Node1, Node2, ... Node]. k ], Node Trust Score List [T new1 ,T new2 ,…,T newk ] , Store timestamps; Write the associated storage structure into the blockchain.

9. A maintenance data storage method based on encryption technology according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step 6 includes: If data verification fails or dynamic trust score T d If the data is below the threshold, the system automatically triggers multi-level alarms; records the tampering process information, including the tampering node ID and the timestamp of the tampering; and generates a responsibility determination report based on the recorded tampering process information, including the tampering process location result, responsible node information, the scope of data damage, and rectification suggestions.

10. A maintenance data storage method based on encryption technology according to claim 1, characterized in that, The specific steps in Step 7 include: Step 7.1: Authorized users input the full-chain traceability tag through the blockchain query interface, and the system verifies user permissions; Step 7.2: After successful authorization verification, the system returns the query results, which include: a list of encryption signatures for each transmission node [Sig1, Sig2, ..., Sig...]. k The following data is required:

1. Transmission node IDs; 2. Transmission timestamps for each transmission node; 3. Signature verification results; 4. Environmental compliance status; 5. Number of path switches; 6. Original transmission node ID, 7. New transmission node ID, 8. Reason for switch, and 9. Switch time for each switch; 10. Initial trust score T0 and dynamic trust score T1 for each transmission node. d Updated Trust Score T new .

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