Multi-receiver bilateral access control privacy protection cross-domain data sharing method
By introducing multi-receiver bilateral access control and proxy re-encryption technology into the vehicle network environment, the computational and communication overhead problems of cross-domain data sharing in the vehicle network are solved, achieving efficient and secure data sharing and access control, and improving the system's practicality and scalability.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202610224197.X
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-02-25
- Publication Date
- 2026-05-12
AI Technical Summary
In the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) environment, existing encryption schemes have high computational complexity and communication burden in multi-receiver scenarios, making it difficult to meet the requirements of low latency and high throughput. Traditional PKI mechanisms introduce management overhead in highly dynamic scenarios, and lack cross-domain data sharing and fine-grained access control, making it difficult to guarantee security and efficiency.
A privacy-preserving cross-domain data sharing method with multi-receiver bilateral access control is adopted. It utilizes a central trusted center to generate public parameters and key pairs, achieves cross-domain data sharing through proxy re-encryption technology, and combines a certificateless cryptography system to reduce computational and communication overhead and support fine-grained access control.
Significantly reduces encryption and communication overhead, improves real-time data sharing performance, reduces redundant data transmission, ensures data security and integrity, and enhances the system's practicality and scalability in large-scale, highly dynamic vehicle networking environments.
Smart Images
Figure CN122027299A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention belongs to the field of vehicle network privacy protection technology, and in particular relates to a cross-domain data sharing method with privacy protection through multi-receiver bilateral access control. Background Technology
[0002] With the rapid development of intelligent transportation systems and vehicle-to-everything (IoV) technologies, real-time data sharing between vehicles and between vehicles and infrastructure has become a crucial technological foundation for supporting traffic management and intelligent driving. Through efficient data interaction, IoV can effectively alleviate traffic congestion, reduce traffic accident rates, and improve road resource utilization efficiency and the overall driving experience. Therefore, building a safe, reliable, and efficient vehicle data sharing mechanism has become one of the research hotspots in the field of IoV.
[0003] However, the vehicle-to-everything (V2X) environment is highly dynamic and open, with a large number of vehicle nodes, high mobility, and frequent changes in network topology, which places stringent demands on the real-time performance and reliability of data transmission. Against this backdrop, vehicle data sharing faces numerous security and performance challenges. On the one hand, vehicles communicating in open wireless channels are vulnerable to various security attacks such as eavesdropping, tampering, and spoofing. On the other hand, traditional encryption and access control mechanisms often struggle to balance security and efficiency in large-scale, multi-receiver scenarios, easily leading to a significant increase in computational and communication overhead.
[0004] Existing point-to-point encryption schemes typically require the sender to perform encryption operations for each receiver separately. As the number of receiving vehicles increases, the computational complexity and communication burden grow linearly, making it difficult to meet the low latency and high throughput requirements of the connected vehicle environment. Furthermore, security mechanisms based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) rely on complex certificate generation, distribution, and verification processes, which introduce additional management overhead and communication latency in the highly dynamic scenario of connected vehicles, reducing overall system efficiency. Simultaneously, existing solutions still have shortcomings in cross-domain data sharing and fine-grained access control, making it difficult to achieve flexible data authorization and management while ensuring security.
[0005] To address the aforementioned issues, there is an urgent need to design a new data sharing security mechanism suitable for the Internet of Vehicles environment. This mechanism should ensure data confidentiality, integrity, and identity authentication security while reducing computational and communication overhead, and supporting flexible access control in scenarios with multiple receivers and cross-domain operations. Summary of the Invention
[0006] To address the aforementioned technical problems, this invention proposes a cross-domain data sharing method with privacy protection through multi-receiver bilateral access control, thereby resolving the issues present in the prior art.
[0007] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides a method for cross-domain data sharing with privacy protection through multi-receiver bilateral access control, comprising: The central trusted center performs system parameter initialization, generates public parameters, and saves the master key; Based on the public parameters and the master key, key pairs are generated for the trusted center, the key distribution center, and the vehicle, respectively. The sending vehicle generates a shared encrypted ciphertext for all receiving vehicles in the target receiving vehicle set using its own private key and the receiving vehicle's public key, which serves as the original ciphertext. The receiving vehicle then uses its own private key and the sending vehicle's public key to decrypt the original ciphertext and recover the plaintext. When cross-domain data sharing is carried out, the roadside unit converts the original ciphertext into re-encrypted ciphertext based on the proxy re-encryption key, and the receiving vehicle in the target domain performs a re-decryption operation on the re-encrypted ciphertext to recover the plaintext, thereby realizing multi-receiver bilateral access control and privacy protection in a cross-domain environment.
[0008] Optionally, the process of initializing system parameters performed by the total trusted center includes: The central trust center selects two large prime numbers and constructs the elliptic curve group and target group upon which the bilinear mapping depends based on the selected large prime numbers; it selects a generator on the elliptic curve group and selects a random number as the master key, and calculates the system master public key based on the generator and the master key; it selects multiple collision-resistant cryptographic hash functions; it publishes the large prime numbers, the generator, the elliptic curve group, the target group, the multiple collision-resistant cryptographic hash functions, and the system master public key as common parameters, and keeps the master key confidential.
[0009] Optionally, the process of generating key pairs for the trusted center, key distribution center, and vehicle includes: The central trusted center generates private and public keys for each trusted center; the trusted center generates private and public keys for the key distribution centers under its jurisdiction; the key distribution centers generate partial private key components and corresponding verification parameters for registered vehicles and send them to the corresponding vehicles; after receiving the partial private key components and corresponding verification parameters, the vehicles use the public key of the corresponding key distribution center to verify the correctness; if the verification is successful, the vehicles select a secret value and generate a complete key pair based on the secret value and the partial private key components.
[0010] Optionally, generating encrypted ciphertext shared by all recipient vehicles within the target recipient vehicle set includes: The sending vehicle randomly selects a first random number and a second random number; a first temporary public key is generated based on the first random number, and a second temporary public key is generated based on the second random number; the sending vehicle calculates intermediate parameters based on its own private key and the public key of the target receiving vehicle. For each receiving vehicle in the target receiving vehicle set, the sending vehicle calculates its corresponding [parameter / data] based on the intermediate parameters. and ; The sending vehicle is based on all receiving vehicles. Construct the first polynomial And extract the set of coefficients of the first polynomial; based on all receiving vehicles Construct the second polynomial And extract the set of coefficients of the second polynomial; The sending vehicle generates a session key based on a first polynomial and a second polynomial. and based on generate and ; The sending vehicle passes through Encrypt plaintext messages to generate core ciphertext components. and ; The sending vehicle obtains the original ciphertext based on the core ciphertext component, the first temporary public key, the second temporary public key, and the coefficient set of the first and second polynomials.
[0011] Optionally, the original ciphertext is converted into re-encrypted ciphertext, which is performed by the roadside unit, and the process includes: The roadside unit receives the original ciphertext and the proxy re-encryption key; verifies the integrity of the original ciphertext; after successful verification, performs conversion calculations on the core ciphertext components in the original ciphertext based on the proxy re-encryption key to obtain the converted ciphertext components; and recombines the unconverted portion of the original ciphertext with the converted ciphertext components to obtain the re-encrypted ciphertext.
[0012] Optionally, performing a decryption operation on the original ciphertext includes: The receiving vehicle, based on the first temporary public key, the second temporary public key, and the coefficient sets of the first and second polynomials contained in the original ciphertext, and combining its own private key with the sender's public key, calculates its corresponding... and Using Lagrange interpolation, based on Recover the secret components from the coefficient set of the first polynomial. ,according to Recovering the secret component from the coefficient set of the second polynomial Based on secret components With secret components Refactoring ;use The core ciphertext components in the original ciphertext are decrypted to recover the plaintext and verify its correctness.
[0013] Optionally, the process of performing a re-decryption operation on the re-encrypted ciphertext includes: The receiving vehicle in the target domain is based on the components in the re-encrypted ciphertext. Calculate intermediate parameters using the private key of the trusted center to which it belongs. ; Based on the intermediate parameters The source domain identifier and the target domain identifier are used to calculate the link value using a hash function. ; Using link values Components in the re-encrypted ciphertext , and The intermediate decryption parameters are calculated. ; Based on the intermediate decryption parameters The remaining components in the re-encrypted ciphertext are used to recover the plaintext and verify the correctness of the decryption.
[0014] Optionally, the process for generating the proxy re-encryption key includes: The agent randomly selects two re-encrypted random numbers. and ; Based on receiver public key component With re-encrypted random numbers Calculate the key generation parameters; Based on the key generation parameters, source domain identifier, and target domain identifier, the link value is calculated using a hash function. Based on the link value and the re-encrypted random number Session key of the source domain sender vehicle The first component used to calculate and generate the proxy re-encryption key RK, along with system common parameters. ; Based on the re-encrypted random number With the recipient's public key component The second component that generates the proxy re-encryption key RK ; Based on the re-encrypted random number The third component that generates the proxy re-encryption key, along with the generators in the system's common parameters. .
[0015] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following advantages and technical effects: This invention proposes a cross-domain secure data sharing and bidirectional access control encryption scheme for vehicle-to-everything (V2X) environments. By introducing proxy re-encryption technology, this invention enables secure data flow between different domains, allowing the same data to be shared by multiple authorized recipients. This avoids the data sender repeatedly performing encryption operations for each recipient, significantly reducing encryption and communication overhead, improving real-time data sharing performance, and reducing unnecessary data redundancy. Simultaneously, this invention introduces a matching encryption mechanism into the multi-receiver data sharing model to achieve fine-grained bidirectional access control and data integrity protection. This mechanism imposes dual constraints on the data generation and access process; encryption and decryption operations can only be successfully executed when both the sender and receiver meet the preset access policy. This ensures that only vehicle nodes belonging to a designated group can generate or access specific data, effectively reducing the risk of malicious data tampering, forgery, or leakage. Furthermore, by combining a certificateless cryptography system, the additional overhead of traditional certificate management is eliminated, further enhancing the system's practicality and scalability in large-scale, highly dynamic V2X environments. Attached Figure Description
[0016] The accompanying drawings, which form part of this application, are used to provide a further understanding of this application. The illustrative embodiments and descriptions of this application are used to explain this application and do not constitute an undue limitation of this application. In the drawings: Figure 1 This is a system model diagram of an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation
[0017] It should be noted that, unless otherwise specified, the embodiments and features described in this application can be combined with each other. This application will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments.
[0018] It should be noted that the steps shown in the flowchart in the accompanying drawings can be executed in a computer system such as a set of computer-executable instructions, and although a logical order is shown in the flowchart, in some cases the steps shown or described may be executed in a different order than that shown here.
[0019] Example 1 like Figure 1 As shown, this embodiment provides a cross-domain data sharing method with privacy protection through multi-receiver bilateral access control, including an initialization phase, a key generation phase, a data encryption phase, and a data decryption phase.
[0020] (a) Initialization phase; (1) System model; The solution of this invention includes five entities: Trusted Center (TA), Vehicle ( ), Total Trusted Center (TTA), Roadside Unit (RSU), and Key Distribution Center (KGC), such as Figure 1 As shown.
[0021] The designated authorized agencies in each jurisdiction are responsible for the registration and management of vehicles within their respective jurisdictions.
[0022] It is equipped with an on-board unit (OBU) that handles data, computation, and wireless communication with road infrastructure and other vehicles. It is considered semi-trusted.
[0023] It is responsible for initializing system parameters, including generating public key parameters and master keys. Simultaneously, it provides identity authentication and key distribution services to trusted entities in various fields, thereby ensuring the integrity and reliability of the system's security trust chain and key management.
[0024] This entity generates and manages vehicle private keys. While its key generation and distribution processes are trusted, there is a risk of user privacy breaches or collusion with external parties in certain situations.
[0025] The semi-trusted core component of the Internet of Vehicles is deployed along roads as a communication infrastructure and acts as a third-party agent to forward data, enabling cross-domain data sharing.
[0026] (2) System parameter initialization; TTA chooses two large prime numbers q and p, and in a finite field... Define an elliptic curve suitable for pairing. It has two cyclic subgroups and Subgroup The order is , generated by Generation. Subgroup The order is q, defined on the twist curve. , generated by Generate. Here. Is the order as The finite field. Target group. Defined as a multiplication group A subgroup of, in It is the embedding degree of the curve, selected such that... The discrete logarithm problem is computationally difficult. TTA selection. ( It is a model The set of all non-zero integers is used as the master key, and the master public key is set accordingly. Furthermore, it chooses the following collision-resistant and safe hash function. : , .
[0027] TTA generates common parameters and will Keep it confidential.
[0028] (ii) Key generation stage; It is assumed that the registration phase communicates through a secure channel and that all entities honestly perform the relevant steps.
[0029] (1) Trusted center key generation; Towards Send identity ID ( And apply to generate a key pair. Random selection As The private key. Calculate. As The public key. Send the key pair .
[0030] (2) Management center key generation; Towards Send identity ID ( And apply to generate a key pair. Random selection As The private key. Calculate. Used as a public key. Send the key pair .
[0031] (3) Vehicle key generation; 1) Towards Send identity ID ( And apply to generate a partial private key. Random selection .calculate As Part of the private key. Send the key pair .
[0032] 2) receive Sent Afterwards, it was verified. If they are equal, receive part of the private key. Then Random selection .calculate . Generate key pairs , .
[0033] (4) Generation of proxy re-encryption keys; The generated re-encryption key is mainly used for cross-domain data sharing, sharing messages from domain A to domain B, with the agent vehicle being randomly selected. ,calculate in for The calculation results Randomly select for the recipient ,calculate , , ( It is the private key used to send messages. in for The calculation results The identities of TA in domain A and domain B are respectively. , , (Re-encrypt the key for the agent). The agent vehicle sends... And the encrypted ciphertext to the data sharing domain .
[0034] (iii) Data encryption stage; This phase mainly achieves the one-to-many data sharing phase within the domain and the cross-domain data sharing re-encryption phase.
[0035] (1) One-to-many data encryption within the domain; Its inputs include common parameters The program takes the sender's private key, the receiver's public key, the sender's identity, the target receiver's identity set, and the plaintext message, and outputs ciphertext. The vehicle that sends the information represents Representative set Information receiving vehicle. Its main steps are: 1) Random selection ,calculate ， ; ， ， Intermediate variables are respectively from ， ， Calculated.
[0036] 2) calculate ). The system is designed to match the unique identity of the receiving vehicle, and this value cannot be reconstructed by any user without a valid private key. It is a decryption auxiliary parameter bound to the receiving vehicle's private key, used to prevent forgery and replay.
[0037] 3) Define two polynomials: in, They are The coefficients of (k=0,1,...,n). , These are two Lagrange interpolation functions used for the receiver's recovery key.
[0038] 4) Random selection ,calculate , , ,in, It is the private key used to send messages. It is the public key used to send messages. and It is an intermediate variable.
[0039] 5) Random selection ,calculate ( )， Finally, the corresponding ciphertext is returned. When the set When the number of vehicles remains unchanged, the coefficients will remain unchanged, thus minimizing costs.
[0040] (2) Cross-domain data re-encryption; In domain B Received and ciphertext back: 1) Through equations Verify the ciphertext is correct; if correct, continue execution.
[0041] 2) Calculate using the re-encryption key ， ， ， ， .
[0042] 3) Generation Send to vehicles within domain B.
[0043] (iv) Data decryption stage; (1) Decryption of data within the domain; gather In After receiving the ciphertext, use your private key to perform the following calculations: 1) ,in To receive the first part of the key for the vehicle. The first part of the sender's public key; 2) ,in These are the identities of the sending and receiving vehicles, respectively. , To receive the vehicle's key ; 3) Using Lagrange polynomials , calculate recover ,calculate , ， Through equations Verify the decrypted plaintext; if the equation holds true, the plaintext is correct.
[0044] (2) Cross-domain decryption; Vehicle calculation in domain B ( )， ( )， ， ， ， Intermediate variables calculated for receiving vehicles are used for recovery. Through equations Check the decrypted m Check if it's correct; if correct, accept; if incorrect, return.
[0045] The secure data sharing scheme provided by this invention, based on certificate-free cryptography, multi-receiver encryption, and advanced access control technology, has significant theoretical and practical value for improving the overall security and practicality of vehicle networking systems.
[0046] The above are merely preferred embodiments of this application, but the scope of protection of this application is not limited thereto. Any variations or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the scope of the technology disclosed in this application should be included within the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be determined by the scope of the claims.
Claims
1. A method for cross-domain data sharing with privacy protection through multi-receiver bilateral access control, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: The central trusted center performs system parameter initialization, generates public parameters, and saves the master key; Based on the public parameters and the master key, key pairs are generated for the trusted center, the key distribution center, and the vehicle, respectively. The sending vehicle generates a shared encrypted ciphertext for all receiving vehicles in the target receiving vehicle set using its own private key and the receiving vehicle's public key, which serves as the original ciphertext. The receiving vehicle then uses its own private key and the sending vehicle's public key to decrypt the original ciphertext and recover the plaintext. When cross-domain data sharing is carried out, the roadside unit converts the original ciphertext into re-encrypted ciphertext based on the proxy re-encryption key, and the receiving vehicle in the target domain performs a re-decryption operation on the re-encrypted ciphertext to recover the plaintext, thereby realizing multi-receiver bilateral access control and privacy protection in a cross-domain environment.
2. The method for cross-domain data sharing with multi-receiver bilateral access control and privacy protection according to claim 1, characterized in that, The process of initializing system parameters by the central trusted center includes: The central trust center selects two large prime numbers and constructs the elliptic curve group and target group upon which the bilinear mapping depends based on the selected large prime numbers; it selects a generator on the elliptic curve group and selects a random number as the master key, and calculates the system master public key based on the generator and the master key; it selects multiple collision-resistant cryptographic hash functions; it publishes the large prime numbers, the generator, the elliptic curve group, the target group, the multiple collision-resistant cryptographic hash functions, and the system master public key as common parameters, and keeps the master key confidential.
3. The method for cross-domain data sharing with multi-receiver bilateral access control and privacy protection according to claim 1, characterized in that, The process of generating key pairs for the trusted center, key distribution center, and vehicle includes: The central trusted center generates private and public keys for each trusted center; the trusted center generates private and public keys for the key distribution centers under its jurisdiction; the key distribution centers generate partial private key components and corresponding verification parameters for registered vehicles and send them to the corresponding vehicles; after receiving the partial private key components and corresponding verification parameters, the vehicles use the public key of the corresponding key distribution center to verify the correctness; if the verification is successful, the vehicles select a secret value and generate a complete key pair based on the secret value and the partial private key components.
4. The method for cross-domain data sharing with multi-receiver bilateral access control and privacy protection according to claim 3, characterized in that, The generated encrypted ciphertext, shared by all recipient vehicles within the target recipient vehicle set, includes: The sending vehicle randomly selects a first random number and a second random number; a first temporary public key is generated based on the first random number, and a second temporary public key is generated based on the second random number; the sending vehicle calculates intermediate parameters based on its own private key and the public key of the target receiving vehicle. For each receiving vehicle in the target receiving vehicle set, the sending vehicle calculates its corresponding [parameter / data] based on the intermediate parameters. and ; The sending vehicle is based on all receiving vehicles. Construct the first polynomial And extract the set of coefficients of the first polynomial; based on all receiving vehicles Construct the second polynomial And extract the set of coefficients of the second polynomial; The sending vehicle generates a session key based on a first polynomial and a second polynomial. and based on generate and ; The sending vehicle passes through Encrypt plaintext messages to generate core ciphertext components. and ; The sending vehicle obtains the original ciphertext based on the core ciphertext component, the first temporary public key, the second temporary public key, and the coefficient set of the first and second polynomials.
5. The method for cross-domain data sharing with multi-receiver bilateral access control and privacy protection according to claim 4, characterized in that, The original ciphertext is converted into re-encrypted ciphertext, which is performed by the roadside unit. The process includes: The roadside unit receives the original ciphertext and the proxy re-encryption key; verifies the integrity of the original ciphertext; after successful verification, performs conversion calculations on the core ciphertext components in the original ciphertext based on the proxy re-encryption key to obtain the converted ciphertext components; and recombines the unconverted portion of the original ciphertext with the converted ciphertext components to obtain the re-encrypted ciphertext.
6. The method for cross-domain data sharing with privacy protection through multi-receiver bilateral access control according to claim 4, characterized in that, Performing a decryption operation on the original ciphertext includes: The receiving vehicle, based on the first temporary public key, the second temporary public key, and the coefficient sets of the first and second polynomials contained in the original ciphertext, and combining its own private key with the sender's public key, calculates its corresponding... and Using Lagrange interpolation, based on Recover the secret components from the coefficient set of the first polynomial. ,according to Recovering the secret component from the coefficient set of the second polynomial Based on secret components With secret components Refactoring ;use The core ciphertext components in the original ciphertext are decrypted to recover the plaintext and verify its correctness.
7. The method for cross-domain data sharing with privacy protection through multi-receiver bilateral access control according to claim 5, characterized in that, The process of performing a re-decryption operation on the re-encrypted ciphertext includes: The receiving vehicle in the target domain is based on the components in the re-encrypted ciphertext. Calculate intermediate parameters using the private key of the trusted center to which it belongs. ; Based on the intermediate parameters The source domain identifier and the target domain identifier are used to calculate the link value using a hash function. ; Using link values Components in the re-encrypted ciphertext , and The intermediate decryption parameters are calculated. ; Based on the intermediate decryption parameters The remaining components in the re-encrypted ciphertext are used to recover the plaintext and verify the correctness of the decryption.
8. The method for cross-domain data sharing with privacy protection through multi-receiver bilateral access control according to claim 5, characterized in that, The process of generating the proxy re-encryption key includes: The agent randomly selects two re-encrypted random numbers. and ; Based on receiver public key component With re-encrypted random numbers Calculate the key generation parameters; Based on the key generation parameters, source domain identifier, and target domain identifier, the link value is calculated using a hash function. Based on the link value and the re-encrypted random number Session key of the source domain sender vehicle The first component used to calculate and generate the proxy re-encryption key RK, along with system common parameters. ; Based on the re-encrypted random number With the recipient's public key component The second component that generates the proxy re-encryption key RK ; Based on the re-encrypted random number The third component that generates the proxy re-encryption key, along with the generators in the system's common parameters. .