Certificate issuing method and device of PKI trust model, equipment and medium

Abstract

The invention discloses a certificate issuing method and device of a PKI trust model, equipment and a medium, and relates to the technical field of information security, and the method comprises the steps: determining a target signature algorithm of each certificate authority according to the business characteristics of the certificate authority and the position of the certificate authority in the trust level of the PKI trust model; generating a self-signature root certificate based on a target signature algorithm through the root certificate issuing mechanism; when a certificate is applied to a parent certificate issuing mechanism, a first signature public key determined based on a target signature algorithm is sent to the parent certificate issuing mechanism through an intermediate certificate issuing mechanism, so that the first signature public key is authenticated and signed to complete certificate issuing; and the information of the terminal user is authenticated and signed through the final-stage certificate issuing mechanism, and a second signature public key generated based on the target signature algorithm is sent to the intermediate certificate issuing mechanism, so that the second signature public key is authenticated and signed, and certificate issuing is completed. Therefore, the certificate can be signed and issued conveniently and flexibly.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of information security technology, and in particular to a certificate issuance method, apparatus, device and medium for a PKI trust model. Background Technology

[0002] The primary function of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is to bind the identity of certificate holders and their associated key pairs (by issuing digital certificates for public keys and related user identity information), providing users with convenient means to apply for, revoke, obtain, and query certificate status. It also utilizes digital certificates and various related services (certificate issuance, blacklist issuance, timestamp services, etc.) to achieve authentication, integrity, non-repudiation, and confidentiality for entities in communication. Traditional PKI uses signature algorithms such as RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman, asymmetric encryption algorithm) and ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) in the certificate issuance and verification process, which are vulnerable to the threat of quantum computing. Due to the diversity of PQC (Post-Quantum Cryptography) algorithms, their applicable scenarios vary greatly. Therefore, selecting suitable post-quantum algorithms for specific application scenarios, conducting application adaptation, testing and verification, and efficiency optimization become the main tasks of PKI post-quantum migration work. Overall, current research on quantum secure PKI primarily focuses on the impact of signature algorithm replacement on certificate management protocols, network transmission protocols, and transmission performance, thereby providing guidance for algorithm selection strategies in post-quantum migration. In quantum secure PKI research, the main technical approach currently involves a complete replacement of signature algorithms, replacing traditional algorithms like RSA and ECDSA with post-quantum signature algorithms such as Dilithium, Rainbow, Picnic, and SPHINCS+. This migration approach is relatively superficial and does not deeply explore the intrinsic connections and compatibility between signature algorithm structures and PKI trust models, making it difficult to meet the engineering implementation needs of industry, such as simple algorithm structure, convenient deployment, and ease of management. Therefore, how to construct simple algorithms for flexible and convenient certificate issuance is a pressing issue that needs to be addressed. Summary of the Invention

[0003] In view of this, the purpose of this invention is to provide a certificate issuance method, apparatus, device, and medium for a PKI trust model, which features a simple algorithm, flexibly and conveniently issues certificates, and is easy to deploy and manage. The specific solution is as follows: Firstly, this application discloses a certificate issuance method for a PKI trust model, including: Based on the business characteristics of the certificate authority and its position in the trust hierarchy of the PKI trust model, the target signature algorithm based on hashing is determined for each certificate authority; the target signature algorithm includes the XMSS signature algorithm and the DFORS signature algorithm. A self-signed root certificate is generated by the root certificate authority based on the target signature algorithm; When an intermediate certificate authority applies for a certificate from a parent certificate authority, the intermediate certificate authority sends a first signature public key determined based on the target signature algorithm to the parent certificate authority so that the parent certificate authority can authenticate and sign the first signature public key to complete the certificate issuance by the intermediate certificate authority; the parent certificate authority is the root certificate authority or the intermediate certificate authority at the next higher level. The final certificate authority authenticates and signs the end-user's information based on the target signature algorithm, and sends the second signature public key generated based on the target signature algorithm to the intermediate certificate authority, so that the intermediate certificate authority can authenticate and sign the second signature public key to complete the certificate issuance by the final certificate authority.

[0004] Optionally, determining the hash-based target signature algorithm corresponding to each certificate authority based on its business characteristics and position in the trust hierarchy of the PKI trust model includes: If the number of certificates issued by the certificate authority is less than a first preset threshold, and the certificate authority is a root certificate authority or an intermediate certificate authority, then the target signature algorithm is determined to be the XMSS signature algorithm. If the number of certificates issued by the certificate authority is greater than the second preset threshold, and the certificate authority is a last-level certificate authority, then the target signature algorithm is determined to be the DFORS signature algorithm.

[0005] Optionally, the method further includes: The system parameters of the target signature algorithm are set by each certificate authority according to the security level requirements and the number of certificates issued within the update cycle; the system parameters include any one or a combination of the following: the height of the XMSS tree, the Winternitz parameter, the hash function, the pseudo-random function seed, the upper limit of the number of signatures, the total number of leaf nodes of the FORST tree, the number of child nodes, and the number of layers.

[0006] Optionally, generating a self-signed root certificate based on the target signature algorithm through a root certificate authority includes: The public key of the XMSS signature algorithm is determined as the third signature public key by the root certificate authority, and a self-signed root certificate is generated based on the third signature public key; the public key of the target signature algorithm is the root node of the XMSS tree.

[0007] Optionally, the step of sending the first signing public key determined based on the target signature algorithm to the parent certificate authority through the intermediate certificate authority, so that the parent certificate authority can authenticate and sign the first signing public key, includes: The intermediate certificate authority determines the public key of the XMSS signature algorithm as the first signature public key, and sends the first signature public key to the parent certificate authority so that the parent certificate authority can authenticate and sign the first signature public key based on the private key of the XMSS signature algorithm; the private key of the XMSS signature algorithm is the Winternitz one-time signature and one-time private key corresponding to the leaf node of the XMSS tree.

[0008] Optionally, sending the second signature public key generated based on the target signature algorithm to the intermediate certificate authority, so that the intermediate certificate authority can authenticate and sign the second signature public key, includes: The second signature public key generated based on the public key of the DFORS signature algorithm is sent to the intermediate certificate authority so that the intermediate certificate authority can authenticate and sign the second signature public key.

[0009] Optionally, the method further includes: The number of certificates issued by the certificate authority and the remaining signature capacity are determined based on the state value of the XMSS signature algorithm. Whether to renew the certificate is determined based on the number of certificates already issued by the certificate authority and the remaining signature capacity.

[0010] Secondly, this application discloses a certificate issuance device for a PKI trust model, comprising: The target signature algorithm determination module is used to determine the hash-based target signature algorithm corresponding to each certificate authority based on the certificate authority's business characteristics and its position in the trust hierarchy of the PKI trust model; the target signature algorithm includes the XMSS signature algorithm and the DFORS signature algorithm; The self-signed root certificate generation module is used to generate a self-signed root certificate by a root certificate authority based on the target signature algorithm. The first certificate issuance module is used to send a first signature public key determined based on the target signature algorithm to the parent certificate authority when an intermediate certificate authority applies for a certificate from the parent certificate authority. This allows the parent certificate authority to authenticate and sign the first signature public key, thereby completing the certificate issuance by the intermediate certificate authority. The parent certificate authority is either the root certificate authority or the next higher-level intermediate certificate authority. The second certificate issuance module is used to authenticate and sign the terminal user's information based on the target signature algorithm by the last-level certificate authority, and send the second signature public key generated based on the target signature algorithm to the intermediate certificate authority, so that the intermediate certificate authority can authenticate and sign the second signature public key to complete the certificate issuance by the last-level certificate authority.

[0011] Thirdly, this application discloses an electronic device, including: Memory, used to store computer programs; A processor is used to execute computer programs to implement a certificate issuance method for a PKI trust model as described above.

[0012] Fourthly, this application discloses a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements a certificate issuance method for the aforementioned PKI trust model.

[0013] This application first determines the target hash-based signature algorithm corresponding to each certificate authority (CEA) based on its business characteristics and position in the trust hierarchy of the PKI trust model. The target signature algorithm includes the XMSS signature algorithm and the DFORS signature algorithm. A root CEA generates a self-signed root certificate based on the target signature algorithm. When an intermediate CEA requests a certificate from its parent CEA, the intermediate CEA sends a first signature public key determined based on the target signature algorithm to the parent CEA, so that the parent CEA can authenticate and sign the first signature public key to complete the certificate issuance by the intermediate CEA. The parent CEA is either the root CEA or a higher-level intermediate CEA. Finally, the last-level CEA authenticates and signs the end-user's information based on the target signature algorithm and sends a second signature public key generated based on the target signature algorithm to the intermediate CEA, so that the intermediate CEA can authenticate and sign the second signature public key to complete the certificate issuance by the last-level CEA. As can be seen, this application constructs a target signature algorithm based on two types of hash signature algorithms, XMSS and DFORS. The signature algorithm is selected and matched according to the business characteristics of different levels of certificate authorities, and used by certificate authorities at each level to issue certificates to lower-level entities. Finally, a PKI hierarchical trust model is designed through fusion. This model employs a simple signature algorithm structure, facilitates the issuance and management of higher-level certificate authorities, and allows for flexible deployment of lower-level certificate authorities, making it more practical in business systems. Attached Figure Description

[0014] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on the provided drawings without creative effort.

[0015] Figure 1 This application discloses a flowchart of a certificate issuance method for a PKI trust model. Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of a post-quantum PKI hierarchical trust model disclosed in this application; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of a PKI hierarchical model disclosed in this application; Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of a certificate issuance device for a PKI trust model disclosed in this application; Figure 5 This is a structural diagram of an electronic device disclosed in this application. Detailed Implementation

[0016] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0017] In quantum-safe PKI research, the main technical approach currently involves replacing the entire signature algorithm, replacing traditional signature algorithms such as RSA and ECDSA with post-quantum signature algorithms such as Dilithium, Rainbow, Picnic, and SPHINCS+. This migration method is relatively superficial and does not deeply explore the inherent connection and compatibility between the signature algorithm structure and the PKI trust model, making it difficult to meet the engineering implementation needs of industry, such as simple algorithm structure, convenient deployment, and ease of management. To address these technical issues, this application discloses a certificate issuance method, apparatus, device, and medium for a PKI trust model, which enables flexible and convenient certificate issuance using a simple algorithm, achieving convenient deployment and easy management.

[0018] See Figure 1 As shown in the figure, this invention discloses a certificate issuance method for a PKI trust model, including: Step S11: Based on the business characteristics of the certificate authority and its position in the trust hierarchy of the PKI trust model, determine the target signature algorithm based on hash for each certificate authority; the target signature algorithm includes the XMSS signature algorithm and the DFORS signature algorithm.

[0019] In this embodiment, the PKI hierarchical trust model based on traditional signature algorithms cannot withstand the threat of quantum computing. Therefore, it is necessary to propose a PKI hierarchical trust model capable of resisting quantum computing threats, namely, the post-quantum PKI hierarchical trust model. The post-quantum PKI hierarchical trust model maintains consistency with the traditional PKI strict hierarchical trust model in terms of model structure and authentication path. The only difference lies in the method and content of the signature algorithm used. Traditional PKI hierarchical models generally use classic signature algorithms such as ECDSA and RSA, and each level of CA (Certificate Authority) uses a unified signature algorithm to issue certificates to lower-level CAs. The post-quantum PKI hierarchical model uses quantum-safe signature algorithms throughout, and each level of CA adopts an appropriate signature algorithm based on the business characteristics of its level. Specifically, the root CA and intermediate CAs generally correspond to the upper-level management organization. Since their certificate issuance volume is relatively small and management requirements are high, they both use the stateful XMSS signature algorithm to issue certificates to their directly connected sub-CAs. The state value can intuitively reflect the number of certificates issued by the CA and the remaining signature count, facilitating the management organization's business data statistics and deployment of certificate update matters. The final-level CA typically directly faces the end-user entity, issuing a large number of certificates. Therefore, the stateless few-signature scheme DFORS is used to issue certificates to its connected end-users. Simultaneously, the final-level CA generally corresponds to the underlying management organization, with a varying number of subordinate end-users. Therefore, the signature algorithm parameters can be flexibly selected based on the number of certificates issued. A post-quantum PKI hierarchical trust model designed based on XMSS and DFORS is as follows: Figure 2 As shown.

[0020] It's important to note that hash-based signature algorithms consist of two schemes: a base signature scheme and an extension algorithm. The base signature scheme defines the main signature process; the key pair can be used to sign one or more messages. The former is also known as a One-time Signature (OTS) scheme, such as Lamport, while the latter is known as a Few-time Signature (FTS) scheme, such as HORS (Hash to Obtain Random Subsets) and FORS (Forest of Random Subsets). The extension algorithm is a top-level construct that employs multiple base signature schemes within a Merkle tree structure. Such algorithms can sign multiple messages and are called Many-time Signature (MTS) algorithms, such as XMSS. XMSS is a stateful multiple signature algorithm using WOTS+ as the base signature scheme, with a fixed number of signatures. (H is the height of the XMSS tree). DFORS is a few-signature scheme proposed by Yehia et al. at AFRICACRYPT 2020. Essentially, it's a variant of the underlying signature scheme FORS, improving the adaptive security strength of the signature scheme by modifying the subset selection function, thereby increasing the number of signatures while maintaining the same security strength. The specific details of the XMSS and DFORS signature algorithms are not elaborated here.

[0021] In addition, such as Figure 3 As shown, the PKI hierarchical model can be described as an inverted tree with the root at the top and the leaves at the bottom. In this tree, the root is the "trust anchor" for all entities in the entire PKI domain, usually called the root CA. Below the root CA are zero or more intermediate CAs, which are represented by the intermediate nodes of the tree. Branches extend from the intermediate nodes to form parent-child CA relationships. The leaves corresponding to PKI entities that are not child CAs are usually called terminal entities. The intermediate CAs connecting the terminal entities are called the last-level CAs. The authentication path of this hierarchical structure is as follows: (1) The root CA certifies the CAs directly below it; (2) Each of these CAs certifies zero or more CAs directly below it; (3) The penultimate CA (last-level CA) certifies the terminal entity. In the PKI hierarchical model, terminal entities are directly certified (i.e., issued certificates) by their upper-level CAs, but their trust anchor is another different CA (the root CA). If there are no child CAs, then the root and the certificate issuer are the same for all terminal entities. The hierarchical trust model is suitable for isolated, layered organizations, but not for enterprises with overlapping internal organizational boundaries. The authentication process typically employs digital signature technology, such as traditional signature algorithms like RSA and ECDSA.

[0022] Classical signature algorithms have no limit on the number of signatures, while hash-based post-quantum signature algorithms generally have an upper bound on the number of signatures. For example, the XMSS signature scheme in this model is a stateful signature algorithm and can only sign certain signatures. The XMSS tree height (H) is the maximum number of signatures issued. The DFORS signature scheme is a stateless signature algorithm, and its security strength decreases with increasing signature count. Therefore, in practical business applications, each level of CA needs to set the system parameters of the signature algorithm according to security level requirements and the number of certificates issued within the update cycle to ensure the signature is unforgeable and the authentication is effective. Therefore, this application determines the target hash-based signature algorithm corresponding to each CA based on the business characteristics of the Certificate Authority and its position in the trust hierarchy of the PKI trust model. In this process, if the number of certificates issued by the CA is less than a first preset threshold, and the CA is a root CA or an intermediate CA, then the target signature algorithm is determined to be the XMSS signature algorithm; if the number of certificates issued by the CA is greater than a second preset threshold, and the CA is a last-level CA, then the target signature algorithm is determined to be the DFORS signature algorithm. Furthermore, each Certificate Authority (CA) sets system parameters for the target signature algorithm based on security level requirements and the number of certificates issued within the update cycle. These system parameters include any combination of one or more of the following: XMSS tree height, Winderitz parameter, hash function, pseudo-random function seed, maximum number of signatures, total number of leaf nodes in the FORST tree, number of child nodes, and number of levels. Simultaneously, the number of certificates already issued by the CA and its remaining signature capacity are determined based on the state value of the XMSS signature algorithm. Based on the number of certificates already issued and the remaining signature capacity, it is determined whether to perform a certificate update.

[0023] Step S12: Generate a self-signed root certificate by the root certificate authority based on the target signature algorithm.

[0024] In this embodiment, the public key of the XMSS signature algorithm is determined as the third signature public key by the root certificate authority, and a self-signed root certificate is generated based on the third signature public key; the public key of the target signature algorithm is the root node of the XMSS tree. Specifically, the root CA uses the XMSS signature algorithm to apply for and issue certificates. On one hand, the root CA submits the XMSS signature algorithm public key (the root node of the XMSS tree) as the signature public key for its own authentication and signing, forming a self-signed root certificate. On the other hand, when the root CA issues a certificate to a child CA, it uses the XMSS signature algorithm private key (WOTS+ private key corresponding to the leaf node of the XMSS tree) to authenticate and sign the child CA's signature public key.

[0025] Step S13: When an intermediate certificate authority applies for a certificate from a parent certificate authority, the intermediate certificate authority sends the first signature public key determined based on the target signature algorithm to the parent certificate authority so that the parent certificate authority can authenticate and sign the first signature public key to complete the certificate issuance by the intermediate certificate authority; the parent certificate authority is the root certificate authority or the next higher-level intermediate certificate authority.

[0026] In this embodiment, the intermediate CA uses the XMSS signature algorithm to apply for and issue certificates. On one hand, when the intermediate CA applies for a certificate from the parent CA, it submits the XMSS signature algorithm public key (XMSS tree root node) as the signature public key to the parent CA for authentication and signing. On the other hand, when the intermediate CA issues a certificate to a child CA, it uses the XMSS signature algorithm private key (WOTS+ private key corresponding to the XMSS tree leaf node) to authenticate and sign the child CA's signature public key. When the intermediate certificate authority applies for a certificate from the parent certificate authority, the intermediate certificate authority determines the XMSS signature algorithm public key as the first signature public key and sends the first signature public key to the parent certificate authority so that the parent certificate authority can authenticate and sign the first signature public key based on the XMSS signature algorithm private key; the XMSS signature algorithm private key is the Winternitz one-time signature and one-time private key corresponding to the XMSS tree leaf node.

[0027] Step S14: The terminal user's information is authenticated and signed by the last-level certificate authority based on the target signature algorithm. The second signature public key generated based on the target signature algorithm is sent to the intermediate certificate authority so that the intermediate certificate authority can authenticate and sign the second signature public key to complete the certificate issuance by the last-level certificate authority.

[0028] In this embodiment, the final-level CA uses the DFORS signature algorithm to apply for and issue certificates. It sends a second signature public key generated based on the public key of the DFORS signature algorithm to the intermediate certificate authority (CA), so that the intermediate CA can authenticate and sign the second signature public key. That is, on the one hand, when the final-level CA applies for a certificate from the parent CA, it submits the DFORS signature algorithm public key as the signature public key to the parent CA for authentication and signing. On the other hand, when the final-level CA issues a certificate to an end user, it uses the DFORS signature algorithm private key to authenticate and sign the end user's information. Ultimately, this enables CAs at each level to issue certificates to lower-level entities. In this way, by deeply analyzing the commonalities in the hierarchical structure between signature algorithm structures and PKI trust models, simple and efficient algorithm components are selected and integrated with the PKI hierarchical trust model for design, resulting in more in-depth research, better application adaptability, and stronger practicality.

[0029] In summary, this application first determines the target hash-based signature algorithm corresponding to each certificate authority based on its business characteristics and position in the trust hierarchy of the PKI trust model; the target signature algorithm includes the XMSS signature algorithm and the DFORS signature algorithm; a self-signed root certificate is generated by the root certificate authority based on the target signature algorithm; when an intermediate certificate authority applies for a certificate from its parent certificate authority, the intermediate certificate authority sends the first signing public key determined based on the target signature algorithm to the parent certificate authority, so that the parent certificate authority can authenticate and sign the first signing public key to complete the certificate issuance by the intermediate certificate authority; the parent certificate authority is the root certificate authority or the next higher-level intermediate certificate authority; finally, the last-level certificate authority authenticates and signs the end-user's information based on the target signature algorithm, and sends the second signing public key generated based on the target signature algorithm to the intermediate certificate authority, so that the intermediate certificate authority can authenticate and sign the second signing public key to complete the certificate issuance by the last-level certificate authority. As can be seen, this application constructs a target signature algorithm based on two types of hash signature algorithms, XMSS and DFORS. The signature algorithm is selected and matched according to the business characteristics of different levels of certificate authorities, and used by certificate authorities at each level to issue certificates to lower-level entities. Finally, a PKI hierarchical trust model is designed through fusion. This model employs a simple signature algorithm structure, facilitates the issuance and management of higher-level certificate authorities, and allows for flexible deployment of lower-level certificate authorities, making it more practical in business systems.

[0030] See Figure 4 As shown, this embodiment of the invention discloses a certificate issuance device for a PKI trust model, comprising: The target signature algorithm determination module 11 is used to determine the hash-based target signature algorithm corresponding to each certificate authority based on the business characteristics of the certificate authority and its position in the trust hierarchy of the PKI trust model; the target signature algorithm includes the XMSS signature algorithm and the DFORS signature algorithm; The self-signed root certificate generation module 12 is used to generate a self-signed root certificate by a root certificate authority based on the target signature algorithm. The first certificate issuance module 13 is used to send a first signature public key determined based on the target signature algorithm to the parent certificate authority through the intermediate certificate authority when the intermediate certificate authority applies for a certificate from the parent certificate authority, so that the parent certificate authority can authenticate and sign the first signature public key to complete the certificate issuance by the intermediate certificate authority; the parent certificate authority is the root certificate authority or the next higher level intermediate certificate authority. The second certificate issuance module 14 is used to authenticate and sign the terminal user's information based on the target signature algorithm by the last-level certificate authority, and send the second signature public key generated based on the target signature algorithm to the intermediate certificate authority so that the intermediate certificate authority can authenticate and sign the second signature public key to complete the certificate issuance by the last-level certificate authority.

[0031] As can be seen, this application constructs a target signature algorithm based on two types of hash signature algorithms, XMSS and DFORS. The signature algorithm is selected and matched according to the business characteristics of different levels of certificate authorities, and used by certificate authorities at each level to issue certificates to lower-level entities. Finally, a PKI hierarchical trust model is designed through fusion. This model employs a simple signature algorithm structure, facilitates the issuance and management of higher-level certificate authorities, and allows for flexible deployment of lower-level certificate authorities, making it more practical in business systems.

[0032] In some specific embodiments, the target signature algorithm determination module 11 can be used to determine the target signature algorithm as the XMSS signature algorithm if the certificate authority's certificate issuance volume is less than a first preset threshold and the certificate authority is a root certificate authority or an intermediate certificate authority; and to determine the target signature algorithm as the DFORS signature algorithm if the certificate authority's certificate issuance volume is greater than a second preset threshold and the certificate authority is a last-level certificate authority.

[0033] In some specific embodiments, the device can also be used to set system parameters of the target signature algorithm by each certificate authority according to security level requirements and the number of certificates issued within the update cycle; the system parameters include any one or a combination of several of the following: XMSS tree height, Winternitz parameter, hash function, pseudo-random function seed, upper limit of signature count, total number of leaf nodes of FORST tree, number of child nodes, and number of layers.

[0034] In some specific embodiments, the self-signed root certificate generation module 12 can be used to determine the public key of the XMSS signature algorithm as the third signature public key through the root certificate authority, and generate a self-signed root certificate based on the third signature public key; the public key of the target signature algorithm is the root node of the XMSS tree.

[0035] In some specific embodiments, the first certificate issuance module 13 can be used to determine the public key of the XMSS signature algorithm as the first signature public key through the intermediate certificate authority, and send the first signature public key to the parent certificate authority so that the parent certificate authority can authenticate and sign the first signature public key based on the private key of the XMSS signature algorithm; the private key of the XMSS signature algorithm is the Winternitz one-time signature and one-time private key corresponding to the leaf node of the XMSS tree.

[0036] In some specific embodiments, the second certificate issuance module 14 can be used to send a second signature public key generated based on the public key of the DFORS signature algorithm to the intermediate certificate authority, so that the intermediate certificate authority can authenticate and sign the second signature public key.

[0037] In some specific embodiments, the device can also be used to determine the number of certificates issued by the certificate authority and the remaining signing capacity based on the state value of the XMSS signature algorithm; and to determine whether to renew the certificate based on the number of certificates issued by the certificate authority and the remaining signing capacity.

[0038] Furthermore, embodiments of this application also disclose an electronic device, Figure 5 This is a structural diagram of an electronic device 20 according to an exemplary embodiment. The content of the diagram should not be construed as limiting the scope of this application.

[0039] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device 20 provided in an embodiment of this application. Specifically, the electronic device 20 may include: at least one processor 21, at least one memory 22, a power supply 23, a communication interface 24, an input / output interface 25, and a communication bus 26. The memory 22 stores a computer program, which is loaded and executed by the processor 21 to implement the relevant steps in the certificate issuance method of the PKI trust model disclosed in any of the foregoing embodiments. Alternatively, the electronic device 20 in this embodiment may specifically be an electronic computer.

[0040] In this embodiment, the power supply 23 is used to provide operating voltage for each hardware device on the electronic device 20; the communication interface 24 can create a data transmission channel between the electronic device 20 and external devices, and the communication protocol it follows can be any communication protocol applicable to the technical solution of this application, and is not specifically limited here; the input / output interface 25 is used to acquire external input data or output data to the outside world, and its specific interface type can be selected according to specific application needs, and is not specifically limited here.

[0041] In addition, the memory 22, as a carrier for resource storage, can be a read-only memory, random access memory, disk or optical disk, etc. The resources stored thereon can include operating system 221, computer program 222, etc., and the storage method can be temporary storage or permanent storage.

[0042] The operating system 221 is used to manage and control the various hardware devices on the electronic device 20 and the computer program 222, which may be Windows Server, Netware, Unix, Linux, etc. In addition to including a computer program capable of performing the certificate issuance method of the PKI trust model executed by the electronic device 20 as disclosed in any of the foregoing embodiments, the computer program 222 may further include computer programs capable of performing other specific tasks.

[0043] Furthermore, this application also discloses a computer-readable storage medium for storing a computer program; wherein, when the computer program is executed by a processor, it implements the certificate issuance method of the aforementioned disclosed PKI trust model. The specific steps of this method can be found in the corresponding content disclosed in the foregoing embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0044] The various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner, with each embodiment focusing on its differences from other embodiments. Similar or identical parts between embodiments can be referred to interchangeably. For the apparatus disclosed in the embodiments, since it corresponds to the method disclosed in the embodiments, the description is relatively simple; relevant parts can be referred to in the method section.

[0045] Those skilled in the art will further recognize that the units and algorithm steps of the various examples described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, computer software, or a combination of both. To clearly illustrate the interchangeability of hardware and software, the components and steps of the various examples have been generally described in terms of functionality in the foregoing description. Whether these functions are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.

[0046] The steps of the methods or algorithms described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented directly by hardware, a software module executed by a processor, or a combination of both. The software module can be located in random access memory (RAM), main memory, read-only memory (ROM), electrically programmable ROM, electrically erasable programmable ROM, registers, hard disk, removable disk, CD-ROM, or any other form of storage medium known in the art.

[0047] Finally, it should be noted that in this document, relational terms such as "first" and "second" are used only to distinguish one entity or operation from another, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Furthermore, the terms "comprising," "including," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such a process, method, article, or apparatus. Without further limitations, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or apparatus that includes said element.

[0048] The technical solutions provided in this application have been described in detail above. Specific examples have been used to illustrate the principles and implementation methods of this application. The descriptions of the above embodiments are only for the purpose of helping to understand the methods and core ideas of this application. At the same time, for those skilled in the art, there will be changes in the specific implementation methods and application scope based on the ideas of this application. Therefore, the content of this specification should not be construed as a limitation of this application.

Claims

1. A certificate issuance method for a PKI trust model, characterized in that, include: Based on the business characteristics of the certificate authority and its position in the trust hierarchy of the PKI trust model, the target signature algorithm based on hashing is determined for each certificate authority; the target signature algorithm includes the XMSS signature algorithm and the DFORS signature algorithm. A self-signed root certificate is generated by the root certificate authority based on the target signature algorithm; When an intermediate certificate authority applies for a certificate from a parent certificate authority, the intermediate certificate authority sends a first signature public key determined based on the target signature algorithm to the parent certificate authority so that the parent certificate authority can authenticate and sign the first signature public key to complete the certificate issuance by the intermediate certificate authority; the parent certificate authority is the root certificate authority or the intermediate certificate authority at the next higher level. The final certificate authority authenticates and signs the end-user's information based on the target signature algorithm, and sends the second signature public key generated based on the target signature algorithm to the intermediate certificate authority, so that the intermediate certificate authority can authenticate and sign the second signature public key to complete the certificate issuance by the final certificate authority.

2. The certificate issuance method for the PKI trust model according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of determining the hash-based target signature algorithm corresponding to each certificate authority based on its business characteristics and position in the trust hierarchy of the PKI trust model includes: If the number of certificates issued by the certificate authority is less than a first preset threshold, and the certificate authority is a root certificate authority or an intermediate certificate authority, then the target signature algorithm is determined to be the XMSS signature algorithm. If the number of certificates issued by the certificate authority is greater than the second preset threshold, and the certificate authority is a last-level certificate authority, then the target signature algorithm is determined to be the DFORS signature algorithm.

3. The certificate issuance method for the PKI trust model according to claim 1, characterized in that, Also includes: The system parameters of the target signature algorithm are set by each certificate authority according to the security level requirements and the number of certificates issued within the update cycle; The system parameters include any one or a combination of the following: the height of the XMSS tree, the Winternitz parameter, the hash function, the pseudo-random function seed, the upper limit of the number of signatures, the total number of leaf nodes of the FORST tree, the number of child nodes, and the number of layers.

4. The certificate issuance method for the PKI trust model according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of generating a self-signed root certificate through a root certificate authority based on the target signature algorithm includes: The public key of the XMSS signature algorithm is determined as the third signature public key by the root certificate authority, and a self-signed root certificate is generated based on the third signature public key; the public key of the target signature algorithm is the root node of the XMSS tree.

5. The certificate issuance method for the PKI trust model according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of sending the first signing public key determined based on the target signature algorithm to the parent certificate authority through the intermediate certificate authority, so that the parent certificate authority can authenticate and sign the first signing public key, includes: The intermediate certificate authority determines the public key of the XMSS signature algorithm as the first signature public key, and sends the first signature public key to the parent certificate authority so that the parent certificate authority can authenticate and sign the first signature public key based on the private key of the XMSS signature algorithm; the private key of the XMSS signature algorithm is the Winternitz one-time signature and one-time private key corresponding to the leaf node of the XMSS tree.

6. The certificate issuance method for the PKI trust model according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of sending the second signature public key generated based on the target signature algorithm to the intermediate certificate authority, so that the intermediate certificate authority can authenticate and sign the second signature public key, includes: The second signature public key generated based on the public key of the DFORS signature algorithm is sent to the intermediate certificate authority so that the intermediate certificate authority can authenticate and sign the second signature public key.

7. The certificate issuance method for the PKI trust model according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that, Also includes: The number of certificates issued by the certificate authority and the remaining signature capacity are determined based on the state value of the XMSS signature algorithm. Whether to renew the certificate is determined based on the number of certificates already issued by the certificate authority and the remaining signature capacity.

8. A certificate issuance device for a PKI trust model, characterized in that, include: The target signature algorithm determination module is used to determine the hash-based target signature algorithm corresponding to each certificate authority based on the certificate authority's business characteristics and its position in the trust hierarchy of the PKI trust model; the target signature algorithm includes the XMSS signature algorithm and the DFORS signature algorithm; The self-signed root certificate generation module is used to generate a self-signed root certificate by a root certificate authority based on the target signature algorithm. The first certificate issuance module is used to send a first signature public key determined based on the target signature algorithm to the parent certificate authority when an intermediate certificate authority applies for a certificate from the parent certificate authority. This allows the parent certificate authority to authenticate and sign the first signature public key, thereby completing the certificate issuance by the intermediate certificate authority. The parent certificate authority is either the root certificate authority or the next higher-level intermediate certificate authority. The second certificate issuance module is used to authenticate and sign the terminal user's information based on the target signature algorithm by the last-level certificate authority, and send the second signature public key generated based on the target signature algorithm to the intermediate certificate authority, so that the intermediate certificate authority can authenticate and sign the second signature public key to complete the certificate issuance by the last-level certificate authority.

9. An electronic device, characterized in that, include: Memory, used to store computer programs; A processor for executing a computer program to implement a certificate issuance method for a PKI trust model as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, A computer program is stored on a computer-readable storage medium, which, when executed by a processor, implements a certificate issuance method for a PKI trust model as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.

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