Method and intrusion manager for handling intrusion of electronic devices

Abstract

A method and intrusion manager (200) for handling an intrusion into an electronic device (202). When a sensor (204) detects (2:2) an intrusion into the electronic device, an intrusion entry indicating the detected intrusion is stored (2:3), and an associated sign-off message identifying the stored intrusion entry is also stored (2:5). The sign-off message includes a signature confirming the detected intrusion, which signature may be received (2:4) as input from an authorized person. Thus, any stored intrusion entry may be checked by searching for the associated sign-off message, and a stored intrusion entry that does not have a matching sign-off message with a valid signature may be determined to be unauthorized.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present disclosure generally relates to methods and intrusion managers for handling intrusions of electronic devices. Background Art

[0002] When selling an electronic device with some kind of warranty, it is often of interest to know whether any unauthorized person has at some point opened and manipulated the electronic device, such as in the event that the device has become faulty or does not operate as expected. For example, a customer who has purchased or rented an electronic device may return to the supplier or vendor of the device and complain that it has some fault or malfunction, such as reduced performance or even failure to operate.

[0003] If a device has been sold or otherwise delivered with a warranty that guarantees free or reduced repairs, it may be a condition of the warranty that the device has not been tampered with by any unauthorized person. To ensure this, a seal or the like may be applied to the lid or cover of the electronic device as a protection, so that a broken seal indicates tampering and potential unauthorized manipulation of the device. In this case, the seller or other supplier is not responsible for the device, since only authorized personnel are generally allowed to open and manipulate the device. Therefore, if the seal is broken, the warranty is generally not valid.

[0004] In the present disclosure, the term "electronic device" may refer to a consumer product, such as a communication device, a computer, a Hi-Fi component or a television, or it may also refer to a system product, such as in a communication network, such as a radio base station or other node in the network. It should be noted that these examples are merely illustrative and not limiting to the following description, which is valid for any electronic device and its authorized or unauthorized intrusion.

[0005] Figure 1 Schematically illustrated is an electronic device 100 that includes a cover 102 that can be opened for access to various parts therein, such as electronic circuits and hardware components. A seal or sticker 104 has been applied to the cover, and if the seal or sticker is found to be broken, for example when a customer takes the device 100 back to a vendor or other supplier and claims a warranty, etc., an indication of intrusion will be provided.

[0006] However, there are several disadvantages to relying on such seals. First, it is often easy for an unauthorized intruder to carefully remove the seal and reapply it after an intrusion without causing any visible damage to the seal, so that the intrusion will not be noticed. Second, the intruder may be able to replace the damaged seal with a new seal. Third, if the seal is found to be damaged, there is no way to establish when the intrusion has occurred or indeed how many intrusions have occurred and by whom. In either case, it may be impossible to track any number of intrusions into the electronic device (which would otherwise be helpful when investigating or evaluating the device in terms of functionality, performance and / or malfunctioning). Summary of the invention

[0007] It is an object of the embodiments described herein to address at least some of the problems and issues outlined above.Achieving this object and other objects is possible by using a method and an intrusion manager as defined in the attached independent claims.

[0008] According to one aspect, a method for handling an intrusion on an electronic device is provided, which may be performed by an intrusion manager. In the method, when an intrusion on the electronic device is detected, an intrusion entry indicating the detected intrusion is stored, for example, in a suitable memory. An associated sign-off message identifying the stored intrusion entry is also stored, the sign-off message including a signature confirming the detected intrusion.

[0009] Thus, one advantage is that any stored intrusion entries in memory can be checked by searching for an associated stored sign-off message, and stored intrusion entries that do not have a matching sign-off message with a valid signature can be identified as unauthorized. Another advantage is that any previously conducted authorized and unauthorized intrusions recorded as intrusion entries can be tracked so that the intrusion history can be investigated for troubleshooting or other evaluation of the electronic device.

[0010] According to another aspect, an intrusion manager is arranged to handle an intrusion into an electronic device. The intrusion manager is configured to detect an intrusion into the electronic device and store an intrusion entry indicating the detected intrusion. The intrusion manager is further configured to store a sign-off message identifying an association of the stored intrusion entry, the sign-off message comprising a signature confirming the detected intrusion.

[0011] The above methods and intrusion managers may be configured and implemented according to different optional embodiments to achieve additional features and benefits to be described below.

[0012] A computer program comprising instructions is also provided, which, when executed on at least one computer in the above intrusion manager, causes the at least one computer to perform the method described above. A carrier containing the above computer program is also provided, wherein the carrier is one of an electronic signal, an optical signal, a radio signal or a computer-readable storage medium. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0013] The solution will now be described in more detail by means of exemplary embodiments and with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:

[0014] Figure 1 is an illustrative example of how electronic devices may be protected by seals according to the prior art.

[0015] Figure 2 is a communication scenario illustrating how the solution may be employed according to some example embodiments.

[0016] Figure 3 is a flow chart illustrating a process in an intrusion manager according to further example embodiments.

[0017] Figure 4 is a flow chart illustrating how an intrusion manager may operate to examine detected intrusions according to further example embodiments.

[0018] Figure 5 is an example diagram illustrating how intrusion entries in a first memory may be checked against sign-off messages in a second memory according to further example embodiments.

[0019] Figure 6 is a signaling diagram illustrating a procedure when a solution is used to check a detected intrusion according to a further example embodiment.

[0020] Figure 7 is a block diagram illustrating how an intrusion manager may be constructed according to further example embodiments. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0021] Briefly described, a solution is provided to enable investigation of intrusions into electronic devices in terms of validity and occurrence, which is achieved by adopting a method and / or intrusion manager arranged to handle intrusions into electronic devices. When a sensor or the like detects that an intrusion has been made into an electronic device, an intrusion entry indicating the detected intrusion is stored in a memory (e.g., a memory in which written entries cannot be modified or erased to avoid any tampering with the intrusion entry), so that the intrusion can be tracked in a reliable manner. Such a memory may be referred to as a "one-time programmable" memory. If the intrusion is made by an authorized person, an associated sign-off message identifying the stored intrusion entry is also stored, for example, in another memory. The intrusion entry and its associated sign-off message are stored locally in different memory spaces (referred to herein as the first memory and the second memory, respectively) of a suitable data storage device arranged in the electronic device.

[0022] To prove that the intrusion was authorized, the sign-off message includes a signature or the like confirming the detected intrusion, which signature may be received as input from an authorized person at the time of the intrusion. The signature may be a digital signature that has been verified by a trusted party, such as a known and trusted certificate authority that issues certificates for digital signatures. Thus, one advantage is that any stored intrusion entries in a data storage device such as a first memory may be checked by searching for an associated sign-off message in the data storage device such as a second memory, and a stored intrusion entry that does not have a matching sign-off message with a valid signature may be determined to be unauthorized.

[0023] Now refer to Figure 2 To describe an example of how the solution may be employed in a process performed by an intrusion manager, Figure 2 In the embodiment of the present invention, the intrusion manager 200 is shown as being implemented in an appropriate manner within the electronic device 202. It is also possible to implement the intrusion manager 200 as a separate entity, which may be attached to or integrated with the intrusion manager 200 in any other manner, and the embodiments, features, and details described herein are not limited in this respect. Therefore, how the intrusion manager 200 is arranged in or at the electronic device 202 depends on the actual implementation (depending on how the electronic device 202 is designed).

[0024] The electronic device 202 may be, but is not limited to, a consumer product, such as a communication device, a computer, a Hi-Fi component or a television, or it may be a node or component of a system having several nodes / components, such as a communication network. It can be assumed that any intrusion into the electronic device 202 is of interest for any reason. The electronic device 202 is schematically shown with a cover or closure 202A which can be opened and closed to allow access to an internal space in which electronic circuits and various hardware components may reside, similar to Figure 1 The intrusion manager 200 in this example is shown to include a control unit 206 that can facilitate the following process.

[0025] The first operation 2:1 shows that the lid or cover 202A is opened or closed, which is registered by the sensor 204 arranged in the electronic device 202. The sensor 204 is thus capable of detecting the manipulation of the lid or cover 202A, and may be a microswitch, a magnetic field sensor, a light sensor, or a motion sensor, to name a few non-limiting examples. The sensor 204 may or may not be considered as part of the intrusion manager 200, and may further be capable of sensing that the housing or cover of the electronic device 202 has been broken. In the next operation 2:2, the control unit 206 receives a signal from the sensor 204, which indicates that an intrusion into the electronic device 202 has been registered (in this case by sensing that the lid or cover 202A has been opened or closed). Some other useful ways of detecting intrusion will be described later below. Therefore, the intrusion manager 200 substantially detects the intrusion into the electronic device 202 in operation 2:2.

[0026] As a result of the detected intrusion, in operation 2:3, the control unit 206 stores information corresponding to and indicating the detected intrusion, the information being designated or defined as an "intrusion entry", which is stored in a first memory space (referred to herein as simply "first memory" 208). The first memory may be a memory in which entries written cannot be modified or erased to avoid any tampering with the intrusion entry. The intrusion entry thus includes a registration that an intrusion has occurred and may contain information such as a detected movement indicating the lid or cover 202A being opened or closed and a timestamp indicating the time when the intrusion was detected. Any further manipulation within the electronic device 202 that has occurred in connection with the detected intrusion is outside the process described herein. Therefore, in this process, it is not necessary for the intrusion manager 200 to accurately detect and register what was done to the electronic device 202 after the intrusion.

[0027] The time of detection may be indicated in terms of a reference time or clock, or by the amount of time since a preset "zero" time, which may have been set when the electronic device 202 was manufactured or put into service. In addition, the zero time may be reset at any time, such as when the electronic device 202 is upgraded or when its owner is changed. The intrusion entry may also contain an identification of the detected intrusion, such as a unique serial number or a combination of characters that can be represented by a finite number of bits. Any combination of the above examples of information may be included in an intrusion entry, and the solution is not limited in this respect.

[0028] In this example, the intrusion is carried out by an authorized person, who also inputs a signature confirming the detected intrusion to the input unit 210 of the intrusion manager 200, and in another operation 2:4, the input signature is received by the control unit 206. Then, in operation 2:5, the control unit 206 stores the received signature together with the identification and / or timestamp in a "sign-off message" associated with the detected intrusion. The sign-off message is stored in a second memory space (referred to herein as "second memory" 212).

[0029] Thus, if the signature in the sign-off message is valid, the sign-off message may be viewed as an attempt to authenticate the intrusion and, therefore, also the stored intrusion entry. The intrusion entry stored in operation 2:3 and the sign-off message stored in operation 2:5 may be associated with each other by having matching timestamps and / or identities. For example, their timestamps may be considered to match if the duration between them is within predefined limits. Furthermore, their identities may be considered to match if they satisfy a predefined relationship (e.g., by being equal).

[0030] Another optional operation 2:6 shows that the control unit 206 can check the validity of the signature by querying the authorization / authentication center 214, etc., which is regarded as a trusted party that may have issued and assigned signatures for exclusive use by one or more authorized persons. This operation can be performed immediately after the intrusion is detected, so that the stored intrusion entries and / or sign-off messages can be marked as valid in the first and second memories, respectively. Alternatively, operation 2:6 can be performed at a later time, such as when checking whether the electronic device 202 has been subjected to any (one or more) unauthorized intrusions, or when retrieving the history of stored intrusion entries to perform troubleshooting or evaluation of the electronic device 202.

[0031] An unauthorized intrusion may be detected in two basic cases. First, the intrusion detected in operation 2:2 may not be followed by a signature as input in operation 2:4. In this case, the intrusion entry stored in the first memory 208 as in operation 2:3 will not have any matching sign-off message stored in the second memory 212, which can be detected by comparing the intrusion entry in memory 208 with the sign-off message in memory 212. As indicated above, the intrusion entry in memory 208 must be matched with a sign-off message including a valid signature in memory 212 (e.g., if the entries have matching timestamps and / or identifications) to prove that the detected intrusion is authorized.

[0032] Secondly, the intrusion detected in operation 2:2 may be followed by a signature entered in operation 2:4, however the signature is not valid, which means that the intruder has entered a "fake" signature in operation 2:4. When the authorization center 214 cannot confirm the validity of the signature, this may be revealed in operation 2:6.

[0033] In either case, when an unauthorized intrusion is detected, either by completely missing a matching sign-off message or finding an invalid signature in a matching sign-off message, the intrusion manager can send a notification to a monitoring center or the like in another optional operation 2:7 to indicate the unauthorized intrusion. Alternatively or additionally, the intrusion entry can be marked as unauthorized in the memory 208, for example, for future troubleshooting or evaluation of the electronic device 202.

[0034] Thus, operations 2:1-2:5 may be viewed as a registration process for recording information about detected intrusions, while operations 2:6-2:7 may be viewed as a check process for retrieving, analyzing, or evaluating any intrusions performed on the electronic device 202. The latter operation may be performed when the user of the electronic device 202 requests warranty repairs from the vendor or other supplier of the device, etc. Thus, one advantage is that any authorized and unauthorized intrusions may be reliably tracked in the manner described herein, and thus the history of intrusions may be analyzed and evaluated, for example, for troubleshooting or the like.

[0035] Figure 3 Another example of how the solution may be employed in terms of actions performed by an intrusion manager such as intrusion manager 200 is shown in the flowchart in FIG. Figure 2 The entities in the flowchart are described, although not limited to Figure 2 The specific example scenario shown in Figure 3 The actions in can be performed by the intrusion manager 200 to handle the intrusion on the electronic device 202.

[0036] The first action 300 shows that the intrusion manager 200 detects an intrusion on the electronic device 202, which corresponds to action 2:2 described above. In the next action 302, the intrusion manager 200 stores an intrusion entry indicating the detected intrusion, which corresponds to action 2:3 described above. In the next optional action 304, the intrusion manager 200 can receive a digital signature as input by a person related to the detected intrusion, which corresponds to action 2:4 described above.

[0037] In a next action 306, the intrusion manager 200 also stores an associated sign-off message, the sign-off message identifying the stored intrusion entry, the sign-off message including a signature confirming the detected intrusion. This action corresponds to action 2:5 described above. Thus, the authorized intrusion has been registered by the intrusion manager 200 and can be tracked at a later point in time, for example when analyzing or evaluating the intrusion that has been made to the electronic device 202. As explained above, if a verifiable signature related to the detected intrusion has been received, the stored sign-off message including the signature will confirm that the stored intrusion entry refers to an authorized intrusion.

[0038] We will now describe the Figure 4 Some additional examples of embodiments employed in the above process of . In one example embodiment, the signature may be a digital signature received as input from an authorized person, such as by manual entry. The digital signature may have been assigned by a trusted party for exclusive use by one or more authorized persons. In another example embodiment, the signature may be a digital signature that has been verified by a trusted party. Intrusion manager 200 may in this case be able to verify the validity of the received signature by querying the trusted party (which may be an authorization center, etc.), as in operation 2:6 described above.

[0039] In another example embodiment, intrusion may be detected when a lid or cover 202A on the electronic device is opened or closed. Intrusion may also be detected when the electronic device 202 is opened in any way to allow access to its internal components, which may be achieved by detaching or braking the cover or housing (depending on how the electronic device 202 is designed).

[0040] In another example embodiment, any stored intrusion entry that does not have a matching sign-off message with a valid signature is determined to be unauthorized. It is described above with respect to operation 2:6 that the intrusion manager 200 can investigate the intrusion entries in the memory 208 by searching the memory 212 for a matching sign-off message including a valid signature. If no such sign-off message is found, then the intrusion entry and the intrusion it indicates are therefore unauthorized. In this case, another example embodiment can be to send a notification to the monitoring center 216 to indicate the unauthorized intrusion.

[0041] As mentioned above, the intrusion entry and its associated sign-off message may be stored in different memory spaces arranged in the electronic device. In another example embodiment, one or more intrusion entries may therefore be stored in a memory in which the written entry cannot be modified (such as the first memory 208 mentioned above), and one or more associated sign-off messages may be stored in a persistent memory (such as the second memory 212 mentioned above). In another example embodiment, the first memory 208 and the second memory 212 are located in the electronic device.

[0042] In another example embodiment, both the intrusion entry and the sign-off message include identifications and / or timestamps to enable the detected intrusion to be verified by matching the intrusion entry with the associated sign-off message. In more detail, the timestamp in the sign-off message may be slightly later than the timestamp in the intrusion entry, and it may be possible to find that the sign-off message is associated with the intrusion entry by comparing their timestamps, and it may even be required that they are not separated in time by more than a predefined limit, although the embodiments are not limited in this respect. When the sign-off message and the intrusion entry include identifications rather than timestamps, it should be possible to find the above association by comparing the identifications (which may be identical or otherwise related in a predefined manner). In another example embodiment, the validity of any detected intrusion can be determined by checking whether the entry for the intrusion has an identification and / or timestamp that matches the identification and / or timestamp of the sign-off message that includes a valid signature.

[0043] It is described above that the sensor 204 can be used to detect intrusion. In further example embodiments, the intrusion can be detected by at least one of the following illustrative but non-limiting alternatives:

[0044] A) Micro switch , the micro switch can be coupled to the lid or cover 202A so that any movement of the lid or cover 202A triggers the micro switch to generate a signal to indicate intrusion, as in operation 2:2.

[0045] B) Magnetic Field Sensor, the magnetic field sensor can be configured to detect movement of the lid or cover 202A or other portion by sensing changes in the magnetic field that typically occur when a metal object is moved.

[0046] C) Light Sensor , the light sensor may be configured to detect changes in light in the electronic device 202 that would occur if the electronic device 202 was turned on and then turned off in some manner.

[0047] D) Motion Sensor , the motion sensor can be configured to detect motion or movement of any part or component in the electronic device 202.

[0048] In another example embodiment, the history of stored intrusion entries can be used for troubleshooting or evaluating the electronic device. For example, if many intrusions into the electronic device 202 have been registered, it may be of interest to gain knowledge of whether any (one or more) unauthorized intrusions have been made and / or how many times the intrusions have occurred and at what times. The stored intrusion entries can then be investigated and evaluated by counting them and checking their timestamps (if used). It is also possible to use, for example, the following to be described Figure 4 The process of checking whether the stored intrusion entries have a matching sign-off message with (one or more) valid signatures. It should be noted that, for example, in the case where the intrusions are carried out by the same person, two or more intrusions can be followed by the entry of the same signature or two or more related signatures.

[0049] Another example of operations in the intrusion manager 200 for completing the above validity check of the registered intrusion of the electronic device 202 is shown in Figure 4 is shown in, which can be combined Figure 3 The operation shown in the following is adopted. Figure 3 The terms used will also be described below. Figure 4 Thus, this process may be employed to enable troubleshooting or evaluation of an electronic device based on a history of stored intrusion entries.

[0050] The first action 400 shows that the intrusion manager 200 checks the intrusion entry in the first memory 208 by comparing the intrusion entry in the first memory 208 with any stored sign-off messages in the second memory 212. If a sign-off message matching the intrusion entry is not found in action 402, the intrusion is registered as unauthorized, for example by marking the intrusion entry under investigation as unauthorized in the first memory 208, and / or a notification of the unauthorized intrusion is issued, as shown by action 404. The process can then return to action 400 for checking the next intrusion entry in the first memory 208.

[0051] On the other hand, if a sign-off message matching an intrusion entry is found in action 402, then in another action 406 the intrusion manager 200 further checks whether the sign-off message includes a valid signature. If in action 408 it is found that the signature in the sign-off message can be verified, then no specific action needs to be taken, and the process can return to action 400 for checking the next intrusion entry in the first memory 208. On the other hand, if in action 408 the signature in the sign-off message cannot be verified, then the intrusion manager 200 will perform action 404 described above, and can then return to action 400 for checking the next intrusion entry. The actions described above can be repeated as long as there are additional intrusion entries to be investigated in the first memory 208.

[0052] Now refer to Figure 5 An example of how the intrusion entries and matching sign-off messages described above may be stored in first and second memories 208 and 212, respectively. The first intrusion entry in memory 208 includes an intrusion type indicating that the lid has been opened, and an identification of the intrusion "ID a". Each intrusion entry may also include a timestamp (not shown). The next intrusion entry in memory 208 includes another intrusion type indicating that the lid has been closed, and an identification of the second intrusion "ID b". If a timestamp is also included in the entry, it may be determined how long the device has been opened between the first (open) and second (closed) entries.

[0053] As described above, an authorized intrusion must have an associated sign-off message with a valid signature in the second memory 212 that matches the corresponding intrusion entry in the memory 208. Figure 5 , all of the intrusion entries shown in memory 208 have matching sign-off messages in memory 212. Accordingly, the first intrusion entry with ID a matches the first sign-off message with identity "ID A" in memory 212 because ID a matches ID A, such as by being equal or otherwise related in a predefined manner. In a simple but illustrative example, such a relationship may be ID A=2x ID a, where ID a may be an integer such as a sequence number. In this case, all identities in the sign-off message are twice the identities in the corresponding intrusion entry.

[0054] Each sign-off message in the memory 212 also includes a valid signature, where both the first and second sign-off messages contain signatures "sign 1" and "sign 2", respectively, and the same person may have opened and then closed the lid according to the first and second intrusion entries. In this case, sign 1 and sign 2 may be the same signature or two related signatures. Similarly, the third and fourth sign-off messages contain signatures "sign 3" and "sign 4", respectively, and another person may have opened and closed the lid according to the third and fourth intrusion entries.

[0055] Now refer to Figure 6 The signaling diagram in Figure 2 , briefly describing an example of a process that can be used to check for detected intrusions by querying an authentication center. For example, the authentication center 214 described herein can be implemented as a function in a cloud-like environment (commonly referred to as a "cloud") with a large amount of processing and storage resources.

[0056] Operation 6:1:

[0057] The control unit 206 requests the intrusion entry from the first memory 208 .

[0058] Operation 6:2:

[0059] The control unit 206 obtains the intrusion entry from the first memory 208 .

[0060] Operation 6:3:

[0061] The control unit 206 searches the second memory 212 for the associated sign-off message, for example by comparing the timestamp and / or identification included in the intrusion entry with the timestamp and / or identification included in the sign-off message in the second memory 212 .

[0062] Operation 6:4:

[0063] The control unit 206 finds a matching sign-off message in the second memory 212, the message including the signature.

[0064] Operation 6:5:

[0065] The control unit 206 queries the certification center 214 as to whether the signature is valid.

[0066] Operation 6:6: The control unit 206 requests the authentication center 214 to verify the signature, ie, to confirm whether it is valid.

[0067] The certification authority 214 checks the validity of the signature against a local storage device that holds valid signatures.

[0068] Operation 6:7:

[0069] The authentication center 214 returns a confirmation (OK) or a denial (NOK) of the validity of the signature to the control unit 206. If OK, the authentication center 214 may include information in the confirmation about which person(s) are authorized to use the signature.

[0070] Operation 6:8:

[0071] The control unit 206 may send a notification to a monitoring center or the like (not shown) to indicate the unauthorized intrusion, as in operation 2:7 above.

[0072] Figure 7 The block diagram in shows a detailed but non-limiting example of how an intrusion manager 700 may be constructed to bring about the solution and embodiments thereof described above. The intrusion manager 700 may be configured to operate according to any of the examples and embodiments for employing the solution as described herein (where appropriate and as follows). The intrusion manager 700 is shown to include a processor P and a memory M, the memory including instructions executable by the processor, whereby the intrusion manager 700 is operable as described herein. The intrusion manager 700 also includes a communication circuit C having suitable means for receiving and sending information in the manner described herein.

[0073] The intrusion manager 700 corresponds to Figure 2 The communication circuit C may be configured to communicate with the sensor (corresponding to the intrusion manager 200 in the electronic device 702) using suitable protocols and messages. Figure 2 ) and communicates with an authorization center (e.g. Figure 2 214) in the authorization center, and communicate with the monitoring center (e.g. Figure 2 The solutions and embodiments herein are not limited to using any particular type of message or protocol for the above communications.

[0074] The intrusion manager 700 includes a computer program product configured or arranged to substantially perform Figure 3 and 4 and more or less as described above for the intrusion manager 200 in various examples and embodiments. Figure 7 , the intrusion manager 700 is arranged or configured to handle an intrusion on the electronic device 702 as follows.

[0075] Intrusion manager 700 is configured to detect intrusion to an electronic device. The detection operation may be performed by detection module 700A in intrusion manager 700, for example, in the manner described above for action 300. Detection module 700A may alternatively be named a sensing module or a notification module.

[0076] The intrusion manager 700 is further configured to store an intrusion entry indicating the detected intrusion, for example, in a memory 700D in which the entry written cannot be modified or erased. This storage operation can be performed by a storage module 700B in the intrusion manager 700, for example as described above for action 302. The storage module 700B can alternatively be named a registration module or a writing module. The intrusion manager 700 can also be configured to receive a digital signature after detecting the intrusion. This operation can be performed by the communication circuit C, substantially as described above for action 304.

[0077] Intrusion manager 700 is also configured to store an associated sign-off message identifying the stored intrusion entry, for example in persistent storage 700E (as described above for act 306), which may be performed by storage module 700B. The stored sign-off message includes a signature confirming the detected intrusion.

[0078] Intrusion manager 700 can further be configured to determine the validity of any detected intrusion by checking whether the entry for the intrusion has an identification and / or timestamp that matches the identification and / or timestamp of the sign-off message including a valid signature, e.g., as described above with respect to actions 400-408. These actions can be performed by evaluation module 700C in intrusion manager 700 by checking the entries and messages stored in memories 700D and 700E.

[0079] It should be noted that Figure 7 Various functional modules or units in the intrusion manager 700 are shown, and those skilled in the art can actually implement these functional modules using suitable software and hardware. Therefore, the solution is generally not limited to the illustrated structure of the intrusion manager 700, and the functional modules or units 700A-C therein can be configured to operate according to any of the features and embodiments described in the present disclosure where appropriate.

[0080] Thus, the functional modules or units 700A-C described above may be implemented in the intrusion manager 700 by means of program modules of a computer program including code components and hardware, which when executed by the processor P causes the intrusion manager 700 to perform at least some of the actions and processes described above.

[0081] exist Figure 7In the embodiment, the processor P may include a single central processing unit (CPU), or may include two or more processing units, such as CPUs. For example, the processor P may include a general-purpose microprocessor, an instruction set processor and / or an associated chipset and / or a dedicated microprocessor, such as an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC). The processor P may also include a storage device for caching purposes.

[0082] Each computer program may be carried by a computer program product in the intrusion manager 700 in the form of a memory M having a computer-readable medium and connected to the processor P. The computer program product or memory in the intrusion manager 700 may therefore include a computer-readable medium on which the computer program is stored, for example in the form of computer program modules or the like. For example, the memory M may be a flash memory, a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an electrically erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM) or a hard disk drive storage device (HDD), and in alternative embodiments, the program modules may be distributed on different computer program products in the form of memories within the intrusion manager 700.

[0083] Therefore, the solution described herein can be implemented in the intrusion manager 700 by a computer program comprising instructions, which, when executed on at least one processor, cause the at least one processor to perform actions according to any one of the above embodiments and examples under appropriate circumstances. The solution can also be implemented in a carrier containing the above computer program, wherein the carrier is one of an electronic signal, an optical signal, a radio signal, or a computer-readable storage product or a computer program product.

[0084] Although the solution has been described with reference to specific example embodiments, the description is generally intended only to illustrate the inventive concept and should not be considered to limit the scope of the solution. For example, the terms "intrusion manager", "control unit", "electronic device", "one-time programmable memory", "persistent memory", "intrusion entry" and "sign-off message" have been used throughout this disclosure, although any other corresponding entities, functions and / or parameters having the features and characteristics described herein may also be used. The solution is defined by the appended claims.

Claims

1. A method for handling an intrusion into an electronic device (202), the method comprising: - detecting (300) an intrusion into said electronic device, - storing (302) an intrusion entry indicating the detected intrusion, and - storing (306) an associated sign-off message identifying the stored intrusion entry, said sign-off message comprising a signature confirming said detected intrusion, The intrusion entry and the sign-off message include an identifier and / or a timestamp, so that the detected intrusion can be confirmed by matching the intrusion entry with the associated sign-off message.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the signature is a digital signature received as input from an authorized person. The method of claim 1 , wherein the signature is based on a digital signature that has been verified by a trusted party.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein the intrusion is detected when a lid or cover (202A) on the electronic device is opened or closed.

5. The method of any of claims 1-4, wherein any stored intrusion entry that does not have a matching sign-off message with a valid signature is determined to be unauthorized.

6. The method of claim 5, wherein a notification is sent to a monitoring center (216) to indicate the unauthorized intrusion.

7. The method of any of claims 1-4, wherein one or more intrusion entries are stored in a first memory (208) in which written entries cannot be modified or erased, and one or more associated sign-off messages are stored in a second memory (212). The method according to claim 7 , wherein the first memory and the second memory are located in the electronic device.

9. A method according to any one of claims 1-4, wherein the validity of any detected intrusion is determined by checking whether an entry for that intrusion has an identification and / or timestamp that matches an identification and / or timestamp of a sign-off message comprising a valid signature.

10. The method of any one of claims 1-4, wherein intrusion is detected by at least one of: A) a micro switch, B) a magnetic field sensor, C) a light sensor, and D) a motion sensor.

11. The method according to any one of claims 1-4, wherein the stored history of intrusion entries is used for troubleshooting or evaluation of the electronic device.

12. An intrusion manager (700) arranged to handle an intrusion on an electronic device (702), wherein the intrusion manager is configured to: - detecting (700A) an intrusion into said electronic device, - storing (700B) an intrusion entry indicating the detected intrusion, and - storing (700B) an associated sign-off message identifying the stored intrusion entry, said sign-off message comprising a signature confirming said detected intrusion, in, The intrusion entry and the sign-off message include identification and / or timestamps to enable the detected intrusion to be verified by matching the intrusion entry with the associated sign-off message.

13. The intrusion manager (700) of claim 12, wherein the signature is a digital signature and the intrusion manager is configured to receive the digital signature as input from an authorized person.

14. The intrusion manager (700) of claim 12, wherein the signature is based on a digital signature that has been verified by a trusted party.

15. The intrusion manager (700) of claim 12, wherein the intrusion manager is configured to detect the intrusion when a lid or cover on the electronic device is opened or closed.

16. The intrusion manager (700) of any of claims 12-15, wherein the intrusion manager is configured to determine that any stored intrusion entry that does not have a matching sign-off message with a valid signature is unauthorized.

17. The intrusion manager (700) of claim 16, wherein the intrusion manager is configured to send a notification to a monitoring center to indicate an unauthorized intrusion.

18. An intrusion manager (700) according to any one of claims 12-15, wherein the intrusion manager is configured to store one or more intrusion entries in a first memory (700D) in which written entries cannot be modified or erased, and to store one or more associated sign-off messages in a second memory (700E).

19. The intrusion manager (700) of claim 18, wherein the first memory and the second memory are included in the intrusion manager and are arranged to be located in the electronic device.

20. An intrusion manager (700) according to any one of claims 12-15, wherein the intrusion manager is configured to determine the validity of any detected intrusion by checking whether an entry for the intrusion has an identification and / or timestamp that matches an identification and / or timestamp of a sign-off message comprising a valid signature.

21. The intrusion manager (700) of any one of claims 12-15, wherein the intrusion manager is configured to detect intrusion via at least one of: A) a micro switch, B) a magnetic field sensor, C) a light sensor, and D) a motion sensor.

22. The intrusion manager (700) of any one of claims 12-15, wherein the intrusion manager is configured to use the stored history of intrusion entries for troubleshooting or evaluation of the electronic device.

23. A computer-readable storage medium storing instructions, which, when executed on at least one processor, cause the at least one processor to perform the method according to any one of claims 1-11.

24. A computer program product comprising instructions which, when executed on at least one processor, cause the at least one processor to perform the method according to any one of claims 1-11.

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