Method, system and device for determining user plane security algorithm
By selecting and sending instructions for the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm in 5G V2X scenarios, the problem that the user plane cannot use the effective confidentiality protection algorithm in PC5 unicast communication is solved, ensuring the confidentiality protection of user plane data.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202010785355.1
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2020-08-06
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-22
- Estimated Expiration
- 2040-08-06
AI Technical Summary
In 5G V2X scenario, in PC5 unicast communication, when the control surface security protection negotiation result is that the control surface confidentiality protection is not enabled, it may cause the user to use an effective confidentiality protection algorithm to protect the data confidentiality.
By selecting a non-null value user plane confidentiality protection algorithm between the second device and the first device, and sending corresponding indication information to the first device, it enables it to use the algorithm to use the user plane confidentiality protection when the user plane confidentiality protection is turned on. User surface data is protected confidentially.
It ensures that when the confidentiality protection of the control surface is not turned on, the user plane can still effectively protect the data, solving the problem that the user plane cannot use the effective confidentiality protection algorithm.
Smart Images

Figure CN114079915B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present application relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to a method, system and device for determining a user plane security algorithm. Background Art
[0002] The communication mode of the terminal device may include Uu communication and PC5 unicast communication. Uu communication refers to the mode in which the terminal device communicates with the base station through the Uu interface. In traditional cellular network communications, terminal devices usually cannot communicate directly with each other. Any signaling sent between terminal devices is processed by the base station before being forwarded. Processed by the base station means that the terminal device and the base station communicate through the Uu interface. However, under the short-distance direct communication requirements of device-to-device (D2D) and vehicle-to-everything (V2X), D2D technology provides a PC5 interface based on short-distance direct communication between terminal devices. PC5 unicast communication refers to the mode in which terminal devices communicate directly through the PC5 interface, and data and signaling are no longer transmitted through the base station. Both communication modes involve control plane security protection and user plane security protection. Control plane security protection refers to whether the control plane integrity protection is enabled and whether the control plane confidentiality protection is enabled; user plane security protection refers to whether the user plane integrity protection is enabled and whether the user plane confidentiality protection is enabled.
[0003] At present, in the 5G V2X standard that defines the use of PC5 communication in the V2X scenario, when both the control plane security protection and the user plane security protection are enabled, the security algorithm used by the user plane is consistent with the security algorithm negotiated by the control plane. For example, when both the control plane integrity protection and the control plane confidentiality protection are enabled, the terminal devices at both ends negotiate to determine that the control plane uses a non-null integrity protection algorithm and a non-null confidentiality protection algorithm. If both the user plane integrity protection and the user plane confidentiality protection are enabled, the security algorithm used by the user plane is consistent with the security algorithm negotiated by the control plane. When the control plane integrity protection is not enabled, the control plane confidentiality protection and the user plane security protection are both disabled, but when the control plane integrity protection is enabled, there is no coupling relationship between the control plane security protection and the user plane security protection. For example, when the control plane integrity protection is enabled, the control plane confidentiality protection can be enabled or disabled, the user plane integrity protection can be enabled or disabled, and the user plane confidentiality protection can be enabled or disabled. The security algorithm used by the PC5 unicast connection is negotiated when negotiating the control plane security activation method, and the negotiation of the user plane security activation method is performed after the negotiation of the control plane security activation method. Therefore, when the control plane security protection negotiation result is that the control plane confidentiality protection is not enabled, the corresponding confidentiality protection algorithm selected for the PC5 unicast connection is an algorithm with a null value. After the user plane security protection negotiation result is that the confidentiality protection is enabled, there may be a situation where the UEs at both ends cannot use an effective confidentiality protection algorithm to protect the confidentiality of the user plane data.
[0004] Therefore, how to determine an effective user plane confidentiality protection algorithm is a technical problem that needs to be solved urgently. Summary of the invention
[0005] The present application provides a method, system and device for determining a user plane security algorithm, which can determine an effective user plane confidentiality protection algorithm, thereby protecting the confidentiality of user plane data.
[0006] The first aspect of the present application provides a method for determining a user plane security algorithm. The method can be executed by a second device, or by a device (such as a processor or chip) in the second device. The method takes the second device as an example and includes the following contents.
[0007] When user plane confidentiality protection is turned on between the second device and the first device and control plane confidentiality protection is not turned on between the second device and the first device, the second device selects a user plane confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value according to the security capabilities of the first device and the security capabilities of the second device, and sends a first message to the first device, where the first message includes first algorithm indication information for indicating the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm.
[0008] In a first aspect of the present application, when user plane confidentiality protection is turned on and control plane confidentiality protection is not turned on between a second device and a first device, the second device selects a non-null value user plane confidentiality protection algorithm based on the security capabilities of the first device and the second device, and informs the first device through first algorithm indication information, so that the first device can use the non-null value user plane confidentiality protection algorithm to perform confidentiality protection on user plane data when user plane confidentiality protection is turned on.
[0009] In a possible implementation, the first message further includes indication information for instructing to enable user plane confidentiality protection between the second device and the first device, so that the first device enables user plane confidentiality protection between the first device and the second device according to the indication information.
[0010] In a possible implementation, the second device receives a second message from the first device, the second message includes a user plane security policy of the first device, and determines whether user plane confidentiality protection between the second device and the first device is enabled based on the user plane security policy of the first device and the user plane security policy of the second device itself. For example, if the user plane security policy of the first device is that user plane confidentiality protection must be enabled (required), and the user plane security policy of the second device is that user plane confidentiality protection must be enabled (required), then the second device determines that user plane confidentiality protection between the second device and the first device is enabled; for another example, if the user plane security policy of the first device is that user plane confidentiality protection is optionally enabled (preferred), and the user plane security policy of the second device is that user plane confidentiality protection is optionally enabled (preferred), the second device may determine whether user plane confidentiality protection between the second device and the first device is enabled based on a preset policy, such as its own load condition.
[0011] In a possible implementation, before the second device receives the second message from the first device, it receives a third message from the first device, the third message includes the control plane security policy of the first device and the security capability of the first device, and the second device determines that the control plane confidentiality protection between the second device and the first device is not enabled based on the control plane security policy of the first device and the control plane security policy of the second device itself. For example, the control plane security policy of the first device is that the control plane confidentiality protection must not be enabled (not needed), and / or the user plane security policy of the second device is that the control plane confidentiality protection must not be enabled (not needed), then the second device determines that the control plane confidentiality protection between the second device and the first device is not enabled; for another example, the user plane security policy of the first device is that the user plane confidentiality protection is optionally enabled (preferred), and the user plane security policy of the second device is that the user plane confidentiality protection is optionally enabled (preferred), the second device can determine that the user plane confidentiality protection between the second device and the first device is not enabled based on a preset policy, such as its own load situation.
[0012] In one possible implementation, the second device also selects a control plane confidentiality protection algorithm with a null value based on the fact that the control plane confidentiality protection between the second device and the first device is not enabled, and sends a fourth message to the first device, where the fourth message includes indication information for indicating the control plane confidentiality protection algorithm with a null value, so that the first device does not enable the control plane confidentiality protection between the second device and the first device based on the indication information.
[0013] In a possible implementation, when the second device receives the third message, it can save the security capabilities of the first device. When the control plane confidentiality protection between the second device and the first device is not enabled, the second device saves the security capabilities of the first device, so that when negotiating the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm, the first device does not need to send the security capabilities of the first device again, which can save signaling overhead.
[0014] The second aspect of the present application provides a method for determining a user plane security algorithm. The method can be executed by a first device, or by a device (such as a processor or chip) in the first device. The method takes the first device as an example and includes the following contents.
[0015] The first device sends a third message to the second device, the third message including the control plane security policy of the first device and the security capability of the first device; receives a fourth message from the second device, the fourth message including indication information of a control plane confidentiality protection algorithm for indicating a null value; sends a second message to the second device, the second message including the user plane security policy of the first device; receives a first message from the second device, the first message including first algorithm indication information of a user plane confidentiality protection algorithm for indicating a non-null value; and performs confidentiality protection on user plane data between the first device and the second device according to the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm indicated by the first algorithm indication information.
[0016] In the second aspect of the present application, the first device determines that the control plane confidentiality protection between it and the second device is not enabled based on the control plane confidentiality protection algorithm with a null value; and obtains a valid user plane confidentiality protection algorithm based on the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value indicated by the first algorithm indication information, thereby performing confidentiality protection on the user plane data.
[0017] In a possible implementation, the first message further includes indication information for instructing to enable user plane confidentiality protection between the second device and the first device, so that the first device enables user plane confidentiality protection between the first device and the second device according to the indication information.
[0018] In a possible implementation, the fourth message further includes indication information for indicating a control plane integrity protection algorithm. Before the first device performs confidentiality protection on user plane data between the first device and the second device according to the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm indicated by the first algorithm indication information, the first device turns on control plane integrity protection with the second device according to the control plane integrity protection algorithm indicated by the indication information of the control plane integrity protection algorithm; performs integrity verification on the first message; and when the first message is verified, the first device turns on user plane confidentiality protection with the second device according to the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm indicated by the first algorithm indication information. The first device performs integrity protection verification on the first message, which can reduce the risk of the first message being tampered with.
[0019] When the methods provided in the first and second aspects are applied to PC5 unicast communication, the first message may be a direct communication acceptance message, the second message may be a direct safety mode completion message, the third message may be a direct communication request message, and the fourth message may be a direct mode command message.
[0020] The third aspect of the present application provides a method for determining a user plane security algorithm, which can be applied to communication scenarios such as PC5 unicast communication. The method can be executed by a second device, or by a device (such as a processor or chip) in the second device. The method takes the second device as an example and includes the following contents.
[0021] When the second device receives the direct connection security command completion message from the first device, it determines that the user plane security protection mode between itself and the first device includes enabling user plane confidentiality protection; the second device selects a user plane security algorithm based on the user plane security protection mode, the security capability of the first device, and the security capability of the second device, and sends a direct connection communication acceptance message including first algorithm indication information to the first device, where the first algorithm indication information is used to indicate the selected user plane security algorithm, and the user plane security algorithm includes a user plane confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value.
[0022] In the first aspect of the present application, when the second device determines that the user plane security protection method includes enabling user plane confidentiality protection, the second device selects a non-null value user plane confidentiality protection algorithm based on the user plane security protection method and the security capabilities of the first device and the second device, and informs the first device through the first algorithm indication information, so that the first device can use the non-null value user plane confidentiality protection algorithm to protect the confidentiality of user plane data when the user plane confidentiality protection is enabled.
[0023] In a possible implementation, when the user plane security protection mode is inconsistent with the control plane security protection mode, the second device selects a user plane security algorithm according to the user plane security protection mode and the security capabilities of the first device and the second device. In this way, when the user plane security protection mode is inconsistent with the control plane security protection mode, the second device can also select a user plane security algorithm to determine a valid user plane security algorithm, thereby performing security protection on user plane data.
[0024] In a possible implementation, the inconsistency between the user plane security protection mode and the control plane security protection mode may include enabling control plane integrity protection and disabling control plane confidentiality protection, while the user plane security protection mode includes enabling user plane confidentiality protection. When the control plane confidentiality protection is not enabled, a non-null user plane confidentiality protection algorithm can also be selected, so that confidentiality protection can be performed on user plane data.
[0025] In a possible implementation, when the second device determines the user plane security protection mode, it can further generate user plane security activation indication information according to the user plane security protection mode. The user plane security activation indication information is used to indicate the determined user plane security protection mode.
[0026] Furthermore, the above-mentioned direct communication acceptance message also includes user plane security activation indication information, so that the first device can obtain the user plane security protection mode through the user plane security activation indication information.
[0027] In one possible implementation, the direct connection security command completion message includes the user plane security policy of the first device, and the second device determines the user plane security protection method between itself and the first device based on the user plane security policy of the first device and the user plane security policy of the second device, including enabling user plane confidentiality protection.
[0028] In a possible implementation, the direct connection security command completion message also includes the security capability of the first device so that the second device can select a user plane security algorithm. The direct connection security command completion message may also not include the security capability of the first device, so that when the second device needs to select a user plane security algorithm, it extracts the security capability of the first device from its stored information, and selects the user plane security algorithm according to the security capabilities of the first device and the second device, and the user plane security protection mode.
[0029] In a possible implementation, when the control plane security algorithm does not support the user plane security protection mode, the second device selects the user plane security algorithm according to the user plane security protection mode and the security capabilities of the first device and the second device. In this way, when the control plane security algorithm does not support the user plane security protection mode, the second device can also select the user plane security algorithm to determine an effective user plane security algorithm, thereby performing security protection on the user plane data.
[0030] Among them, the control plane security algorithm does not support the user plane security protection method. For example, if the control plane confidentiality protection algorithm is null, and the user plane confidentiality protection needs to be enabled, then the control plane confidentiality protection algorithm does not support the user plane confidentiality protection being enabled.
[0031] In a possible implementation, before the second device receives the direct connection security command completion message from the first device, the second device further negotiates a control plane security algorithm, which may include:
[0032] A direct communication request message is received from a first device, where the direct communication request message includes a control plane security policy of the first device and a security capability of the first device; in this way, the second device can determine a control plane security protection method with the first device based on the control plane security policy of the first device and the control plane security policy of the second device; and then, based on the control plane security protection method, the security capability of the first device and the security capability of the second device, a control plane security algorithm is selected, and a direct security mode command message including second algorithm indication information is sent to the first device, where the second algorithm indication information is used to indicate the selected control plane security algorithm.
[0033] When the second device receives the security capabilities of the first device, it can store the security capabilities of the first device, so that when the first device sends a direct connection security command completion message, it is not necessary to carry the security capabilities of the first device in the direct connection security command completion message.
[0034] In a fourth aspect, the present application provides a method for determining a user plane security algorithm, which can be applied to communication scenarios such as PC5 unicast communication. The method can be executed by a first device, or by a device (such as a processor or chip) in the first device. The method takes the first device as an example and includes the following contents.
[0035] The first device receives a direct communication acceptance message from the second device, wherein the direct communication acceptance message includes user plane security activation indication information and first algorithm indication information for indicating a user plane security algorithm; the first device determines a user plane security protection method between the first device and the second device based on the user plane security activation indication information; and performs user plane security protection on user plane data between the first device and the second device based on the user plane security protection method and the user plane security algorithm indicated by the first algorithm indication information.
[0036] In the fourth aspect of the present application, the user plane security protection method is indicated by user plane security activation indication information, and the user plane security algorithm is indicated by first algorithm indication information, so that user plane data can be securely protected.
[0037] In a possible implementation, before determining the user plane security algorithm, the first device performs control plane negotiation with the second device to determine the control plane security algorithm and the control plane security protection method. The control plane security algorithm is determined by receiving a direct connection security mode command message from the second device, the direct connection security mode command message including second algorithm indication information for indicating the control plane security algorithm.
[0038] In one possible implementation, when control plane integrity protection is turned on, the first device performs integrity protection verification on the direct security mode command message, and when the direct security mode command message passes the integrity protection verification, the first device determines the control plane security protection method between the first device and the second device based on the control plane security algorithm indicated by the second algorithm indication information.
[0039] In one possible implementation, the first device sends a direct connection security command completion message to the second device, where the direct connection security command completion message includes the user plane security policy of the first device, so that the second device determines the user plane security protection method according to the user plane security policies of the first device and the second device.
[0040] In a possible implementation, the direct connection security command completion message also includes the security capabilities of the first device, so that the second device can select a control plane security algorithm based on the security capabilities of the first device and the second device. The second device can store the security capabilities of the first device, so that when the second device needs to select a user plane security algorithm, it can directly obtain the security capabilities of the first device without the first device sending the security capabilities of the first device again, saving signaling overhead.
[0041] The fifth aspect of the present application provides a method for determining a user plane security algorithm, which can be applied to communication scenarios such as PC5 unicast communication and Uu communication. The method can be executed by a first device, or by a device (such as a processor or chip) in the first device. The method takes the first device as an example and includes the following contents.
[0042] A first device receives a direct communication acceptance message from a second device, the direct communication acceptance message including first algorithm indication information for indicating a user plane security algorithm; determines a user plane security protection method between the first device and the second device according to the user plane security algorithm indicated by the first algorithm indication information; and performs user plane security protection on user plane data between the first device and the second device according to the user plane security protection method and the user plane security algorithm.
[0043] In the fifth aspect of the present application, the first algorithm indication information can indicate both the selected user plane security algorithm and the user plane security protection method, thereby providing security protection for user plane data.
[0044] In a possible implementation, before determining the user plane security algorithm, the first device performs control plane negotiation with the second device to determine the control plane security algorithm and the control plane security protection method. The control plane security algorithm is determined by receiving a direct connection security mode command message from the second device, the direct connection security mode command message including second algorithm indication information for indicating the control plane security algorithm.
[0045] In one possible implementation, when control plane integrity protection is turned on, the first device performs integrity protection verification on the direct security mode command message, and when the direct security mode command message passes the integrity protection verification, the first device determines the control plane security protection method between the first device and the second device based on the control plane security algorithm indicated by the second algorithm indication information.
[0046] In one possible implementation, the first device sends a direct connection security command completion message to the second device, where the direct connection security command completion message includes the user plane security policy of the first device, so that the second device determines the user plane security protection method according to the user plane security policies of the first device and the second device.
[0047] In a possible implementation, the direct connection security command completion message also includes the security capabilities of the first device, so that the second device can select a control plane security algorithm based on the security capabilities of the first device and the second device. The second device can store the security capabilities of the first device, so that when the second device needs to select a user plane security algorithm, it can directly obtain the security capabilities of the first device without the first device sending the security capabilities of the first device again, saving signaling overhead.
[0048] In a sixth aspect of the present application, a communication device is provided, which may be a second device or a device in the second device. In one design, the device may include a module corresponding to the method / operation / step / action described in the first or third aspect and various possible implementations, and the module may be a hardware circuit, or software, or a combination of a hardware circuit and software. In one design, the device may include a processing module and a transceiver module. Exemplarily,
[0049] a processing module, configured to select a user plane confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value according to a security capability of the first device and a security capability of the second device when user plane confidentiality protection is enabled between the second device and the first device and control plane confidentiality protection is not enabled between the second device and the first device;
[0050] The transceiver module is used to send a first message to a first device, where the first message includes first algorithm indication information used to indicate a user plane confidentiality protection algorithm.
[0051] In a seventh aspect of the present application, there is provided a communication device, which includes a processor for implementing the method described in the first or third aspect above. The device may also include a memory for storing instructions and data. The memory is coupled to the processor, and when the processor executes the instructions stored in the memory, the device can implement the method provided by the first aspect and each possible implementation of the first aspect, or the third aspect and each possible implementation of the third aspect. The device may also include a communication interface, which is used for the device to communicate with other devices. Exemplarily, the communication interface may be a circuit hardware module such as a transceiver, a bus, etc., and the other device may be a first device, etc. In one possible design, the device includes:
[0052] A memory for storing program instructions;
[0053] The processor is used to select a user plane confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value according to the security capability of the first device and the security capability of the second device when the user plane confidentiality protection between the second device and the first device is enabled and the control plane confidentiality protection between the second device and the first device is not enabled, and send a first message to the first device using the communication interface, where the first message includes first algorithm indication information for indicating the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm.
[0054] An eighth aspect of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium comprising instructions, which, when executed on a computer, enables the computer to execute the method provided by the first aspect and its various possible implementations, or the third aspect and its various possible implementations.
[0055] In a ninth aspect, the present application provides a chip system, which includes a processor and may also include a memory, for implementing the method provided by the first aspect and each possible implementation of the first aspect, or the third aspect and each possible implementation of the third aspect. The chip system may be composed of a chip, or may include a chip and other discrete devices.
[0056] The tenth aspect of the present application provides a communication device, which can be a first device or a device in the first device. In one design, the device may include a module corresponding to the method / operation / step / action described in the second aspect or the fourth aspect or the fifth aspect and various possible implementations, and the module may be a hardware circuit or software, or a combination of a hardware circuit and software. In one design, the device may include a processing module and a transceiver module. Exemplarily,
[0057] A transceiver module, configured to send a third message to a second device, the third message including a control plane security policy of the first device and a security capability of the first device; receive a fourth message from the second device, the fourth message including indication information of a control plane confidentiality protection algorithm indicating a null value; send a second message to the second device, the second message including a user plane security policy of the first device; receive a first message from the second device, the first message including first algorithm indication information of a user plane confidentiality protection algorithm indicating a non-null value;
[0058] The processing module is used to perform confidentiality protection on user plane data between the second device according to the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm indicated by the first algorithm indication information.
[0059] In an eleventh aspect of the present application, a communication device is provided, which includes a processor for implementing the method described in the second aspect or the third aspect above. The device may also include a memory for storing instructions and data. The memory is coupled to the processor, and when the processor executes the instructions stored in the memory, the device can implement the method described in the second aspect and each possible implementation of the second aspect, or the fourth aspect and each possible implementation of the fourth aspect, or the fifth aspect and each possible implementation of the fifth aspect. The device may also include a communication interface, which is used for the device to communicate with other devices. Exemplarily, the communication interface may be a circuit hardware module such as a transceiver, a bus, and the other device may be a second device, etc. In one possible design, the device includes:
[0060] A memory for storing program instructions;
[0061] A processor, configured to send a third message to a second device using a communication interface, the third message including a control plane security policy of the first device and a security capability of the first device; receive a fourth message from the second device, the fourth message including indication information of a control plane confidentiality protection algorithm for indicating a null value; send a second message to the second device, the second message including a user plane security policy of the first device; receive a first message from the second device, the first message including first algorithm indication information of a user plane confidentiality protection algorithm for indicating a non-null value; and perform confidentiality protection on user plane data between the second device and the second device according to the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm indicated by the first algorithm indication information.
[0062] The twelfth aspect of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium, comprising instructions, which, when executed on a computer, enables the computer to execute the method provided by the second aspect and its various possible implementations, or the fourth aspect and its various possible implementations, or the fifth aspect and its various possible implementations.
[0063] In a thirteenth aspect, the present application provides a chip system, which includes a processor and may also include a memory, for implementing the method provided by the second aspect and each possible implementation of the second aspect, or the fourth aspect and each possible implementation of the fourth aspect, or the fifth aspect and each possible implementation of the fifth aspect. The chip system may be composed of a chip, or may include a chip and other discrete devices.
[0064] A fourteenth aspect of the present application provides a communication system, the communication system comprising a first device and a second device;
[0065] The second device is configured to select a user plane confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value according to the security capability of the first device and the security capability of the second device when user plane confidentiality protection is enabled between the second device and the first device and control plane confidentiality protection is not enabled between the second device and the first device; and send a first message to the first device, where the first message includes first algorithm indication information for indicating the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm;
[0066] The first device is used to receive a first message.
[0067] It can be understood that the system provided in the thirteenth aspect includes the first device involved in the first aspect and the second device involved in the second aspect. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0068] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of the process of establishing unicast communication for PC5;
[0069] Figure 2 An example diagram of security protection in PC5 unicast communication;
[0070] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of a network architecture for applying an embodiment of the present application;
[0071] Figure 4 A flowchart of a method for determining a user plane security algorithm provided in Embodiment 1 of the present application;
[0072] Figure 5 A flowchart of a method for determining a user plane security algorithm provided in Embodiment 2 of the present application;
[0073] Figure 6 A flowchart of a method for determining a user plane security algorithm provided in Embodiment 3 of the present application;
[0074] Figure 7 A schematic diagram of the structure of a communication device provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0075] Figure 8 A schematic diagram of the structure of another communication device provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0076] In order to better understand the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of the present application, the technical terms involved in the embodiments of the present application are first introduced.
[0077] 1. Security Strategy
[0078] The security policy is used to describe whether to enable security protection. There are three types: required, not needed, and preferred. If the security policy is required, it means that security protection needs to be enabled; if the security policy is not needed, it means that security protection does not need to be enabled; if the security policy is preferred, it means that security protection can be enabled or not. When the security policy is sent, generally only one of the three types (required, not needed, and preferred) will be selected for sending. In some special scenarios, at least two types may be selected for sending, and one of them is preferred. For example, when not needed and preferred are sent, it means that security protection is not preferred; when required and preferred are sent, it means that security protection is preferred.
[0079] The security policy may include a control plane security policy and a user plane security policy. The control plane security policy is used to indicate whether the control plane confidentiality protection and / or the control plane integrity protection are enabled. The user plane security policy is used to indicate whether the user plane confidentiality protection and / or the user plane integrity protection are enabled. Among them, the values of the control plane confidentiality protection policy, the control plane integrity protection policy, the user plane confidentiality protection policy and / or the user plane integrity protection policy may include enabled (required), not enabled (not needed) and optional (preferred). For example, if the control plane confidentiality protection policy is not needed and the control plane integrity protection policy is required, it means that the control plane confidentiality protection does not need to be enabled and the control plane integrity protection needs to be enabled.
[0080] Control plane confidentiality protection is to protect the confidentiality of signaling during transmission. Control plane confidentiality protection can also be called control plane encryption protection. Confidentiality means that the real content cannot be directly seen. Control plane integrity protection is to protect the integrity of signaling during transmission. Integrity means that it is consistent with the original signaling and has not been modified. User plane confidentiality protection is to protect the confidentiality of user plane data during transmission. User plane confidentiality protection can also be called user plane encryption protection. User plane integrity protection is to protect the integrity of user plane data during transmission. Integrity means that it is consistent with the original user plane data and has not been modified.
[0081] The security policy can be used to determine the security protection mode. For example, in PC5 unicast communication, the initiator informs the receiving end of its security policy. The receiving end can determine the security protection mode between itself and the initiator based on the security policy of the initiator and the security policy of the receiving end. The security protection mode may include a control plane security protection mode and a user plane security protection mode. The control plane security protection mode refers to whether the control plane confidentiality protection is enabled, and / or whether the control plane integrity protection is enabled, for example, the control plane security protection mode is to enable control plane confidentiality protection and enable control plane integrity protection; the user plane security protection mode refers to whether the user plane confidentiality protection is enabled, and / or whether the user plane integrity protection is enabled, for example, the user plane security protection mode is to enable user plane confidentiality protection and not enable user plane integrity protection.
[0082] 2. Security Algorithm
[0083] The security algorithm includes: at least one confidentiality protection algorithm and at least one integrity protection algorithm. The confidentiality protection algorithm can also be called an encryption algorithm.
[0084] Security algorithms can be further divided into control plane security algorithms and user plane security algorithms. The control plane security algorithm is used to protect signaling, including the control plane confidentiality protection algorithm and the control plane integrity protection algorithm; the user plane security algorithm is used to protect user plane data, including the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm and the user plane integrity protection algorithm.
[0085] Currently, the user plane security algorithm is the same as the control plane security algorithm, but in an embodiment of the present application, the user plane security algorithm may be the same as the control plane security algorithm or may be different.
[0086] It should be noted that a security algorithm with a null value may indicate that security protection is not enabled. For example, if the control plane integrity protection algorithm negotiated between the first device and the second device is a null value, it may indicate that control plane integrity protection is not enabled between the first device and the second device.
[0087] 3. Security protection and settlement security protection
[0088] Security protection: For nodes that perform security functions, the control plane security algorithm and the control plane security key are used together to protect the control plane data (i.e., signaling), and the user plane security algorithm and the user plane security key are used together to protect the user plane data. Specifically, security protection includes:
[0089] (1) User plane confidentiality protection: User plane data is encrypted and protected using user plane encryption keys and user plane confidentiality protection algorithms;
[0090] (2) User plane integrity protection: Use the user plane integrity protection key and user plane integrity protection algorithm to protect the integrity of user plane data;
[0091] (3) Control plane confidentiality protection: Use the control plane encryption key and control plane confidentiality protection algorithm to encrypt and protect the control plane data;
[0092] (4) Control plane integrity protection: Use the control plane integrity protection key and control plane integrity protection algorithm to protect the integrity of the control plane data.
[0093] The embodiments of the present application do not limit the order of encryption protection and integrity protection, that is, the user plane / control plane data may be encrypted first and then integrity protected; or the user plane / control plane may be integrity protected first and then encryption protected. Of course, the user plane and the control plane may not use the same execution order.
[0094] For nodes that perform security functions, the control plane security algorithm and the control plane security key are used together to obtain the original control plane data, and the user plane security algorithm and the user plane security key are used together to obtain the original user plane data. Specifically, the security protection includes:
[0095] (1) User plane decryption: Decrypt the encrypted user plane data using the user plane encryption key and the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm;
[0096] (2) User plane integrity verification: Use the user plane integrity protection key and user plane integrity protection algorithm to perform integrity protection verification on user plane data;
[0097] (3) Control plane decryption: Decrypt the encrypted control plane data using the control plane encryption key and the control plane confidentiality protection algorithm;
[0098] (4) Control plane integrity verification: Use the control plane integrity protection key and control plane integrity protection algorithm to perform integrity protection verification on the control plane data.
[0099] The embodiments of the present application do not limit the order of decryption and verification of integrity protection. However, it should be understood that if the user plane / control plane data is first encrypted and then integrity protected, the order of decrypting the security protection is to first verify the integrity protection and then decrypt the encrypted user plane data; if the user plane / control plane data is first integrity protected and then encrypted, the order of decrypting the security protection is to first decrypt the encrypted data and then verify the integrity protection. Decrypting security protection is the opposite of turning on security protection, that is, security protection needs to be decrypted only when security protection is turned on.
[0100] 4. Security protection in PC5 unicast communication
[0101] In PC5 unicast communication, the initiator and the receiver negotiate to determine whether PC5 security is enabled, that is, to determine the security protection method between the two ends. The initiator and the receiver can negotiate through control plane messages (or signaling messages). For example, during the establishment of PC5 unicast communication, the initiator and the receiver negotiate through control plane messages. Figure 1 shown. Figure 1 In the example, the initiator is user equipment (UE) 1 and the receiver is UE 2. Specifically:
[0102] Step 101: UE 1 sends a direct communication request (DCR) message to UE 2. Correspondingly, UE 2 receives the direct communication request message from UE 1.
[0103] Among them, the direct communication request message may include the security capabilities of UE 1 (UE 1security capabilities), the control plane security policy of UE 1 (UE 1signalling security policy) and optionally a random number 1 (nonce_1) generated by UE 1. The security capabilities of UE 1 may include the security algorithms supported by UE 1 (applicable to the user plane and / or the control plane). The security algorithms supported by UE 1 may be the security algorithms supported by UE 1 in this PC5 unicast connection, or they may be the security algorithms supported by UE 1 itself. The security algorithms include integrity protection algorithms and confidentiality protection algorithms. The definition of UE2's security capabilities is similar and will not be repeated later. The control plane security policy of UE 1 is the control plane security policy that UE 1 hopes to use in this PC5 unicast connection, including the control plane integrity protection policy and the control plane confidentiality protection policy. For example, if UE 1 hopes to enable control plane confidentiality protection in this PC5 unicast connection, the control plane integrity protection policy is enabled (required).
[0104] The direct communication request message may also include information required for key establishment (Key_Est_Info), which may be an information container (container) for carrying information required for key establishment. UE 1 and UE 2 may establish a shared key between UE 1 and UE 2 by exchanging key establishment information.
[0105] Optionally, the direct communication request message may also include a root key identifier (K NRP ID), K NRP ID is used to identify the root key K NRP , KNRP It can be the shared key established by UE 1 and UE 2 in the mutual authentication process and key establishment process before step 101. If UE 1 can perceive the identity of UE 2 and UE 1 has saved some context information between UE 2 and UE 2, the direct communication request message includes K NRP ID. UE 1 can sense the identity of UE 2, that is, it can determine which user UE 2 is. UE 1 stores some context information between UE 2, that is, UE 1 and UE 2 have communicated before, and UE 1 stores some context information between UE 2, which includes K between UE 1 and UE 2. NRP and K NRP ID.
[0106] Optionally, step 101 may also be a direct rekeying request message sent by UE 1 to UE 2, and accordingly, UE 2 receives the direct rekeying request from UE 1. In this case, the message does not include the control plane security policy of UE 1.
[0107] Step 102, UE 2 determines the control plane security protection mode between UE 2 and UE 1, that is, UE 2 determines whether to enable control plane integrity protection and control plane confidentiality protection for the signaling between UE 2 and UE 1, and selects a security algorithm.
[0108] UE 2 determines the control plane security protection mode between UE 1 and UE 2 according to the control plane security policy of UE 1 and the control plane security policy of UE 2. The control plane security protection mode between UE 2 and UE 1 can also be described as the control plane security protection mode used by the PC5 unicast connection.
[0109] For example, UE 2 may determine whether to enable control plane integrity protection in the following manner:
[0110] (1) The control plane integrity protection policy of UE 1 is required, and the control plane integrity protection policy of UE 2 is preferred or required, then UE 2 determines to enable the control plane integrity protection between itself and UE 1;
[0111] (2) The control plane integrity protection policy of UE 1 is required or preferred, and the control plane integrity protection policy of UE 2 is required, then UE 2 determines to enable the control plane integrity protection between itself and UE 1;
[0112] (3) The control plane integrity protection policy of UE 1 is preferred and the control plane integrity protection policy of UE 2 is preferred, then UE 2 determines whether to enable the control plane integrity protection between UE 1 and UE 1 according to its own policy; for example, the default policy may be to enable the control plane integrity protection between UE 1 and UE 1, or to determine whether to enable the control plane integrity protection between UE 2 and UE 1 according to the performance of UE 2; the specific policy setting is not limited;
[0113] (4) When either the control plane integrity protection policy of UE 1 or the control plane integrity protection policy of UE 2 is not needed and the other is not required, UE 2 determines not to enable the control plane integrity protection between UE 1 and UE 1;
[0114] (5) When either the control plane integrity protection policy of UE 1 or the control plane integrity protection policy of UE 2 is not needed and the other is required, a secure connection cannot be established between UE 2 and UE 1.
[0115] The method by which UE 2 determines whether to enable control plane confidentiality protection is similar to the method by which UE 2 determines whether to enable control plane integrity protection, and will not be described in detail. Further, in a possible implementation, if UE 2 determines not to enable control plane integrity protection with UE 1, then UE 2 determines not to enable control plane confidentiality protection with UE 1; if UE 2 determines to enable control plane integrity protection with UE 1, then the method by which UE 2 determines whether to enable control plane confidentiality protection with UE 1 is similar to the method by which UE 2 determines whether to enable control plane integrity protection.
[0116] Further, UE 2 determines a security algorithm according to the control plane security protection mode determined between UE 1 and UE 2.
[0117] Specifically, UE 2 may determine, based on its own security capability and the security capability of UE 1, a confidentiality protection algorithm supported by both UE 1 and UE 2 as the control plane confidentiality protection algorithm between UE 1 and UE 2, and determine an integrity protection algorithm supported by both UE 1 and UE2 as the control plane integrity protection algorithm between UE 1 and UE 2. For example, if UE 2 determines that it is necessary to enable control plane confidentiality protection with UE 1, UE 2 selects a confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value supported by both UE 1 and UE 2 as the confidentiality protection algorithm for performing control plane confidentiality protection between UE 1 and UE 2 based on the security capabilities of UE 1 and UE 2. If UE 2 determines that it is necessary not to enable control plane confidentiality protection with UE 1, UE 2 determines an algorithm with a null value as the control plane confidentiality protection algorithm between UE 1 and UE 2. For another example, if UE 2 determines that it is necessary to enable control plane integrity protection with UE 1, UE 2 selects an integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value. If UE 2 determines that it is necessary not to enable the control plane integrity protection between UE 1 , UE 2 determines an algorithm with a null value as the control plane integrity protection algorithm between UE 1 and UE 2 .
[0118] Optionally, in step 103, UE 1 and UE 2 perform a mutual authentication process and a key establishment process.
[0119] In the prior art, if UE 2 determines to enable control plane integrity protection, and there is no existing shared key between UE 1 and UE 2, it is necessary to trigger the mutual authentication process and key establishment process with UE 1. If UE 2 determines not to enable control plane integrity protection, it is not necessary to perform step 103. If the direct communication request message includes K NRP ID, then UE 2 uses K NRP ID determines the shared key K between UE 1 and UE 1 NRP , so step 103 may not be executed.
[0120] Step 104: UE 2 sends a direct security mode command message to UE 1. Correspondingly, UE 1 receives the direct security mode command message from UE 2. If UE 2 determines in step 102 that control plane integrity protection is enabled, UE 2 performs integrity protection on the direct security mode command message.
[0121] The direct connection security mode command message includes the security algorithm (chosen_algs) selected by UE 2. The selected security algorithm may include the security algorithm selected by UE 2 in step 102. The security algorithm may be one of the following three:
[0122] (1) When UE 2 determines not to enable integrity protection of the control plane, it also defaults to not enable confidentiality protection of the control plane. Then, the security algorithm includes an integrity protection algorithm with a null value and a confidentiality protection algorithm with a null value, which can indicate that integrity protection of the control plane and confidentiality protection of the control plane are not enabled between UE 2 and UE 1.
[0123] (2) When UE 2 determines to enable control plane integrity protection and control plane confidentiality protection, the security algorithm includes a non-null value integrity protection algorithm and a non-null value confidentiality protection algorithm, and can indicate to enable control plane integrity protection and control plane confidentiality protection between UE 2 and UE 1;
[0124] (3) When UE 2 determines to enable control plane integrity protection and not enable control plane confidentiality protection, the security algorithm includes a non-null value integrity protection algorithm and a null value confidentiality protection algorithm, which can indicate to enable control plane integrity protection and not enable control plane confidentiality protection between UE 2 and UE 1.
[0125] The direct connection security mode command message also includes the security capability of UE 1 and the control plane security policy of UE 1. The security capability of UE 1 and the control plane security policy of UE 1 are the security capability of UE 1 and the control plane security policy of UE 1 received by UE 2 from the message in step 101 to prevent a bidding down attack. In the case where UE 2 determines to enable control plane integrity protection, the direct connection security mode command message also includes a random number 2 (nonce_2) generated by UE 2. Since UE 2 enables control plane integrity protection, UE 2 can perform integrity protection on the direct connection security mode command message. For example, UE 2 can use the root key K NRP , random number 1 and random number 2 to calculate the session key K NRP-sess , further based on the session key K NRP-sess The integrity protection key (NRPIK) is derived and generated, and the integrity protection key is used to protect the integrity of the direct connection security mode command message.
[0126] Optionally, regardless of whether control plane confidentiality protection is enabled, direct connection security mode command messages are not encrypted.
[0127] Step 105: UE 1 determines a control plane security protection mode between UE 1 and UE 2, that is, UE 1 determines whether to enable control plane integrity protection and control plane confidentiality protection for signaling between UE 1 and UE 2.
[0128] UE 1 determines the control plane security protection mode between UE 2 and UE 2 according to the selected security algorithm included in the direct security mode command message. That is, the selected security algorithm included in the direct security mode command message is used to indicate the security algorithm used between UE 1 and UE 2, and implicitly indicates whether to enable the corresponding control plane security protection. For example, if the confidentiality protection algorithm is a non-null value, UE 1 determines to enable the control plane confidentiality protection, and uses the confidentiality protection algorithm carried in the direct security mode command message to perform confidentiality protection on subsequent control plane messages; if the integrity protection algorithm is a non-null value, UE 1 determines to enable the control plane integrity protection, and uses the control plane integrity protection algorithm carried in the direct security mode command message to perform integrity protection on subsequent control plane messages.
[0129] When control plane integrity protection is enabled, UE 1 uses K NRP , random number 1 and random number 2 to calculate the session key K NRP-sess , and further use K NRP-sess The integrity protection key (NRPIK) used in the PC5 unicast connection is calculated. If the control plane confidentiality protection is also enabled, UE 1 further uses K NRP-sess The encryption key (NRPEK) used in the PC5 unicast connection is calculated.
[0130] When control plane integrity protection is enabled, UE 1 performs the following three verification processes:
[0131] A. UE 1 verifies whether the security capability of UE 1 in the direct connection security mode command message is the same as the security capability sent to UE 2;
[0132] B. UE 1 verifies whether the security policy of UE 1 in the direct connection security mode command message is the same as the security policy sent to UE 2;
[0133] C. If integrity protection is enabled, integrity verification is performed on the direct connection security mode command message. If integrity protection is not enabled, integrity verification is not required.
[0134] When all three of the above verifications are passed, UE 1 activates the control plane security between it and UE 2, and carries the user plane security policy of UE 1 in the direct connection security mode completion message. If any of the above three verifications fails, UE 1 releases the connection with UE 2 and sends a connection establishment rejection message to UE 2, which also carries the rejection reason value. It should be noted that this application does not limit the order in which the above three verifications are executed.
[0135] When the control plane integrity protection is not enabled, UE 1 performs the above verification processes A and B. If both verification processes pass, UE 1 carries its user plane security policy in the direct connection security mode completion message.
[0136] Step 106: UE 1 sends a direct security mode complete message to UE 2. Correspondingly, UE 2 receives the direct security mode complete message from UE 1.
[0137] The direct connection security mode completion message carries the user plane security policy of UE 1, which is used for negotiation with UE 2 to determine the user plane security protection mode.
[0138] Optionally, when the control plane integrity protection between UE 1 and UE 2 is enabled, UE 1 performs integrity protection on the direct connection security mode completion message. If the control plane confidentiality protection is also enabled between UE 1 and UE 2, UE 1 performs confidentiality protection on the direct connection security mode completion message.
[0139] Step 107, UE 2 determines the user plane security protection mode between UE 2 and UE 1, that is, UE 2 determines whether to enable user plane integrity protection and whether to enable user plane confidentiality protection for user plane data between UE 2 and UE 1.
[0140] When UE 2 receives the direct connection security mode completion message, it can determine the user plane security protection mode between UE 1 and UE 2 according to the user plane security policy of UE 1 and the user plane security policy of UE 2. The process of UE 2 determining the user plane security protection mode is similar to the process of UE 2 determining the control plane security protection mode, which will not be repeated here.
[0141] Step 108: UE 2 sends a direct communication accept message to UE 1. Correspondingly, UE 1 receives the direct communication accept message from UE 2.
[0142] The direct communication acceptance message may include a user plane security configuration, and the user plane security configuration is used to indicate whether the user plane integrity protection is enabled and whether the user plane confidentiality protection is enabled. The user plane security configuration can be understood as a kind of indication information, and the indication information is used to indicate whether the user plane integrity protection is enabled and whether the user plane confidentiality protection is enabled.
[0143] When receiving the direct communication acceptance message, UE 1 enables corresponding security protection according to the user plane security configuration.
[0144] When both control plane integrity protection and user plane integrity protection are enabled, the control plane and user plane use the same non-null value integrity protection algorithm; when both control plane confidentiality protection and user plane confidentiality protection are enabled, the control plane and user plane use the same non-null value confidentiality protection algorithm.
[0145] When the control plane integrity protection is not enabled, the control plane confidentiality protection is disabled by default, and both the user plane integrity protection and the user plane confidentiality protection are disabled, that is, the integrity protection algorithm is a null value, and the confidentiality protection algorithm is a null value. However, when the control plane integrity protection is enabled, the control plane confidentiality protection can be enabled or disabled, the user plane integrity protection can be enabled or disabled, and the user plane encryption can be enabled or disabled, and the latter three are enabled or disabled independently of each other. Since the security algorithm used for the PC5 unicast connection is negotiated when negotiating the control plane security enablement method, and the negotiation of the user plane security enablement method is performed after the negotiation of the control plane security enablement method, when the control plane security protection negotiation result is that the control plane confidentiality protection is not enabled, the corresponding confidentiality protection algorithm for the PC5 unicast connection is selected as an algorithm with a null value. After the user plane security protection negotiation result is that the confidentiality protection is enabled, there may be a situation where the UEs at both ends cannot use an effective confidentiality protection algorithm to protect the confidentiality of the user plane data.
[0146] For example, see Figure 2 As shown, Figure 2 and Figure 1 The same parts can be found in Figure 1 Description. Figure 2In step 102a, UE 2 determines that the control plane integrity protection is turned on and the control plane confidentiality protection is not turned on. Then the security algorithm carried in the direct connection security mode command message in step 104a includes a non-null value integrity protection algorithm and a null value confidentiality protection algorithm to instruct UE 1 to turn on the control plane integrity protection and not turn on the control plane confidentiality protection. However, UE 2 determines in step 107a that the user plane confidentiality protection is turned on, and the user plane security configuration in the direct connection communication acceptance message indicates that the user plane confidentiality protection is turned on. UE 1 obtains a null value confidentiality protection algorithm from the security algorithm in step 104a, and the null value confidentiality protection algorithm cannot effectively protect the confidentiality of the user plane data.
[0147] Optionally, step 108 may also be a direct rekeying response message sent by UE 2 to UE 1 , and correspondingly, UE 1 receives a direct rekeying request from UE 2 .
[0148] Optionally, step 108 may also be an RRC connection reconfiguration message sent by UE 2 to UE 1 , and correspondingly, UE 1 receives the RRC connection reconfiguration message from UE 2 .
[0149] 5. Security protection in Uu communication
[0150] The security protection method of the Uu interface for communication between the base station and the terminal device is to first enable the radio resource control (RRC) layer security protection, and then enable the user plane security protection. The RRC layer security protection can be understood as the control plane security protection. The RRC layer security protection method is to forcibly enable integrity protection and optionally enable confidentiality protection. The base station carries a security algorithm in the access stratum (AS) security mode command (SMC) message sent to the terminal device. The security algorithm includes an integrity protection algorithm and a confidentiality protection algorithm. When the base station determines the user plane security protection method, it indicates to the terminal device whether to enable user plane integrity protection and whether to enable user plane confidentiality protection through the security enablement indication information carried in the RRC connection reconfiguration message. If the user plane integrity protection is enabled, the terminal device can use the integrity protection algorithm carried by the AS SMC message to perform integrity protection on the user plane data; if the user plane confidentiality protection is enabled, the terminal device can use the confidentiality protection algorithm carried by the AS SMC message to perform confidentiality protection on the user plane data.
[0151] In Uu communication, there may be a situation where user plane confidentiality protection is enabled, but an effective confidentiality protection algorithm cannot be used to protect the confidentiality of user plane data.
[0152] The security protection in PC5 communication and the security protection in Uu communication are shown in Table 1 below.
[0153]
[0154] Table 1
[0155] As can be seen from Table 1, the security protection of PC5 communication and Uu communication has the following problems: when the control plane integrity protection is turned on and the control plane confidentiality protection is not turned on, when the user plane confidentiality protection needs to be turned on, it is impossible to use an effective confidentiality protection algorithm to protect the confidentiality of the user plane data.
[0156] In view of this, the embodiments of the present application provide a method, system and device for determining a user plane security algorithm, which can determine an effective user plane security algorithm, thereby protecting the security of user plane data. Further, an effective user plane confidentiality protection algorithm can be determined, thereby protecting the confidentiality of user plane data.
[0157] In the drawings of the embodiments of the present application, the steps shown in each embodiment and the order of the steps are used for example and do not constitute a limitation on the embodiments of the present application. It should be understood that the specific implementation of executing some of the steps in the drawings or adjusting the order of the steps falls within the scope of protection of the present application.
[0158] The technology described in the embodiments of the present application can be used in various communication systems, such as a fourth generation (4G) communication system, a 4.5G communication system, a 5G communication system, a system that integrates multiple communication systems, or a communication system that evolves in the future.
[0159] The device involved in the embodiments of the present application may be a terminal device (also referred to as a terminal), which may be a device with a wireless transceiver function, which may be deployed on land, including indoors or outdoors, handheld or vehicle-mounted; it may also be deployed on the water surface (such as a ship, etc.); it may also be deployed in the air (for example, on an airplane, a balloon, and an artificial satellite, etc.). The terminal device may be a UE, which includes a handheld device, a vehicle-mounted device, a wearable device, or a computing device with a wireless communication function. Exemplarily, the UE may be a mobile phone, a tablet computer, or a computer with a wireless transceiver function. The terminal device may also be a virtual reality (VR) terminal device, an augmented reality (AR) terminal device, a smart vehicle terminal device, a wireless terminal in industrial control, a wireless terminal in unmanned driving, a drone, a drone controller, a wireless terminal in telemedicine, a wireless terminal in a smart grid, a wireless terminal in a smart city, a wireless terminal in a smart home, and the like. In an embodiment of the present application, the device for realizing the function of the terminal device may be the terminal device; or it may be a device that can support the terminal device to realize the function, such as a chip system, which may be installed in the terminal device or used in combination with the terminal device, such as a processor.
[0160] The device involved in the embodiment of the present application may also be an access network device, which may include a base station (BS), which may be a device deployed in a wireless access network that can communicate wirelessly with a terminal device. Among them, the base station may have various forms, such as a macro base station, a micro base station, a relay station, and an access point. Exemplarily, the access network device involved in the embodiment of the present application may be a base station in 5G or a base station in long-term evolution (LTE), wherein the base station in 5G may also be referred to as a transmission reception point (TRP) or a next generation base station node (next generation Node B, gNB). In the embodiment of the present application, the device for implementing the function of the access network device may be an access network device; it may also be a device that can support the access network device to implement the function, such as a chip system, which may be installed in the access network device or used in combination with the access network device, such as a processor. In the embodiment of the present application, the chip system may be composed of a chip, or may include a chip and other discrete devices.
[0161] The device involved in the embodiment of the present application may also be a core network device, which may include an access and mobile management function (AMF) for mobility management and access management, a session management function (SMF) for session management, etc., and a user plane function (UPF) for forwarding and receiving user data in a terminal device.
[0162] In the technical solution provided in the embodiment of the present application, the technical solution provided in the embodiment of the present application is described by taking the device for realizing the function of the terminal device as an example. In the present application, the terminal device can be a terminal device in a D2D communication system, a terminal device in a V2X communication system, a vehicle-mounted terminal in a vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication system, a drone and a drone controller in an unmanned aerial system (UAS), etc., and can also be a terminal device in other short-distance direct communication systems.
[0163] See also Figure 3 , is a schematic diagram of a network architecture for applying an embodiment of the present application. Figure 3 The system includes a first device 301 and a second device 302 .
[0164] The device may be a terminal device, an access network device, or a core network device. The access network device may be, for example, a base station in various communication systems, and the core network device may be, for example, a user plane function (UPF), an access and mobility management function (AMF), or a multi-access edge computing (MEC) device. The first device 301 and the second device 302 may be devices of the same type, for example, both are UEs, or may be devices of different types, for example, the first device 301 is a terminal device, and the second device 302 is an access network device or an AMF network element.
[0165] Application In the present application, negotiation of the user plane security algorithm between the first device 301 and the second device 302 may include the following three methods, in which the first device 301 initiates a PC5 unicast connection to the second device 302 as an example.
[0166] Method 1: The first device 301 negotiates with the second device 302 on the control plane, and the second device 302 determines the control plane security protection mode, the control plane security algorithm, and the second algorithm indication information. The second algorithm indication information includes the control plane security algorithm, and the second algorithm indication information can be used to indicate both the control plane security protection mode and the control plane security algorithm. It should be noted that the algorithm indicated by the second algorithm indication information can also be used as a user plane security protection algorithm. The first device 301 negotiates with the second device 302 on the control plane, and after determining the control plane security protection mode and the control plane security algorithm, the second device 302 determines the user plane security protection mode and generates user plane security activation indication information.
[0167] The second device 302 determines that the security algorithm indicated in the second algorithm indication information does not support the user plane security protection mode, for example, during the control plane negotiation, the second device 302 determines that confidentiality protection is not enabled, and the second algorithm indication information includes a null value confidentiality protection algorithm, while during the user plane negotiation, the second device 302 determines that user plane confidentiality protection is enabled, and at this time, the null value confidentiality protection algorithm in the second algorithm indication information does not support the user plane confidentiality protection enabling; or the second device 302 determines that the user plane security protection mode is inconsistent with the control plane security protection mode, for example, the control plane integrity protection is enabled and the confidentiality protection is not enabled, and the user plane confidentiality protection is enabled; then the second device 302 selects the user plane security algorithm according to the user plane security protection mode and the security capabilities of the first device 301 and the second device 302, and indicates the user plane security algorithm through the first algorithm indication information. For example, the second device 302 determines that the control plane integrity protection is enabled, the control plane confidentiality protection is not enabled, and the user plane confidentiality protection is enabled, and the first algorithm indication information includes a non-null value confidentiality protection algorithm identifier for indicating the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm.
[0168] In method one, the second algorithm indication information can be used to indicate both the control plane security protection method and the control plane security algorithm; the user plane security activation indication information is used to indicate the user plane security protection method, and the first algorithm indication information is used to indicate the user plane security algorithm. Since the scheme additionally sends the first algorithm indication information used to indicate user plane security protection, it ensures that the devices at both ends can obtain the security protection algorithm that supports the activation of user plane security protection. In method one, optionally, the second device 302 selects the user plane security algorithm based on the user plane security protection method and the security capabilities of the first device 301 and the second device 302, regardless of whether the user plane and control plane security protection methods are inconsistent, or regardless of whether the control plane security algorithm supports the user plane security protection method, and indicates the user plane security algorithm through the first algorithm indication information, so as to simplify the processing logic of the device and improve the processing efficiency.
[0169] Mode 2: The first device 301 negotiates with the second device 302 on the control plane, and the second device 302 determines the control plane security protection mode, the control plane security algorithm, and the second algorithm indication information. The second algorithm indication information includes the control plane security algorithm, and the second algorithm indication information can be used to indicate both the control plane security protection mode and the control plane security algorithm. It should be noted that the algorithm indicated by the second algorithm indication information can also be used as a user plane security protection algorithm. The first device 301 negotiates with the second device 302 on the control plane, and after determining the control plane security protection mode and the control plane security algorithm, the second device 302 determines the user plane security protection mode.
[0170] The second device 302 determines that the security algorithm indicated in the second algorithm indication information does not support the user plane security protection mode, for example, the control plane confidentiality protection algorithm is null, the user plane confidentiality protection is enabled, and the null value confidentiality protection algorithm does not support the user plane confidentiality protection to be enabled; or the second device 302 determines that the user plane security protection mode is inconsistent with the control plane security protection mode, for example, the control plane integrity protection is enabled and the confidentiality protection is not enabled, and the user plane confidentiality protection is enabled; then the second device 302 selects the user plane security algorithm according to the user plane security protection mode and the security capabilities of the first device 301 and the second device 302, and indicates the user plane security algorithm through the first algorithm indication information. The first algorithm indication information can also indicate the user plane security protection mode. For example, the second device 302 determines that the control plane integrity protection is enabled, the confidentiality protection is not enabled, and the user plane confidentiality protection is enabled, and the first algorithm indication information includes a null value integrity protection algorithm identifier and a non-null value confidentiality protection algorithm identifier, which are used to indicate that the user plane integrity protection algorithm and the user plane integrity protection are not enabled, and indicate that the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm and the user plane confidentiality protection are enabled.
[0171] In the second method, the second algorithm indication information can be used to indicate both the control plane security protection method and the control plane security algorithm; the first algorithm indication information can be used to indicate both the user plane security protection method and the user plane security algorithm. This scheme ensures that the devices at both ends can obtain the security protection algorithm that supports the user plane security protection activation by additionally sending the first algorithm indication information for indicating the user plane security protection, and at the same time uses the first algorithm indication information to indicate the user plane security activation method, thereby reducing the message length.
[0172] In method two, optionally, the second device 302 selects a user plane security algorithm based on the user plane security protection method and the security capabilities of the first device 301 and the second device 302, regardless of whether the user plane and control plane security protection methods are inconsistent, or regardless of whether the control plane security algorithm supports the user plane security protection method, and indicates the user plane security algorithm and the user plane security activation method through the first algorithm indication information, so as to simplify the processing logic of the device and thereby improve processing efficiency.
[0173] Mode three, the first device 301 and the second device 302 negotiate on the control plane, and the second device 302 determines the control plane security protection mode, and based on the security protection being turned on, selects a security algorithm according to the security capabilities of the first device 301 and the second device 302, and the selected security algorithm is indicated by the third algorithm indication information. The third algorithm indication information indicates a non-null value integrity protection algorithm and a non-null value confidentiality protection algorithm. The control plane security protection mode is indicated by the control plane security turn-on indication information, and the first device 301 determines the control plane security protection algorithm according to the control plane security protection mode and the third algorithm indication information. The user plane security protection mode is indicated by the user plane security turn-on indication information, and the first device 301 determines the user plane security protection algorithm according to the user plane security protection mode and the third algorithm indication information. Specifically, if the security protection is turned on, the non-null security protection algorithm indicated in the third algorithm indication information is used for security protection, and if the security protection is not turned on, the null value security protection algorithm is used by default, or no algorithm is executed to save computing resources.
[0174] In method three, the control plane security enable indication information is used to indicate the control plane security protection method, the user plane security enable indication information is used to indicate the user plane security protection method, and the third algorithm indication information is used to indicate the integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value and the confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value, wherein the non-null integrity protection algorithm indicated in the third algorithm indication information is used when the integrity protection is enabled, and the non-null confidentiality protection algorithm in the third algorithm indication information is used when the confidentiality protection is enabled. If security protection is not enabled, the security protection algorithm with a null value is used by default, or no algorithm is executed to save computing resources. This scheme indicates the confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value and the integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value in the third algorithm indication information, ensuring that the devices at both ends can obtain the security protection algorithm that supports the enabling of user plane security protection. At the same time, only the security enable indication information is used in the user plane security negotiation to indicate the user plane security enablement method, thereby reducing the message length.
[0175] By adopting any of the above three methods, when integrity protection of the control plane is enabled and confidentiality protection is not enabled, and confidentiality protection of the user plane is enabled, an effective confidentiality protection algorithm can be determined, thereby protecting the confidentiality of user plane data.
[0176] The method for determining the user plane security algorithm provided in the embodiment of the present application is specifically described below, with UE1 being taken as an example for the first device and UE 2 being taken as an example for the second device. It should be noted that the message name between the network elements or the name of each parameter in the message in the following embodiment of the present application is only an example, and other names may also be used in the specific implementation, and the embodiment of the present application does not specifically limit this.
[0177] See also Figure 4 , is a flow chart of a method for determining a user plane security algorithm provided in Embodiment 1 of the present application, and the flow may include but is not limited to the following steps:
[0178] Step 401: UE 1 sends a direct communication request message to UE 2. Correspondingly, UE 2 receives the direct communication request message from UE 1.
[0179] Optionally, step 401 may also be a direct rekeying request message sent by UE 1 to UE 2, and accordingly, UE 2 receives the direct rekeying request from UE 1. In this case, the message does not include the control plane security policy of UE 1.
[0180] When UE 1 decides to establish PC5 unicast communication with UE 2, UE 1 sends a direct communication request message to UE 2.
[0181] Among them, the direct communication request message may include the control plane security policy of UE 1, which is used to negotiate with UE 2 to determine whether to enable control plane integrity protection and whether to enable control plane confidentiality protection. The security policy of UE 1 can be configured for it by the core network device and notified to UE 1. For example, the policy control function (PCF) network element in the 5G core network configures the security policy for UE 1 and notifies the UE; it can also be configured for it by the application function (AF) network element and notified to UE 1; it can also be configured for it by the AF network element and notified to UE 1 through the PCF network element; it can also be obtained by the core network device from the unified data management (UDM) network element and sent to the UE; it can also be pre-configured on the UE by the network operator. This application does not limit how UEs obtain their respective control plane security policies.
[0182] The direct communication request message may also include the security capabilities of UE 1, and the security capabilities of UE 1 may include a list of security algorithms supported by UE 1 in the PC5 unicast connection. The security algorithm list includes an integrity protection algorithm list and a confidentiality protection algorithm list. The integrity protection algorithm list includes one or more integrity protection algorithms with non-null values and / or null values, and the confidentiality protection algorithm list includes one or more confidentiality protection algorithms with non-null values and / or null values.
[0183] Optionally, the direct communication request message may also include a random number 1 generated by UE 1, and the random number 1 may be used to generate a session key K NRP-sess .
[0184] Step 402: UE 2 determines a control plane security protection method between UE 1 and UE 2, and selects a security algorithm.
[0185] UE 2 determines the control plane security protection mode between UE 1 and UE 2 according to the control plane security policy of UE 1 and the control plane security policy of UE 2, that is, determines the control plane security protection mode for the PC5 unicast connection. The process of UE 2 determining whether to enable control plane integrity protection and whether to enable control plane confidentiality protection can be referred to Figure 1 The specific description of the relevant steps in will not be repeated here. In this application, when the control plane integrity protection is not enabled, the control plane confidentiality protection is not enabled by default, and the user plane security protection is not enabled.
[0186] In order to solve the problem that when the control plane confidentiality protection is not enabled and the user plane confidentiality protection is enabled, an effective confidentiality protection algorithm cannot be used to protect the user plane confidentiality, in this application, the control plane security protection mode determined by UE 2 is to enable the control plane integrity protection and not enable the control plane confidentiality protection.
[0187] Further, UE 2 selects a security algorithm according to the determined control plane security protection mode, the security capability of UE 1 and the security capability of UE 2. The process of UE 2 selecting a security algorithm can be referred to Figure 1 For example, if the control plane security protection mode is to enable control plane integrity protection and disable control plane confidentiality protection, then UE 2 selects a non-null value integrity protection algorithm and a null value confidentiality protection algorithm according to the security capabilities of the UEs at both ends.
[0188] Optionally, UE 2 stores the security capabilities of UE 1. If UE 2 determines to enable control plane integrity protection but not control plane confidentiality protection, UE 2 stores the security capabilities of UE 1 so that when UE 2 determines to enable user plane confidentiality protection, it can select a confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value according to the stored security capabilities of UE 1. If UE 2 determines to enable control plane confidentiality protection, UE 2 can store the security capabilities of UE 1 or not. If UE 2 stores the security capabilities of UE 1, it can ensure that when both user plane and control plane security are enabled and different security protection algorithms can be used, UE 2 can also select the security protection algorithm to be used according to the security capabilities of UE 1 stored in advance, so as to prevent the security capabilities of UE 1 from being sent again in the signaling message. If UE 2 does not store the security capabilities of UE 1, the storage burden of UE 2 can be reduced.
[0189] Optionally, when UE 2 determines that the integrity of the control plane is turned on, UE 2 forces the control plane confidentiality protection to be turned on; or when UE 2 determines that the control plane confidentiality protection is turned on, UE 2 forces the control plane integrity protection to be turned on; and selects a security algorithm based on the security capabilities of UE 1 and UE 2, and selects an integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value and a confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value. For example, if UE 2 decides to turn on the integrity protection of the control plane, UE 2 forces the control plane confidentiality protection to be turned on and selects an integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value and a confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value. This solution enables both UE 1 and UE 2 to select a security protection algorithm with a non-null value during the control plane negotiation phase, ensuring that the devices at both ends can obtain a security protection algorithm that supports the turning on of user plane security protection.
[0190] Optionally, when UE 2 determines that control plane integrity protection is enabled and control plane confidentiality protection is not enabled and selects a confidentiality protection algorithm with a null value according to the security capabilities of UE 1 and UE 2, UE 2 additionally selects an additional confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value according to the security capabilities of UE 1 and UE 2. This ensures that the devices at both ends can obtain a security protection algorithm that supports enabling user plane security protection.
[0191] Optionally, in step 403, UE 1 and UE 2 obtain a shared key. The shared key is K NRP .
[0192] The shared key refers to a key known to and used by both UE 1 and UE 2. For example, the method of performing mutual authentication and then establishing a key can be the same as in the prior art when UE 2 determines that it is necessary to enable control plane integrity protection between UE 1 and UE 1, that is, referring to the above Figure 1 Step 103 of the embodiment. UE 2 may trigger step 403 .
[0193] If the direct communication request message includes K NRP ID, then UE 2 uses K NRP ID determines the shared key K between UE 1 and UE 1 NRP , so step 403 may not be executed.
[0194] Regardless of whether control plane integrity protection is enabled, UE 2 can perform step 403. For example, the operator can choose to perform step 403 every time. For another example, in the subsequent process of UE 1 and UE 2, when the message is not integrity protected, both need to obtain a shared key to protect the message without integrity protection.
[0195] In the present application, the specific implementation method of UE 1 and UE 2 obtaining the shared key is not limited. Exemplarily, UE 1 and UE 2 may obtain the shared key in the following four ways:
[0196] Method 1: UE 2 triggers the mutual authentication process with UE 1, and after mutual authentication, performs the key establishment process with UE 1. The mutual authentication process is used to verify the identities of both parties, that is, UE 2 verifies whether UE 1 is a legitimate user, and UE 1 verifies whether UE 2 is a legitimate user. When both parties are legitimate users, the key establishment process is performed so that both parties can obtain a shared key.
[0197] In the second method, a shared key between UE 1 and UE 2 is pre-configured, and both ends can obtain the shared key from the pre-configuration when needed.
[0198] In method three, UE 1 and UE 2 are pre-configured with public and private keys and certificates. When a shared key is needed, both ends can generate a shared key based on the public and private keys and certificates.
[0199] UE 1 is configured with the public key of UE 1, the private key of UE 1 and the certificate of UE 1, and the certificate of UE 1 includes the public key of UE 1; UE 2 is configured with the public key of UE 2, the private key of UE 2 and the certificate of UE 2, and the certificate of UE 2 includes the public key of UE 2. The process of generating a shared key using the public and private keys and the certificates may be: taking the process of establishing a shared key initiated by UE 2 as an example, UE 2 sends its own certificate to UE 1, and after UE 1 verifies the legitimacy of the certificate of UE 2 and encrypts the shared information 1 provided by UE 1 using the public key of UE 2, UE 1 sends the certificate of UE 1 and the encrypted shared information 1 to UE 2. After receiving the certificate, UE 2 verifies the legitimacy of the certificate of UE 1, and then uses the private key of UE 2 to decrypt the encrypted shared information 1 to obtain the shared information 1, and generates the shared key using the decrypted shared information 1 and the shared information 2 generated by itself. After that, UE 2 encrypts shared information 2 using the public key of UE 1, and then UE 2 sends the certificate of UE 2 and the encrypted shared information 2 to UE 1. Subsequently, UE 1 decrypts and obtains shared information 2 and generates a shared key together with shared information 1.
[0200] In method 4, UE 1 and UE 2 store some context information, and then UE 1 and UE 2 can directly obtain the shared key from the some context information.
[0201] When UE 1 accesses UE 2 for the first time, UE 1 and UE 2 perform a mutual authentication process and a key establishment process to obtain a shared key. UE 1 and UE 2 can use the shared key K NRP , random number 1 and random number 2 generate the session key K NRP-sess , and then use the session key K NRP-sess Continue to deduce and generate the encryption key NRPEK and / or integrity protection key NRPIK. UE 1 and UE 2 use the corresponding keys for security protection according to the determined security protection method. After UE 1 is disconnected from UE 2, NRPEK and NRPIK are deleted. For example, NRPEK and NRPIK are deleted when the context information is deleted. When UE 1 accesses UE 2 again, UE 1 and UE 2 need to obtain the shared key in the context information to generate NRPEK and / or NRPIK.
[0202] Step 404: UE 2 sends a direct connection security mode command message to UE 1. Correspondingly, UE 1 receives the direct connection security mode command message from UE 2.
[0203] The direct connection security mode command message includes second algorithm indication information, and the second algorithm indication information is used to indicate the control plane security algorithm, that is, to indicate the security algorithm selected in step 402.
[0204] In the case where the selected security algorithm includes an integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value and a confidentiality protection algorithm with a null value, the second algorithm indication information may include an algorithm identifier of the integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value and an algorithm identifier of the confidentiality protection algorithm with a null value. For example, the second algorithm indication information may be expressed as {algorithm identifier of the integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value, algorithm identifier of the confidentiality protection algorithm with a null value}. For another example, the second algorithm indication information may be expressed as {[integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value, algorithm identifier], [confidentiality protection algorithm with a null value, algorithm identifier]}. The specific form of the second algorithm indication information is not limited in this application.
[0205] Optionally, if UE 2 forcibly turns on control plane confidentiality protection when it determines that control plane integrity protection is turned on; or forcibly turns on control plane integrity protection when it determines that control plane confidentiality protection is turned on; and selects a non-null integrity protection algorithm and a non-null confidentiality protection algorithm according to the security capabilities of UE 1 and UE 2, then the second algorithm indication information includes the selected non-null integrity protection algorithm and the non-null confidentiality protection algorithm, so that a non-null security protection algorithm is obtained in the control plane security algorithm negotiation phase, and when security protection needs to be turned on in the user plane, the non-null security protection algorithm obtained in the control plane security algorithm negotiation phase can be directly used. For example, if UE 2 decides to turn on control plane integrity protection, then UE 2 forcibly turns on control plane confidentiality protection and selects a non-null integrity protection algorithm and a non-null confidentiality protection algorithm. At this time, the second algorithm indication information can be expressed as {algorithm identifier of the non-null integrity protection algorithm, algorithm identifier of the non-null confidentiality protection algorithm}.
[0206] Optionally, if UE 2 selects a confidentiality protection algorithm with a null value based on the security capabilities of UE 1 and UE 2 when determining that the control plane integrity protection is turned on and the control plane confidentiality protection is not turned on and selects a confidentiality protection algorithm with a null value based on the security capabilities of UE 1 and UE 2, then the second algorithm indication information includes the algorithm identifier of the confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value, so that the security protection algorithm with a non-null value is obtained in the control plane security algorithm negotiation stage, and the security protection algorithm with a non-null value obtained in the control plane security algorithm negotiation stage can be directly used when security protection needs to be turned on in the user plane. For example, if UE 2 decides to turn on the integrity protection of the control plane and not to turn on the confidentiality protection of the control plane, then UE 2 selects a non-null integrity protection algorithm and a null confidentiality protection algorithm, and selects a non-null confidentiality protection algorithm based on the security capabilities of UE 1 and UE 2. At this time, the second algorithm indication information can be expressed as {algorithm identifier of the integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value, algorithm identifier of the confidentiality protection algorithm with a null value, algorithm identifier of the additional non-null confidentiality protection algorithm}.
[0207] Optionally, the direct connection security mode command message may further include a random number 2 generated by UE 2, where the random number 2 may be used to generate an integrity protection key and / or a confidentiality protection key.
[0208] Further, UE 2 determines a protection key, which is used to protect part or all of the information carried by the direct connection security mode message. The protection key may be a shared key K between UE 2 and UE 1. NRP , or it can be based on the shared key K NRP The generated session key K NRP-sess The protection key can also be based on the session key K NRP-sess Generate integrity protection key (NRPIK) and / or confidentiality protection key (NRPEK).
[0209] When the control plane integrity protection is enabled and the control plane confidentiality protection is disabled, UE 2 generates an integrity protection key but does not generate a confidentiality protection key. The integrity protection key is used to perform integrity protection on part or all of the information carried by the direct connection security mode message, for example, the integrity protection key is used to perform integrity protection on the second algorithm indication information.
[0210] Step 405: UE 1 determines a control plane security protection mode between UE 2 and UE 2 according to the second algorithm indication information.
[0211] Optionally, if the second algorithm indication information acquired by UE 1 includes an additional confidentiality protection algorithm identifier with a non-null value, UE 1 stores the confidentiality protection algorithm indicated by the confidentiality protection algorithm identifier with a non-null value.
[0212] Based on the premise that the control plane integrity protection is enabled, when UE 1 receives the direct connection security mode command message, it performs integrity protection verification on the direct connection security mode command message according to the shared key obtained in step 103 .
[0213] UE 1 and UE 2 can negotiate or pre-configure which protection key to use. If the protection key is a shared key K NRP , then UE 1 uses the shared key to perform integrity protection verification on the direct connection security mode command message; if the protection key is the session key K NRP-sess , then UE 1 uses the shared key K NRP Generate session key K NRP-sess , and uses the session key K NRP-sess Perform integrity protection verification on the direct connection security mode command message; if the protection key is the integrity protection key (NRPIK), UE 1 verifies the integrity of the direct connection security mode command message based on random number 1, random number 2 and shared key K NRP Derived session key K NRP-sess , and continue to use the integrity protection key (NRPIK) derived from the session key, and use the integrity protection key (NRPIK) to perform integrity protection verification on the direct connection security mode command message.
[0214] In the case where the direct connection security mode command message passes the integrity protection verification, UE 1 determines the control plane security protection mode between UE 2 and UE 2 according to the second algorithm indication information, and performs subsequent procedures to establish a PC5 unicast connection with UE 2. Optionally, in the case where the direct connection security mode command message fails to pass the integrity protection verification, UE 1 sends a connection establishment rejection message to UE 2. Accordingly, UE 2 receives the connection establishment rejection message from UE 1. The connection establishment rejection message is used to indicate that UE 2 refuses to establish a PC5 unicast connection with UE 1.
[0215] UE 1 determines to enable control plane integrity protection and disable control plane confidentiality protection according to the second algorithm indication information, and then UE 1 does not generate a confidentiality protection key (NRPEK).
[0216] Step 406: UE 1 sends a direct connection security mode completion message to UE 2. Correspondingly, UE 2 receives the direct connection security mode completion message from UE 1.
[0217] The direct connection security command completion message includes the user plane security policy of UE 1, so that UE 2 determines the user plane security protection mode between UE 1 and UE 2 in combination with the user plane security policy of UE 1 and UE 2.
[0218] Optionally, the direct connection security command completion message also includes the security capabilities of UE 1, so that UE 2 selects a user plane security algorithm based on the security capabilities of UE 1 and UE2, as well as the user plane security protection mode. If, in step 402, UE 2 performs the step of storing the security capabilities of UE 1, then UE 1 may not carry the security capabilities of UE 1 in the direct connection security command completion message. If, in step 402, UE 2 does not perform the step of storing the security capabilities of UE 1, then UE 1 may carry the security capabilities of UE 1 in the direct connection security command completion message.
[0219] UE1 carries the security capability of UE1 in the direct connection security command completion message. The security capability of UE1 may be carried when UE1 determines that control plane confidentiality protection is not enabled but control plane integrity protection is enabled, or may be carried without any prerequisite restrictions.
[0220] Step 407: UE 2 determines that the user plane security protection mode between UE 2 and UE 1 includes user plane confidentiality protection activation, and generates user plane security activation indication information.
[0221] In one implementation, when UE 2 receives the direct connection security mode completion message, it determines that the user plane security protection mode between UE 1 and UE 2 includes opening the user plane confidentiality protection according to the user plane security policy of UE 1 and UE 2. The user plane security protection mode between UE 2 and UE 1 is the user plane security protection mode for this PC5 unicast connection. UE 2 determines the user plane security protection mode according to the user plane security policy of the UEs at both ends, which can be referred to Figure 1 The corresponding description of determining the control plane security protection method according to the control plane security policy of the UE at both ends is not repeated here.
[0222] In another implementation, when UE 2 receives the direct connection security mode completion message, if the control plane confidentiality protection is not enabled at this time, regardless of the user plane security policies of the UEs at both ends, the user plane security protection mode between UE 2 and UE 1 is determined by default to include user plane confidentiality protection not being enabled, that is, user plane confidentiality protection is not enabled by default. This prevents the situation where a non-null value confidentiality protection algorithm is not negotiated when confidentiality protection is required on the user plane due to a non-null value confidentiality protection algorithm not being obtained during the control plane security algorithm negotiation phase.
[0223] In another implementation, when UE 2 receives the direct connection security mode completion message, regardless of the user plane confidentiality and / or integrity protection policies of the UEs at both ends, the user plane confidentiality and / or integrity protection mode between UE 1 and UE 2 is determined by default to be consistent with the control plane confidentiality and / or integrity protection mode, that is, the user plane confidentiality protection and / or user plane integrity protection mode is determined by default to be consistent with the control plane, so as to prevent the situation that the non-null value security protection algorithm is not obtained in the control plane security algorithm negotiation stage, resulting in the situation that the non-null value security protection algorithm that has been negotiated when the user plane needs to be turned on for security protection is not obtained, and the logic of the user plane policy negotiation of the UE is simplified to improve the processing efficiency. It can be that regardless of the user plane confidentiality protection policy of the UEs at both ends, the user plane confidentiality protection mode between UE 1 and UE 1 is determined by default to be consistent with the control plane confidentiality protection mode, or it can be that regardless of the user plane integrity protection policy of the UEs at both ends, the user plane integrity protection mode between UE 1 and UE 1 is determined by default to be consistent with the control plane integrity protection mode, or it can be that regardless of the user plane confidentiality and integrity protection policy of the UEs at both ends, the user plane confidentiality and integrity protection mode between UE 1 and UE 1 is determined by default to be consistent with the control plane confidentiality and integrity protection mode. For example, if the control plane integrity protection is enabled and the control plane confidentiality protection is not enabled, then the user plane integrity protection is also enabled and the user plane confidentiality protection is not enabled. For another example, if the control plane integrity protection is enabled and the control plane confidentiality protection is not enabled, UE 2 only decides not to enable the user plane confidentiality protection either, and the user plane integrity protection is determined according to the user plane integrity protection policy at both ends.
[0224] When UE 2 determines the user plane security protection mode, user plane security start indication information is generated to indicate whether to start user plane integrity protection and whether to start user plane confidentiality protection. For example, if the user plane security protection mode is user plane integrity protection start and user plane confidentiality protection start, then the generated user plane security start indication information is used to indicate whether to start user plane integrity protection and to start user plane confidentiality protection. For another example, if the user plane security protection mode is user plane integrity protection not start and user plane confidentiality protection start, then the generated user plane security start indication information is used to indicate not to start user plane integrity protection and to start user plane confidentiality protection.
[0225] Step 408: When the user plane security protection mode is inconsistent with the control plane security protection mode, UE 2 selects a user plane security algorithm according to the user plane security protection mode, the security capability of UE 1 and the security capability of UE 2.
[0226] The security capability of UE 1 at this time may be the security capability of UE 1 stored by UE 2 in step 402 , or may be sent by UE 1 to UE 2 in step 406 .
[0227] The user plane security protection mode is inconsistent with the control plane security protection mode, which may include any of the following situations:
[0228] (1) The control plane integrity protection is enabled in the same way as the user plane integrity protection, but the control plane confidentiality protection is enabled in a different way than the user plane confidentiality protection. For example, the control plane integrity protection is enabled and the control plane confidentiality protection is not enabled, while the user plane integrity protection is enabled and the user plane confidentiality protection is enabled.
[0229] (2) The control plane integrity protection is not enabled in the same way as the user plane integrity protection, but the control plane confidentiality protection is enabled in the same way as the user plane confidentiality protection. For example, the control plane integrity protection is enabled and the control plane confidentiality protection is enabled, the user plane integrity protection is not enabled and the user plane confidentiality protection is enabled.
[0230] (3) The control plane integrity protection is not enabled in the same way as the user plane integrity protection, and the control plane confidentiality protection is not enabled in the same way as the user plane confidentiality protection. For example, the control plane integrity protection is enabled and the control plane confidentiality protection is enabled, while the user plane integrity protection is not enabled and the user plane confidentiality protection is not enabled.
[0231] In the present application, the user plane security protection mode and the control plane security protection mode are inconsistent, which may include: the user plane security protection mode includes user plane confidentiality protection is enabled, while the control plane security protection mode is control plane integrity protection is enabled and control plane confidentiality protection is not enabled. For example, see Table 2 below.
[0232]
[0233] Table 2
[0234] In Table 2, the inconsistency represented by number 1 refers to the inconsistency between the user plane confidentiality protection being enabled and the control plane confidentiality protection being disabled; the inconsistency represented by number 2 refers to the inconsistency between the user plane confidentiality protection being enabled and the control plane confidentiality protection being disabled, and the inconsistency between the user plane integrity protection being disabled and the control plane integrity protection being enabled.
[0235] For number 1, UE 2 selects a non-null value integrity protection algorithm as the user plane integrity protection algorithm and a non-null value confidentiality protection algorithm as the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm according to the user plane security protection mode, the security capability of UE 1 and the security capability of UE 2. It should be noted that the non-null value integrity protection algorithm selected in step 408 and the non-null value integrity protection algorithm selected in step 402 may be the same or different. In the case of the same, the integrity protection algorithm used by the control plane may be directly used and the selection step may be omitted to save the time of UE 2 selecting the integrity protection algorithm and simplify the processing logic of UE 2 to improve the terminal performance; if they are different, security may be improved.
[0236] For number 2, UE 2 selects a confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value as the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm according to the user plane security protection mode, the security capability of UE 1 and the security capability of UE 2.
[0237] Further, UE 2 generates a confidentiality protection key (NRPEK) when selecting a confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value. If a non-null integrity protection algorithm is also selected, an integrity protection key (NRPIK) may also be generated, or the integrity protection key generated during control plane negotiation may be obtained.
[0238] Optionally, when the control plane integrity protection is turned on, the inconsistency between the user plane security protection mode and the control plane security protection mode may also include several situations as shown in Table 3.
[0239]
[0240] Table 3
[0241] For numbers 3 and 6, UE 2 selects a null value confidentiality protection algorithm and a null value integrity protection algorithm as the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm and the user plane integrity protection algorithm. Or UE 2 does not select a security algorithm to simplify the processing logic of UE 2 and thus improve terminal performance.
[0242] For number 4, UE 2 selects a non-null value confidentiality protection algorithm as the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm. The user plane confidentiality protection algorithm and the control plane confidentiality protection algorithm may be the same or different. In the case of the same, the confidentiality protection algorithm used by the control plane may be directly used and the selection step may be omitted to save the time of UE 2 selecting the confidentiality protection algorithm and simplify the processing logic of UE 2 to improve the terminal performance.
[0243] For number 5, UE 2 selects the integrity protection algorithm of a non-null value as the user plane integrity protection algorithm. The user plane integrity protection algorithm and the control plane integrity protection algorithm may be the same or different. In the case of the same, the integrity protection algorithm used by the control plane may be directly used and the selection step may be omitted to save the time of UE 2 selecting the integrity protection algorithm and simplify the processing logic of UE 2 to improve the terminal performance.
[0244] In one implementation, regardless of the user plane security protection mode, UE 2 selects a non-null value confidentiality protection algorithm by default, so that when UE 1 determines that the user plane confidentiality protection is turned on, it can perform confidentiality protection according to the confidentiality protection algorithm. Optionally, UE 2 selects a non-null value integrity protection algorithm by default, so that when UE 1 determines that the user plane integrity protection is turned on, it can perform integrity protection according to the integrity protection algorithm. In this implementation, if security protection is not turned on, a null value security protection algorithm is selected by default, or no security algorithm is selected, so as to simplify the processing logic of UE 2 and thus improve terminal performance.
[0245] In another implementation, if UE 2 determines by default not to enable user plane confidentiality protection based on that control plane confidentiality protection is not enabled, UE 2 selects a null value confidentiality protection algorithm as the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm, or does not select a security algorithm to simplify the processing logic of UE 2 and thus improve terminal performance.
[0246] In another implementation, if UE 2 determines by default that the user plane confidentiality and / or integrity protection mode between UE 1 and UE 2 is consistent with the control plane confidentiality and / or integrity protection mode, if UE 2 determines that the user plane confidentiality protection mode is confidentiality protection enabled according to control plane confidentiality protection enabled, the selected user plane confidentiality protection algorithm can be consistent with the control plane, or can be a different non-null value confidentiality protection algorithm; if UE 2 determines that the user plane integrity protection mode is integrity protection enabled according to control plane integrity protection enabled, the selected user plane integrity protection algorithm can be consistent with the control plane, or can be a different non-null value integrity protection algorithm. If the user plane security protection mode determined by UE 2 is not enabled, a security protection algorithm with a null value is selected, or no security protection algorithm is selected to simplify the processing logic of UE 2 and thus improve terminal performance.
[0247] Optionally, when the user plane security protection mode is consistent with the control plane security protection mode, UE 2 selects a user plane security algorithm based on the user plane security protection mode, the security capability of UE 1 and the security capability of UE 2, where the selected user plane security algorithm may be consistent with the control plane security algorithm or may be inconsistent with the control plane security algorithm.
[0248] Step 409: UE 2 sends a direct communication acceptance message to UE 1. Correspondingly, UE 1 receives the direct communication acceptance message from UE 2.
[0249] Optionally, step 409 may also be a direct rekeying response message sent by UE 2 to UE 1 , and correspondingly, UE 1 receives a direct rekeying request from UE 2 .
[0250] Optionally, step 409 may also be an RRC connection reconfiguration message sent by UE 2 to UE 1, and correspondingly, UE 1 receives the RRC connection reconfiguration message from UE 2.
[0251] The direct communication acceptance message includes user plane security enable indication information and first algorithm indication information for indicating the user plane security algorithm. The user plane security enable indication information is used to indicate whether to enable user plane integrity protection and whether to enable user plane confidentiality protection. The first algorithm indication information indicates the security algorithm selected in step 408. Optionally, the first algorithm identifier may be carried only when the user plane security protection mode is inconsistent with the control plane security protection mode, or there may be no such restriction.
[0252] For number 1, UE 1 determines to enable user plane confidentiality protection and user plane integrity protection according to the user plane security enable indication information. The first algorithm indication information includes an algorithm identifier of a confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value, which is used to indicate the selected confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value. If the control plane integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value is the same as the user plane integrity protection algorithm, then the first algorithm indication information may include or exclude the integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value. In the case where the integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value is not included, when UE 1 determines to enable user plane integrity protection according to the user plane security enable indication information, the control plane integrity protection algorithm is used as the user plane integrity protection algorithm by default; in the case where the integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value is included, when UE 1 determines to enable user plane integrity protection according to the user plane security enable indication information, the user plane integrity protection algorithm is determined according to the algorithm identifier of the user plane integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value in the first algorithm indication information. If the control plane integrity protection algorithm is different from the user plane integrity protection algorithm, then the first algorithm indication information includes the integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value, and the integrity protection algorithm is different from the control plane integrity protection algorithm.
[0253] For number 2, UE 1 determines not to enable user plane integrity protection but to enable user plane confidentiality protection according to the user plane security enable indication information. The first algorithm indication information includes an algorithm identifier of a confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value and an algorithm identifier of an integrity protection algorithm with a null value, or the first algorithm indication information does not include an algorithm identifier of an integrity protection algorithm. The algorithm identifier of a confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value is used to indicate a selected confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value; the algorithm identifier of an integrity protection algorithm with a null value is used to indicate a selected integrity protection algorithm with a null value. Optionally, the first algorithm indication information includes an algorithm identifier of a confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value but does not include an algorithm identifier of an integrity protection algorithm. When UE 1 determines not to enable user plane integrity protection according to the user plane security enable indication information, user plane integrity protection is not performed by default, or a null integrity protection algorithm is used by default.
[0254] For number 3, UE 1 determines not to enable user plane integrity protection and user plane confidentiality protection according to the user plane security enable indication information. The first algorithm indication information is used to indicate a null value confidentiality protection algorithm and a null value integrity protection algorithm, or the first algorithm indication information does not include an algorithm identifier of the integrity protection algorithm, or the first algorithm indication information does not include an algorithm identifier of the confidentiality protection algorithm, or neither is carried. Optionally, the first algorithm indication information may not be carried.
[0255] For number 4, UE 1 determines not to enable user plane integrity protection but to enable user plane confidentiality protection according to the user plane security enable indication information. The first algorithm indication information includes an algorithm identifier of a confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value and an algorithm identifier of an integrity protection algorithm with a null value, or the first algorithm indication information does not include an algorithm identifier of an integrity protection algorithm, or the first algorithm indication information does not include an algorithm identifier of a confidentiality protection algorithm, or neither is carried. The confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value may be the same as or different from the control plane confidentiality protection algorithm. If they are the same, the first algorithm indication information may not carry the algorithm identifier of the confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value. When UE 1 determines to enable user plane confidentiality protection according to the user plane security enable indication information, the control plane confidentiality protection algorithm is used by default. If they are different, the first algorithm indication information includes an algorithm identifier of a confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value, and the confidentiality protection algorithm is different from the control plane confidentiality protection algorithm to improve security. Optionally, the first algorithm indication information may not be carried.
[0256] For number 5, UE 1 determines to enable user plane integrity protection but not to enable user plane confidentiality protection according to the user plane security enable indication information. The first algorithm indication information includes an algorithm identifier of the integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value and an algorithm identifier of the confidentiality protection algorithm with a null value, or the first algorithm indication information does not include the algorithm identifier of the confidentiality protection algorithm, or the first algorithm indication information does not include the algorithm identifier of the integrity protection algorithm, or neither is carried. The integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value and the control plane integrity protection algorithm may be the same or different. If they are the same, the first algorithm indication information may not carry the algorithm identifier of the integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value. When UE 1 determines to enable user plane integrity protection according to the user plane security enable indication information, the control plane integrity protection algorithm is used by default to reduce the message length. If they are different, the first algorithm indication information includes the algorithm identifier of the integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value, and the integrity protection algorithm is different from the control plane integrity protection algorithm to improve security. Optionally, the first algorithm indication information may not be carried.
[0257] For number 6, UE 1 determines not to enable user plane integrity protection and user plane confidentiality protection according to the user plane security enable indication information. The first algorithm indication information is used to indicate a confidentiality protection algorithm with a null value and an integrity protection algorithm with a null value, or does not carry an algorithm identifier of a confidentiality protection algorithm, or does not carry an algorithm identifier of an integrity protection algorithm, or does not carry either. Optionally, the first algorithm indication information may not be carried.
[0258] In one implementation, regardless of the user plane security protection mode, the first algorithm indication information is used by default to indicate a confidentiality protection algorithm of a non-null value, so that when UE 1 determines that user plane confidentiality protection is enabled, it can perform confidentiality protection according to the confidentiality protection algorithm. Optionally, the first algorithm indication information is also used by default to indicate an integrity protection algorithm of a non-null value, so that when UE 1 determines that user plane integrity protection is enabled, it can perform integrity protection according to the integrity protection algorithm.
[0259] In another implementation, if UE 2 selects a confidentiality protection algorithm with a null value by default according to control plane confidentiality protection not being enabled, the first algorithm indication information includes the confidentiality protection algorithm with a null value. Optionally, the first algorithm indication information is not carried.
[0260] In another implementation, if UE 2 determines by default that the user plane security protection mode is consistent with the control plane, and the selected user plane confidentiality and integrity protection algorithm is the same as the control plane, then the first algorithm indication information is consistent with the second algorithm indication information. Optionally, the first algorithm indication information may not be carried. UE 2 determines by default that the user plane security protection mode is consistent with the control plane, and the selected user plane non-null value protection algorithm is different from the control plane, then the first algorithm indication information includes the algorithm identifier of the non-null value confidentiality and / or integrity protection algorithm different from the control plane. If UE 2 determines by default that only the user plane confidentiality protection mode is consistent with the control plane confidentiality protection mode, and the selected user plane confidentiality protection algorithm is the same as the control plane, then the first algorithm indication information includes the algorithm identifier of the confidentiality protection algorithm that is the same as the control plane. Optionally, the first algorithm indication information may also not include the algorithm identifier of the confidentiality protection algorithm that is the same as the control plane. If UE 2 determines by default that only the user plane integrity protection mode is consistent with the control plane integrity protection mode, and the selected user plane integrity protection algorithm is the same as the control plane, then the first algorithm indication information includes the algorithm identifier of the integrity protection algorithm that is the same as the control plane. Optionally, the first algorithm indication information may not include an algorithm identifier of the same integrity protection algorithm as that of the control plane.
[0261] Optionally, when the user plane security protection mode of UE 2 is consistent with the control plane security protection mode, the user plane security algorithm selected in step 409, the user plane security algorithm selected by UE 2 may be consistent with the control plane security algorithm, or may be inconsistent with the control plane security algorithm. If the selected algorithms are consistent, the first algorithm indication information may be carried, including the algorithm identifier of the selected user plane confidentiality protection algorithm and the algorithm identifier of the integrity protection algorithm, or the first algorithm indication information may not be carried. If the selected user plane security algorithm is inconsistent with the control plane security algorithm, the first algorithm indication information including the algorithm identifier of the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm and the algorithm identifier of the user plane integrity protection algorithm shall be carried.
[0262] Optionally, if UE 2 determines that control plane integrity protection is turned on and control plane confidentiality protection is not turned on and selects a confidentiality protection algorithm with a null value based on the security capabilities of UE 1 and the security capabilities of UE 2, and additionally selects an additional confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value based on the security capabilities of UE 1 and the security capabilities of UE 2, then the first algorithm identifier may not be carried at this time.
[0263] Step 410: UE 1 determines a user plane security protection mode between itself and UE 2 according to the user plane security activation indication information, and determines a user plane protection algorithm according to the first algorithm indication information.
[0264] When UE 1 receives the direct communication acceptance message, it determines the user plane security protection mode between itself and UE 2 according to the user plane security activation indication information; if the direct communication acceptance message carries the first algorithm indication information, it determines the user plane protection algorithm according to the first algorithm indication information. If the direct communication acceptance message does not carry the first algorithm indication information, it uses the same security algorithm as the security algorithm used by the control plane.
[0265] For example, the user plane security protection mode is user plane integrity protection on and user plane confidentiality protection on, and the first algorithm indication information is used to indicate a non-null value integrity protection algorithm and a non-null value confidentiality protection algorithm, then UE1 uses a non-null value integrity protection algorithm and integrity protection key to perform integrity protection on the first user plane data, and uses a non-null value confidentiality protection algorithm and confidentiality protection key to perform confidentiality protection on the first user plane data, thereby achieving security protection of user plane data. The first user plane data here refers to the user plane data sent by UE 1 to UE 2. For the second user plane data sent by UE 2 to UE 1, UE 1 can use a non-null value integrity protection algorithm and integrity protection key to perform integrity protection verification on the second user plane data, and use a non-null value confidentiality protection algorithm and confidentiality protection key to decrypt the second user plane data.
[0266] For another example, the user plane security protection mode is that the user plane integrity protection is not enabled and the user plane confidentiality protection is enabled, and the first algorithm indication information is used to indicate the integrity protection algorithm of the null value and the confidentiality protection algorithm of the non-null value. Then UE 1 does not perform integrity protection on the first user plane data, and uses the confidentiality protection algorithm and confidentiality protection key of the non-null value to protect the confidentiality of the first user plane data, thereby achieving confidentiality protection of the user plane data.
[0267] Optionally, if the second algorithm indication information received by UE 1 includes an additional non-null value confidentiality protection algorithm, and UE 1 determines that user plane confidentiality protection is turned on based on the security activation indication information, it is determined to use the additional non-null value confidentiality protection algorithm included in the second algorithm indication information as the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm.
[0268] Wherein, UE 1 may generate a confidentiality protection key when it is determined that the user plane confidentiality protection is enabled; if it is determined that the user plane confidentiality protection is not enabled, the confidentiality protection key is not generated, and optionally, the corresponding null value confidentiality protection algorithm is not executed to save computing resources. UE 1 generates an integrity protection key when it is determined that the user plane integrity protection is enabled; if it is determined that the user plane integrity protection is not enabled, the integrity protection key is not generated, and optionally, the corresponding null value integrity protection algorithm is not executed to save computing resources.
[0269] exist Figure 4 In the illustrated embodiment, the second algorithm indication information is used to indicate both the control plane security algorithm and the control plane security protection mode; the first algorithm indication information is used to indicate the user plane security algorithm, and the user plane security enable indication information is used to indicate the user plane security protection mode. The first algorithm indication information indicates which confidentiality protection algorithm is used by the user plane to effectively protect the confidentiality of the user plane data.
[0270] See also Figure 5 , which is a flow chart of the method for determining the user plane security algorithm provided in the second embodiment of the present application. Figure 5 The process shown in Figure 4 For the same or similar parts, see Figure 4 In the corresponding description of the embodiment shown, the process may include but is not limited to the following steps:
[0271] Step 501: UE 1 sends a direct communication request message to UE 2. Correspondingly, UE 2 receives the direct communication request message from UE 1.
[0272] Optionally, step 501 may also be a direct rekeying request message sent by UE 1 to UE 2, and accordingly, UE 2 receives the direct rekeying request from UE 1. In this case, the message does not include the control plane security policy of UE 1.
[0273] Step 502: UE 2 determines a control plane security protection method between UE 1 and UE 2, and selects a security algorithm.
[0274] Optionally, in step 503, UE 1 and UE 2 obtain a shared key. The shared key is K NRP .
[0275] Step 504: UE 2 sends a direct connection security mode command message to UE 1. Correspondingly, UE 1 receives the direct connection security mode command message from UE 2.
[0276] Step 505: UE 1 determines a control plane security protection mode between UE 2 and UE 2 according to the second algorithm indication information.
[0277] Step 506: UE 1 sends a direct connection security mode completion message to UE 2. Correspondingly, UE 2 receives the direct connection security mode completion message from UE 1.
[0278] For the specific implementation process of steps 501 to 506, please refer to Figure 4 The specific description of steps 401 to 406 in the illustrated embodiment will not be repeated here.
[0279] Step 507: UE 2 determines that the user plane security protection mode between UE 2 and UE 1 includes enabling user plane confidentiality protection, and selects a user plane security algorithm.
[0280] In one implementation, when UE 2 receives the direct connection security mode completion message, it determines, according to the user plane security policies of UE 1 and UE 2, that the user plane security protection mode between UE 1 and UE 2 includes enabling user plane confidentiality protection.
[0281] In another implementation, when UE 2 receives the direct connection security mode completion message, if the control plane confidentiality protection is not enabled at this time, regardless of the user plane security policies of the UEs at both ends, the user plane security protection method between UE 1 and UE 1 is determined by default to include user plane confidentiality protection not being enabled, that is, user plane confidentiality protection is not enabled by default.
[0282] In another implementation, when UE 2 receives the direct connection security mode completion message, regardless of the user plane security policies of the UEs at both ends, it defaults to determining that the user plane security protection method between UE 1 and the control plane security protection method is consistent, that is, the default user plane confidentiality protection and user plane integrity protection method are consistent with the control plane.
[0283] When UE 2 determines the user plane security protection mode, it selects a user plane security algorithm according to the user plane security protection mode.
[0284] When the user plane integrity protection is not enabled, the user plane integrity protection algorithm is a null value integrity protection algorithm. When the user plane confidentiality protection is not enabled, the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm is a null value confidentiality protection algorithm.
[0285] When the control plane integrity protection is turned on and the user plane integrity protection is also turned on, the user plane integrity protection algorithm and the control plane integrity protection algorithm may be the same non-null value integrity protection algorithm or different non-null value integrity protection algorithms. If the control plane and the user plane are required to use the same non-null value integrity protection algorithm, the UE 2 may or may not perform the algorithm selection step, and the algorithm selection step is not performed to save the processing resources of the UE 2. If the control plane and the user plane are not required to use the same non-null value integrity protection algorithm, the UE 2 selects a non-null value integrity protection algorithm, which may be different from or the same as the non-null value integrity protection algorithm of the control plane. If the protection algorithms are the same, the processing logic of the UE can be simplified, and if the protection algorithms are different, the security can be improved.
[0286] When the control plane confidentiality protection is turned on and the user plane confidentiality protection is also turned on, the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm and the control plane confidentiality protection algorithm may be the same non-null value confidentiality protection algorithm or different non-null value confidentiality protection algorithms. If the control plane and the user plane are required to use the same non-null value confidentiality protection algorithm, UE 2 may or may not perform the algorithm selection step. If the control plane and the user plane are not required to use the same non-null value confidentiality protection algorithm, UE 2 selects a non-null value confidentiality protection algorithm, which may be different from or the same as the non-null value confidentiality protection algorithm of the control plane.
[0287] Example 1: The user plane security protection mode is user plane integrity protection enabled and user plane confidentiality protection enabled. Then UE 2 selects a non-null integrity protection algorithm from the supported integrity protection algorithm list as the user plane integrity protection algorithm based on the security capabilities of the UEs at both ends; and selects a non-null confidentiality protection algorithm from the supported confidentiality protection algorithm list as the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm.
[0288] When control plane integrity protection is enabled and control plane confidentiality protection is disabled, the user plane integrity protection algorithm may be the same as or different from the control plane integrity protection algorithm. When control plane integrity protection is enabled and control plane confidentiality protection is enabled, the user plane integrity protection algorithm may be the same as or different from the control plane integrity protection algorithm, and the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm may be the same as or different from the control plane confidentiality protection algorithm.
[0289] Example 2: The user plane security protection mode is user plane integrity protection disabled and user plane confidentiality protection enabled. Then UE 2 selects a non-null value confidentiality protection algorithm from the list of supported confidentiality protection algorithms as the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm based on the security capabilities of the UEs at both ends, and does not select an integrity protection algorithm or the default integrity protection algorithm is null.
[0290] When control plane integrity protection and control plane confidentiality protection are enabled, the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm and the control plane confidentiality protection algorithm may be the same or different.
[0291] Step 508: UE 2 sends a direct communication acceptance message to UE 1. Correspondingly, UE 1 receives the direct communication acceptance message from UE 2.
[0292] Optionally, step 508 may also be a direct rekeying response message sent by UE 2 to UE 1 , and correspondingly, UE 1 receives a direct rekeying request from UE 2 .
[0293] Optionally, step 508 may also be an RRC connection reconfiguration message sent by UE 2 to UE 1, and correspondingly, UE 1 receives the RRC connection reconfiguration message from UE 2.
[0294] The direct communication acceptance message includes first algorithm indication information, which is used to indicate the user plane security algorithm selected in step 507. The first algorithm indication message is also used to indicate the user plane security protection mode.
[0295] In one implementation, if the user plane confidentiality protection mode is different from the control plane confidentiality protection mode, the first algorithm indication information includes the algorithm identifier of the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm, otherwise the first algorithm indication information does not include the algorithm identifier of the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm. If the user plane integrity protection mode is different from the control plane integrity protection mode, the first algorithm indication information includes the algorithm identifier of the user plane integrity protection algorithm, otherwise the first algorithm indication information does not include the algorithm identifier of the user plane integrity protection algorithm. Optionally, if the user plane security protection mode is consistent with the control plane security protection mode, the first algorithm indication information is not carried, and the first algorithm indication information of a null value may also be carried.
[0296] In this implementation, if the first algorithm indication information carries only the algorithm identifier of the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm, the user plane integrity protection mode of UE 1 is consistent with the control plane integrity protection mode, and the user plane integrity protection algorithm of UE 1 is consistent with the control plane integrity protection algorithm. If the first algorithm indication information carries only the algorithm identifier of the user plane integrity protection algorithm, the user plane confidentiality protection mode of UE 1 is consistent with the control plane confidentiality protection mode, and the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm of UE 1 is consistent with the control plane confidentiality protection algorithm. If the first algorithm indication information carries the algorithm identifier of the user plane integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value, UE 1 enables user plane integrity protection and uses the integrity protection algorithm identified by the algorithm identifier to perform integrity protection on the user plane. If the first algorithm indication information carries the algorithm identifier of the user plane integrity protection algorithm with a null value, UE 1 does not enable user plane integrity protection. Optionally, UE 1 does not execute the null value user plane integrity protection algorithm to save computing resources. If the first algorithm indication information carries an algorithm identifier of a user plane confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value, UE 1 enables user plane confidentiality protection and uses the confidentiality protection algorithm identified by the algorithm identifier to perform confidentiality protection on the user plane. If the first algorithm indication information carries an algorithm identifier of a user plane confidentiality protection algorithm with a null value, UE 1 does not enable user plane confidentiality protection. Optionally, UE 1 does not execute the null user plane confidentiality protection algorithm to save computing resources.
[0297] In another implementation manner, the first algorithm indication information includes, by default, an algorithm identifier of a user plane confidentiality protection algorithm and an algorithm identifier of a user plane integrity protection algorithm.
[0298] In this implementation, if the first algorithm indication information carries an algorithm identifier of a user plane integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value, UE 1 enables user plane integrity protection and uses the integrity protection algorithm identified by the algorithm identifier to perform integrity protection on the user plane. If the first algorithm indication information carries an algorithm identifier of a user plane integrity protection algorithm with a null value, UE 1 does not enable user plane integrity protection. Optionally, UE 1 does not execute the null user plane integrity protection algorithm to save computing resources. If the first algorithm indication information carries an algorithm identifier of a user plane confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value, UE 1 enables user plane confidentiality protection and uses the confidentiality protection algorithm identified by the algorithm identifier to perform confidentiality protection on the user plane. If the first algorithm indication information carries an algorithm identifier of a user plane confidentiality protection algorithm with a null value, UE 1 does not enable user plane confidentiality protection. Optionally, UE 1 does not execute the null user plane confidentiality protection algorithm to save computing resources.
[0299] In another implementation, the first algorithm indication information includes a non-null algorithm identifier of the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm only when user plane confidentiality protection is enabled. The first algorithm indication information includes a non-null algorithm identifier of the user plane integrity protection algorithm only when user plane integrity protection is enabled.
[0300] In this implementation, if the first algorithm indication information carries only the algorithm identifier of the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm, the user plane integrity protection is disabled by default of UE 1, the user plane confidentiality protection is enabled by default of UE 1, and the confidentiality protection algorithm identified by the algorithm identifier is used to perform confidentiality protection on the user plane. If the first algorithm indication information carries only the algorithm identifier of the user plane integrity protection algorithm, the user plane confidentiality protection is disabled by default of UE 1, the user plane integrity protection is enabled by default of UE 1, and the integrity protection algorithm identified by the algorithm identifier is used to perform integrity protection on the user plane.
[0301] For the above example 1, when user plane integrity protection and user plane confidentiality protection are enabled, the first algorithm indication information may include an algorithm identifier of the integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value and an algorithm identifier of the confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value.
[0302] For the above example 1, when both user plane integrity protection and user plane confidentiality protection are enabled, and control plane integrity protection is enabled and control plane confidentiality protection is not enabled, optionally, the first algorithm indication information includes an algorithm identifier of a confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value, and does not include an algorithm identifier of an integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value. When UE 1 receives the first algorithm indication information, the default user plane integrity protection enabling mode is consistent with the control plane integrity protection enabling mode, that is, user plane integrity protection is enabled and the control plane integrity protection algorithm is used as the user plane integrity protection algorithm. If the selected user plane integrity protection algorithm is different from the control plane integrity protection algorithm, then the first algorithm indication information includes an algorithm identifier of an integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value and an algorithm identifier of a confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value, and the integrity protection algorithm is different from the control plane integrity protection algorithm.
[0303] When the control plane integrity protection is turned on and the control plane confidentiality protection is turned on, if the user plane integrity protection algorithm is different from the control plane integrity protection algorithm, then the first algorithm indication information is used to indicate a non-null user plane integrity protection algorithm; if the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm is different from the control plane confidentiality protection algorithm, then the first algorithm indication information is used to indicate a non-null user plane confidentiality protection algorithm; if the user plane integrity protection algorithm is different from the control plane integrity protection algorithm and the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm is different from the control plane confidentiality protection algorithm, then the first algorithm indication information is used to indicate a non-null user plane integrity protection algorithm and a non-null user plane confidentiality protection algorithm.
[0304] For the above example 2, when user plane integrity protection is not enabled and user plane confidentiality protection is enabled, the first algorithm indication information includes an algorithm identifier of an integrity protection algorithm with a null value and an algorithm identifier of a confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value.
[0305] Optionally, the first algorithm indication information includes an algorithm identifier of a confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value. When UE 1 receives the first algorithm indication information, user plane integrity protection is disabled by default, and integrity protection is not performed on user plane data.
[0306] When control plane integrity protection is enabled and control plane confidentiality protection is enabled, if the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm is different from the control plane confidentiality protection algorithm, the first algorithm indication information is used to indicate a non-null value of the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm.
[0307] Step 509: UE 1 determines a user plane security algorithm according to the first algorithm indication information, and determines a user plane security protection mode between UE 2 and UE 2.
[0308] In an implementation manner, the first algorithm indication information determined by UE 1 includes an algorithm identifier of a security algorithm whose user plane security protection mode is different from that of the control plane confidentiality protection mode.
[0309] In this implementation, if the first algorithm indication information carries only the algorithm identifier of the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm, the user plane integrity protection mode of UE 1 is consistent with the control plane integrity protection mode, and the user plane integrity protection algorithm of UE 1 is consistent with the control plane integrity protection algorithm. If the first algorithm indication information carries only the algorithm identifier of the user plane integrity protection algorithm, the user plane confidentiality protection mode of UE 1 is consistent with the control plane confidentiality protection mode, and the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm of UE 1 is consistent with the control plane confidentiality protection algorithm. If the first algorithm indication information carries the algorithm identifier of the user plane integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value, UE 1 enables user plane integrity protection and uses the integrity protection algorithm of the non-null value user plane integrity protection algorithm identifier to perform integrity protection on the user plane. If the first algorithm indication information carries the algorithm identifier of the user plane integrity protection algorithm with a null value, UE 1 does not enable user plane integrity protection, and optionally, UE 1 does not execute the null value user plane integrity protection algorithm to save computing resources. If the first algorithm indication information carries an algorithm identifier of a user plane confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value, UE 1 enables user plane confidentiality protection and uses the confidentiality protection algorithm identified by the algorithm identifier to perform confidentiality protection on the user plane. If the first algorithm indication information carries an algorithm identifier of a user plane confidentiality protection algorithm with a null value, UE 1 does not enable user plane confidentiality protection. Optionally, UE 1 does not execute the null user plane confidentiality protection algorithm to save computing resources.
[0310] In another implementation manner, the first algorithm indication information includes, by default, an algorithm identifier of a user plane confidentiality protection algorithm and an algorithm identifier of a user plane integrity protection algorithm.
[0311] In this implementation, if the first algorithm indication information carries an algorithm identifier of a user plane integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value, UE 1 enables user plane integrity protection and uses the integrity protection algorithm identified by the algorithm identifier to perform integrity protection on the user plane. If the first algorithm indication information carries an algorithm identifier of a user plane integrity protection algorithm with a null value, UE 1 does not enable user plane integrity protection. Optionally, UE 1 does not execute the null user plane integrity protection algorithm to save computing resources. If the first algorithm indication information carries an algorithm identifier of a user plane confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value, UE 1 enables user plane confidentiality protection and uses the confidentiality protection algorithm identified by the algorithm identifier to perform confidentiality protection on the user plane. If the first algorithm indication information carries an algorithm identifier of a user plane confidentiality protection algorithm with a null value, UE 1 does not enable user plane confidentiality protection. Optionally, UE 1 does not execute the null user plane confidentiality protection algorithm to save computing resources.
[0312] In another implementation, the first algorithm indication information includes a non-null algorithm identifier of the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm only when user plane confidentiality protection is enabled. The first algorithm indication information includes a non-null algorithm identifier of the user plane integrity protection algorithm only when user plane integrity protection is enabled.
[0313] In this implementation, if the first algorithm indication information carries only the algorithm identifier of the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm, the user plane integrity protection is disabled by default of UE 1, the user plane confidentiality protection is enabled by default of UE 1, and the confidentiality protection algorithm identified by the algorithm identifier is used to perform confidentiality protection on the user plane. If the first algorithm indication information carries only the algorithm identifier of the user plane integrity protection algorithm, the user plane confidentiality protection is disabled by default of UE 1, the user plane integrity protection is enabled by default of UE 1, and the integrity protection algorithm identified by the algorithm identifier is used to perform integrity protection on the user plane.
[0314] In this implementation, if the first algorithm indication information carries only the algorithm identifier of the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm, the user plane integrity protection is disabled by default of UE 1, the user plane confidentiality protection is enabled by default of UE 1, and the confidentiality protection algorithm identified by the algorithm identifier is used to perform confidentiality protection on the user plane. If the first algorithm indication information carries only the algorithm identifier of the user plane integrity protection algorithm, the user plane confidentiality protection is disabled by default of UE 1, the user plane integrity protection is enabled by default of UE 1, and the integrity protection algorithm identified by the algorithm identifier is used to perform integrity protection on the user plane.
[0315] Further, UE 1 may generate a confidentiality protection key when it is determined that the user plane confidentiality protection is enabled; if it is determined that the user plane confidentiality protection is not enabled, the confidentiality protection key is not generated, and optionally, the corresponding null value confidentiality protection algorithm is not executed to save computing resources. UE 1 generates an integrity protection key when it is determined that the user plane integrity protection is enabled; if it is determined that the user plane integrity protection is not enabled, the integrity protection key is not generated, and optionally, the corresponding null value integrity protection algorithm is not executed to save computing resources.
[0316] UE 1, when determining the user plane security algorithm and the user plane security protection mode, performs security protection on the first user plane data and de-security protection on the second user plane data according to the confidentiality protection key and / or the integrity protection key. The first user plane data refers to the user plane data sent by UE 1 to UE 2, and the second user plane data refers to the user plane data sent by UE2 to UE 1.
[0317] exist Figure 5 In the illustrated embodiment, the second algorithm indication information is used to indicate both the control plane security algorithm and the control plane security protection mode; the first algorithm indication information is used to indicate both the user plane security algorithm and the user plane security protection mode. By indicating which confidentiality protection algorithm is used by the user plane and indicating the user plane security protection mode through the first algorithm indication information, the confidentiality of the user plane data can be effectively protected while saving signaling overhead.
[0318] See also Figure 6 , is a flow chart of a method for determining a user plane security algorithm provided in Embodiment 3 of the present application, Figure 6 The process shown in Figure 4 or Figure 5 For the same or similar parts, see Figure 4 and Figure 5 In the corresponding description of the embodiment shown, the process may include but is not limited to the following steps:
[0319] Step 601: UE 1 sends a direct communication request message to UE 2. Correspondingly, UE 2 receives the direct communication request message from UE 1.
[0320] Optionally, step 601 may also be a direct rekeying request message sent by UE 1 to UE 2, and accordingly, UE 2 receives the direct rekeying request from UE 1. In this case, the message does not include the control plane security policy of UE 1.
[0321] The specific implementation process of step 601 can be found in Figure 4The specific description of step 401 in the illustrated embodiment will not be repeated here.
[0322] Step 602: UE 2 determines the control plane security protection mode between UE 1 and UE 2, and generates control plane security activation indication information.
[0323] The difference between step 602 and step 402 is that, when determining the control plane security protection mode, step 602 generates control plane security activation indication information matching the control plane security protection mode, to indicate whether UE 1 activates control plane integrity protection and whether to activate control plane confidentiality protection.
[0324] For example, if the control plane security protection mode is control plane integrity protection enabled and control plane confidentiality protection disabled, then the control plane security enable indication information is used to instruct UE 1 to enable control plane integrity protection and disable control plane confidentiality protection.
[0325] Step 603: UE 2 selects a security algorithm, and both the integrity protection algorithm and the confidentiality protection algorithm are non-null values.
[0326] UE 2 selects an integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value from the supported integrity protection algorithm list and selects a confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value from the supported confidentiality protection algorithm list according to the security capabilities of UE 1 and UE 2.
[0327] It should be noted that the selection of the integrity protection algorithm in step 603 is based on the activation of integrity protection, and the selection of the confidentiality protection algorithm is based on the activation of confidentiality protection, which has nothing to do with the control plane security protection method determined in step 602.
[0328] The present application does not limit the order of execution of step 602 and step 603 , which may be executed simultaneously, or step 602 may be executed first and then step 603 , or step 603 may be executed first and then step 602 .
[0329] Optionally, in step 604, UE 1 and UE 2 obtain a shared key. The shared key is K NRP .
[0330] The specific implementation process of step 604 can be found in Figure 4 The specific description of step 403 in the illustrated embodiment will not be repeated here.
[0331] Step 605 : UE 2 sends a direct connection security mode command message to UE 1 . Correspondingly, UE 1 receives the direct connection security mode command message from UE 2 .
[0332] Among them, the direct connection security mode command message includes control plane security activation indication information and third algorithm indication information, and the third algorithm indication information is used to indicate the security algorithm selected in step 603, including the algorithm identifier of the integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value and the algorithm identifier of the confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value.
[0333] Among them, if the control plane security start indication information indicates that the control plane integrity and / or confidentiality protection is not turned on, the integrity algorithm with a null value and / or the confidentiality protection algorithm with a null value are selected by default, and optionally, the integrity protection algorithm and / or the confidentiality protection algorithm may not be selected and executed. The algorithm identifier of the integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value included in the third algorithm indication information is used to indicate the integrity protection algorithm used when the control plane and / or user plane integrity protection is turned on. The algorithm identifier of the confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value is used to indicate the integrity protection algorithm used when the control plane and / or user plane integrity protection is turned on.
[0334] Optionally, the direct connection security mode command message further includes a random number 2 generated by UE 2, where the random number 2 may be used to generate an integrity protection key and / or a confidentiality protection key.
[0335] Optionally, UE 2 stores third algorithm indication information.
[0336] Step 606: UE 1 determines the control plane security protection mode between UE 2 and UE 2 according to the control plane security activation indication information.
[0337] Based on the premise that the control plane integrity protection is enabled, when UE 1 receives the direct connection security mode command message, it performs integrity protection verification on the direct connection security mode command message according to the shared key obtained in step 604 .
[0338] In the case where the direct connection security mode command message passes the integrity protection verification, UE 1 determines the control plane security protection mode between UE 2 and UE 2 according to the control plane security start indication information, and performs control plane security protection according to the third algorithm indication information. Specifically, if the control plane security start indication information received by UE 1 indicates that the control plane integrity and / or confidentiality protection is not turned on, the integrity algorithm with a null value and / or the confidentiality protection algorithm with a null value are selected by default as the control plane integrity and / or control plane confidentiality protection algorithm. Optionally, the integrity protection algorithm and / or the confidentiality protection algorithm may not be selected and executed. If the control plane security start indication information indicates that the control plane integrity protection is turned on, the integrity protection algorithm indicated by the algorithm identifier of the non-null value integrity protection algorithm included in the third algorithm indication information is used as the control plane integrity protection algorithm to perform integrity protection on the control plane; if the control plane security start indication information indicates that the control plane confidentiality protection is turned on, the confidentiality protection algorithm indicated by the algorithm identifier of the non-null value confidentiality protection algorithm included in the third algorithm indication information is used as the control plane confidentiality protection algorithm to perform confidentiality protection on the control plane.
[0339] For example, the control plane security enable indication information is used to indicate enabling control plane integrity protection and disabling control plane confidentiality protection, then the control plane security protection mode is control plane integrity protection enabled and control plane confidentiality protection disabled. UE 1 uses a non-null value integrity protection algorithm to perform integrity protection on the signaling according to the third algorithm indication information, uses a null value confidentiality protection algorithm by default, or does not execute any algorithm, and does not perform confidentiality protection on the signaling to save computing resources.
[0340] For another example, the control plane security enable indication information is used to indicate enabling control plane integrity protection and enabling control plane confidentiality protection, then the control plane security protection mode is control plane integrity protection enable and control plane confidentiality protection enable. UE 1 uses a non-null value integrity protection algorithm to perform integrity protection on the signaling and uses a non-null value confidentiality protection algorithm to perform confidentiality protection on the signaling according to the third algorithm indication information.
[0341] Optionally, UE 1 stores third algorithm indication information.
[0342] Step 607 : UE 1 sends a direct connection security mode acceptance message to UE 2 . Correspondingly, UE 2 receives the direct connection security mode acceptance message from UE 1 .
[0343] The direct connection security mode acceptance message may include the user plane security policy of UE 1, but may not include the security capability of UE 1.
[0344] Step 608: UE 2 determines that the user plane security protection mode between UE 2 and UE 1 includes user plane confidentiality protection activation, and generates user plane security activation indication information.
[0345] The specific implementation process of step 608 can be found in Figure 4 The specific description of step 407 in the illustrated embodiment will not be repeated here.
[0346] Step 609: UE 2 sends a direct communication acceptance message to UE 1. Correspondingly, UE 1 receives the direct communication acceptance message from UE 2.
[0347] Optionally, step 609 may also be a direct rekeying response message sent by UE 2 to UE 1 , and correspondingly, UE 1 receives a direct rekeying request from UE 2 .
[0348] Optionally, step 609 may also be an RRC connection reconfiguration message sent by UE 2 to UE 1, and correspondingly, UE 1 receives the RRC connection reconfiguration message from UE 2.
[0349] The direct communication acceptance message includes user plane security activation indication information, which is used to indicate whether UE 1 activates user plane integrity protection and whether to activate user plane confidentiality protection.
[0350] Step 610: UE 1 determines a user plane security protection mode between itself and UE 2 according to the user plane security activation indication information, and determines a user plane protection algorithm according to the third algorithm indication information.
[0351] When receiving the direct communication acceptance message, UE 1 determines the user plane security protection mode between itself and UE 2 according to the user plane security activation indication information; and determines the user plane protection algorithm according to the third algorithm indication information.
[0352] Specifically, if the user plane security start indication information received by UE 1 indicates that the user plane integrity and / or confidentiality protection is not turned on, the integrity protection algorithm with a null value and / or the confidentiality protection algorithm with a null value are selected by default as the user plane integrity and / or user plane confidentiality protection algorithm. Optionally, the integrity protection algorithm and / or the confidentiality protection algorithm may not be selected and executed. If the user plane security start indication information indicates that the user plane integrity protection is turned on, the integrity protection algorithm indicated by the algorithm identifier of the non-null value integrity protection algorithm included in the third algorithm indication information is used as the user plane integrity protection algorithm to perform integrity protection on the user plane; if the user plane security start indication information indicates that the user plane protection is turned on, the confidentiality protection algorithm indicated by the algorithm identifier of the non-null value confidentiality protection algorithm included in the third algorithm indication information is used as the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm to perform confidentiality protection on the user plane.
[0353] For example, the user plane security protection mode is user plane integrity protection turned on and user plane confidentiality protection turned on. UE 1 performs integrity protection and confidentiality protection on the first user plane data according to the integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value and the confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value indicated by the third algorithm indication information, thereby achieving security protection of the user plane data.
[0354] For another example, the user plane security protection mode is that the user plane integrity protection is not enabled and the user plane confidentiality protection is enabled, and UE1 performs confidentiality protection on the first user plane data according to the confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value indicated by the third algorithm indication information, thereby achieving security protection of the user plane data. At this time, integrity protection may not be performed on the first user plane data, or integrity protection may be performed by using a null value integrity protection algorithm by default.
[0355] exist Figure 6 In the illustrated embodiment, the control plane security enable indication information is used to indicate the control plane security protection mode, and the user plane security enable indication information is used to indicate the user plane security protection mode. When integrity protection and / or confidentiality protection is enabled, a security algorithm with a corresponding non-null value is selected according to the third algorithm indication information to perform corresponding security protection, thereby achieving control plane security protection and user plane security protection.
[0356] Figure 4-Figure 6 The embodiment shown is introduced by taking the PC5 communication establishment process as an example, and the present application can also be applied to the PC5 communication direct key update process. In the PC5 communication direct key update process, the direct communication request message can be replaced by a direct key update request message, and the direct communication acceptance message can be replaced by a direct key update reply message.
[0357] This application can also be applied to Uu communication. When applied to Uu communication, Figure 4-Figure 6UE 2 in the message may be replaced by an access network device or a base station, the direct communication request message may be replaced by a connection establishment request message, the direct security mode command message may be replaced by an access layer security mode command message, the direct security mode completion message may be replaced by an access layer security mode completion message, and the direct communication acceptance message may be replaced by an RRC connection reconfiguration message.
[0358] The present application can also be applied to the process of non-access stratum (NAS) security protection, such as the security protection between UE and AMF network element. When applied to the process of NAS security protection, Figure 4-Figure 6 UE2 in the message can be replaced by a core network device, the direct communication request message can be replaced by a connection establishment request message, the direct security mode command message can be replaced by a non-access layer security mode command message, the direct security mode completion message can be replaced by a non-access layer security mode completion message, and the direct communication acceptance message can be replaced by an RRC connection reconfiguration message.
[0359] Corresponding to the method provided in the above method embodiment, the present application embodiment also provides a corresponding device, including a module for executing the corresponding module of the above embodiment. The module can be software, hardware, or a combination of software and hardware.
[0360] See also Figure 7 , which is a structural diagram of a communication device provided in this application.
[0361] See also Figure 7 , which is a structural diagram of a communication device provided in this application. Figure 7 The communication device 700 shown includes a transceiver module 701 and a processing module 702 .
[0362] In one design, apparatus 700 is a second device:
[0363] Exemplarily, the processing module 702 is configured to select a user plane confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value according to the security capability of the first device and the security capability of the second device when the user plane confidentiality protection between the second device and the first device is enabled and the control plane confidentiality protection between the second device and the first device is not enabled;
[0364] The transceiver module 701 is used to send a first message to a first device, where the first message includes first algorithm indication information used to indicate a user plane confidentiality protection algorithm.
[0365] This example is used to implement Figure 4-Figure 6 Functionality of UE 2 in the illustrated embodiment.
[0366] In one design, apparatus 700 is a first device:
[0367] Exemplarily, the transceiver module 701 is configured to send a third message to the second device, where the third message includes a control plane security policy of the first device and a security capability of the first device; receive a fourth message from the second device, where the fourth message includes indication information of a control plane confidentiality protection algorithm for indicating a null value; send a second message to the second device, where the second message includes a user plane security policy of the first device; receive a first message from the second device, where the first message includes first algorithm indication information of a user plane confidentiality protection algorithm for indicating a non-null value;
[0368] The processing module 702 is configured to perform confidentiality protection on user plane data between the second device and the second device according to the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm indicated by the first algorithm indication information.
[0369] This example is used to implement Figure 4-Figure 6 Functionality of UE 1 in the illustrated embodiment.
[0370] See also Figure 8 , is a structural diagram of another communication device provided in this application. Figure 8 The communication device 800 shown includes at least one processor 801 , a memory 802 , and optionally, a communication interface 803 .
[0371] The memory 802 may be a volatile memory, such as a random access memory; the memory may also be a non-volatile memory, such as a read-only memory, a flash memory, a hard disk drive (HDD) or a solid-state drive (SSD), or the memory 802 may be any other medium that can be used to carry or store the desired program code in the form of instructions or data structures and can be accessed by a computer, but is not limited thereto. The memory 802 may be a combination of the above memories.
[0372] The specific connection medium between the processor 801 and the memory 802 is not limited in the embodiment of the present application. In the figure, the memory 802 and the processor 801 are connected via a bus 804, which is represented by a thick line in the figure. The connection between other components is only for schematic illustration and is not limited. The bus 804 can be divided into an address bus, a data bus, a control bus, etc. For ease of representation, Figure 8 Only one thick line is used in the diagram, but this does not mean that there is only one bus or only one type of bus.
[0373] The processor 801 may have a data transceiver function and may communicate with other devices. Figure 8An independent data transceiver module, such as a communication interface 803, may also be provided in the device for transmitting and receiving data; when the processor 801 communicates with other devices, data may be transmitted through the communication interface 803.
[0374] In one example, when the second device uses Figure 8 When the form shown is Figure 8 The processor in the UE 1 can call the computer-executable instructions stored in the memory 802 to enable the UE 1 to execute the method executed by the UE 2 in any of the above method embodiments.
[0375] In one example, when the first device uses Figure 8 When the form shown is Figure 8 The processor in the UE 1 can call the computer execution instructions stored in the memory 802 to enable the UE 1 to execute the method executed by the UE 1 in any of the above method embodiments.
[0376] Specifically, Figure 7 The functions / implementation processes of the processing module and the transceiver module can be achieved through Figure 8 The processor 801 in the embodiment calls the computer execution instruction stored in the memory 802 to implement. Or, Figure 7 The function / implementation process of the processing module can be achieved through Figure 8 The processor 801 in the embodiment calls the computer execution instruction stored in the memory 802 to implement, Figure 7 The function / implementation process of the transceiver module can be achieved through Figure 8 It is implemented by the communication interface 803 in.
[0377] The present application also provides a communication system, which may include Figure 4-Figure 6 UE 1 and UE 2 in.
[0378] It is understandable that some optional features in the embodiments of the present application may be implemented independently in certain scenarios without relying on other features, such as the solution on which they are currently based, to solve corresponding technical problems and achieve corresponding effects, or may be combined with other features according to needs in certain scenarios. Accordingly, the devices provided in the embodiments of the present application may also realize these features or functions accordingly, which will not be elaborated here.
[0379] Those skilled in the art can also understand that the various illustrative logical blocks and steps listed in the embodiments of the present application can be implemented by electronic hardware, computer software, or a combination of the two. Whether such functions are implemented by hardware or software depends on the specific application and the design requirements of the entire system. Those skilled in the art can use various methods to implement the functions for corresponding applications, but such implementation should not be understood as exceeding the scope of protection of the embodiments of the present application.
[0380] The scheme described in this application can be implemented in various ways. For example, these technologies can be implemented in hardware, software or a combination of hardware. For hardware implementation, the processing unit used to perform these technologies at a communication device (e.g., a base station, a terminal, a network entity, a core network element or a chip) can be implemented in one or more general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSP), digital signal processing devices, application specific integrated circuits (ASIC), programmable logic devices, field programmable gate arrays (FPGA), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gates or transistor logic, discrete hardware components, or any combination thereof. The general-purpose processor can be a microprocessor, and optionally, the general-purpose processor can also be any conventional processor, controller, microcontroller or state machine. The processor can also be implemented by a combination of computing devices, such as a digital signal processor and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, one or more microprocessors in conjunction with a digital signal processor core, or any other similar configuration.
[0381] It can be understood that the memory in the embodiments of the present application can be a volatile memory or a non-volatile memory, or can include both volatile and non-volatile memories. Among them, the non-volatile memory can be a read-only memory (ROM), a programmable read-only memory (PROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), or a flash memory. The volatile memory can be a random access memory (RAM), which is used as an external cache. By way of example and not limitation, many forms of RAM are available, such as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), double data rate SDRAM (DDR SDRAM), enhanced SDRAM (ESDRAM), synchronous link DRAM (SLDRAM), and direct RAM (DR RAM). It should be noted that the memory of the systems and methods described herein is intended to include, but is not limited to, these and any other suitable types of memory.
[0382] The present application also provides a computer-readable medium on which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed by a computer, the functions of any of the above method embodiments are implemented.
[0383] The present application also provides a computer program product, which implements the functions of any of the above method embodiments when executed by a computer.
[0384] In the above embodiments, it can be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, firmware or any combination thereof. When implemented using software, it can be implemented in whole or in part in the form of a computer program product. The computer program product includes one or more computer instructions. When the computer instructions are loaded and executed on a computer, the process or function described in the embodiment of the present application is generated in whole or in part. The computer may be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device. The computer instructions may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium, for example, the computer instructions may be transmitted from a website site, computer, server or data center by wired (e.g., coaxial cable, optical fiber, digital subscriber line (digital subscriber line, DSL)) or wireless (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.) mode to another website site, computer, server or data center. The computer-readable storage medium may be any available medium that a computer can access or a data storage device such as a server or data center that includes one or more available media integrated. The available medium may be a magnetic medium (eg, a floppy disk, a hard disk, a magnetic tape), an optical medium (eg, a high-density digital video disc (DVD)), or a semiconductor medium (eg, a solid state disk (SSD)).
[0385] It is understood that the "embodiment" mentioned throughout the specification means that the specific features, structures or characteristics related to the embodiment are included in at least one embodiment of the present application. Therefore, the various embodiments in the entire specification do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment. In addition, these specific features, structures or characteristics can be combined in one or more embodiments in any suitable manner. It is understood that in various embodiments of the present application, the size of the sequence number of the above-mentioned processes does not mean the order of execution, and the execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiment of the present application.
[0386] It can be understood that in the present application, "when", "if" and "if" all mean that the device will take corresponding actions under certain objective circumstances, and do not limit the time, nor do they require that the device must have a judgment action when it is implemented, nor do they mean that there are other limitations.
[0387] In this application, elements expressed in the singular are intended to mean "one or more" rather than "one and only one", unless otherwise specified. In this application, "at least one" is intended to mean "one or more", and "more than one" is intended to mean "two or more", unless otherwise specified.
[0388] In addition, the terms "system" and "network" are often used interchangeably in this article. The term "and / or" in this article is only a description of the association relationship of associated objects, indicating that there can be three relationships. For example, A and / or B can mean: A exists alone, A and B exist at the same time, and B exists alone. A can be singular or plural, and B can be singular or plural.
[0389] The predefined in the present application may be understood as defined, predefined, stored, pre-stored, pre-negotiated, pre-configured, solidified, or pre-burned.
[0390] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that, for the sake of convenience and brevity of description, the specific working processes of the systems, devices and units described above may refer to the corresponding processes in the aforementioned method embodiments and will not be repeated here.
[0391] The same or similar parts between the various embodiments in this application can refer to each other. In the various embodiments in this application, and the various implementation methods / implementation methods / implementation methods in each embodiment, if there is no special explanation and logical conflict, the terms and / or descriptions between different embodiments and the various implementation methods / implementation methods / implementation methods in each embodiment are consistent and can be referenced to each other. The technical features in different embodiments and the various implementation methods / implementation methods / implementation methods in each embodiment can be combined to form new embodiments, implementation methods, implementation methods, or implementation methods according to their inherent logical relationships. The above-described implementation methods of this application do not constitute a limitation on the scope of protection of this application.
[0392] The above description is only a specific implementation manner of the present application, but the protection scope of the present application is not limited thereto. Any technician familiar with the technical field can easily think of changes or substitutions within the technical scope disclosed in the present application, which should be included in the protection scope of the present application.
Claims
1. A method for determining a user plane security algorithm, the method being performed by a second device or an apparatus in the second device, characterized in that: include: Receiving a direct communication request message from a first device, wherein the direct communication request message includes a security capability of the first device and a control plane security policy of the first device; Determining a control plane security protection method between the first device and the second device according to a control plane security policy of the first device and a control plane security policy of the second device; When the control plane security protection mode is that the control plane integrity protection is turned on and the control plane confidentiality protection is not turned on, a direct connection security mode command message is sent to the first device, and when the second device receives a direct connection security mode completion message from the first device carrying the user plane security policy of the first device, regardless of the user plane security policy of the first device and the user plane security policy of the second device, it is determined that the user plane confidentiality protection between the first device and the first device is not turned on; wherein the direct connection security mode command message includes an integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value and a confidentiality protection algorithm with a null value.
2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The method further comprises: An integrity protection algorithm for the non-null value and a confidentiality protection algorithm for the null value are selected according to the security capability of the second device and the security capability of the first device.
3. A method for determining a user plane security algorithm, the method being performed by a second device or an apparatus in the second device, characterized in that: include: receiving a direct communication request message from a first device, wherein the direct communication request message includes a control plane security policy of the first device and a security capability of the first device; Determining, according to a control plane security policy of the first device and a control plane security policy of the second device, that control plane confidentiality protection between the first device and the second device is not enabled; Sending a direct communication command message to the first device, where the direct communication command message includes indication information of a control plane confidentiality protection algorithm for indicating a null value; receiving a direct communication completion message from the first device, where the direct communication completion message includes a user plane security policy of the first device; Determining, according to a user plane security policy of the first device and a user plane security policy of the first device, that user plane confidentiality protection between the first device and the first device is enabled; Selecting a user plane confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value according to the security capability of the first device and the security capability of the second device; A direct communication acceptance message is sent to the first device, where the direct communication acceptance message includes first algorithm indication information for indicating the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm.
4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The direct communication acceptance message also includes indication information for indicating to enable user plane confidentiality protection between the second device and the first device.
5. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that: The method further comprises: The security capability of the first device is saved.
6. A method for determining a user plane security algorithm, the method being performed by a first device or an apparatus in the first device, characterized in that: include: Sending a direct communication request message to the second device, where the direct communication request message includes a control plane security policy of the first device and a security capability of the first device; receiving a direct communication command message from the second device, the direct communication command message including indication information of a control plane confidentiality protection algorithm for indicating a null value; Sending a direct communication completion message to the second device, where the direct communication completion message includes a user plane security policy of the first device; receiving a direct connection communication acceptance message from the second device, wherein the direct connection communication acceptance message includes first algorithm indication information for indicating a user plane confidentiality protection algorithm of a non-null value; According to the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm indicated by the first algorithm indication information, confidentiality protection is performed on the user plane data between the second device.
7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that The direct communication acceptance message also includes indication information for indicating to enable user plane confidentiality protection between the second device and the first device.
8. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that The direct communication command message also includes indication information for indicating a control plane integrity protection algorithm; Before performing confidentiality protection on user plane data between the user plane and the second device according to the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm indicated by the first algorithm indication information, the method further includes: Enable control plane integrity protection between the second device and the control plane integrity protection algorithm indicated by the indication information of the control plane integrity protection algorithm; Performing integrity verification on the direct communication acceptance message; In a case where the direct communication acceptance message is verified to be successful, user plane confidentiality protection between the second device and the user plane is enabled according to the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm indicated by the first algorithm indication information.
9. A communication device, characterized in that: The communication device is a second device or a device in the second device, and the communication device includes a processing module and a transceiver module; The transceiver module is configured to receive a direct communication request message from a first device, wherein the direct communication request message includes a security capability of the first device and a control plane security policy of the first device; The processing module is used to determine a control plane security protection mode between the first device and the second device according to a control plane security policy of the first device and a control plane security policy of the second device; The transceiver module is also used to send a direct connection security mode command message to the first device when the control plane security protection mode is that the control plane integrity protection is turned on and the control plane confidentiality protection is not turned on, and when the transceiver module receives a direct connection security mode completion message from the first device carrying the user plane security policy of the first device, the processing module is also used to determine that the user plane confidentiality protection between the first device and the first device is not turned on regardless of the user plane security policy of the first device and the user plane security policy of the second device; wherein the direct connection security mode command message includes an integrity protection algorithm with a non-null value and a confidentiality protection algorithm with a null value.
10. The device according to claim 9, characterized in that The processing module is further configured to select an integrity protection algorithm for the non-null value and a confidentiality protection algorithm for the null value according to the security capability of the second device and the security capability of the first device.
11. A communication device, characterized in that: The device comprises a processing module and a transceiver module, and the processing module and the transceiver module are used for the device to execute the method according to any one of claims 3 to 5.
12. A communication device, characterized in that: include: A processor, wherein the processor is coupled to a memory, wherein the memory is used to store programs or instructions, and when the programs or instructions are executed by the processor, the device executes the method according to any one of claims 1 to 8.
13. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed, the computer is caused to perform the method according to any one of claims 1 to 8.
14. A communication system, characterized in that: comprising a first device and a second device; The first device is configured to send a direct communication request message to the second device, wherein the direct communication request message includes a security capability of the first device and a control plane security policy of the first device; The second device is configured to determine a control plane security protection mode between the first device and the second device according to a control plane security policy of the first device and a control plane security policy of the second device; and send a direct connection security mode command message to the first device when the control plane security protection mode is that control plane integrity protection is enabled and control plane confidentiality protection is not enabled; wherein the direct connection security mode command message includes an integrity protection algorithm of a non-null value and a confidentiality protection algorithm of a null value; The first device is further used to send a direct connection security mode completion message carrying a user plane security policy of the first device to the second device; The second device is further configured to, upon receiving the direct connection security mode completion message, determine that user plane confidentiality protection between the first device and the second device is not enabled, regardless of a user plane security policy of the first device and a user plane security policy of the second device.
15. The system according to claim 14, characterized in that The second device is further configured to select an integrity protection algorithm for the non-null value and a confidentiality protection algorithm for the null value according to a security capability of the second device and a security capability of the first device.
16. A communication system, characterized in that: comprising a first device and a second device; The first device is used to send a direct communication request message to the second device, where the direct communication request message includes a control plane security policy of the first device and a security capability of the first device; The second device is used to determine that control plane confidentiality protection between the first device and the second device is not enabled according to the control plane security policy of the first device and the control plane security policy of the second device; send a direct communication command message to the first device, wherein the direct communication command message includes indication information of a control plane confidentiality protection algorithm indicating a null value; The first device is further configured to send a direct communication completion message to the second device, where the direct communication completion message includes a user plane security policy of the first device; The second device is further used to determine that user plane confidentiality protection between the first device and the second device is turned on according to the user plane security policy of the first device and the user plane security policy of the second device; select a user plane confidentiality protection algorithm with a non-null value according to the security capability of the first device and the security capability of the second device; send a direct communication acceptance message to the first device, the direct communication acceptance message including first algorithm indication information for indicating the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm; The first device is used to receive the direct communication acceptance message.
17. The system according to claim 16, characterized in that The direct communication acceptance message also includes indication information for indicating to enable user plane confidentiality protection between the second device and the first device.
18. The system according to claim 16, characterized in that The second device is further used to store the security capability of the first device.
19. The system according to claim 16, characterized in that The direct communication command message also includes indication information for indicating a control plane integrity protection algorithm; The first device is also used to enable control plane integrity protection between the second device and the control plane integrity protection algorithm indicated by the indication information of the control plane integrity protection algorithm; to perform integrity verification on the direct communication acceptance message; and when the direct communication acceptance message is verified, to enable user plane confidentiality protection between the second device and the user plane confidentiality protection algorithm indicated by the first algorithm indication information.
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