Method and device for identifying fake base stations and sending information

Abstract

The present invention discloses a method and device for identifying a fake base station and information transmission, belonging to the field of communication technology. The specific implementation scheme includes: receiving an RRC redirection message sent by a base station; determining whether the RRC redirection message includes first information; the first information is used to identify the authenticity of the base station; when the RRC redirection message includes the first information, identifying whether the first information meets a preset condition; when the first information does not meet the preset condition, determining that the base station is a fake base station. According to the scheme in this application, the authenticity of the base station can be identified.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of communication technology, and in particular relates to a method and device for identifying a pseudo base station and sending information. Background Art

[0002] At present, fake base stations can first use their high signal strength to trick terminals such as user equipment (UE) to reside in fake base stations, then send fake system messages, tracking area information, etc. to trigger UE to establish a connection with the fake base station, and finally force the UE to be transferred to a base station with weaker network defense capabilities through the Radio Resource Control (RRC) redirection process, preparing for subsequent network attacks. Therefore, how to identify fake base stations is an urgent problem to be solved. Summary of the invention

[0003] The purpose of the embodiments of the present invention is to provide a method and device for identifying a pseudo base station and sending information, so as to solve the problem of how to identify a pseudo base station.

[0004] In order to solve the above-mentioned technical problems, the present invention is achieved as follows:

[0005] In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a method for identifying a pseudo base station, which is applied to a terminal and includes:

[0006] Receiving an RRC redirection message sent by the base station;

[0007] Determining whether the RRC redirection message includes first information; wherein the first information is used to identify the authenticity of the base station;

[0008] In a case where the RRC redirection message includes the first information, identifying whether the first information meets a preset condition;

[0009] When the first information does not meet a preset condition, it is determined that the base station is a pseudo base station.

[0010] Optionally, the determining whether the RRC redirection message includes the first information includes:

[0011] Determining whether the RRC redirection message is encrypted;

[0012] In a case where the RRC redirection message is not encrypted, determining whether the RRC redirection message includes the first information.

[0013] Optionally, the identifying whether the first information meets a preset condition includes:

[0014] Identifying whether the first information is consistent with pre-stored information;

[0015] The determining that the base station is a pseudo base station when the first information does not satisfy a preset condition includes: determining that the base station is a pseudo base station when the first information is inconsistent with the pre-stored information.

[0016] Optionally, the first information includes at least one of the following: core network information, and neighboring cell information of a neighboring base station.

[0017] In a second aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a method for sending information, which is applied to a base station, including:

[0018] Generate an RRC redirection message;

[0019] Adding first information to the RRC redirection message; wherein the first information is used to identify the authenticity of the base station;

[0020] An RRC redirection message added with the first information is sent to the terminal.

[0021] Optionally, the adding first information in the RRC redirection message includes:

[0022] Determining whether the base station has enabled a security mode command;

[0023] In a case where the base station does not enable the security mode command, the first information is added to the RRC redirection message.

[0024] Optionally, the first information includes at least one of the following: core network information, and neighboring cell information of a neighboring base station.

[0025] In a third aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a device for identifying a pseudo base station, which is applied to a terminal, including:

[0026] A receiving module, used for receiving an RRC redirection message sent by a base station;

[0027] A determination module, configured to determine whether the RRC redirection message includes first information; wherein the first information is used to identify the authenticity of the base station;

[0028] an identification module, configured to identify whether the first information meets a preset condition when the first information is included in the RRC redirection message;

[0029] A determination module is used to determine that the base station is a pseudo base station when the first information does not meet a preset condition.

[0030] Optionally, the determination module includes:

[0031] A first determining unit, configured to determine whether the RRC redirection message is encrypted;

[0032] The second determination unit is configured to determine whether the RRC redirection message includes the first information when the RRC redirection message is not encrypted.

[0033] Optionally, the identification module is specifically used to: identify whether the first information is consistent with pre-stored information;

[0034] The determination module is specifically configured to: determine that the base station is a pseudo base station when the first information is inconsistent with the pre-stored information.

[0035] Optionally, the first information includes at least one of the following: core network information, and neighboring cell information of a neighboring base station.

[0036] In a fourth aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides an apparatus for sending information, which is applied to a base station, including:

[0037] A generating module, used for generating an RRC redirection message;

[0038] An adding module, configured to add first information to the RRC redirection message; wherein the first information is used to identify the authenticity of the base station;

[0039] The sending module is used to send the RRC redirection message added with the first information to the terminal.

[0040] Optionally, the adding module includes:

[0041] A determination unit, configured to determine whether the base station has enabled a security mode command;

[0042] An adding unit is used to add the first information to the RRC redirection message when the base station does not enable the security mode command.

[0043] Optionally, the first information includes at least one of the following: core network information, and neighboring cell information of a neighboring base station.

[0044] In a fifth aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a communication device, which includes a processor, a memory, and a program or instruction stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the program or instruction, when executed by the processor, implements the steps of the method described in the first aspect, or the steps of the method described in the second aspect.

[0045] In a sixth aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium, on which a program or instruction is stored. When the program or instruction is executed by a processor, the steps of the method described in the first aspect or the steps of the method described in the second aspect are implemented.

[0046] In the embodiment of the present invention, after receiving the RRC redirection message sent by the base station, the terminal can determine whether the RRC redirection message includes the first information, the first information is used to identify the authenticity of the base station, and when the RRC redirection message includes the first information and the first information does not meet the preset condition, the base station is determined to be a fake base station. In this way, the authenticity of the base station can be identified. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0047] Figure 1 is a flow chart of a method for identifying a pseudo base station provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0048] Figure 2 is a flowchart of a process for identifying a pseudo base station in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0049] Figure 3 is a flow chart of a method for sending information provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0050] Figure 4 is a flowchart of a process of sending an RRC redirection message in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0051] Figure 5 It is a structural schematic diagram of a device for identifying a pseudo base station provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0052] Figure 6 It is a structural schematic diagram of a device for sending information provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0053] Figure 7 It is a structural diagram of a communication device provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0054] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0055] The terms "first", "second", etc. in the specification and claims of the present invention are used to distinguish similar objects, and are not used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that the data used in this way can be interchanged where appropriate, so that the embodiments of the present invention can be implemented in an order other than those illustrated or described herein, and the objects distinguished by "first", "second", etc. are generally of the same type, and the number of objects is not limited. For example, the first object can be one or more. In addition, "and / or" in the specification and claims represents at least one of the connected objects, and the character " / " generally indicates that the objects associated with each other are in an "or" relationship.

[0056] In order to facilitate understanding of this application, the process of a fake base station attacking a UE is first described in detail. The process of a fake base station attacking a UE mainly includes:

[0057] 1) Attack preparation: The fake base station induces the UE to reside in the fake base station through cell reselection with higher power or better coverage conditions. However, since the Tracking Area Code (TAC) information of the fake base station is different from the TAC information stored in the UE, it will trigger the UE to initiate the Tracking Area Update (TAU) process. At the same time, the TAU process triggers the RRC connection process between the UE and the fake base station, allowing the UE to establish an RRC connection with the fake base station.

[0058] 2) Start RRC redirection: After the RRC connection between the UE and the fake base station is established, and before the access stratum (AS) starts encryption, the fake base station sends a forged RRC connection release message to the UE, instructing the UE to redirect the RRC connection to its designated target network, such as the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) network with poor defense capabilities.

[0059] 3) Start the attack: The UE releases the RRC connection of the fake base station and chooses to reside in the GSM network cell designated by the fake base station. The attacker then attacks the UE residing on the fake base station system and obtains its private information.

[0060] From the above process of fake base station attacking UE, we can know that the fake base station forms a cell with better coverage conditions, induces UE to transfer from the current resident base station to the fake base station through cell reselection, and establishes an RRC connection with the fake base station. The fake base station then uses a "legitimate" RRC connection release message to redirect the UE RRC to the designated network to prepare for the attack.

[0061] Based on the process of a fake base station attacking a UE, an embodiment of the present invention proposes a method for identifying a fake base station by utilizing RRC redirection. The method proposes a new message that is different from the current RRC connection release message. "Verification" information is attached to the new message, so that the UE can use the "verification" information to identify the fake base station, that is, to confirm the legitimacy of the base station, thereby preventing the UE from being illegally redirected to its designated base station by the fake base station.

[0062] The method provided by the embodiment of the present invention is described in detail below through specific embodiments and application scenarios in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0063] See also Figure 1 , Figure 1 is a flow chart of a method for identifying a pseudo base station provided by an embodiment of the present invention, the method is applied to a terminal, such as Figure 1 As shown, the method comprises the following steps:

[0064] Step 101: Receive an RRC redirection message sent by a base station.

[0065] Optionally, the RRC redirection message may be an RRC connection release message. The RRC redirection message may be a new message different from the current RRC Connection Release message.

[0066] Step 102: Determine whether the RRC redirection message includes the first information.

[0067] The first information is used to identify the authenticity of the base station. The first information can be understood as the authentication information attached to the RRC redirection message, and the first information can be used to identify whether the corresponding base station is a fake base station.

[0068] Optionally, the first information may include at least one of the following: core network information, neighboring cell information of a neighboring base station. The core network information includes, but is not limited to, TAC information registered by the terminal, IP address assigned to the terminal, Globally Unique Temporary UE Identity (GUTI) and other information. The neighboring cell information of the neighboring base station includes, but is not limited to, adjacent frequency and adjacent area information (such as the frequency of the adjacent frequency and adjacent area), cell identification ID, affiliated public land mobile network (PLMN) information, affiliated TAC information, etc. In addition, the first information may also be a specific bit or a specific field, etc.

[0069] Step 103: When the RRC redirection message includes the first information, identify whether the first information meets a preset condition.

[0070] In this embodiment, when the RRC redirection message does not include the first information, the terminal may consider that the base station sending the RRC redirection message is a pseudo base station. Afterwards, the terminal may release the RRC connection with the base station and terminate the RRC redirection process.

[0071] The above-mentioned preset conditions can be preset based on actual needs. For example, the first information can be consistent with the information pre-stored in the terminal, or the first information can be verified to be true.

[0072] Step 104: When the first information does not satisfy a preset condition, determine that the base station is a pseudo base station.

[0073] In this embodiment, after determining that the base station is a pseudo base station, the terminal may release the RRC connection with the base station and terminate the RRC redirection process.

[0074] Optionally, when the first information meets a preset condition, the terminal may consider the base station to be a legitimate base station, and then perform RRC redirection according to the RRC redirection message.

[0075] In the method for identifying a fake base station in an embodiment of the present invention, after receiving an RRC redirection message sent by a base station, the terminal can determine whether the RRC redirection message includes first information, the first information being used to identify the authenticity of the base station, and if the RRC redirection message includes the first information and the first information does not meet a preset condition, the base station is determined to be a fake base station. Thus, the authenticity of the base station can be identified.

[0076] Furthermore, the present application also follows the existing RRC redirection process and does not destroy the existing mechanism process. It only adds a small amount of additional information to the RRC redirection message. This additional information can prevent the terminal from being induced by a fake base station to a base station with weaker network defense capabilities, thereby preventing the terminal's privacy information from being obtained by the fake base station.

[0077] In the embodiment of the present invention, since the RRC redirection message sent by the base station under the safe mode command (Safe Mode Command, SMC) is encrypted and safe, a fake base station cannot forge the encrypted RRC redirection message. Therefore, when the terminal determines whether the received RRC redirection message includes the first information, it can first determine whether the RRC redirection message is encrypted, and if it is determined that the RRC redirection message is not encrypted, it can then determine whether the RRC redirection message includes the first information. If the RRC redirection message has been encrypted, that is, it is an encrypted message, it can be determined that the base station sending the RRC redirection message is legal, and RRC redirection can be performed according to the RRC redirection message.

[0078] Optionally, the process of identifying whether the first information meets the preset condition may include: the terminal identifying whether the first information is consistent with pre-stored information. Then, if the first information is inconsistent with the pre-stored information, the terminal determines that the corresponding base station is a pseudo base station.

[0079] Combine the following Figure 2 The process of identifying a fake base station in the embodiment of the present invention is described in detail. Figure 2 As shown, the process of identifying a fake base station may include the following steps:

[0080] Step 21: The UE receives an RRC redirection message from the base station.

[0081] Step 22: The UE determines whether the RRC redirection message is SMC encrypted information. If it is encrypted information, execute step 26, otherwise execute step 23.

[0082] Step 23: The UE determines whether the RRC redirection message includes first information, where the first information is additional authentication information. If the first information is not included, step 25 is executed, otherwise step 24 is executed.

[0083] Step 24: The UE identifies whether the first information meets a preset condition. If the preset condition is not met, step 25 is executed, otherwise step 26 is executed.

[0084] For example, when identifying whether the first information satisfies a preset condition, the UE may identify whether the first information is consistent with pre-stored information. If the first information is consistent with the pre-stored information, the preset condition is satisfied; otherwise, the preset condition is not satisfied.

[0085] Step 25: The UE determines that the base station is a pseudo base station, releases the RRC connection with the base station and terminates the RRC redirection process, adds the corresponding cell to the blacklist, or prohibits access to the corresponding cell for a preset time, such as 1 hour or longer, to avoid any possible stay in a short time.

[0086] Step 26: The UE determines that the base station is a legitimate base station, and redirects to the target base station according to the RRC redirection message in accordance with the established process.

[0087] One implementation Figure 2The UE device of the middle solution may include a central processor, an information transceiver module, an information verification module and an information storage module. The information transceiver module, the information verification module and the information storage module are coupled to each other or to the central processor. The information transceiver module is configured to receive an RRC redirection message sent from a base station, the information verification module is configured to verify the additional information in the received RRC redirection message with the corresponding information stored in the information storage module, the information storage module is configured to store possible additional verification information, and the central controller is configured to control the information transceiver module, the information verification module and the information storage module to perform the above actions.

[0088] See also Figure 3 , Figure 3 is a flow chart of a method for sending information provided by an embodiment of the present invention, the method is applied to a base station, such as Figure 3 As shown, the method comprises the following steps:

[0089] Step 301: Generate an RRC redirection message.

[0090] Optionally, the RRC redirection message may be an RRC connection release (Connection Release) message.

[0091] Step 302: Add first information to the RRC redirection message.

[0092] The first information is used to identify the authenticity of the base station. The first information can be understood as the authentication information attached to the RRC redirection message, and the first information can be used to identify whether the corresponding base station is a fake base station.

[0093] Optionally, the above process of adding the first information in the RRC redirection message may include: the base station determines whether the security mode command is enabled, and adds the first information in the RRC redirection message if the security mode command is not enabled.

[0094] Step 303: Send the RRC redirection message with the first information added to the terminal.

[0095] In this way, after receiving the RRC redirection message with the first information added, the terminal can determine whether the corresponding base station is a fake base station based on the first information, thereby realizing the authenticity identification of the base station. In other words, the embodiment of the present application modifies the current RRC redirection process, and the RRC redirection message sent by the legitimate base station to the terminal can enable the terminal to judge the legitimacy of the message with the help of the additional authentication information, thereby preventing the fake base station from forcibly redirecting the terminal to a cell with lower defense power for residence.

[0096] In the embodiment of the present invention, optionally, the above-mentioned first information may include at least one of the following: core network information, neighboring cell information of a neighboring base station, a specific bit or a specific field, etc.

[0097] Optionally, the core network information includes but is not limited to the TAC information registered by the terminal, the IP address assigned to the terminal, GUTI and other information, or other information that is not easily obtained or forged by a fake base station. The core network information may be requested by the base station to the core network network element. The core network network element includes but is not limited to the access mobility management function (Access Management Function, AMF) entity, the user plane function (User Plane Function, UPF) entity, etc. For example, the TAC information and GUTI registered by the terminal are information related to the terminal mobility, which comes from the AMF entity of the core network. For another example, the IP address information is related to the user plane function, which comes from the UPF entity of the core network. For the specific request method, the existing request message can be reused, or a newly defined request message can be used.

[0098] In one implementation, when obtaining core network information, the base station can send an additional information request (ADDITION INFORMATION REQUEST) message to the core network network element to request attachment information, and the core network network element can send an additional information response (ADDITION INFORMATION RESPONSE) message to the base station in response. The response message includes but is not limited to the following parameters: TAC information registered by the terminal, IP address assigned to the terminal, GUTI and other information, or other information that is not easily obtained or forged by a fake base station.

[0099] Optionally, the neighboring cell information of the neighboring base station includes but is not limited to adjacent frequency and adjacent area information (such as the frequency of the adjacent frequency and adjacent area), cell identification ID, affiliated PLMN information, affiliated TAC information, etc., or other information that is not easily obtained or forged by a fake base station. The neighboring cell information of the neighboring base station can be requested by the base station to the neighboring base station. For the specific request method, the existing request message can be reused, or a newly defined request message can be used.

[0100] In one implementation, when obtaining the neighboring cell information of the neighboring base station, the base station may send an additional information request (ADDITION INFORMATION REQUEST) message to the neighboring base station to request additional information, and the neighboring base station may send an additional information response (ADDITION INFORMATION RESPONSE) message to the base station in response, and the response message includes but is not limited to the following parameters: the frequency of the neighboring frequency and neighboring area within the range of the neighboring base station, the cell ID, the affiliated PLMN information, the affiliated TAC information, etc. It should be pointed out that when feeding back information, the neighboring base station may extract the locally stored information or obtain the information from the core network to which it belongs and provide it according to the specific situation. Preferably, the number of target neighboring base stations to which the current base station sends the request may be multiple, such as 6.

[0101] Combine the following Figure 4 The sending process of the RRC redirection message in the embodiment of the present invention is described in detail. Figure 4 As shown, the sending process may include the following steps:

[0102] Step 41: The base station generates an RRC redirection message to be sent to the UE.

[0103] Step 42: The base station determines whether the SMC has been activated. If the SMC has been activated, the SMC mode is directly adopted and step 48 is executed; otherwise, step 43 is executed.

[0104] Step 43: The base station adds first information to the RRC redirection message, such as core network information used by the UE to authenticate the base station.

[0105] Step 44: Determine whether the core network information is added successfully. If the addition is successful, execute step 48, otherwise execute step 45.

[0106] Optionally, if the request for the core network information sent by the base station to the core network has no response for a long time, resulting in the timer for the local monitoring process to time out, or if the response message of the core network received by the base station is abnormal (such as garbled characters, cannot be parsed), etc., it is determined that the adding of the core network information has failed. After successfully obtaining the core network information, the base station can add it to the RRC redirection message, that is, it is determined that the adding of the core network information is successful.

[0107] Step 45: the base station adds other first information to the RRC redirection message, such as neighboring cell information of the neighboring base station for the UE to identify the authenticity of the base station.

[0108] Step 46: Determine whether the neighboring cell information of the neighboring base station is added successfully. If the addition is successful, execute step 48, otherwise execute step 47.

[0109] Optionally, if the request sent by the base station to the neighboring base station for requesting the corresponding neighboring cell information has no response for a long time, resulting in the timer for the local monitoring process to time out, or if the response message of the neighboring base station received by the base station is abnormal (for example, garbled, unable to be parsed), etc., it is determined that the neighboring cell information of the neighboring base station has failed to be added. After successfully obtaining the neighboring cell information of the neighboring base station, the base station can add it to the RRC redirection message, that is, it is determined that the neighboring cell information of the neighboring base station has been successfully added.

[0110] It should be noted that the above steps 43 and 45 can be used independently or in combination. When used in combination, a sequence can be adopted. If one of the solutions fails to be added, another solution is activated, such as Figure 4 But except Figure 4 In addition to the order shown, you can also choose to add the neighboring cell information of the neighboring base station first, and then choose to add the core network information if the addition fails.

[0111] Step 47: Abandon sending the RRC redirection message to the UE. For example, abandon the redirection process to the target base station and change to redirection within the system.

[0112] Step 48: Send an RRC redirection message to the UE.

[0113] One implementation Figure 4 The base station device of the middle solution may include a central processor, an information request module, an information generation module, an information processing module, an SMC module and an information sending module, and each module is coupled to each other or coupled to the central processor. Among them, the information generation module is configured to generate an RRC redirection message, the information processing module is configured to attach core network information and / or neighboring cell information of a neighboring base station to the RRC redirection message, the SMC module is configured to decide whether to adopt the SMC mode, the information sending module is configured to send an RRC redirection message in the SMC mode, or to send an RRC redirection message with attached core network information and / or neighboring cell information of a neighboring base station in the non-SMC mode, the information request module is configured to request core network information from a core network element and / or request corresponding neighboring cell information from at least one neighboring base station, and the central processor is configured to control and coordinate the behavior of each module.

[0114] See also Figure 5 , Figure 5 is a schematic diagram of a structure of a device for identifying a pseudo base station provided by an embodiment of the present invention, and the device is applied to a terminal, such as Figure 5 As shown, the device 50 for identifying a pseudo base station includes:

[0115] A receiving module 51, configured to receive an RRC redirection message sent by a base station;

[0116] A determination module 52 is used to determine whether the RRC redirection message includes first information; wherein the first information is used to identify the authenticity of the base station;

[0117] an identification module 53, configured to identify whether the first information meets a preset condition when the RRC redirection message includes the first information;

[0118] The determination module 54 is configured to determine that the base station is a pseudo base station when the first information does not satisfy a preset condition.

[0119] Optionally, the determination module 52 includes:

[0120] A first determining unit, configured to determine whether the RRC redirection message is encrypted;

[0121] The second determination unit is configured to determine whether the RRC redirection message includes the first information when the RRC redirection message is not encrypted.

[0122] Optionally, the identification module 53 is specifically used to: identify whether the first information is consistent with pre-stored information;

[0123] The determination module 54 is specifically configured to: determine that the base station is a pseudo base station when the first information is inconsistent with the pre-stored information.

[0124] Optionally, the first information includes at least one of the following: core network information, and neighboring cell information of a neighboring base station.

[0125] It is understandable that the apparatus 50 for identifying a fake base station according to the embodiment of the present invention can implement the above Figure 1 The various processes of the method embodiment shown can achieve the same technical effect, and will not be described again here to avoid repetition.

[0126] See also Figure 6 , Figure 6 is a schematic diagram of the structure of an information sending device provided by an embodiment of the present invention, and the device is applied to a base station, such as Figure 6 As shown, the information sending device 60 includes:

[0127] A generating module 61, configured to generate an RRC redirection message;

[0128] An adding module 62 is used to add first information to the RRC redirection message; wherein the first information is used to identify the authenticity of the base station;

[0129] The sending module 63 is used to send the RRC redirection message added with the first information to the terminal.

[0130] Optionally, the adding module 62 includes:

[0131] A determination unit, configured to determine whether the base station has enabled a security mode command;

[0132] An adding unit is used to add the first information to the RRC redirection message when the base station does not enable the security mode command.

[0133] Optionally, the first information includes at least one of the following: core network information, and neighboring cell information of a neighboring base station.

[0134] It is understandable that the information sending device 60 of the embodiment of the present invention can implement the above Figure 3 The various processes of the method embodiment shown can achieve the same technical effect, and will not be described again here to avoid repetition.

[0135] In addition, an embodiment of the present invention further provides a communication device, including a processor, a memory, and a program or instruction stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the program or instruction can be executed by the processor to achieve the above Figure 1 The various processes of the method embodiment shown, or the implementation of the above Figure 3 The various processes of the method embodiment shown can achieve the same technical effect, and will not be described again here to avoid repetition.

[0136] See also Figure 7 As shown, an embodiment of the present invention further provides a communication device 70 , including a bus 71 , a transceiver 72 , an antenna 73 , a bus interface 74 , a processor 75 and a memory 76 .

[0137] In the embodiment of the present invention, the electronic device 70 further includes: a computer program stored in the memory 76 and executable on the processor 75. It is understandable that when the computer program is executed by the processor 75, the above-mentioned Figure 1 The various processes of the method embodiment shown, or the implementation of the above Figure 3 The various processes of the method embodiment shown can achieve the same technical effect, and will not be described again here to avoid repetition.

[0138] exist Figure 7In the embodiment, the bus architecture (represented by bus 71) is shown, and bus 71 may include any number of interconnected buses and bridges, and bus 71 links various circuits including one or more processors represented by processor 75 and memory represented by memory 76. Bus 71 may also link various other circuits such as peripherals, voltage regulators, and power management circuits, which are well known in the art and are therefore not further described herein. Bus interface 74 provides an interface between bus 71 and transceiver 72. Transceiver 72 may be one element or multiple elements, such as multiple receivers and transmitters, providing a unit for communicating with various other devices on a transmission medium. Data processed by processor 75 is transmitted on a wireless medium via antenna 73, and further, antenna 73 also receives data and transmits the data to processor 75.

[0139] The processor 75 is responsible for managing the bus 71 and general processing, and can also provide various functions, including timing, peripheral interfaces, voltage regulation, power management and other control functions. The memory 76 can be used to store data used by the processor 75 when performing operations.

[0140] Optionally, the processor 75 may be a CPU, an ASIC, an FPGA or a CPLD.

[0141] The embodiment of the present invention further provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which can implement the above-mentioned Figure 1 The various processes of the method embodiment shown, or the implementation of the above Figure 3 The various processes of the method embodiment shown can achieve the same technical effect, and will not be described again here to avoid repetition.

[0142] Computer readable media include permanent and non-permanent, removable and non-removable media, and can be implemented by any method or technology to store information. Information can be computer readable instructions, data structures, program modules or other data. Examples of computer storage media include, but are not limited to, phase change memory (PRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), other types of random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technology, compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), digital versatile disk (DVD) or other optical storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tape magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices or any other non-transmission media that can be used to store information that can be accessed by a computing device. As defined herein, computer readable media does not include temporary computer readable media (transitory media), such as modulated data signals and carrier waves.

[0143] It should be noted that, in this article, the terms "include", "comprises" or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, article or device including a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also other elements not explicitly listed, or also includes elements inherent to such process, method, article or device. In the absence of further restrictions, an element defined by the sentence "comprises a ..." does not exclude the existence of other identical elements in the process, method, article or device including the element.

[0144] The serial numbers of the above embodiments of the present invention are only for description and do not represent the advantages or disadvantages of the embodiments.

[0145] Through the description of the above implementation methods, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that the above-mentioned embodiment methods can be implemented by means of software plus a necessary general hardware platform, and of course by hardware, but in many cases the former is a better implementation method. Based on such an understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, or the part that contributes to the prior art, can be embodied in the form of a software product, which is stored in a storage medium (such as ROM / RAM, a magnetic disk, or an optical disk), and includes a number of instructions for enabling a service classification device (which can be a mobile phone, a computer, a server, an air conditioner, or a network device, etc.) to execute the methods described in each embodiment of the present invention.

[0146] The above is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention. It should be pointed out that for ordinary technicians in this technical field, several improvements and modifications can be made without departing from the principle of the present invention. These improvements and modifications should also be regarded as the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for identifying a fake base station, applied to a terminal, characterized in that: include: Receiving a radio resource control RRC redirection message sent by a base station; Determine whether the RRC redirection message includes first information; wherein the first information is used to identify the authenticity of the base station; the first information includes at least one of the following: core network information, neighboring cell information of a neighboring base station; In a case where the RRC redirection message includes the first information, identifying whether the first information meets a preset condition; If the first information does not meet a preset condition, determining that the base station is a pseudo base station; The step of identifying whether the first information satisfies a preset condition includes: Identifying whether the first information is consistent with pre-stored information; The determining that the base station is a pseudo base station when the first information does not meet a preset condition includes: When the first information is inconsistent with the pre-stored information, it is determined that the base station is a pseudo base station.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The determining whether the RRC redirection message includes the first information includes: Determining whether the RRC redirection message is encrypted; In a case where the RRC redirection message is not encrypted, determining whether the RRC redirection message includes the first information.

3. A method for sending information, applied to a base station, characterized in that: include: Generate an RRC redirection message; Adding first information to the RRC redirection message; wherein the first information is used to identify the authenticity of the base station; the first information includes at least one of the following: core network information, neighboring cell information of a neighboring base station; An RRC redirection message with the first information added thereto is sent to the terminal, so that the terminal identifies whether the first information is consistent with pre-stored information, and determines that the base station is a pseudo base station when the first information is inconsistent with the pre-stored information.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The adding the first information in the RRC redirection message includes: Determining whether the base station has enabled a security mode command; In a case where the base station does not enable the security mode command, the first information is added to the RRC redirection message.

5. A device for identifying a fake base station, applied to a terminal, characterized in that: include: A receiving module, used to receive an RRC redirection message sent by a base station; A determination module, configured to determine whether the RRC redirection message includes first information; wherein the first information is used to identify the authenticity of the base station; the first information includes at least one of the following: core network information, neighboring cell information of a neighboring base station; an identification module, configured to identify whether the first information meets a preset condition when the first information is included in the RRC redirection message; A determination module, configured to determine that the base station is a pseudo base station when the first information does not meet a preset condition; The identification module is specifically used to: identify whether the first information is consistent with pre-stored information; The determination module is specifically configured to: determine that the base station is a pseudo base station when the first information is inconsistent with the pre-stored information.

6. The device according to claim 5, characterized in that The determination module comprises: A first determining unit, configured to determine whether the RRC redirection message is encrypted; The second determination unit is configured to determine whether the RRC redirection message includes the first information when the RRC redirection message is not encrypted.

7. An information sending device, applied to a base station, characterized in that: include: A generating module, used for generating an RRC redirection message; An adding module, configured to add first information to the RRC redirection message; wherein the first information is used to identify the authenticity of the base station; the first information includes at least one of the following: core network information, neighboring cell information of a neighboring base station; A sending module is used to send an RRC redirection message with the first information added to the terminal, so that the terminal identifies whether the first information is consistent with the pre-stored information, and when the first information is inconsistent with the pre-stored information, determines that the base station is a pseudo base station.

8. The device according to claim 7, characterized in that The adding module comprises: A determination unit, configured to determine whether the base station has enabled a security mode command; An adding unit is used to add the first information to the RRC redirection message when the base station does not enable the security mode command.

9. A communication device, characterized in that: It includes a processor, a memory, and a program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein when the program is executed by the processor, the steps of the method for identifying a pseudo base station as described in claim 1 or 2 are implemented, or the steps of the method for sending information as described in claim 3 or 4 are implemented.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores a program, and when the program is executed by the processor, the program implements the steps of the method for identifying a pseudo base station as described in claim 1 or 2, or implements the steps of the method for sending information as described in claim 3 or 4.

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