Defect-based physical layer fingerprinting
Through the beamforming signal and MIMO multipath channel characteristics of the wireless device, a password key is generated based on the unique defect of the device, which solves the problem of key exchange session security in the wireless communication system and realizes secure communication between devices.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202080065913.5
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2019-09-25
- Filing Date
- 2020-09-01
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-22
- Estimated Expiration
- 2040-09-01
AI Technical Summary
Existing wireless communication systems have difficulty ensuring the security of cryptographic keys during key exchange sessions, especially in the absence of sharing parameters, and are susceptible to the risk of deciphering and decryption by unauthorized users.
The security of communication is ensured by leveraging beamforming signals and multi-input multi-output (MIMO) multi-path channel characteristics between wireless devices, cryptographic keys are generated based on unique defects or non-natural objects of the device.
Secure communication between devices without explicitly sharing of password keys is realized, preventing eavesdropper devices from estimating the correct password key, and enhancing communication security.
Smart Images

Figure CN114503626B_ABST
Abstract
Description
[0001] Priority claim
[0002] This patent application claims priority to U.S. Non-Provisional Application No. 16 / 583,005, filed on September 25, 2019, entitled “IMPAIRMENT BASED PHYSICALLAYER FINGERPRINT,” which is assigned to its assignee and is expressly incorporated herein by reference. Technical Field
[0003] Aspects of the present disclosure relate generally to wireless communications and to techniques and apparatus for defect-based physical layer fingerprinting. Some techniques and apparatus described herein may use defect-based physical layer fingerprinting and / or one or more multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) multipath channel characteristics to generate cryptographic keys that are not shared during a key exchange session. Background Art
[0004] Wireless communication systems are widely deployed to provide various telecommunication services, such as telephone, video, data, messaging, and broadcasting. Typical wireless communication systems may employ multiple access technologies that can support communication with multiple users by sharing available system resources (e.g., bandwidth, transmit power, etc.). Examples of these multiple access technologies include code division multiple access (CDMA) systems, time division multiple access (TDMA) systems, frequency division multiple access (FDMA) systems, orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) systems, single carrier frequency division multiple access (SC-FDMA) systems, time division synchronous code division multiple access (TD-SCDMA) systems, and long term evolution (LTE). LTE / LTE Advanced is a set of enhancements to the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) mobile standard promulgated by the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).
[0005] A wireless communication network may include multiple base stations (BS) that may support communication of multiple user equipment (UE). User equipment (UE) may communicate with a base station (BS) via a downlink and an uplink. A downlink (or forward link) refers to a communication link from a BS to a UE, and an uplink (or reverse link) refers to a communication link from a UE to a BS. As described in more detail herein, a BS may be referred to as a Node B, gNB, access point (AP), radio head, transmission reception point (TRP), new radio (NR) BS, 5G Node B, etc.
[0006] The above multiple access technologies have been adopted in various telecommunication standards to provide a public protocol that enables different user equipment to communicate within the scope of municipal, national, regional, and even global levels. The new radio (NR), which can also be referred to as 5G, is a set of enhancements to the LTE mobile standard promulgated by the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). NR is designed to better support mobile broadband Internet access by improving spectrum efficiency, reducing costs, improving services, utilizing new spectrum, and using orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) (CP-OFDM) with cyclic prefix (CP) on the downlink (DL), using CP-OFDM and / or SC-FDM (e.g., also known as discrete Fourier transform spread OFDM (DFT-s-OFDM)) on the uplink (UL), and supporting beamforming, multiple input multiple output (MIMO) antenna technology. MIMO) and carrier aggregation other open standards better converge. However, as the demand for mobile broadband access continues to increase, further improvements to LTE and NR technologies are needed. Preferably, these improvements should be applicable to other multiple access technologies and telecommunication standards that adopt these technologies. Summary of the invention
[0007] In some aspects, a method of wireless communication performed by a wireless device may include: receiving a beamforming signal from a transmitting device; estimating a weighted sum based at least in part on multiple coefficients associated with the beamforming signal, wherein the multiple coefficients include one or more coefficients related to one or more defects associated with the transmitting device and one or more coefficients that depend on a spatial location of the wireless device; determining a cryptographic key based at least in part on a ratio between the multiple coefficients in the weighted sum associated with the beamforming signal; and protecting one or more communications between the wireless device and the transmitting device based at least in part on the cryptographic key.
[0008] In some aspects, a wireless device for wireless communication may include a memory and one or more processors coupled to the memory. The memory and the one or more processors may be configured to: receive a beamforming signal from a transmitting device; estimate a weighted sum based at least in part on a plurality of coefficients associated with the beamforming signal, wherein the plurality of coefficients include one or more coefficients related to one or more impairments associated with the transmitting device and one or more coefficients dependent on a spatial location of the wireless device; determine a cryptographic key based at least in part on a ratio between the plurality of coefficients in the weighted sum associated with the beamforming signal; and protect one or more communications between the wireless device and the transmitting device based at least in part on the cryptographic key.
[0009] In some aspects, a non-transitory computer-readable medium may store one or more instructions for wireless communication. The one or more instructions, when executed by one or more processors of a wireless device, may cause the one or more processors to perform the following: receiving a beamforming signal from a transmitting device; estimating a weighted sum based at least in part on a plurality of coefficients associated with the beamforming signal, wherein the plurality of coefficients include one or more coefficients related to one or more impairments associated with the transmitting device and one or more coefficients depending on a spatial location of the wireless device; determining a cryptographic key based at least in part on a ratio between the plurality of coefficients in the weighted sum associated with the beamforming signal; and protecting one or more communications between the wireless device and the transmitting device based at least in part on the cryptographic key.
[0010] In some aspects, an apparatus for wireless communication may include: a component for receiving a beamforming signal from a transmitting device; a component for estimating a weighted sum based at least in part on multiple coefficients associated with the beamforming signal, wherein the multiple coefficients include one or more coefficients related to one or more defects associated with the transmitting device and one or more coefficients that depend on the spatial location of the wireless device; a component for determining a cryptographic key based at least in part on a ratio between the multiple coefficients in the weighted sum associated with the beamforming signal; and a component for protecting one or more communications between the wireless device and the transmitting device based at least in part on the cryptographic key.
[0011] Aspects generally include methods, apparatus, systems, computer program products, non-transitory computer-readable media, user equipment, base stations, wireless communication devices, and / or processing systems as substantially described herein with reference to and as illustrated by the accompanying drawings and description.
[0012] The foregoing has outlined rather broadly the features and technical advantages of examples according to the present disclosure so that the following detailed description may be better understood. Additional features and advantages will be described below. The disclosed concepts and specific examples may be easily used as a basis for users to modify or design other structures that perform the same purpose of the present disclosure. These equivalent constructions do not depart from the scope of the appended claims. The features of the concepts disclosed herein, their organization and methods of operation, and associated advantages will be better understood from the following description when considered in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Each of the accompanying drawings is provided for the purpose of illustration and description and not as a definition of limitations to the claims. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0013] In order that the above-mentioned features of the present disclosure may be understood in detail, a more specific description briefly summarized above may be obtained by reference to some of the aspects shown in the accompanying drawings. It should be noted, however, that the accompanying drawings only illustrate certain typical aspects of the present disclosure and therefore should not be considered as limiting the scope thereof, as the description may allow for other equivalent aspects. The same reference numerals in different drawings may identify the same or similar elements.
[0014] Figure 1 is a block diagram illustrating an example of a wireless communication network according to various aspects of the present disclosure.
[0015] Figure 2 is a block diagram illustrating an example of a base station communicating with a UE in a wireless communication network according to various aspects of the present disclosure.
[0016] Figure 3 is a diagram illustrating an example implementation in which two wireless devices independently generate cryptographic keys based on unique physical layer fingerprints in accordance with various aspects of the present disclosure.
[0017] Figure 4 is a diagram illustrating example processes performed, for example, by a wireless device in accordance with various aspects of the present disclosure. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0018] Various aspects of the present invention are described more fully below with reference to the accompanying drawings. However, the present disclosure can be implemented in many different forms, and should not be interpreted as being limited to any specific structure or function presented throughout the present disclosure. On the contrary, these aspects are provided to make the present disclosure detailed and complete, and the scope of the present disclosure will be fully conveyed to those skilled in the art. Based on the teachings of this article, it should be understood by those skilled in the art that the scope of the present disclosure is intended to cover any aspect of the disclosure disclosed herein, whether implemented independently of any other aspect of the present disclosure or combined with any other aspect of the present disclosure. For example, any number of aspects set forth herein can be used to implement a device or practice method. In addition, the scope of the present disclosure is intended to cover such a device or method that utilizes other structures, functions, or structures and functions practiced in addition to the various aspects of the disclosure set forth herein. It should be understood that any aspect of the present disclosure can be implemented by one or more elements in the claims.
[0019] Several aspects of telecommunication systems will now be presented with reference to various devices and techniques. These devices and techniques will be described in the following detailed description and illustrated in the accompanying drawings by various blocks, modules, components, circuits, steps, processes, algorithms, etc. (collectively referred to as "elements"). These elements may be implemented using hardware, software, or a combination thereof. Whether these elements are implemented as hardware or software depends on the specific application and the design constraints imposed on the overall system.
[0020] It should be noted that although various aspects may be described herein using terminology generally associated with 3G and / or 4G wireless technologies, various aspects of the present disclosure may be applied to other generation-based communication systems, such as 5G and beyond, including NR technologies.
[0021] Figure 1 is a diagram showing a wireless network 100 in which aspects of the present disclosure may be practiced. The wireless network 100 may be an LTE network or some other wireless network, such as a 5G or NR network. The wireless network 100 may include a plurality of BSs 110 (shown as BS 110a, BS 110b, BS 110c, and BS 110d) and other network entities. A BS is an entity that communicates with a user equipment (UE) and may also be referred to as a base station, NR BS, Node B, gNB, 5G Node B (NB), access point, transmit receive point (TRP), etc. Each BS may provide communication coverage for a particular geographic area. In 3GPP, the term "cell" may refer to a coverage area of a BS and / or a BS subsystem serving that coverage area, depending on the context in which the term is used.
[0022] A BS may provide communication coverage for a macro cell, a pico cell, a femto cell, and / or another type of cell. A macro cell may cover a relatively large geographic area (e.g., a few kilometers in radius) and may allow unrestricted access by UEs through service subscription. A pico cell may cover a relatively small geographic area and may allow unrestricted access by UEs through service subscription. A femto cell may cover a relatively small geographic area (e.g., a home) and may allow restricted access by UEs associated with the femto cell (e.g., UEs in a closed subscriber group (CSG)). A BS for a macro cell may be referred to as a macro BS. A BS for a pico cell may be referred to as a pico BS. A BS for a femto cell may be referred to as a femto BS or a home BS. In Figure 1 In the example shown, BS 110a may be a macro BS for macro cell 102a, BS 110b may be a pico BS for pico cell 102b, and BS 110c may be a femto BS 102c for a femto cell. A BS may support one or more (e.g., three) cells. The terms "eNB", "base station", "NR BS", "gNB", "TRP", "AP", "Node B", "5G NB", and "cell" may be used interchangeably herein.
[0023] In some aspects, the cells may not necessarily be fixed, and the geographic area of the cells may move depending on the location of the mobile BS. In some aspects, the BSs may be interconnected to each other and / or to one or more other BSs or network nodes (not shown) in the wireless network 100 through various types of backhaul interfaces such as direct physical connections, virtual networks, wireless channels, and / or the like using any suitable transport network.
[0024] The wireless network 100 may also include a relay station. A relay station is an entity that can receive data transmissions from an upstream station (e.g., a BS or a UE) and send data transmissions to a downstream station (e.g., a UE or a BS). A relay station may also be a UE that can relay transmissions for other UEs. Figure 1 In the example shown, a relay station 110d may communicate with a macro BS 110a and a UE 120d to facilitate communication between the BS 110a and the UE 120d. A relay station may also be referred to as a relay BS, a relay base station, a relay, or the like.
[0025] The wireless network 100 may be a heterogeneous network including different types of BSs, such as a macro BS, a pico BS, a femto BS, a relay BS, etc. These different types of BSs may have different transmit power levels, different coverage areas, and different effects on interference in the wireless network 100. For example, a macro BS may have a high transmit power level (e.g., 5 watts to 40 watts), while a pico BS, a femto BS, and a relay BS may have a lower transmit power level (e.g., 0.1 watt to 2 watts).
[0026] A network controller 130 may be coupled to a set of BSs and may provide coordination and control for these BSs. The network controller 130 may communicate with the BSs via a wireless or wired backhaul. The BSs may also communicate with each other (eg, directly or indirectly via a wireless backhaul or a wired backhaul).
[0027] UE 120 (e.g., 120a, 120b, 120c) can be dispersed in the wireless network 100, and each UE can be stationary or mobile. UE can also be referred to as an access terminal, terminal, mobile station, subscriber unit, station, etc. UE can be a cellular phone (e.g., a smart phone), a personal digital assistant (PDA), a wireless modem, a wireless communication device, a handheld device, a laptop computer, a cordless phone, a wireless local loop (WLL) station, a tablet computer, a camera, a gaming device, a netbook, a smartbook, an ultrabook, a medical device or equipment, a biometric sensor / device, a wearable device (smart watch, smart clothing, smart glasses, smart wristband, smart jewelry (e.g., smart ring, smart bracelet)), an entertainment device (e.g., a music or video device or a satellite radio), a vehicle component or sensor, a smart meter / sensor, an industrial manufacturing device, a global positioning system device, or any other suitable device configured to communicate via a wireless medium or a wired medium.
[0028] Some UEs may be considered as machine type communication (MTC) or evolved or enhanced machine type communication (eMTC) UEs. MTC and eMTC UEs include, for example, robots, drones, remote devices, sensors, meters, monitors, location tags, etc., which may communicate with a base station, another device (e.g., a remote device), or some other entity. A wireless node may provide, for example, a connection to a network or to a network (e.g., a wide area network such as the Internet or a cellular network) via a wired communication link or a wireless communication link. Some UEs may be considered as Internet of Things (IoT) devices, and / or may be implemented as NB-IoT (narrowband Internet of Things) devices. Some UEs may be considered as customer premises equipment (CPE). UE 120 may be included inside a housing that houses components of UE 120 (such as a processor component, a memory component, etc.).
[0029] Generally, any number of wireless networks can be deployed in a given geographic area. Each wireless network can support a specific RAT and can operate on one or more frequencies. RAT can also be referred to as radio technology, air interface, etc. Frequency can also be referred to as carrier, channel, etc. Each frequency can support a single RAT in a given geographic area to avoid interference between wireless networks of different RATs. In some cases, NR or 5G RAT networks can be deployed.
[0030] In some aspects, two or more UEs 120 (e.g., shown as UE 120a and UE 120e) may communicate directly using one or more sidelink channels (e.g., without using base station 110 as an intermediary for communicating with each other). For example, UE 120 may communicate using peer-to-peer (P2P) communication, device-to-device (D2D) communication, vehicle-to-everything (V2X) protocols (e.g., which may include vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) protocols, vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) protocols, etc.), mesh networks, etc. In this case, UE 120 may perform scheduling operations, resource selection operations, and / or other operations described elsewhere herein as being performed by base station 110.
[0031] As pointed out above, Figure 1 are provided as examples. Other examples may be related to Figure 1 Different than described.
[0032] Figure 2 A block diagram of a design 200 of a base station 110 and a UE 120 is shown, which may be Figure 1 Base station 110 may be equipped with T antennas 234a through 234t, and UE 120 may be equipped with R antennas 252a through 252r, where in general T ≥ 1 and R ≥ 1.
[0033] At the base station 110, the transmit processor 220 may receive data for one or more UEs from the data source 212, select one or more modulation and coding schemes (MCS) for each UE based at least in part on a channel quality indicator (CQI) received from the UE, process (e.g., encode and modulate) the data for each UE based at least in part on the MCS selected for the UE, and provide data symbols for all UEs. The transmit processor 220 may also process system information (e.g., for semi-static resource partitioning information (SRPI), etc.) and control information (e.g., CQI requests, grants, upper layer signaling, etc.) and provide overhead symbols and control symbols. The transmit processor 220 may also generate reference symbols for reference signals (e.g., cell-specific reference signals (CRS)) and synchronization signals (e.g., primary synchronization signals (PSS) and secondary synchronization signals (SSS)). The transmit (TX) multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) processor 230 may perform spatial processing (e.g., precoding) on data symbols, control symbols, overhead symbols, and / or reference symbols, if applicable, and may provide T output symbol streams to T modulators (MOD) 232a to 232t. Each modulator 232 may process a corresponding output symbol stream (e.g., for OFDM, etc.) to obtain an output sample stream. Each modulator 232 may also process (e.g., convert to analog, amplify, filter, and up-convert) the output sample stream to obtain a downlink signal. T downlink signals from modulators 232a to 232t may be transmitted via T antennas 234a to 234t, respectively. According to various aspects described in more detail below, position coding may be used to generate synchronization signals to transmit additional information.
[0034] At the UE 120, antennas 252a to 252r may receive downlink signals from the base station 110 and / or other base stations, and may provide received signals to demodulators (DEMODs) 254a to 254r, respectively. Each demodulator 254 may condition (e.g., filter, amplify, downconvert, and digitize) the received signal to obtain input samples. Each demodulator 254 may also process the input samples (e.g., for OFDM, etc.) to obtain received symbols. The MIMO detector 256 may obtain received symbols from all R demodulators 254a to 254r, perform MIMO detection on the received symbols (if applicable), and provide detected symbols. The receive processor 258 may process (e.g., demodulate and decode) the detected symbols, provide decoded data for the UE 120 to the data sink 260, and provide decoded control information and system information to the controller / processor 280. The channel processor may determine reference signal received power (RSRP), received signal strength indicator (RSSI), reference signal received quality (RSRQ), channel quality indicator (CQI), etc. In some aspects, one or more components of UE 120 may be included in a housing.
[0035] On the uplink, at the UE 120, a transmit processor 264 may receive and process data from a data source 262 and control information from a controller / processor 280 (e.g., for reports including RSRP, RSSI, RSRQ, CQI, etc.). The transmit processor 264 may also generate reference symbols for one or more reference signals. The symbols from the transmit processor 264 may be precoded by a TX MIMO processor 266 (if applicable), further processed by modulators 254a through 254r (e.g., for DFT-s-OFDM, CP-OFDM, etc.), and transmitted to the base station 110. At the base station 110, uplink signals from the UE 120 and other UEs may be received by the antenna 234, processed by the demodulator 232, detected by the MIMO detector 236 (if applicable), and further processed by the receive processor 238 to obtain decoded data and control information transmitted by the UE 120. The receive processor 238 may provide decoded data to a data sink 239 and provide decoded control information to a controller / processor 240. The base station 110 may include a communication unit 244 and communicate with the network controller 130 via the communication unit 244. The network controller 130 may include a communication unit 294, a controller / processor 290, and a memory 292.
[0036] Controller / processor 240 of base station 110, controller / processor 280 of UE 120, controller / processor 290 of network controller 130, and / or Figure 2Any other component of the system may perform one or more techniques associated with defect-based physical layer fingerprinting. For example, controller / processor 240 of base station 110, controller / processor 280 of UE 120, controller / processor 290 of network controller 130, and / or Figure 2 Any other component of the controller / processor 240 of the base station 110, the controller / processor 280 of the UE 120, and / or the like may perform one or more techniques to use a defect-based physical layer fingerprint and / or one or more MIMO multipath channel characteristics to generate cryptographic keys that are not shared during the key exchange session. For example, the controller / processor 240 of the base station 110, the controller / processor 280 of the UE 120, and / or Figure 2 Any other component of the can perform or direct e.g. Figure 4 400 and / or other processes described herein. Memories 242, 282, 292 may store data and program codes for base station 110, UE 120, and network controller 130, respectively. In some aspects, memory 242, memory 282, and / or memory 292 may include a non-transitory computer-readable medium storing one or more instructions for wireless communication. For example, one or more instructions, when executed by one or more processors of base station 110, UE 120, network controller 130, etc., may perform or direct, for example, Figure 4 The scheduler 246 may schedule UEs for data transmission on the downlink and / or uplink.
[0037] In some aspects, the base station 110, UE 120, network controller 130, etc. may include components for receiving a beamforming signal from a transmitting device, components for estimating a weighted sum based at least in part on a plurality of coefficients associated with the beamforming signal, components for determining a cryptographic key based at least in part on a ratio between a plurality of coefficients in the weighted sum associated with the beamforming signal; components for protecting one or more communications between the wireless device and the transmitting device based at least in part on the cryptographic key, etc. In some aspects, such components may include a combination of Figure 2 One or more components of the base station 110 described herein, such as antenna 234, DEMOD 232, MIMO detector 236, receive processor 238, controller / processor 240, transmit processor 220, TX MIMO processor 230, MOD 232, antenna 234, etc. Additionally or alternatively, such components may include a combination of Figure 2One or more components of the UE 120 described herein, such as the controller / processor 280, the transmit processor 264, the TX MIMO processor 266, the MOD 254, the antenna 252, the DEMOD 254, the MIMO detector 256, the receive processor 258, etc. Additionally or alternatively, such components may include a combination of Figure 2 One or more components of a network controller 290 are depicted, such as a controller / processor 290, a memory 292, a communication unit 294, and the like.
[0038] As mentioned above, Figure 2 are provided as examples. Other examples may be related to Figure 2 The examples described are different.
[0039] When two devices communicate via a wireless channel in a wireless network (e.g., an LTE network, an NR network, etc.), a cryptographic key may be used to encrypt or otherwise encrypt traffic sent via the wireless channel. For example, security techniques are typically implemented in wireless networks using known send-receive decoding that relies on higher-layer encryption using a cryptographic key that is shared between endpoint devices and is used to encrypt plaintext into ciphertext and decrypt ciphertext into plaintext. Therefore, in order to protect the wireless channel and enable confidential communication via the wireless channel, the endpoint devices may perform a key exchange session at the beginning of a communication session to negotiate or otherwise exchange cryptographic keys to be used during the communication session. In security protocols that rely on key exchange sessions, the need to exchange cryptographic keys to be used during a communication session is a weakness that can be exploited by unauthorized users (e.g., eavesdroppers). For example, if an unauthorized user has access to a cryptographic key, the unauthorized user may be able to decipher or decrypt data sent during a communication session. That is, if two devices cannot establish a secure initial key exchange, the devices will not be able to communicate securely via a wireless channel without the risk of information sent via the wireless channel being intercepted and decrypted by an unauthorized third party who obtains the secret key during the initial key exchange.
[0040] Some aspects described herein provide techniques and apparatus for generating cryptographic keys at different wireless devices in a coordinated manner without the wireless devices explicitly sharing cryptographic keys or any parameters for generating cryptographic keys. For example, one or more components in an analog path may be associated with a set of defects or unnatural objects (e.g., power amplifier nonlinearities, frequency-dependent residual sidebands (RSBs), frequency drift, etc.) that are unique to a particular device, such that any given device may have a unique radio frequency (RF) fingerprint that can be used to generate cryptographic keys. For example, the set of defects or unnatural objects on one device may generally be different from another device, such that the set of defects or unnatural objects may be unique in the sense that the set of defects or unnatural objects on two different devices may rarely or never be the same. In addition, some techniques and apparatus described herein may use beamforming to send a beamformed signal to an intended receiver via a MIMO multipath channel, and the beamformed signal may be associated with a set of digital predistortion (DPD) coefficients (e.g., channel phase, beamforming phase, etc.) that are different at different spatial locations.
[0041] For example, as described herein, a beamformed signal may generally refer to a signal transmitted from a device having multiple antennas, and the beamformed signal may be directed in a particular direction (e.g., toward an intended receiver) by controlling the signals transmitted from the multiple antennas. Thus, as described in further detail herein, a transmitting device having multiple transmitting antennas may generate a cryptographic key based on one or more imperfections associated with one or more components (e.g., a power amplifier) in an analog path, and the transmitting device may use beamforming techniques to direct a beam (e.g., a beamformed signal) toward the spatial location of an intended receiver via a MIMO multipath channel. As described in further detail below, based on one or more coefficients related to imperfections associated with one or more components in an analog path and certain characteristics of a DPD coefficient of a beam when the intended receiver is spatially located at or near the center of a beam directed toward the intended receiver, the intended receiver may estimate a weighted sum associated with the beam and use the weighted sum to derive the same cryptographic key as the transmitting device.
[0042] In this manner, wireless devices (e.g., a transmitting device and an intended receiver) can use cryptographic keys to protect one or more communications over a MIMO multipath channel without having to perform a key exchange session or otherwise explicitly share cryptographic keys or parameters for generating cryptographic keys. In addition, because the DPD coefficients are different at different spatial locations, an eavesdropper device at a different physical location cannot correctly estimate one or more coefficients associated with an imperfection associated with one or more components in the analog path between the wireless devices 310, 320, and therefore cannot generate a cryptographic key for protecting one or more communications between the wireless devices 310, 320.
[0043] Figure 3 3 is a diagram illustrating an example implementation 300 in accordance with various aspects of the present disclosure, in which two wireless devices independently generate cryptographic keys based on unique physical layer fingerprints. For example, as described in further detail herein, the two wireless devices can independently generate cryptographic keys based on one or more defects unique to one or more components in an analog RF path between the wireless devices. For example, in Figure 3 In the illustrated example implementation 300, a first wireless device 310 (Alice) and a second wireless device 320 (Bob) establish a secure communication session that is protected from unauthorized access by an eavesdropper device 330 (Eve). In general, the first wireless device 310 and the second wireless device 320 may correspond to a base station and a UE communicating via an uplink and a downlink, a pair of UEs communicating via a sidelink, a pair of network devices (e.g., a base station, a network controller, a server, etc.) communicating via a wireless backhaul link, and the like.
[0044] exist Figure 3 In the illustrated example implementation 300, a first wireless device 310 may correspond to a multi-antenna transmitter that transmits a beamformed signal (which may be referred to herein simply as a beam) directed toward a second wireless device 320 having one or more receive antennas. Typically, each of the multiple transmit antennas may be associated with one or more nonlinear power amplifiers. More specifically, in a linear power amplifier, the output signal is typically proportional to the input signal, while a nonlinear power amplifier may produce an output signal that is not proportional to the input signal. For example, in a wireless device having multiple transmit antennas each associated with one or more nonlinear power amplifiers, the output signal from each nonlinear power amplifier may be represented as follows:
[0045] PA n =x+a n |x| 2 x
[0046] Where n is the index of the nonlinear power amplifier, x is the input signal of the nonlinear power amplifier, and a n is a coefficient representing the amount of nonlinearity in the power amplifier (e.g., depends on the power supplied to the nonlinear power amplifier), and the high-order term a n |x| 2 x is the Volterra kernel representing the nonlinearity of the power amplifier. In general, for each power amplifier, the coefficient a n The values of can be the same or different. For example, as described in further detail elsewhere herein, the coefficient a can be controlled independently for each power amplifier. n (e.g., based on unique characteristics associated with the power amplifier, the power level provided to the power amplifier, etc.). Furthermore, although the foregoing examples use one Volterra kernel to represent the nonlinearity of the power amplifier, in some aspects one or more additional Volterra kernels (e.g., b n |x| 4 x, etc.) to represent the nonlinearity of one or more power amplifiers. Thus, in some aspects, the output signal from each nonlinear power amplifier may generally include a linear term (e.g., x in the aforementioned example), and any suitable number of nonlinear terms (or Volterra kernels) to represent any suitable type of nonlinear behavior, effect, characteristic, property, etc. associated with one or more components in the analog RF path between the wireless devices 310, 320. For example, in the aforementioned example, a n |x| 2 x may represent a nonlinear relationship between input power and output power associated with the power amplifier, although the Volterra kernel may represent or otherwise model other suitable types of nonlinear behavior, such as memory effects that cause power amplifier characteristics to change as a function of past input levels.
[0047] like Figure 3 340, the first wireless device 310 may generate cryptographic keys to be used to protect one or more communications with the second wireless device 320 based on one or more unique defects that provide a unique RF fingerprint to the first wireless device 310. For example, as described herein, the unique defects may include nonlinearities of a power amplifier as represented above. Additionally or alternatively, in some aspects, the unique defects may include frequency-dependent RSBs associated with mismatches between in-phase (I) and quadrature (Q) components, frequency drift associated with an oscillator's deviation from a nominal frequency or oscillator phase noise (e.g., due to component aging, temperature changes, variations in bias voltages, etc.), and / or other suitable non-natural objects in the analog path that provide a unique RF fingerprint for a particular wireless device.
[0048] In some aspects, when the only imperfection used by the first wireless device 310 to generate the cryptographic key is related to power amplifier nonlinearity, the cryptographic key may correspond to the average of the nonlinear coefficients across all power amplifiers in a particular analog path (e.g., power amplifiers associated with multiple transmit antennas in a given transmit chain). For example, in some aspects, a cryptographic key generated by the first wireless device 310 and to be used to protect one or more communications with the second wireless device 320 may be represented as follows:
[0049]
[0050] where n is the index of each nonlinear power amplifier, and a n is a coefficient representing the amount of nonlinearity per power amplifier. For example, as shown by reference numeral 342, the first wireless device 310 may transmit a beam directed toward an intended receiver (the second wireless device 320), and the beam may generally be transmitted using multiple transmit antennas coupled to multiple power amplifiers, each of which may be coupled with a different nonlinear coefficient a. n The second wireless device 320 may be associated with a nonlinear coefficient because each power amplifier may have a unique nonlinear property. Therefore, the average of the nonlinear coefficients across all power amplifiers may be used as a cryptographic key, and as indicated by reference numeral 344, the second wireless device 320 may estimate the cryptographic key based on one or more coefficients associated with the beam transmitted by the first wireless device 310. For example, in order to steer the beam toward the second wireless device 320, the first wireless device 310 may control the beamforming phase, relative amplitude, etc. associated with the signal at each transmit antenna to establish a pattern of constructive and destructive interference that causes the signal to coherently combine at the spatial location of the second wireless device 320. Therefore, the second wireless device 320 may estimate the cryptographic key generated by the first wireless device 310 based on various coefficients associated with the beam received from the first wireless device 310, which may include one or more coefficients related to one or more imperfections (e.g., nonlinearities) uniquely associated with a plurality of power amplifiers at the first wireless device 310 and one or more coefficients depending on the spatial location of the second wireless device 320.
[0051] For example, as described above, the first wireless device 310 may use multiple transmit antennas to transmit a beam directed toward the second wireless device 320, each transmit antenna being associated with one or more power amplifiers, and the term n may represent the number of transmit antennas. Thus, in some aspects, a signal carried in a beam received by the second wireless device 320 may be represented as follows:
[0052]
[0053] where h n is the channel phase between the nth transmit antenna at the second wireless device 320 and the first wireless device 310, θ n is the beamforming phase applied to the nth transmit antenna (e.g., to steer the beam toward a particular azimuth angle that results in coherent combining of the beams at the spatial location of the second wireless device 320), and (x+a n |x| 2 x) is the output signal from the nth power amplifier, as described above. Thus, the signal received by the second wireless device 320 may correspond to a weighted sum based on various coefficients that depend on one or more imperfections associated with the first wireless device 310 (e.g., power amplifier nonlinearity in this example), a beamforming phase applied at the first wireless device 310 to steer the beam toward the second wireless device 320, and a channel phase that depends on one or more MIMO multipath channel characteristics between the first wireless device 310 and the second wireless device 320 (e.g., obstacles, reflective surfaces, and / or other objects in the environment that affect the way the signal propagates between the first wireless device 310 and the second wireless device 320).
[0054] In some aspects, the second wireless device 320 may estimate the cryptographic key based on a ratio between multiple coefficients in a weighted sum associated with the received signal. For example, in some aspects, the second wireless device 320 may estimate the cryptographic key as a ratio of one or more third-order coefficients to one or more first-order coefficients, as follows:
[0055]
[0056] In some aspects, because the beam transmitted by the first wireless device 310 is directed toward the spatial location of the second wireless device 320, the signals transmitted from the multiple antennas of the first wireless device 310 can be coherently combined at the spatial location of the second wireless device 320. For example, when the beam is steered or otherwise directed toward a particular azimuth in space, the signals making up the beam can be coherently combined in the particular azimuth, which in this case corresponds to the spatial location of the second wireless device 320. That is, the first wireless device 310 tunes or otherwise controls θ n to ensure that the beams will be coherently combined at the spatial location of the second wireless device 320, which results in the property θ for each transmit antenna n h n ≈1. Therefore, in the above ratio, θ n h n The term can be simplified to one, resulting in the second wireless device 320 estimating the cryptographic key as follows:
[0057]
[0058] It is substantially equivalent to the cryptographic key generated at the first wireless device 310. In addition, in some aspects, the beam may not be directed to or otherwise precisely centered on the spatial location of the second wireless device 320 (e.g., due to multipath channel characteristics). Therefore, in some aspects, the second wireless device 320 can quantize each coefficient in the weighted sum and estimate the cryptographic key based on the quantized coefficients to minimize the probability of incorrectly estimating the cryptographic key.
[0059] In some aspects, such as Figure 3 As further shown in FIG. 3 and by reference numeral 346, the eavesdropper device 330 may also receive the beam transmitted by the first wireless device 310. However, as shown by reference numeral 348, the eavesdropper device 330 cannot estimate the correct cryptographic key because the beam is directed toward the second wireless device 320 (rather than toward the eavesdropper device 330), and thus at least the channel phase coefficient will be different at the eavesdropper device 330 due to different multipath channel characteristics. Specifically, in a manner similar to that described above, the signal carried in the beam received by the eavesdropper device 330 may be represented as follows:
[0060] y Eve =∑ n g n θ n (x+a n |x| 2 x)
[0061] where g n is the channel phase between the receiving antenna at the eavesdropper device 330 and the nth transmitting antenna at the first wireless device 310. Therefore, when trying to estimate the cryptographic key as a ratio of one or more third-order coefficients to one or more first-order coefficients, the eavesdropper device 330 can estimate the cryptographic key as follows:
[0062]
[0063] In this case, since the beam is not steered toward the eavesdropper device 330, θ n With g m The product of is not equal to one, so the eavesdropper device 330 cannot correctly estimate the cryptographic key Furthermore, even if the eavesdropper device 330 is somehow able to obtain h m (e.g., the channel phase between the receiving antenna at the second wireless device 320 and the nth transmitting antenna at the first wireless device 310), the eavesdropper device 330 still cannot use h mFor example, even if the eavesdropper device 330 knows the reciprocal wireless channel between the first wireless device 310 and the second wireless device 320, the eavesdropper device 330 can only obtain the weighted sum And the cryptographic key cannot be estimated without knowing the values of the individual coefficients
[0064] In other words, in order to correctly estimate the cryptographic key to The eavesdropper device 330 will have to correctly estimate θ n 、a n , and h n , while the intended receiver (second wireless device 320) can use a single receive antenna to estimate only the weighted sum to derive the correct cryptographic key based on the beams coherently combined at the spatial location of the second wireless device 320. The eavesdropper device 330 would have to employ an array of receive antennas at least equal to the number of transmit antennas used at the first wireless device 310 in order to estimate the correct cryptographic key based on θ. n 、a n , and h n This is prohibitively expensive for many potential eavesdroppers, especially when the first wireless device 310 is a millimeter wave base station using 64, 128, or 256 transmit antennas. Even if the eavesdropper device 330 employs a sufficiently large array of receive antennas (e.g., N receive antennas), the eavesdropper device 330 will still need to calculate the coefficients of the N×N matrix to estimate θ individually. n 、a n , and h n For example, assuming noise-free reception by the eavesdropper device 330 with an equal number of receiving and transmitting antennas, the signal received at the mth antenna at the eavesdropper device 330 is:
[0065]
[0066] where g m,n is the channel response between the nth transmitting antenna at the first wireless device 310 and the mth receiving antenna at the eavesdropper device 330, which can be written in the following matrix form:
[0067] y Eve =G(x+ a |x| 2 x)
[0068] in a =[a0,…a (Tx-1) ] T , and G is a MIMO (e.g., beamforming) matrix, where the elements g m,n θ nThe mth row and nth column between the first wireless device 310 and the eavesdropper device 330. In this case, the eavesdropper device 330 can only estimate:
[0069] G -1 y Eve =(x+ a |x| 2 x)
[0070] And only if the perfect estimate a The eavesdropper device 330 can only correctly estimate the cryptographic key when θ is less than θ, which is practically impossible due to the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) requirement. For example, in addition to requiring the number of receive antennas to equal or exceed the number of transmit antennas used at the first wireless device 310, estimating G is difficult when there are many transmit antennas due to link budget constraints. In contrast, the intended receiver (second wireless device 320) does not need to estimate the elements of the H channel matrix because θ is based on the spatial location of the intended receiver that is steered toward the beam. n and h n The product of simplifies to unity (1). Similarly, noise and link budget limitations may prevent the eavesdropper device 330 from accurately estimating a Because the estimation of each element of each antenna requires that the SNR at the eavesdropper device 330 is 20log higher than the SNR at the second wireless device 320 10 (Tx), where Tx is the number of transmit antennas used by the first wireless device 310 (e.g., assuming that the first wireless device 310 uses 128 transmit antennas, the SNR at the eavesdropper device 330 would need to be approximately 40 dB higher than the SNR at the second wireless device 320, which is not practically achievable). Specifically, the SNR must be higher at the eavesdropper device 330 because the eavesdropper device 330 does not receive the beamforming gain that the second wireless device 320 experiences due to the coherently combined signals at the spatial location of the second wireless device 320.
[0071] Thus, because the cryptographic key cannot be estimated or otherwise obtained by the eavesdropper device 330, the cryptographic key can be used to protect one or more communications between the first wireless device 310 and the second wireless device 320. For example, in some aspects, the first wireless device 310 can use the cryptographic key to encrypt information to be sent to the second wireless device 320, and the second wireless device 320 can use the cryptographic key to decrypt information received from the first wireless device 310. In similar aspects, the second wireless device 320 can use the cryptographic key to encrypt information to be sent to the first wireless device 310, and the first wireless device 310 can use the cryptographic key to decrypt information received from the second wireless device 320.
[0072] Additionally or alternatively, the cryptographic key may be used as an authentication mechanism to verify the identity of the sending device. For example, because the θ n 、a n and h n The first wireless device 310 can calculate the weighted sum The weighted sum is sent as a signature associated with one or more messages sent in the beam to the second wireless device 320 (e.g., in a manner similar to digital signatures performed using a private key in a public key or asymmetric cryptographic system). In this way, the second wireless device 320 can independently calculate a weighted sum based on the beam received via one or more receive antennas and compare the calculation of the weighted sum to the signature received from the first wireless device 310. In this way, if the calculation of the weighted sum matches the signature received from the first wireless device 310, the second wireless device 320 can verify the legitimacy of the transmitting device and / or detect when the beam is sent by a rogue device (e.g., as in a man-in-the-middle attack) if the calculation of the weighted sum is different from the signature accompanying the beam transmission. In addition, because the fingerprinting mechanism described herein is based on a weighted sum including one or more DPD coefficients related to channel phase, beamforming phase, etc., the second wireless device 320 does not have to be located at the center of the beam in order to calculate the expected signature of the first wireless device 310. In addition, because the eavesdropper device 330 and the first wireless device 310 are in different spatial locations, even if the eavesdropper device 330 obtains the weighted sum in some way The eavesdropper device 330 cannot use the channel phase h n Generate a transmit beam.
[0073] In some aspects, to provide further security via an additional degree of randomness, the first wireless device 310 can generate one or more waveforms to exploit one or more defects that provide a unique fingerprint of the first wireless device 310 in a controlled manner. For example, in some aspects, the first wireless device 310 can configure or otherwise control the a of each power amplifier by using different input powers per power amplifier, different power supply levels, etc. n Thus, during the key establishment phase, the first wireless device 310 may transmit at different power levels per power amplifier, which may result in a value that will be used as a cryptographic key or fingerprint for authentication. n for a particular power amplifier. n The value of may generally depend on the power backoff relative to the saturation of the power amplifier. For example, if the signal is transmitted at a power that is sufficiently backoff from the saturation point of the power amplifier, then a ncan have a small value, and the power amplifier can operate linearly or with small nonlinear terms. However, if the power is increased to a level close to the saturation point of the power amplifier, then a n Thus, by changing the power level at which each power amplifier operates (eg, from zero to a power level close to the saturation point of the power amplifier), the first wireless device 310 may use a n The specific combination of power amplifiers used to control which power amplifiers contribute to the establishment of the cryptographic key or fingerprint, the contribution of each power amplifier to the establishment of the cryptographic key or fingerprint, etc. In addition, during normal communication between the first wireless device 310 and the second wireless device 320, the a used during the key establishment phase is not repeated. n to prevent the eavesdropper device 330 from gaining access to the communications between the wireless devices 310 and 320.
[0074] As pointed out above, Figure 3 are provided as examples. Other examples may be related to Figure 3 The examples described are different.
[0075] Figure 4 4 is a diagram illustrating an example process 400 performed, for example, by a wireless device in accordance with various aspects of the present disclosure. Example process 400 is an example in which a wireless device (e.g., base station 110, UE 120, network controller 130, wireless device 310, wireless device 320, etc.) performs operations to generate a cryptographic key based at least in part on one or more defects related to a unique physical layer fingerprint.
[0076] like Figure 4 As shown, in some aspects, process 400 may include receiving a beamformed signal from a transmitting device (block 410). For example, a wireless device (e.g., using antenna 234, DEMOD 232, MIMO detector 236, receive processor 238, controller / processor 240, antenna 252, DEMOD 254, MIMO detector 256, receive processor 258, controller / processor 280, controller / processor 290, communication unit 294, etc.) may receive a beamformed signal from a transmitting device, as described above.
[0077] like Figure 4As further shown in FIG. 4 , in some aspects, process 400 may include estimating a weighted sum based at least in part on a plurality of coefficients associated with the beamformed signal, wherein the plurality of coefficients include one or more coefficients related to one or more impairments associated with the transmitting device and one or more coefficients that depend on the spatial location of the wireless device (block 420). For example, the wireless device (e.g., using controller / processor 240, controller / processor 280, controller / processor 290, etc.) may estimate the weighted sum based at least in part on the plurality of coefficients associated with the beamformed signal, as described above. In some aspects, the plurality of coefficients include one or more coefficients related to one or more impairments associated with the transmitting device and one or more coefficients that depend on the spatial location of the wireless device.
[0078] like Figure 4 As further shown in FIG. 4 , in some aspects, process 400 may include determining a cryptographic key based at least in part on a ratio between a plurality of coefficients in a weighted sum associated with the beamformed signal (block 430). For example, a wireless device (e.g., using controller / processor 240, controller / processor 280, controller / processor 290, etc.) may determine a cryptographic key based at least in part on a ratio between a plurality of coefficients in a weighted sum associated with the beamformed signal, as described above.
[0079] like Figure 4 As further shown in FIG. 4 , in some aspects, process 400 may include protecting one or more communications between the wireless device and the transmitting device based at least in part on the cryptographic key (block 440). For example, the wireless device (e.g., using antenna 234, DEMOD 232, MIMO detector 236, receive processor 238, controller / processor 240, transmit processor 220, TX MIMO processor 230, MOD 232, antenna 252, DEMOD 254, MIMO detector 256, receive processor 258, controller / processor 280, transmit processor 264, TX MIMO processor 266, MOD 254, controller / processor 290, communication unit 294, etc.) may protect one or more communications between the wireless device and the transmitting device based at least in part on the cryptographic key, as described above.
[0080] Process 400 may include additional aspects, such as any single aspect and / or any combination of aspects described below and / or in conjunction with one or more other processes described elsewhere herein.
[0081] In a first aspect, beamformed signals are coherently combined at the spatial location of the wireless device.
[0082] In a second aspect, either alone or in combination with the first aspect, the one or more imperfections associated with the transmitting device include non-linearities associated with one or more power amplifiers.
[0083] In a third aspect, either alone or in combination with one or more of the first and second aspects, the cryptographic key is based at least in part on an average nonlinearity between the plurality of power amplifiers.
[0084] In a fourth aspect, alone or in combination with one or more of the first to third aspects, the one or more defects associated with the transmitting device include frequency-dependent residual sidebands associated with one or more power amplifiers.
[0085] In a fifth aspect, alone or in combination with one or more of the first to fourth aspects, the one or more defects associated with the transmitting device include frequency drift associated with one or more power amplifiers.
[0086] In the sixth aspect, alone or in combination with one or more of the first to fifth aspects, the one or more coefficients depending on the spatial position of the wireless device include a channel phase between the wireless device and one or more transmitting antennas at the transmitting device, and a beamforming phase applied at each of the one or more transmitting antennas.
[0087] In a seventh aspect, either alone or in combination with one or more of the first to sixth aspects, one or more coefficients related to one or more impairments associated with a transmitting device are based at least in part on a transmit power level associated with a beamforming signal.
[0088] In an eighth aspect, either alone or in combination with one or more of the first to seventh aspects, the wireless device quantizes a plurality of coefficients and determines a cryptographic key based at least in part on the quantized plurality of coefficients.
[0089] In the ninth aspect, either alone or in combination with one or more of the first to eighth aspects, protecting one or more communications between a wireless device and a sending device includes one or more of decrypting information received from the sending device using a cryptographic key, encrypting information sent to the sending device using a cryptographic key, or authenticating the identity of the sending device using a cryptographic key.
[0090] In a tenth aspect, alone or in combination with one or more of the first to ninth aspects, the beamforming signal comprises one or more Volterra kernels representing one or more imperfections associated with the transmitting device.
[0091] although Figure 4 Example blocks of process 400 are shown, but in some aspects, process 400 may include Figure 4 More blocks, fewer blocks, different blocks, or differently arranged blocks than those depicted in process 400. Additionally or alternatively, two or more of the blocks of process 400 may be executed in parallel.
[0092] The above disclosure provides illustration and description, but is not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the aspects to the precise forms disclosed. Modifications and variations may be made in light of the above disclosure or may be acquired from practice of the aspects.
[0093] As used herein, the term "component" is intended to be broadly interpreted as hardware, software, and / or a combination of hardware and software. As used herein, a processor is implemented in hardware, firmware, and / or a combination of hardware and software.
[0094] As used herein, satisfying a threshold may refer to a value that is greater than a threshold, greater than or equal to a threshold, less than a threshold, less than or equal to a threshold, equal to a threshold, not equal to a threshold, etc., depending on the context.
[0095] Obviously, the systems and / or methods described herein can be implemented in various forms of hardware, firmware, and / or combinations of hardware and software. The actual dedicated control hardware or software code used to implement these systems and / or methods is not a limitation on the various aspects. Therefore, the operation and behavior of the systems and / or methods are described without reference to specific software codes. It should be understood that software and hardware can be designed to implement the systems and / or methods based at least in part on the description herein.
[0096] Although specific combinations of features are cited in the claims and / or disclosed in the specification, these combinations are not intended to limit the disclosure of the various aspects. In fact, many of these features can be combined in ways that are not specifically cited in the claims and / or not disclosed in the specification. Although each dependent claim listed below may only be directly subordinate to one claim, the disclosure of the various aspects includes each dependent claim combined with each other claim in the claim set. The phrase "at least one" in the list of reference items refers to any combination of those items, including single members. As an example, "at least one of a, b or c" is intended to cover a, b, c, ab, ac, bc and abc, as well as combinations with multiple identical elements (e.g., aa, aaa, aab, aac, abb, acc, bb, bbb, bbc, cc and ccc or any other order of a, b and c).
[0097] Unless explicitly stated, any element, behavior or instruction used herein should not be interpreted as critical or essential. In addition, as used herein, the articles "one" and "an" are intended to include one or more items and can be used interchangeably with "one or more". In addition, as used herein, the terms "set" and "group" are intended to include one or more items (e.g., related items, unrelated items, combinations of related items and unrelated items, etc.), and can be used interchangeably with "one or more". In the case of only one item being meant, the phrase "only one" or similar language is used. In addition, as used herein, the terms "has", "have", "having", etc. are intended to be open terms. In addition, the phrase "based on" is intended to mean "based at least in part on", unless otherwise explicitly stated.
Claims
1. A method of wireless communication, comprising: receiving, at a wireless device, signals from a transmitting device, wherein the signals have been beamformed by the transmitting device and steered toward the wireless device using a plurality of transmit antennas, and wherein the beamformed signals are coherently combined at a spatial location of the wireless device; estimating, at the wireless device, a weighted sum based at least in part on a plurality of coefficients associated with the beamformed signal, wherein the plurality of coefficients includes one or more coefficients related to one or more impairments related to nonlinearities associated with one or more power amplifiers of the transmit device associated with the plurality of transmit antennas and one or more coefficients dependent on the spatial location of the wireless device; determining, at the wireless device, a cryptographic key based at least in part on a ratio between the plurality of coefficients in the weighted sum associated with the beamformed signal; and At the wireless device, one or more communications between the wireless device and the sending device are secured based at least in part on the cryptographic key.
2. The method according to claim 1, wherein The cryptographic key is based at least in part on an average nonlinearity among a plurality of power amplifiers.
3. The method according to claim 1, wherein The one or more coefficients related to one or more impairments associated with the transmitting device are based at least in part on a transmit power level associated with the beamformed signal. 4 . The method of claim 1 , further comprising quantizing the plurality of coefficients, wherein the cryptographic key is determined based at least in part on the quantized plurality of coefficients.
5. The method according to claim 1, wherein Protecting the one or more communications between the wireless device and the sending device includes one or more of: using the cryptographic key to decrypt information received from the sending device, using the cryptographic key to encrypt information sent to the sending device, or using the cryptographic key to authenticate the identity of the sending device.
6. The method according to claim 1, wherein The beamformed signal includes one or more Volterra kernels representing the one or more impairments associated with the transmitting device.
7. A wireless device for wireless communication, comprising: Memory; as well as one or more processors coupled to the memory, the memory and the one or more processors being configured to: receiving signals from a transmitting device, wherein the signals have been beamformed by the transmitting device and steered toward the wireless device using a plurality of transmit antennas, and wherein the beamformed signals are coherently combined at the spatial location of the wireless device; estimating a weighted sum based at least in part on a plurality of coefficients associated with the beamformed signal, wherein the plurality of coefficients includes one or more coefficients associated with one or more impairments associated with nonlinearities associated with one or more power amplifiers of the transmit device associated with the plurality of transmit antennas and one or more coefficients dependent on the spatial location of the wireless device; determining a cryptographic key based at least in part on a ratio between the plurality of coefficients in the weighted sum associated with the beamformed signal; and One or more communications between the wireless device and the transmitting device are secured based at least in part on the cryptographic key.
8. The wireless device according to claim 7, wherein The cryptographic key is based at least in part on an average nonlinearity among a plurality of power amplifiers.
9. The wireless device according to claim 7, wherein The one or more coefficients related to the one or more impairments associated with the transmitting device are based at least in part on a transmit power level associated with the beamformed signal.
10. The wireless device of claim 7, wherein: The memory and the one or more processors are further configured to quantize the plurality of coefficients, wherein the cryptographic key is determined based at least in part on the quantized plurality of coefficients.
11. The wireless device of claim 7, wherein: When protecting the one or more communications between the wireless device and the sending device, the memory and the one or more processors are further configured to perform one or more of the following: decrypt information received from the sending device using the cryptographic key, encrypt information sent to the sending device using the cryptographic key, or authenticate the identity of the sending device using the cryptographic key.
12. The wireless device of claim 7, wherein: The beamformed signal includes one or more Volterra kernels representing the one or more impairments associated with the transmitting device.
13. A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing one or more instructions for wireless communication, the one or more instructions comprising: One or more instructions that, when executed by one or more processors of a wireless device, cause the one or more processors to: receiving signals from a transmitting device, wherein the signals have been beamformed by the transmitting device and steered toward the wireless device using a plurality of transmit antennas, and wherein the beamformed signals are coherently combined at the spatial location of the wireless device; estimating a weighted sum based at least in part on a plurality of coefficients associated with the beamformed signal, wherein the plurality of coefficients includes one or more coefficients associated with one or more impairments associated with nonlinearities associated with one or more power amplifiers of the transmit device associated with the plurality of transmit antennas and one or more coefficients dependent on the spatial location of the wireless device; determining a cryptographic key based at least in part on a ratio between the plurality of coefficients in the weighted sum associated with the beamformed signal; and One or more communications between the wireless device and the transmitting device are secured based at least in part on the cryptographic key.
14. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 13, wherein: The cryptographic key is based at least in part on an average nonlinearity among a plurality of power amplifiers.
15. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 13, wherein: The one or more coefficients related to the one or more impairments associated with the transmitting device are based at least in part on a transmit power level associated with the beamformed signal.
16. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 13, wherein: The one or more instructions, when executed by the one or more processors, further cause the one or more processors to quantize the plurality of coefficients, wherein the cryptographic key is determined based at least in part on the quantized plurality of coefficients.
17. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 13, wherein: The one or more instructions that cause the one or more processors to protect the one or more communications between the wireless device and the sending device also cause the one or more processors to perform one or more of the following: decrypt information received from the sending device using the cryptographic key, encrypt information sent to the sending device using the cryptographic key, or authenticate the identity of the sending device using the cryptographic key.
18. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 13, wherein: The beamformed signal includes one or more Volterra kernels representing the one or more impairments associated with the transmitting device.
19. An apparatus for wireless communication, comprising: means for receiving signals from a transmitting device, wherein the signals have been beamformed by the transmitting device and directed toward the apparatus using a plurality of transmit antennas, and wherein the beamformed signals are coherently combined at the spatial location of the apparatus; means for estimating a weighted sum based at least in part on a plurality of coefficients associated with the beamformed signal, wherein the plurality of coefficients includes one or more coefficients associated with one or more impairments associated with a nonlinearity associated with one or more power amplifiers of the transmit device associated with the plurality of transmit antennas and one or more coefficients dependent on the spatial location of the apparatus; means for determining a cryptographic key based at least in part on a ratio between the plurality of coefficients in the weighted sum associated with the beamformed signal; and means for protecting one or more communications between the apparatus and the sending device based at least in part on the cryptographic key.
20. The device according to claim 19, wherein The cryptographic key is based at least in part on an average nonlinearity among a plurality of power amplifiers.
21. The apparatus according to claim 19, wherein The one or more coefficients related to the one or more impairments associated with the transmitting device are based at least in part on a transmit power level associated with the beamformed signal.
22. The apparatus of claim 19, further comprising means for quantizing the plurality of coefficients, wherein The cryptographic key is determined based at least in part on the quantized plurality of coefficients.
23. The apparatus according to claim 19, wherein The components for protecting the one or more communications between the apparatus and the sending device include one or more of: components for decrypting information received from the sending device using the cryptographic key, components for encrypting information sent to the sending device using the cryptographic key, or components for authenticating the identity of the sending device using the cryptographic key.
24. The apparatus according to claim 19, wherein The beamformed signal includes one or more Volterra kernels representing the one or more impairments associated with the transmitting device.
25. A wireless communication system comprising at least a wireless device and a transmitting device, the system comprising: means for receiving, at the wireless device, signals from the transmitting device, wherein the signals have been beamformed by the transmitting device and directed toward the wireless device using a plurality of transmit antennas, and wherein the beamformed signals are coherently combined at the spatial location of the wireless device; means for estimating, at the wireless device, a weighted sum based at least in part on a plurality of coefficients associated with the beamformed signal, wherein the plurality of coefficients includes one or more coefficients related to one or more impairments related to nonlinearities associated with one or more power amplifiers of the transmit device associated with the plurality of transmit antennas and one or more coefficients dependent on the spatial location of the wireless device; means for determining, at the wireless device, a cryptographic key based at least in part on a ratio between the plurality of coefficients in the weighted sum associated with the beamformed signal; and Means for protecting, at the wireless device, one or more communications between the wireless device and the transmitting device based at least in part on the cryptographic key.
