Synaesthesia signal receiving method, device, radar equipment and medium for preventing information leakage

Abstract

The present application discloses a method, device, radar device and medium for receiving synaesthesia signals to prevent information leakage. By applying the technical solution of the present application, when the radar device is in the stage of receiving radar signals, an interference signal can be continuously sent, so that, except for the legitimate radar receiver, other malicious devices cannot steal the information in the original radar echo signal. This avoids the problem existing in the related art that malicious users can estimate the signal of the corresponding frequency based on the direction, intensity and other parameters of the original radar echo signal to steal the user's privacy data.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to radar signal data processing technology, and in particular to a method, device, radar equipment and medium for receiving synaesthesia signals to prevent information leakage. Background Art

[0002] In related technologies, frequency band sharing between radar and communication systems has attracted widespread attention because it can avoid underutilization of long-term allocated spectrum resources, thereby improving spectrum efficiency. The next generation of mobile communication networks is believed to have natively integrated sensing functions. Many typical communication devices (such as base stations) may have sensing functions (such as transmitting radar waveforms for environmental perception) in addition to communication functions. However, combining communication systems with radars will generate new privacy issues - radar echo privacy issues.

[0003] Specifically, when the target involves or is related to an individual, the radar echo may contain the user's private information. At the same time, the radar echo is also very easy to be eavesdropped. For example, malicious users can deploy eavesdropping devices on home base stations, street base stations, and even mobile phones to steal the user's private data. Therefore, how to design a method for receiving synaesthesia signals to prevent information leakage has become a problem that needs to be solved. Summary of the invention

[0004] The embodiments of the present application provide a method, device, radar equipment and medium for receiving synaesthesia signals to prevent information leakage, thereby solving the problem in the related art that radar echo signals are easily eavesdropped by malicious users.

[0005] According to one aspect of an embodiment of the present application, a method for receiving a synaesthesia signal to prevent information leakage is provided, which is applied to a radar device including an interference transmitter and an interference canceller, including:

[0006] Determine the radar device startup signal reception state;

[0007] Driving the jammer to send a jammer signal, where the jammer signal is used to interfere with the original radar echo signal;

[0008] After receiving the target radar echo signal, the interference signal in the target radar echo signal is eliminated to obtain the original radar echo signal.

[0009] Optionally, in another embodiment of the method of the present application, the step of driving the jammer to send a jammer signal includes:

[0010] Determining a signal waveform of the original radar echo signal;

[0011] The jammer transmitter is driven to send at least one jammer signal having the same waveform as the original radar echo signal.

[0012] Optionally, in another embodiment of the method of the present application, the step of driving the jammer to send at least one jammer signal having the same waveform as the original radar echo signal includes:

[0013] At least one transmission time is randomly determined, and at the at least one randomly determined transmission time point, the jammer is driven to send at least one jammer signal having the same waveform as the original radar echo signal.

[0014] Optionally, in another embodiment of the method of the present application, the step of driving the jammer to send at least one jammer signal having the same waveform as the original radar echo signal includes:

[0015] Determine the current signal transmission scenario;

[0016] Based on the signal transmission scenario, determining the transmission intensity and transmission frequency of the interference signal;

[0017] The interference transmitter is driven to transmit an interference signal with the transmission intensity and the transmission frequency.

[0018] Optionally, in another embodiment of the method of the present application, the eliminating the interference signal in the target radar echo signal includes:

[0019] When the target radar echo signal has not reached the radar device, or the target radar echo signal has been completely received, calculating a channel state value between the jammer and the radar receiving antenna;

[0020] Based on the channel state value, the interference signal and the target radar echo signal, the interference signal in the target radar echo signal is eliminated.

[0021] Optionally, in another embodiment of the method of the present application, the interference signal in the target radar echo signal is eliminated based on the following formula:

[0022]

[0023] Wherein, z(t) represents the original radar echo signal, y(t) represents the target radar echo signal, represents the channel state value, and x(t) represents the interference signal.

[0024] Optionally, in another embodiment of the method of the present application, after obtaining the original radar echo signal, the method further includes:

[0025] The original radar echo signal is analyzed to determine information parameters carried by the original radar echo signal.

[0026] According to another aspect of the embodiment of the present application, a synaesthesia signal receiving device for preventing information leakage is provided, which is applied to a radar device including an interference transmitter and an interference canceller, including:

[0027] A determination module, configured to determine a start-up signal reception state of the radar device;

[0028] A driving module, configured to drive the jammer to send a jammer signal, wherein the jammer signal is used to interfere with the original radar echo signal;

[0029] The generating module is configured to eliminate the interference signal in the target radar echo signal after receiving the target radar echo signal to obtain the original radar echo signal.

[0030] According to another aspect of the embodiments of the present application, a radar device is provided, including:

[0031] A memory for storing executable instructions; and

[0032] The display is used to execute the executable instructions with the memory to complete the operation of any of the above-mentioned synaesthesia signal receiving methods for preventing information leakage.

[0033] According to another aspect of the embodiments of the present application, a computer-readable storage medium is provided for storing computer-readable instructions, wherein the instructions, when executed, perform the operations of any of the above-mentioned synaesthesia signal receiving methods for preventing information leakage.

[0034] In the present application, after determining that the radar device starts the signal receiving state, the interference transmitter can be driven to send an interference signal, and the interference signal is used to interfere with the original radar echo signal; after receiving the target radar echo signal, the interference signal in the target radar echo signal is eliminated to obtain the original radar echo signal. By applying the technical solution of the present application, when the radar device is in the stage of receiving radar signals, the interference signal can be continuously sent, so that except for the legitimate radar receiver, other malicious devices cannot steal the information in the original radar echo signal. This avoids the problem existing in the related art that malicious users can estimate the signal of the corresponding frequency based on the direction, intensity and other parameters of the original radar echo signal to steal the user's privacy data.

[0035] The technical solution of the present application is further described in detail below through the accompanying drawings and embodiments. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0036] The accompanying drawings, which constitute a part of the specification, illustrate embodiments of the present application and, together with the description, serve to explain the principles of the present application.

[0037] The present application can be more clearly understood from the following detailed description with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:

[0038] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of a synaesthesia signal receiving method for preventing information leakage proposed in this application;

[0039] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a process of receiving and sending radar echo signals by a radar device in a related technology proposed in this application;

[0040] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of a process for a malicious user to steal a radar echo signal received by a radar device in a related technology proposed in this application;

[0041] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the electronic device for receiving synaesthesia signals to prevent information leakage proposed in this application;

[0042] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the synaesthesia signal receiving radar device for preventing information leakage proposed in this application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0043] Various exemplary embodiments of the present application will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. It should be noted that unless otherwise specifically stated, the relative arrangement of components and steps, numerical expressions and numerical values ​​set forth in these embodiments do not limit the scope of the present application.

[0044] At the same time, it should be understood that for the convenience of description, the sizes of the various parts shown in the drawings are not drawn according to the actual proportional relationship.

[0045] The following description of at least one exemplary embodiment is merely illustrative in nature and is not intended to limit the present application, its application, or uses.

[0046] Technologies, methods, and equipment known to ordinary technicians in the relevant art may not be discussed in detail, but where appropriate, the technologies, methods, and equipment should be considered as part of the specification.

[0047] It should be noted that like reference numerals and letters refer to similar items in the following figures, and therefore, once an item is defined in one figure, it need not be further discussed in subsequent figures.

[0048] In addition, the technical solutions between the various embodiments of the present application can be combined with each other, but it must be based on the fact that ordinary technicians in the field can implement it. When the combination of technical solutions is contradictory or cannot be implemented, it should be deemed that such combination of technical solutions does not exist and is not within the scope of protection required by this application.

[0049] It should be noted that all directional indications in the embodiments of the present application (such as up, down, left, right, front, back, etc.) are only used to explain the relative position relationship, movement status, etc. between the components under a certain specific posture (as shown in the accompanying drawings). If the specific posture changes, the directional indication will also change accordingly.

[0050] Combine the following Figure 1-Figure 3 To describe the synaesthesia signal receiving method for preventing information leakage according to the exemplary embodiment of the present application. It should be noted that the following application scenarios are only shown to facilitate understanding of the spirit and principle of the present application, and the embodiments of the present application are not limited in this respect. On the contrary, the embodiments of the present application can be applied to any applicable scenario.

[0051] The present application also proposes a method, device, radar equipment and medium for receiving synaesthesia signals to prevent information leakage.

[0052] Figure 1 The flowchart of a method for receiving synaesthesia signals to prevent information leakage according to an embodiment of the present application is schematically shown. Figure 1 As shown, the method is applied to a radar device including an interference transmitter and an interference canceller, comprising:

[0053] S101, determining whether the radar device starts signal receiving status.

[0054] In related technologies, frequency band sharing between radar equipment and communication systems has attracted widespread attention because it can avoid underutilization of long-term allocated spectrum resources, thereby improving spectrum efficiency. Among them, the next generation of mobile communication networks is believed to have natively integrated sensing functions, and many typical communication devices (such as base stations) may have sensing functions (such as transmitting radar waveforms for environmental perception) in addition to communication functions. However, in the scenario of combining communication systems with radars, radar echo privacy issues will arise.

[0055] Furthermore, the research on the integration of communication and perception is still ongoing, and there are several technical routes to achieve it. However, the basic form of the perception radar remains unchanged, that is, it includes a transmitter, a transmitting antenna, a receiver, a receiving antenna, a signal processing part, and a support part. The function realization process of the radar is also unchanged, that is, the transmitter of the radar equipment transmits electromagnetic waves in a certain direction through the transmitting antenna. When the electromagnetic waves encounter objects in this direction, they will be reflected. The radar receiving antenna receives the reflected waves and performs signal processing to extract target information (distance, speed, etc.).

[0056] Optionally, in the synaesthesia integration scenario, radar has many uses, such as in smart furniture, radar can be used for character recognition, character relationship recognition, daily activity recognition, etc. In environmental detection, it can be used for human identity recognition, location and tracking, etc. In human-computer interaction, human body information can be collected. From the above, it can be said that radar is closely related to privacy, and this information is contained in the radar's reflected echo. By extracting information from the echo, the radar can estimate the parameters of the target, such as the distance, angle, speed, etc. of the target. When the radar's resolution is high enough (for example, the radar's operating frequency band can be increased to improve the resolution), it can continuously scan targets larger than the radar resolution unit for target mapping and obtain rich information about the target.

[0057] When the target involves or is related to an individual, the radar echo may contain private information, such as "radar portraits", license plate numbers, etc. Radar echoes are also very easy to be eavesdropped on, such as when criminals deploy eavesdropping devices on home base stations, street base stations, and even mobile phones, so the protection of radar echoes is imperative.

[0058] In one way, Figure 2 The figure shows the structure of the radar device. It can be seen that the frequency source provides the local oscillator frequency and the global clock frequency to the transmitter to send the transmission wave, and the frequency source provides the local oscillator frequency and the global clock frequency to the receiver to analyze the received RF echo.

[0059] The following is an explanation of the process of malicious users eavesdropping on radar echo signals in the related art:

[0060] like Figure 3 The figure shows the process of a malicious user eavesdropping on the radar echo signal, which includes:

[0061] Step 1: A malicious user physically places a monitoring device near the base station radar device to be eavesdropped on;

[0062] Step 2, waiting to receive a waveform signal, and judging whether the signal is a radar echo signal according to the direction and strength of the waveform signal, if not, continuing step 2. If yes, continuing step 3;

[0063] Step 3: Estimate the local oscillator frequency and global clock frequency corresponding to the radar based on the radar echo signal to obtain f L With f CLK ;

[0064] Step 4: f is estimated based on the previous radar echo signal L With f CLK , analyze the received radar echo signal and obtain I(n),Q(n);

[0065] Step 5, combining the information obtained from the transmitted wave and the reflected wave, performs signal processing such as angle of arrival (DOA) estimation, target distance estimation, etc., to obtain sensitive data and enter the next round of eavesdropping, that is, jump to step 2 again.

[0066] S102, driving the jammer to send a jammer signal, where the jammer signal is used to interfere with the original radar echo signal.

[0067] In view of the above problems, the present application proposes a radar device including a jammer and an interference canceller, and uses the jammer to continuously send jamming signals, so that the radar device receiving the radar signal can only receive the radar echo signal containing the jamming signal. However, since the legitimate radar device knows the specific parameters of the jamming signal, it can remove the jamming signal from the received radar signal. In this way, the purpose of preventing other malicious devices except the legitimate radar receiver from stealing the information in the original radar echo signal is achieved.

[0068] It can be understood that the above method can avoid the problem existing in the related art that malicious users can estimate the signal of the corresponding frequency based on the direction, intensity and other parameters of the original radar echo signal to steal the user's privacy data.

[0069] S103, after receiving the target radar echo signal, eliminate the interference signal in the target radar echo signal to obtain the original radar echo signal.

[0070] The following is a specific example of the anti-information leakage synaesthesia signal receiving method proposed in this application, which includes:

[0071] Step a, during the transmission phase of the radar device, the radar device operates normally;

[0072] Step b, during the receiving phase of the radar device, the jammer (i.e., the jammer transmitter of the radar device) sends a jammer signal;

[0073] Step c: after receiving the target radar echo signal containing the interference signal, the legal radar device eliminates the noise (ie, the interference signal) therein, obtains the accurate echo (ie, the original radar echo signal), and then performs signal processing.

[0074] It is understandable that since interference is sent during the receiving stage, the eavesdropping device cannot obtain the arrival time and frequency of the radar echo. However, since the radar device knows the sent noise signal, it can eliminate it without affecting the original echo signal, thereby achieving the purpose of anti-eavesdropping.

[0075] In the present application, after determining that the radar device starts the signal receiving state, the interference transmitter can be driven to send an interference signal, and the interference signal is used to interfere with the original radar echo signal; after receiving the target radar echo signal, the interference signal in the target radar echo signal is eliminated to obtain the original radar echo signal. By applying the technical solution of the present application, when the radar device is in the stage of receiving radar signals, the interference signal can be continuously sent, so that except for the legitimate radar receiver, other malicious devices cannot steal the information in the original radar echo signal. This avoids the problem existing in the related art that malicious users can estimate the signal of the corresponding frequency based on the direction, intensity and other parameters of the original radar echo signal to steal the user's privacy data.

[0076] Optionally, in another embodiment of the method of the present application, the step of driving the jammer to send a jammer signal includes:

[0077] Determining a signal waveform of the original radar echo signal;

[0078] The jammer transmitter is driven to send at least one jammer signal having the same waveform as the original radar echo signal.

[0079] Optionally, in another embodiment of the method of the present application, the step of driving the jammer to send at least one jammer signal having the same waveform as the original radar echo signal includes:

[0080] At least one transmission time is randomly determined, and at the at least one randomly determined transmission time point, the jammer is driven to send at least one jammer signal having the same waveform as the original radar echo signal.

[0081] Optionally, in another embodiment of the method of the present application, the step of driving the jammer to send at least one jammer signal having the same waveform as the original radar echo signal includes:

[0082] Determine the current signal transmission scenario;

[0083] Based on the signal transmission scenario, determining the transmission intensity and transmission frequency of the interference signal;

[0084] The interference transmitter is driven to transmit an interference signal with the transmission intensity and the transmission frequency.

[0085] Optionally, in another embodiment of the method of the present application, the eliminating the interference signal in the target radar echo signal includes:

[0086] When the target radar echo signal has not reached the radar device, or the target radar echo signal has been completely received, calculating a channel state value between the jammer and the radar receiving antenna;

[0087] Based on the channel state value, the interference signal and the target radar echo signal, the interference signal in the target radar echo signal is eliminated.

[0088] Optionally, in another embodiment of the method of the present application, the interference signal in the target radar echo signal is eliminated based on the following formula:

[0089]

[0090] Wherein, z(t) represents the original radar echo signal, y(t) represents the target radar echo signal, represents the channel state value, and x(t) represents the interference signal.

[0091] Optionally, in another embodiment of the method of the present application, after obtaining the original radar echo signal, the method further includes:

[0092] The original radar echo signal is analyzed to determine information parameters carried by the original radar echo signal.

[0093] As an example of the present application, the process of driving the jammer to send a jamming signal for jamming the original radar echo signal is specifically described below:

[0094] Among them, the transmission waveform of the jammer needs to be the same as the radar echo signal, so that it can not be easily eliminated by malicious users.

[0095] In one optional manner, the transmission strength and frequency of the interference signal can be randomly selected within a reasonable range. In another manner, the transmission strength and frequency can be selected according to the current signal transmission scenario to select the transmission strength and transmission frequency that match it to send the interference signal.

[0096] It should be noted that, in the embodiment of the present application, the transmission time can be randomly taken multiple times during the receiving phase of the radar, so that an eavesdropper cannot distinguish which one is the real echo signal.

[0097] As another example of the present application, the process of eliminating the interference signal in the target radar echo signal is specifically described below:

[0098] As an example, z(t) is the original radar echo signal, x(t) is the interference signal sent by the interference transmitter, y(t) is the target radar echo signal received by the radar device, and H(t) represents the channel state between the interference transmitter and the radar receiving antenna, and n(t) is the noise.

[0099] Among them, then y(t)=H(t)*x(t)+z(t)+n(t).

[0100] It can be understood that since the interference sent by x(t) and the signal received by the radar at y(t) are known, when the radar reflection wave has not yet arrived or the reflection wave has ended (that is, the target radar echo signal has not reached the radar device, or the target radar echo signal has been completely received), that is, when z(t) = 0, H(t) can be estimated by the channel estimation method to obtain (ie, channel state value).

[0101] According to the above method, the following formula can be used The original radar echo signal is obtained after the interference signal is eliminated.

[0102] By applying the technical solution of the present application, when the radar device is in the stage of receiving radar signals, the interference signal can be continuously sent, so that no malicious device other than the legitimate radar receiver can steal the information in the original radar echo signal. This avoids the problem existing in the related art that malicious users can estimate the signal of the corresponding frequency based on the direction, strength and other parameters of the original radar echo signal to steal the user's privacy data.

[0103] Optionally, in another embodiment of the present application, Figure 4 As shown, the present application also provides a synaesthesia signal receiving device for preventing information leakage. It includes a determination module 201, a driving module 202, and a generation module 203, which is applied to a radar device including an interference transmitter and an interference canceller, including:

[0104] A determination module 201 is configured to determine a start-up signal receiving state of the radar device;

[0105] A driving module 202, configured to drive the jammer to send a jammer signal, wherein the jammer signal is used to interfere with the original radar echo signal;

[0106] The generating module 203 is configured to, after receiving the target radar echo signal, eliminate the interference signal in the target radar echo signal to obtain the original radar echo signal.

[0107] In the present application, after determining that the radar device starts the signal receiving state, the interference transmitter can be driven to send an interference signal, and the interference signal is used to interfere with the original radar echo signal; after receiving the target radar echo signal, the interference signal in the target radar echo signal is eliminated to obtain the original radar echo signal. By applying the technical solution of the present application, when the radar device is in the stage of receiving radar signals, the interference signal can be continuously sent, so that except for the legitimate radar receiver, other malicious devices cannot steal the information in the original radar echo signal. This avoids the problem existing in the related art that malicious users can estimate the signal of the corresponding frequency based on the direction, intensity and other parameters of the original radar echo signal to steal the user's privacy data.

[0108] In another embodiment of the present application, the driving module 201 is configured as follows:

[0109] Determining a signal waveform of the original radar echo signal;

[0110] The jammer transmitter is driven to send at least one jammer signal having the same waveform as the original radar echo signal.

[0111] In another embodiment of the present application, the driving module 201 is configured as follows:

[0112] At least one transmission time is randomly determined, and at the at least one randomly determined transmission time point, the jammer is driven to send at least one jammer signal having the same waveform as the original radar echo signal.

[0113] In another embodiment of the present application, the driving module 201 is configured as follows:

[0114] Determine the current signal transmission scenario;

[0115] Based on the signal transmission scenario, determining the transmission intensity and transmission frequency of the interference signal;

[0116] The interference transmitter is driven to transmit an interference signal with the transmission intensity and the transmission frequency.

[0117] In another embodiment of the present application, the driving module 201 is configured as follows:

[0118] When the target radar echo signal has not reached the radar device, or the target radar echo signal has been completely received, calculating a channel state value between the jammer and the radar receiving antenna;

[0119] Based on the channel state value, the interference signal and the target radar echo signal, the interference signal in the target radar echo signal is eliminated.

[0120] In another embodiment of the present application, the driving module 201 is configured as follows:

[0121] The interference signal in the target radar echo signal is eliminated based on the following formula:

[0122]

[0123] Wherein, z(t) represents the original radar echo signal, y(t) represents the target radar echo signal, represents the channel state value, and x(t) represents the interference signal.

[0124] In another embodiment of the present application, the driving module 201 is configured as follows:

[0125] The original radar echo signal is analyzed to determine information parameters carried by the original radar echo signal.

[0126] Figure 5 3 is a logical structure block diagram of a radar device according to an exemplary embodiment. For example, the radar device 300 may be a radar device including an interference transmitter and an interference canceller.

[0127] In an exemplary embodiment, a non-temporary computer-readable storage medium including instructions is also provided, such as a memory including instructions, and the above instructions can be executed by a radar device processor to complete the above-mentioned anti-information leakage synaesthesia signal receiving method, the method comprising: determining the radar device to start the signal receiving state; driving the interference transmitter to send an interference signal, the interference signal is used to interfere with the original radar echo signal; after receiving the target radar echo signal, the interference signal in the target radar echo signal is eliminated to obtain the original radar echo signal. Optionally, the above instructions can also be executed by the processor of the radar device to complete the other steps involved in the above-mentioned exemplary embodiment. For example, the non-temporary computer-readable storage medium can be a ROM, a random access memory (RAM), a CD-ROM, a magnetic tape, a floppy disk, and an optical data storage device, etc.

[0128] In an exemplary embodiment, an application / computer program product is also provided, including one or more instructions, which can be executed by a processor of a radar device to complete the above-mentioned anti-information leakage synaesthesia signal receiving method, the method comprising: determining the radar device to start the signal receiving state; driving the interference transmitter to send an interference signal, the interference signal is used to interfere with the original radar echo signal; after receiving the target radar echo signal, the interference signal in the target radar echo signal is eliminated to obtain the original radar echo signal. Optionally, the above-mentioned instructions can also be executed by the processor of the radar device to complete the other steps involved in the above-mentioned exemplary embodiment.

[0129] Figure 5 FIG. 3 is an example diagram of a radar device 300. A person skilled in the art can understand that Figure 5 It is only an example of the radar device 300 and does not constitute a limitation of the radar device 300. It may include more or fewer components than shown in the figure, or a combination of certain components, or different components. For example, the radar device 300 may also include input and output devices, network access devices, buses, etc.

[0130] The processor 302 may be a central processing unit (CPU), or other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSP), application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA) or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. A general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor or the processor 302 may also be any conventional processor, etc. The processor 302 is the control center of the radar device 300, and uses various interfaces and lines to connect various parts of the entire radar device 300.

[0131] The memory 301 can be used to store computer-readable instructions 303. The processor 302 implements various functions of the radar device 300 by running or executing the computer-readable instructions or modules stored in the memory 301 and calling the data stored in the memory 301. The memory 301 can mainly include a program storage area and a data storage area, wherein the program storage area can store an operating system, an application required for at least one function (such as a sound playback function, an image playback function, etc.), etc.; the data storage area can store data created according to the use of the radar device 300, etc. In addition, the memory 301 can include a hard disk, a memory, a plug-in hard disk, a smart memory card (Smart Media Card, SMC), a secure digital (Secure Digital, SD) card, a flash card (Flash Card), at least one disk storage device, a flash memory device, a read-only memory (Read-Only Memory, ROM), a random access memory (Random Access Memory, ROM), etc. Memory, RAM) or other non-volatile / volatile storage devices.

[0132] If the module integrated in the radar device 300 is implemented in the form of a software function module and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the present invention implements all or part of the processes in the above-mentioned embodiment method, and can also instruct the relevant hardware to complete it through computer-readable instructions. The computer-readable instructions can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. When the computer-readable instructions are executed by the processor, the steps of the above-mentioned various method embodiments can be implemented.

[0133] Those skilled in the art will readily appreciate other embodiments of the present application after considering the specification and practicing the invention disclosed herein. The present application is intended to cover any modification, use or adaptation of the present application, which follows the general principles of the present application and includes common knowledge or customary techniques in the art that are not disclosed in the present application. The specification and examples are intended to be exemplary only, and the true scope and spirit of the present application are indicated by the following claims.

[0134] It should be understood that the present application is not limited to the precise structures that have been described above and shown in the drawings, and that various modifications and changes may be made without departing from the scope thereof. The scope of the present application is limited only by the appended claims.

Claims

1. A method for receiving synaesthesia signals to prevent information leakage, characterized in that: Applicable to radar equipment including jammers and jammer cancellers, including: Determine the radar device startup signal reception state; Driving the jammer to send a jammer signal, where the jammer signal is used to interfere with the original radar echo signal; After receiving the target radar echo signal, the interference signal in the target radar echo signal is eliminated to obtain the original radar echo signal; Wherein, the eliminating the interference signal in the target radar echo signal includes: when the target radar echo signal has not reached the radar device, or the target radar echo signal has been completely received, calculating the channel state value between the interference transmitter and the radar receiving antenna; based on the channel state value, the interference signal and the target radar echo signal, eliminating the interference signal in the target radar echo signal; eliminating the interference signal in the target radar echo signal based on the following formula: ； in, represents the original radar echo signal, represents the target radar echo signal, represents the channel state value, represents the interference signal.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The step of driving the interference transmitter to send an interference signal includes: Determining a signal waveform of the original radar echo signal; The jammer transmitter is driven to send at least one jammer signal having the same waveform as the original radar echo signal.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The step of driving the jammer to send at least one jammer signal having the same waveform as the original radar echo signal comprises: At least one transmission time is randomly determined, and at the at least one randomly determined transmission time point, the jammer is driven to send at least one jammer signal having the same waveform as the original radar echo signal.

4. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The step of driving the jammer to send at least one jammer signal having the same waveform as the original radar echo signal comprises: Determine the current signal transmission scenario; Based on the signal transmission scenario, determining the transmission intensity and transmission frequency of the interference signal; The interference transmitter is driven to transmit an interference signal with the transmission intensity and the transmission frequency.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that After obtaining the original radar echo signal, the method further includes: The original radar echo signal is analyzed to determine information parameters carried by the original radar echo signal.

6. A synaesthesia signal receiving device for preventing information leakage, characterized in that: Applicable to radar equipment including jammers and jammer cancellers, including: A determination module, configured to determine a start-up signal reception state of the radar device; A driving module, configured to drive the jammer to send a jammer signal, wherein the jammer signal is used to interfere with the original radar echo signal; A generating module is configured to, after receiving the target radar echo signal, eliminate the interference signal in the target radar echo signal to obtain the original radar echo signal; The generating module is specifically configured to: eliminate the interference signal in the target radar echo signal, including: when the target radar echo signal has not reached the radar device, or the target radar echo signal has been completely received, calculate the channel state value between the interference transmitter and the radar receiving antenna; based on the channel state value, the interference signal and the target radar echo signal, eliminate the interference signal in the target radar echo signal; eliminate the interference signal in the target radar echo signal based on the following formula: ； in, represents the original radar echo signal, represents the target radar echo signal, represents the channel state value, represents the interference signal.

7. A radar device, characterized in that: include: A memory for storing executable instructions; as well as, A processor is used to execute the executable instructions with the memory to complete the operation of the synaesthesia signal receiving method for preventing information leakage as described in any one of claims 1-5.

8. A computer-readable storage medium for storing computer-readable instructions, characterized in that: When the instruction is executed, the operation of the anti-information leakage synaesthesia signal receiving method according to any one of claims 1 to 5 is performed.

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