A drone identity authentication and key negotiation method based on location password

Abstract

The present invention discloses a method for unmanned aerial vehicle identity authentication and key negotiation based on location password, comprising the following steps: Step 1: Unmanned aerial vehicle identity registration: Unmanned aerial vehicle node UAV i It is an entity whose identity and location information authenticity needs to be verified; the ground station GCS is a trusted entity that verifies the integrity of the prover's location information and stores a standard location information feature database; the wingman UAVP used to assist in the proof i Calculate and generate the shared session key K with the ground station GCS; Step 2: Authentication: The ground station and the drone will complete mutual identity authentication and authentication of the drone's geographical location security and negotiation of the symmetric key between the two parties, and finally negotiate a 160-bit symmetric key; Step 3: Update CRP. The authentication scheme based on the location password of the present invention strengthens the protection of the drone's location information, and uses an unclonable function to authenticate the drone's identity, which can achieve the effect of being impossible to be imitated.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of drone identity authentication, and in particular to a drone identity authentication and key negotiation method based on a location password. Background Art

[0002] In a network environment such as drone networks where the resources of both communicating parties are relatively limited, the identity authentication and session key negotiation protocols of both parties are generally verified by using a public-private key system to verify the digital signature, thereby authenticating the identities of both parties. This system not only requires a certificate authority to issue digital certificates but also requires a certain amount of computing power to run the encryption and decryption operations of the public-private key system.

[0003] In addition, for drones and IoT devices, the security of using a single feature for authentication is low, and authentication based on location features is a trend. However, the communication process of GPS and drone networks also use public channels, so there are serious security issues, such as being easily spoofed, so consider using an authentication solution based on location passwords.

[0004] The existing technology lacks the authentication of drone location information. Drone location information is easier to fake than identity information. It may not be where it claims to be, so the authentication of location information cannot be ignored. In addition, the communication process of GPS and drone network also use public channels, so there are serious security issues. Drones can be easily deceived inadvertently. Summary of the invention

[0005] In order to overcome the shortcomings of the above technologies, the purpose of the present invention is to provide a drone identity authentication and key negotiation method based on location password. The authentication scheme based on location password strengthens the protection of drone location information, and uses an unclonable function to authenticate the identity of the drone, which can achieve the effect of being impossible to imitate.

[0006] In order to achieve the above object, the technical solution adopted by the present invention is:

[0007] A method for drone identity authentication and key negotiation based on location password, comprising the following steps;

[0008] Step 1: Drone Identity Registration:

[0009] UAV Node i It is an entity whose identity and location information authenticity needs to be verified; the ground station GCS is a trusted entity that verifies the integrity of the prover's location information and stores a standard location information feature database; the wingman UAVP used to assist in the proof iCalculate and generate the shared session key K together with the ground station GCS. The drone identity registration requires the drone node to register its own PUF and other information in the feature database of the ground station through a secure channel, and pre-negotiate the secret value for subsequent cryptographic calculations;

[0010] Step 2: Authentication:

[0011] The ground station and the drone will complete mutual identity authentication, authentication of the drone's geographic location security, and negotiation of the symmetric key between the two parties. The output of the SHA-1 function is 160 bits, and a 160-bit symmetric key will eventually be negotiated.

[0012] Step 3: Update CRP.

[0013] The step 1 mainly includes the following steps:

[0014] The drone first performs the following actions

[0015] (1) Use a random number generator to generate a 32-bit random number C, which is used as the input of the physically unclonable function, i.e., the challenge, to generate a 320-bit response R = PUF(C), and obtain the geographic location at that time c l, expressed in latitude and longitude.

[0016] (2) Send the registration message RMSG1{(C, R), cl} to the ground station through the secure channel between the UAV and the ground station;

[0017] When the ground station receives the message RMSG1{(C, R), cl}, it will perform the following actions:

[0018] (3) Generate a 160-bit unique ID for the drone With a 320-bit unique secret value

[0019] According to the exclusive number And the response R sent by it calculates the anonymous number:

[0020]

[0021] The challenge response pair (C, R) and actual number of the drone Exclusive secret value Instead of anonymous number stored in its database;

[0022] (4) Assign the drone a unique number Exclusive secret value and ground station ID GSSent to the drone via a secure channel as RMSG2.

[0023] When the drone receives a message from the ground station The following actions will be performed:

[0024] (5) According to the number sent by the ground station Calculate the anonymous number: Then the number obtained by the drone Secure Secret Value and ground station ID GS And store it in the drone's built-in secure storage area, such as TPM.

[0025] The specific process of step 2 is as follows:

[0026] First, the drone follows the following steps:

[0027] (1) Take C as input and use the PUF function to calculate the response Generate a 160-bit random number r1 and use R to calculate the mask of the random number r1:

[0028] (2) Use the response R and the real ID of the drone UAV Compute the summary about r1:

[0029]

[0030] Compute the digest of all messages to be sent over a public channel:

[0031]

[0032] (3) Authentication message Send to the ground station authentication center through a public channel;

[0033] When the ground station receives the message The following actions will be performed:

[0034] (4) The ground station will first GS Compare with its own number, if it does not match, the process will be terminated directly. If it matches, the ground sheet will be based on the anonymous number Find the corresponding actual number Then find the secret value negotiated in advance with the drone

[0035] (5) Calculate the digest of MSG1 to determine whether it comes from a trusted node and has not been tampered with:

[0036]

[0037] If M2′==M2, it means the message comes from the UAV i , and has not been tampered with. Otherwise, it means that the source of the message is unreliable, and the ground station will discard the packet and terminate the process;

[0038] Calculate the random number based on the encrypted intermediate message X in the previous step:

[0039] (6) The response R and real ID of the r′1 joint drone in the previous calculation result UAV Calculation Summary:

[0040]

[0041] If M′1 == M1, it means that the calculation of key information r1 is correct, otherwise r1 may be tampered with, and the process is terminated;

[0042] (7) Using location cryptography to detect UAVs i To verify the location, the specific steps are as follows (assuming that the message travels at the speed of light, from the UAV i It can also be said that the communication time between UAVP1 and the ground station and each wingman UAVP2, UAVP3, UAVP4 is t1, t2, t3 respectively):

[0043] (8) If the drone passes the position verification, let r2 = K i+1 , otherwise let r2 = r1 using the response R and the secret value Encrypt the random number r2 generated in the previous step:

[0044]

[0045] The random numbers r1 and r2 generated by both parties and the response R are used to generate the digest result, which will be used as the symmetric key for encrypted communication:

[0046] (9) Use the response R and the real ID of the drone UAV Compute the summary about r2:

[0047]

[0048] Compute the digest of all messages to be sent over a public channel:

[0049]

[0050] (10) Send the authentication message MSG2{Y, M3, M4} to the corresponding drone through the public channel;

[0051] When the drone receives the message MSG2{Y, M3, M4}, it will perform the following actions:

[0052] (11) Calculate the digest of message MSG2 to determine whether it comes from a trusted node and has not been tampered with.

[0053]

[0054] If M4′==M4, it means the message comes from ID GS The ground station has not been tampered with, otherwise it means that the source of the message is unreliable, the message will be discarded and the process will be terminated. At the same time, if the calculated r′2==r1, it means that the ground station has detected a spoofing attack based on the GPS information sent by the drone. At this time, the drone needs to take vigilant actions, such as climbing altitude to reduce the intensity of the new high attack from the ground, or enabling cellular network and other equipment to assist in geographic location detection to obtain the real geographic location to resist GPS attacks. The above two situations will cause the drone to perform packet loss processing and terminate the process;

[0055] According to the encrypted message Y, UAV i The response R and the secret value Calculate the random number from the ground station:

[0056] The response R and real ID of the r′1 joint drone in the previous calculation result UAV Calculation Summary:

[0057]

[0058] If M′3 == M3, it means that the calculation of key information r2 is correct, otherwise r2 may be tampered with, and the process is terminated;

[0059] (12) The random numbers r1 and r2 generated by both parties and the response R are used to generate a summary, which will be used as the symmetric key for encrypted communication: At this point, the negotiation of the symmetric key is completed. The subsequent part will update the challenge-response pairs reserved by the drone and the ground station to ensure the forward and backward security of the process.

[0060] The step (7) mainly comprises the following steps:

[0061] (7)a: The ground station selects the key K1 and transmits it to the wingmen UAVP2, UAVP3, and UAVP4 through an internal secret channel to generate an information string V1, V2, and V3 for each of them.

[0062] (7b): Each wingman sends the key and message string to the prover to ensure that they can reach the UAV to be verified at the same time at time Ti ;

[0063] (7c): UAV to be verified i Calculate K at time T i+1 =PRG(V i , K i ), (i=1,2,3), K i+1 Broadcast to all validators.

[0064] (7d): At T+t i Moment, UAVP i To K i+1 Verify that if all verifiers pass the K i+1 The verification of the UAV to be verified i The location is verified.

[0065] The step 3 is specifically as follows:

[0066] (1) The ground station generates a 32-bit random number C * , which is input as a challenge Get 320 bits response

[0067] Update the anonymous ID in the database

[0068] Compute response mask

[0069]

[0070] (2) Use the random number r2 from the ground station and the real ID of the drone UAV Calculate the response R * Summary:

[0071] Compute the digest of all messages to be sent over a public channel:

[0072]

[0073] (3) The authentication message MSG3{C * , mR * M5, M6} are sent to the ground station via a common channel;

[0074] When the ground station receives the message MSG3{C * , mR * M5, M6}, the following actions will be performed:

[0075] (4) First, calculate the digest of message MSG3 to determine whether it comes from a trusted node and has not been tampered with:

[0076]

[0077] If M6′==M6, it means the message comes from ground station and has not been tampered with. Otherwise, it means that the source of the message is unreliable, the message will be discarded and the process will be terminated.

[0078] Then according to the response mask, secret value and session key To calculate the updated challenge:

[0079]

[0080] Use the drone's previous response R to verify that the decrypted response is correct:

[0081]

[0082] Verify M5′: If M5′ == M5, it means that all the above calculations are completed correctly, that is, the drone has correctly decrypted r2 and the ground station has also correctly decrypted the updated response R * ; Otherwise, it means that there is a problem with the previous calculation, which may be a man-in-the-middle attack or other attacks. In this case, the process will be terminated;

[0083] (5) Update UAV i The challenge correspondence is the c just calculated * , R * ′, that is, let (C, R) = (C * , R * ′);

[0084] Update UAV based on updated response i Anonymous ID

[0085] Beneficial effects of the present invention:

[0086] First, the present invention uses physical unclonable functions and position cryptography to achieve dual authentication of the drone's identity and location. The protocol can not only verify the drone's location and resist location-based collusion attacks, but also verify the identity.

[0087] Second, the present invention combines the key negotiation protocol with the authentication protocol. The communication between drones and between drones and ground stations is securely transmitted using ciphertext, and a 160-bit random string can be generated as the communication key for group communication. The protocol is able to resist replay attacks, forged identity attacks, and man-in-the-middle attacks.

[0088] Third, based on the characteristics of PUF, even if the drone is captured by the enemy, the enemy cannot copy the identity characteristics of the drone, thereby effectively reducing the risk of drones in the group being impersonated and data stolen. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0089] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram of the process of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0090] The present invention is further described in detail below in conjunction with embodiments.

[0091] like Figure 1 As shown: A method for drone identity authentication and key negotiation based on location password, comprising the following steps;

[0092] Step 1: Drone identity registration.

[0093] In the present invention, the UAV node UAV i It is an entity whose identity and location information authenticity needs to be verified; the ground station GCS is a trusted entity that verifies the integrity of the prover's location information and stores a standard location information feature database; the wingman UAVP used to assist in the proof i Calculate and generate the shared session key K together with the ground station GCS;

[0094] The drone first performs the following actions

[0095] (1) Use a random number generator to generate 32 bits s The random number C is used as the input of the physically unclonable function, i.e., the challenge, to generate a 320-bit response R=PUF(C), and obtain the geographic location cl at this time, expressed in longitude and latitude.

[0096] (2) Send the message MSG1{(C, R), cl} to the ground station through the secure channel between the UAV and the ground station;

[0097] When the ground station receives the message MSG1{(C, R), cl}, it will perform the following actions:

[0098] (3) Generate a 160-bit unique ID for the drone With a 320-bit unique secret value

[0099] According to the exclusive number And the response R sent by it calculates the anonymous number:

[0100]

[0101] The challenge response pair (C, R) and actual number of the drone Exclusive secret value Instead of anonymous number stored in its database;

[0102] (4) Assign the drone a unique number Exclusive secret value and ground station ID GS Sent to the drone as MSG2 via secure channel.

[0103] When the drone receives a message from the ground station The following actions will be performed:

[0104] (5) According to the number sent by the ground station Calculate the anonymous number: Then the number obtained by the drone Secure Secret Value and ground station ID GS And store it in the drone's built-in secure storage area, such as TPM.

[0105] Step 2: Authentication

[0106] This phase is the main phase of the protocol. In this phase, the ground station and the drone will complete mutual identity authentication and the authentication of the drone's geographical location security as well as the negotiation of the symmetric key between the two parties, and finally a 160-bit symmetric key will be negotiated. The specific process is as follows

[0107] First, the drone performs the following steps

[0108] (1) Take C as input and use the PUF function to calculate the response Generate a 160-bit random number r1 and use R to calculate the mask of the random number r1:

[0109] (2) Use the response R and the real ID of the drone UAV Compute the summary about r1:

[0110]

[0111] Compute the digest of all messages to be sent over a public channel:

[0112]

[0113] (3) Authentication message Send to the ground station authentication center through a public channel;

[0114] When the ground station receives the message The following actions will be performed:

[0115] (4) The ground station will first GS Compare with its own number, if it does not match, the process will be terminated directly. If it matches, the ground sheet will be based on the anonymous number Find the corresponding actual number Then find the secret value negotiated in advance with the drone

[0116] (5) Calculate the digest of MSG1 to determine whether it comes from a trusted node and has not been tampered with:

[0117]

[0118] If M2′==M2, it means the message comes from the UAV i , and has not been tampered with. Otherwise, it means that the source of the message is unreliable, and the ground station will discard the packet and terminate the process;

[0119] Calculate the random number based on the encrypted intermediate message X in the previous step:

[0120] (6) The response R and real ID of the r′1 joint drone in the previous calculation result UAV Calculation Summary:

[0121]

[0122] If M′1 == M1, it means that the calculation of key information r1 is correct, otherwise r1 may be tampered with, and the process is terminated;

[0123] (7) Using location cryptography to detect UAVs i To verify the location, the specific steps are as follows (assuming that the message travels at the speed of light, from the UAV i It can also be said that the communication time between UAVP1 and the ground station and each wingman UAVP2, UAVP3, UAVP4 is t1, t2, t3 respectively):

[0124] (7)a: The ground station selects the key K1 and transmits it to the wingmen UAVP2, UAVP3, and UAVP4 through an internal secret channel to generate an information string V1, V2, and V3 for each of them.

[0125] (7b): Each wingman sends the key and message string to the prover to ensure that they can reach the UAV to be verified at the same time at time T i；

[0126] (7c): UAV to be verified i Calculate K at time T i+1 =PRG(Vi , K i ), (i=1,2,3), K i+1 Broadcast to all validators.

[0127] (7d): At T+t i Moment, UAVP i To K i+1 Verify that if all verifiers pass the K i+1 The verification of the UAV to be verified i The location is verified.

[0128] (8) If the drone passes the position verification, let r2 = K i+1 , otherwise let r2 = r1 using the response R and the secret value Encrypt the random number r2 generated in the previous step:

[0129]

[0130] The random numbers r1 and r2 generated by both parties and the response R are used to generate the digest result, which will be used as the symmetric key for encrypted communication:

[0131] (9) Use the response R and the real ID of the drone UAV Compute the summary about r2:

[0132]

[0133] Compute the digest of all messages to be sent over a public channel:

[0134]

[0135] (10) Send the authentication message MSG2{Y, M3, M4} to the corresponding drone through the public channel;

[0136] When the drone receives the message MSG2{Y,M3,M4}, it will perform the following actions

[0137] (11) Calculate the digest of message MSG2 to determine whether it comes from a trusted node and has not been tampered with.

[0138]

[0139] If M4′==M4, it means the message comes from ID GSThe ground station has not been tampered with, otherwise it means that the source of the message is unreliable, the message will be discarded and the process will be terminated. At the same time, if the calculated r′2==r1, it means that the ground station has detected a spoofing attack based on the GPS information sent by the drone. At this time, the drone needs to take vigilant actions, such as climbing altitude to reduce the intensity of the new high attack from the ground, or enabling cellular network and other equipment to assist in geographic location detection to obtain the real geographic location to resist GPS attacks. The above two situations will cause the drone to perform packet loss processing and terminate the process;

[0140] According to the encrypted message Y, UAV i The response R and the secret value Calculate the random number from the ground station:

[0141] The response R and real ID of the r′1 joint drone in the previous calculation result UAV Calculation Summary:

[0142]

[0143] If M′3 == M3, it means that the calculation of key information r2 is correct, otherwise r2 may be tampered with, and the process is terminated;

[0144] (12) The random numbers r1 and r2 generated by both parties and the response R are used to generate a summary, which will be used as the symmetric key for encrypted communication: At this point, the negotiation of the symmetric key is completed. The subsequent part will update the challenge response pairs reserved by the drone and the ground station to ensure the forward and backward security of the process;

[0145] Step 3: Update CRP

[0146] (1) The ground station generates a 32-bit random number C * , which is input as a challenge Get 320 bits response

[0147] Update the anonymous ID in the database

[0148] Compute response mask

[0149]

[0150] (2) Use the random number r2 from the ground station and the real ID of the drone UAV Calculate the response R * Summary:

[0151] Compute the digest of all messages to be sent over a public channel:

[0152]

[0153] (3) The authentication message MSG3{C * , mR * M5, M6} are sent to the ground station via a common channel;

[0154] When the ground station receives the message MSG3{C * , mR * M5, M6}, the following actions will be performed:

[0155] (4) First, calculate the digest of message MSG3 to determine whether it comes from a trusted node and has not been tampered with:

[0156]

[0157] If M6′==M6, it means the message comes from ground station and has not been tampered with. Otherwise, it means that the source of the message is unreliable, the message will be discarded and the process will be terminated.

[0158] Then according to the response mask, secret value and session key To calculate the updated challenge:

[0159]

[0160] Use the drone's previous response R to verify that the decrypted response is correct:

[0161]

[0162] Verify M5′: If M5′ == M5, it means that all the above calculations are completed correctly, that is, the drone has correctly decrypted r2 and the ground station has also correctly decrypted the updated response R * ; Otherwise, it means that there is a problem with the previous calculation, which may be a man-in-the-middle attack or other attacks. In this case, the process will be terminated;

[0163] (5) Update UAV i The challenge correspondence is the c just calculated * , R * ′, that is, let (C, R) = (C * , R * ′);

[0164] Update UAV based on updated response i Anonymous ID

Claims

1. A method for drone identity authentication and key negotiation based on location password, characterized in that: The steps include: Step 1: Drone Identity Registration: UAV Node i It is an entity whose identity and location information authenticity needs to be verified; the ground station GCS is a trusted entity that verifies the integrity of the prover's location information and stores a standard location information feature database; Wingman UAVP for assisted proof i The shared session key K is calculated and generated together with the ground station GCS. The drone identity registration requires the drone node to register its PUF information in the feature database of the ground station through a secure channel, and pre-negotiate the secret value for subsequent cryptographic calculations; Step 2: Authentication: The ground station and the drone will complete mutual identity authentication, authentication of the drone's geographic location security, and negotiation of the symmetric key between the two parties, and ultimately a 160-bit symmetric key will be negotiated; Step 3: Update CRP; The specific process of step 2 is as follows: First, the drone follows the following steps: (1) Take C as input and use the PUF function to calculate the response Generate a 160-bit random number r1 and use R to calculate the mask of the random number r1: (2) Use the response R and the real ID of the drone UAV Compute the summary about r1: Compute the digest of all messages to be sent over a public channel: ID GS is the ground station number; (3) Authentication message Send to the ground station authentication center through a public channel; When the ground station receives the message The following actions will be performed: (4) The ground station will first GS Compare with its own number, if it does not match, the process will be terminated directly, if it matches, the ground will be based on the anonymous number Find the corresponding actual number Then find the secret value negotiated in advance with the drone (5) Calculate the digest of MSG1 to determine whether it comes from a trusted node and has not been tampered with: If M2'==M2, it means the message comes from UAV i , and has not been tampered with, otherwise it means that the source of the message is unreliable, and the ground station will discard the packet and terminate the process; Calculate the random number based on the encrypted intermediate message X in the previous step: (6) The response R and real ID of the r'1 joint drone in the previous calculation result UAV Calculation Summary: If M'1 == M1, it means that the calculation of key information r1 is correct, otherwise r1 may be tampered with, and the process is terminated; (7) Using location cryptography to detect UAVs i To verify your location: (8) If the drone passes the position verification, let r2 = K i+1 , otherwise let r2 = r1 using the response R and the secret value Encrypt the random number r2 generated in the previous step: The random numbers r1 and r2 generated by both parties and the response R are used to generate the digest result, which will be used as the symmetric key for encrypted communication: (9) Use the response R and the real ID of the drone UAV Compute the summary about r2: Compute the digest of all messages to be sent over a public channel: (10) Send the authentication message MSG2{Y, M3, M4} to the corresponding drone through the public channel; When the drone receives the message MSG2{Y, M3, M4}, it will perform the following actions; (11) Calculate the digest of message MSG2 to determine whether it comes from a trusted node and has not been tampered with. If M4'==M4, it means the message comes from ID GS If the calculated r'2 == r1, it means that the ground station has detected a spoofing attack based on the GPS information sent by the drone, and the drone needs to take alert actions; According to the encrypted message Y, UAV i The response R and the secret value Calculate random numbers from the ground station The response R and real ID of the r'1 joint drone in the previous calculation result UAV Calculation Summary: If M'3 == M3, it means that the calculation of key information r2 is correct, otherwise r2 may be tampered with, and the process is terminated; (12) The random numbers r1 and r2 generated by both parties and the response R are used to generate a summary, which will be used as the symmetric key for encrypted communication: At this point, the negotiation of the symmetric key is completed. The subsequent part will update the challenge response pairs reserved by the drone and the ground station to ensure the forward and backward security of the process; The step (7) mainly includes the following steps: Assuming that the message propagates at the speed of light, the UAV i It can also be said that the communication time between UAVP1 and the ground station and each wingman UAVP2, UAVP3, UAVP4 is t1, t2, t3 respectively: (7a): The ground station selects the key K1 and transmits it to the wingmen UAVP2, UAVP3, and UAVP4 through an internal secret channel to generate an information string V1, V2, and V3 respectively; (7b): Each wingman sends the key and message string to the prover to ensure that they can reach the UAV to be verified at the same time at time T i ; (7c): UAV to be verified i Calculate K at time T i+1 =PRG(V i , K i ), (i=1, 2, 3,), K i+1 Broadcast to all validators; (7d): At T+t i Moment, UAVP i K i+1 Verify that if all verifiers pass the K i+1 The verification of the UAV to be verified i The location was verified.

2. The method for drone identity authentication and key negotiation based on location password according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step 1 mainly includes the following steps: The drone first performs the following actions (1) Use a random number generator to generate a 32-bit random number C, which is used as the input of the physically unclonable function, i.e., the challenge, to generate a 320-bit response R = PUF(C), and obtain the geographic location cl at this time, expressed in longitude and latitude; (2) Send the message MSG1{(C,R),cl} to the ground station through the secure channel between the UAV and the ground station; When the ground station receives the message MSG1{(C,R),cl}, it will perform the following actions: (3) Generate a 160-bit unique ID for the drone With a 320-bit unique secret value According to the exclusive number And the response R sent by it calculates the anonymous number: The challenge response pair (C, R) and actual number of the drone Exclusive secret value Instead of anonymous number stored in its database; (4) Assign the drone a unique number Exclusive secret value and ground station ID GS Sent to the drone via a secure channel as RMSG2; When the drone receives a message from the ground station The following actions will be performed: (5) According to the number sent by the ground station Calculate the anonymous number: Then the number obtained by the drone Secure Secret Value and ground station ID GS And store in the drone's built-in secure storage area.

3. The method for drone identity authentication and key negotiation based on location password according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step 3 is specifically as follows: (1) The ground station generates a 32-bit random number C * , treat it as a challenge input Get 320 bits response Update the anonymous ID in the database Compute response mask (2) Use the random number r2 from the ground station and the real ID of the drone UAV Calculate the response R * Summary: Compute the digest of all messages to be sent over a public channel: (3) The authentication message MSF3{C * ,mR * M5, M6} are sent to the ground station via a common channel; When the ground station receives the message MSG3{C * ,mR * M5,M6}, the following actions will be performed: (4) First, calculate the digest of message MSG3 to determine whether it comes from a trusted node and has not been tampered with: If M6'==M6, it means the message comes from The ground station has not been tampered with, otherwise it means that the source of the message is unreliable, the message will be discarded and the process will be terminated; Then according to the response mask, secret value and session key To calculate the updated challenge: Use the drone's previous response R to verify whether the decrypted response is correct: Verify M5': If M5' == M5, then all the above calculations are completed correctly, that is, the drone has correctly decrypted r2 and the ground station has also correctly decrypted the updated response R * ; Otherwise, it means that there is a problem with the previous calculation, which may be a man-in-the-middle attack or other attacks. In this case, the process will be terminated; (5) Update UAV i The challenge correspondence is the c just calculated * ,R *' , that is, let (C, R) = (C * ,R *′ ); Update UAV based on updated response i Anonymous ID

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