Blockchain-based Object Tracking Method, Device and Electronic Device

Abstract

The present invention discloses a blockchain-based object tracking method, apparatus and electronic device, relating to the technical field of blockchain. Among them, the method includes: obtaining an anonymous signature set obtained by at least one object signing a to-be-signed event in the blockchain, where the object is any object in the signature group corresponding to the blockchain, the anonymous signature set is a signature set that does not include the identity information of the at least one object, the anonymous signature set is composed of multiple anonymous signatures, and the anonymous signature includes at least tag information; detecting each anonymous signature in the anonymous signature set, and determining an abnormal anonymous signature from the anonymous signature set; tracking the abnormal anonymous signature based on the tag information to determine the target object corresponding to the abnormal anonymous signature. The present invention solves the technical problem in the prior art that it is impossible to accurately track abnormal anonymous signature objects in the blockchain network.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of blockchain, and in particular, to a method, apparatus, and electronic device for object tracking based on blockchain. Background Art

[0002] With the wide application of blockchain technology, the problem of privacy and security protection of users during operation is increasingly becoming a hot topic of concern. Currently, to prevent the leakage of user privacy, the following two methods are usually adopted: one is to isolate the association between the signer and the signature author, that is, the signer and the signature author are different, so as to effectively reduce the theft of signature information and signer information by snoops; the other is to use the method of hiding the information publisher in the signature group for confusing publication, effectively confusing the snoops so that they cannot find the real information publisher. However, the above methods can only prevent privacy theft by snoops outside the signature group and cannot effectively prevent and accurately track snooping from within the signature group. For example, a signer uses the signature right he has for illegal operations such as false signatures, duplicate signatures, and network attacks.

[0003] For the above problems, no effective solution has been proposed yet. Summary of the Invention

[0004] Embodiments of the present invention provide a method, apparatus, and electronic device for object tracking based on blockchain to at least solve the technical problem in the prior art that abnormal anonymous signature objects in a blockchain network cannot be accurately tracked.

[0005] According to one aspect of the embodiments of the present invention, there is provided a method for object tracking based on blockchain, including: obtaining an anonymous signature set obtained by at least one object signing a to-be-signed event in the blockchain, where the object is any object in the signature group corresponding to the blockchain, the anonymous signature set is a signature set that does not include the identity information of at least one object, the anonymous signature set is composed of multiple anonymous signatures, and the anonymous signature includes at least tag information, and the tag information is composed of a public key set of the signature group and an event number corresponding to the to-be-signed event; detecting each anonymous signature in the anonymous signature set, and determining an abnormal anonymous signature from the anonymous signature set; tracking the abnormal anonymous signature based on the tag information to determine the target object corresponding to the abnormal anonymous signature.

[0006] Further, the method for object tracking based on blockchain further includes: generating a to-be-signed event to enable at least one object to perform anonymous signature on the to-be-signed event; obtaining a data set generated during the process of at least one object performing anonymous signature on the to-be-signed event, and performing parsing processing on the data set to obtain a data message.

[0007] Further, the blockchain-based object tracking method further includes: judging the integrity of a data packet to obtain a judgment result; and when the judgment result indicates that the data packet is complete, signing a to-be-signed event based on the tag information corresponding to at least one object to obtain an anonymous signature set.

[0008] Further, the blockchain-based object tracking method further includes: invoking a smart contract corresponding to a blockchain node, and generating a verification command for verifying the signatures in the anonymous signature set based on the smart contract; obtaining a first anonymous signature and a second anonymous signature based on the verification command, where the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature are any two anonymous signatures in the anonymous signature set; comparing the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature to obtain a comparison result, where the comparison result indicates whether the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature have the same tag information; and when the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature have the same tag information, determining the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature as abnormal anonymous signatures, and outputting the public key in the tag information of the first anonymous signature.

[0009] Further, the blockchain-based object tracking method further includes: tracking the abnormal anonymous signature based on the public key in the tag information of the first anonymous signature to determine the target object corresponding to the abnormal anonymous signature.

[0010] Further, the blockchain-based object tracking method further includes: obtaining the identity information of the target object, and pushing the identity information to a target platform so that the target platform tracks the target object.

[0011] According to another aspect of the embodiments of the present invention, there is also provided a blockchain-based object tracking device, including: an obtaining module, configured to obtain an anonymous signature set obtained by at least one object signing a to-be-signed event in a blockchain, where the object is any object in a signature group corresponding to the blockchain, the anonymous signature set is a signature set that does not include the identity information of at least one object, the anonymous signature set is composed of multiple anonymous signatures, and the anonymous signature includes at least tag information, and the tag information is composed of a public key set of the signature group and an event number corresponding to the to-be-signed event; a detection module, configured to detect each anonymous signature in the anonymous signature set and determine an abnormal anonymous signature from the anonymous signature set; and a determination module, configured to track the abnormal anonymous signature based on the tag information to determine the target object corresponding to the abnormal anonymous signature.

[0012] According to another aspect of the embodiments of the present invention, there is also provided a computer-readable storage medium, in which a computer program is stored, where the computer program is set to execute the above-mentioned blockchain-based object tracking method when running.

[0013] According to another aspect of the embodiments of the present invention, there is also provided an electronic device, which includes one or more processors; a memory for storing one or more programs, and when the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the one or more processors are caused to implement a program for running, wherein the program is set to execute the above-mentioned blockchain-based object tracking method when running.

[0014] According to another aspect of the embodiments of the present invention, there is also provided a computer program product, including a computer program / instructions, which implement the above-mentioned blockchain-based object tracking method when executed by a processor.

[0015] In the embodiments of the present invention, a method of determining a target object corresponding to an abnormal anonymous signature based on tag information is adopted. First, an anonymous signature set obtained by at least one object signing a signature event in the blockchain is acquired, then each anonymous signature in the anonymous signature set is detected, an abnormal anonymous signature is determined from the anonymous signature set, and then the abnormal anonymous signature is tracked based on the tag information to determine the target object corresponding to the abnormal anonymous signature. Among them, the object is any object in the signature group corresponding to the blockchain, the anonymous signature set is a signature set that does not include the identity information of at least one object, the anonymous signature set is composed of multiple anonymous signatures, the anonymous signature includes at least tag information, and the tag information is composed of the public key set of the signature group and the event number corresponding to the signature event.

[0016] In the above process, by acquiring the anonymous signature set obtained by at least one object signing a signature event in the blockchain, a data basis is provided for subsequent detection of anonymous signatures; by detecting each anonymous signature in the anonymous signature set, an abnormal anonymous signature can be determined from the anonymous signature set, effectively protecting the privacy of the signature group and preventing information leakage, thereby improving the fairness and impartiality of anonymous signatures; by tracking the abnormal anonymous signature based on the tag information, the target object corresponding to the abnormal anonymous signature can be determined, realizing traceability of anonymous signatures, facilitating the organizer of the signature activity to discover illegal signatures and control the illegal signature objects, thereby effectively reducing the risk of the signature event being illegally repeatedly signed, and further being able to prevent malicious manipulation behaviors within the signature group.

[0017] It can be seen that through the technical solution of the present invention, the purpose of discovering abnormal anonymous signatures within the signature group is achieved, thereby realizing the technical effect of improving the accuracy of tracking abnormal anonymous signature objects in the blockchain network, and further solving the technical problem in the prior art that abnormal anonymous signature objects in the blockchain network cannot be accurately tracked. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0018] The accompanying drawings described herein are used to provide a further understanding of the present invention and form a part of this application. The schematic embodiments of the present invention and their descriptions are used to explain the present invention and shall not unduly limit the present invention. In the drawings:

[0019] Figure 1 is a flowchart of an optional blockchain-based object tracking method according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0020] Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of an optional blockchain traceable anonymous signature system according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0021] Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of information access of an optional blockchain traceable anonymous signature system according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0022] Figure 4 is a schematic diagram of modules of an optional blockchain traceable anonymous signature system according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0023] Figure 5 is a signature flowchart of an optional blockchain traceable anonymous signature system according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0024] Figure 6 is a signature verification flowchart of an optional blockchain traceable anonymous signature system according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0025] Figure 7 is an access flowchart of an optional blockchain traceable anonymous signature system according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0026] Figure 8 is a schematic diagram of an optional blockchain-based object tracking device according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0027] Figure 9 is a schematic diagram of an optional electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Embodiments

[0028] In order to enable those skilled in the art of the present technology to better understand the present invention solution, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, rather than all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without creative efforts shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.

[0029] It should be noted that the terms "first", "second", etc. in the description, claims and above-mentioned drawings of the present invention are used to distinguish similar objects, and do not necessarily need to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that the data used in this way can be interchanged under appropriate circumstances, so that the embodiments of the present invention described here can be implemented in an order other than those illustrated or described here. In addition, the terms "including" and "having" and any variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion. For example, a process, method, system, product or device that includes a series of steps or units does not necessarily have to be limited to those steps or units clearly listed, but may include other steps or units not clearly listed or inherent to these processes, methods, products or devices.

[0030] It should be noted that the relevant information (including but not limited to user equipment information, user personal information, etc.) and data (including but not limited to data for display, data for analysis, etc.) involved in the present invention are all information and data authorized by the user or fully authorized by all parties. For example, an interface is set between this system and relevant users or institutions. Before obtaining relevant information, a request for acquisition needs to be sent to the aforementioned users or institutions through the interface, and after receiving the consent information fed back by the aforementioned users or institutions, the relevant information can be obtained.

[0031] Embodiment 1

[0032] According to an embodiment of the present invention, a method embodiment of an object tracking method based on a blockchain is provided. It should be noted that the steps shown in the flowchart of the accompanying drawings can be executed in a computer system such as a set of computer executable instructions. And although the logical order is shown in the flowchart, in some cases, the steps shown or described can be executed in a different order than here.

[0033] Figure 1 is a flowchart of an optional object tracking method based on a blockchain according to an embodiment of the present invention, as Figure 1 shown, the method includes the following steps:

[0034] Step S101, obtaining an anonymous signature set obtained by at least one object signing a to-be-signed event in the blockchain, where the object is any object in the signature group corresponding to the blockchain, the anonymous signature set is a signature set that does not include the identity information of at least one object, the anonymous signature set is composed of multiple anonymous signatures, and the anonymous signature includes at least tag information, and the tag information is composed of the public key set of the signature group and the event number corresponding to the to-be-signed event.

[0035] In the above steps, at least one object's anonymous signature set obtained by signing the event to be signed in the blockchain can be obtained through devices such as an application system, a processor, and an electronic device. In this embodiment, through the Figure 2 blockchain traceable anonymous signature system shown in the figure, at least one object's anonymous signature set obtained by signing the event to be signed in the blockchain is obtained. As shown in Figure 2 the figure, the blockchain traceable anonymous signature system includes: blockchain infrastructure cloud 1, blockchain consensus accounting node 2, gateway access node 3, signature user 4, and malicious actor 5.

[0036] Among them, the blockchain infrastructure cloud 1: is responsible for providing and allocating network resources, computing resources, and storage resources according to the user's networking resource request, creating a blockchain networking service, supporting the selection of a blockchain product image according to the user's blockchain product standard, configuring virtual node resources, and creating a blockchain network. The blockchain consensus accounting node 2: In the blockchain infrastructure cloud 1, the blockchain consensus accounting node is a virtual computing node and is a basic component of the blockchain network. The blockchain network has several blockchain consensus accounting nodes. As blockchain computing nodes, they are mainly responsible for blockchain transaction access and processing, providing intelligent contract execution, transaction consensus, and transaction accounting; at the same time, they also provide security services such as data encryption, decryption, and identity authentication for transaction data. The gateway access node 3: is responsible for receiving the transaction requests of the nodes accessing the blockchain network, routing the transaction requests to the blockchain nodes, and feeding back the messages of the blockchain nodes to the transaction initiator. The signer 4: a member of the signature group, configures public and private keys, and can sign and verify data messages using a traceable anonymous signature algorithm. As a verifier, the true identity of the signer cannot be known. The malicious actor 5: a member of the signature group, takes advantage of the decentralized characteristics and full ledger characteristics of the blockchain and system security vulnerabilities to attempt to spy on information, falsely sign, duplicate sign, and launch network attacks in violation of the activity regulations, etc., to disrupt the smooth progress of the activity.

[0037] Optionally, the object can include the signer and the malicious actor, and the two together form the signature group. The multiple anonymous signatures obtained after the signature group signs the event to be signed form the anonymous signature set. Among them, the anonymous signature is traceable, that is, the anonymous signature includes tag information composed of the public key set of the signature group and the event number corresponding to the event to be signed. Optionally, the tag information is represented by the letter L, and the formal representation is: L = {issue, pk N}, where pk N represents the public key set of the signature group, and issue represents the event number of the activity, for example, the candidate number of the election, the serial number of the voting event, etc. The members of the signature group can sign the event to be signed by associating the tag information L and can also verify its legality, but there is no way to discover the identity information of the signer.

[0038] Optionally, the set of algorithms to be used subsequently is described herein. Let the ordered public key set pk N =(pk1,...,pk n ) be a ring, and the set of traceable signature functions is represented as follows:

[0039] Σ=(Gen,Sig,Ver,Trace)

[0040] Where: Gen represents a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that takes the security parameter k∈N as input and outputs the public and private keys (pk,sk); Sig represents a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that takes the secret key sk i (i∈N), the traceable tag L=(issue,pk N ), and the data message m∈{0,1} * , and outputs the signature S; Ver represents a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that takes the traceable tag L=(issue,pk N ) and the data message m∈{0,1} * , and the signature S as input and outputs true or false; Trace represents a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that takes the traceable tag L=(issue,pk N ), two data message / signature pairs, {m1,S1}{m2,S2}, and outputs the following optional results:

[0041]

[0042] Specifically, Figure 3 is an optional schematic diagram of information access for a blockchain traceable anonymous signature system according to an embodiment of the present invention, as Figure 3 shown, the information access includes: focus activity 20, signer 21, malicious actor 22, gateway access node 23, blockchain network 24, consensus accounting node 25, identity authentication node 26, verifier 27.

[0043] Among them, the focus activity 20 refers to an event activity organized and initiated through the blockchain network 24 and participated in jointly by the signature group. For example, a voting event, which formally includes data information such as activity description, activity time, activity location, and activity participants. The signer 21 refers to an application or individual that participates in the voting event published based on the blockchain through the gateway access node 23 and signs the data message according to the requirements of the activity. All signers constitute the signature group, jointly participate in the voting event, and exchange activity data messages. In this example, the signers include signers A, B, C, D, E (verifiers) and F (malicious actor). The malicious actor 22 refers to a malicious node that illegally intrudes into the blockchain network. The malicious actor 22 obtains focus information through methods such as message listening, interception, disguise, and intrusion to illegally obtain the spatial information of the event, maliciously inject false information into the blockchain network, causing information leakage or disrupting the normal operation of the blockchain network. The gateway access node 23 is the sender and receiver of the focus information and also the signature verification device for the focus information. It is responsible for receiving the data messages passed in by the signer or verifier, generating a traceable anonymous signature, and invoking the smart contract API provided by the blockchain to transmit the signature to the blockchain network. The blockchain network 24 is a decentralized network constructed using the consensus accounting technology. The blockchain network consists of consensus accounting nodes, authentication nodes, etc. This technology uses the method of group consensus to ensure the consistency of transactions. The ledger data is stored in the consensus accounting nodes, and the transaction data has the characteristics of decentralization, immutability, security, and reliability. The consensus accounting node 25 is the consensus accounting node of the blockchain network, storing the transaction world state, identity encrypted data message information, receiving the instructions of the transaction sender and transaction receiver, and providing services such as data information routing and information sending and receiving. The identity authentication node 26 is the node that issues digital identity credentials in the blockchain network 24 and assigns digital identities to the blockchain network. The verifier 27 is a node used to receive the traceable anonymous signature message and verify it using the verification algorithm.

[0044] It should be noted that in the above process, by obtaining the set of anonymous signatures obtained by at least one object signing the event to be signed in the blockchain, an accurate data basis can be provided for subsequent detection of each anonymous signature in the set of anonymous signatures.

[0045] Step S102, detect each anonymous signature in the set of anonymous signatures, and determine the abnormal anonymous signatures from the set of anonymous signatures.

[0046] In the above steps, each anonymous signature in the set of anonymous signatures can be detected by devices such as an application system, a processor, and an electronic device. In this embodiment, each anonymous signature in the set of anonymous signatures is detected by the module of the traceable anonymous signature system as Figure 4 shown. Each anonymous signature in the set of anonymous signatures is detected by the module of the traceable anonymous signature system as Figure 4As shown in the figure, it includes: a main control unit 30, a sensor module 31, an event data processing unit 32, and a wireless communication module 33. Among them, the main control unit 30: This module is responsible for data transmission and overall invocation of each processing module. The sensor module 31: This module is used to sense voting events and generate event focus information m. The focus event processing module 32: Responsible for executing Sign() to sign transaction data and executing ChkSign() to verify the signature of transaction data. It includes a traceable digital signature unit 321, a traceable digital signature verification unit 322, and a traceable signature check unit 323. The communication module 33: Used to execute the wireless transmission protocol to receive the transaction information request message proposed by the transaction information requester, send data information to the transaction information requester, and return false if the attribute permission verification fails.

[0047] Optionally, detecting each anonymous signature in the anonymous signature set may be to detect whether each anonymous signature has the same event tag information L. If it is detected that there is the same tag information L, the abnormal anonymous signature can be determined from the anonymous signature set, that is, it can be determined that there is a malicious actor in the signature group who repeatedly signs the same event.

[0048] It should be noted that in the above process, by detecting each anonymous signature in the anonymous signature set and determining the abnormal anonymous signature from the anonymous signature set, the fairness and impartiality of the anonymous signature are improved.

[0049] Step S103, trace the abnormal anonymous signature based on the tag information to determine the target object corresponding to the abnormal anonymous signature.

[0050] In the above step, tracing the abnormal anonymous signature based on the tag information may be to trace the abnormal anonymous signature based on the public key of the signature group included in the tag information L, and determine the target object corresponding to the abnormal anonymous signature according to the public key of the signature group, that is, determine the malicious actor.

[0051] It should be noted that by tracing the abnormal anonymous signature based on the tag information, the target object corresponding to the abnormal anonymous signature can be determined, realizing the traceability of the anonymous signature, facilitating the organizer of the signature activity to discover the illegal signature and control the illegal signature object, thereby being able to prevent malicious manipulation behavior within the signature group.

[0052] Based on the scheme defined in the above steps S101 to S103, it can be known that in an embodiment of the present invention, a method of determining the target object corresponding to the abnormal anonymous signature based on the tag information is adopted. First, an anonymous signature set obtained by signing the event to be signed by at least one object in the blockchain is obtained, and then each anonymous signature in the anonymous signature set is detected, and the abnormal anonymous signature is determined from the anonymous signature set. Then, the abnormal anonymous signature is tracked based on the tag information to determine the target object corresponding to the abnormal anonymous signature. Among them, the object is any object in the signature group corresponding to the blockchain, the anonymous signature set is a signature set that does not contain the identity information of at least one object, the anonymous signature set is composed of multiple anonymous signatures, and the anonymous signature includes at least tag information, and the tag information is composed of the public key set of the signature group and the event number corresponding to the event to be signed.

[0053] It is easy to notice that in the above process, by obtaining the anonymous signature set obtained by signing the signature event in the blockchain by at least one object, a data basis is provided for the subsequent detection of anonymous signatures; by detecting each anonymous signature in the anonymous signature set, abnormal anonymous signatures can be determined from the anonymous signature set, which can effectively protect the privacy of the signature group and prevent information leakage, thereby improving the fairness and impartiality of anonymous signatures; by tracking abnormal anonymous signatures based on label information, the target object corresponding to the abnormal anonymous signature can be determined, and the anonymous signature can be traced, which is convenient for the organizer of the signature activity to discover illegal signatures and control the illegal signature objects, thereby effectively reducing the risk of illegal repeated signatures of the event to be signed, and then preventing malicious manipulation within the signature group.

[0054] It can be seen that through the technical solution of the present invention, the purpose of discovering abnormal anonymous signatures within a signature group is achieved, thereby achieving the technical effect of improving the accuracy of tracking abnormal anonymous signature objects in the blockchain network, and further solving the technical problem in the prior art that it is impossible to accurately track abnormal anonymous signature objects in the blockchain network.

[0055] In an optional embodiment, before obtaining an anonymous signature set obtained by at least one object signing an event to be signed in the blockchain, an event to be signed is first generated so that at least one object anonymously signs the event to be signed, and then a data set generated in the process of at least one object anonymously signing the event to be signed is obtained, and the data set is parsed to obtain a data message.

[0056] Optional, Figure 7 This is an optional blockchain traceable anonymous signature system access flow chart according to an embodiment of the present invention, which can provide users with traceable anonymous signature, signature verification and traceable verification services.Figure 7 As shown in Figure 7 , first, an initialization step S600 is performed: start the initialization program GlobalSetup(), which is used to execute the GlobalSetup() algorithm to initialize variables, input random security parameters, and output global parameters Params.

[0057] Specifically, as Figure 5 shown in Figure 5 , in step S40: the identity authentication node starts the initialization program GlobalSetup(), which is used to execute the GlobalSetup() algorithm to initialize variables, input the random security parameter λ, and output the global parameters Params, that is:

[0058] GlobalSetup(λ) → Params

[0059] Among them, λ represents the security parameter, and Params is shared to other consensus accounting nodes through the blockchain network.

[0060] Furthermore, step S601 is performed: let G be a multiplicative group of order prime number q, and g be a generator of G. Define the hash functions H1, H2, and H3 as follows:

[0061] H1: {0, 1}* → G

[0062] H2: {0, 1}* → G

[0063] H3: {0, 1}* → Z q

[0064] Among them, q is a prime number, and Z q represents the integers modulo q.

[0065] Furthermore, step S602 is performed: Signer A initiates a focus event signature. In this embodiment, taking a voting event as an example, before obtaining the anonymous signature set obtained by at least one object signing the event to be signed in the blockchain, first, Signer A initiates a voting event signature to generate the event to be signed, and the signature group performs an anonymous signature on the event to be signed.

[0066] Furthermore, step 603 is performed: the gateway access node generates a traceable anonymous signature data packet PM, unpacks it, and sends it to the blockchain node. That is, obtain the data set generated during the process of at least one object performing an anonymous signature on the event to be signed, and perform parsing processing on the data set to obtain the data packet.

[0067] Specifically, as Figure 5 shown in Figure 5 , in step S41: the signer initiates a voting event through the access node, generates data information m, and let the signature of (L, m) be (A1, c N , z N), the traceable signature function Sign is expressed as:

[0068] S = Sign(L, m) = {A1, c N , z N}

[0069] Among them, the traceable anonymous signature algorithm is expressed as follows:

[0070] Input: L = {issue, pk N}, m = {0, 1} *

[0071] Output: A1, c N , z N

[0072] The algorithm steps are as follows:

[0073] Step 1: Randomly select w i ∈Z q , and set and a i , b i ∈G;

[0074] Step 2: Randomly select z j , c j ∈Z q , and set

[0075] Step 3: Set c = H3(L, A0, A1, a N , b N ), where, a N =(a1,..., a N ), and b = (b1,..., b n );

[0076] Step 4: Set c i , z i respectively satisfy the following formulas:

[0077] c i = c - ∑ i≠j c j (mod q)

[0078] z i = w i - c i x i (mod q)

[0079] And return (c i , z i ), where, c N =(c1,..., c n ), zN = (z1,..., z n ).

[0080] Furthermore, perform step S42: Let S be a traceable signature, formally represented as: S = (A1, c N , z N ), and P M represents the blockchain network focus information message, formally represented as:

[0081] P M = (L, m, q, g, pk1, pk2,... pk n , A1, c N , z N , param, chksum)

[0082] where L = {issue, pk N} represents the traceable tag, m = {0, 1} * represents the voting event, q is a prime number, g is the generator of G, pk1... pkn are the signer public keys, params is the encryption security parameter, c N = (c1,..., c n ), z N = (z1,..., z n ), and chksum is the check bit.

[0083] It should be noted that by parsing and processing the data set to obtain the data message, an accurate data basis can be provided for subsequent integrity judgment of the data message, thereby effectively reducing the risk of malicious tampering of the anonymous signature.

[0084] In an alternative embodiment, in the process of obtaining the anonymous signature set obtained by at least one object signing the event to be signed in the blockchain, first perform an integrity judgment on the data message to obtain a judgment result, and then, when the judgment result indicates that the data message is complete, sign the event to be signed based on the tag information corresponding to at least one object to obtain the anonymous signature set.

[0085] Optionally, after obtaining the data message, perform step S604: The blockchain consensus accounting node checks whether the integrity of the message data is normal. If an abnormality is found, this processing flow is exited; otherwise, the next step is continued. That is, when the judgment result indicates that the data message is complete, sign the event to be signed based on the tag information corresponding to at least one object to obtain the anonymous signature set.

[0086] Further, perform step S605 and step S606: For each i (i < N), calculate a1, …, an and b1, …, bn; execute the Sign() function calculation to perform a traceable anonymous signature on the focus event.

[0087] Specifically, through the traceable digital signature unit 321, execute the traceable signature function Sign to generate a traceable anonymous signature. Let the voting event m ∈ {0, 1} * , and the event label is expressed as: L = {issue, pk N}, where issue represents the event serial number, and pk N = {pk1, pk2,... pk n} represents the public key of the sender. Then the processing flow of Sign is as follows: First, initialize the security parameter, calculate the hash value of the event label L: h = H1(L), and calculate the intermediate variable where x i (x i ∈ Z q ) is a random number. Let the signer be i, calculate A0 = H2(L, m), For any signer i ≠ j, initialize as follows: σ j = A0A1 j ∈ G; then calculate the traceable signature. Let the signature of (L, m) be (A1, c N , z N ), and the traceable signature function Sign is expressed as:

[0088] S = Sign(L, m) = {A1, c N , z N}

[0089] The traceable anonymous signature algorithm is expressed as follows:

[0090] Input: L = {issue, pk N}, m = {0, 1} *

[0091] Output: A1, c N , z N

[0092] The algorithm steps are as follows:

[0093] Step 1: Randomly select w i ∈ Z q , set and a i , b i ∈ G;

[0094] Step 2: Randomly select z j , c j ∈ Zq , set

[0095] Step 3: Set c = H3(L, A0, A1, a N , b N ), where a N = (a1,..., a N ), and b = (b1,..., b n );

[0096] Step 4: Set c i , z i to satisfy the following formulas respectively:

[0097] c i = c - ∑ i≠j c j (mod q)

[0098] z i = w i - c i x i (mod q)

[0099] and return (c i , z i ), where c N = (c1,..., c n ), z N = (z1,..., z n ).

[0100] Step 5: Output the traceable signature σ = (A1, c N , z N ) of (L, m).

[0101] Furthermore, output the traceable signature message. Let S be the traceable signature, formally represented as: S = (A1, c N , z N ), and P M represents the blockchain network focus information message, formally represented as:

[0102] P M = (L, m, q, g, pk1, pk2,... pk n , A1, c N , z N , param, chksum)

[0103] where L = {issue, pk N} represents the traceable label, and m = {0, 1} *Denote the voting event, q is a prime number, g is the generator of G, pk1...pkn are the public keys of the signers, and params is the encryption security parameter. c N =(c1,...,c n ), z N =(z1,...,z n ), and chksum is the checksum bit.

[0104] Among them, before executing the traceable signature function Sign to generate a traceable anonymous signature, the public and private keys of the signer need to be generated. Specifically, execute the key generation function Gen to generate the public and private keys of the wireless sensor network. Let the public and private keys of signer i∈[1,n] be {pk i , sk i}, select a random number x i (x i ∈Z q ), and perform the following calculations:

[0105]

[0106] Obtain the public and private keys as {pk i , sk i}, which is expressed as: pk i ={Gid i , g, y i , G}, sk i ={pk i , x i}. Among them, Gen is formally expressed as: Gen(g, G, q, i)={pk i , sk i}, g is the generator of G, and q is a large prime number.

[0107] It should be noted that in the above process, the traceable anonymous signature algorithm is used to sign the event to be signed, so that the obtained anonymous signature contains the label information, so that the anonymous signature can be traced. At the same time, the flexibility of the event is maintained, there is no need to specially set up key sharing, nor does it rely on the participation of a third-party notary, effectively reducing the risk of the event to be signed being illegally and repeatedly signed, and thus being able to prevent malicious manipulation behaviors within the signing group.

[0108] In an alternative embodiment, in the process of detecting each anonymous signature in the anonymous signature set and determining the abnormal anonymous signature from the anonymous signature set, first, the smart contract corresponding to the blockchain node is called to generate a verification command for verifying the signatures in the anonymous signature set based on the smart contract. Then, the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature are obtained based on the verification command. Next, the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature are compared to obtain a comparison result. When the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature have the same tag information, the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature are determined to be abnormal anonymous signatures, and the public key in the tag information of the first anonymous signature is output. Among them, the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature are any two anonymous signatures in the anonymous signature set, and the comparison result indicates whether the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature have the same tag information.

[0109] Optionally, steps S607 to S614 are performed. Among them, the processing procedures of steps S607, S610, and S611 are the same as those of the foregoing steps S601, S604, and S605, and will not be elaborated here.

[0110] Optionally, before calling the smart contract corresponding to the blockchain node, first perform step S608: Verifier B receives the focus event data. Specifically, as Figure 6 shown, in step S50: Initialize the signature verification information. The receiver, that is, Verifier B, receives the traceable anonymous signature message P M , and parses the message to generate signature verification information:

[0111] P M =(L, m, q, g, pk1, pk2,... pk n , A1, c N , z N , param, chksum)

[0112] Furthermore, perform steps S609 and S612: Generate call information, call the smart contract provided by the blockchain node, initiate the signature verification process, that is, generate a verification command for verifying the signatures in the anonymous signature set based on the smart contract, and execute the chksign() function, and respectively output the verification result true or false according to the calculation result. Specifically, as Figure 6 shown, in step S51: Through the traceable digital signature unit 322, execute the signature verification function Chksign to verify the signature S.

[0113] The Chksign() signature verification algorithm is expressed as follows:

[0114] Input: P M

[0115] Output: Whether the signature verification is successful, True or False

[0116] The algorithm steps are as follows:

[0117] Step 1: Parse L = (issue, pk N ), for i ∈ N, check whether the following relations hold:

[0118] g, A1 ∈ G; (2) c i , z i ∈ Z q ; (3) y i ∈ Z q ;

[0119] Step 2: Set h = H1(L), A0 = H1(L, m), for all i ∈ N, calculate

[0120] Step 3: For i ∈ N, calculate

[0121] Step 4: Verify the following congruence formula:

[0122] H2(L, m, A0, A1, a N , b N ) ≡ ∑ i∈N c i (mod q)

[0123] where, a N = (a1,..., a n ), b N = (b1,..., b n ). If the above formula check is successful, the output is true, indicating that the signature verification is successful, otherwise the output is false, indicating that the signature verification fails.

[0124] Furthermore, perform step S613 and step S614: Execute the Tracesign() function, and output pk, link, indep respectively according to the calculation results, and receive the verification feedback information. Specifically, as Figure 6 shown, step S52: Execute the traceable function TraceSign to verify the replay count, and compare the relationship between two pairs of tuples (m, σ), (m′, σ′) through the Tracesign() function, that is, whether they have the same label information L.

[0125] Optionally, through the traceable signature check unit 323, execute the traceable function TraceSign to verify the replay count. Specifically, randomly obtain two pairs of data tuples (m, σ), (m′, σ′), that is, the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature, where, σ = (A1, c N , zN ), σ′ = (A1′, c′ N , z′ N ). Next, compare the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature as follows:

[0126] Step 1: Parse L = {issue, pk N}, set h = H(L), A0 = H′(L, m),

[0127] Step 2: For i ∈ N, calculate σ i = A0A1 i ∈ G. At the same time, calculate σ′ i = A′0A′1 i ∈ G;

[0128] Step 3: Initialize φ → list; For i ∈ N, if σ i = σ′ i , set pk i → List;

[0129] Step 4: If list has only one element pk, output pk;

[0130] If list → pk N , output "link";

[0131] If list → φ, or 1 < list < n, output "indep"

[0132] Optionally, in the case where the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature have the same tag information, that is, if list has only one element pk, determine the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature as abnormal anonymous signatures, and output the public key in the tag information of the first anonymous signature, that is, output pk, indicating that the same signature object signs the same event multiple times.

[0133] Optionally, when the tag information of the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature is different, but the event information m in the anonymous signatures is the same, that is, m = m′, that is, if list → pk N , then determine the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature as normal anonymous signatures, and output "link", indicating that different signature objects sign the same event.

[0134] Optionally, when the tag information of the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature is different, and the event information m in the anonymous signatures is also different, that is, if list → φ, or 1 < list < n, then output "indep", indicating that different signature objects sign different events, that is, the two signatures have no relationship.

[0135] It should be noted that by comparing whether the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature have the same tag information, the abnormal anonymous signature can be accurately determined without specially setting up key sharing, which is more convenient for the organizer of the signature activity to discover the illegal signature. Furthermore, the organizer can track the illegal object based on the output public key.

[0136] In an alternative embodiment, during the process of tracking the abnormal anonymous signature based on the tag information to determine the target object corresponding to the abnormal anonymous signature, the abnormal anonymous signature is tracked based on the public key in the tag information of the first anonymous signature to determine the target object corresponding to the abnormal anonymous signature.

[0137] Optionally, after determining that there is an abnormal anonymous signature in the anonymous signature set in the foregoing process, that is, there is an abnormal signature object in the signature group, the target object corresponding to the abnormal anonymous signature can be determined based on the output public key, that is, the perpetrator corresponding to it can be determined based on the public key.

[0138] In an alternative embodiment, after determining the target object corresponding to the abnormal anonymous signature, the identity information of the target object is obtained and pushed to the target platform so that the target platform can track the target object.

[0139] Optionally, the target platform may refer to a blockchain network or the data center of a law enforcement department. Optionally, after determining the target object corresponding to the abnormal anonymous signature, that is, the perpetrator, the identity information of the perpetrator can be obtained and pushed to the blockchain network for broadcasting to notify other signers in the signature group of the identity of the perpetrator; alternatively, the identity information can also be pushed to the data center of the law enforcement department so that the law enforcement department can track the perpetrator.

[0140] It should be noted that by tracking the abnormal anonymous signature through the public key in the tag information, the target object corresponding to the abnormal anonymous signature is determined, which improves the security of the signature and also improves the execution efficiency of tracking the target object.

[0141] Thus, through the technical solution of the present invention, the purpose of discovering the abnormal anonymous signature inside the signature group is achieved, thereby realizing the technical effect of improving the accuracy of tracking the abnormal anonymous signature object in the blockchain network, and further solving the technical problem that the abnormal anonymous signature object in the blockchain network cannot be accurately tracked in the prior art.

[0142] Embodiment 2

[0143] According to an embodiment of the present invention, an embodiment of an object tracking device based on a blockchain is provided, wherein, Figure 8Schematic diagram of an optional blockchain-based object tracking device according to an embodiment of the present invention, as Figure 8 shown, the device includes: an acquisition module 801, configured to acquire an anonymous signature set obtained by at least one object signing a to-be-signed event in the blockchain, where the object is any object in the signature group corresponding to the blockchain, the anonymous signature set is a signature set that does not include the identity information of the at least one object, the anonymous signature set is composed of multiple anonymous signatures, and the anonymous signature includes at least tag information, and the tag information is composed of a public key set of the signature group and an event number corresponding to the to-be-signed event; a detection module 802, configured to detect each anonymous signature in the anonymous signature set and determine an abnormal anonymous signature from the anonymous signature set; a determination module 803, configured to track the abnormal anonymous signature based on the tag information and determine the target object corresponding to the abnormal anonymous signature.

[0144] It should be noted that the above acquisition module 801, detection module 802, and determination module 803 correspond to steps S101 to S103 in the above embodiment. The examples and application scenarios implemented by the three modules and the corresponding steps are the same, but are not limited to the content disclosed in the above embodiment 1.

[0145] Optionally, the blockchain-based object tracking device further includes: a generation module, configured to generate a to-be-signed event, so that at least one object performs anonymous signature on the to-be-signed event; a first acquisition module, configured to acquire a data set generated during the process of at least one object performing anonymous signature on the to-be-signed event, and perform parsing processing on the data set to obtain a data message.

[0146] Optionally, the acquisition module includes: a judgment module, configured to perform integrity judgment on the data message to obtain a judgment result; a signature module, configured to sign the to-be-signed event based on the tag information corresponding to at least one object when the judgment result indicates that the data message is complete, to obtain an anonymous signature set.

[0147] Optionally, the detection module includes: a call module, configured to call a smart contract corresponding to a blockchain node and generate a verification command for verifying the signatures in the anonymous signature set based on the smart contract; a second acquisition module, configured to acquire a first anonymous signature and a second anonymous signature based on the verification command, where the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature are any two anonymous signatures in the anonymous signature set; a comparison module, configured to compare the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature to obtain a comparison result, where the comparison result indicates whether the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature have the same tag information; a first determination module, configured to determine that the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature are abnormal anonymous signatures and output the public key in the tag information of the first anonymous signature when the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature have the same tag information.

[0148] Optionally, the determination module includes: a tracking module, configured to track the abnormal anonymous signature based on the public key in the tag information of the first anonymous signature, and determine the target object corresponding to the abnormal anonymous signature.

[0149] Optionally, the blockchain-based object tracking device further includes: a pushing module, configured to obtain the identity information of the target object and push the identity information to the target platform, so that the target platform tracks the target object.

[0150] Embodiment 3

[0151] According to another aspect of the embodiments of the present invention, there is also provided a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, where the computer program is configured to execute the above-mentioned blockchain-based object tracking method when running.

[0152] Embodiment 4

[0153] According to another aspect of the embodiments of the present invention, there is also provided an electronic device, where Figure 9 is a schematic diagram of an optional electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention, as Figure 9 shown, the electronic device includes one or more processors; a memory for storing one or more programs, and when the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the one or more processors are caused to implement a program for running, where the program is configured to execute the above-mentioned blockchain-based object tracking method when running.

[0154] Embodiment 5

[0155] According to another aspect of the embodiments of the present invention, there is also provided a computer program product including computer programs / instructions, and when the computer programs / instructions are executed by a processor, the above-mentioned blockchain-based object tracking method is implemented.

[0156] The serial numbers of the above embodiments of the present invention are only for description and do not represent the advantages or disadvantages of the embodiments.

[0157] In the above embodiments of the present invention, the descriptions of the respective embodiments have their own emphases. For parts not detailed in a certain embodiment, reference may be made to the relevant descriptions of other embodiments.

[0158] In several embodiments provided by this application, it should be understood that the disclosed technical content can be implemented in other ways. Among them, the device embodiments described above are merely illustrative. For example, the division of the units can be a logical function division. In actual implementation, there can be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. Another point is that the displayed or discussed coupling, direct coupling, or communication connection between each other can be through some interfaces. The indirect coupling or communication connection of units or modules can be in an electrical or other form.

[0159] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated. The components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they can be located in one place or distributed to multiple units. Some or all of the units can be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment.

[0160] In addition, in each embodiment of the present invention, each functional unit can be integrated in a processing unit, or each unit can exist physically alone, or two or more units can be integrated in one unit. The above-mentioned integrated units can be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of software functional units.

[0161] If the above-mentioned integrated unit is implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on such an understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or all or part of this technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions to enable a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in each embodiment of the present invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes: USB flash drives, read-only memories (ROM, Read-Only Memory), random access memories (RAM, Random Access Memory), mobile hard disks, magnetic disks, or optical discs and other various media that can store program codes.

[0162] The above are only the preferred embodiments of the present invention. It should be noted that for those of ordinary skill in the art, without departing from the principle of the present invention, several improvements and refinements can be made, and these improvements and refinements should also be regarded as the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A blockchain-based object tracking method, characterized in that, Including: Obtaining an anonymous signature set obtained by at least one object signing a signature event m in a blockchain, where the object is any object in a signature group corresponding to the blockchain, the anonymous signature set is a signature set that does not include the identity information of the at least one object, the anonymous signature set is composed of multiple anonymous signatures, and the anonymous signature includes at least tag information L, and the tag information is composed of the public key of the at least one object and the event number corresponding to the signature event; Detecting each anonymous signature in the anonymous signature set, and determining an abnormal anonymous signature from the anonymous signature set; Tracking the abnormal anonymous signature based on the tag information, and determining the target object corresponding to the abnormal anonymous signature; Wherein, obtaining the anonymous signature set obtained by at least one object signing a signature event in a blockchain includes: Anonymously signing the signature event based on the tag information corresponding to the at least one object to obtain an anonymous signature S; Construct a data packet , where q is a prime number, g is a generator of G, params is an encryption security parameter, chksum is a check bit, and G is a multiplicative group of order q, is the public key set of the signature group; Judging the integrity of the data packet, and when the judgment result indicates that the data packet is complete, signing the signature event again based on the tag information corresponding to at least one object to obtain an anonymous signature, so as to obtain the anonymous signature set.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein Detecting each anonymous signature in the anonymous signature set, and determining an abnormal anonymous signature from the anonymous signature set, including: Invoking the smart contract corresponding to the blockchain node, and generating a verification command for verifying the signatures in the anonymous signature set based on the smart contract; Obtaining a first anonymous signature and a second anonymous signature based on the verification command, where the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature are any two anonymous signatures in the anonymous signature set; Comparing the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature to obtain a comparison result, where the comparison result indicates whether the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature have the same tag information; When the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature have the same tag information, determining the first anonymous signature and the second anonymous signature as the abnormal anonymous signature, and outputting the public key in the tag information of the first anonymous signature.

3. The method according to claim 2, wherein Tracking the abnormal anonymous signature based on the tag information, and determining the target object corresponding to the abnormal anonymous signature, including: Tracking the abnormal anonymous signature based on the public key in the tag information of the first anonymous signature, and determining the target object corresponding to the abnormal anonymous signature.

4. The method according to claim 3, wherein After determining the target object corresponding to the abnormal anonymous signature, the method further includes: Obtaining the identity information of the target object, and pushing the identity information to the target platform, so that the target platform tracks the target object.

5. An object tracking device based on blockchain, characterized in that, Including: An acquisition module, configured to acquire a set of anonymous signatures obtained by at least one object signing a to-be-signed event m in a blockchain, where the object is any object in a signature group corresponding to the blockchain, the set of anonymous signatures is a signature set that does not include the identity information of the at least one object, the set of anonymous signatures is composed of multiple anonymous signatures, and each anonymous signature at least includes tag information L, and the tag information is composed of the public key of the at least one object and the event number corresponding to the to-be-signed event; A detection module, configured to detect each anonymous signature in the set of anonymous signatures and determine an abnormal anonymous signature from the set of anonymous signatures; A determination module, configured to trace the abnormal anonymous signature based on the tag information and determine a target object corresponding to the abnormal anonymous signature; Wherein, the device is further configured to: perform anonymous signature on the event to be signed based on the label information corresponding to the at least one object, to obtain an anonymous signature S; construct a data packet , where q is a prime number, g is a generator of G, params is an encryption security parameter, chksum is a check bit, G is a multiplicative group of order prime number q, is the public key set of the signature group; perform integrity judgment on the data packet, and when the judgment result indicates that the data packet is complete, perform signature on the event to be signed again based on the label information corresponding to the at least one object to obtain an anonymous signature, so as to obtain the anonymous signature set.

6. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, A computer program is stored in the computer-readable storage medium, where the computer program is configured to execute the blockchain-based object tracking method described in any one of claims 1 to 4 when running.

7. An electronic device, characterized in that, The electronic device includes one or more processors; A memory, configured to store one or more programs, and when the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the one or more processors are caused to implement a program for running, where the program is configured to execute the blockchain-based object tracking method described in any one of claims 1 to 4 when running.

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