A park energy optimization method and system based on electricity-carbon sharing

Abstract

The present application relates to a kind of park energy optimization method and system based on electricity-carbon sharing, the method includes: obtaining user side basic load model, energy production model and carbon emission model, constructs user side income model;Park carbon quota total amount is based on user same type typical daily average carbon emission, constructs park carbon quota distribution model;According to the electricity income of operator and carbon quota income, constructs operator utility model;Stauberberg master-slave game model is constructed, based on user side income model and operator utility model, determine the objective function of Stauberberg master-slave game model;Optimization is carried out to target function, park operator and user carry out game, reach game equilibrium point, determine user optimal load strategy and operator optimal electricity-carbon pricing strategy according to game equilibrium point, realize electricity-carbon sharing park energy optimization.The present application can keep park energy and carbon quota supply and demand balance, improve clean energy consumption rate, reduce park carbon emission.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of power system technology, and in particular to a method and system for optimizing energy in industrial parks based on electricity-carbon sharing. Background Technology

[0002] As a hub in the energy chain and a crucial component of the carbon emission chain, the power system has seen its installed capacity of new energy sources reach new highs year after year, driven by robust policies and strong energy demand. Simultaneously, the potential for carbon emission reduction on the power system's source side is being continuously explored, with power generation companies reducing carbon emissions through carbon-reduction retrofits and production optimization of thermal power units. However, research on the emission reduction potential of load-side users is relatively limited. Furthermore, the large-scale grid connection of new energy sources has impacted the stability of the power system; their intermittent and fluctuating output necessitates deep peak shaving by thermal power plants, increasing carbon emissions. Therefore, broadening the scope of emission reduction entities in the power system, mitigating carbon costs on the generation side, and incentivizing deep emission reduction by load-side users are key issues for raising the overall carbon emission reduction ceiling of the power system. Summary of the Invention

[0003] The purpose of this invention is to provide a method and system for optimizing park energy based on electricity-carbon sharing, which can maintain a balance between energy and carbon quota supply and demand in the park, improve the clean energy consumption rate, and reduce the park's carbon emissions.

[0004] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides the following solution:

[0005] This invention provides a method for optimizing park energy based on electricity-carbon sharing, the method comprising:

[0006] Obtain the user-side basic load model, user-side capacity model, and user-side carbon emission model within the park, and construct a user-side revenue model based on the user-side basic load model, user-side capacity model, and user-side carbon emission model.

[0007] A carbon quota allocation model for the park is constructed based on the total carbon quota of the park within a set time period and the typical daily average carbon emissions of users of the same type.

[0008] Based on the electricity revenue and carbon quota revenue of operators within the park, construct an operator utility model;

[0009] A Staberg master-slave game model is constructed. Based on the user-side revenue model and the operator utility model, the objective function of the Staberg master-slave game model is determined. In the Staberg master-slave game model, the park operator affects the user's revenue by optimizing the shared electricity price, carbon price and carbon quota within the park, while the user affects the park operator's revenue by changing the load consumption. The park operator and the user engage in a game.

[0010] The objective function is optimized by conducting a game between the park operator and the user until a game equilibrium point is reached; at the game equilibrium point, the revenue of the operator and the user reaches its maximum value.

[0011] The user load strategy corresponding to the game equilibrium point is determined as the user's optimal load strategy, and the electricity and carbon price strategies corresponding to the game equilibrium point are determined as the operator's optimal electricity-carbon pricing strategy, thereby realizing energy optimization of the park through electricity-carbon sharing.

[0012] Optionally, obtaining the user-side basic load model, user-side capacity model, and user-side carbon emission model within the park specifically includes:

[0013] For the user side n For each user, obtain the user-side basic load model; the user-side basic load model represents the first user. n Individual users t Total consumption load for the time period; the first n The total consumption load of user is the first n The sum of adjustable load, reduceable load, and fixed load for each user;

[0014] Obtain the user-side capacity model; the user-side capacity model represents the first... n Individual users t Total energy produced during the period; the first n Individual users t The total energy produced during the period was the first n Individual users t Clean energy produced during the period and t The sum of the power generation of the self-owned power plant during the period;

[0015] Obtain a user-side carbon emission model; the user-side carbon emission model represents the user's carbon emissions. t Carbon emissions produced during a given period; by obtaining the carbon emission intensity of the self-owned power plant, the first n Individual users t Power generation of self-owned power plants during the period, the first i Carbon emission intensity of each carbon emission source, carbon emission source i The consumption of non-clean energy and t Initial value of time-weighted carbon emission intensity, combined with the aforementioned first... n The total power consumption of each user at any given time period and the first n The total energy produced by a user in any given time period determines the first... n Individual users t Carbon emissions during a given period.

[0016] Optionally, the tThe formula for calculating the initial value of time-weighted carbon emission intensity is as follows:

[0017] ;

[0018] ;

[0019] ;

[0020] in, for t Preliminary value of time-weighted carbon emission intensity express t Carbon emission intensity obtained from time-period main network carbon flow tracking This represents the net electricity purchase amount of all users at the current moment, in their initial state. This represents the net electricity sales of all users at the current moment, in their initial state. For the first n Individual users t Total energy produced during the period For the first n Individual users t The initial total consumption load for the time period.

[0021] Optionally, the expression for the user-side revenue model is:

[0022] ;

[0023] in, This indicates the revenue of users in the park. This indicates the electricity consumption of users in the park. Production efficiency Indicates the first n The benefit coefficient per user This represents the cost required for a self-owned power plant to produce one unit of electricity. This indicates the user's revenue when there is surplus energy. This represents the cost of purchasing electricity when there is a shortage of production energy. Benefits for users participating in carbon credit sharing The electricity price within the park. The electricity purchase price within the park, To share carbon prices within the park, For park users t The remaining carbon allowance for the period, For the first n Individual users t Total energy produced during the period For the first n Individual users t Total consumption load for a given period.

[0024] Optionally, the expression for the carbon quota allocation model of the industrial park is:

[0025] ;

[0026] ;

[0027] in, This represents the user's initial free carbon emission allowance. This represents the average daily total carbon emissions for the same type. Indicates the first n Typical daily average carbon emissions of a single user of the same type Indicates the first n Typical day for users of the same type Average load over a period of time express d Total carbon allowance for Tianyuan District This represents the quota coefficient.

[0028] Optionally, the expression for the operator utility model is:

[0029] ;

[0030] ;

[0031] ;

[0032] in, express t The revenue of the park operator at any time. for t The electricity revenue of the park operator at any time. for t Carbon allowance revenue for park operators. express t Total net electricity purchases by users in the park at any time express t Total net electricity sales of users in the park at any time express t The total net load of users in the park at any time The electricity price within the park. The electricity purchase price within the park, To share carbon prices within the park, The purchase price of electricity traded with the public power grid, The price at which electricity is sold in connection with the public power grid. For park users t The remaining carbon allowance for the period, for t The carbon price in the external carbon market at all times.

[0033] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention also provides the following technical solution:

[0034] An energy optimization system for industrial parks based on electricity-carbon sharing, the system comprising:

[0035] The user-side revenue model establishment unit is used to obtain the user-side basic load model, user-side capacity model and user-side carbon emission model within the park, and to construct a user-side revenue model based on energy flow-carbon flow coupling based on the user-side basic load model, the user-side capacity model and the user-side carbon emission model.

[0036] The park carbon quota allocation model building unit is used to construct a park carbon quota allocation model based on the total amount of park carbon quotas within a set time period and the typical daily average carbon emissions of users of the same type.

[0037] The operator utility model construction unit is used to construct operator utility models based on the electricity revenue and carbon quota revenue of operators within the park.

[0038] The Staberg master-slave game model establishment and objective function determination unit is used to construct the Staberg master-slave game model and determine the objective function of the Staberg master-slave game model based on the user-side revenue model and the operator utility model. In the Staberg master-slave game model, the park operator affects user revenue by optimizing the shared electricity price, carbon price and carbon quota within the park, and the user affects the park operator's revenue by changing load consumption. The park operator and the user engage in a game.

[0039] The game equilibrium point determination unit is used to optimize the objective function and conduct a game between the park operator and the user until a game equilibrium point is reached; at the game equilibrium point, the revenue of the operator and the user reaches its maximum value.

[0040] The park energy optimization unit is used to determine the user load strategy corresponding to the game equilibrium point as the user's optimal load strategy, and to determine the electricity and carbon price strategies corresponding to the game equilibrium point as the operator's optimal electricity-carbon pricing strategy, thereby realizing park energy optimization with electricity-carbon sharing.

[0041] Optionally, the user-side revenue model establishment unit specifically includes:

[0042] The user-side basic load model obtains sub-units for the user-side first... n For each user, obtain the user-side basic load model; the user-side basic load model represents the first user. n Individual users t Total consumption load for the time period; the first n The total consumption load of user is the first nThe sum of adjustable load, reduceable load, and fixed load for each user;

[0043] The user-side capacity model acquisition subunit is used to acquire the user-side capacity model; the user-side capacity model represents the first... n Individual users t Total energy produced during the period; the first n Individual users t The total energy produced during the period was the first n Individual users t Clean energy produced during the period and t The sum of the power generation of the self-owned power plant during the period;

[0044] The user-side carbon emission model acquisition subunit is used to acquire the user-side carbon emission model; the user-side carbon emission model represents the user's carbon emissions. t Carbon emissions produced during a given period; by obtaining the carbon emission intensity of the self-owned power plant, the first n Individual users t Power generation of self-owned power plants during the period, the first i individual carbon emission sources, carbon emission sources i The consumption of non-clean energy and t Initial value of time-weighted carbon emission intensity, combined with the aforementioned first... n The total power consumption of each user at any given time period and the first n The total energy produced by a user in any given time period determines the first... n Individual users t Carbon emissions during a given period.

[0045] Optionally, the expression for the user-side revenue model is:

[0046] ;

[0047] in, This indicates the revenue of users in the park. This indicates the electricity consumption of users in the park. Production efficiency Indicates the first n The benefit coefficient per user This represents the cost required for a self-owned power plant to produce one unit of electricity. This indicates the user's revenue when there is surplus energy. This represents the cost of purchasing electricity when there is a shortage of production energy. Benefits for users participating in carbon credit sharing The electricity price within the park. The electricity purchase price within the park, To share carbon prices within the park, For park users tThe remaining carbon allowance for the period, For the first n Individual users t Total energy produced during the period For the first n Individual users t Total consumption load for a given period.

[0048] Optionally, the expression for the operator utility model is:

[0049] ;

[0050] ;

[0051] ;

[0052] in, express t The revenue of the park operator at any time. for t The electricity revenue of the park operator at any time. for t Carbon allowance revenue for park operators. express t Total net electricity purchases by users in the park at any time express t Total net electricity sales of users in the park at any time express t The total net load of users in the park at any time The electricity price within the park. The electricity purchase price within the park, To share carbon prices within the park, The purchase price of electricity traded with the public power grid, The price at which electricity is sold in connection with the public power grid. For park users t The remaining carbon allowance for the period, Let be the carbon price in the external carbon market at time t.

[0053] According to specific embodiments provided by the present invention, the present invention discloses the following technical effects:

[0054] This invention provides a method and system for optimizing park energy based on electricity-carbon sharing. The method includes: acquiring user-side basic load models, user-side capacity models, and user-side carbon emission models within the park; constructing a user-side revenue model based on energy flow-carbon flow coupling based on these models; constructing a park carbon quota allocation model based on the total park carbon quota within a set time period and the typical daily average carbon emissions of similar users; constructing an operator utility model based on the operator's electricity revenue and carbon quota revenue within the park; constructing a Stahlberg master-slave game model; determining the objective function of the Stahlberg master-slave game model based on the user-side revenue model and the operator utility model; optimizing the objective function and conducting a game between park operators and users until a game equilibrium point is reached; at the game equilibrium point, the revenue of operators and users reaches its maximum value. The user load strategy corresponding to the game equilibrium point is determined as the optimal user load strategy, and the electricity and carbon price strategies corresponding to the game equilibrium point are determined as the optimal electricity-carbon pricing strategy for operators, thus achieving energy optimization of the park through electricity-carbon sharing. This invention can maintain a balance between energy and carbon quota supply and demand in the park, improve the clean energy consumption rate, and reduce the park's carbon emissions. Attached Figure Description

[0055] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0056] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the contract between the industrial park operator and the park user according to the present invention;

[0057] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the energy optimization system structure within the park according to the present invention;

[0058] Figure 3 This is a flowchart of an energy optimization method for industrial parks based on electricity-carbon sharing, according to the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0059] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0060] The purpose of this invention is to provide a method and system for optimizing park energy based on electricity-carbon sharing, which can maintain a balance between energy and carbon quota supply and demand in the park, improve the clean energy consumption rate, and reduce the park's carbon emissions.

[0061] To make the above-mentioned objects, features and advantages of the present invention more apparent and understandable, the present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.

[0062] First, this invention proposes an electricity-carbon sharing model for industrial parks on the distribution network side.

[0063] 1) Sharing Subjects and Sharing Objectives

[0064] In the proposed industrial park electricity-carbon sharing model, the sharing entities are industrial park operators and park users, with a non-cooperative and non-competitive relationship between users. All industrial park users have installed distributed photovoltaic power sources and intelligent energy management equipment, making them active producers and consumers of electricity. Some users' single carbon emission source is non-clean electricity from the main grid; others have multiple carbon emission sources (such as hybrid electric vehicles).

[0065] This sharing model can benefit both operators and park users simultaneously, achieving the goal of building low-carbon parks. Specific objectives include: 1) For industrial park users, ensuring reduced electricity and carbon emission costs while meeting certain load consumption requirements, and maximizing returns when energy or carbon allowances are surplus; 2) For industrial park operators, maximizing returns; 3) For the industrial park as a whole, improving the clean energy utilization rate and reducing carbon emissions.

[0066] 2) Sharing mode

[0067] Industrial park operator and park user contract such as Figure 1 As shown, through cooperation, both parties reduce electricity costs and carbon emissions, achieving mutual benefit and forming an industrial park electricity-carbon sharing system. In this system model, the operator acts as a pure rule-maker, not participating in day-to-day decision-making, while users make load decisions based on the rules. The specific functions of the park operator include: ① allocating free carbon emission allowances for park users; ② setting electricity and carbon prices under the park's electricity-carbon sharing system; ③ acting as a hub for energy and carbon flow convergence among park users, the public power grid, and the external carbon market, coordinating energy and carbon allowance sharing transactions within the park's electricity-carbon sharing system.

[0068] The power-carbon sharing model for industrial parks on the distribution network side includes an energy-sharing mechanism and a carbon quota-sharing mechanism, both of which are settled every t-period. The energy-sharing mechanism and the carbon quota-sharing mechanism are coupled. During the sharing process, industrial park operators and users transmit information through smart energy management equipment, share energy through the park's grid structure, and calculate carbon emissions based on the carbon emission intensity embedded in the energy flow.

[0069] (1) Energy sharing in the park

[0070] Assuming that the clean energy produced by users is primarily used to meet their own load consumption, and based on the electricity price set by the park operator, users in the park's energy-sharing mechanism can purchase clean energy from other users or sell their own produced clean energy to the park operator according to their needs. (Set any industrial park user...) Electricity consumed during industrial production activities in time period t Total electricity production When the energy produced by a user exceeds the electrical energy consumed... At that time, the first n Individual users as sellers Profits are generated by selling surplus clean energy to park operators; when the energy produced by users is less than the electricity consumed, that is... At that time, the first n Individual users as buyers Purchase electricity from the park operator to maintain normal industrial production.

[0071] The electricity produced or consumed by industrial users in the park is collected in the virtual park power pool, and the park operator is responsible for trading it with the public power grid to maintain a balance between energy supply and demand. Based on the clean energy grid connection price, when the park's total net load... At that time, the park operator sold excess electricity to the power distribution network; At that time, the park operator purchases the required electricity from the power distribution network.

[0072] (2) Carbon quota sharing in the park

[0073] In the industrial park's carbon quota sharing mechanism, users buy and sell carbon quotas based on their own needs. (Setting up any industrial park user...) During period t, you will have an initial free carbon emission allowance allocated by the park operator based on historical carbon emissions. Carbon emissions When a user's carbon emission allowance exceeds their carbon emission amount, i.e. At that time, the first n Individual users as sellers Profits are generated by selling surplus carbon allowances to park operators; when a user's carbon emission allowances are less than their carbon emission quota, i.e., At that time, the first n Individual users as buyers Purchase additional carbon allowances from the park operator or face penalties for failing carbon emission assessments.

[0074] Carbon emissions from industrial users within the park are considered aggregators, participating in the external carbon market through the park operator to maintain a balance between carbon allowance supply and demand. When the park's carbon allowance surplus... At that time, park operators profited by selling carbon allowances to the carbon market; At that time, park operators need to purchase allowances from the external carbon market.

[0075] 3) Interaction process of the park's carbon sharing system

[0076] (1) Confirmation of willingness. Industrial park users may voluntarily choose to participate in or not participate in this sharing model. If an industrial park user chooses not to participate in this sharing model, he / she will use electricity at the normal electricity price and will not be able to participate in the energy-carbon quota sharing benefit, nor will he / she be subject to carbon emission assessment. If an industrial park user chooses to participate in this sharing model, then the user will automatically be subject to carbon emission assessment and participate in the park's energy-carbon quota sharing, and will bear the profits and losses on his / her own.

[0077] (2) The operator issues the free carbon emission allowance for time period t to the user one time period in advance, along with the electricity and carbon prices within the park. The operator constructs an electricity-carbon pricing model for energy-carbon allowance sharing within the park based on a master-slave game model. This is achieved by optimizing the electricity purchase price within the park. Electricity sales price and carbon price This guides users in making load decisions.

[0078] (3) No. n Individual users make load decisions based on the carbon price of electricity within the park. Load decision Photovoltaic power generation Report it to the operator.

[0079] (4) Operators coordinate the sharing of energy-carbon quotas among users in the park, calculate the overall electricity consumption and carbon emissions of the park, and complete the clearing with the public power grid and external carbon market.

[0080] (5) Calculate the revenue of park operators and users, and calculate the carbon emission reduction assessment indicators of the park.

[0081] 4) Park Energy Optimization System. The park energy optimization system mainly consists of the park user portion and the park operator portion. The park user portion includes load modeling, capacity, and carbon emission calculation functions; the park operator portion includes quota calculation, clearing, optimized pricing, and revenue calculation functions. A schematic diagram of the park's energy optimization system structure is shown below. Figure 2 As shown.

[0082] Furthermore, such as Figure 3 As shown, this invention provides a method for optimizing park energy based on electricity-carbon sharing, the method comprising:

[0083] S1: Obtain the user-side basic load model, user-side capacity model, and user-side carbon emission model within the park, and based on the user-side basic load model, user-side capacity model, and user-side carbon emission model, construct a user-side revenue model based on energy flow-carbon flow coupling. User-side revenue includes energy sharing revenue and carbon quota sharing revenue.

[0084] S2: Based on the total amount of carbon quota in the park within a set time period and the average daily carbon emissions of users of the same type, construct a carbon quota allocation model for the park.

[0085] S3: Construct an operator utility model based on the electricity revenue and carbon quota revenue of operators within the park.

[0086] S4: Construct a Staberg master-slave game model. Based on the user-side revenue model and the operator utility model, determine the objective function of the Staberg master-slave game model. In the Staberg master-slave game model, the park operator affects user revenue by optimizing the shared electricity price, carbon price, and carbon quota within the park, while users affect the park operator's revenue by changing their load consumption. The park operator and the user engage in a game.

[0087] S5: Optimize the objective function by conducting a game between the park operator and the user until a game equilibrium point is reached; at the game equilibrium point, the revenue of the operator and the user reaches its maximum value.

[0088] S6: Determine the user load strategy corresponding to the game equilibrium point as the user's optimal load strategy, and determine the electricity and carbon price strategies corresponding to the game equilibrium point as the operator's optimal electricity-carbon pricing strategy, thereby realizing energy optimization of the park through electricity-carbon sharing.

[0089] Further, in step S1, obtaining the user-side basic load model, user-side capacity model, and user-side carbon emission model within the park specifically includes:

[0090] S11: For the user side, the first n For each user, obtain the user-side basic load model; the user-side basic load model represents the first user. n Individual users t Total consumption load during the period The first n The total consumption load of user is the first n Adjustable load for individual users It can reduce the load. and fixed load The sum; of which, industrial users participating in energy-carbon quota sharing total N Name, set representation is The user's daily load is . No. n Individual users t Total consumption load during the period The expression is:

[0091] .

[0092] S12: Obtain the user-side capacity model; the user-side capacity model represents the... n Individual users t Total energy produced during the period; the first n Individual users t The total energy produced during the period was the first n Individual users t Clean energy produced during the period and t The sum of electricity generated by self-owned power plants during a given time period. Of this, the energy produced by users in a single day is... Clean energy produced by user-distributed renewable energy power sources If the first n If a user is equipped with its own power plant, the generator units of the power plant will be based on the day-ahead planning curve. Electricity generation. At any given time. t within, no. n The energy produced by individual users includes clean electricity generated from distributed energy resources. Non-clean energy .

[0093] S13: Obtain the user-side carbon emission model; the user-side carbon emission model represents the user's carbon emissions. t Carbon emissions produced during a given period; by obtaining the carbon emission intensity of the self-owned power plant, the first n Individual users t Power generation of self-owned power plants during the period, the first i Carbon emission intensity of each carbon emission source, carbon emission source i The consumption of non-clean energy and t Initial value of time-weighted carbon emission intensity, combined with the aforementioned first... n The total power consumption of each user at any given time period and the first n The total energy produced by a user in any given time period determines the first... n Carbon emissions of a user during time period t.

[0094] Among them, for users in diverse industrial parks, the first n In addition to non-clean electricity (public power grid, self-owned power plant), individual users have other sources of carbon emissions. (such as hybrid electric vehicles).

[0095] By measuring the carbon emissions produced by users in the park Clearly define users' carbon emission responsibilities, the first n Individual users t The expression for the carbon emission model for a given time period is:

[0096] ;

[0097] in, For user-side carbon emissions, The carbon emission intensity of self-owned power plants, For the first n Individual users t Power generation from the self-owned power plant during a given period. Indicates the first n The first user's i Each carbon emission source in t Carbon emission intensity over a period of time Indicates carbon emission sources i exist t The non-clean energy consumed during that period for t Preliminary value of time-weighted carbon emission intensity For the first n Total energy produced by a user during time period t For the first n Individual users t Total power consumption during the time period. For users without their own power plants. and It is 0.

[0098] Among them, carbon quota sharing within the park is based on the remaining carbon quotas of park users during time period t. The calculation method is as follows:

[0099] ;

[0100] In the formula, The initial carbon allowance allocated to the park operator for time period t. This indicates the amount of carbon emissions produced by a user's electricity activities.

[0101] Further, in step S13, the... t The formula for calculating the initial value of time-weighted carbon emission intensity is as follows:

[0102] ;

[0103] ;

[0104] ;

[0105] in, for t Preliminary value of time-weighted carbon emission intensity express t Carbon emission intensity obtained from time-period main network carbon flow tracking This represents the net electricity purchase amount of all users at the current moment, in their initial state. This represents the net electricity sales of all users at the current moment, in their initial state. For the first n Individual users t Total energy produced during the period For the first n Individual users t The initial total consumption load for the time period.

[0106] Further, in step S1, the expression for the user-side revenue model is:

[0107] ;

[0108] in, This indicates the revenue of users in the park. This indicates the electricity consumption of users in the park. Production efficiency Indicates the first n The benefit coefficient per user This represents the cost required for a self-owned power plant to produce one unit of electricity. This indicates the user's revenue when there is surplus energy. This represents the cost of purchasing electricity when there is a shortage of production energy. Benefits for users participating in carbon credit sharing The electricity price within the park. The electricity purchase price within the park, To share carbon prices within the park, For park users t The remaining carbon allowance for the period, For the first n Individual users t Total energy produced during the period For the first n Individual users t Total consumption load for a given period.

[0109] Furthermore, the constraints on the shared electricity price within the park are as follows:

[0110] ;

[0111] In the formula, The electricity price within the park. The electricity purchase price within the park, The purchase price of electricity traded with the public power grid; The price at which electricity is sold in transactions with the public power grid.

[0112] No. n The upper and lower limits of the total power load for each user are as follows:

[0113] ;

[0114] In the formula Indicates the first n Minimum load consumption per user Indicates the first n Maximum load consumption per user It is the first n Decision variables for individual users participating in energy-carbon quota sharing.

[0115] Shared carbon price The maximum and minimum value constraints are as follows:

[0116] ;

[0117] In the formula This indicates the lowest shared carbon price within the park. This indicates the highest shared carbon price within the park.

[0118] Furthermore, in step S2, on typical days of the same type, the initial free carbon emission allowances for distribution-side users are allocated based on the "grandfather allocation scheme". The expression for the carbon quota allocation model of the industrial park is:

[0119] ;

[0120] ;

[0121] Among them, the typical daily average total carbon emissions of the same type of industrial park are , This represents the user's initial free carbon emission allowance. Indicates the first n Typical daily average carbon emissions of a single user of the same type Indicates the first n Typical day for users of the same type Average load over a period of time express d Total carbon allowance for Tianyuan District This represents the quota coefficient.

[0122] Furthermore, in step S3, the main trading partners of the multi-energy industrial park operator include industrial park users, public power grids, and external carbon markets. The expression for the operator's utility model is as follows:

[0123] ;

[0124] ;

[0125] ;

[0126] in, express t The revenue of the park operator at any time. for t The electricity revenue of the park operator at any time. for t Carbon allowance revenue for park operators. express t Total net electricity purchases by users in the park at any time express t Total net electricity sales of users in the park at any time express t The total net load of users in the park at any time The electricity price within the park. The electricity purchase price within the park, To share carbon prices within the park, The purchase price of electricity traded with the public power grid, The price at which electricity is sold in connection with the public power grid. For park users t The remaining carbon allowance for the period, The carbon price in the external carbon market.

[0127] In the energy-sharing mechanism, the main trading partners of the operator include industrial park users and the public power grid. When the energy produced by a user cannot meet its own consumption, the user purchases electricity from the operator, and the operator obtains revenue from the sale of electricity. The model is as follows: When users produce surplus energy, they sell it to operators, who then pay the electricity purchase cost. The model is as follows: When the park's net load At that time, the park operator can sell surplus clean energy from the park to the public power grid, generating revenue of... When the park's net load The cost model for the park operator to purchase electricity from the public power grid. The park operator's total revenue from electricity is:

[0128] ;

[0129] ;

[0130] ;

[0131] ;

[0132] In the formula, express t Total net electricity purchases by users in the park at any given time; express t Total net electricity sales to users in the park at any given time; express t The total net load of users in the park at any given time.

[0133] In the carbon allowance sharing mechanism, the main trading partners for operators include industrial park users and external carbon markets. When a user's carbon emissions exceed their own carbon allowances, the user purchases additional carbon allowances from the operator, and the operator earns revenue. When a user's carbon emissions are less than their own carbon allowances, the user sells the surplus carbon allowances to the operator, and the operator pays the purchase cost. The total revenue for the park operator in carbon allowance sharing is:

[0134] .

[0135] 3) The optimization solution of the park operator's utility function is based on the optimization solution of the park users. To reduce algorithm complexity, given the high coupling between the revenue functions of park users and park operators, this method treats the multi-objective optimization problem of maximizing the benefits of park operators and users as a single-objective optimization problem. The user revenue model... Differentiation yields:

[0136] ;

[0137] Substituting the above formula into the operator utility model yields the objective function, which is the function given the net load of the park. hour:

[0138] When the park's net load hour:

[0139] Furthermore, in steps S4-S6, the objective function is used as the objective function of the Tarberg master-slave game model, and the objective function is optimized to conduct the game between the park operator and the user until the game equilibrium point is reached; at the game equilibrium point, the revenue of the operator and the user reaches the maximum value.

[0140] The specific process is as follows:

[0141] 1) In the optimization and sharing of energy-carbon quotas within the industrial park, there are two main stakeholders: park operators and park users. Their participation in energy-carbon quota sharing aims to maximize their own interests. During time period t, the park operator optimizes the shared electricity price within the park. and carbon price and carbon quotas This impacts user revenue; users influence the interests of the park operator by changing their load consumption. The process of this interest-based game between the two parties can be structured as a Stahlberg master-slave game. .

[0142] (1) The participants in the master-follower game include the set of park users who act as followers. N And the park operator as the leader. Park users make load decisions based on dynamic electricity prices, carbon prices, and free carbon allowances set by the park operator.

[0143] (2) This is a set of load policies for users in the park, from which users make decisions.

[0144] (3) The benefits for park users reflect the benefits generated by users' electricity consumption and the total benefits of participating in energy and carbon quota sharing.

[0145] (4) , , The strategy set for park operators includes electricity sales price, electricity purchase price, and carbon trading price.

[0146] (5) This refers to the total profit generated by the park operator from participating in energy-carbon quota sharing within the park, as well as trading with the power distribution network and external carbon markets.

[0147] In the master-slave game, both the park operator and park users employ optimal selection strategies to maximize their own utility functions. The optimal strategy for all users' load consumption is determined by the price and carbon quota set by the park operator, and simultaneously, the price and carbon quota set by the park operator are also optimal strategies for users' load consumption. It reached the Staberg equilibrium.

[0148] Among them, the definition is: in game theory In the game, the strategy set of the players When the following inequality constraints are satisfied, Defined as a game A Staberg equilibrium solution.

[0149] ;

[0150] ;

[0151] In the formula, Indicates except the first n The optimal strategy set for all users in the park except for the individual user.

[0152] At the Staberg equilibrium point In this context, neither leading park operators nor follower park users can gain higher returns by changing their strategies.

[0153] 2) The game process is as follows:

[0154] (1) Obtain the user's initial data and the parameters of the park's carbon sharing system. The parameters include: , , , , , , .in , and These serve as the initial values ​​for the park's electricity and carbon prices, respectively. Users identify themselves as buyers and sellers.

[0155] (2) The park operator accepts the user's initial electricity consumption data and production capacity data, and issues the user's free carbon emission quota and the park's electricity and carbon price strategies.

[0156] (3) Users accept the free carbon emission quotas and the electricity and carbon price strategies issued by the park operator, formulate user load consumption strategies based on user revenue models, and upload the strategies to the park operator.

[0157] (4) The park operator calculates revenue based on the user load strategy and the park operator utility model. If the revenue of both the operator and the user reaches the maximum value, that is, neither party can obtain higher revenue by changing the strategy, then the Staberg equilibrium is reached and the game stops; otherwise, (2)-(4) are repeated until the game equilibrium point is reached.

[0158] (5) The electricity price and carbon price at the equilibrium point are used as the final strategy of the park operator; the load decision at the equilibrium point is used as the final strategy of the user.

[0159] 3) Further develop evaluation indicators for the emission reduction effect of microgrids. This indicates the carbon emissions of the microgrid after adopting low-carbon strategies. Carbon emissions at the highest clean energy utilization rate (i.e., complete utilization of clean energy) The percentage.

[0160] .

[0161] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention also provides the following technical solution:

[0162] An energy optimization system for industrial parks based on electricity-carbon sharing is provided. The system includes: a user-side revenue model establishment unit, an industrial park carbon quota allocation model establishment unit, an operator utility model construction unit, a Staberg master-slave game model establishment and objective function determination unit, a game equilibrium point determination unit, and an industrial park energy optimization unit.

[0163] The user-side revenue model establishment unit is used to obtain the user-side basic load model, user-side production capacity model, and user-side carbon emission model within the park, and to construct a user-side revenue model based on energy flow-carbon flow coupling based on the user-side basic load model, the user-side production capacity model, and the user-side carbon emission model.

[0164] The park carbon quota allocation model building unit is used to construct a park carbon quota allocation model based on the total amount of park carbon quotas within a set time period and the typical daily average carbon emissions of users of the same type.

[0165] The operator utility model construction unit is used to construct operator utility models based on the electricity revenue and carbon quota revenue of operators within the park.

[0166] The Staberg master-slave game model establishment and objective function determination unit is used to construct the Staberg master-slave game model and determine the objective function of the Staberg master-slave game model based on the user-side revenue model and the operator utility model. In the Staberg master-slave game model, the park operator affects user revenue by optimizing the shared electricity price, carbon price and carbon quota within the park, while users affect the park operator's revenue by changing their load consumption. The park operator and the users engage in a game.

[0167] The game equilibrium point determination unit is used to optimize the objective function and conduct a game between the park operator and the user until a game equilibrium point is reached; at the game equilibrium point, the revenue of the operator and the user reaches its maximum value.

[0168] The park energy optimization unit is used to determine the user load strategy corresponding to the game equilibrium point as the user's optimal load strategy, and to determine the electricity and carbon price strategies corresponding to the game equilibrium point as the operator's optimal electricity-carbon pricing strategy, thereby realizing park energy optimization with electricity-carbon sharing.

[0169] Furthermore, the user-side revenue model establishment unit specifically includes:

[0170] The user-side basic load model obtains sub-units for the user-side first... n For each user, obtain the user-side basic load model; the user-side basic load model represents the first user.n Individual users t Total consumption load for the time period; the first n The total consumption load of user is the first n The sum of an individual user's adjustable load, reducible load, and fixed load.

[0171] The user-side capacity model acquisition subunit is used to acquire the user-side capacity model; the user-side capacity model represents the first... n Individual users t Total energy produced during the period; the first n Individual users t The total energy produced during the period was the first n Individual users t Clean energy produced during the period and t The sum of the electricity generated by the self-owned power plant during the period.

[0172] The user-side carbon emission model acquisition subunit is used to acquire the user-side carbon intensity model; the user-side carbon emission model represents the user's carbon intensity. t Carbon emissions produced during a given period; by obtaining the carbon emission intensity of the self-owned power plant, the first n Individual users t Power generation of self-owned power plants during the period, the first i Carbon emission intensity of each carbon emission source, carbon emission source i The consumption of non-clean energy and t Initial value of time-weighted carbon emission intensity, combined with the aforementioned first... n The total power consumption of each user at any given time period and the first n The total energy produced by a user in any given time period determines the first... n Individual users t Carbon emissions during a given period.

[0173] Furthermore, the expression for the user-side revenue model is:

[0174] ;

[0175] in, This indicates the revenue of users in the park. This indicates the electricity consumption of users in the park. Production efficiency Indicates the first n The benefit coefficient per user This represents the cost required for a self-owned power plant to produce one unit of electricity. This indicates the user's revenue when there is surplus energy. This represents the cost of purchasing electricity when there is a shortage of production energy. Benefits for users participating in carbon credit sharing The electricity price within the park. The electricity purchase price within the park, To share carbon prices within the park, For park users t The remaining carbon allowance for the period, For the first n Individual users t Total energy produced during the period For the first n Individual users t Total consumption load for a given period.

[0176] Furthermore, the expression for the operator utility model is:

[0177] ;

[0178] ;

[0179] ;

[0180] in, express t The revenue of the park operator at any time. for t The electricity revenue of the park operator at any time. for t Carbon allowance revenue for park operators. express t Total net electricity purchases by users in the park at any time express t Total net electricity sales of users in the park at any time express t The total net load of users in the park at any time The electricity price within the park. The electricity purchase price within the park, To share carbon prices within the park, The purchase price of electricity traded with the public power grid, The price at which electricity is sold in connection with the public power grid. For park users t The remaining carbon allowance for the period, The carbon price in the external carbon market.

[0181] Technical effects of the invention:

[0182] 1) The electricity-carbon sharing model proposed in this invention links the source-side carbon market and load-side consumers through the park's electricity-carbon sharing system. Based on the park's energy sharing mechanism and carbon quota sharing mechanism, on the one hand, carbon emission costs are introduced from the power generation side to the distribution side, improving the liquidity of the carbon emission reduction market; on the other hand, the emission reduction potential of users who do not meet the carbon market access conditions is explored, incentivizing users to actively participate in carbon emission reduction.

[0183] 2) The optimized pricing model for energy-carbon quota sharing in industrial parks proposed in this invention reduces the computational complexity for both park operators and users, and improves the solution speed. Furthermore, from the perspective of energy flow-carbon flow coupling, it considers constructing an optimized pricing model for energy-carbon quota sharing between operators and diverse users. By guiding user decisions through internal electricity and carbon prices within the park, it improves the clean energy consumption rate of the park and reduces carbon emissions.

[0184] The various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner, with each embodiment focusing on its differences from other embodiments. Similar or identical parts between embodiments can be referred to interchangeably. For the systems disclosed in the embodiments, since they correspond to the methods disclosed in the embodiments, the descriptions are relatively simple; relevant parts can be referred to the method section.

[0185] This document uses specific examples to illustrate the principles and implementation methods of the present invention. The descriptions of the above embodiments are only for the purpose of helping to understand the method and core ideas of the present invention. Furthermore, those skilled in the art will recognize that, based on the ideas of the present invention, there will be changes in the specific implementation methods and application scope. Therefore, the content of this specification should not be construed as a limitation of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for optimizing park energy based on electricity-carbon sharing, characterized in that, The method includes: Obtain the user-side basic load model, user-side capacity model, and user-side carbon emission model within the park, and construct a user-side revenue model based on the user-side basic load model, user-side capacity model, and user-side carbon emission model. A carbon quota allocation model for the park is constructed based on the total carbon quota of the park within a set time period and the typical daily average carbon emissions of users of the same type. Based on the electricity revenue and carbon quota revenue of operators within the park, construct an operator utility model; A Staberg master-slave game model is constructed, and the objective function of the Staberg master-slave game model is determined based on the user-side revenue model and the operator utility model. In the Staberg master-slave game model, the park operator affects the user's revenue by optimizing the shared electricity price, carbon price and carbon quota within the park, and the user affects the park operator's revenue by changing the load consumption. The park operator and the user engage in a game. The objective function is optimized by conducting a game between the park operator and the user until a game equilibrium point is reached; at the game equilibrium point, the revenue of the operator and the user reaches its maximum value. The user load strategy corresponding to the game equilibrium point is determined as the optimal user load strategy, and the electricity and carbon price strategies corresponding to the game equilibrium point are determined as the optimal electricity-carbon pricing strategy for operators, thereby realizing energy optimization of the park through electricity-carbon sharing. The expression for the user-side revenue model is: ； in, This indicates the revenue of users in the park. This indicates the electricity consumption of users in the park. Production efficiency Indicates the first n The benefit coefficient per user This represents the cost required for a self-owned power plant to produce one unit of electricity. This indicates the user's revenue when there is surplus energy. This represents the cost of purchasing electricity when there is a shortage of production energy. Benefits for users participating in carbon credit sharing The electricity price within the park. The electricity purchase price within the park, To share carbon prices within the park, For park users t The remaining carbon allowance for the period, For the first n Individual users t Total energy produced during the period For the first n Individual users t Total consumption load for the period; When the park's net load When the objective function is: When the park's net load When the objective function is: ； in, This represents the revenue of the park operator at time t; The initial value of the weighted carbon emission intensity for time period t; The price at which electricity is sold in connection with the public power grid; Initial free carbon emission allowances allocated based on historical carbon emissions; Carbon emission intensity of self-owned power plants; Let t be the amount of electricity generated by the self-owned power plant of the nth user during time period t; Let be the initial value of the weighted carbon emission intensity for the nth user during time period t; The carbon price in the external carbon market; The number of buyers during energy sharing within the park; The number of sellers during energy sharing within the park; The total number of users participating in the transaction; The purchase price for electricity traded with the public power grid.

2. The energy optimization method for industrial parks based on electricity-carbon sharing according to claim 1, characterized in that, The acquisition of the user-side basic load model, user-side capacity model, and user-side carbon emission model within the park specifically includes: For the user side n For each user, obtain the user-side basic load model; the user-side basic load model represents the first user. n Individual users t Total consumption load for the time period; the first n The total consumption load of user is the first n The sum of adjustable load, reduceable load, and fixed load for each user; Obtain the user-side capacity model; the user-side capacity model represents the first... n Individual users t Total energy produced during the period; the first n The total energy produced by user t during time period t is the first n Individual users t Clean energy produced during the period and t The sum of the power generation of the self-owned power plant during the period; Obtain a user-side carbon emission model; the user-side carbon emission model represents the user's carbon emissions. t Carbon emissions produced during a given period; by obtaining the carbon emission intensity of the self-owned power plant, the first n Individual users t Power generation of self-owned power plants during the period, the first i Carbon emission intensity of each carbon emission source, carbon emission source i The consumption of non-clean energy and t Initial value of time-weighted carbon emission intensity, combined with the aforementioned first... n The total power consumption of each user at any given time period and the first n The total energy produced by a user in any given time period determines the first... n Individual users t Carbon emissions during a given period.

3. The energy optimization method for industrial parks based on electricity-carbon sharing according to claim 2, characterized in that, The t The formula for calculating the initial value of time-weighted carbon emission intensity is as follows: ； ； ； in, for t Preliminary value of time-weighted carbon emission intensity express t Carbon emission intensity obtained from time-period main network carbon flow tracking This represents the net electricity purchase amount of all users at the current moment, in their initial state. This represents the net electricity sales of all users at the current moment, in their initial state. For the first n Individual users t Total energy produced during the period For the first n Individual users t The initial total consumption load for the time period.

4. The energy optimization method for industrial parks based on electricity-carbon sharing according to claim 1, characterized in that, The expression for the carbon quota allocation model of the industrial park is: ； ； in, This represents the user's initial free carbon emission allowance. This represents the average daily total carbon emissions for the same type. Indicates the first n Typical daily average carbon emissions of a single user of the same type Indicates the first n Typical day for users of the same type Average load over a period of time express d Total carbon allowance for Tianyuan District This represents the quota coefficient.

5. The energy optimization method for industrial parks based on electricity-carbon sharing according to claim 1, characterized in that, The expression for the operator utility model is: ； ； ； in, express t The revenue of the park operator at any time. for t The electricity revenue of the park operator at any time. for t Carbon allowance revenue for park operators. express t Total net electricity purchases by users in the park at any time express t Total net electricity sales of users in the park at any time express t The total net load of users in the park at any time The electricity price within the park. The electricity purchase price within the park, To share carbon prices within the park, The purchase price of electricity traded with the public power grid, The price at which electricity is sold in connection with the public power grid. For park users t The remaining carbon allowance for the period, The carbon price in the external carbon market.

6. A park energy optimization system based on electricity-carbon sharing, characterized in that, The system includes: The user-side revenue model establishment unit is used to obtain the user-side basic load model, user-side capacity model and user-side carbon emission model within the park, and to construct a user-side revenue model based on energy flow-carbon flow coupling based on the user-side basic load model, the user-side capacity model and the user-side carbon emission model. The park carbon quota allocation model building unit is used to construct a park carbon quota allocation model based on the total amount of park carbon quotas within a set time period and the typical daily average carbon emissions of users of the same type. The operator utility model construction unit is used to construct operator utility models based on the electricity revenue and carbon quota revenue of operators within the park. The Staberg master-slave game model establishment and objective function determination unit is used to construct the Staberg master-slave game model and determine the objective function of the Staberg master-slave game model based on the user-side revenue model and the operator utility model. In the Staberg master-slave game model, the park operator affects user revenue by optimizing the shared electricity price, carbon price and carbon quota within the park, and the user affects the park operator's revenue by changing load consumption. The park operator and the user engage in a game. The game equilibrium point determination unit is used to optimize the objective function and conduct a game between the park operator and the user until a game equilibrium point is reached; at the game equilibrium point, the revenue of the operator and the user reaches its maximum value. The park energy optimization unit is used to determine the user load strategy corresponding to the game equilibrium point as the user's optimal load strategy, and to determine the electricity and carbon price strategies corresponding to the game equilibrium point as the operator's optimal electricity-carbon pricing strategy, thereby realizing park energy optimization with shared electricity and carbon. The expression for the user-side revenue model is: ； in, This indicates the revenue of users in the park. This indicates the electricity consumption of users in the park. Production efficiency Indicates the first n The benefit coefficient per user This represents the cost required for a self-owned power plant to produce one unit of electricity. This indicates the user's revenue when there is surplus energy. This represents the cost of purchasing electricity when there is a shortage of production energy. Benefits for users participating in carbon credit sharing The electricity price within the park. The electricity purchase price within the park, To share carbon prices within the park, For park users t The remaining carbon allowance for the period, For the first n Individual users t Total energy produced during the period For the first n Individual users t Total consumption load for the period; When the park's net load When the objective function is: When the park's net load When the objective function is: ； in, This represents the revenue of the park operator at time t; The initial value of the weighted carbon emission intensity for time period t; The price at which electricity is sold in connection with the public power grid; Initial free carbon emission allowances allocated based on historical carbon emissions; Carbon emission intensity of self-owned power plants; Let t be the amount of electricity generated by the self-owned power plant of the nth user during time period t; Let be the initial value of the weighted carbon emission intensity for the nth user during time period t; The carbon price in the external carbon market; The number of buyers during energy sharing within the park; The number of sellers during energy sharing within the park; The total number of users participating in the transaction; The purchase price for electricity traded with the public power grid.

7. The park energy optimization system based on electricity-carbon sharing according to claim 6, characterized in that, The user-side revenue model establishment unit specifically includes: The user-side basic load model obtains sub-units for the user-side first... n For each user, obtain the user-side basic load model; the user-side basic load model represents the first user. n Individual users t Total consumption load for the time period; the first n The total consumption load of user is the first n The sum of adjustable load, reduceable load, and fixed load for each user; The user-side capacity model acquisition subunit is used to acquire the user-side capacity model; the user-side capacity model represents the first... n Individual users t Total energy produced during the period; the first n Individual users t The total energy produced during the period was the first n Individual users t Clean energy produced during the period and t The sum of the power generation of the self-owned power plant during the period; The user-side carbon emission model acquisition subunit is used to acquire the user-side carbon emission model; the user-side carbon emission model represents the user's carbon emissions. t Carbon emissions produced during a given period; by obtaining the carbon emission intensity of the self-owned power plant, the first n Individual users t Power generation of self-owned power plants during the period, the first i Carbon emission intensity of each carbon emission source, carbon emission source i The consumption of non-clean energy and t Initial value of time-weighted carbon emission intensity, combined with the aforementioned first... n The total power consumption of each user at any given time period and the first n The total energy produced by a user in any given time period determines the first... n Individual users t Carbon emissions during a given period.

8. The park energy optimization system based on electricity-carbon sharing according to claim 6, characterized in that, The expression for the operator utility model is: ； ； ； in, This represents the revenue of the park operator at time t. Let t be the electricity revenue of the park operator. Let t be the carbon allowance revenue of the park operator. This represents the total net electricity purchases by users in the park at time t. This represents the total net electricity sales by users in the park at time t. This represents the total net load of users in the park at time t. The electricity price within the park. The electricity purchase price within the park, To share carbon prices within the park, The purchase price of electricity traded with the public power grid, The price at which electricity is sold in connection with the public power grid. For users in the park, the remaining carbon allowances for time period t. The carbon price in the external carbon market.

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