A method for efficiently interfering with 5G networks

Abstract

The present invention relates to the field of electronic countermeasure technologies, and specifically relates to a method for efficiently interfering with a 5G network. First, an attack cell is selected; then, the physical downlink control channel of the device corresponding to the attack cell is cracked, and the physical control information in the physical downlink control channel is parsed; then, an interference signal is generated based on the physical control information; and finally, the interference signal is sent at a specified moment to disrupt the 5G network communication of the device corresponding to the attack cell. In the present invention, targeted interference with the device is achieved based on the physical downlink control channel, which is energy-efficient and solves the problem of high power consumption caused by the existing method for interfering with the 5G network, which performs undifferentiated signal interference. Moreover, the interference has strong concealment and is not easily detected by the interference detection function on the network side, so that the anti-interference behavior that may exist on the network side will not be triggered.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of electronic countermeasure technologies, and particularly to a method for efficiently interfering with 5G networks. Background Art

[0002] The interference requirements for 5G networks may stem from various reasons, such as electronic countermeasures, or the need for signal shielding in special venues, etc.

[0003] The current mainstream methods mainly focus on signal suppression and signal induction. With the increasing maturity of the anti-fake base station function on mobile phones, general signal induction can no longer successfully interfere with mobile phones. Currently, the signal suppression method is mainly used to achieve signal shielding. For example, signal shielding vehicles will appear near college entrance examination sites.

[0004] The principle of this method is to perform undifferentiated signal interference in the frequency band where the network operates. By continuously sending interference signals across the entire frequency band, the signal suppression effect is achieved, so that the terminal cannot achieve normal communication functions in this area due to excessive interference.

[0005] Since it does not analyze the communication signal itself but only performs undifferentiated full-band and full-time interference, it requires a large amount of energy consumption. Therefore, communication interference vehicles generally do not work for too long.

[0006] If it is possible to simulate interfering with mobile phones and generate uplink transmission interference for all mobile phones that are sending signals to the base station, the goal of interfering with the network can be achieved with a very small power. However, due to the strict confidentiality of the air interface in 4G / 5G networks, it is very difficult for third-party users to know at what moment and on what frequency band the mobile phone will send signals to the base station. This makes the method of interfering with the uplink also only able to perform full-channel and full-time interference. Summary of the Invention

[0007] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a method for efficiently interfering with 5G networks, aiming to solve the problem of high power consumption caused by undifferentiated signal interference in the existing methods for interfering with 5G networks.

[0008] To achieve the above purpose, the present invention provides a method for efficiently interfering with 5G networks, including the following steps:

[0009] Search for and synchronize all existing nearby cells, and select the attack cell;

[0010] Crack the physical downlink control channel of the device corresponding to the attack cell, and analyze the physical control information in the physical downlink control channel;

[0011] Generate interference signals based on the physical control information;

[0012] Send the interference signal at a specified moment to disrupt the 5G network communication of the device corresponding to the attacked cell.

[0013] Among them, the selected attacked cell includes:

[0014] The interference device searches for and synchronizes to the 5G network, and selects the cell to be attacked through the list of 5G cells that have been successfully searched for and synchronized.

[0015] Among them, cracking the physical downlink control channel of the device corresponding to the attacked cell and analyzing the physical control information in the physical downlink control channel includes:

[0016] Select all the radio network temporary identifiers of the device corresponding to the attacked cell;

[0017] Calculate the search space corresponding to each radio network temporary identifier through each radio network temporary identifier and system time information;

[0018] Blindly detect the physical downlink control channel of each radio network temporary identifier within the search space to obtain a traversal set;

[0019] Traverse and filter the traversal set through each transmission time interval to obtain a preliminary screening set;

[0020] Perform secondary analysis and detection on the preliminary screening set. If the detection passes, obtain a passing set;

[0021] Analyze the indication field of the downlink control information of the physical downlink control channel in the passing set to obtain the configuration on the time-frequency resources of the user's physical uplink shared channel at the target moment.

[0022] Among them, generating the interference signal based on the physical control information includes:

[0023] Infer the time-frequency domain position of the demodulation reference signal of the physical uplink shared channel and the time-frequency domain position of the data signal of the physical uplink shared channel based on the configuration on the user's time-frequency resources;

[0024] Generate an interference signal for the time-frequency domain position of the data signal of the physical uplink shared channel.

[0025] Among them, inferring the time-frequency domain position of the demodulation reference signal of the physical uplink shared channel and the time-frequency domain position of the data signal of the physical uplink shared channel based on the configuration on the user's time-frequency resources includes:

[0026] View all the distributions of the demodulation reference signal of the physical uplink shared channel and the data signal of the physical uplink shared channel in the configuration on the user's time-frequency resources in the 3GPP protocol to obtain the time-frequency domain position of the data signal of the physical uplink shared channel.

[0027] Among them, sending the interference signal to disrupt the 5G network communication of the device corresponding to the attacked cell includes:

[0028] Processing and sending the interference signal at the target moment to disrupt the 5G network communication of the device corresponding to the attacked cell.

[0029] Among them, when sending the interference signal, only when a user is actually performing uplink transmission, the time-frequency position of the transmission is targeted, and only the physical uplink shared channel data signal symbols are directionally interfered, no interference signal is generated at other times, and the interference signal does not interfere with the demodulation reference signal.

[0030] A method for efficiently interfering with a 5G network according to the present invention, first, selecting an attacked cell; then, cracking the physical downlink control channel of the device corresponding to the attacked cell and parsing the physical control information in the physical downlink control channel; then, generating an interference signal based on the physical control information; finally, sending the interference signal to disrupt the 5G network communication of the device corresponding to the attacked cell. In the present invention, targeted interference with the device is achieved based on the physical downlink control channel, which is energy-efficient and solves the problem of high power consumption in the existing method of interfering with the 5G network by performing undifferentiated signal interference. At the same time, the concealment of the interference is greatly improved, making it impossible for general interference detection technologies and detection devices to detect the interference signal. Thus, effective anti-interference actions cannot be carried out. Description of the Drawings

[0031] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the following will briefly introduce the drawings required for use in the description of the embodiments or the prior art. Obviously, the following drawings are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those of ordinary skill in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative efforts.

[0032] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram of the time-domain position information of the DMRS symbol for all configurations when the DMRS is in the single-symbol mode.

[0033] Figure 2 It is a schematic diagram of the relationship between the total symbol time domain length of the PUSCH and the symbols that must be PUSCH data signals.

[0034] Figure 3 It is a flowchart of a method for efficiently interfering with a 5G network provided by the present invention.

[0035] Figure 4 It is a flowchart of cracking the physical downlink control channel of the device corresponding to the attacked cell and parsing the physical control information in the physical downlink control channel. Detailed implementation manners

[0036] The embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below. Examples of the embodiments are shown in the accompanying drawings, where the same or similar reference numerals denote the same or similar elements or elements having the same or similar functions throughout. The embodiments described below by referring to the accompanying drawings are exemplary and are intended to explain the present invention, and should not be construed as a limitation to the present invention.

[0037] Please refer to Figures 1 to 4 , the present invention provides a method for efficiently interfering with a 5G network, including the following steps:

[0038] S1 Search for and synchronize all existing nearby cells, and select an attack cell;

[0039] Specifically, the interference device searches for and synchronizes the 5G network, the list of 5G cells that are successfully searched for and synchronized, and selects an attack cell.

[0040] At this stage, the device only needs to perform ordinary mobile phone synchronization functions, mainly to complete functions such as network search, network synchronization, network tracking, and system message reading. Furthermore, it knows which 5G cells are working in this area. For the cell to be interfered with, perform downlink signal synchronization, interpret the cell configuration, etc.

[0041] S2 Crack the physical downlink control channel of the device corresponding to the attack cell, and parse the physical control information in the physical downlink control channel;

[0042] Specifically, the device cracks the physical downlink control channel (PDCCH) and parses information such as time and frequency domain in the physical control information (UL GRANT) to obtain the parsed information.

[0043] After synchronizing the target cell and parsing the cell parameters of the common channel. Furthermore, it knows the search space used by the physical downlink control channel of this cell, including CSS and USS.

[0044] Then simulate the process of UE blind detection of the physical downlink control channel to crack the physical control information in the physical downlink control channel. This process can be further divided into the following processes:

[0045] S21 Select all radio network temporary identifiers of the device corresponding to the attack cell;

[0046] Specifically, for each, select a possible radio network temporary identifier (RNTI).

[0047] S22 Calculate the search space corresponding to each radio network temporary identifier through each radio network temporary identifier and system time information;

[0048] Specifically, based on the system time information, the USS search space of the current radio network temporary identifier is calculated.

[0049] S23 performs blind detection on the physical downlink control channel of each radio network temporary identifier within the search space to obtain a traversal set.

[0050] Specifically, within this space, blind detection of the physical downlink control channel is performed. If the CRC passes, it indicates that a physical downlink control channel is detected, and it is then added to the traversal set of the physical downlink control channel blind detection. For other cases, it is discarded. For each transmission time interval (TTI), blind detection is performed on all radio network representations to obtain a traversal set.

[0051] S24 traverses and filters the traversal set through each transmission time interval to obtain a preliminary screening set.

[0052] Specifically, for each downlink control information in the set, its downlink control information format is detected. If it is downlink control information format 0 (DCI_0), it indicates that it is control information for uplink scheduling of the user, and then it is added to the preliminary screening set. For other cases, it is discarded. Finally, a preliminary screening set of uplink scheduling information is filtered out from the traversal set.

[0053] S25 performs secondary parsing and detection on the preliminary screening set. If the detection passes, a passing set is obtained.

[0054] Specifically, for all physical downlink control channels in the blind detection preliminary screening set, further parsing is performed to analyze whether there are obvious conflicts in their parameters, such as the number of symbols exceeding 14, or the number of RBs exceeding the maximum bandwidth, etc. If there are obvious abnormalities, it indicates a misdetection, and the physical downlink control channel is discarded. Those that pass the parameter rationality verification are put into the blind detection passing set.

[0055] S26 parses the indication field of the downlink control information of the physical downlink control channel in the passing set to obtain the configuration of the time-frequency resources of the user's physical uplink shared channel at the target time. This includes on which frequency band the user transmits, at what time the user transmits, and how many OFDM symbols there are in total, etc.

[0056] Specifically, finally, in the blind detection passing set, by parsing the indication field of the downlink control information format 0 (DCI_0) and analyzing its content, it is known that after the k2 time slot, which user will perform uplink data transmission on what time-frequency resources.

[0057] S3 generates an interference signal based on the physical control information.

[0058] The specific method is as follows:

[0059] S31 infers the time-frequency domain positions of the demodulation reference signal of the physical uplink shared channel and the time-frequency domain positions of the data signal of the physical uplink shared channel based on the configuration on the user time-frequency resources;

[0060] Specifically, the information in the downlink control information will include the time-domain information and frequency-domain information of the PUSCH DMRS and DATA together. However, to obtain which of these time-domain symbols are DMRS and which are DATA, high-layer information of the user is required, such as how many DMRS symbols are configured and the symbol pattern of the DMRS, etc. These parameters are not included in the downlink control information, so they cannot be directly known.

[0061] However, by looking at the 3GPP (3rd Generation Partnership Project) protocol, for all configurations, the distribution of the DMRS and DATA of the PUSCH can be deduced. In any DMRS configuration, it must be the position of the PUSCH DATA.

[0062] PUSCH: Physical Uplink Shared Channel;

[0063] DMRS: Demodulation Reference Signal;

[0064] DATA: Data Signal.

[0065] As Figure 1 shown (when the DMRS is in the single-symbol mode), the protocol specifies the positions of the DMRS for all configurations of the number of DMRS symbols (dmrs-addPos value, mapping type) and the total symbol time-domain length (ld) of the PUSCH.

[0066] As Figure 2 described, by substituting the two possible values of l0 (2 and 3), it can be deduced that when ld is fixed, it must be the position of the PUSCH DATA, and the parameter of ld can be obtained from the downlink control information. So we can obtain the position information that must be the PUSCH DATA, and then perform stealthy directional interference on these positions.

[0067] S32 generates an interference signal for the time-frequency domain positions of the data signal of the physical uplink shared channel.

[0068] Specifically, that is, any symbol with a certain amount of energy is deployed at the RE at this position, and then stored waiting to be sent.

[0069] S4 sends the interference signal at a specified time to disrupt the 5G network communication of the device corresponding to the attacked cell.

[0070] Specifically, the interference signal is processed and then transmitted at the target moment to disrupt the 5G network communication of the device corresponding to the attacked cell. By the time of k2, the interference device prepares the interference signal and, like an ordinary mobile phone, after performing normal LOWPHY processing, transmits the wireless signal at k2. When transmitting the interference signal, it only targets the time-frequency position of the transmission when a user is actually performing uplink transmission and only directionally interferes with the physical uplink shared channel data signal symbols, without generating interference signals at other times, and the interference signal does not interfere with the demodulation reference signal, so it will not be detected by the interference detection algorithm at the receiving end.

[0071] The particularity of this method lies in that since the customized interference signal is only transmitted following the accurate time-frequency position scheduled by the user when there is actually a user performing uplink transmission, only interfering with the PUSCH DATA part. Therefore, it can achieve:

[0072] 1. Interfere with users. Since the PUSCH DATA (data) is severely interfered while the PUSCH DMRS is not interfered, the base station cannot perform correct channel equalization and thus cannot decode the uplink PUSCH channel.

[0073] 2. High efficiency and energy saving. Since it only interferes with the part of RB resources in the accurate time-frequency domain at the moment when there is actually traffic, it is highly efficient and energy-saving. And since only terminal users need to be simulated, only a power slightly higher than the maximum power of the terminal needs to be transmitted. Currently, the maximum transmission power of the terminal is about 200 mW, and transmitting 400 mW of interference by the jammer is sufficient to interfere with users. On the contrary, for traditional downlink interference, the transmission power of the base station may be 100 W, so the jammer needs at least several thousand times the power to effectively interfere.

[0074] 3. Extremely strong concealment. All current anti-interference technologies are based on DMRS for measurement, then estimating interference and noise, and then taking countermeasures, or regularly scanning the air interface to check the background noise generated when no user is scheduled to determine if there is a fixed external interference. Since this method only interferes in real time when there is actual user traffic and perfectly avoids the user's DMRS signal, the receiver cannot detect the interference at all. Therefore, there is no way to implement any anti-interference countermeasure technology or indicate the presence of interference.

[0075] An important implementation point of the present invention is to crack the physical downlink control channel. Since there is no prior information on the wireless network temporary identifier, it is necessary to traverse all wireless network temporary identifiers (tens of thousands). This process needs to be completed in a short time (shorter than K2, otherwise there is not enough time to prepare the interference signal). Therefore, hardware acceleration such as FPGA is needed to perform multi-channel concurrent blind detection. The blind detection technology itself is a technology stipulated by the protocol, and there are a large number of mature and efficient implementation methods. By designing the preliminary screening and verification methods, and through a large number of concurrent calculations by FPGA, the blind detection of tens of thousands of wireless network temporary identifiers can be completed within the specified time. After cracking the physical downlink control channel, the remaining operations are all simple and mature technologies, without implementation difficulties. The present invention is not limited to the 5GNR network. As long as it is based on this scheduling method and the DMRS and DATA distribution patterns, any type of 5G private network can use this method to achieve efficient electronic countermeasures. FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array) is a further development product based on programmable devices such as PAL (Programmable Array Logic) and GAL (Generic Array Logic).

[0076] The above-disclosed is only a preferred embodiment of a method for efficiently interfering with the 5G network of the present invention. Of course, it cannot be used to limit the scope of the rights of the present invention. Those of ordinary skill in the art can understand all or part of the processes of implementing the above embodiments, and the equivalent changes made according to the claims of the present invention still fall within the scope covered by the invention.

Claims

1. A method for efficiently interfering with 5G networks, characterized in that, Including the following steps: Search for and synchronize all existing nearby cells, and select an attack cell; Crack the physical downlink control channel of the device corresponding to the attack cell, and analyze the physical control information in the physical downlink control channel; Generate an interference signal based on the physical control information; Send the interference signal at a specified moment to disrupt the 5G network communication of the device corresponding to the attack cell; The generating the interference signal based on the physical control information includes: Based on the configuration on the time-frequency resources of the user's physical uplink shared channel, infer the time-frequency domain positions of the demodulation reference signal of the physical uplink shared channel and the time-frequency domain position of the data signal of the physical uplink shared channel; Generate an interference signal for the time-frequency domain position of the data signal of the physical uplink shared channel; The inferring the time-frequency domain positions of the demodulation reference signal of the physical uplink shared channel and the time-frequency domain position of the data signal of the physical uplink shared channel based on the configuration on the user's time-frequency resources includes: View all the distributions of the demodulation reference signal of the physical uplink shared channel and the data signal of the physical uplink shared channel in the configuration on the user's time-frequency resources in the 3GPP protocol to obtain the time-frequency domain position of the data signal of the physical uplink shared channel.

2. The method for highly efficient interference with 5G network according to claim 1, wherein The selecting the attack cell includes: The interference device searches for and synchronizes the 5G network, and selects the cell to be attacked through the list of 5G cells successfully searched for and synchronized.

3. The method for highly efficient interference with 5G network according to claim 2, wherein The cracking the physical downlink control channel of the device corresponding to the attack cell and analyzing the physical control information in the physical downlink control channel includes: Select all the radio network temporary identifiers of the device corresponding to the attack cell; Calculate the search space corresponding to each radio network temporary identifier through each radio network temporary identifier and system time information; Blindly detect the physical downlink control channel of each radio network temporary identifier within the search space to obtain a traversal set; Traverse and screen the traversal set through each transmission time interval to obtain a primary screening set; Perform secondary analysis and detection on the primary screening set. If the detection passes, obtain a passing set; Analyze the indication field of the downlink control information of the physical downlink control channel in the passing set to obtain the configuration on the time-frequency resources of the user's physical uplink shared channel at the target moment.

4. The method for highly efficient interference with 5G network according to claim 1, wherein The sending the interference signal to disrupt the 5G network communication of the device corresponding to the attack cell includes: Process and send the interference signal at the specified moment to disrupt the 5G network communication of the device corresponding to the attack cell.

5. The method for highly efficient interference with 5G network according to claim 1, wherein The sending the interference signal only performs directional interference on the time-frequency position of the transmission when there is a user actually performing uplink transmission, and only on the symbols of the data signal of the physical uplink shared channel, does not generate interference signals at other times, and the interference signal does not interfere with the demodulation reference signal.

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