Protection of sensitive user data in communication networks

Abstract

The present disclosure provides a method for operating a network node in a communication network to protect sensitive information or metadata (SUPI) of users of the communication network from being affected by untrusted processing module nodes. The trusted processing module node is configured to generate a home environment authentication vector (HEAV). The HEAV includes anonymous metadata (SUPI*) derived from the metadata (SUPI), and a second key (K1). A first untrusted device node (AUSF) is configured to send an authentication response derived from the HEAV to a second untrusted network device node (AMF). An authentication request derived from the authentication response is sent to a user equipment node (UE). The user equipment node (UE) is configured to calculate an authentication key (K1) from the authentication request. AMF ), based on the authentication key, performing two-way authentication between the second non-trusted network device node (AMF) and the user equipment node (UE).

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present disclosure generally relates to security in communication networks; more specifically, the present disclosure relates to a method for operating a node in a communication network to protect sensitive user data or metadata of a user. In addition, the present disclosure relates to a node configured to operate according to the method. Background Art

[0002] The use of security features in data processing, information systems, and communications networks helps achieve privacy, fairness, accuracy, confidentiality, and other required standards. Such security features use encryption or cryptography techniques; among other things, such security features are used in e-commerce, wireless communications, and broadcasting. Encryption is also used to prevent hacker attacks, protect web pages, and block access to a given user's sensitive data.

[0003] In the case of a communication network that may include trusted and untrusted network elements, disadvantages arise when seeking to maintain communication compatibility between the trusted network elements and the untrusted network elements, wherein security may be compromised. A network element is a device that operates as part of a communication network and may also be referred to as a processing module node. Due to compatibility requirements, sensitive user data or metadata associated with users of the communication network may be exposed. For example, sensitive user data or metadata associated with a user, such as a unique identifier or user identifier, may be used in an unencrypted manner and as plain text during communications between a trusted network element and an untrusted network element in the communication network. This creates privacy issues for users of the communication network because sensitive user data in plain text may be exposed to untrusted network elements.

[0004] Similarly, the fifth-generation (5G) core network includes trusted network elements and untrusted network elements, as well as user equipment nodes that are uniquely identified in the 5G core network using a subscriber permanent identifier (SUPI). Due to compatibility requirements between trusted network elements and untrusted network elements, sensitive user data or metadata of users (including but not limited to SUPI) are used in plain text without encryption. This creates security issues in the 5G core network because sensitive user data or metadata is exposed to untrusted network elements. In addition, this creates confidentiality and anonymity issues for users associated with user equipment nodes because this occurs without the user's consent. Currently, there is no practical solution to this problem.

[0005] Therefore, in view of the above shortcomings associated with known security features, there is a need to address the above shortcomings in the prior art to ensure confidentiality and anonymity of sensitive user data or metadata to prevent sensitive user data from being leaked to untrusted network elements. Summary of the invention

[0006] The purpose of the present disclosure is to provide an improved method to ensure the confidentiality and anonymity of sensitive user data or metadata of a user to prevent sensitive user data from leaking to untrusted network elements in a communication network.

[0007] This object is achieved by the features of the independent claim. Other implementations are apparent from the dependent claims, the description and the drawings.

[0008] According to a first aspect, a method for operating a trusted processing module node of a communication network is provided. The trusted processing module node is configured to be communicatively coupled with a first non-trusted device node (AUSF), a second non-trusted device node (AMF) and a user equipment node (UE). The method comprises, at the trusted processing module node, applying a first key derivation function to metadata (SUPI) and a first key (K seaf ), generating a home environment authentication vector. The home environment authentication vector includes anonymous metadata (SUPI*) derived from metadata (SUPI) and also includes a second key (K 1 The method includes sending an authentication response from a trusted processing module node to a second untrusted network device node (AMF) of the communication network through a first untrusted device node (AUSF) of the communication network. The authentication response is a response from a trusted processing module node including anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and a second key (K 1 )’s belonging environment authentication vector data is derived.

[0009] Since the home environment authentication vector does not include the first key (K seaf ), so the metadata (SUPI) is protected from brute force attacks from potential attackers including the first untrusted device node (AUSF) and the second untrusted network device node (AMF). The confidentiality of the metadata (SUPI) is protected because the potential attacker may only be able to obtain the ciphertext of the metadata (SUPI) from the communication network.

[0010] In a first possible implementation of the method for operating a trusted processing module node of the first aspect, the method further comprises sending an authentication request derived from the authentication response to a user equipment node (UE) connected to the communication network from the second non-trusted network device node (AMF). The user equipment node (UE) is configured to calculate an authentication key (K) from the authentication request using a key derivation function (HMAC). AMF The method also includes the following steps: AMF ) performs two-way authentication between the second non-trusted network device node (AMF) and the user equipment node (UE). AMF ) ensures that the above two-way authentication process uses anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and the first key (K seaf ).

[0011] In one implementation, the method includes arranging the trusted processing module node to wirelessly communicate with at least a portion of a communication network. Optionally, the method includes arranging the trusted processing module node (10) to comply with 5G network specifications for wireless communication.

[0012] According to a second aspect, there is provided a computer program product comprising a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having stored thereon computer-readable instructions executable by a computerized device comprising processing hardware to perform the method of the first aspect.

[0013] According to a third aspect, a method for operating a user equipment node (UE) of a communication network is provided. The user equipment node (UE) is configured to be communicatively coupled to a first untrusted device node (AUSF), a second untrusted device node (AMF), and a trusted processing module node. The method includes receiving, at the user equipment node (UE), an authentication request derived from an authentication response from a second untrusted network device node (AMF). The user equipment node (UE) is configured to calculate an authentication key (K) from the authentication request using a key derivation function (HMAC). AMF The method also includes the following steps: AMF ) performs two-way authentication between the second non-trusted network device node (AMF) and the user equipment node (UE).

[0014] Since the home environment authentication vector does not include the first key (K seaf ), so the metadata (SUPI) is protected from brute force attacks from potential attackers including AUSF and AMF. The confidentiality of the metadata (SUPI) is protected because a potential attacker may only be able to obtain the ciphertext of the metadata (SUPI) from the communication network. AMF ) ensures that the above two-way authentication process uses anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and the first key (K seaf ).

[0015] In a first possible implementation of the method for operating a user equipment node (UE) of the third aspect, the method further includes, at a trusted processing module node of the communication network, applying a first key derivation function to metadata (SUPI) and a first key (K seaf ), generating a home environment authentication vector. The home environment authentication vector includes anonymous metadata (SUPI*) derived from metadata (SUPI) and also includes a second key (K 1The method further includes sending an authentication response from the trusted processing module node to a second untrusted network device node (AMF) of the communication network through a first untrusted device node (AUSF) of the communication network. The authentication response is a token including anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and a second key (K 1 )’s belonging environment authentication vector data is derived.

[0016] According to a fourth aspect, a method for operating a first untrusted device node (AUSF) of a communication network is provided. The first untrusted device node (AUSF) is configured to be communicatively coupled with a second untrusted device node (AMF), a user equipment node (UE) and a trusted processing module node. The method includes receiving an authentication response from the trusted processing module node. The authentication response is a token including anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and a second key (K 1 The method comprises sending an authentication response to a second non-trusted network device node (AMF) of the communication network.

[0017] Since the home environment authentication vector does not include the first key (K seaf ), so the metadata (SUPI) is protected from brute force attacks from potential attackers including AUSF and AMF. The confidentiality of the metadata (SUPI) is protected because a potential attacker may only be able to obtain the ciphertext of the metadata (SUPI) from the communication network.

[0018] In a first possible implementation of the method for operating a first untrusted device node (AUSF) of the fourth aspect, the method further comprises sending an authentication request derived from the authentication response to a user equipment node (UE) connected to the communication network from the second untrusted network device node (AMF). The user equipment node (UE) is configured to calculate an authentication key (K) from the authentication request using a key derivation function (HMAC). AMF The method also includes the following steps: AMF ) performs two-way authentication between the second non-trusted network device node (AMF) and the user equipment node (UE).

[0019] Authentication key (K AMF ) ensures that the above two-way authentication process uses anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and the first key (K seaf ). Authentication key (K AMF ) ensures that the above two-way authentication process uses anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and the first key (K seaf ).

[0020] In a second possible implementation of the method for operating a first untrusted device node (AUSF) of the fourth aspect or the first implementation of the fourth aspect, the method further includes, at a trusted processing module node of the communication network, applying a first key derivation function to metadata (SUPI) and a first key (K seaf ), generating a home environment authentication vector. The home environment authentication vector includes anonymous metadata (SUPI*) derived from metadata (SUPI) and also includes a second key (K 1 ).

[0021] Optionally, the method comprises arranging the first untrusted device node (AUSF) as an authentication server function.

[0022] Optionally, the method comprises protecting the anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and the second key (K 1 ) is not eavesdropped. More optionally, the method includes protecting the anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and the second key (K by a cryptographic hash function for probabilistic polynomial-time turing (PPT) 1 ) is not eavesdropped.

[0023] Optionally, the method includes arranging the first untrusted device node (AUSF) to wirelessly communicate with at least a portion of the communication network. More optionally, the method includes arranging the first untrusted device node (AUSF) to comply with 5G network specifications for wireless communication.

[0024] According to a fifth aspect, there is provided a computer program product comprising a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having computer-readable instructions stored thereon, the computer-readable instructions being executable by a computerized device comprising processing hardware to perform the method of the fourth aspect.

[0025] According to a sixth aspect, a method for operating a second non-trusted device node (AMF) of a communication network is provided. The second non-trusted device node (AMF) is configured to be communicatively coupled with a first non-trusted device node (AUSF), a user device node (UE) and a trusted processing module node. The method includes the second non-trusted network device node (AMF) receiving an authentication response from the first non-trusted network device node (AUSF). The method includes sending an authentication request derived from the authentication response to a user device node (UE) connected to the communication network from the second non-trusted network device node (AMF). The user device node (UE) is configured to calculate an authentication key (K) from the authentication request using a key derivation function (HMAC). AMF The method includes the following steps:AMF ) performs two-way authentication between the second non-trusted network device node (AMF) and the user equipment node (UE).

[0026] Since the home environment authentication vector does not include the first key (K seaf ), so the metadata (SUPI) is protected from brute force attacks from potential attackers including AUSF and AMF. The confidentiality of the metadata (SUPI) is protected because a potential attacker may only be able to obtain the ciphertext of the metadata (SUPI) from the communication network.

[0027] In a first possible implementation of the method for operating a second non-trusted device node (AMF) of the sixth aspect, the method further includes, at a trusted processing module node of the communication network, applying a first key derivation function to metadata (SUPI) and a first key (K seaf ), generating a home environment authentication vector. The home environment authentication vector includes anonymous metadata (SUPI*) derived from metadata (SUPI) and also includes a second key (K 1 The method further includes sending an authentication response from the trusted processing module node to a first untrusted device node (AUSF) of the communication network. The authentication response is a token including anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and a second key (K 1 )’s belonging environment authentication vector data is derived.

[0028] In a first possible implementation of any of the above aspects or implementations thereof, the method includes arranging a first untrusted device node (AUSF) as an authentication server function and arranging a second untrusted device node (AMF) as an access and mobility management function.

[0029] In a second possible implementation of any of the above aspects or implementations thereof, the method includes protecting anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and a second key (K 1 ) is not eavesdropped.

[0030] In a third possible implementation of the second possible implementation, the method includes protecting the anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and the second key (K 1 ) is not eavesdropped. A potential attacker may have the AUSF and AMF. The cryptographic hash function prevents a potential attacker from compromising confidentiality and extracting the original SUPI data.

[0031] In a fourth possible implementation of any of the above aspects or implementations thereof, the method includes arranging at least a portion of the communication network into a wireless communication network.

[0032] In a fifth possible implementation of the fourth possible implementation, the method includes arranging the wireless communication network to comply with 5G network specifications.

[0033] Optionally, the method further comprises arranging a second non-trusted device node (AMF) as an access and mobility management function.

[0034] Optionally, the method comprises protecting the anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and the second key (K 1 ) is not eavesdropped. More optionally, the method includes protecting the anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and the second key (K 1 ) is not eavesdropped.

[0035] Optionally, the method includes arranging the second non-trusted device node (AMF) to wirelessly communicate with at least a portion of the communication network. More optionally, the method includes arranging the second non-trusted device node (AMF) to comply with 5G network specifications for wireless communication.

[0036] According to a seventh aspect, there is provided a computer program product comprising a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having computer-readable instructions stored thereon, the computer-readable instructions being executable by a computerized device comprising processing hardware to perform the method of the sixth aspect.

[0037] According to an eighth aspect, a trusted processing module node is provided, the trusted processing module node being configured to communicate with a communication network, the communication network being configured to transmit sensitive user data. The communication network comprises a first non-trusted device node (AUSF) and a second non-trusted device node (AMF). The communication network is coupled to the trusted processing module node and a user equipment node (UE). The trusted processing module node is configured to generate a first key derivation function by applying a first key derivation function to metadata (SUPI) and a first key (K seaf ), generating a home environment authentication vector. The home environment authentication vector includes anonymous metadata (SUPI*) derived from metadata (SUPI) and also includes a second key (K 1 The trusted processing module node is configured to send an authentication response to a first untrusted device node (AUSF) of the communication network. The authentication response is a sequence of authentication information including anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and a second key (K 1). The first untrusted network device node (AUSF) is configured to send an authentication response from it to a second untrusted network device node (AMF) of the communication network. The second untrusted network device node (AMF) is configured to send an authentication request derived from the authentication response to a user equipment node (UE) connected to the communication network. The user equipment node (UE) is configured to calculate an authentication key (K) from the authentication request using a key derivation function (HMAC). AMF The second non-trusted network device (AMF) and the user equipment (UE) use the authentication key (K AMF ) performs two-way authentication between the two.

[0038] Since the home environment authentication vector does not include the first key (K seaf ), so the metadata (SUPI) is protected from brute force attacks from potential attackers including AUSF and AMF. The confidentiality of the metadata (SUPI) is protected because a potential attacker may only be able to obtain the ciphertext of the metadata (SUPI) from the communication network.

[0039] According to a ninth aspect, a user equipment node (UE) is provided, the user equipment node being configured to communicate with a communication network configured to transmit sensitive user data. The communication network comprises a first untrusted device node (AUSF) and a second untrusted device node (AMF). The communication network is coupled to a trusted processing module node. The trusted processing module node is configured to generate a first key derivation function by applying a first key derivation function to metadata (SUPI) and a first key (K seaf ), generating a home environment authentication vector. The home environment authentication vector includes anonymous metadata (SUPI*) derived from metadata (SUPI) and also includes a second key (K 1 The trusted processing module node is configured to send an authentication response to a first untrusted device node (AUSF) of the communication network. The authentication response is a response from a private key including anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and a second key (K 1 ). The first untrusted network device node (AUSF) is configured to send an authentication response from it to a second untrusted network device node (AMF) of the communication network. The second untrusted network device node (AMF) is configured to send an authentication request derived from the authentication response to a user equipment node (UE) connected to the communication network. The user equipment node (UE) is configured to calculate an authentication key (K) from the authentication request using a key derivation function (HMAC). AMF The second non-trusted network device (AMF) and the user equipment (UE) use the authentication key (K AMF ) performs two-way authentication between the two. Since the home environment authentication vector does not include the first key (K seaf), so the metadata (SUPI) is protected from brute force attacks from potential attackers including AUSF and AMF. The confidentiality of the metadata (SUPI) is protected because a potential attacker may only be able to obtain the ciphertext of the metadata (SUPI) from the communication network.

[0040] According to a tenth aspect, a first untrusted device node (AUSF) is provided, the first untrusted device node being configured to communicate with a communication network configured to transmit sensitive user data. The communication network comprises a second untrusted device node (AMF) and a user equipment node (UE). The communication network is coupled to a trusted processing module node. The trusted processing module node is configured to generate a first key derivation function by applying a first key derivation function to metadata (SUPI) and a first key (K seaf ), generating a home environment authentication vector. The home environment authentication vector includes anonymous metadata (SUPI*) derived from metadata (SUPI) and also includes a second key (K 1 The trusted processing module node is configured to send an authentication response to a first untrusted device node (AUSF) of the communication network. The authentication response is a response from a private key including anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and a second key (K 1 ). The first untrusted network device node (AUSF) is configured to send an authentication response from it to a second untrusted network device node (AMF) of the communication network. The second untrusted network device node (AMF) is configured to send an authentication request derived from the authentication response to a user equipment node (UE) connected to the communication network. The user equipment node (UE) is configured to calculate an authentication key (K) from the authentication request using a key derivation function (HMAC). AMF The second non-trusted network device (AMF) and the user equipment (UE) use the authentication key (K AMF ) performs two-way authentication between the two.

[0041] Since the home environment authentication vector does not include the first key (K seaf ), so the metadata (SUPI) is protected from brute force attacks from potential attackers including AUSF and AMF. The confidentiality of the metadata (SUPI) is protected because a potential attacker may only be able to obtain the ciphertext of the metadata (SUPI) from the communication network.

[0042] According to an eleventh aspect, a second non-trusted device node (AMF) is provided, the second non-trusted device node being configured to communicate with a communication network configured to transmit sensitive user data. The communication network comprises a first non-trusted device node (AUSF) and a user equipment node (UE). The communication network is coupled to a trusted processing module node. The trusted processing module node is configured to generate a first key derivation function by applying a first key derivation function to metadata (SUPI) and a first key (K seaf ), generating a home environment authentication vector. The home environment authentication vector includes anonymous metadata (SUPI*) derived from metadata (SUPI) and also includes a second key (K 1 The trusted processing module node is configured to send an authentication response to a first untrusted device node (AUSF) of the communication network. The authentication response is a response from a private key including anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and a second key (K 1 ). The first untrusted network device node (AUSF) is configured to send an authentication response from it to a second untrusted network device node (AMF) of the communication network. The second untrusted network device node (AMF) is configured to send an authentication request derived from the authentication response to a user equipment node (UE) connected to the communication network. The user equipment node (UE) is configured to calculate an authentication key (K) from the authentication request using a key derivation function (HMAC). AMF The second non-trusted network device (AMF) and the user equipment (UE) use the authentication key (K AMF ) performs two-way authentication between the two.

[0043] Since the home environment authentication vector does not include the first key (K seaf ), so the metadata (SUPI) is protected from brute force attacks from potential attackers including AUSF and AMF. The confidentiality of the metadata (SUPI) is protected because a potential attacker may only be able to obtain the ciphertext of the metadata (SUPI) from the communication network.

[0044] In a first possible implementation of the node described in any one of the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth aspects or their above-mentioned implementation methods, the first untrusted device node (AUSF) is arranged as an authentication server function, and the second untrusted device node (AMF) is arranged as an access and mobility management function.

[0045] In a second possible implementation of the node described in any one of the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth aspects or the above implementation of the node, the anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and the second key (K 1 ) is not eavesdropped.

[0046] In a third possible implementation of the node described in any one of the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth aspects or the above implementations thereof, the anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and the second key (K 1 ) cannot be eavesdropped. Potential attackers including AUSF and AMF cannot break the confidentiality attribute and extract the original SUPI data.

[0047] In a fourth possible implementation of the node described in any one of the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth aspects or their above implementations, at least a part of the communication network is arranged as a wireless communication network.

[0048] In a fifth possible implementation of the node of the fourth possible implementation of the node described in any one of the fifth aspect, sixth aspect, seventh aspect and eighth aspect or the above-mentioned implementation manners, the wireless communication network is arranged to comply with 5G network specifications.

[0049] According to the twelfth aspect, a computer program product is provided including a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, on which computer-readable instructions are stored, and the computer-readable instructions can be executed by a computerized device including processing hardware to perform any method in any of the first, second, third or fourth aspects or their implementations.

[0050] The present invention solves a technical problem in the prior art, wherein the technical problem involves protecting the confidentiality and anonymity of sensitive user data or metadata of a user from being affected by an untrusted network element in a communication network without using plain text for communication between the trusted network element and the untrusted network element in the communication network.

[0051] Therefore, unlike the prior art, the trusted processing module nodes and untrusted processing module nodes and user device nodes of the communication network provided by the present disclosure and the method for operating the trusted processing module nodes and untrusted processing module nodes and user device nodes enable the data owner to control the confidentiality and anonymity of sensitive user data (e.g., personal information). Even if the untrusted processing module nodes can process encrypted sensitive user data or metadata, they may not be able to obtain plaintext metadata. Therefore, potential attackers can be prevented from leaking sensitive information or metadata. In addition, the present disclosure improves data security, that is, the confidentiality of sensitive user data (e.g., user permanent identification (SUPI)) achieved by encryption.

[0052] These and other aspects of the disclosure will be apparent from one or more of the embodiments described hereinafter. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0053] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present disclosure or the technical solutions in the prior art, the following is a brief description of the drawings. In addition, the drawings in the following description only show some embodiments of the present disclosure, and ordinary technicians in this field can also obtain other drawings based on these drawings without creative work.

[0054] Figure 1 is a schematic diagram depicting a communication network according to an example of the present disclosure;

[0055] Figure 2 is an interactive diagram depicting a method of operating a trusted processing module node of a communication network to provide confidentiality and anonymity of sensitive user data or metadata of users of the communication network according to an example of the present disclosure;

[0056] Figure 3 is a schematic diagram depicting a fifth generation communications network including a fifth generation core network in communication with a user equipment according to an example of the present disclosure;

[0057] Figure 4 is a diagram illustrating an example of an embodiment of the present disclosure including a method for operating Figure 1 A flowchart of the method steps for a trusted processing module node in a communication network;

[0058] Figure 5 is an example according to the present disclosure including a method for operating Figure 1 A flowchart of method steps for a user equipment node in a communication network;

[0059] Figure 6 is an example according to the present disclosure including a method for operating Figure 1 A flowchart of the method steps for a first untrusted device node in a communication network;

[0060] Figure 7 is an example according to the present disclosure including a method for operating Figure 1 A flowchart of method steps for a second non-trusted device node in a communication network. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0061] Embodiments of the present disclosure provide methods of operating a trusted processing module node in a communication network that provides confidentiality and anonymity of sensitive user data or metadata of users of the communication network.

[0062] In order to make it easier for those skilled in the art to understand the aspects of the present disclosure, the following embodiments of the present disclosure are described with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0063] The terms "first," "second," "third," and "fourth" (if any) in the overview of the present disclosure, the claims, and the above-mentioned figures are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific sequence or order. It should be understood that the terms used in this way are interchangeable where appropriate, such as enabling the embodiments of the present disclosure described herein to be implemented in sequences other than those shown or described herein. In addition, the terms "including" and "having" and any variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusions. For example, a process, method, system, product, or apparatus that includes a series of steps or units is not necessarily limited to the steps or units explicitly listed, but may include other steps or units that are not explicitly listed or inherent to such processes, methods, products, or apparatus.

[0064] Figure 1 1 is a schematic diagram of a communication network 15 according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. The communication network 15 includes a trusted processing module node 10. The trusted processing module node 10 is configured to be communicatively coupled with a first non-trusted device node 20 (AUSF), a second non-trusted device node 30 (AMF), and a user equipment node 40 (UE). The trusted processing module node 10 is configured to communicate ... seaf ) to generate a home environment authentication vector (home environment authentication vector). The home environment authentication vector includes anonymous metadata (SUPI*) derived from metadata (SUPI) and also includes a second key (K 1 The trusted processing module node 10 is configured to send an authentication response to the first untrusted device node 20 (AUSF) of the communication network 15. The authentication response is a response from a private key including anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and a second key (K 1 ). The first untrusted network device node 20 (AUSF) is configured to send an authentication response therefrom to a second untrusted network device node 30 (AMF) of the communication network 15. The second untrusted network device node 30 (AMF) is configured to send an authentication request derived from the authentication response to a user equipment node 40 (UE) connected to the communication network 15. The user equipment node 40 (UE) is configured to calculate an authentication key (K) from the authentication request using a key derivation function (HMAC). AMF The second non-trusted network device 30 (AMF) and the user equipment 40 (UE) are configured to authenticate each other based on the authentication key (K AMF ) performs two-way authentication between the two.

[0065] The authentication server function (AUSF) may be used to facilitate security processing in the communication network 15. The core access and mobility management function (AMF) may be used for registration management, connection management, reachability management, mobility management, and various functions related to security and access management and authorization of the user equipment node 40 (UE). The user equipment node 40 (UE) may be any device used directly by the user for communication. The user equipment node 40 (UE) may include, but is not limited to, a handheld phone, a laptop equipped with a mobile broadband adapter. In the communication network 15, each user is assigned a globally unique user permanent identity (SUPI).

[0066] Examples of SUPI formats may include an international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) and a network access identifier (NAI). During the authentication process between the user equipment node 40 (UE) and the home network of the user equipment node 40 (UE), the security anchor function (SEAF) is used as a middleman in the communication network 15. Based on the SEAF, the authentication from the user equipment node 40 (UE) can be rejected or accepted. seaf ” refers to a key that can be generated using the Security Anchor feature.

[0067] A hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) may be a code used for message authentication. The HMAC may involve a cryptographic hash function and a secret cryptographic key.

[0068] The user equipment node 40 (UE) is configured to communicate with a communication network 15, which is configured to transmit sensitive user data. The communication network 15 includes a first non-trusted device node (AUSF, 20) and a second non-trusted device node (AMF, 30). The communication network 15 is coupled to the trusted processing module node 10. The trusted processing module node 10 is configured to obtain a first key derivation function by applying the first key derivation function to the metadata (SUPI) and the first key (K seaf ) to generate a home environment authentication vector. The home environment authentication vector includes anonymous metadata (SUPI*) derived from metadata (SUPI) and also includes a second key (K 1 The trusted processing module node 10 is configured to send an authentication response to the first untrusted device node 20 (AUSF) of the communication network 15. The authentication response is a response from a private key including anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and a second key (K 1). The first untrusted network device node 20 (AUSF) is configured to send an authentication response therefrom to a second untrusted network device node 30 (AMF) of the communication network 15. The second untrusted network device node 30 (AMF) is configured to send an authentication request derived from the authentication response to a user equipment node 40 (UE) connected to the communication network 15. The user equipment node 40 (UE) is configured to calculate an authentication key (K) from the authentication request using a key derivation function (HMAC). AMF The second non-trusted network device node 30 (AMF) and the user equipment node 40 (UE) are configured to be based on the authentication key (K AMF ) performs two-way authentication between the two.

[0069] The first non-trusted device node 20 (AUSF) is configured to communicate with a communication network 15, which is configured to transmit sensitive user data. The communication network 15 includes a second non-trusted device node 30 (AMF) and a user equipment node 40 (UE). The communication network 15 is coupled to the trusted processing module node 10. The trusted processing module node 10 is configured to generate a first key derivation function by applying the first key derivation function to the metadata (SUPI) and the first key (K seaf ) to generate a home environment authentication vector. The home environment authentication vector includes anonymous metadata (SUPI*) derived from metadata (SUPI) and also includes a second key (K 1 The trusted processing module node 10 is configured to send an authentication response to the first untrusted device node 20 (AUSF) of the communication network 15. The authentication response is a response from a private key including anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and a second key (K 1 ). The first untrusted network device node 20 (AUSF) is configured to send an authentication response therefrom to a second untrusted network device node 30 (AMF) of the communication network 15. The second untrusted network device node 30 (AMF) is configured to send an authentication request derived from the authentication response to a user equipment node 40 (UE) connected to the communication network 15. The user equipment node 40 (UE) is configured to calculate an authentication key (K) from the authentication request using a key derivation function (HMAC). AMF The second non-trusted network device node 30 (AMF) and the user equipment node 40 (UE) are configured to be based on the authentication key (K AMF ) performs two-way authentication between the two.

[0070] The second non-trusted device node 30 (AMF) is configured to communicate with the communication network 15, which is configured to transmit sensitive user data. The communication network 15 includes the first non-trusted device node 20 (AUSF) and the user equipment node 40 (UE). The communication network 15 is coupled to the trusted processing module node 10. The trusted processing module node 10 is configured to obtain a first key derivation function by applying the first key derivation function to the metadata (SUPI) and the first key (K seaf ) to generate a home environment authentication vector. The home environment authentication vector includes anonymous metadata (SUPI*) derived from metadata (SUPI) and also includes a second key (K 1 The trusted processing module node 10 is configured to send an authentication response to the first untrusted device node 20 (AUSF) of the communication network 15. The authentication response is a response from a private key including anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and a second key (K 1 ). The first untrusted network device node 20 (AUSF) is configured to send an authentication response therefrom to a second untrusted network device node 30 (AMF) of the communication network 15. The second untrusted network device node 30 (AMF) is configured to send an authentication request derived from the authentication response to a user equipment node 40 (UE) connected to the communication network 15. The user equipment node 40 (UE) is configured to calculate an authentication key (K) from the authentication request using a key derivation function (HMAC). AMF The second non-trusted network device node 30 (AMF) and the user equipment 40 (UE) are configured to be based on the authentication key (K AMF ) performs two-way authentication between the two.

[0071] In one embodiment, the first untrusted device node 20 (AUSF) is arranged as an authentication server function and the second untrusted device node 30 (AMF) is arranged as an access and mobility management function.

[0072] In one embodiment, the anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and the second key (K 1 ) cannot be eavesdropped. The anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and the second key (K 1 ) is not eavesdropped.

[0073] In one embodiment, at least a portion of the communication network 15 is arranged as a wireless communication network 15. The wireless communication network 15 may be arranged to comply with 5G network specifications.

[0074] Figure 21 is an interactive diagram of method steps for operating a trusted processing module node 10 of a communication network 15 to provide confidentiality and anonymity of sensitive user data or metadata of users of the communication network 15 according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. In step 202, at the trusted processing module node 10, a first key derivation function is applied to the metadata (SUPI) and the first key (K seaf ) to generate a home environment authentication vector. The home environment authentication vector includes anonymous metadata (SUPI*) derived from metadata (SUPI) and also includes a second key (K 1 In step 204, the trusted processing module node 10 sends an authentication response to the first untrusted device node 20 (AUSF) of the communication network 15. The authentication response is a response from the anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and the second key (K 1 ) of the home environment authentication vector. In step 206, an authentication response is sent from the first untrusted network device node 20 (AUSF) of the communication network 15 to the second untrusted network device node 30 (AMF). In step 208, an authentication request derived from the authentication response is sent from the second untrusted network device node 30 (AMF) to the user equipment node 40 (UE) connected to the communication network 15. In step 210, an authentication key (K) is calculated from the authentication request using a key derivation function (HMAC) at the user equipment node 40 (UE). AMF In step 212, based on the authentication key (K AMF ) performs two-way authentication between the second non-trusted network device node 30 (AMF) and the user equipment 40 (UE).

[0075] Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of a fifth generation communication network 300 including a fifth generation core network 302 in communication with a user equipment node 310 according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. The fifth generation core network 302 includes a trusted network device node 304 communicatively coupled to an AUSF node 306 and an AMF node 308. The AMF module 308 is communicatively coupled to the user equipment node 310. The AUSF node 306 may also be a unified data management (UDM) node or an authentication credential repository and processing function (ARPF) node according to the 5G standard.

[0076] The trusted network device node 304 includes an anonymous SUPI processing module 312, which processes the anonymous SUPI by applying a first key derivation function to the metadata (SUPI) and the first key (K seaf) to generate a home environment authentication vector. The home environment authentication vector includes anonymous metadata (SUPI*) derived from metadata (SUPI) and also includes a second key (K 1 ). The anonymous metadata and the second key can be derived as (K 1 ,C)=F1(K,m), where the first key is "K" and the metadata (SUPI) is "m". "K" and "m" are provided as input to the function "F1", which calculates the anonymous value, metadata or anonymous metadata "C" and the second key "K 1 " as output.

[0077] The authentication response is received at the trusted network device node 304 from a server including anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and a second key (K 1 )'s home environment authentication vector. An authentication response is sent from the trusted network device node 304 to the AUSF node 306 of the fifth generation core network 302. Then, the authentication response is sent from the AUSF node 306 to the AMF node 308. The authentication response is used to derive an authentication request sent from the AMF node 308 to the user equipment node 310. The user equipment node 310 calculates an authentication key (K) from the authentication request using a key derivation function (HMAC). AMF ). Authentication key derivation function F2[K AMF =F2(K 1 ,C)] can be used to calculate the authentication key (K AMF ). F2 takes K calculated by F1 1 and C as input and calculate the authentication key (K AMF ). (K AMF ) is used to perform two-way authentication.

[0078] Based on the authentication key (K AMF ), a two-way authentication is performed between the AMF node 308 and the user equipment node 310. Optionally, the original key derivation function described in the 5G standard is used as the key derivation function.

[0079] Figure 4 The present invention is a diagram showing a method for operating Figure 1 1. The trusted processing module node 10 is configured to be communicatively coupled to a first non-trusted device node 20 (AUSF), a second non-trusted device node 30 (AMF), and a user equipment node 40 (UE). In step 402, at the trusted processing module node 10, a first key derivation function is applied to metadata (SUPI) and a first key (K seaf) to generate a home environment authentication vector. The home environment authentication vector includes anonymous metadata (SUPI*) derived from metadata (SUPI) and also includes a second key (K 1 ). In step 404, an authentication response is sent from the trusted processing module node 10 to the second untrusted network device node 30 (AMF) of the communication network 15 through the first untrusted device node 20 (AUSF) of the communication network 15. The authentication response is a ciphertext containing the anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and the second key (K 1 )’s belonging environment authentication vector data is derived.

[0080] According to the first embodiment, the method for operating a trusted processing module node 10 of a communication network 15 further comprises sending an authentication request derived from the authentication response from a second non-trusted network device node 30 (AMF) to a user equipment node 40 (UE) connected to the communication network 15. The user equipment node 40 (UE) is configured to calculate an authentication key (K) from the authentication request using a key derivation function (HMAC). AMF ). A method for operating a trusted processing module node 10 of a communication network 15 includes: based on an authentication key (K AMF ) performs two-way authentication between the second non-trusted network device node 30 (AMF) and the user equipment node 40 (UE).

[0081] Figure 5 The present invention is a diagram showing a method for operating Figure 1 Flowchart of method steps for a user equipment node 40 (UE) of a communication network 15 in FIG. The user equipment node 40 (UE) is configured to be communicatively coupled to a first non-trusted device node 20 (AUSF), a second non-trusted device node 30 (AMF) and a trusted processing module node 10. In step 502, an authentication request derived from an authentication response is received at the user equipment node 40 (UE) from the second non-trusted network device node 30 (AMF). The user equipment node 40 (UE) is configured to calculate an authentication key (K) from the authentication request using a key derivation function (HMAC). AMF In step 504, based on the authentication key (K AMF ) performs two-way authentication between the second non-trusted network device node 30 (AMF) and the user equipment node 40 (UE).

[0082] According to a first embodiment, a method for operating a user equipment node 40 (UE) of a communication network 15 comprises, at a trusted processing module node 10 of the communication network 15, applying a first key derivation function to metadata (SUPI) and a first key (K seaf) to generate a home environment authentication vector. The home environment authentication vector includes anonymous metadata (SUPI*) derived from metadata (SUPI) and also includes a second key (K 1 ). The method for operating a user equipment node 40 (UE) of a communication network 15 includes sending an authentication response from a trusted processing module node 10 to a second untrusted network device node 30 (AMF) of the communication network 15 through a first untrusted device node 20 (AUSF) of the communication network 15. The authentication response is a sequence of messages including anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and a second key (K 1 )’s belonging environment authentication vector data is derived.

[0083] Figure 6 The present invention is a diagram showing a method for operating Figure 1 1. Flowchart of method steps for a first untrusted device node 20 (AUSF) in a communication network 15. The first untrusted network device node 20 (AUSF) is configured to be communicatively coupled with a second untrusted device node 30 (AMF), a user device node 40 (UE) and a trusted processing module node 10. In step 602, an authentication response is received from the trusted processing module node 10. The authentication response is a sequence of steps including anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and a second key (K 1 In step 604, an authentication response is sent to the second non-trusted network device node 30 (AMF) of the communication network 15.

[0084] According to the first embodiment, the method for operating the first untrusted device node 20 (AUSF) of the communication network 15 further comprises sending an authentication request derived from the authentication response from the second untrusted network device node 30 (AMF) to the user equipment node 40 (UE) connected to the communication network 15. The user equipment node 40 (UE) is configured to calculate the authentication key (K) from the authentication request using a key derivation function (HMAC). AMF ). A method for operating a first untrusted device node 20 (AUSF) of a communication network 15 comprises: AMF ) performs two-way authentication between the second non-trusted network device node 30 (AMF) and the user equipment node 40 (UE).

[0085] According to a second embodiment, the method for operating a first untrusted device node 20 (AUSF) of a communication network 15 further comprises, at a trusted processing module node 10 of the communication network 15, applying a first key derivation function to the metadata (SUPI) and the first key (K seaf ) to generate a home environment authentication vector. The home environment authentication vector includes anonymous metadata (SUPI*) derived from metadata (SUPI) and also includes a second key (K1 ).

[0086] Figure 7 The present invention is a diagram showing a method for operating Figure 1 Flowchart of method steps of a second non-trusted device node 30 (AMF) of a communication network 15 in FIG. The second non-trusted device node 30 (AMF) is configured to be communicatively coupled with the first non-trusted device node 20 (AUSF), the user device node 40 (UE) and the trusted processing module node 10. In step 702, an authentication response is received from the first non-trusted network device node 20 (AUSF) at the second non-trusted network device node 30 (AMF). In step 704, an authentication request derived from the authentication response is sent from the second non-trusted network device node 30 (AMF) to the user device node 40 (UE) connected to the communication network 15. The user device node 40 (UE) is configured to calculate an authentication key (K) from the authentication request using a key derivation function (HMAC). AMF In step 706, based on the authentication key (K AMF ) performs two-way authentication between the second non-trusted network device node 30 (AMF) and the user equipment node 40 (UE).

[0087] According to a first embodiment, a method for operating a second non-trusted device node 30 (AMF) of a communication network 15 comprises, at a trusted processing module node 10 of the communication network 15, applying a first key derivation function to metadata (SUPI) and a first key (K seaf ) to generate a home environment authentication vector. The home environment authentication vector includes anonymous metadata (SUPI*) derived from metadata (SUPI) and also includes a second key (K 1 ). The method for operating the second non-trusted device node 30 (AMF) of the communication network 15 includes sending an authentication response from the trusted processing module node 10 to the first non-trusted device node 20 (AUSF) of the communication network 15. The authentication response is a sequence of authentication information including anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and a second key (K 1 )’s belonging environment authentication vector data is derived.

[0088] In one embodiment, the first untrusted device node 20 (AUSF) is arranged as an authentication server function and the second untrusted device node 30 (AMF) is arranged as an access and mobility management function.

[0089] In one embodiment, the anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and the second key (K 1 ) is not eavesdropped.

[0090] The anonymous metadata (SUPI*) and the second key (K 1 ) is not eavesdropped.

[0091] In one embodiment, at least a portion of the communication network 15 is arranged as a wireless communication network. The wireless communication network may be arranged to comply with 5G network specifications.

[0092] A computer program product is provided that includes a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having computer-readable instructions stored thereon, the computer-readable instructions being executable by a computerized device including processing hardware to perform any of the above methods or one or more steps of the above methods.

[0093] The authentication between the user equipment node 40 (UE) and the second untrusted network device node 30 (AMF) for accessing the 5G network includes:

[0094] 1. For each Authenticate_Get request, UDM / ARPF can create 5G HE AV;

[0095] 2. UDM / ARPF sends an authentication response [5G HE AV, AV, SUPI] to the first untrusted network device node 20 (AUSF). Note: including SUPI plain text and SUPI information leakage;

[0096] 3. UDM / ARPF sends an authentication response [5G HE AV, AV, SUPI] to the second untrusted network device node 30 (AMF). Note: including SUPI plain text and SUPI information leakage;

[0097] 4. The second untrusted network device node 30 (AMF) sends an authentication request to the user equipment node 40 (UE);

[0098] 5. The second untrusted network device node 30 (AMF) and the user equipment node 40 (UE) use K seaf and (SUPI, metadata) to derive the key K AMF :

[0099] K AMF =HMAC(K seaf ,SUPI||MateData);

[0100] 6. The second untrusted network device node 30 (AMF) and the user equipment node 40 (UE) use the same K AMF Perform a two-way authentication process.

[0101] SUPI and K of 5G core networkseaf The anonymity benefits include:

[0102] 1. For each Authenticate_Get request, the trusted processing module node 10 for SUPI anonymity can create a 5GHE AV and calculate the anonymous SUPI: (K 1 ,SUPI*)=F1(K seaf ,SUPI||MateData);

[0103] 2. The trusted processing module node 10 sends an authentication response [5G HE AV, AV, SUPI*] to the first untrusted device node 20 (AUSF) (UDM / ARPF / AUSF). Note: including SUPI* and K 1 , no information leakage;

[0104] 3. UDM / ARPF / AUSF sends an authentication response [5G HE AV, AV, SUPI] to the second untrusted device node 30 (AMF). Note: including SUPI* and K 1 , no information leakage;

[0105] 4. The second non-trusted network device node 30 (AMF) sends an authentication request () to the user equipment node 40 (UE);

[0106] 5. User equipment node 40 (UE) uses K seaf and (SUPI, metadata) to derive the key K AMF :

[0107] K AMF =HMAC(K seaf ,SUPI||MateData); AMF uses K 1 and (SUPI*) derive the same key K AMF :K AMF =F2(K 1 ,SUPI*);

[0108] 6. The second untrusted device node 30 (AMF) and the user equipment node 40 (UE) use the same K AMF Perform a two-way authentication process.

[0109] In one embodiment, functions F1 and F2 are implemented as follows:

[0110] F: Hash-based HMAC;

[0111] F1: HASH((K' seaf XOR ipad||IV)||M), where M: SUPI||Metadata; if K seafis greater than the hash block length, then K' seaf =HASH(K seaf ); otherwise, K' seaf =K seaf ;

[0112] F2: HASH((K' seaf XOR opad||IV)||M*), where M*: the output of F1; if K seaf is greater than the hash block length, then K' seaf =HASH(K seaf ); otherwise, K' seaf =K seaf ;

[0113] Although the present disclosure and its advantages have been described in detail, it should be understood that various changes, substitutions and alterations can be made herein without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as defined by the appended claims.

Claims

1. A method for operating a trusted processing module node of a communication network, characterized in that: The trusted processing module node is configured to be communicatively coupled with a first non-trusted network device node, a second non-trusted network device node, and a user device node, wherein the method comprises: (a) generating, at the trusted processing module node, a home context authentication vector by applying a first key derivation function to the metadata and a first key, wherein the home context authentication vector includes anonymous metadata derived from the metadata and also includes a second key; and (b) sending an authentication response from the trusted processing module node to the second non-trusted network device node of the communication network through the first non-trusted network device node of the communication network, wherein the authentication response is derived from data of the home environment authentication vector including the anonymous metadata and the second key.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The method further comprises: (c) sending, from the second non-trusted network device node to the user equipment node connected to the communication network, an authentication request derived from the authentication response, wherein the user equipment node is configured to calculate an authentication key from the authentication request using a key derivation function; and (d) performing two-way authentication between the second untrusted network device node and the user equipment node based on the authentication key.

3. A method for operating a user equipment node of a communication network, characterized in that The user equipment node is configured to be communicatively coupled with a first non-trusted network equipment node, a second non-trusted network equipment node, and a trusted processing module node, wherein the method comprises: (a) receiving, at the user equipment node, an authentication request derived from an authentication response from the second non-trusted network equipment node, wherein the user equipment node is configured to calculate an authentication key from the authentication request using a key derivation function; (b) performing two-way authentication between the second untrusted network device node and the user equipment node based on the authentication key; and (c) generating, at the trusted processing module node of the communication network, a home context authentication vector by applying a first key derivation function to the metadata and the first key, wherein the home context authentication vector includes anonymous metadata derived from the metadata and also includes a second key.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The method further comprises: (d) sending an authentication response from the trusted processing module node to the second non-trusted network device node of the communication network through the first non-trusted network device node of the communication network, wherein the authentication response is derived from data of the home environment authentication vector including the anonymous metadata and the second key.

5. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that The method includes arranging the trusted processing module node to communicate wirelessly with at least a portion of the communications network.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that The method includes arranging the trusted processing module node to comply with 5G network specifications for wireless communications.

7. A computer program product comprising a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium has computer-readable instructions stored thereon, the computer-readable instructions being executable by a computerized device including processing hardware to perform the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6.

8. A method for operating a first non-trusted network device node of a communication network, characterized in that: The first non-trusted network device node is configured to be communicatively coupled with a second non-trusted network device node, a user device node, and a trusted processing module node, wherein the method comprises: (a) generating, at the trusted processing module node of the communication network, a home context authentication vector by applying a first key derivation function to metadata and a first key, wherein the home context authentication vector comprises anonymous metadata derived from the metadata and further comprises a second key; (b) receiving an authentication response from the trusted processing module node, wherein the authentication response is derived from data of the home environment authentication vector; and (c) sending the authentication response to the second untrusted network device node of the communication network.

9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that The method further comprises: (d) sending, from the second non-trusted network device node to the user equipment node connected to the communication network, an authentication request derived from the authentication response, wherein the user equipment node is configured to calculate an authentication key from the authentication request using a key derivation function; and (e) performing two-way authentication between the second untrusted network device node and the user equipment node based on the authentication key.

10. The method according to claim 8 or 9, characterized in that: The method comprises arranging the first non-trusted network device node as an authentication server function.

11. The method according to claim 8 or 9, characterized in that: The method includes protecting the anonymous metadata and the second key from eavesdropping at the first untrusted network device node.

12. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that The method includes protecting the anonymous metadata and the second key from eavesdropping by a cryptographic hash function for probabilistic polynomial-time Turing.

13. The method according to claim 8 or 9, characterized in that: The method includes arranging the first non-trusted network device node to communicate wirelessly with at least a portion of the communications network.

14. The method according to claim 13, characterized in that The method includes arranging the first non-trusted network device node to comply with 5G network specifications for wireless communication.

15. A computer program product comprising a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium has computer-readable instructions stored thereon, the computer-readable instructions being executable by a computerized device including processing hardware to perform the method according to any one of claims 8 to 14.

16. A method for operating a second non-trusted network device node of a communication network, characterized in that: The second non-trusted network device node is configured to be communicatively coupled with the first non-trusted network device node, the user device node, and the trusted processing module node, wherein the method includes: (a) the second non-trusted network device node receives an authentication response from the first non-trusted network device node; (b) sending, from the second non-trusted network device node to the user equipment node connected to the communication network, an authentication request derived from the authentication response, wherein the user equipment node is configured to calculate an authentication key from the authentication request using a key derivation function; (c) performing two-way authentication between the second untrusted network device node and the user equipment node based on the authentication key; and (d) generating, at the trusted processing module node of the communication network, a home context authentication vector by applying a first key derivation function to the metadata and the first key, wherein the home context authentication vector includes anonymous metadata derived from the metadata and also includes a second key.

17. The method according to claim 16, characterized in that The method further comprises: (e) sending an authentication response from the trusted processing module node to the first non-trusted network device node of the communication network, wherein the authentication response is derived from data of the home context authentication vector including the anonymous metadata and the second key.

18. The method according to claim 16 or 17, characterized in that The method further comprises arranging the second non-trusted network device node as an access and mobility management function.

19. The method according to claim 16 or 17, characterized in that The method includes protecting the anonymous metadata and the second key from eavesdropping at the second untrusted network device node.

20. The method according to claim 19, characterized in that The method includes protecting the anonymous metadata and the second key from eavesdropping by a cryptographic hash function for probabilistic polynomial-time Turing.

21. The method according to claim 16 or 17, characterized in that The method includes arranging the second non-trusted network device node to communicate wirelessly with at least a portion of the communications network.

22. The method according to claim 21, characterized in that The method includes arranging the second non-trusted network device node to comply with 5G network specifications for wireless communication.

23. A computer program product comprising a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium has computer-readable instructions stored thereon, the computer-readable instructions being executable by a computerized device including processing hardware to perform the method of any one of claims 16 to 22.

24. A trusted processing module node configured to communicate with a communication network, the communication network configured to transmit sensitive user data, wherein: The communication network comprises a first non-trusted network device node and a second non-trusted network device node, and wherein the communication network is coupled to the trusted processing module node and the user device node, characterized in that: (a) the trusted processing module node is configured to generate a home environment authentication vector by applying a first key derivation function to the metadata and a first key, wherein the home environment authentication vector includes anonymous metadata derived from the metadata and also includes a second key; (b) the trusted processing module node is configured to send an authentication response to the first non-trusted network device node of the communication network, wherein the authentication response is derived from data of the home environment authentication vector including the anonymous metadata and the second key; (c) the first non-trusted network device node is configured to send the authentication response therefrom to the second non-trusted network device node of the communication network; (d) the second non-trusted network device node is configured to send an authentication request derived from the authentication response to the user equipment node connected to the communication network, wherein the user equipment node is configured to calculate an authentication key from the authentication request using a key derivation function; and (e) The second non-trusted network device node and the user equipment node are configured to perform a two-way authentication between the two based on the authentication key.

25. The trusted processing module node according to claim 24, characterized in that: The trusted processing module node is configured to communicate wirelessly with at least a portion of the communication network.

26. The trusted processing module node according to claim 25, characterized in that: The trusted processing module node is configured to comply with 5G network specifications.

27. A user equipment node configured to communicate with a communication network configured to transmit sensitive user data, wherein: The communication network comprises a first non-trusted network device node and a second non-trusted network device node, and wherein the communication network is coupled to a trusted processing module node, characterized in that: (a) the trusted processing module node is configured to generate a home environment authentication vector by applying a first key derivation function to the metadata and a first key, wherein the home environment authentication vector includes anonymous metadata derived from the metadata and also includes a second key; (b) the trusted processing module node is configured to send an authentication response to the first non-trusted network device node of the communication network, wherein the authentication response is derived from data of the home environment authentication vector including the anonymous metadata and the second key; (c) the first non-trusted network device node is configured to send an authentication response therefrom to the second non-trusted network device node of the communications network; (d) the second non-trusted network device node is configured to send an authentication request derived from the authentication response to the user equipment node connected to the communication network, wherein the user equipment node is configured to calculate an authentication key from the authentication request using a key derivation function; and (e) The second non-trusted network device node and the user equipment node are configured to perform a two-way authentication between the two based on the authentication key.

28. A first non-trusted network device node configured to communicate with a communication network configured to transmit sensitive user data, wherein: The communication network comprises a second non-trusted network device node and a user device node, and wherein the communication network is coupled to a trusted processing module node, characterized in that: (a) the trusted processing module node is configured to generate a home environment authentication vector by applying a first key derivation function to the metadata and a first key, wherein the home environment authentication vector includes anonymous metadata derived from the metadata and also includes a second key; (b) the trusted processing module node is configured to send an authentication response to the first non-trusted network device node of the communication network, wherein the authentication response is derived from data of the home environment authentication vector including the anonymous metadata and the second key; (c) the first non-trusted network device node is configured to send an authentication response therefrom to the second non-trusted network device node of the communications network; (d) the second non-trusted network device node is configured to send an authentication request derived from the authentication response to the user equipment node connected to the communication network, wherein the user equipment node is configured to calculate an authentication key from the authentication request using a key derivation function; and (e) The second non-trusted network device node and the user equipment node are configured to perform a two-way authentication between the two based on the authentication key.

29. The first untrusted network device node according to claim 28, characterized in that: The first non-trusted network device node is arranged as an authentication server function.

30. The first untrusted network device node according to claim 28 or 29, characterized in that: The anonymous metadata and the second key are protected from eavesdropping at the first untrusted network device node.

31. The first untrusted network device node according to claim 30, characterized in that: The anonymous metadata and the second key are protected from eavesdropping by a cryptographic hash function for probabilistic polynomial-time Turing.

32. The first untrusted network device node according to claim 28 or 29, characterized in that: The first non-trusted network device node is configured to wirelessly communicate with at least a portion of the communication network.

33. The first untrusted network device node according to claim 32, characterized in that: The first non-trusted network device node is arranged to comply with 5G network specifications.

34. A second non-trusted network device node configured to communicate with a communication network configured to transmit sensitive user data, wherein: The communication network comprises a first non-trusted network device node and a user device node, and wherein the communication network is coupled to a trusted processing module node, characterized in that: (a) the trusted processing module node is configured to generate a home environment authentication vector by applying a first key derivation function to the metadata and a first key, wherein the home environment authentication vector includes anonymous metadata derived from the metadata and also includes a second key; (b) the trusted processing module node is configured to send an authentication response to the first non-trusted network device node of the communication network, wherein the authentication response is derived from data of the home environment authentication vector including the anonymous metadata and the second key; (c) the first non-trusted network device node is configured to send the authentication response therefrom to the second non-trusted network device node of the communication network; (d) the second non-trusted network device node is configured to send an authentication request derived from the authentication response to the user equipment node connected to the communication network, wherein the user equipment node is configured to calculate an authentication key from the authentication request using a key derivation function; and (e) The second non-trusted network device node and the user equipment node are configured to perform a two-way authentication between the two based on the authentication key.

35. The second untrusted network device node according to claim 34, characterized in that: The second non-trusted network device node is arranged as an access and mobility management function.

36. The second untrusted network device node according to claim 34 or 35, characterized in that: The anonymous metadata and the second key are protected from eavesdropping at the second untrusted network device node.

37. The second untrusted network device node according to claim 36, characterized in that: The anonymous metadata and the second key are protected from eavesdropping by a cryptographic hash function for probabilistic polynomial-time Turing.

38. The second untrusted network device node according to claim 34 or 35, characterized in that: The second non-trusted network device node is configured to wirelessly communicate with at least a portion of the communication network.

39. The second untrusted network device node according to claim 38, characterized in that: The second untrusted network device node is configured to comply with 5G network specifications.

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