Vehicle-to-everything (v2x) message processing method and apparatus, vehicle, and v2x device

Abstract

The application discloses a kind of vehicle networking V2X message processing method, device, vehicle and V2X equipment, it is related to vehicle networking technical field, the method is applied to first vehicle, the method includes: based on the first data obtained from the first message sent by V2X equipment, application scene algorithm analysis is carried out, wherein the first message carries the vehicle parameter of second vehicle.This application scheme can solve the problem that the message sent by the second vehicle (sending end vehicle) is directly discarded when the first vehicle judges that the message is not legal in the prior art, which leads to the inability to handle the emergency situation of the first vehicle in time, causing traffic accidents, and improves the safety of driving.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of vehicle networking technology, and in particular to a vehicle networking V2X message processing method, apparatus, vehicle, and V2X equipment. Background Art

[0002] In vehicle to everything (V2X) communication, the vehicle communication process is as follows Figure 1 As shown, when a vehicle sends a message, it first uses the SM3 algorithm (a domestic hash algorithm) to digest the message, and then signs the message using the private key corresponding to the public key carried in the pseudonym certificate. The vehicle then encodes the message along with the pseudonym certificate / pseudonym certificate digest, and then sends the message. When a vehicle receives a message, it first decodes it and then verifies the certificate (first verifies the certificate signature, then performs hash digest processing on the certificate content, and then compares the certificate content with the certificate hash digest). After the certificate verification is successful, the message data is verified (first verifies the message signature, then performs hash digest processing on the message, and then compares the message content with the message digest).

[0003] After receiving the pseudonym certificate, the receiver needs to perform certificate consistency verification in addition to the above steps to verify the vehicle identity. If the certificate consistency verification cannot be performed, the received data packet will be directly discarded. In this way, in an emergency, if the packet is directly discarded, it may lead to the inability to handle the emergency and cause a traffic accident. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The purpose of this application is to provide a method, apparatus, vehicle, and V2X device for processing V2X messages in a vehicle network, thereby solving the problem in the prior art of being unable to promptly handle emergencies when messages are discarded due to an inability to verify certificate consistency.

[0005] In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a method for processing a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) message, applied to a first vehicle, the method comprising:

[0006] An application scenario algorithm analysis is performed based on first data obtained from a first message sent from a V2X device, wherein the first message carries vehicle parameters of a second vehicle.

[0007] Optionally, performing an application scenario algorithm analysis based on the first data obtained from the first message sent by the V2X device includes:

[0008] When it is determined that the second message sent by the second vehicle is illegal and the second message is not discarded, and the second vehicle does not have a fake identity, an application scenario algorithm analysis is performed based on the first data.

[0009] Optionally, if the received second message satisfies any of the following conditions, it is determined that the second message is illegal:

[0010] The second message does not carry a certificate;

[0011] The certificate carried in the second message is no longer valid;

[0012] The certificate carried by the second message is not in a valid geographical area;

[0013] The certificate carried by the second message exceeds the legal authority;

[0014] The certificate carried by the second message is in a certificate revocation list;

[0015] The certificate carried in the second message is revoked.

[0016] Optionally, the first data is related to an application scenario in which the first vehicle is located;

[0017] Performing an application scenario algorithm analysis based on first data obtained from a first message sent by the V2X device, including:

[0018] When the vehicle ID in the second message is the same as the vehicle ID in the first data, obtaining second data related to the application scenario of the first vehicle from the second message;

[0019] verifying the authenticity of the second message based on the first data and the second data;

[0020] When the authenticity of the second message is verified, an application scenario algorithm analysis is performed based on the second data.

[0021] Optionally, verifying the authenticity of the second message according to the first data and the second data includes:

[0022] In a case where the reception time of the first message is within a first preset time period after the reception time of the second message, the authenticity of the second message is verified based on the first data and the second data.

[0023] Optionally, the first data includes a vehicle ID and at least one of the following:

[0024] time;

[0025] Location;

[0026] Vehicle speed;

[0027] Vehicle dimensions;

[0028] Vehicle type;

[0029] Other dynamic information related to the vehicle;

[0030] Other static information related to the vehicle.

[0031] Optionally, verifying the authenticity of the second message according to the first data and the second data includes at least one of the following:

[0032] If the vehicle size in the first data is the same as the vehicle size in the second message, determining that the first message is authentic;

[0033] If the vehicle type in the first message is consistent with the vehicle type in the second message, determining that the first message is authentic;

[0034] If the static information related to the vehicle in the first message is the same as the static information related to the vehicle in the second message, determining that the first message is authentic;

[0035] Determining that the second message is authentic is when the position of the second vehicle at a first moment calculated based on the position, time, and speed in the second message and the position in the first message meet a first preset condition; wherein the first moment is the time in the first message;

[0036] If the speed of the second vehicle at the first moment calculated based on the time and speed in the second message and the speed in the first message meet a second preset condition, determining that the second message is authentic;

[0037] When other dynamic information related to other vehicles of the second vehicle at the first moment is obtained based on other dynamic information related to the vehicle in the first message, and the other dynamic information related to the vehicle in the second message meets a third preset condition, the first message is determined to be true.

[0038] Optionally, performing an application scenario algorithm analysis based on the first data obtained from the first message sent by the V2X device includes:

[0039] In a case where it is determined that the second message sent by the second vehicle is illegal and the second message is discarded, an application scenario algorithm analysis is performed based on the first data.

[0040] Optionally, the method further includes:

[0041] If no third message sent by the V2X device is received within a second preset time period after receiving the second message sent by the second vehicle, it is determined that the second vehicle does not have a fake identity; wherein the third message is used to indicate that the second vehicle has a fake identity.

[0042] In a second aspect, an embodiment of the present application further provides a method for processing a V2X message in a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) network, which is applied to a V2X device. The method includes:

[0043] When it is determined that the received second message sent by the second vehicle is illegal, sensing vehicle parameters of the second vehicle;

[0044] A first message is sent to a first vehicle, so that the first vehicle performs an application scenario algorithm analysis based on first data obtained from the first message, wherein the first message carries vehicle parameters of the second vehicle.

[0045] Optionally, sending the first message to the first vehicle includes:

[0046] When it is determined that the second vehicle does not have a false identity, the first message is sent to the first vehicle.

[0047] Optionally, verifying whether the second vehicle is a fake identity includes:

[0048] When the perceived location information of the second vehicle and the location carried in the second message meet a fourth preset condition, it is determined that the second vehicle does not have a fake identity.

[0049] Optionally, verifying whether the second vehicle is a fake identity includes:

[0050] If the second message and the fourth message sent by the third vehicle meet the first condition, determining that the second vehicle has a fake identity;

[0051] The first condition includes:

[0052] The fourth message is legal;

[0053] The vehicle ID carried by the second message is different from the vehicle ID carried by the fourth message;

[0054] The information carried by the second message and the corresponding information carried by the fourth message meet corresponding preset conditions.

[0055] Optionally, the method further includes:

[0056] In the case where it is determined that the second vehicle has a counterfeit identity, a third message is sent to the first vehicle, where the third message is used to indicate that the second vehicle has a counterfeit identity.

[0057] Optionally, the method is characterized in that sending the first message to the first vehicle includes:

[0058] The first message is sent to the first vehicle by multicast, wherein the first message only carries vehicle parameters of the second vehicle.

[0059] Optionally, the first vehicle is any vehicle within an area with the second vehicle as the center and the first length as the radius.

[0060] In a third aspect, an embodiment of the present application further provides a vehicle comprising a transceiver, a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory and running on the processor, wherein when the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the vehicle network V2X message processing method as described in the first aspect are implemented.

[0061] In a fourth aspect, an embodiment of the present application further provides a V2X device, comprising a transceiver, a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and running on the processor. When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the vehicle network V2X message processing method as described in the second aspect are implemented.

[0062] In a fifth aspect, an embodiment of the present application further provides a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) message processing device, applied to a first vehicle, comprising:

[0063] The processing module performs an application scenario algorithm analysis based on first data obtained from a first message sent from the V2X device, wherein the first message carries vehicle parameters of the second vehicle.

[0064] In a sixth aspect, an embodiment of the present application further provides a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) message processing device, which is applied to a V2X device. The device includes:

[0065] a sensing module, configured to sense vehicle parameters of the second vehicle when it is determined that the received second message sent by the second vehicle is illegal;

[0066] A sending module is used to send a first message to a first vehicle, so that the first vehicle performs an application scenario algorithm analysis based on first data obtained from the first message, wherein the first message is related to the second vehicle.

[0067] In the seventh aspect, an embodiment of the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored, characterized in that when the computer program is executed by a processor, it implements the vehicle network V2X message processing method as described in the first aspect, or the vehicle network V2X message processing method as described in the second aspect.

[0068] The above technical solution of the present application has at least the following beneficial effects:

[0069] In the vehicle network V2X message processing method applied to a first vehicle in an embodiment of the present application, the first vehicle performs an application scenario algorithm analysis based on first data obtained from a first message sent from a V2X device, wherein the first message carries vehicle parameters of the second vehicle. In this way, the problem in the prior art that the first vehicle directly discards the message when determining that the message sent by the second vehicle is illegal can be solved, resulting in the inability to promptly handle the emergency situation of the first vehicle and causing a traffic accident, thereby improving driving safety. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0070] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of the flow of sending, receiving and processing messages for existing vehicles;

[0071] Figure 2 This is the architecture diagram of the V2X certificate management system;

[0072] Figure 3 This is a flowchart of a method for processing a V2X message in accordance with an embodiment of the present application.

[0073] Figure 4 This is a second flow chart of the method for processing V2X messages in accordance with an embodiment of the present application;

[0074] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the V2X message processing device of the vehicle network according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0075] Figure 6 This is the second structural diagram of the V2X message processing device of the vehicle network according to the embodiment of the present application;

[0076] Figure 7 This is a schematic structural diagram of a vehicle according to an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0077] In order to make the technical problems, technical solutions and advantages to be solved by the present application clearer, the following will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments. In the following description, specific details such as specific configurations and components are provided only to help fully understand the embodiments of the present application. Therefore, it should be clear to those skilled in the art that various changes and modifications can be made to the embodiments described herein without departing from the scope and spirit of the present application. In addition, for clarity and brevity, the description of known functions and structures has been omitted.

[0078] It should be understood that references throughout this specification to "one embodiment" or "an embodiment" mean that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic associated with the embodiment is included in at least one embodiment of the present application. Therefore, the appearances of "in one embodiment" or "in an embodiment" throughout this specification do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment. Furthermore, these particular features, structures, or characteristics may be combined in any suitable manner in one or more embodiments.

[0079] In the various embodiments of the present application, it should be understood that the size of the serial numbers of the following processes does not mean the order of execution. The execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of the present application.

[0080] In the embodiments provided herein, it should be understood that "B corresponding to A" means that B is associated with A and B can be determined based on A. However, it should also be understood that determining B based on A does not mean determining B based solely on A; B can also be determined based on A and / or other information.

[0081] When describing the embodiments of the present application, some concepts used in the following description are first explained.

[0082] like Figure 2 Figure 2 shows a schematic diagram of the LTE-V2X certificate management system architecture.

[0083] The LTE-V2X certificate management system issues the following certificates for common V2X devices:

[0084] Enrollment Certificate (EC): A V2X device applies to a Certificate Authority (CA) for a uniquely issued certificate based on its initial device credentials. The onboard unit (OBU) uses the EC to apply for a pseudonym certificate (PC), and the roadside unit (RSU) uses the EC to apply for an application certificate (AC).

[0085] PC: OBU applies for batch-issued certificates from the pseudonymous CA through EC, which can be used to protect vehicle anonymity.

[0086] AC: An RSU applies for a certificate issued by the application CA using an EC. An RSU can only have one AC. This certificate serves as the identity credential for traffic light status, traffic information, commercial service information, and other information broadcast by the RSU.

[0087] Wherein, the certificate related to the OBU is EC and PC. The OBU applies for the certificate and the pseudonym certificate process is as shown in Figure 3

[0088] (a) The OBU applies for the EC through the non-continuous conduction mode (DCM) to the registration certificate authority (ECA) by means of the device initial certificate and the authentication authorization accounting (AAA). The ECA verifies the application and issues the EC to the OBU.

[0089] (b) After the OBU obtains the EC returned by the ECA, the OBU applies for the PC to the pseudonym certificate authority (PCA) through the pseudonym certificate regulatory authority (PRA) by means of the EC. The PRA verifies the application and returns the PC download address and the download time to the OBU.

[0090] (c) The PCA returns the PC to the PRA.

[0091] (d) The OBU applies for the PC to the PRA. The PRA verifies the application and returns the PC to the OBU.

[0092] (e) The OBU verifies the pseudonym certificate download response and stores the issued PC.

[0093] (f) The OBU uses the private key corresponding to the PC to digitally sign the broadcast message and broadcasts the message. The broadcast message also contains the PC. Unlike the AC, the PC can protect the privacy of the vehicle. For example, after the OBU applies for the PC in batches to the PCA, the OBU can change the PC every few minutes to prevent being tracked, so as to achieve the purpose of privacy protection.

[0094] The vehicle-to-everything (V2X) message processing method, device, vehicle and V2X equipment provided by the embodiments of the present application will be described in detail in combination with the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments and application scenarios.

[0095] As shown in Figure 3 , the present application provides a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) message processing method applied to a first vehicle, and the method comprises the following steps:

[0096] Step 301: Based on the first data obtained from a first message sent by a V2X device, performing application scenario algorithm analysis, wherein the first message carries vehicle parameters of a second vehicle.​

[0097] In an embodiment of the present application, the first vehicle (receiving vehicle) performs an application scenario algorithm analysis based on the first data obtained from the first message (such as RSM or SSM, etc.) carrying the vehicle parameters of the second vehicle sent from the V2X device (such as RSU), and implements the execution of the algorithm corresponding to the application scenario in which the first vehicle is located based on the message sent by the V2X device. In this way, the problem in the prior art that the first vehicle directly discards the message when it determines that the message sent by the second vehicle (sending vehicle) is illegal can be solved, resulting in the inability to promptly handle the emergency situation of the first vehicle, causing traffic accidents, thereby improving driving safety.

[0098] As an optional implementation, step 301, based on the first data obtained from the first message sent by the V2X device, performs an application scenario algorithm analysis, including:

[0099] When it is determined that the second message sent by the second vehicle is illegal and the second message is not discarded, and the second vehicle does not have a fake identity, an application scenario algorithm analysis is performed based on the first data.

[0100] Here, it should be noted that if the second vehicle impersonates another vehicle to send the second message, there is a malicious release of false information, which may cause the first vehicle to be unable to obtain the data required for the correct application scenario algorithm and cause road congestion or traffic accidents. Therefore, in this optional implementation method, it is first necessary to determine whether the second vehicle impersonates another vehicle.

[0101] Here, it should also be noted that, optionally, when the first vehicle determines that the second message is illegal, it can further determine whether the first vehicle is in an emergency situation, that is, determine the current application scenario of the first vehicle. When the first vehicle is in an emergency situation, in order to deal with the emergency situation, other methods are needed to verify the authenticity of the second message. Therefore, when the first vehicle is in an emergency situation, it can further determine whether the second vehicle is impersonating its identity. If there is no impersonation, an application scenario algorithm analysis is performed based on the first data to deal with the emergency situation; that is: when the first vehicle determines that the second message is illegal, the first vehicle is in an emergency situation and the second vehicle is not impersonating its identity, an application scenario algorithm analysis is performed based on the first data.

[0102] Therefore, the specific implementation process of this optional implementation method can be:

[0103] First, the first vehicle receives a second message sent by the second vehicle;

[0104] Secondly, the first vehicle verifies the legitimacy of the second message;

[0105] Again, in the case where the second message is illegal, the first vehicle determines its own application scenario;

[0106] Then, when the application scenario of the first vehicle is an emergency application scenario, the first vehicle determines whether the second vehicle has counterfeited its identity;

[0107] Finally, when it is determined that the second vehicle does not have a counterfeit identity, an application scenario algorithm analysis is performed based on the first data.

[0108] Furthermore, as an optional implementation, the method further includes:

[0109] If no third message sent by the V2X device is received within a second preset time period after receiving the second message sent by the second vehicle, it is determined that the second vehicle does not have a fake identity; wherein the third message is used to indicate that the second vehicle has a fake identity.

[0110] That is to say, when the first vehicle determines that the second message is illegal, it can determine whether the second vehicle is impersonating its identity based on whether it receives a third message sent by the V2X device indicating that the second vehicle is impersonating its identity within a second preset time period. Specifically, if the third message is received within the third preset time period, it is determined that the second vehicle is impersonating its identity and the second message is discarded. On the contrary, if the third message is not received within the third preset time period, it is determined that the second vehicle is not impersonating its identity, and further verification is conducted to verify whether the message field of the second message has been tampered with.

[0111] As an optional implementation manner, if the received second message satisfies any of the following conditions, it is determined that the second message is illegal:

[0112] The second message does not carry a certificate;

[0113] The certificate carried in the second message is no longer valid;

[0114] The certificate carried by the second message is not in a valid geographical area;

[0115] The certificate carried by the second message exceeds the legal authority;

[0116] The certificate carried by the second message is in a certificate revocation list;

[0117] The certificate carried in the second message is revoked.

[0118] That is to say, when verifying the legitimacy of the second message, specifically verifying the consistency of the certificate carried by the second message, if the certificate consistency verification fails due to reasons such as the second message does not carry a certificate, or the certificate carried by the second message is not within the validity period, or the certificate carried by the second message exceeds the legal authority, or the integer carried by the second message is in the integer revocation list, or the certificate carried by the second message is revoked, the second message is determined to be illegal.

[0119] As an optional implementation, the first data is related to an application scenario in which the first vehicle is located;

[0120] Here, it should be noted that the application scenario of the first vehicle includes a safety application scenario, wherein the safety application scenario includes the contents in the following table:

[0121]

[0122] Table 1

[0123] Step 301, performing an application scenario algorithm analysis based on first data obtained from a first message sent by a V2X device, includes:

[0124] (1) when the vehicle ID in the second message is the same as the vehicle ID in the first data, obtaining second data related to the application scenario in which the first vehicle is located from the second message;

[0125] Here, it should be noted that in this step, the vehicle ID in the first data is first compared with the vehicle ID in the second message. When the two are the same, it is determined that the information carried by the first data and the second data is information about the same vehicle.

[0126] Here, it should be noted that, taking the emergency brake warning scenario as an example, the data related to the application scenario is described. Specifically, the data related to the emergency brake warning scenario is shown in Table 2 below:

[0127]

[0128] Table 2

[0129] (2) verifying the authenticity of the second message based on the first data and the second data;

[0130] (3) When the authenticity of the second message is verified, an application scenario algorithm analysis is performed based on the second data.

[0131] It should be noted here that, currently, when the second message sent by the second vehicle is illegal, the first vehicle will directly discard the second message. In this way, if the first vehicle is in an emergency situation, the first vehicle cannot handle the emergency situation in time, causing a safety hazard. In this optional implementation method, when it is determined that the second message is illegal, the authenticity of the second message will be further verified based on the first data related to the application scenario of the first vehicle in the first message sent by the V2X device and the second data in the second message. When it is determined that the second message is authentic, the algorithm related to the application scenario of the first vehicle can continue to be executed based on the second data in the second message, so as to handle the emergency situation of the first vehicle in time and eliminate safety hazards.

[0132] As a specific implementation, verifying the authenticity of the second message according to the first data includes:

[0133] When the moment of receiving the first message (i.e., the moment of receiving the first message) is within a first preset time length after receiving the second message (i.e., the moment of receiving the second message), the authenticity of the second message is verified based on the first data.

[0134] That is to say, in this specific implementation, the time interval between receiving the first message and the second message should be as small as possible. In this way, the data time in the first message collected by the first vehicle is closer to the data time in the second message obtained by the V2X device. In this way, the problem of verification data being out of sync is avoided, the timeliness of the data is guaranteed, and the accuracy of verification is improved.

[0135] Specifically, the first data includes a vehicle ID and at least one of the following:

[0136] time;

[0137] Location;

[0138] Vehicle speed;

[0139] Vehicle dimensions;

[0140] Vehicle type;

[0141] Other dynamic information related to the vehicle;

[0142] Other static information related to the vehicle.

[0143] It should be noted here that the time in the first data may be the time when the V2X device obtains or senses the information of the second vehicle; other dynamic information related to the vehicle includes dynamic information related to the application scenario of the first vehicle, such as: emergency braking status information, abnormal status information, out-of-control status information (anti-lock braking system status, vehicle electronic stability system status, traction control system status, lane departure warning system, other out-of-control status information, etc.); other static information related to the vehicle may include, but is not limited to, vehicle body color or dynamic information related to the application scenario.

[0144] As another optional implementation, verifying the authenticity of the second message based on the first data and the second data includes at least one of the following:

[0145] If the vehicle size in the first data is the same as the vehicle size in the second message, determining that the first message is authentic;

[0146] If the vehicle type in the first message is consistent with the vehicle type in the second message, determining that the first message is authentic;

[0147] If the static information related to the vehicle in the first message is the same as the static information related to the vehicle in the second message, determining that the first message is authentic;

[0148] Determining that the second message is authentic is when the position of the second vehicle at a first moment calculated based on the position, time, and speed in the second message and the position in the first message meet a first preset condition; wherein the first moment is the time in the first message;

[0149] If the speed of the second vehicle at the first moment calculated based on the time and speed in the second message and the speed in the first message meet a second preset condition, determining that the second message is authentic;

[0150] When other dynamic information related to other vehicles of the second vehicle at the first moment is obtained based on other dynamic information related to the vehicle in the first message, and the other dynamic information related to the vehicle in the second message meets a third preset condition, the first message is determined to be true.

[0151] Here, it should be noted that the other dynamic information and other static information in the embodiments of the present application may be the other dynamic information and other static information described above.

[0152] The embodiments of the present application can be implemented according to the following specific examples:

[0153] (1) Calculate the position difference Δd of the same vehicle at the same moment in the first message and the second message, and check whether it is less than 0.5 m;

[0154] (2) comparing the dimensions of the same vehicle in the first message and the second message to determine whether the dimensions are the same;

[0155] (3) comparing whether the vehicle type in the first message and the vehicle type in the second message are the same;

[0156] (4) Calculate the speed difference Δv of the same vehicle at the same time in the first message and the second message, and whether it is less than the floating error;

[0157] (5) calculating whether the difference in other dynamic information of the same vehicle in the first message and the second message is within a corresponding preset range;

[0158] (6) comparing the first message with the second message regarding other static messages of the same vehicle to determine whether they are consistent;

[0159] (7) If any of the comparison results from (1) to (6) above is negative, the second message is determined to be authentic; otherwise, the second message is determined to be unauthentic;

[0160] (9) When the second message is true, execute the corresponding algorithm based on the second message.

[0161] Here, it should be noted that the above steps (1) to (6) can be executed in parallel or sequentially, and the execution order can be adjusted.

[0162] Specifically, the position of the second vehicle at the first moment calculated based on the position, time, and speed in the second message and whether the position in the first message meets the first preset condition are implemented as follows:

[0163] First, the position of the second vehicle at the time in the first message (the time when the V2X device detects the second vehicle parameters) is calculated, specifically according to the following formula:

[0164]

[0165]

[0166] Among them, x t The second vehicle is calculated at t R Position at time t R is the time in the first message, i.e., the moment when the V2X device detects the second vehicle information; x0 is the position in the second message; t B is the time in the second message, i.e. the moment when the second vehicle sends the second message; v0 is the speed in the second message, i.e. the speed of the second vehicle at t B The speed at the moment; a is the acceleration; v Ris the speed in the first message, i.e., the speed of the second vehicle detected by the V2X device at t R The speed of time.

[0167] Secondly, if the second vehicle is calculated at t R Position x at time t The distance difference Δd from the position in the first message = |x R -x t If the first preset condition is met, such as less than 0.5m, the second message is determined to be authentic.

[0168] Specifically, the speed of the second vehicle at the first moment calculated based on the time and speed in the second message and the speed in the first message satisfy the second preset condition in the following manner:

[0169] First, the speed of the second vehicle at the time when the V2X device detects the second vehicle parameters in the first message is calculated, specifically according to the following formula:

[0170] v t =a*(t R -t B )+v B

[0171]

[0172] Among them, v t The second vehicle is calculated at t R Vehicle speed at time t R is the time in the first message; t B is the time in the second message, i.e., the moment when the second vehicle sends the second message; B is the speed in the second message, i.e. the second vehicle at t B The speed at the moment; a is the acceleration; v R is the speed in the first message, i.e., the speed of the second vehicle detected by the V2X device at t R The speed of time.

[0173] Secondly, if the second vehicle is calculated at t R Speed ​​v at a moment t With the speed v in the first message B The speed difference Δv=|v R -v t If the second preset condition is met, such as the floating error requirement, the second message is determined to be authentic.

[0174] As an optional implementation, step 301, based on the first data obtained from the first message sent by the V2X device, performs an application scenario algorithm analysis, including:

[0175] In a case where it is determined that the second message sent by the second vehicle is illegal and the second message is discarded, performing application scenario algorithm analysis based on the first data.

[0176] That is, if the first vehicle discards the second message due to determining that the second message is illegal, if the first message is received within a preset time length after the second message is received, and the vehicle ID in the first message and the vehicle ID in the second message are the same, the first vehicle can perform a corresponding application scenario algorithm based on the first data in the received first message to process the emergency situation in which the first vehicle is located and eliminate safety hazards.

[0177] The embodiment of the application further provides a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) message processing method applied to a V2X device, and the method comprises the following steps:

[0178] In step 401, when it is confirmed that the second message sent by the second vehicle is illegal, the vehicle parameters of the second vehicle are perceived.

[0179] Here, it should be noted that the process in which the V2X device detects whether the second message is legal can refer to the process in which the first vehicle detects the legality of the second message, and will not be described here.

[0180] In step 402, the first message is sent to the first vehicle, so that the first vehicle performs application scenario algorithm analysis based on the first data obtained from the first message, wherein the first message carries the vehicle parameters of the second vehicle.

[0181] Here, it should be noted that the V2X device can send the first message using an existing broadcast mode, but is not limited thereto, wherein when the message is sent in a broadcast mode, the first message can carry the vehicle parameters of multiple vehicles (including the second vehicle) received by the V2X, that is, the first message is a list message, and each column corresponds to the vehicle parameters of a vehicle.

[0182] In the V2X message processing method of the embodiment of the application, when the V2X device receives the second message sent by the second vehicle and determines that the second message is illegal, the V2X device can perceive the parameters of the second vehicle based on its own sensors, so as to send the first message carrying the parameters of the second vehicle to the first vehicle, so that the first vehicle performs application scenario algorithm analysis based on the first data obtained from the first message, thereby solving the problem in the prior art that the first vehicle directly discards the message sent by the second vehicle when it is determined that the message is illegal, which leads to the inability to timely process the emergency situation in which the first vehicle is located and causes traffic accidents, and improving the safety of driving.

[0183] As an optional implementation manner, sending the first message to the first vehicle comprises:

[0184] When it is determined that the second vehicle does not have a false identity, the first message is sent to the first vehicle.

[0185] That is to say, when the V2X device determines that the second message is illegal, it needs to further determine whether the vehicle sending the second message is impersonating its identity. Only when it is determined that the second vehicle is not impersonating its identity will it further send the first message to the first vehicle, so that the first vehicle can perform application scenario algorithm analysis based on the first data obtained from the first message.

[0186] Furthermore, as an optional implementation, verifying whether the second vehicle is impersonating an identity includes:

[0187] When the perceived location information of the second vehicle and the location carried in the second message meet a fourth preset condition, it is determined that the second vehicle does not have a fake identity.

[0188] That is, in this optional implementation, whether the second vehicle is impersonating the vehicle can be determined by comparing the location information sensed by the V2X device with the location information carried in the second message. Specifically, the determination may include:

[0189] a) The V2X device detects the position of the second vehicle using its own sensor (e.g., antenna). For example, by using the V2X device as a base station and the second vehicle as a user equipment (UE), the AOA positioning technology is used to calculate the azimuth angle between the second vehicle and the V2X device, and the TOA positioning technology is used to calculate the distance between the second vehicle and the V2X device. Thus, the position of the second vehicle (including phase angle and distance) is calculated based on the AOA positioning technology and the TOA positioning technology.

[0190] b) If the detected position of the second vehicle is inconsistent with the position carried in the second message (eg, the distance between the two positions is outside a preset range), the second vehicle is determined to be a counterfeit.

[0191] As another optional implementation, verifying whether the second vehicle is impersonating an identity includes:

[0192] If the second message and the fourth message sent by the third vehicle meet the first condition, determining that the second vehicle has a fake identity;

[0193] The first condition includes:

[0194] The fourth message is legal;

[0195] The vehicle ID carried by the second message is different from the vehicle ID carried by the fourth message;

[0196] The information carried by the second message and the corresponding information carried by the fourth message meet corresponding preset conditions.

[0197] That is, if a V2X device receives two messages simultaneously containing the same information except for the vehicle ID, and one of the messages is legitimate, it determines that the vehicle sending the illegal message is a fake. The verification process specifically includes:

[0198] a) receiving a BSM message sent by a legitimate vehicle within a preset time period of receiving the second message;

[0199] b) When the V2X device detects that the second message has a different BSM message ID from the legitimate vehicle, but the location, speed, vehicle size, and vehicle type are consistent, it determines that the second vehicle is a counterfeit.

[0200] Furthermore, as an optional implementation, the method further includes:

[0201] In the case where it is determined that the second vehicle has a counterfeit identity, a third message is sent to the first vehicle, where the third message is used to indicate that the second vehicle has a counterfeit identity.

[0202] As an optional implementation manner, sending the first message to the first vehicle includes:

[0203] The first message is sent to the first vehicle by multicast, wherein the first message only carries vehicle parameters of the second vehicle.

[0204] That is to say, the V2X device can send the first message that only includes the vehicle parameters of the second vehicle to other vehicles around the second vehicle (vehicles that may be in emergency situations) in a multicast manner to inform other vehicles around the second vehicle of the parameters of the second vehicle, so that other vehicles can execute corresponding algorithms based on the first message to handle emergency situations and eliminate safety hazards.

[0205] The first vehicle is any vehicle within an area with the second vehicle as the center and the first length as the radius.

[0206] That is to say, the first vehicle is a vehicle that is located within a range where the first message multicasted by the V2X device can be received, or in other words, the first vehicle is a vehicle that may be in an emergency or is about to be in an emergency.

[0207] In order to facilitate a clearer understanding of the technical solution of this application, the applicant now describes the following application scenarios as examples.

[0208] Example 1: When a first vehicle is in an emergency situation and cannot verify the legitimacy of a second message sent by a second vehicle and therefore discards the second message, resulting in the first vehicle being unable to promptly handle the emergency situation and posing a safety hazard, the emergency situation can be handled according to the execution process of the V2X message processing method of an embodiment of the present application. The specific process is as follows:

[0209] (1) After the second vehicle sends the second message, the first vehicle executes step (2), and the V2X device executes step (7)

[0210] (2) The first vehicle receives a second message sent by the second vehicle;

[0211] (3) The first vehicle verifies whether the second message is legitimate, and then executes step (4), (5) or (6);

[0212] (4) when the first vehicle determines that the second message is legitimate, executing a corresponding algorithm using the second message;

[0213] (5) When the second message is illegal, the first vehicle executes step (11);

[0214] (6) When the second message is illegal, the first vehicle discards the second message and executes step (11);

[0215] (7) The V2X device receives the second message and verifies the legitimacy of the second message, and then executes step (8);

[0216] (8) When the V2X device verifies that the second message is illegal, it further verifies whether the second vehicle is impersonating the vehicle, and then executes step (9) or (10);

[0217] (9) When the V2X device determines that the second vehicle is impersonating the vehicle, the V2X device sends a third message to surrounding vehicles to inform the surrounding vehicles of the impersonation of the second vehicle;

[0218] (10) When the V2X device determines that the second vehicle does not have a fake identity, it broadcasts a first message, where the first message carries vehicle parameters related to the second vehicle;

[0219] (11) The first vehicle determines whether it is in an emergency situation;

[0220] (12) when the first vehicle determines that it is in an emergency situation, further determining whether the second vehicle is impersonating the second vehicle;

[0221] (13) When the first vehicle receives a third message sent by the V2X device within a preset time period after receiving the second message, it determines that the second vehicle is impersonating the vehicle, and in this case, discards the second message;

[0222] (14) When the first vehicle does not receive the first message sent by the V2X device within a preset time period after receiving the second message, it is determined that the second vehicle is not impersonating the second vehicle, and step (15) or (16) is executed;

[0223] (15) when the first vehicle discards the second message because the second message is illegal, executing a corresponding algorithm based on the first message;

[0224] (16) the first vehicle verifies whether a message field of the second message has been tampered with, if the first vehicle does not discard the second message due to the second message being illegal;

[0225] (17) The first vehicle discards the second message if the message field is tampered with;

[0226] (18) The first vehicle executes a corresponding algorithm based on the second message when the message field is not tampered with.

[0227] Example 2: The first vehicle verifies whether the second message is legitimate

[0228] (1) The second vehicle sends a second message, specifically including:

[0229] a) digesting the second message using the SM3 algorithm;

[0230] b) signing the second message using the private key corresponding to the public key carried in the pseudonym certificate;

[0231] c) encoding the pseudonym certificate / pseudonym certificate digest in the second message;

[0232] d) sending the second message processed through steps a) to c) above;

[0233] (2) The first vehicle processes the received second message, specifically including:

[0234] a) decoding the second message;

[0235] b) verifying the certificate carried in the second message, specifically comprising: first verifying the certificate signature, secondly performing hash digest processing on the certificate content, and finally comparing the certificate content with the certificate hash digest;

[0236] c) if the certificate verification passes, verifying the data in the second message, specifically including: first verifying the message signature, secondly performing hash digest processing on the message, and finally comparing the message content with the message digest;

[0237] d) performing certificate consistency verification, specifically checking the following: the legitimacy of the CA certificate that issued the pseudonym certificate (the certificate carried in the second message), the validity period of the pseudonym certificate, the valid geographical scope of the pseudonym certificate, the legal authority of the pseudonym certificate, and whether the pseudonym certificate is on the certificate revocation list;

[0238] If the certificate carried in the second message satisfies any of the following conditions, the second message is determined to be illegal:

[0239] The second message does not carry a certificate;

[0240] The certificate carried in the second message is no longer valid;

[0241] The certificate carried by the second message is not in a valid geographical area;

[0242] The certificate carried by the second message exceeds the legal authority;

[0243] The certificate carried by the second message is in a certificate revocation list;

[0244] The certificate carried in the second message is revoked.

[0245] Example 3: The V2X device verifies whether the second vehicle is impersonating the original vehicle

[0246] (1) receiving a second message sent by a second vehicle;

[0247] (2) Verify whether the second message is legitimate. For details, refer to the verification method in Example 1 for verification;

[0248] (3) When it is determined that the second message is illegal, verify whether the second vehicle is impersonating an identity; wherein the second vehicle impersonating an identity can be divided into two scenarios: Scenario 1: the second vehicle impersonates a vehicle without an OBU installed; Scenario 2: the second vehicle impersonates a vehicle with an OBU installed. The following describes the verification process of whether the second vehicle is impersonating an identity for the above two scenarios respectively:

[0249] Scenario 1: The second vehicle pretends to be a vehicle without an OBU installed

[0250] a) The V2X device detects the position of the second vehicle using its own sensor (e.g., antenna). For example, by using the V2X device as a base station and the second vehicle as a user equipment (UE), the AOA positioning technology is used to calculate the azimuth angle between the second vehicle and the V2X device, and the TOA positioning technology is used to calculate the distance between the second vehicle and the V2X device. Thus, the position of the second vehicle (including phase angle and distance) is calculated based on the AOA positioning technology and the TOA positioning technology.

[0251] b) If the position of the detected second vehicle is not consistent with the position carried in the second message, it is determined that the second vehicle is impersonating an identity.

[0252] Scenario two: the second vehicle impersonates a vehicle that has installed OBU

[0253] a) Within a preset time length of receiving the second message, BSM information sent by a legal vehicle is received;

[0254] b) When the V2X device detects that the second message is different from the BSM message ID sent by the legal vehicle, and the information such as position, vehicle speed, vehicle size, vehicle type, etc. is consistent, it is determined that the second vehicle is impersonating an identity.

[0255] (3) When it is determined that the second vehicle is impersonating an identity, other vehicles are informed that the second vehicle is impersonating an identity through broadcasting or groupcasting;

[0256] (4) When it is determined that the second vehicle is not impersonating an identity, the first message is sent through broadcasting or groupcasting, and the first message carries the relevant information of the second vehicle perceived by the V2X device.

[0257] Example four: the first vehicle verifies whether the message field is tampered

[0258] (1) Whether the first message with the second vehicle ID is received within 1s of receiving the second message is searched, and if so, at least one of steps (2) to (7) is executed;

[0259] (2) Whether the position difference Δd of the same vehicle at the same time in the first message and the second message is within a preset range;

[0260] (3) Whether the size of the same vehicle in the first message and the second message is compared;

[0261] (4) Whether the type of the same vehicle in the first message and the second message is compared;

[0262] (5) Whether the speed difference Δv of the same vehicle at the same time in the first message and the second message is within a corresponding preset range is calculated.

[0263] (6) Whether the difference of other dynamic information of the same vehicle in the first message and the second message is within a corresponding preset range is calculated.

[0264] (7) Whether the static message of other same vehicles in the first message and the second message is consistent is compared;

[0265] (8) If the comparison results of the above (2) to (7) are false, it is determined that the message field is tampered, otherwise, it is determined that the message field is not tampered.

[0266] (9) When the message field has not been tampered with, execute the corresponding algorithm based on the second message.

[0267] like Figure 5 As shown, an embodiment of the present application further provides a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) message processing device, which is applied to a first vehicle and includes:

[0268] The processing module 501 performs an application scenario algorithm analysis based on first data obtained from a first message sent from a V2X device, where the first message carries vehicle parameters of a second vehicle.

[0269] In an embodiment of the present application, the processing module 501 performs an application scenario algorithm analysis based on the first data obtained from the first message (such as RSM or SSM, etc.) carrying the vehicle parameters of the second vehicle sent from the V2X device (such as RSU), and realizes the execution of the algorithm corresponding to the application scenario in which the first vehicle is located based on the message sent by the V2X device. In this way, the problem in the prior art that the first vehicle directly discards the message when it determines that the message sent by the second vehicle (the sending vehicle) is illegal, resulting in the inability to promptly handle the emergency situation of the first vehicle and causing traffic accidents can be solved, thereby improving driving safety.

[0270] Optionally, the processing module 501 is specifically configured to:

[0271] When it is determined that the second message sent by the second vehicle is illegal and the second message is not discarded, and the second vehicle does not have a fake identity, an application scenario algorithm analysis is performed based on the first data.

[0272] Optionally, the apparatus further includes a first determining module, configured to determine that the second message is illegal if the received second message satisfies any of the following conditions:

[0273] The second message does not carry a certificate;

[0274] The certificate carried in the second message is no longer valid;

[0275] The certificate carried by the second message is not in a valid geographical area;

[0276] The certificate carried by the second message exceeds the legal authority;

[0277] The certificate carried by the second message is in a certificate revocation list;

[0278] The certificate carried in the second message is revoked.

[0279] Optionally, the first data is related to an application scenario in which the first vehicle is located;

[0280] Performing an application scenario algorithm analysis based on first data obtained from a first message sent by the V2X device, including:

[0281] The processing module 501 includes

[0282] an acquisition submodule, configured to acquire, from the second message, second data related to the application scenario in which the first vehicle is located, when the vehicle ID in the second message is the same as the vehicle ID in the first data;

[0283] a verification submodule, configured to verify the authenticity of the second message based on the first data and the second data;

[0284] The processing submodule is used to perform application scenario algorithm analysis based on the second data when the authenticity of the second message is verified.

[0285] Optionally, the verification submodule is specifically used to:

[0286] In a case where the reception time of the first message is within a first preset time period after the reception time of the second message, the authenticity of the second message is verified based on the first data and the second data.

[0287] Optionally, the first data includes a vehicle ID and at least one of the following:

[0288] time;

[0289] Location;

[0290] Vehicle speed;

[0291] Vehicle dimensions;

[0292] Vehicle type;

[0293] Other dynamic information related to the vehicle;

[0294] Other static information related to the vehicle.

[0295] Optionally, when the verification submodule is used to verify the authenticity of the second message based on the first data and the second data, it includes at least one of the following:

[0296] If the vehicle size in the first data is the same as the vehicle size in the second message, determining that the first message is authentic;

[0297] If the vehicle type in the first message is consistent with the vehicle type in the second message, determining that the first message is authentic;

[0298] If the static information related to the vehicle in the first message is the same as the static information related to the vehicle in the second message, determining that the first message is authentic;

[0299] Determining that the second message is authentic is when the position of the second vehicle at a first moment calculated based on the position, time, and speed in the second message and the position in the first message meet a first preset condition; wherein the first moment is the time in the first message;

[0300] If the speed of the second vehicle at the first moment calculated based on the time and speed in the second message and the speed in the first message meet a second preset condition, determining that the second message is authentic;

[0301] When other dynamic information related to other vehicles of the second vehicle at the first moment is obtained based on other dynamic information related to the vehicle in the first message, and the other dynamic information related to the vehicle in the second message meets a third preset condition, the first message is determined to be true.

[0302] Optionally, the processing module 501 is specifically configured to:

[0303] In a case where it is determined that the second message sent by the second vehicle is illegal and the second message is discarded, an application scenario algorithm analysis is performed based on the first data.

[0304] Optionally, the device further comprises:

[0305] The second determination module is configured to determine that the second vehicle does not have a counterfeit identity if no third message sent by the V2X device is received within a second preset time period after receiving the second message sent by the second vehicle; wherein the third message is used to indicate that the second vehicle has a counterfeit identity.

[0306] like Figure 6 As shown, an embodiment of the present application provides a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) message processing device, which is applied to a V2X device. The device includes:

[0307] A sensing module 601 is configured to sense vehicle parameters of the second vehicle when it is determined that the received second message sent by the second vehicle is illegal;

[0308] The first sending module 602 is configured to send a first message to a first vehicle, so that the first vehicle performs an application scenario algorithm analysis based on first data obtained from the first message, wherein the first message is related to a second vehicle.

[0309] In the V2X message processing device of the embodiment of the present application, when the perception module 601 receives the second message sent by the second vehicle and determines that the second message is illegal, it can perceive the parameters of the second vehicle based on its own sensors, so that the first sending module 602 sends the first message carrying the parameters of the second vehicle to the first vehicle. In this way, the first vehicle can perform application scenario algorithm analysis based on the first data obtained from the first message. In this way, the problem in the prior art that the first vehicle directly discards the message when it determines that the message sent by the second vehicle is illegal, resulting in the inability to promptly handle the emergency situation of the first vehicle and causing traffic accidents is solved, thereby improving driving safety.

[0310] Optionally, the sending module 602 is specifically configured to:

[0311] When it is determined that the second vehicle does not have a false identity, the first message is sent to the first vehicle.

[0312] Optionally, the device further includes a first verification module for verifying whether the second vehicle is a fake identity, wherein the first verification module is specifically configured to:

[0313] When the perceived location information of the second vehicle and the location carried in the second message meet a fourth preset condition, it is determined that the second vehicle does not have a fake identity.

[0314] Optionally, the device further includes a second verification module for verifying whether the second vehicle is a fake identity, wherein the second verification module is specifically configured to:

[0315] If the second message and the fourth message sent by the third vehicle meet the first condition, determining that the second vehicle has a fake identity;

[0316] The first condition includes:

[0317] The fourth message is legal;

[0318] The vehicle ID carried by the second message is different from the vehicle ID carried by the fourth message;

[0319] The information carried by the second message and the corresponding information carried by the fourth message meet corresponding preset conditions.

[0320] Optionally, the device further comprises:

[0321] The second sending module is used to send a third message to the first vehicle when it is determined that the second vehicle has a fake identity, wherein the third message is used to indicate that the second vehicle has a fake identity.

[0322] Optionally, the first sending module is specifically configured to:

[0323] The first message is sent to the first vehicle by multicast, wherein the first message only carries vehicle parameters of the second vehicle.

[0324] Optionally, the first vehicle is any vehicle within an area with the second vehicle as the center and the first length as the radius.

[0325] like Figure 7 As shown, an embodiment of the present application further provides a vehicle, comprising: a processor 700, a memory 720, and a program stored on the memory 720 and executable on the processor 700. When the program is executed by the processor 700, the various processes of the embodiment of the vehicle network V2X message processing method applied to the first vehicle as described above are implemented, and the same technical effect can be achieved. In order to avoid repetition, it will not be described here.

[0326] The transceiver 710 is configured to receive and send data under the control of the processor 700 .

[0327] Among them, Figure 7 In the embodiment, the bus architecture may include any number of interconnected buses and bridges, specifically various circuits of one or more processors represented by processor 700 and memory represented by memory 720, which are linked together. The bus architecture may also link together various other circuits such as peripheral devices, voltage regulators, and power management circuits, which are well known in the art and are therefore not further described herein. The bus interface provides an interface. The transceiver 710 may be a plurality of components, i.e., a transmitter and a receiver, providing a unit for communicating with various other devices on a transmission medium. For different user devices, the user interface 730 may also be an interface capable of connecting external or internal devices as required, and the connected devices include but are not limited to a keypad, a display, a speaker, a microphone, a joystick, etc.

[0328] The processor 700 is responsible for managing the bus architecture and general processing, and the memory 720 can store data used by the processor 700 when performing operations.

[0329] An embodiment of the present application further provides a V2X device, including a transceiver, a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and running on the processor. The processor, when executing the computer program, implements each process of the embodiment of the vehicle network V2X message processing method applied to the V2X device as described above, and can achieve the same technical effect. To avoid repetition, the details are not described here.

[0330] The transceiver is used to receive and send data under the control of the processor.

[0331] Here, it should be noted that the structure of the V2X device is similar to that of the vehicle. Therefore, the structure of the V2X device can refer to Figure 7 .

[0332] The bus architecture in a V2X device may include any number of interconnected buses and bridges, specifically linking various circuits, represented by one or more processors and memories. The bus architecture may also link various other circuits, such as peripherals, voltage regulators, and power management circuits. These are well known in the art and are not further described herein. A bus interface provides an interface. A transceiver may comprise multiple components, including a transmitter and a receiver, providing a means for communicating with various other devices over a transmission medium. For different user devices, the user interface may also be an interface capable of connecting to required external or internal devices. Connected devices may include, but are not limited to, a keypad, display, speaker, microphone, joystick, and the like.

[0333] The processor is responsible for managing the bus architecture and general processing, and the memory can store data used by the processor 700 when performing operations.

[0334] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the steps to implement the above embodiments may be accomplished by hardware, or may be accomplished by instructing relevant hardware through a computer program, wherein the computer program includes instructions for executing part or all of the steps of the above method; and the computer program may be stored in a readable storage medium, which may be any form of storage medium.

[0335] In addition, embodiments of the present application further provide a computer-readable storage medium having a program stored thereon. When executed by a processor, the program implements the aforementioned method for processing V2X messages in a connected vehicle network (V2X) for a first vehicle, or the various processes of the aforementioned method for processing V2X messages in a connected vehicle network (V2X) for a V2X device, achieving the same technical effects. To avoid repetition, these are not described here. The computer-readable storage medium may be, for example, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk, or an optical disk.

[0336] In addition, it should be noted that, in the apparatus and method of the present application, it is obvious that each component or each step can be decomposed and / or recombined. These decompositions and / or recombinations should be regarded as equivalent schemes of the present application. Moreover, the steps of performing the above-mentioned series of processes can naturally be performed in the order of description or in chronological order, but do not necessarily need to be performed in chronological order, and some steps can be performed in parallel or independently of each other. For those of ordinary skill in the art, it will be understood that all or any steps or components of the method and apparatus of the present application can be implemented in any computing device (including processors, storage media, etc.) or a network of computing devices with hardware, firmware, software or a combination thereof, which can be achieved by those of ordinary skill in the art using their basic programming skills after reading the description of the present application.

[0337] Therefore, the purpose of this application can also be achieved by running a program or a group of programs on any computing device. The computing device can be a well-known general-purpose device. Therefore, the purpose of this application can also be achieved simply by providing a program product containing program code that implements the method or device. In other words, such a program product also constitutes this application, and the storage medium storing such a program product also constitutes this application. Obviously, the storage medium can be any well-known storage medium or any storage medium developed in the future.

[0338] Finally, it should be noted that, in this document, relational terms such as first and second, etc., are used only to distinguish one entity or operation from another entity or operation, and do not necessarily require or imply any actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Moreover, the terms "comprises," "comprising," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or terminal device comprising a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also other elements not explicitly listed, or elements inherent to such process, method, article, or device. In the absence of further limitations, an element defined by the phrase "comprising a ..." does not exclude the presence of additional identical elements in the process, method, article, or device comprising the element.

[0339] The above is a preferred embodiment of the present application. It should be pointed out that for ordinary technicians in this technical field, several improvements and modifications can be made without departing from the principles described in the present application. These improvements and modifications should also be regarded as the scope of protection of the present application.

Claims

1. A method for processing vehicle-to-everything (V2X) messages, characterized in that: Applied to a first vehicle, the method includes: When it is determined that the second message sent by the second vehicle is illegal and the second message is not discarded, and the first vehicle is in an emergency and it is determined that the second vehicle is not impersonating an identity, performing an application scenario algorithm analysis based on first data obtained from the first message sent by the V2X device, wherein the first message carries vehicle parameters of the second vehicle and the first data is related to the application scenario in which the first vehicle is located; The method of performing an application scenario algorithm analysis based on the first data obtained from the first message sent by the V2X device includes: When the vehicle ID in the second message is the same as the vehicle ID in the first data, obtaining second data related to the application scenario of the first vehicle from the second message; verifying the authenticity of the second message based on the first data and the second data; When the authenticity of the second message is verified, an application scenario algorithm analysis is performed based on the second data.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that If the received second message meets any of the following conditions, it is determined that the second message is illegal: The second message does not carry a certificate; The certificate carried in the second message is no longer valid; The certificate carried by the second message is not in a valid geographical area; The certificate carried by the second message exceeds the legal authority; The certificate carried by the second message is in a certificate revocation list; The certificate carried in the second message is revoked.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Verifying the authenticity of the second message according to the first data and the second data includes: In a case where the reception time of the first message is within a first preset time period after the reception time of the second message, the authenticity of the second message is verified based on the first data and the second data.

4. The method according to claim 1 or 3, characterized in that The first data includes a vehicle ID and at least one of the following: time; Location; Vehicle speed; Vehicle dimensions; Vehicle type; Other dynamic information related to the vehicle; Other static information related to the vehicle.

5. The method according to claim 1, wherein Verifying the authenticity of the second message according to the first data and the second data includes at least one of the following: If the vehicle size in the first data is the same as the vehicle size in the second message, determining that the second message is authentic; If the vehicle type in the first message is consistent with the vehicle type in the second message, determining that the second message is authentic; If the static information related to the vehicle in the first message is the same as the static information related to the vehicle in the second message, determining that the second message is authentic; Determining that the second message is authentic is when the position of the second vehicle at a first moment calculated based on the position, time, and speed in the second message and the position in the first message meet a first preset condition; wherein the first moment is the time in the second message; If the speed of the second vehicle at the first moment calculated based on the time and speed in the second message and the speed in the first message meet a second preset condition, determining that the second message is authentic; When other dynamic information related to other vehicles of the second vehicle at the first moment is obtained based on other dynamic information related to the vehicle in the first message, and the other dynamic information related to the vehicle in the second message meets a third preset condition, the second message is determined to be true.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Performing an application scenario algorithm analysis based on first data obtained from a first message sent by the V2X device, including: In a case where it is determined that the second message sent by the second vehicle is illegal and the second message is discarded, an application scenario algorithm analysis is performed based on the first data.

7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The method further comprises: If no third message sent by the V2X device is received within a second preset time period after receiving the second message sent by the second vehicle, it is determined that the second vehicle does not have a fake identity; wherein the third message is used to indicate that the second vehicle has a fake identity.

8. A method for processing vehicle-to-everything (V2X) messages, characterized in that: Applied to a V2X device, the method includes: When it is determined that the received second message sent by the second vehicle is illegal, sensing vehicle parameters of the second vehicle; When it is determined that the second vehicle does not have a fake identity, a first message is sent to the first vehicle, so that the first vehicle performs an application scenario algorithm analysis based on the first data obtained from the first message when it is determined that the second message sent by the second vehicle is illegal and the second message is not discarded, and the first vehicle is in an emergency situation and the second vehicle does not have a fake identity, wherein the first message carries the vehicle parameters of the second vehicle; and the first data is related to the application scenario in which the first vehicle is located.

9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that Verifying whether the second vehicle is a fake identity includes: When the perceived location information of the second vehicle and the location carried in the second message meet a fourth preset condition, it is determined that the second vehicle does not have a fake identity.

10. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that Verifying whether the second vehicle is a fake identity includes: If the second message and the fourth message sent by the third vehicle meet the first condition, determining that the second vehicle has a fake identity; The first condition includes: The fourth message is legal; The vehicle ID carried by the second message is different from the vehicle ID carried by the fourth message; The information carried by the second message and the corresponding information carried by the fourth message meet corresponding preset conditions.

11. The method according to any one of claims 8 to 10, characterized in that The method further comprises: In the case where it is determined that the second vehicle has a counterfeit identity, a third message is sent to the first vehicle, where the third message is used to indicate that the second vehicle has a counterfeit identity.

12. The method according to any one of claims 8 to 10, characterized in that Sending a first message to a first vehicle includes: The first message is sent to the first vehicle by multicast, wherein the first message only carries vehicle parameters of the second vehicle.

13. The method according to claim 12, characterized in that The first vehicle is any vehicle within an area with the second vehicle as the center and the first length as the radius.

14. A vehicle comprising a transceiver, a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and running on the processor, characterized in that: When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the vehicle network V2X message processing method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.

15. A V2X device comprising a transceiver, a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and running on the processor, characterized in that: When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the vehicle network V2X message processing method according to any one of claims 8 to 13 are implemented.

16. A vehicle network V2X message processing device, characterized in that: Applied to a first vehicle, the device comprises: a processing module configured to, when it is determined that the second message sent by the second vehicle is illegal and the second message is not discarded, and when the first vehicle is in an emergency and it is determined that the second vehicle is not impersonating an identity, perform an application scenario algorithm analysis based on first data obtained from the first message sent by the V2X device, wherein the first message carries vehicle parameters of the second vehicle and the first data is related to the application scenario in which the first vehicle is located; Wherein, the processing module includes: an acquisition submodule, configured to acquire, from the second message, second data related to the application scenario in which the first vehicle is located, when the vehicle ID in the second message is the same as the vehicle ID in the first data; a verification submodule, configured to verify the authenticity of the second message based on the first data and the second data; The processing submodule is used to perform application scenario algorithm analysis based on the second data when the authenticity of the second message is verified.

17. A vehicle network V2X message processing device, characterized in that: Applied to V2X equipment, the apparatus includes: a sensing module, configured to sense vehicle parameters of the second vehicle when it is determined that the received second message sent by the second vehicle is illegal; A sending module is used to send a first message to a first vehicle when it is determined that the second vehicle does not have a counterfeit identity, so that the first vehicle performs an application scenario algorithm analysis based on first data obtained from the first message when it is determined that the second message sent by the second vehicle is illegal and does not discard the second message, and the first vehicle is in an emergency situation and the second vehicle does not have a counterfeit identity, wherein the first message is related to the second vehicle; and the first data is related to the application scenario in which the first vehicle is located.

18. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by a processor, the method for processing a V2X message of the Internet of Vehicles according to any one of claims 1 to 7 or the method for processing a V2X message of the Internet of Vehicles according to any one of claims 8 to 13 is implemented.

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