Power satellite navigation and timing security device detection device and detection method

Abstract

The application provides a power satellite navigation timing security device detection device and detection method, which verifies the ability of the satellite navigation timing security device to prevent abnormal satellite navigation service and false satellite interference deception by simulating satellite navigation receiving antenna output signals. The method connects the simulated satellite navigation receiving signal to the satellite navigation antenna interface of the satellite navigation timing security device, adopts time-frequency migration and signal strength control of the simulated satellite navigation timing, and controls the real-time response of the satellite navigation timing security device output signal to verify the performance of the satellite navigation timing security device in resisting abnormal satellite time-frequency migration and preventing false satellite interference deception. The method is directly applicable to verifying the ability of time synchronization equipment to resist abnormal and false satellite navigation timing, is universal, complete and easy to trace, and does not interfere with the normal use of satellite navigation services in the surrounding social environment.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of power equipment testing, specifically a testing device and method for power satellite navigation and timing security devices. Background Technology

[0002] This application is a detection method for satellite navigation timing security devices, as proposed in "Detection Method for Time Synchronization Devices Based on Satellite Timing Module Output Signal Simulation" (Patent No. ZL2018 11308104.3, hereinafter referred to as "Separate Application") and "Detection Method for Satellite Timing Port Simulation Signal of Time Synchronization Device" (Patent Application No. 202210377595.7, hereinafter referred to as "Separate Application").

[0003] Power monitoring systems employ time synchronization systems to unify local, regional, and wide-area time within the power system. In recent years, relying on the continuous improvement of relevant power time synchronization standards and the widespread application of satellite navigation time synchronization, power system operation monitoring has been achieved, supporting stable power grid operation, event analysis, and fault handling. However, with current satellite navigation security needs and advancements in satellite navigation signal deception and interference technologies, the "power user side" requires a comprehensive and holistic improvement in its security risk prevention and control capabilities.

[0004] The power time synchronization system consists of time synchronization devices widely deployed in various power dispatching agencies, substations, and power plants. To unify the time of equipment in different locations through these devices, the time source primarily utilizes the integrated timing and positioning service of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). Specifically, satellite navigation timing is physically calibrated at a standard second frequency of 1Hz (or second-frequency), and provides the standard clock value at the start of the second. Of course, accurate timing is also a fundamental characteristic of navigation accuracy; for example, a frequency difference of 1ns typically corresponds to a dynamic position error of approximately 30cm.

[0005] In recent years, power systems have experienced safety incidents such as equipment malfunctions and regional power grid alarms due to satellite system anomalies and signal interference. Currently, most power time synchronization devices rely solely on judging the continuity of clock information to prevent deception and interference with satellite navigation and timing signals. They lack the ability to prevent false satellite deception and attacks from abnormal satellites that could cause time frequency deviations or clock corruption. Therefore, there are significant on-site safety hazards, and prevention and control measures need to be innovated, while relevant standards need to be updated.

[0006] Power time synchronization devices currently primarily utilize external antennas to directly incorporate GNSS time sources—BeiDou (BDS) and GPS signals. Currently, most field applications employ a dual-clock source solution with BDS as the primary source and GPS as a secondary source. This results in a large number of in-service devices of various types, spanning long service lives, with diverse integration methods and varying execution standards. Therefore, based on the standardized connection mode between the time synchronization device and the satellite antenna port, a satellite navigation and timing security device (hereinafter referred to as "Timing Security Device (ASIC)") can be deployed between them to prevent satellite antenna spoofing interference signals. This achieves universal prevention and control of abnormal satellite navigation time-frequency migration and false satellite spoofing interference signals on the "power user side." It can provide satellite navigation and timing security protection for the vast number of in-service time synchronization devices and also meet the security adaptation needs of numerous device manufacturers' conventional products.

[0007] Regarding the field applicability of the time synchronization security device (ASIC), it utilizes GNSS baseband carrier signals demodulated by satellite receiving antennas via GNSS radio frequency communication. Firstly, it adopts a universal port design for field use, sending the baseband carrier signal from the GNSS input port out through the GNSS output port. Secondly, it prevents interference and deception risks from "abnormal satellite services" and "fake satellite services" by monitoring the GNSS input port and controlling the GNSS output port online. Thirdly, it facilitates field deployment and implementation, adopting a universal embedded mode that is easy to install, adapt, and secure – directly connecting the existing antenna to the GNSS input port and connecting the GNSS output port to the antenna port of the field time synchronization device.

[0008] The inventors of this application, through research during the development of this invention, discovered the following physical principles for the timing security device (ASIC) to prevent interference and deception: First, "abnormal satellite service" refers to GNSS navigation and timing signals emitted by satellites in abnormal or faulty states. These signals have almost no difference in physical spectrum from normal services and can be identified based on the accuracy of the received signal's second-frequency and clock information continuity. Second, "spoof satellite service" refers to GNSS navigation signals simulated by third-party equipment. These signals typically employ radio frequency signal-to-noise ratio suppression (i.e., spoof signals are much stronger than normal signals) to hijack satellite communication channels and can be identified based on whether there are abnormalities in the GNSS input port signal strength. Combining these two principles ensures the secure application of satellite navigation and timing while also identifying the nature of the attack target, facilitating rapid response and emergency warnings. Therefore, based on the timing signal time-frequency migration characteristic detection principle (as per the separate application) and combined with the satellite timing port signal simulation of the time synchronization equipment (as per the separate application), this application can verify the ASIC's comprehensive ability to "resist abnormal satellite time-frequency migration" and "prevent spoof satellite interference and deception."

[0009] The controllable time-stamped frequency source (TFM) in the "separate application" can, after being synchronized with GNSS time,: 1. control the baseband simulation signal port (RF-M) to emit a baseband simulation signal (RF) that is synchronized or asynchronous with GNSS time through simulation mode; 2. control the baseband carrier signal strength (I) transmitted by RF through simulation parameters; 3. emit a timing mark pulse signal (PM) through simulation status identifier to scale the simulation behavior starting at a certain standard time.

[0010] Therefore, the "detection loop" applied for in this case uses the standard IRIG-B signal (BS) output by the Time Synchronization Tester (SCS) as a reference. It employs the baseband carrier signal (RFO) emitted by the TFM, which becomes the output port (GNSSO) of the ASIC input port (GNSS2). The RFO is connected to the Satellite Timing Module (STM) to monitor the time-frequency migration prevention and control performance. Combined with the PM in the TFM-scaled simulation state, an oscilloscope (OSC) can be used with test leads and a dedicated test fixture (TF) to display the second pulse signal (1PPS) and message information signal (NS) output by the BS, RF, PM, RFO, and STM. Based on the signal response characteristics such as time-frequency migration of the timing signal and changes in the baseband carrier signal strength, the ASIC's ability to identify and handle abnormal satellite services and spoofing satellite services can be verified. This method of simulating the satellite receiving antenna outputting the baseband carrier signal, compared to the commonly used method of relaying control satellite navigation RF signals both domestically and internationally, avoids interference with the normal use of satellite navigation services in the surrounding social environment. Furthermore, the anti-spoofing interference simulation is easier to control, more complete, and more convenient.

[0011] Since the performance of ASIC in "resisting abnormal satellite time-frequency migration" can be verified by TFM simulation based on the "detection loop" which can lead to "time-frequency migration of satellite navigation baseband carrier signals", and by monitoring the "1PPS and NS signal time-frequency migration degree" of STM and the "time-frequency migration resistance RFO signal cutoff time" of ASIC through OSC monitoring. Therefore, the performance testing of the aforementioned "detection loop" is implemented in the following ways: First, for the "time-frequency shifted satellite navigation baseband carrier signal," the same method as the time synchronization and time-asynchronous simulation of the TFM simulation signal relative to the standard time synchronization signal in the "separate application" can be used; second, for the detection of the "degree of time-frequency shift of 1PPS and NS signals," the control calibration can be based on the TFM simulation signal control in the "separate application," and a similar method can be adopted to detect the time-frequency shift characteristics of the simulation signal through STM; third, for the performance of "resisting abnormal satellite time-frequency shift," a similar approach to the evaluation of the stability and correctness assurance capability of the output timing signal of the time synchronization device, as in the "separately authorized" application, can be adopted to evaluate the "time of cutting off the RFO signal to resist time-frequency shift," with the differences being: 1) if the time-frequency shift of the "separately authorized" time synchronization device determines that it exceeds the tolerance, it switches to "self-timekeeping" mode; 2) if the ASIC of this application determines that the time-frequency shift exceeds the tolerance, it cuts off the output signal RFO. Therefore, this application will not elaborate further.

[0012] Therefore, the performance of the ASIC in "preventing false satellite interference and deception" can be achieved by detecting the abnormal shutdown response time (Δt') of the baseband carrier signal strength from the moment (t') of the RF strength rise at the ASIC baseband carrier signal input port (GNSSI) to the moment (t) of the ASIC's RFO signal shutdown. t' can be identified by changes in the RF and RFO strengths I or by increased background noise. Therefore, based on the above "detection loop," if the signal conversion delay of the two sets of dedicated test fixtures and the time difference between them are ignored, and the baseband carrier signal transmission from RF to RFO in the ASIC is made delay-free, Δt' can be detected through RF signal strength control and RFO response: First, in the TFM, the baseband carrier signal RF strength I is set to "I = i < C" and the output RF is started; second, in the ASIC, the baseband carrier signal strength monitoring threshold (Iv) is set to "Iv = C” and start RFO output; Third, in OSC, set the display recording field to be locked by the rising edge (tp) of PM and start waiting for capture; Fourth, in TFM, set the starting time value (T') of changing the RF signal strength, set the RF strength change at time T' to “I = j ≥ C”, set the PM output time value to T' as well, and start waiting for the RF strength to change automatically at time T'; Fifth, in OSC at time T', the signal strength change time t' of RF and RFO can be identified by tp, and the RFO signal turn-off time t” is obtained from “I=j to I≈0” of RFO, and “Δt'=t”-t' is measured. Summary of the Invention

[0013] This invention provides a testing method for satellite navigation timing security devices. By simulating the output signal of a satellite navigation receiving antenna, the method verifies the ability of the security device to prevent abnormal satellite navigation services and spoofing interference. The method involves connecting the received signal of the simulated satellite navigation antenna to the satellite navigation antenna interface of the security device. It then employs simulated satellite navigation timing time-frequency shifts and signal strength control, along with real-time responses to the output signal of the security device, to test the device's performance in resisting abnormal satellite time-frequency shifts and preventing spoofing interference. This method is directly applicable to testing the ability of time synchronization equipment to resist abnormal and spoofed satellite navigation timing. It is universal, complete, easily traceable, and does not interfere with the normal use of satellite navigation services in the surrounding social environment.

[0014] A testing method for a satellite navigation timing security device includes a controllable time stamp frequency source, a timing security device, a satellite navigation timing module, an oscilloscope, a time synchronization tester, a first satellite antenna, a second satellite antenna, a first coaxial cable, a second coaxial cable, a first test fixture, and a second test fixture.

[0015] The timing mark pulse signal output port of the controllable time mark frequency source is connected to the second channel input port of the oscilloscope. The simulation signal output port of the controllable time mark frequency source is connected to the satellite antenna interface of the timing and security device via the first coaxial cable, and the simulation signal output port of the controllable time mark frequency source is connected to the third channel input port of the oscilloscope via the first test fixture. The signal output port of the timing and security device is connected to the satellite antenna interface of the satellite navigation timing module via the second coaxial cable, and the signal output port of the timing and security device is connected to the fourth channel input port of the oscilloscope via the second test fixture. The second pulse signal output port and the navigation message signal output port of the satellite navigation timing module are connected to the fifth channel input port and the sixth channel input port of the oscilloscope, respectively. The time synchronization signal output port of the time synchronization tester is connected to the first channel input port of the oscilloscope. The first satellite antenna is connected to the satellite antenna interface of the controllable time mark frequency source, and the second satellite antenna is connected to the satellite antenna interface of the time synchronization tester.

[0016] Furthermore, the abnormal shutdown response time (Δt') of the baseband carrier signal strength from the start time (t') of the change in the baseband simulated signal (RF) strength received by the satellite antenna interface (21) of the tested timing security device (2) to the turn-off time (t") of the baseband carrier signal (RFO) output by the signal output port (22) is detected through the following steps:

[0017] Step 201: On the human-machine interface (48) of the oscilloscope (4), set the rising edge time (tp) of the timing mark pulse signal (PM) input from the second channel input port (42) to lock the display recording field and start the waiting lock;

[0018] Step 202: At the human-machine interface (18) of the controllable time-scale frequency source (1), set the signal strength control time value (T’) of the baseband simulation signal (RF) output by the simulation signal output port (13) to “T’=[MM:SS:mmm]”, set the RF signal strength control value (I’) at T’ to “I’=j>C”, set the PM output time to T’, and start waiting for T’ to arrive;

[0019] Step 203: At the human-machine interface (18) of the controllable time-scale frequency source (1), when the time reaches T’, lock and display “T’=[MM:SS:mmm]” and “I’=j”;

[0020] Step 204: In the locked display record field of the human-machine interface (48) of the oscilloscope (4), from tp, it can be identified that the baseband carrier signal strength (I) of the baseband carrier signal (RFO) output by the signal output port (22) of RF and the timing and security device (2) jumps from “I≈i<C” to “I≈j>C” to obtain t’, and after t’, the RFO signal strength drops from “I≈j” to “I≈0” to obtain the RFO signal off time (t”). From t’, it can be correspondingly identified that the standard IRIG-B time synchronization signal (BS0) output once per second by the time synchronization signal output port (52) of the time synchronization tester (5) in the second period where t’ is located and the start edge time (t0) of BS0, so as to decode the time information value (Tb0) carried by BS0 to obtain the time value (T0) at t0 as “T0=Tb0=[MM:SS]”. From t0 and t”, it can be identified that the second pulse signal (1PPS0) output by the second pulse signal output port (32) of the satellite navigation timing module (3) whose rising edge is time-synchronized with t0 and the navigation message frame signal (NS0) output by the navigation message signal output port (33) of the satellite navigation timing module (3) that lags behind the first output of 1PPS0, so as to observe that there is no subsequent second pulse signal (1PPS) after 1PPS0 and no subsequent navigation message frame signal (NS) after NS0;

[0021] Step 205: From the known T0, t0, T’, and t’, the time difference (Δt) between t’ and t0 is “Δt= t’-t0 ≈mmm” and “T’=[MM:SS:mmm] ≈T0+Δt = [MM:SS]+Δt”;

[0022] Step 206: From the known t’ and t”, the baseband carrier signal strength abnormal turn-off response time (Δt’) is “Δt’=t”-t’”; It can be transferred to the performance detection of “resisting abnormal satellite time-frequency migration”;

[0023] Step 207: The detection of Δt’ is completed.

[0024] Further, the device settings and detection preparation steps of the detection circuit specifically include:

[0025] Step 101: At the human-machine interface of the time synchronization tester, set the working state and the time synchronization of the signal of the satellite antenna interface port, and start the standard IRIG-B time synchronization signal (BS) to be output from the time synchronization signal output port.

[0026] Step 102: At the human-machine interface of the controllable time scale frequency source, set the working state and the time synchronization of the signal of the satellite antenna interface port, set the signal intensity control value (I’) of the baseband simulation signal (RF) output from the simulation signal output port as “I’ = i < C”, and start the RF to be output from the simulation signal output port.

[0027] Step 103: At the human-machine interface (28) of the time service security device, set the baseband carrier signal monitoring threshold quantity (Iv) for monitoring the signal intensity of the satellite antenna interface as “Iv = C”, and start the monitoring of the RF input of the satellite antenna interface port and the output of the baseband carrier signal (RFO) from the open signal output port.

[0028] Step 104: Start the satellite navigation time service module and its working state is normal.

[0029] Step 105: At the human-machine interface of the oscilloscope, set the first channel input port to monitor the standard IRIG-B time synchronization signal (BS) of the time synchronization signal output port, the second channel input port to monitor the timing mark pulse signal (PM) of the timing mark pulse signal output port, the third channel input port to monitor RF, the fourth channel input port to monitor RFO, the fifth channel input port to monitor the second pulse signal (1PPS) output from the second pulse signal output port, the sixth channel input port to monitor the navigation message frame signal (NS) of the navigation message signal output port (33) and the signal status display is normal, and set the display record field to be locked by the rising edge moment (t*) of any 1PPS input from the fifth channel input port (45) and start waiting for locking.

[0030] Step 106: In the display record field locked by t* at the human-machine interface of the oscilloscope, “t* = t” where t* should be consistent with the starting edge moment (t) of a certain BS, and the time information value obtained by decoding BS at t moment is consistent with the time information value (Tr) obtained by decoding NS that lags behind the first output of t* as “Tr = Tb”, and the baseband carrier signal intensity quantities I of RF and RFO are both “I ≈ i”.

[0031] Step 107: The device settings and detection preparation work are completed.

[0032] This invention presents a detection method based on the simulated satellite navigation timing signal and its time-frequency migration characteristics control method described in a separate application, and the technical approach of identifying timing frequency migration and controlling signal output methods in time synchronization equipment as described in a separate authorized application. By simulating and controlling the time-frequency migration and signal strength of satellite navigation timing, this invention proposes a detection method for the ability of satellite navigation timing security devices to resist abnormal satellite timing services and prevent deception by spoofing satellites. This method is technically complete, highly traceable, and versatile. It does not affect the normal use of satellite navigation services in the social environment and is directly applicable to verifying the ability of time synchronization equipment to resist abnormal and spoofed satellite navigation timing. Attached Figure Description

[0033] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the equipment connections used in the satellite navigation timing security device detection method of the present invention;

[0034] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the loop equipment setup and test preparation steps for the "prevention of false satellite interference and deception" performance test in the satellite navigation timing security device test method of the present invention;

[0035] Figure 3 This is a waveform timing diagram illustrating the performance test of the satellite navigation timing security device detection method of the present invention for "preventing false satellite interference and deception".

[0036] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the detection steps for the "prevention of false satellite interference and deception" performance test of the satellite navigation timing security device detection method of the present invention.

[0037] In the diagram: 1—Controllable Time Scale Frequency Source (TFM), 2—Time Synchronization Security Device (ASIC), 3—Satellite Navigation Timing Module (STM), 4—Oscilloscope (OSC), 5—Time Synchronization Tester (SCS), 6—First Satellite Antenna (A), 7—Second Satellite Antenna (B), 81—First Coaxial Cable (C1), 82—Second Coaxial Cable (C2), 91—First Test Fixture (TF1), 92—Second Test Fixture (TF2);

[0038] 11—TFM satellite antenna interface (GNSS1), 12—TFM timing mark pulse signal output port (PMK), 13—TFM simulation signal output port (RF-M), 18—TFM human-machine interface (T-HMI), 21—ASIC satellite antenna interface (GNSS2), 22—ASIC signal output port (GNSS1), 28—ASIC human-machine interface (A-HMI), 31—STM satellite antenna interface (GNSS1). 3) 32—STM second pulse signal output port (FRQ), 33—STM navigation message signal output port (TX), 41—OSC first channel input port (CH1), 42—OSC second channel input port (CH2), 43—OSC third channel input port (CH3), 44—OSC fourth channel input port (CH4), 45—OSC fifth channel input port (CH5), 46—OSC sixth channel input port (CH6), 48—OSC human-machine interface (O-HMI), 51—SCS satellite antenna interface (GNSS5), 52—SCS time synchronization signal output port (IRIG-B), 58—SCS human-machine interface (S-HMI);

[0039] BS—IRIG-B outputs a standard IRIG-B time synchronization signal once per second, t—the start edge time of a certain BS, Tb—the time information value at time t carried by the BS, T—the standard time value at time t, RF—the baseband simulation signal output by RF-M, PM—the timing marker pulse signal output by PMK, tp—the rising edge time of PM, RFO—the baseband carrier signal output by GNSSO, I—the baseband carrier signal strength of RF or RFO, I'—the RF signal strength control value set by TFM, Iv—the baseband carrier signal monitoring threshold value configured by ASIC to monitor and judge GNSS2 if I exceeds the limit, and then shut down the GNSSO signal output;

[0040] n—natural numbers “0,1,2…”, m—integers “0,1,2…9”, i, j, C—a certain value;

[0041] t'—the start time of the strength change of RF and RFO signals, T'—the RF signal strength control time value set by TFM pointing to time t', t”—the time when the RFO signal is turned off, 1PPS—the second pulse signal output by FRQ, t*—the rising edge time of a certain 1PPS, NS—the navigation message frame signal output by TX lagging behind the first output of t*, Tr—the time information value carried by NS pointing to t*;

[0042] [MM:SS:mmm]—T' time value, MM—T' whole minute time value, SS—T' whole second time value, mmm—T' millisecond time value;

[0043] BS0—BS in the second time interval where t' is located, Tb0—the time information value carried by BS0, t0—the start edge time of BS0, T0—the time value at time t0 is also the [MM:SS] value of T', BSn—BS starting "n" seconds after time t0, tn—the start edge time of BSn, Tn—the standard time value at time tn.

[0044] 1PPS0 — 1PPS that rises synchronously with time t0; NS0 — NS that lags behind the first occurrence of 1PPS0.

[0045] Δt—the time difference between t' and t0 (Δt = t' - t0 ≈ T' - T0 = mm);

[0046] Δt'—the abnormal shutdown response time of the ASIC's baseband carrier signal strength (Δt'=t”-t');

[0047] The functions of the main equipment shown in the diagram are as follows:

[0048] TFM—A controllable time-stamped frequency source based on the "separate application" upgrade function. It can control the satellite navigation simulation signal output port RF-M to emit satellite navigation simulation signals that are time-synchronized or time-asynchronous with the satellite antenna interface GNSS1 through time synchronization and time asynchronous simulation modes. It can change the average RF signal strength at a specified time and control the time marker pulse signal output port PMK to emit the time marker pulse signal PM at a specified time.

[0049] ASIC—Satellite Navigation and Timing Security Device—introduces satellite navigation signals through the GNSS2 satellite antenna interface. Based on time-frequency migration characteristics identification and baseband carrier signal strength monitoring, it has the ability to "resist abnormal satellite time-frequency migration" and "prevent and control false satellite interference and deception."

[0050] STM—Satellite Timing Module, which can convert satellite navigation signals received through the GNSS3 satellite antenna interface into output response second pulse detection signal 1PPS and satellite navigation message frame detection signal NS;

[0051] OSC—Oscilloscope;

[0052] SCS—Time Synchronization Tester, can synchronize with the satellite navigation signal input from the GNSS5 satellite antenna interface and emit a standard IRIG-B time synchronization signal BS;

[0053] TF—Test fixture, used for sampling and amplifying RF and RFO signals. Detailed Implementation

[0054] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0055] This application presents a detection method for satellite navigation timing security devices based on the "Separately Authorized" SCS anti-abnormal time-frequency migration capability detection and the "Separately Authorized" TFM simulated baseband carrier signal time-frequency migration capability detection, combined with the fact that TFM can control RF signal strength.

[0056] The detection steps and methods of the satellite navigation timing security device provided by this invention are as follows:

[0057] 1. ASIC detection loop equipment and port connection method

[0058] like Figure 1 As shown, the PMK (timing mark pulse signal output port 12) of the TFM (controllable time mark frequency source 1) is connected to CH2 (second channel input port 42) of the OSC (oscilloscope 4). The RF-M (simulation signal output port 13) of the TFM is connected to GNSS2 (satellite antenna interface 21) of the ASIC (timing and security device 2) via C1 (first coaxial cable 81), and the RF-M of the TFM is connected to CH3 (third channel input port 43) of the OSC via TF1 (first test fixture 91). The GNSS3 (signal output port 22) of the ASIC is connected to GNSS3 (satellite antenna interface 31) of the STM (satellite navigation and timing module 3) via C2 (second coaxial cable 82), and A The SIC's GNSSO is connected to the OSC's CH4 (fourth channel input port 44) via TF2 (second test fixture 92). The STM's FRQ (second pulse signal output port 32) and TX (navigation message signal output port 33) are connected to the OSC's CH5 (fifth channel input port 45) and CH6 (sixth channel input port 46), respectively. The SCS (time synchronization tester 5)'s IRIG-B (time synchronization signal output port 52) ​​is connected to the OSC's CH1 (first channel input port 41). A (first satellite antenna 6) is connected to the TFM's GNSS1 (satellite antenna interface 11), and B (second satellite antenna 7) is connected to the SCS's GNSS5 (satellite antenna interface 51).

[0059] 2. Preparation for detecting the response time Δt' from abnormal input RF baseband carrier signal strength to output RFO shutdown in ASIC.

[0060] Combination Figure 1, Figure 2 , Figure 3 , to ensure that there is no delay in the ASIC's transmission of RF to RFO baseband carrier signals and the STM's conversion response from RFO to 1PPS. The device settings and detection preparation steps of the detection loop are as follows:

[0061] Step 101: At the S-HMI (Human Machine Interface 58) of the SCS, set the working state to be time synchronized with the GNSS5 port signal, and start the IRIG-B to output the standard IRIG-B time synchronization signal (BS);

[0062] Step 102: At the T-HMI (Human Machine Interface 18) of the TFM, set the working state to be time synchronized with the GNSS1 port signal, set the RF signal strength control value (I’) to “I’ = i < C”, and start the RF-M to output the baseband simulation signal (RF);

[0063] Step 103: At the A-HMI (Human Machine Interface 28) of the ASIC, set the baseband carrier signal monitoring threshold amount Iv to “Iv = C”, and start the GNSS2 port RF input monitoring and the GNSSO port to output the baseband carrier signal (RFO);

[0064] Step 104: Start the STM and its working state is normal;

[0065] Step 105: At the O-HMI (Human Machine Interface 48) of the OSC, set CH1 to monitor BS, CH2 to monitor the timing mark pulse signal (PM), CH3 to monitor RF, CH4 to monitor RFO, CH5 to monitor the second pulse signal (1PPS), CH6 to monitor the navigation message frame signal (NS) and the signal status display is normal. Set the display record field to be locked at the rising edge moment (t*) of any 1PPS input from CH5 and start waiting for locking;

[0066] Step 106: In the display record field locked by t* at the O-HMI of the OSC, it should be “t* = t” that t* is consistent with the starting edge moment (t) of a certain BS. The time information value (Tb) obtained by decoding BS at t moment and the time information value (Tr) obtained by decoding NS that first appears after lagging t* should be “Tr = Tb”, and the baseband carrier signal intensities I of RF and RFO are both “I ≈ i”;

[0067] Step 107: The device settings and detection preparation work are completed.

[0068] 3. Detection of Δt’ of ASIC

[0069] Combined with Figure 1 , Figure 3 , Figure 4, if the signal conversion delays of TF1 and TF2 are made consistent, and the ASIC has no delay and no attenuation in transmitting the baseband carrier signal from RF to RFO, then the abnormal shutdown response time Δt’ of the ASIC to close the baseband carrier signal of RFO due to receiving an abnormal-strength RF can be detected through the following steps:

[0070] Step 201: On the O-HMI of the OSC, set the display record field to lock and start waiting for locking at the rising edge moment (tp) of the PM input from CH2.

[0071] Step 202: On the T-HMI of the TFM, set the RF signal strength control time value (T’) to “T’=[MM:SS:mmm]”, set the I’ at T’ to “I’=j>C”, set the PM output moment time to T’, and start waiting for T’ to arrive.

[0072] Step 203: On the T-HMI of the TFM, when the time reaches T’, lock and display “T’=[MM:SS:mmm]” and “I’=j”.

[0073] Step 204: In the locked display record field of the O-HMI of the OSC, from tp, it can be identified that the RF and RFO signal strengths jump from “I≈i<C” to “I≈j>C” to obtain the intensity change start moment (t’). After t’, the RFO signal strength drops from “I≈j” to “I≈0” to obtain the RFO signal shutdown moment (t”). From t’, the BS (BS0) in the second period where t’ is located and the start edge moment (t0) of BS0 can be correspondingly identified, and then the time information value (Tb0) carried by BS0 can be decoded to obtain the time value (T0) at t0 as “T0=Tb0=[MM:SS]”. From t0 and t”, the 1PPS (1PPS0) synchronized with t0 at the rising edge and the NS (NS0) lagging behind the first appearance of 1PPS0 can be identified, and then it can be observed that there is no 1PPS after 1PPS0 and no NS after NS0.

[0074] Step 205: From the known T0, t0, T’, t’, the time difference (Δt) between t’ and t0 can be obtained as “Δt= t’-t0 ≈mmm” and “T’=[MM:SS:mmm] ≈T0+Δt = [MM:SS]+Δt”.

[0075] Step 206: From the known t’ and t”, the abnormal shutdown response time (Δt’) of the baseband carrier signal strength can be obtained as “Δt’=t”-t’”. It can be transferred to the performance detection of “resisting abnormal satellite time-frequency migration”.

[0076] Step 207: The detection of Δt’ is completed.

[0077] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any variations or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed in the present invention should be included within the scope of protection of the present invention. Therefore, the scope of protection of the present invention should be determined by the scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A power satellite navigation and timing security device detection device, characterized by: The application relates to a time synchronization test device for a satellite navigation security device, which comprises a controllable time mark frequency source (1), a time-providing security device (2), a satellite navigation time-providing module (3), an oscilloscope (4), a time synchronization tester (5), a first satellite antenna (6), a second satellite antenna (7), a first coaxial cable (81), a second coaxial cable (82), a first test clamp (91) and a second test clamp (92). The timing mark pulse signal output port (12) of the controllable time mark frequency source (1) is connected to the second channel input port (42) of the oscilloscope (4), the simulation signal output port (13) of the controllable time mark frequency source (1) is connected to the satellite antenna interface (21) of the time-providing security device (2) through the first coaxial cable (81), and the simulation signal output port (13) of the controllable time mark frequency source (1) is connected to the third channel input port (43) of the oscilloscope (4) through the first test clamp (91). The signal output port (22) of the time-providing security device (2) is connected to the satellite antenna interface (31) of the satellite navigation time-providing module (3) through the second coaxial cable (82), and the signal output port (22) of the time-providing security device (2) is connected to the fourth channel input port (44) of the oscilloscope (4) through the second test clamp (92). The second pulse signal output port (32) and the navigation message signal output port (33) of the satellite navigation time-providing module (3) are connected to the fifth channel input port (45) and the sixth channel input port (46) of the oscilloscope (4) respectively. The time synchronization signal output port (52) of the time synchronization tester (5) is connected to the first channel input port (41) of the oscilloscope (4). The first satellite antenna (6) is connected to the satellite antenna interface (11) of the controllable time mark frequency source (1), and the second satellite antenna (7) is connected to the satellite antenna interface (51) of the time synchronization tester (5).

2. The detection method of the detection device using the electric satellite navigation security device as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: The abnormal shutdown response time Delta t' of the baseband carrier signal strength of the satellite antenna interface (21) of the time-providing security device (2) receiving the baseband simulation signal RF from the starting time t' when the RF signal strength changes to the baseband carrier signal off time t" of the baseband carrier signal output from the signal output port (22) is detected through the following steps: Step 201: on the man-machine interface (48) of the oscilloscope (4), the rising edge time tp of the timing mark pulse signal PM input from the second channel input port (42) is locked and the waiting lock is started; Step 202: on the man-machine interface (18) of the controllable time mark frequency source (1), the baseband simulation signal RF signal strength control time value T' output from the simulation signal output port (13) is set as "T'=[MM:SS:mmm]", the RF signal strength control value I' at T' is set as "I'=j>C", and the PM output time is set as T', and the waiting T' is started; Step 203: on the man-machine interface (18) of the controllable time mark frequency source (1), the time T' is locked and the display "T'=[MM:SS:mmm]" and "I'=j" are started. ​ ​ Step 204: In the display record field of the oscilloscope (4) man-machine interface (48), the baseband carrier signal strength I of the baseband carrier signal RFO output by the signal output port (22) of the RF and timing security device (2) is identified by "I≈i<C" to "I≈j>C" to obtain t', and after t', the RFO signal strength I is identified by "I≈j" to "I≈0" to obtain the RFO signal off time t", and the standard IRIG-B time synchronization signal BS0 output once per second by the time synchronization signal output port (52) of the time synchronization tester (5) corresponding to the time period in which t' is located is identified by the rising edge time t0 of BS0 to decode the time information value Tb0 carried by BS0 to obtain the time value T0 at t0 as "T0=Tb0=[MM:SS]"; t0 and t" are used to identify the satellite navigation and timing module (3) second pulse signal output port (32) outputting the second pulse signal 1PPS0 and the satellite navigation and timing module (3) navigation message signal output port (33) outputting the navigation message frame signal NS0 lagging behind the first 1PPS0, so that it is observed that there is no subsequent second pulse signal 1PPS after 1PPS0 and no subsequent navigation message frame signal NS after NS0; Step 205: By knowing T0, t0, T', t', the time difference Δt between t' and t0 is obtained as "Δt=t'-t0≈mmm" and "T'=[MM:SS:mmm]≈T0+Δt=[MM:SS]+Δt"; Step 206: By knowing t', t", the baseband carrier signal strength abnormal off response time Δt' is obtained as "Δt'=t"-t'""; go to "resist abnormal satellite time-frequency migration" performance detection; Step 207: Δt' detection is completed.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein: The device setting and detection preparation steps of the detection circuit specifically include: Step 101: In the time synchronization tester (5) man-machine interface (58), set the working state and the satellite antenna interface (51) port signal time synchronization, and start the time synchronization signal output port (52) to output the standard IRIG-B time synchronization signal BS; Step 102: In the controllable time standard frequency source (1) man-machine interface (18), set the working state and the satellite antenna interface (11) port signal time synchronization, set the baseband simulation signal RF signal strength control value I' output by the simulation signal output port (13) to "I'=i<C", and start the simulation signal output port (13) to output RF; Step 103: In the timing security device (2) man-machine interface (28), set the baseband carrier signal monitoring threshold value Iv for monitoring the satellite antenna interface (21) signal strength to "Iv=C", start the satellite antenna interface (21) port RF input monitoring, and open the signal output port (22) to output the baseband carrier signal RFO; Step 104: Start the satellite navigation and timing module (3) and make it work normally; Step 105: At the oscilloscope (4) man-machine interface (48), set the first channel input port (41) to monitor the standard IRIG-B time synchronization signal BS output from the time synchronization signal output port (52), the second channel input port (42) to monitor the timing mark pulse signal PM output from the timing mark pulse signal output port (12), the third channel input port (43) to monitor RF, the fourth channel input port (44) to monitor RFO, the fifth channel input port (45) to monitor the second pulse signal 1PPS output from the second pulse signal output port (32), the sixth channel input port (46) to monitor the navigation message signal NS output from the navigation message signal output port (33), and the signal state is displayed as normal. Set the display recording area to be locked at the rising edge time t* of any 1PPS input from the fifth channel input port (45) and start waiting for locking; Step 106: At the oscilloscope (4) man-machine interface (48), the display recording area locked at t* should be consistent with the starting edge time t of a certain BS as "t*=t". Decoding BS gets the time information value Tb at time t, which should be consistent with the time information value Tr obtained by decoding the lagging NS as "Tr=Tb". The baseband carrier signal strength I of RF and RFO is "I≈i"; Step 107: The device setting and detection preparation work is completed.

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