Trusted network connection method of general composable security under cloud network end architecture

Abstract

This invention discloses a general, composable, secure, and trusted connection method under a cloud-network-device architecture. It primarily addresses the problems of existing trusted network connections where user and platform authentication cannot be bound together, and where scalable and sustainable connection authentication cannot be provided across networks. The implementation scheme is as follows: two terminals complete identity registration and platform registration in the cloud respectively; the platform trusted bases of the two terminals complete platform verification and generate an initial trusted base session key under cloud-network collaboration; the terminals complete identity verification and generate an initial identity base session key under cloud-network collaboration; in subsequent rounds, the trusted base completes platform verification and generates the current round's trusted base key, and the terminals complete two-way identity verification and generate the current round's identity key; a trusted connection is established between the terminals, and the current round's trusted connection key is output. This invention provides users with strong binding between platform verification and identity authentication, resists platform substitution attacks, continuously generates connection keys, maintains the scalability of trusted network connections, and can be used in cloud-network-device architecture scenarios.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of information security technology. It specifically designs a trusted connection framework in a general composable technology, which can be used in cloud-network-device architecture scenarios to ensure trusted network connections between terminals. Background Technology

[0002] The Internet of Things (IoT) originated from industrial automation and machine-to-machine (M2M) communication in the 1980s. With advancements in internet and wireless communication technologies, the widespread adoption of mobile internet in 2015, and the rollout of 5G technology, the IoT has experienced unprecedented growth. Currently, the number of connected IoT devices globally exceeds several billion, and this number is projected to reach several billion to tens of billions by 2025. As IoT devices are widely used in daily life and production, IoT security has become a pressing issue. If IoT security is not guaranteed, attackers can exploit vulnerabilities to infiltrate devices, steal sensitive data, manipulate systems, or launch large-scale cyberattacks. For businesses and organizations, a lack of IoT security can lead to business disruptions, financial losses, and reputational damage. Attacks on critical infrastructure can pose public safety risks, such as transportation system malfunctions, energy outages, and damage to medical equipment. Therefore, establishing secure connections for IoT terminals is urgent and necessary.

[0003] IoT terminal devices typically consist of a vast number of devices belonging to various management domains and employing diverse connection mechanisms. These devices are often unsupervised around the clock, operating in a self-managed and autonomous state. While these characteristics bring convenience and efficiency, they also introduce security vulnerabilities. The two main threats facing the IoT are traditional network attacks and attacks on terminal systems. Successful attacks can cause incalculable losses. Due to the massive diversity, heterogeneous mechanisms, and multi-domain coexistence of IoT terminal devices, it is difficult to find a unified security association solution. Furthermore, various IoT devices are vulnerable to diverse attacks, making the establishment of secure associations for IoT terminals a serious challenge.

[0004] A general, composable, secure, and trusted network connection method within a cloud-network-edge architecture can effectively address the challenges faced by the aforementioned IoT terminal systems. It can provide interactive services for multi-domain IoT systems and achieve composable security across multiple systems with heterogeneous mechanisms, breaking down barriers between different mechanisms. Lightweight cryptographic operations can effectively solve the problems of massive and diverse IoT terminal devices and insufficient computing power. Since IoT terminal systems are often unattended 24 / 7 and mostly autonomous, a chain structure can ensure synchronized state updates between connected parties without requiring additional manpower. Configuring network authentication protocols for the network connection framework can resist traditional network attacks, and trusted computing technology can effectively prevent attacks on terminal systems.

[0005] Typical network authentication protocols such as TLS were proposed in 1999 as a successor to SSL. TLS provides robust security and protection services by encrypting communication data, verifying the identities of communicating parties, and providing integrity protection to meet the ever-growing demands for network communication security. The TLS protocol plays a crucial role in web browsing, email, instant messaging, and mobile applications. It not only protects the secure transmission of sensitive information but also provides users with key functions such as confidentiality, data integrity, and authentication. The emergence of TLS has made network communication more secure and reliable, making significant contributions to protecting user privacy and data security. However, TLS cannot provide composable security and cannot provide effective security guarantees for multi-domain, heterogeneous IoT terminal systems.

[0006] The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) proposed the first version of the TPM specification in 2004. This specification defined the functions and interface standards of hardware security chips and was the first platform verification standard. The TNC specification, proposed by the TCG in 2010, defined a framework for network identity authentication and secure communication based on TPM, providing users with identity authentication. This authentication scheme, combining platform verification and identity authentication, provides users with secure and reliable network connection protection. However, this scheme cannot resist platform substitution attacks and does not support cross-network authentication.

[0007] In 2010, the paper "Universally composable secure TNC model and EAP-TNC protocol in IF-T" published in the journal *Science China Information Sciences* proposed a universally composable secure TNC protocol for trusted network connections. This paper established a universally composable security model for trusted network connections and proposed an ideal function for trusted network connections. EAP Certification Ideal Function and the EAP-TNC ideal function This paper proves that the existing protocol DH PN cannot safely realize ideal functions. A platform substitution attack targeting the DH PN protocol was discovered. By introducing twin DH switching technology, a method was designed to securely implement the ideal function. The protocol is TD-HPN. This solution can effectively resist platform substitution attacks, but it lacks scalability and persistence, and does not support cross-network authentication. Summary of the Invention

[0008] The purpose of this invention is to overcome the shortcomings of the prior art and propose a general, composable, secure, and trusted network connection method under a cloud-network-device architecture. This method provides sustainable key derivation services for IoT terminal devices and users while ensuring resistance to platform substitution attacks, better supports cross-network authentication, and improves the scalability of the framework.

[0009] To achieve the above objectives, the technical solution of the present invention includes the following steps:

[0010] (1) Initialize the key:

[0011] 1a) Terminal A and Terminal B complete identity registration and platform registration in the cloud respectively, and generate initial trusted base session key TK0 and initial identity base session key IK0 under cloud-network collaboration;

[0012] 1b) Under cloud-network collaboration, the trusted base TCB of terminal A A Trusted Base (TCB) of Terminal B B Complete platform verification and generate the initial trusted connection key RK0;

[0013] (2) Verify the trusted base of the two terminals:

[0014] 2a) Terminal A and Terminal B respectively verify the ideal function module of the platform. Send platform verification message (EAP-TNCRequest, sid, U) i ,NAR,NAA) and (EAP-TNC Response,sid,U i (NAR, NAA), where EAP-TNC Request is the trusted network connection initiation operation code, sid is the session identifier, and U i For the user's identity in the system, NAR is the platform information of the trusted network connection initiator, NAA is the platform information of the trusted network connection responder, and EAP-TNC Response is the trusted connection response operation code;

[0015] 2b) Platform verification of ideal function module The platform verification information received from two terminals A and B is checked and verified, and the verification results (EAP-TNC Established,sid,t) are sent to both terminals A and B. i ), where EAP-TNCEstablished indicates that the platform verification is complete, t i The authentication factor is generated during the i-th round of platform verification.

[0016] 2c) Two terminals A and B use the trusted base session key TK from the (i-1)th round. i-1 and Identity-Based Session Key (IK)i-1 and certification factor t i Generate the trusted base key for the i-th round: TK i =Hash(t) i TK i-1 IK i-1 ), where Hash(.) is the hash function;

[0017] (3) Verify the identities of the two terminal users:

[0018] 3a) Two terminals, A and B, respectively send data to the identity verification ideal function module. Send identity verification message (EAPRequest, sid, U) i ,NAR,NAA) and (EAP Response,sid,U i (,NAR,NAA), where EAP Request is the identity verification request operation code and EAP Response is the identity verification response operation code;

[0019] 3b) Ideal function module for identity verification Authenticate two terminals A and B and send the authentication results (EAP Established, sid, k) to them. i ), where EAP Established indicates successful authentication, k i Authentication factors generated during the identity verification process;

[0020] 3c) Two terminals A and B use the trusted base session key TK from the previous round. i-1 The previous round's identity-based session key IK i-1 and certification factor k i Generate the identity base key for this round: IK i =Hash(k) i TK i-1 IK i-1 );

[0021] (4) Establishment of trusted network connections

[0022] 4a) Terminals A and B respectively calculate the authentication key AK for this round. i And the trusted connection key RK for this round i :

[0023]

[0024]

[0025] Where f(.) is a pseudo-random function;

[0026] 4b) Terminal A sends a key confirmation message (TNC Success, sid, mac) to Terminal B, where TNC Success indicates a successful trusted network connection and mac is the message authentication code; Terminal B uses the authentication key AK i Checking the correctness of a Mac:

[0027] If correct, the two terminals complete the trusted connection for this round and locally store the key TK for this round. i And IK i and using RK i To communicate, execute (5);

[0028] Otherwise, the agreement will be terminated;

[0029] (5) The two terminals determine whether to proceed with the next round of communication based on their needs:

[0030] If necessary, let round number i = i + 1 and return to step 2;

[0031] Otherwise, the agreement will be terminated.

[0032] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following advantages:

[0033] 1) This invention adopts a cloud-network-device architecture, achieving multi-domain security management through the cloud, eliminating the limitations of traditional methods that cannot perform security management across multiple domains. Simultaneously, this invention supports cross-network authentication, enabling identity verification across network mechanisms and management domains, providing a more flexible and secure authentication method. Compared with existing technologies, this invention not only provides a higher level of security, suitable for complex multi-domain network environments, but also offers more reliable security guarantees for users and organizations.

[0034] 2) This invention introduces universal composable security, ensuring the solution remains secure even when executed concurrently with any number of other protocols, providing strong protection against various attacks. Simultaneously, the universal composable security supports modular design, making the invention highly reusable in security design and analysis, thus possessing strong scalability. Furthermore, by service-orientedizing security protocols, this invention provides secure and convenient trusted connection services for IoT terminal systems and customers, allowing users to establish secure connections with other users simply by calling the invention in a black-box manner.

[0035] 3) In the dual-chain interleaved structure of this invention, since the first key chain serves as the identity base key and the second key chain serves as the trusted base key, the interleaved structure strongly binds the keys on the two chains, thus fundamentally eliminating the possibility of malicious users launching platform substitution attacks. Furthermore, because in the chained structure, users only need to access the registration key in the cloud during the first communication, and thereafter can continuously derive session keys along the key chain, thus reducing dependence on public resources compared to existing technologies.

[0036] 4) The main component of the chain key structure of the present invention is a hash function. However, due to the limited computing power of IoT unmanned systems, they cannot use schemes that require high computing power. The lightweight hash function in the chain structure requires less computing resources than existing technologies and can be better suited for IoT unmanned system scenarios.

[0037] In summary, this invention, based on general composable security technology and a dual-chain interleaved structure, ensures identity authentication and platform authentication between IoT terminal devices, and adapts lightweight cryptographic algorithms to meet the secure connection requirements of IoT terminal devices. Attached Figure Description

[0038] Figure 1 This is a system model diagram used in this invention;

[0039] Figure 2 This is the overall flowchart of the implementation of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0040] The embodiments of the present invention will now be described in further detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0041] Reference Figure 1 The system model used in this invention includes three entities: cloud, network, and terminal.

[0042] Suppose there are two terminals, A and B, that are preparing to interact. They complete identity registration and platform registration in the cloud, respectively, and obtain the initial trusted base session key and identity base session key.

[0043] In the first round of interaction, both parties derive the new trusted base session key and identity base session key for this round, based on the registered initial trusted base session key and identity base session key, and the authentication factor obtained from the ideal function. Subsequently, both parties complete two-way identity authentication and output the trusted connection key for this round using the new trusted base session key and identity base session key generated in this round.

[0044] After the interaction ends, both parties save the trusted base session key and the identity base session key of this round and wait for the next connection.

[0045] Subsequent rounds are essentially identical to the first round, except that each round uses the trusted base session key and identity base session key stored in the previous round to derive the trusted connection key for the current round.

[0046] Reference Figure 2 The implementation steps of this example include the following:

[0047] Step 1: Initialize the key:

[0048] 1.1) Terminal A and Terminal B complete identity registration in the cloud, that is, reserve some identity authentication information and keys, including: identity verification key, signature key and user identity, and generate an initial identity base session key IK0 under cloud network collaboration, and then store it in the cloud and locally for later use;

[0049] 1.2) Terminal A and Terminal B respectively complete platform registration in the cloud, that is, reserve some platform authentication information and keys, including: endorsement key, storage key, binding key, inheritance key, authentication key and platform basic information, and generate an initial trusted base session key TK0 under cloud network collaboration, and then store it in the cloud and locally for later use;

[0050] 1.3) Under cloud-network collaboration, the trusted base TCB of terminal A A Trusted Base (TCB) of Terminal B B Starting with the Trusted Measurement Root Kernel (CRTM), the integrity of the entire platform's resources is measured using a chain of trust. Trusted reports are then provided to the cloud via the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). Specifically, after the CRTM starts the system, it measures key components and firmware, including the bootloader, firmware, and operating system. During system operation, whenever a key component changes, the CRTM generates a corresponding incremental measurement. The system records the incremental measurement result and the initial measurement result through a measurement log to form a chain of trust. Using the measurement log and the chain of trust, the integrity and trustworthiness of each component in the system are verified, and a trusted report is generated based on the measurement log and the chain of trust.

[0051] 1.4) The cloud uses the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) of terminal A. A TPM with Terminal B B The provided trusted report generates the initial trusted base session key RK0.

[0052] Step 2: Verify the trusted base of the two terminals.

[0053] 2.1) Based on the security requirements and attacker behavior of the platform verification process, a model is created and the platform verification protocol is abstracted into an ideal function module for platform verification.

[0054] 2.2) Terminal A and Terminal B respectively verify the ideal function module of the platform. Send platform verification message (EAP-TNCRequest, sid, U) i ,NAR,NAA) and (EAP-TNC Response,sid,U i (NAR, NAA), where:

[0055] EAP-TNC Request is an operation code initiated for a trusted network connection, where sid is the session identifier, and U... i For the user's identity in the system, NAR is the platform information of the trusted network connection initiator, NAA is the platform information of the trusted network connection responder, and EAP-TNC Response is the trusted connection response operation code;

[0056] 2.3) Platform verification of ideal function module The platform integrity of two terminals, A and B, is assessed separately. The platform verification information received from terminals A and B is checked and verified, that is, the platform verification request information received from terminals A and B is compared and verified with the information registered by the platform in the cloud.

[0057] If both terminals A and B pass the comparison check, then the platform verifies the ideal function module. Choose a random authentication factor t i Send the platform verification result (EAP-TNC Established,sid,t) to terminal A and terminal B. i ), where EAP-TNC Established indicates platform verification completion information, t i The authentication factor is generated during the i-th round of platform verification.

[0058] If at least one terminal platform fails the comparison verification step, then verify whether the platform has been compromised by an attacker:

[0059] If the system has been compromised by an attacker, then the authentication factor t′ chosen by the attacker will be used. i Send platform verification results (EAP-TNC Established,sid,t′) to terminal A and terminal B. i );

[0060] If the attacker fails to compromise the protocol, then the execution of the protocol will be terminated.

[0061] 2.4) Two terminals A and B use the trusted base session key TK from the (i-1)th round. i-1 and Identity-Based Session Key (IK) i-1 and certification factor t iGenerate the trusted base key for the i-th round: TK i =Hash(t) i TK i-1 IK i-1 ),in:

[0062] Hash(.) is a hash function;

[0063] TK i-1 When i = 1, it is the initial trusted base key TK0 registered in the cloud; when i ≠ 1, it is the trusted base session key TK for the (i-1)th round. i-1 ;

[0064] IK i-1 When i = 1, it is the initial identity base key IK0 registered in the cloud; when i ≠ 1, it is the identity base session key IK for the (i-1)th round. i-1 .

[0065] Step 3: Verify the identities of the two terminal users.

[0066] 3.1) Use general composable techniques to analyze the security requirements and attacker behaviors of the identity verification process, model them, and abstract the identity verification protocol into an ideal identity verification function module.

[0067] 3.2) Two terminals, A and B, respectively send data to the identity verification ideal function module. Send identity verification message (EAPRequest, sid, U) i ,NAR,NAA) and (EAP Response,sid,U i (,NAR,NAA), where EAP Request is the identity verification request operation code and EAP Response is the identity verification response operation code;

[0068] 3.3) Ideal function module for identity verification Upon receiving identity verification requests from two terminals, A and B, their identity verification is performed based on their different cloud-based settings:

[0069] If at least one party fails to register in the cloud, or if the identity information in the identity verification request does not match the registration information in the cloud, the execution of the agreement shall be terminated.

[0070] If the identity information of both terminals A and B is verified through the cloud and the submitted identity authentication factors are both valid, then a random authentication factor k is selected. i And send the identity verification result (EAP Established, sid, k) to terminal A and terminal B. i ), where EAP Established indicates successful authentication, ki Authentication factors generated during the identity verification process;

[0071] If the identity information of both terminals A and B is verified through the cloud, but at least one of them submits an invalid key exchange factor, then proceed to step 3.4.

[0072] 3.4) Determine if a user with an illegitimate key exchange factor has been compromised by an attacker:

[0073] If a user who submitted an invalid key exchange factor has been compromised by an attacker, then the authentication factor k chosen by the attacker will be used. i Send the identity verification results (EAP Established, sid, k) to two terminals A and B respectively. i ′), execute 3.5);

[0074] If the user who submitted the invalid key exchange factor has not been compromised by an attacker, the execution of the protocol will be terminated.

[0075] 3.5) Two terminals A and B use the trusted base session key TK from the previous round. i-1 The previous round's identity-based session key IK i-1 and certification factor k i Generate the identity base key for this round: IK i =Hash(k) i TK i-1 IK i-1 ),in:

[0076] TK i-1 When i = 1, it is the initial trusted base key TK0 registered in the cloud; when i ≠ 1, it is the trusted base session key TK for the (i-1)th round. i-1 ;

[0077] IK i-1 When i = 1, it is the initial identity base key IK0 registered in the cloud; when i ≠ 1, it is the identity base session key IK for the (i-1)th round. i-1 .

[0078] Step 4: Establish a connection to a trusted network.

[0079] 4.1) Both terminals A and B calculate their respective authentication keys AK for this round. i And the trusted connection key RK for this round i :

[0080]

[0081]

[0082] Where f(.) is a pseudo-random function;

[0083] 4.2) Terminal A sends a key confirmation message (TNC Success, sid, mac) to Terminal B, where TNC Success indicates a successful trusted network connection, and mac is the key confirmation message using the AK key. i The message authentication code for the key confirmation message calculated for the key.

[0084] 4.3) After receiving the key confirmation message, terminal B uses the authentication key AK i Checking the correctness of a Mac:

[0085] If correct, then terminal A and terminal B complete the trusted connection for this round, and locally store the trusted base key TK for this round. i and identity base key IK i and utilize the trusted connection key RK i To initiate communication, proceed to step 5.

[0086] Otherwise, the agreement will be terminated;

[0087] Step 5: The two terminals determine whether to proceed with the next round of communication based on their needs.

[0088] If necessary, let round number i = i + 1 and return to step 2;

[0089] Otherwise, the agreement will be terminated.

[0090] The above description is merely a specific example of the present invention and does not constitute any limitation on the present invention. Obviously, those skilled in the art, after understanding the content and principles of the present invention, may make various modifications and changes in form and detail without departing from the principles and structure of the present invention. However, these modifications and changes based on the ideas of the present invention are within the scope of protection of the claims of the present invention.

Claims

1. A general, composable, secure, and trusted network connection method under a cloud-network-device architecture, comprising the following steps: (1) Initialize the key: 1a) Terminal A and Terminal B complete identity registration and platform registration in the cloud respectively, and generate initial trusted base session key TK0 and initial identity base session key IK0 under cloud-network collaboration; 1b) Under cloud-network collaboration, the trusted base TCB of terminal A A Trusted Base (TCB) of Terminal B B Complete platform verification and generate the initial trusted connection key RK0; (2) Verify the trusted base of the two terminals: 2a) Terminal A and Terminal B respectively verify the ideal function module of the platform. Send platform verification message (EAP-TNCRequest, sid, U) i ,NAR,NAA) and (EAP-TNC Response,sid,U i (NAR, NAA), where EAP-TNC Request is the trusted network connection initiation operation code, sid is the session identifier, and U i For the user's identity in the system, NAR is the platform information of the trusted network connection initiator, NAA is the platform information of the trusted network connection responder, and EAP-TNC Response is the trusted connection response operation code; 2b) Platform verification of ideal function module The platform verification information received from two terminals A and B is checked and verified, and the verification results (EAP-TNC Established,sid,t) are sent to both terminals A and B. i ), where EAP-TNCEstablished indicates that the platform verification is complete, t i The authentication factor is generated during the i-th round of platform verification. 2c) Two terminals A and B use the trusted base session key TK from the (i-1)th round. i-1 and Identity-Based Session Key (IK) i-1 and certification factor t i Generate the trusted base key for the i-th round: TK i =Hash(t) i TK i-1 IK i-1 ), where Hash(.) is the hash function; (3) Verify the identities of the two terminal users: 3a) Two terminals, A and B, respectively send data to the identity verification ideal function module. Send identity verification message (EAP Request, sid, U) i ,NAR,NAA) and (EAP Response,sid,U i (,NAR,NAA), where EAP Request is the identity verification request operation code and EAP Response is the identity verification response operation code; 3b) Ideal function module for identity verification Authenticate two terminals A and B and send the authentication results (EAP Established, sid, k) to them. i ), where EAP Established indicates successful authentication, k i Authentication factors generated during the identity verification process; 3c) Two terminals A and B use the trusted base session key TK from the previous round. i-1 The previous round's identity-based session key IK i-1 and certification factor k i Generate the identity base key for this round: IK i =Hash(k) i TK i-1 IK i-1 ); (4) Establishment of trusted network connections 4a) Terminals A and B respectively calculate the authentication key AK for this round. i And the trusted connection key RK for this round i : Where f(.) is a pseudo-random function; 4b) Terminal A sends a key confirmation message (TNC Success, sid, mac) to Terminal B, where TNC Success indicates a successful trusted network connection and mac is the message authentication code; Terminal B uses the authentication key AK i Checking the correctness of a Mac: If correct, the two terminals complete the trusted connection for this round and locally store the key TK for this round. i And IK i and using RK i To communicate, execute (5); Otherwise, the agreement will be terminated; (5) The two terminals determine whether to proceed with the next round of communication based on their needs: If necessary, let round number i = i + 1 and return to step 2; Otherwise, the agreement will be terminated.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step 1a), terminal A and terminal B complete identity registration in the cloud respectively, which reserves some identity authentication information and keys, including: identity verification key, signature key and user identity.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step 1a), terminal A and terminal B complete platform registration in the cloud, which reserves some platform authentication information and keys, including: endorsement key, storage key, binding key, inheritance key, authentication key and platform basic information.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step 1b), the trusted base TCB of terminal A A Trusted Base (TCB) of Terminal B B The platform verification process begins with the Trusted Measurement Root Kernel (CRTM) and uses a trust chain approach to measure the integrity of all platform resources. This yields an integrity measurement value, which is then used by the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to provide trust reports to other entities. Visitors use these reports to determine the platform's trustworthiness.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, Terminal A and Terminal B respectively use the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) A and TPM B Providing trusted reports to other entities is achieved as follows: After the Trusted Measurement Root (CRTM) boots the system, it measures key components and firmware, including the bootloader, firmware, and operating system. During system operation, whenever a critical component changes, the Trust Measurement Root Kernel (CRTM) generates a corresponding incremental measurement. The system records the incremental measurement result and the initial measurement result through the measurement log to form a trust chain. Using metric logs and trust chains, the integrity and trustworthiness of each component in the system are verified, and a trust report is generated based on the metric logs and trust chains. This trust report is then provided to other entities through the Trusted Platform Module (TPM).

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step 2b) Platform verification of ideal function module The verification and validation of platform verification information received from two terminals, A and B, is performed in the platform verification ideal function module. After receiving platform verification requests from two terminals, A and B, the received information is compared and verified with the information registered on the platform in the cloud: If both terminals A and B pass the comparison check, the platform verifies the ideal function module. Choose a random authentication factor t i Send the platform verification result (EAP-TNC Established,sid,t) to terminal A and terminal B. i ); If at least one terminal platform fails the comparison verification step, then verify whether the platform has been compromised by an adversary: If a platform that fails the comparison and verification step has been compromised by an adversary, then the authentication factor t selected by the adversary will be used. i Send platform verification results (EAP-TNC Established, sid, t) to terminals A and B. i ′); If a platform that fails the comparison and verification process has not been compromised by an adversary, the execution of the agreement will be terminated.

7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step 3b) Identity verification ideal function module To authenticate two terminals A and B, the following steps are performed: 3b1) Ideal function module for identity verification Upon receiving identity verification requests from two terminals, A and B, their identity verification is performed based on their different cloud-based settings: If at least one party fails to register in the cloud, or if the identity information in the identity verification request does not match the registration information in the cloud, the execution of the agreement shall be terminated. If the identity information of both terminals A and B is verified through the cloud and the submitted identity authentication factors are both valid, then a random authentication factor k is selected. i And send the identity verification result (EAP Established, sid, k) to terminal A and terminal B. i ); If the identity information of both terminals A and B is verified through the cloud, but at least one of them submits an invalid key exchange factor, then execute 3b2); 3b2) Determine if a user who submitted an invalid key exchange factor has been compromised by an adversary: If a user who submitted an invalid key exchange factor has been compromised by an adversary, then the authentication factor k chosen by the adversary will be used. i Send the identity verification results (EAP Established, sid, k) to two terminals A and B respectively. i ′); If the user who submitted the invalid key exchange factor has not been compromised by an adversary, the execution of the protocol will be terminated.

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