GNSS / SINS Integrated Navigation Signal Detection and Anti-interference Methods under Satellite Disturbance Environment

By employing a GNSS/SINS integrated navigation signal detection method, utilizing satellite weights and signal confidence calculations, and combining inertial-assisted loop technology, the accuracy and reliability issues of satellite navigation systems in urban environments and under electronic interference were resolved. This enabled rapid identification and isolation of spoofing signals, thereby improving the receiver's anti-interference capability.

CN117288186BActive Publication Date: 2026-11-17NANJING UNIV OF SCI & TECH
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202311442073.1
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2023-10-31
Publication Date
2026-11-17
Estimated Expiration
2043-10-31

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The accuracy and reliability of satellite navigation systems are affected by urban environments and electronic interference. Existing methods for detecting deception interference suffer from high computational load or hardware complexity, making it difficult to effectively identify slowly changing deception interference.

Method used

The GNSS/SINS integrated navigation signal detection method is adopted. By setting the elevation cutoff angle, allocating satellite weight factors and signal confidence, and combining a multi-level joint detection algorithm for spoofing interference signals, the receiver acquisition signal power and tracking threshold are adjusted using inertial-assisted loop technology to achieve rapid identification and isolation of spoofing signals.

Benefits of technology

It enables rapid and accurate detection of spoofing signals in environments with satellite disturbances, improves the receiver's anti-interference capability, and ensures that positioning accuracy remains stable in complex environments.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

This invention discloses a method for GNSS / SINS integrated navigation signal detection and anti-interference under satellite disturbance environment. The method is as follows: First, select satellites with elevation angles greater than the elevation cutoff angle, and assign a weight factor W to each satellite. i and signal confidence C i Then, based on the satellite weighting factor and satellite signal confidence level, satellite availability calculation and satellite selection are performed. Next, a multi-level joint detection algorithm for spoofing interference signals is used to detect whether the system is in a spoofing interference environment. Finally, through inertial auxiliary loop technology, the influence of the inertial navigation system on the receiver's acquisition signal power and tracking threshold is adjusted to ensure that the interference-to-signal ratio meets system requirements. This invention features a simple algorithm, fast recognition speed, and high recognition accuracy. It can isolate spoofing signals and improve the receiver's anti-interference capability.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of integrated navigation anti-interference technology, and in particular to a method for GNSS / SINS integrated navigation signal detection and anti-interference under satellite disturbance environment. Background Technology

[0002] Satellite navigation systems are affected by a variety of factors, including urban environments, jamming, and deception. These factors pose significant challenges to the accuracy and reliability of satellite navigation systems, requiring specialized research and solutions.

[0003] First, the urban environment is one of the important factors affecting the performance of satellite navigation systems. Tall buildings, narrow streets, and other obstructions can cause problems such as signal attenuation, multipath effects, and signal intermittency. These factors cause satellite availability to fluctuate constantly, which adversely affects the accuracy of positioning and navigation.

[0004] Secondly, the use of electronic jamming equipment by adversaries or malicious actors to interfere with the reception and processing of satellite signals can severely impact the performance of satellite navigation systems. To counter this interference, it is necessary to enhance the anti-jamming capabilities of receivers and establish secure and reliable navigation authentication mechanisms and anti-spoofing algorithms to ensure that the navigation system uses genuine and reliable signals for navigation and positioning.

[0005] To address the problem of interference with satellite navigation, researchers are developing novel antenna designs and positioning algorithms to improve the signal reception capabilities of navigation systems in complex environments. They are also exploring the use of multi-sensor fusion technology to combine satellite, inertial, and other navigation systems, thereby improving the overall accuracy and reliability of navigation.

[0006] In the research of satellite signal anti-spoofing technology, spoofing interference detection technology can be divided into six categories: navigation data information, space processing, radio frequency front-end processing, baseband digital signal processing, positioning and navigation calculation results, and machine learning. However, most detection methods have a large difference between theory and engineering implementation. To achieve a high detection probability of spoofing interference signals, it is necessary to greatly increase the amount of computation or significantly increase the complexity of hardware design.

[0007] Spoofing jamming has two main methods: forwarding and generation. Generational spoofing jamming involves attackers generating misleading signals to interfere with or mislead the receiver. It is primarily divided into two types: abrupt and gradual change. Abrupt spoofing jamming is simple to implement; it typically involves sudden signal changes to confuse the receiver's interpretation and processing of the signal. Gradual change spoofing jamming involves attackers gradually altering the signal's properties or parameters over a longer period to achieve the jamming effect. Unlike abrupt spoofing jamming, gradual change uses a more gradual and covert approach to signal changes, aiming to reduce the likelihood of detection. This type of jamming usually requires a longer time to achieve the slow signal changes, aiming to mislead the receiver's interpretation and judgment of the signal; however, this jamming method is more difficult to implement. Summary of the Invention

[0008] The purpose of this invention is to provide a GNSS / SINS integrated navigation signal detection and anti-interference method that is simple in algorithm, has high recognition accuracy, fast recognition speed, can isolate spoofing signals, and improves the anti-interference capability of the receiver.

[0009] The technical solution to achieve the purpose of this invention is: a method for detecting and resisting interference of GNSS / SINS integrated navigation signals under satellite disturbance environment, comprising the following steps:

[0010] Step 1: Set the elevation cutoff angle E0. Select satellites with elevation angles greater than E0 for weight calculation, and do not perform weight calculation on satellites with elevation angles less than E0.

[0011] Step 2: Assign a weighting factor W to each satellite. i ;

[0012] Step 3: Assign a signal confidence level C to each satellite. i ;

[0013] Step 4: Based on the satellite weighting factor W i and satellite signal confidence C i To perform satellite availability calculations and satellite selection;

[0014] Step 5: Use a multi-level joint detection algorithm for deception interference signals to detect whether the system is in a deception interference environment;

[0015] Step 6: By using inertial auxiliary loop technology, adjust the degree of influence of the inertial navigation system on the receiver's acquisition signal power and tracking threshold, so that the interference-to-signal ratio meets the system requirements.

[0016] Furthermore, in step 1, the elevation cutoff angle E0 is set, and satellites with elevation angles greater than E0 are selected for weight calculation, while satellites with elevation angles less than E0 are not included in the weight calculation. Specifically, the details are as follows:

[0017] In real-world scenarios, a low satellite elevation angle can cause multipath effects, leading to discrepancies in pseudorange measurements and affecting positioning accuracy. Therefore, an elevation cutoff angle E0 is set according to the application scenario. For ground positioning, due to numerous obstructions from buildings and other factors, E0 is set to 10°; for low-altitude aircraft positioning, E0 is set to 5°. When the elevation angle of satellite i is lower than the elevation cutoff angle E0, its weighting factor W is adjusted. i Set it directly to 0, and it will not participate in the weight calculation process.

[0018] Furthermore, step 2 involves assigning a weighting factor W to each satellite. i The details are as follows:

[0019] Set a weighting factor W for each captured satellite. i The weighting factor represents the magnitude of the satellite's impact on positioning accuracy; the larger the weighting factor, the greater the satellite's role in the current positioning. Assume the receiver currently acquires n satellites, and the observation matrix is ​​H. n The observation component of satellite i is h i The observation matrix for the remaining n-1 satellites is H. n-1 We can obtain the following formula:

[0020]

[0021] According to the Sherman-Morrison formula, when A∈R n×n Let u, v ∈ R be an invertible matrix. n When the matrix is ​​a column vector, its inverse is:

[0022]

[0023] part According to equations (2) and (3), then:

[0024]

[0025] make Rearranging equation (4) yields:

[0026]

[0027] The weight of satellite i's influence on the satellite distribution among the current n satellites is:

[0028]

[0029] In the formula Δh ij,j For ΔA i The diagonal elements, where j = 1, 2, 3, 4; W iis the weighting factor for satellite i at the current time.

[0030] Furthermore, step 3 involves assigning a signal confidence level C to each satellite. i The details are as follows:

[0031] Set the signal confidence level C for each satellite. i This value represents the signal accuracy of the satellite. A lower value indicates that the satellite signal deviates further from the estimated true signal and is more difficult to correct; conversely, a higher value indicates a higher degree of accuracy. The formula is as follows:

[0032]

[0033] In the formula, C adaptire_i For satellite signal adaptive confidence, based on signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and pseudorange error ρ err The parameters are adaptively adjusted based on their magnitude and changes. When there is a large jump in the signal-to-noise ratio or pseudorange information value, the confidence level of the satellite is reduced.

[0034] Furthermore, the method for adjusting the adaptive confidence level of the satellite signal is as follows:

[0035] The signal confidence level C of the satellite is determined based on the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) jump. i The method is as follows:

[0036]

[0037] In the formula, dSNR ave_i Let SNR be the average jump value of the signal-to-noise ratio of the i-th satellite. cur_i Let i be the current signal-to-noise ratio value of the i-th satellite. Let n be the signal-to-noise ratio value of the i-th satellite in the previous time interval, and n be the number of counts in a certain period of time, set to the number of counts in 5 seconds.

[0038] Jump detection threshold dSNR i for:

[0039] dSNR i =dSNR ave_i *1.2 (9)

[0040] The next signal-to-noise ratio jump value is compared with the threshold dSNR. i For comparison, when the next signal-to-noise ratio jump variable exceeds dSNR i This reduces the confidence level of satellite i; the amount of confidence reduction each time is dC. i for:

[0041]

[0042] The lower the original confidence level of a satellite, the greater the decrease in satellite confidence level; when the signal-to-noise ratio jump does not exceed the average signal-to-noise ratio jump value, the confidence level of the satellite is increased by a fixed 0.05.

[0043] Furthermore, step 4, based on the satellite weighting factor W... i and satellite signal confidence C i The satellite availability calculation and satellite selection process is carried out as follows:

[0044] Step 4.1: Based on the satellite weighting factor W i and satellite signal confidence C i The formula for calculating satellite priority is:

[0045]

[0046] Priority in the formula i This indicates the priority of satellite i for positioning, and n represents the number of currently available satellites;

[0047] Step 4.2: When in an interference-free environment, the satellite weighting factor and confidence level have equal influence on satellite selection priority. When there is interference in the environment, the influence of confidence level on satellite selection priority remains unchanged, while the influence of weighting factor on satellite selection priority is adjusted according to the number of available satellites. Based on the minimum requirement of 4 satellites for positioning, the more satellites there are, the smaller the influence of weighting factor on satellite selection priority.

[0048] Furthermore, step 5 employs a multi-level joint detection algorithm for deception interference signals to detect whether the system is in a deception interference environment, as detailed below:

[0049] Step 5.1: Detect the signal-to-noise ratio, as follows:

[0050] Under interference-free conditions, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of satellite signals is high; when satellite signals are interfered with by spoofing signals, the SNR changes as follows:

[0051]

[0052] In the formula, SNR′ represents the signal-to-noise ratio of the receiver after receiving a spoofed signal, and P s P represents the power of the actual satellite signal. i N is the power of the deception signal, and N0 is the system noise power spectral density.

[0053] Converting the actual satellite signal power change in equation (15) into more readily available distance information between the receiver and the satellite, the change in signal-to-noise ratio after the receiver is subjected to a deceptive signal is:

[0054]

[0055] In the formula, α is a parameter related to the distance between the receiver and the satellite;

[0056] Under spoofing interference, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of a satellite signal is reduced due to the power of the spoofing signal; the higher the power of the spoofing signal, the lower the SNR, and αP. i It is the increase in the noise floor of the satellite signal received by the receiver. Deception interference signals will increase the noise floor of the received signal.

[0057] The appropriate threshold is set based on the actual situation of the receiver to determine whether the receiver is under attack by a spoofing signal; the signal-to-noise ratio threshold is set as follows:

[0058]

[0059] In the formula, SNR0 is the signal-to-noise ratio threshold, and SNR i_visible Let N be the signal-to-noise ratio of the i-th visible satellite, and N be the number of visible satellites.

[0060] When the threshold is exceeded, an alarm is issued indicating possible deception interference, and the confidence level of satellite i is reduced according to formula (10);

[0061] Step 5.2: Detect the receiver clock error, as follows:

[0062] The pseudorange equation for a single satellite after satellite clock error compensation is:

[0063]

[0064] In the formula, ρ i Let x represent the pseudorange from the i-th satellite to the target antenna, (x) s y s , z s (x) represents the three-dimensional position of the satellite. u y u , z u ) represents the three-dimensional position of the target object, Δt u For local clock difference, This is the sum of errors in the ionosphere, troposphere, and other error terms.

[0065] After obtaining N pseudo-distance equations of this expression, a system of equations is formed and linearized to obtain:

[0066] G·ΔX u =b (19)

[0067] In the formula, ΔX u =[Δx u Δy u Δz u Δt u ] TFor state variables;

[0068]

[0069]

[0070] The least squares solution to equation (19) is:

[0071] Δx0=(G T G) -1 G T b (22)

[0072] Since Δx0=[Δx u Δy u Δz u Δt u ] T The clock difference Δt can be obtained through equation (22). u ;

[0073] Common errors in pseudorange observations can significantly impact clock bias. The intrusion of deceptive signals can cause fluctuations in clock bias, which can be used to detect these fluctuations. Because the variables themselves are directly used as the basis for judging deceptive signals, multiple judgment criteria are needed to prevent outliers in the data from affecting the detection process.

[0074] Δt u_pre0 -Δt u_pre1 ≤2×(Δt u_pre1 -Δt u ) (twenty three)

[0075] In the formula, Δt u_pre0 , Δt u_pre1 These represent the clock difference values ​​at the previous two time points and the previous time point, respectively. If the clock difference jump at the current time is large, an alert is issued and Δt is saved. u_pre1 The value is the new Δt u _ pre0 The clock difference is used to continue comparing the jump amplitude at the next moment. If it exceeds twice, an alarm is triggered that it may be attacked by a deceptive interference signal. Under normal circumstances, the clock difference jump has upper and lower limits, and there will be outliers at some times. When an interference signal occurs, the clock difference jump amplitude will exceed the range of the upper and lower limits. At this time, the occurrence of the interference signal can be determined, and pseudorange and pseudorange rate detection can be performed to confirm the existence of the deceptive signal.

[0076] Step 5.3: Based on the pseudorange and pseudorange rate information, perform consistency detection of pseudorange and pseudorange rate using inertial assistance, as detailed below:

[0077] By analyzing changes in pseudorange and pseudorange rate, we can determine whether satellite signals are being interfered with or spoofed. The formula is as follows:

[0078]

[0079] In the formula, ρ u , These represent the pseudorange and pseudorange rate of the antenna relative to the satellite, respectively, output by the GNSS receiver. m , These are the pseudorange and pseudorange rate of the carrier relative to the satellite, calculated from inertial navigation information combined with satellite ephemeris, and Δρ, respectively. These represent the errors between the two calculation methods;

[0080] For the i-th satellite, its corresponding ρ m , The calculation method is as follows:

[0081]

[0082]

[0083] Where, ρ m_i , These are the pseudorange and pseudorange rate of SINS relative to satellite i, respectively. m y m , z m ), These represent the position and velocity of the inertial system in the ECEF coordinate system, respectively. These represent the position and velocity of satellite i in the ECEF coordinate system, respectively.

[0084] Under normal circumstances, the error divergence of an inertial system is very small in a short period of time, Δρ, The values ​​are all very small; however, when there is a sudden spoofing signal, the receiver's position, velocity, or time information is skewed, and the pseudorange and pseudorange rate calculated by the receiver will be deviated; according to Δρ under normal circumstances, Set appropriate threshold values ​​for the values, and refer to Equations (8) and (9) for the setting method. When it is detected that the two exceed the set threshold values, it is determined that they have been interfered with by the deception signal.

[0085] When a slowly varying deception signal exists, a periodic enhancement detection is designed. Utilizing the high precision of inertial navigation in a short time, the pseudorange rate calculated from the inertial navigation velocity is periodically constructed. This pseudorange rate is then compared with the pseudorange rate calculated from the satellite navigation results to construct a statistical check, thus achieving slowly varying deception detection. Since the inertial navigation position information is obtained by integrating the velocity information, the error in the position information accumulates faster. In equation (24), the pseudorange information ρ derived from the position... m Error accumulation also occurs faster than pseudorange rate information. Therefore, pseudorange rate consistency detection is used to perform statistical analysis on the pseudorange rate sequence.

[0086] Differentiating equation (18) for satellite pseudorange yields the pseudorange rate equation, which is:

[0087]

[0088] In the formula This represents the pseudorange rate of the i-th satellite. This represents the change in distance between the satellite and the receiver. Indicates receiver clock frequency drift. This represents the delayed rate of change in the ionosphere and troposphere, which is less sensitive to time changes, so it is discarded.

[0089] Will Expressed as the vector difference in velocity between the satellite and the receiver, rearranging equation (27) yields:

[0090]

[0091] In the formula, v i Let v be the velocity vector of the i-th satellite and v be the velocity vector of the receiver. When the spoofing interference source processes the original satellite signal to generate a spoofing signal or directly forwards it, the inconsistency of the velocity vector due to the change in signal direction will cause a jump in the pseudorange rate of the actually acquired satellite signal. Therefore, the statistical test of the residual of the receiver pseudorange rate is constructed as follows:

[0092]

[0093] In the formula, This represents the theoretical residual of the pseudorange rate between the receiver and satellite i. Utilizing the high precision of inertial navigation velocity information over short time intervals, the pseudorange rate is calculated using the inertial navigation velocity. Alternative Theory Pseudorange

[0094] The residuals caused by inertial navigation velocity drift diverge over time. Within the inspection period, when the residuals exceed the set threshold for residuals caused by inertial navigation drift, the satellite's signal is determined to be a spoofing signal. Outliers are identified by calculating the mean and standard deviation of the residuals and using these statistical data. The formula is as follows:

[0095]

[0096]

[0097] In the formula, s represents the mean of the residuals. ∈ The standard deviation of the residuals is represented by n, which represents the sample size. i Let represent the residual of the i-th observation; according to the properties of the normal distribution, approximately 99.7% of the observations will be within 3 seconds. ∈Within the range, therefore when the observation exceeds 3s ∈ If the value falls within the specified range, it is considered an outlier.

[0098] Furthermore, step 6 involves adjusting the influence of the inertial navigation system on the receiver's acquisition signal power and tracking threshold using inertial auxiliary loop technology, so that the interference-to-signal ratio meets the system requirements, as detailed below:

[0099] During inertial-assisted acquisition, the position, velocity, and acceleration information output by the inertial navigation system are used, combined with the satellite's position and velocity information, to calculate the Doppler frequency shift and its resulting frequency error, code shift, and pseudorange information. The calculated Doppler frequency shift is then... PN code frequency offset τ and code shift Δτ dyn The data is transmitted to the numerically controlled oscillator (NCO), the voltage-controlled oscillator (VCC), and the code generator (PN), respectively. Using the time position provided by GNSS / SINS, the initial values ​​of the code phase and Doppler frequency shift are set to complete the acquisition process.

[0100] Furthermore, the structure of the inertial auxiliary loop is as follows:

[0101] The code ring uses a carrier-assisted second-order delay phase-locked loop (DLL); the carrier ring uses an inertial-assisted third-order phase-locked loop (PLL); a first-order low-pass filter is incorporated into the inertial-assisted section. The loop filter of the third-order phase-locked loop (PLL) is selected in the following form:

[0102]

[0103] The external frequency auxiliary deviation is obtained by estimating the speed deviation and clock frequency deviation through the navigation filter. The reference input signal is added, differentiated, and then passed through the inertial filter to obtain the external frequency auxiliary information.

[0104] The phase error output by the phase detector is the difference between the phase of the reference input signal and the phase of the external phase noise and the output signal of the voltage-controlled oscillator;

[0105] The phase error is filtered by the loop filter of the third-order phase-locked loop (PLL), added to the external frequency auxiliary information, and integrated to obtain the output signal phase of the voltage-controlled oscillator.

[0106] Compared with the prior art, the significant advantages of this invention are: (1) It simultaneously considers the two main factors affecting positioning accuracy, namely satellite spatial geometric distribution and observation error, and completes the current satellite availability judgment in real time to complete the positioning satellite selection work. The algorithm is simple and the recognition speed is fast; (2) It makes full use of the advantages of GNSS / SINS integrated navigation and designs an algorithm that enables the system to have good detection effect on sudden and gradual deception signals, and also has a certain ability to suppress interference signals. The recognition accuracy is high, and it can isolate deception signals, thereby improving the anti-interference capability of the receiver. Attached Figure Description

[0107] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the GNSS / SINS integrated navigation signal detection and anti-interference method under satellite disturbance conditions according to the present invention.

[0108] Figure 2 This is a curve showing the star selection effect on complex road sections in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0109] Figure 3 This is a graph showing the effect of satellite selection on horizontal positioning accuracy in complex environments, as described in this invention embodiment.

[0110] Figure 4 This is a graph showing the clock difference jump results in an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0111] The present invention will now be described in further detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.

[0112] Combination Figure 1 The present invention discloses a method for detecting and resisting interference of GNSS / SINS integrated navigation signals under satellite disturbance environment, comprising the following steps:

[0113] A method for GNSS / SINS integrated navigation signal detection and anti-interference under satellite disturbance environment includes the following steps:

[0114] Step 1: Set the elevation cutoff angle E0. Select satellites with elevation angles greater than E0 for weight calculation, and do not perform weight calculation on satellites with elevation angles less than E0.

[0115] Step 2: Assign a weighting factor W to each satellite. i ;

[0116] Step 3: Assign a signal confidence level C to each satellite. i ;

[0117] Step 4: Based on the satellite weighting factor W i and satellite signal confidence C i To perform satellite availability calculations and satellite selection;

[0118] Step 5: Use a multi-level joint detection algorithm for deception interference signals to detect whether the system is in a deception interference environment;

[0119] Step 6: By using inertial auxiliary loop technology, adjust the degree of influence of the inertial navigation system on the receiver's acquisition signal power and tracking threshold, so that the interference-to-signal ratio meets the system requirements.

[0120] As a specific example, in step 1, an elevation cutoff angle E0 is set. Satellites with elevation angles greater than E0 are selected for weight calculation, while satellites with elevation angles less than E0 are not included in the weight calculation. The details are as follows:

[0121] In real-world scenarios, if the satellite elevation angle is too low, it can cause multipath effects, leading to discrepancies in the measured pseudorange and thus affecting positioning accuracy. Therefore, based on the application scenario, the elevation cutoff angle E0 is set to 5–10 degrees. When the elevation angle of satellite i is lower than the elevation cutoff angle E0, its weighting factor W is adjusted. i Set it directly to 0, and it will not participate in the weight calculation process.

[0122] As a specific example, in step 2, a weighting factor W is assigned to each satellite. i This is used to quickly determine the quality of each satellite's distribution within the overall satellite array, as detailed below:

[0123] In the early stages of receiver design and performance analysis, the concept of precision factor was defined, where the geometric precision factor is expressed as follows:

[0124]

[0125] In the formula h i,i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) is (H T H) -1 The diagonal elements are H, where H is the observation matrix.

[0126] The accuracy factor can be viewed as a linear mapping from measurement error in the observations to state estimation error, because each row vector of the observation matrix H is composed of the three direction cosine vectors of a certain satellite and the user plus 1. The specific dimension and form are determined by the X matrix setting, so (H T H) -1 It must be related to the geometric distribution of multiple satellites.

[0127] Because of the relative movement between the satellite and the receiver, the satellites captured by the GNSS receiver are constantly changing at different times, and the relative positions of each captured satellite in the sky are also constantly changing. A weighting factor W is assigned to each captured satellite. iThe weighting factor represents the magnitude of the satellite's impact on positioning accuracy; a larger weighting factor indicates a greater role the satellite plays in the current positioning process. Assume the receiver is currently acquiring n satellites, and the observation matrix is ​​H. n The observation component of a certain satellite i is h i The observation matrix for the remaining n-1 satellites is H. n-1 We can obtain the following formula:

[0128]

[0129] According to the Sherman-Morrison formula, when A∈R n×n Let u, v ∈ R be an invertible matrix. n When the matrix is ​​a column vector, its inverse is:

[0130]

[0131] set up According to equations (2) and (3), then:

[0132]

[0133] make Rearranging equation (4) yields:

[0134]

[0135] The weight of satellite i's influence on the satellite distribution among the current n satellites is:

[0136]

[0137] In the formula Δh ij,j (is ΔA) i The diagonal elements, where j = 1, 2, 3, 4; W i This is the weighting factor of satellite i at the current time.

[0138] As a specific example, in step 3, a signal confidence level C is assigned to each satellite. i It is used to quickly respond to changes in satellite signal quality in complex environments, and assists the weighting factor in completing satellite selection in complex environments, especially in deception and interference environments, as follows:

[0139] Signal confidence level C for each satellite i This indicates the accuracy of the satellite signal; a lower value means the signal deviates further from the estimated true signal and is more difficult to correct, while a higher value indicates a higher accuracy. The formula is as follows:

[0140]

[0141] In the formula, C adaptire_i Based on the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and pseudorange error (ρ) err The system adaptively adjusts parameters based on their magnitude and changes. When there is a large jump in the signal-to-noise ratio or pseudorange information value, the confidence level of the satellite is reduced.

[0142] The signal confidence level C of the satellite is determined based on the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) jump. i The method is as follows:

[0143]

[0144] In the formula, dSNR ave_i Let SNR be the average jump value of the signal-to-noise ratio of the i-th satellite. cur_i Let i be the current signal-to-noise ratio value of the i-th satellite. Let n be the signal-to-noise ratio value of the i-th satellite in the previous time interval, and n be the number of counts in a certain period of time, which can be set to the number of counts in 5 seconds.

[0145] Jump detection threshold dSNR i The settings are as follows:

[0146] dSNR i =dSNR ave_i *1.2 (9)

[0147] The next signal-to-noise ratio jump value is compared with the threshold dSNR. i For comparison, when the next signal-to-noise ratio jump variable exceeds dSNR i This reduces the confidence level of satellite i; the amount of confidence reduction each time is dC. i The following is:

[0148]

[0149] The lower the original confidence level of a satellite, the greater the decrease in satellite confidence level. When the signal-to-noise ratio jump does not exceed the average signal-to-noise ratio jump value, the confidence level of the satellite is increased by a fixed 0.05.

[0150] As a specific example, in step 4, based on the satellite weighting factor W i and satellite signal confidence C i The satellite availability calculation and satellite selection process is carried out as follows:

[0151] Step 4.1: Based on the satellite weighting factor W i and satellite signal confidence C i The formula for calculating satellite priority is:

[0152]

[0153] Priority in the formula iThis indicates the priority of satellite i for positioning, and n represents the number of currently available satellites.

[0154] Step 4.2: When in an interference-free environment, the satellite weighting factor and confidence level have equal influence on satellite selection priority. When there is interference in the environment, the influence of confidence level on satellite selection priority remains unchanged, while the weighting factor's influence on satellite selection priority is adjusted according to the number of available satellites. Taking the minimum requirement of 4 satellites for positioning as a benchmark, the more satellites there are, the smaller the influence of the weighting factor on satellite selection priority.

[0155] Star selection effect diagram for complex road sections, as shown below Figure 2 As shown in the figure, when satellite signals are interfered with, positioning results without satellite selection will produce errors of varying magnitudes. However, after satellite selection based on the aforementioned weighting factors and confidence levels, the satellite positioning results remain basically stable before and after interference. The impact of satellite selection on horizontal positioning accuracy in complex environments is as follows: Figure 3 As shown, the removal of some satellites causes a decrease in positioning accuracy of 0-2 meters. However, even under conditions of significant interference and severe degradation of satellite signal quality, the positioning accuracy can still be maintained within 3 meters. The receiver used in the test was a BeiDou single-frequency receiver with 12 channels. Theoretically, multi-mode multi-frequency receivers would achieve better positioning results under the above processing method.

[0156] As a specific example, in step 5, a multi-level joint detection algorithm for deception interference signals is used to detect whether the system is in a deception interference environment, as detailed below:

[0157] There are various ways to deceive jamming signals. One common method is to send a fake signal that resembles the real signal to fool the receiver. This can be achieved by sending fake signals with different modulation schemes, such as pseudo-random noise codes or pseudo-frequency hopping codes. Furthermore, jamming signals can also affect the positioning results by altering parameters such as the signal's arrival time, phase, and amplitude.

[0158] In implementing deception and jamming signals, a thorough understanding of the modulation, coding, and transmission characteristics of satellite signals is required. For example, the pseudo-random noise code in GPS signals is a long sequence code with a period of 1 millisecond, which repeats multiple times during signal transmission. Therefore, if a deceitful agent can obtain the pseudo-random noise code of a GPS signal, they can generate a fake signal similar to the real signal and achieve the effect of deception and jamming by changing its arrival time, phase, amplitude, and other parameters.

[0159] The basic characteristics of GPS signals can be represented by the following formula:

[0160] s t (t)=A(t)·cos[2πfc t+φ(t)] (12)

[0161] In the formula, s t (t) represents the carrier wave of the GPS signal, A(t) represents the amplitude of the signal, and f c φ(t) represents the carrier frequency of the signal, and φ(t) represents the phase of the signal.

[0162] Generative spoofing jamming involves the source satellite receiver, after obtaining satellite signal parameters, using various techniques such as frequency shifting, code phase alteration, and signal strength variation to disguise false navigation signals, making them indistinguishable from genuine navigation signals. Generative spoofing jamming can be expressed by the following formula:

[0163] s f (t)=A(t)·cos[2πf c t+φ(t)]+n(t) (13)

[0164] In the formula, s f (t) represents the deception interference signal, A(t) represents the amplitude of the signal, and f c Let φ(t) represent the carrier frequency of the signal, φ(t) represent the phase of the signal, and n(t) represent additive white Gaussian noise.

[0165] For repeater-based spoofing jamming, the jamming source receiver relays the received satellite signal to the target receiver using high-power transmission equipment. The spoofing source intercepts and decodes the real signal, altering parameters such as the signal's arrival time, phase, and amplitude, and then sends the false signal to the receiver through various means. Repeater-based spoofing can be represented by the following formula:

[0166] s r (t)=s t (t-τ)+n(t) (14)

[0167] In the formula, s r (t) represents the signal observed by the receiver, s t (t) represents the real signal, τ represents the signal propagation delay, and n(t) represents additive white Gaussian noise. The above formulas illustrate the impact of deception signals on satellite signals. According to... Figure 1 As shown, a multi-level joint detection algorithm for deception signals is used to detect the presence of deception interference signals, affecting the calculation method of satellite selection priority in equation (11), and the confidence level of the corresponding satellite is adaptively adjusted to a certain extent based on the detection results of the following detection method. The deception interference detection steps are as follows:

[0168] Step 5.1: Detect the signal-to-noise ratio, as follows:

[0169] In the absence of interference, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of satellite signals is usually high; when satellite signals are interfered with by spoofing signals, the SNR changes as follows:

[0170]

[0171] In the formula, SNR′ represents the signal-to-noise ratio of the receiver after receiving a spoofed signal, and P s P represents the power of the actual satellite signal. i N is the power of the deception signal, and N0 is the system noise power spectral density.

[0172] Converting the actual satellite signal power change in equation (15) into more readily available distance information between the receiver and the satellite, the change in signal-to-noise ratio after the receiver is subjected to a deceptive signal is:

[0173]

[0174] In the formula, α is a parameter related to the distance between the receiver and the satellite.

[0175] It can be seen that under spoofing signal interference, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of satellite signals is reduced due to the power of the spoofing signal; the higher the power of the spoofing signal, the lower the SNR and αP. i It is the increase in the noise floor of the satellite signal received by the receiver. Deception interference signals will increase the noise floor of the received signal.

[0176] By setting the appropriate threshold based on the actual situation of the receiver, it is possible to make a preliminary judgment on whether the receiver has been attacked by spoofing signals. The signal-to-noise ratio threshold is set as follows:

[0177]

[0178] In the formula, SNR0 is the signal-to-noise ratio threshold, and SNR i_visible Let N be the signal-to-noise ratio of the i-th visible satellite, and N be the number of visible satellites.

[0179] When the threshold is exceeded, an alarm is given that there may be deception interference, and the confidence of satellite i is reduced according to formula (10).

[0180] Step 5.2: Detect the receiver clock error, as follows:

[0181] The pseudorange equation for a single satellite after satellite clock error compensation is:

[0182]

[0183] In the formula, ρ i Let x represent the pseudorange from the i-th satellite to the target antenna, (x) s y s , z s(x) represents the three-dimensional position of the satellite. u y u , z u ) represents the three-dimensional position of the target object, Δt u For local clock difference, n ρi This is the sum of errors in the ionosphere, troposphere, and other error terms.

[0184] After obtaining N pseudo-distance equations of this expression, a system of equations is formed and linearized to obtain:

[0185] G·ΔX u =b (19)

[0186] In the formula, ΔX u =[Δx u Δy u Δz u Δt u ] T It is a state variable.

[0187]

[0188]

[0189] The least squares solution to equation (19) is:

[0190] Δx0=(G T G) -1 G T b (22)

[0191] Since Δx0=[Δx u Δy u Δz u Δt u ] T The clock difference Δt can be obtained through equation (22). u .

[0192] The common error of pseudorange observations does not affect position calculation, but it has a significant impact on clock error. The intrusion of spoofing signals will cause fluctuations in clock error, and these fluctuations can be used to detect spoofing signals. Because the variables themselves are directly used as the basis for judging spoofing signals, multiple judgment criteria are required to prevent outliers in the data from affecting the detection process.

[0193] Δt u_pre0 -Δt u_pre1 ≤2×(Δt u_pre1 -Δt u ) (twenty three)

[0194] In the formula, Δt u_pre0 , Δt u _pre1 These represent the clock difference values ​​at the previous two time points and the previous time point, respectively. If the clock difference jump at the current time is large, an alert is issued and Δt is saved. u_pre1 The value is the new Δt u_pre0 This is used to continue comparing the amplitude of the jump at the next moment. If it exceeds two times, an alarm is triggered indicating that it may be under attack by a deceptive interference signal. Figure 4 The clock bias jump result diagram shown indicates that, under normal circumstances, the clock bias jump has upper and lower limits, and there will be outliers at some times. When an interference signal occurs, the clock bias jump amplitude will exceed the range of the upper and lower limits. At this time, the occurrence of the interference signal can be determined, and pseudorange and pseudorange rate detection can be performed to confirm the existence of the spoofing signal.

[0195] Step 5.3: Based on the pseudorange and pseudorange rate information, perform inertial-assisted pseudorange / pseudorange rate consistency detection, as follows:

[0196] Spoofing interference typically involves modifying or falsifying satellite signals to mislead the receiver into believing that it is farther or closer to the satellite, which can lead to incorrect position calculations. In GNSS / SINS integrated navigation, the inertial system (INS) utilizes accelerometers and gyroscopes in the inertial measurement unit (IMU) to measure the navigation system's motion. Through integration, the position, velocity, and attitude information of the navigation system can be obtained. Combining the receiver's current motion state with satellite ephemeris data, the INS can estimate the approximate position and velocity of each satellite, and then achieve receiver positioning by calculating the pseudorange and pseudorange rate between the receiver and the satellite. This information helps in selecting suitable satellites. When satellite signals are subjected to spoofing interference, the pseudorange and pseudorange rate will change abnormally. Therefore, by analyzing the changes in pseudorange and pseudorange rate, it can be determined whether the satellite signal has been interfered with or spoofed. The calculation process is as follows:

[0197]

[0198] In the formula, ρ u , These represent the pseudorange and pseudorange rate of the antenna relative to the satellite, respectively, output by the GNSS receiver. m , These are the pseudorange and pseudorange rate of the carrier relative to the satellite, calculated from inertial navigation information combined with satellite ephemeris, and Δρ, respectively. These represent the errors between the two calculation methods;

[0199] For the i-th satellite, its corresponding ρ m , The calculation method is as follows:

[0200]

[0201]

[0202] Where, ρ m_i , These are the pseudorange and pseudorange rate of SINS relative to satellite i, respectively. m y m , z m ), These represent the position and velocity of the inertial system in the ECEF coordinate system, respectively. These represent the position and velocity of satellite i in the ECEF coordinate system, respectively.

[0203] Under normal circumstances, the error divergence of an inertial system is very small in a short period of time, Δρ, The values ​​are all very small; however, when a sudden spoofing signal exists, the receiver's position, velocity, or time information is skewed, and the pseudorange and pseudorange rate calculated by the receiver will be inaccurate. Based on the normal Δρ, Set appropriate threshold values ​​for the values, and refer to Equations (8) and (9) for the setting method. When it is detected that the two exceed the set threshold values, it can be judged that they are likely to be interfered with by deception signals.

[0204] Slowly varying deception signals are difficult to implement, but they are more concealed and deceptive, causing greater harm. Therefore, detection of slowly varying deception signals is necessary. Since deception signals cannot seamlessly enter the receiver loop in reality, they will inevitably cause changes in the observed measurements. Therefore, a periodic enhancement detection method is designed. Leveraging the high accuracy of inertial navigation systems (INS) over short periods, the pseudorange rate calculated from the INS velocity is periodically constructed. This pseudorange rate is then compared with the pseudorange rate calculated from the satellite navigation results to create a statistical check metric, thus achieving the detection of slowly varying deception signals.

[0205] Since the position information of the inertial navigation system is obtained by integrating the velocity information, the error of the position information accumulates faster. In equation (24), the pseudorange information ρ derived from the position is... m Error accumulation also occurs faster than pseudorange rate information. Therefore, only the pseudorange rate consistency test is used to perform statistical analysis on the pseudorange rate sequence.

[0206] Differentiating equation (18) for satellite pseudorange yields the pseudorange rate equation, which is simplified as follows:

[0207]

[0208] In the formula This represents the pseudorange rate of the i-th satellite. This represents the change in distance between the satellite and the receiver. Indicates receiver clock frequency drift. Indicates the delayed rate of change of the ionosphere and troposphere. The item is not very sensitive to changes over time, so it is discarded.

[0209] Will Expressed as the vector difference in velocity between the satellite and the receiver, rearranging equation (27) yields:

[0210]

[0211] In the formula, v i Let v be the velocity vector of the i-th satellite, and v be the velocity vector of the receiver. When a spoofing interference source processes the original satellite signal to generate a spoofing signal or directly relays it, the inconsistency in velocity vectors due to changes in signal direction can cause a jump in the pseudorange rate of the actually acquired satellite signal. Therefore, the statistical test for the residual of the receiver pseudorange rate is constructed as follows:

[0212]

[0213] In the formula, This represents the theoretical residual of the pseudorange rate between the receiver and satellite i. Utilizing the high precision of inertial navigation velocity information over short time intervals, the pseudorange rate is calculated using the inertial navigation velocity. Alternative Theory Pseudorange

[0214] The residuals caused by inertial navigation velocity drift diverge over time. Within the inspection period, when the residuals exceed the set threshold for residuals caused by inertial navigation drift, the satellite's signal is determined to be a spoofing signal. Outliers are identified by calculating the mean and standard deviation of the residuals and using these statistical data. The formula is as follows:

[0215]

[0216]

[0217] In the formula, s represents the mean of the residuals. ∈ The standard deviation of the residuals is represented by n, which represents the sample size. i Let represent the residual of the i-th observation; according to the properties of the normal distribution, approximately 99.7% of the observations will be within 3 seconds. ∈ Within the range, therefore when a certain observation exceeds 3 seconds ∈ If the value falls within the specified range, it is considered an outlier.

[0218] As a specific example, in step 6, the influence of the inertial navigation system on the receiver's acquisition signal power and tracking threshold is adjusted using inertial auxiliary loop technology to ensure the interference-to-signal ratio meets system requirements and improves the receiver's anti-interference capability, as detailed below:

[0219] During inertial-assisted acquisition, the position, velocity, and acceleration information output by the inertial navigation system are used, combined with the satellite's position and velocity information, to calculate the Doppler frequency shift and its resulting frequency error, code shift, and pseudorange information. The derived information is then used to assist the receiver loop in calculating the Doppler frequency shift. PN code frequency offset τ and code shift Δτ dyn The data is transmitted to the numerically controlled oscillator (NCO), voltage-controlled oscillator (VCC), and code generator (PN) respectively. Using the time and position provided by GNSS / SINS, the initial values ​​of code phase and Doppler frequency shift are set to complete the acquisition process. With inertial assistance, the noise floor of the channel is reduced.

[0220] The inertial-assisted tracking loop structure is as follows: the code loop uses a carrier-assisted second-order delay phase-locked loop (DLL); the carrier loop uses an inertial-assisted third-order phase-locked loop (PLL); a first-order low-pass filter is established in the inertial-assisted part. The loop filter of the third-order phase-locked loop (PLL) is selected in the following form:

[0221]

[0222] The speed deviation and clock frequency deviation estimated by the navigation filter are used to obtain the external frequency auxiliary deviation. The reference input signal is added, differentiated, and then passed through the inertial filter to obtain the external frequency auxiliary information. The phase error output by the phase detector is the difference between the phase of the reference input signal and the phase of the external phase noise and the phase of the output signal of the voltage-controlled oscillator. The phase error is filtered by the loop filter of the third-order phase-locked loop (PLL), added to the external frequency auxiliary information, and integrated to obtain the phase of the output signal of the voltage-controlled oscillator.

[0223] In a GNSS receiver, the tracking threshold T thr This threshold is used to determine whether a satellite signal received by the receiver can be tracked, and is usually a fixed value. When inertial assistance is used, the receiver's ability to track satellites is enhanced, and this tracking threshold is lowered. The formula is:

[0224]

[0225] In the formula, C / N0 is the signal-to-interference ratio, S is the received signal power, N is the noise power, B is the tracking loop signal bandwidth, and T is the integration time.

[0226] Therefore, it can be seen that inertial assistance can significantly reduce the tracking loop signal bandwidth B and greatly reduce the channel noise floor N. In addition, the effects of inertial assistance are as follows:

[0227] S=S′-ΔS (34)

[0228] T = T thr -ΔT (35)

[0229] In the formula, S′ represents the signal power captured by the satellite receiver, and ΔS and ΔT represent the values ​​that the signal power and tracking threshold can be reduced after inertial assistance, respectively, reflecting the degree to which the navigation system's dependence on satellite information is reduced. When the values ​​of ΔS and ΔT are reduced, the computational load and power consumption will increase. However, according to equations (33) to (35), it can be concluded that increasing the values ​​of ΔS and ΔT can improve the interference-to-signal ratio, enhance the tracking performance, and thus improve the receiver's anti-spoofing interference capability.

[0230] In summary, the GNSS / SINS integrated navigation signal detection and anti-interference method of the present invention under satellite disturbance environment can achieve a superior ability to quickly determine satellite availability in complex environments and ensure positioning accuracy; it adopts a multi-level joint detection algorithm for deception signals to quickly and accurately detect deception signals, and marks and isolates the satellites that receive the deception signals; and it employs inertial-assisted deception signal detection and integrated navigation technology to further ensure the accuracy and comprehensiveness of deception signal detection.

Claims

1. A method for GNSS / SINS integrated navigation signal detection and anti-jamming in a satellite perturbation environment, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: Step 1: Set the elevation cutoff angle Select an elevation angle greater than the elevation cutoff angle. The satellites are weighted, and the elevation angle is less than the elevation cutoff angle. The satellites are not subject to weight calculation; Step 2: Assign weight factors to each satellite ; Step 3: Assign signal confidence level to each satellite ; Step 4: Based on satellite weighting factors and satellite signal confidence To perform satellite availability calculations and satellite selection; Step 5: Use a multi-level joint detection algorithm for deception interference signals to detect whether the system is in a deception interference environment; Step 6: By using inertial auxiliary loop technology, adjust the degree of influence of the inertial navigation system on the receiver's acquisition signal power and tracking threshold, so that the interference-to-signal ratio meets the system requirements; Step 5 describes the use of a multi-level joint detection algorithm for deception interference signals to detect whether the system is in a deception interference environment, as detailed below: Step 5.1: Detect the signal-to-noise ratio, as follows: Under interference-free conditions, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the satellite signal is higher than the set value; when the satellite signal is interfered with by spoofing signals, the change in SNR is as follows: (15) In the formula, This represents the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) value after the receiver receives a spoofed signal. The power of the actual satellite signal. To deceive the power of the signal, The system noise power spectral density; Another type of receiver experiences a change in signal-to-noise ratio after being subjected to a spoofed signal, which is: (16) In the formula, It is a parameter related to the distance between the receiver and the satellite; Under spoofing interference, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of satellite signals is reduced due to the power of the spoofing signal; the higher the power of the spoofing signal, the lower the SNR. It is the increase in the noise floor of the satellite signal received by the receiver. Deception interference signals will increase the noise floor of the received signal. The appropriate threshold is set based on the actual situation of the receiver to determine whether the receiver is under attack by a spoofing signal; the signal-to-noise ratio threshold is set as follows: (17) In the formula, The signal-to-noise ratio threshold. For the first The signal-to-noise ratio of a visible satellite, Number of visible satellites; When the threshold is exceeded, an alarm is issued indicating possible deception interference, and the satellite speed is reduced according to formula (10). Confidence level; Step 5.2: Detect the receiver clock error, as follows: The pseudorange equation for a single satellite after satellite clock error compensation is: (18) In the formula, Indicates the first The pseudorange from the satellite to the target antenna, For the satellite's three-dimensional position, Let c be the three-dimensional position of the target object, and c be the speed of light. For local clock difference, This is the sum of errors in the ionosphere, troposphere, and other error terms. After obtaining N pseudo-distance equations of this expression, a system of equations is formed and linearized to obtain: (19) In the formula, For state variables; (20) (21) The least squares solution to equation (19) is: (22) because The clock difference can be obtained through equation (22). ; Common errors in pseudorange observations can affect clock bias. The intrusion of deceptive signals can cause fluctuations in clock bias, which are then used to detect these fluctuations. Because the variables themselves are directly used as the basis for judging deceptive signals, multiple judgment criteria are needed to prevent outliers in the data from affecting the detection process. (23) In the formula, , These represent the clock difference values ​​of the previous two hours and the previous hour, respectively. If the current clock difference jump is greater than the set value, an alert will be issued and the data will be saved. The value is new The clock difference is used to continue comparing the jump amplitude at the next moment. If it exceeds twice, an alarm will be triggered, indicating that the clock difference may be under attack by a deceptive interference signal. Under normal circumstances, the clock difference jump has upper and lower limits, and there will be outliers at some times. When an interference signal occurs, the clock difference jump amplitude will exceed the range of the upper and lower limits. At this time, the occurrence of the interference signal is determined, and pseudorange and pseudorange rate are detected to confirm the existence of the deceptive signal. Step 5.3: Based on the pseudorange and pseudorange rate information, perform consistency detection of pseudorange and pseudorange rate using inertial assistance, as detailed below: By analyzing changes in pseudorange and pseudorange rate, we can determine whether satellite signals are being interfered with or spoofed. The formula is as follows: (24) In the formula, , These are the pseudorange and pseudorange rate of the antenna relative to the satellite, respectively, output by the GNSS receiver. , These are the pseudorange and pseudorange rate of the carrier relative to the satellite, calculated from inertial navigation information combined with satellite ephemeris data. , These represent the errors between the two calculation methods; For the Each satellite, its corresponding , The calculation method is as follows: (25) (26) in, , SINS is relative to satellite. pseudorange, pseudorange rate, , These represent the position and velocity of the inertial system in the ECEF coordinate system, respectively. , Satellites in ECEF coordinate system Position and velocity; Under normal circumstances, the error divergence of the inertial system is less than the set value within the set time period. , The values ​​are all less than the set values; however, when there is a sudden spoofing signal, the receiver's position, velocity, or time information is skewed, and the pseudorange and pseudorange rate calculated by the receiver will be deviated; according to normal circumstances , The value is set as a threshold value, and the setting method is referred to Equation (8) and Equation (9). When it is detected that the two exceed the set threshold value, it is determined that they have been interfered with by the deception signal. When a slowly varying deception signal exists, a periodic enhancement detection is designed. Utilizing the high precision of inertial navigation in a short time, the pseudorange rate calculated from the inertial navigation velocity is periodically constructed. This pseudorange rate is then compared with the pseudorange rate calculated from the satellite navigation results to construct a statistical check, thus achieving slowly varying deception detection. Since the inertial navigation position information is obtained by integrating the velocity information, the error accumulation of the position information is faster. The pseudorange information derived from the position in equation (24) is... Error accumulation also occurs faster than pseudorange rate information. Therefore, a pseudorange rate consistency test is used to perform statistical analysis on the pseudorange rate sequence; Differentiating equation (18) for satellite pseudorange yields the pseudorange rate equation, which is: (27) In the formula Indicates the first pseudorange rate of satellites, This represents the change in distance between the satellite and the receiver. Indicates receiver clock frequency drift. This represents the delayed rate of change in the ionosphere and troposphere, which is less sensitive to time changes, so it is discarded. Will Expressed as the vector difference in velocity between the satellite and the receiver, rearranging equation (27) yields: (28) In the formula, For the first The velocity vector of the satellite. Let be the velocity vector of the receiver. When a deception interference source processes the original satellite signal to generate a deception signal or directly relays it, the inconsistency in the velocity vector due to changes in signal direction will cause a jump in the pseudorange rate of the actually acquired satellite signal. Therefore, the statistical test quantity for constructing the residual of the receiver pseudorange rate is as follows: (29) In the formula, Indicates the receiver and satellite The theoretical residual of the pseudorange rate is obtained by using the short-time, high-precision characteristics of inertial navigation velocity information to deduce the pseudorange rate from the inertial navigation velocity. Alternative Theory Pseudorange ; The residuals caused by inertial navigation velocity drift diverge over time. Within the inspection period, when the residuals exceed the set threshold for residuals caused by inertial navigation drift, the satellite's signal is determined to be a spoofing signal. Outliers are identified by calculating the mean and standard deviation of the residuals and using these statistical data. The formula is as follows: (30) (31) In the formula, This represents the mean of the residuals. The standard deviation of the residuals is represented by n, where n represents the sample size. Indicates the first The residuals of 3 observations; according to the properties of the normal distribution, approximately 99.7% of the observations will be within 3... Within the range, therefore when the observed value exceeds 3 If the value falls within the specified range, it is considered an outlier.

2. The method for GNSS / SINS integrated navigation signal detection and anti-interference under satellite disturbance environment according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step 1 describes setting the elevation cutoff angle. Select an elevation angle greater than the elevation cutoff angle. The satellites are weighted, and the elevation angle is less than the elevation cutoff angle. The satellites are not subject to weighting calculations, as detailed below: The elevation cutoff angle is determined according to the application scenario. Set to 5-10 degrees, when the satellite The elevation angle is lower than the elevation cutoff angle. When, the weighting factor Set it directly to 0, and it will not participate in the weight calculation process.

3. The method for GNSS / SINS integrated navigation signal detection and anti-interference under satellite disturbance environment according to claim 2, characterized in that, Step 2 describes assigning weighting factors to each satellite. The details are as follows: Set a weighting factor for each captured satellite. This indicates the magnitude of the satellite's impact on positioning accuracy; a larger weighting factor indicates a greater role the satellite plays in the current positioning. Assume the receiver currently acquires n satellites, and the observation matrix is... ,satellite The observed components are The observation matrix for the remaining n-1 satellites is We get the following equation: (2) According to the Sherman-Morrison formula, when It is an invertible matrix. When the matrix is ​​a column vector, its inverse is: (3) set up According to equations (2) and (3), then: (4) make Arrange equation (4) to get: (5) satellite The weights of the influence on satellite distribution among the current n satellites are: (6) In the formula for The diagonal elements, where j = 1, 2, 3, 4; That is, the satellite at the current moment Weighting factors.

4. The GNSS / SINS integrated navigation signal detection and anti-interference method under satellite disturbance environment according to claim 3, characterized in that, Step 3 describes assigning signal confidence levels to each satellite. The details are as follows: Set the signal confidence level for each satellite. This value represents the accuracy of the satellite's signal. A lower value indicates that the satellite signal deviates more from the estimated true signal and is more difficult to correct; conversely, a higher value indicates a higher accuracy of the satellite signal. The formula is as follows: (7) In the formula, For satellite signal adaptive confidence, based on signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and pseudorange error... The parameters are adaptively adjusted based on their magnitude and changes. When there is a large jump in the signal-to-noise ratio or pseudorange information value, the confidence level of the satellite is reduced.

5. The GNSS / SINS integrated navigation signal detection and anti-interference method under satellite disturbance environment according to claim 4, characterized in that, The method for adjusting the adaptive confidence level of satellite signals is as follows: Determining satellite signal confidence based on signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) jumps. The method is as follows: (8) In the formula, For the first Average jump value of signal-to-noise ratio of each satellite For the first Current signal-to-noise ratio of the satellites For the first The last signal-to-noise ratio value of the satellite, The count is for the period of 5 seconds; Jump judgment threshold for: (9) The next signal-to-noise ratio jump value and the threshold For comparison, when the signal-to-noise ratio jump variable exceeds This reduces the satellite The confidence level; the amount of decrease in confidence level each time. for: (10) The lower the original confidence level of a satellite, the greater the decrease in satellite confidence level; when the signal-to-noise ratio jump does not exceed the average signal-to-noise ratio jump value, the confidence level of the satellite is increased by a fixed 0.

05.

6. The method for GNSS / SINS integrated navigation signal detection and anti-interference under satellite disturbance environment according to claim 5, characterized in that, Step 4, based on satellite weighting factors and satellite signal confidence The satellite availability calculation and satellite selection process is carried out as follows: Step 4.1: Based on satellite weighting factors and satellite signal confidence The formula for calculating satellite priority is: (11) In the formula Indicates satellite The priority used for positioning, where n represents the number of currently available satellites; Step 4.2: When in an interference-free environment, the satellite weighting factor and confidence level have equal influence on satellite selection priority. When there is interference in the environment, the influence of confidence level on satellite selection priority remains unchanged, while the influence of weighting factor on satellite selection priority is adjusted according to the number of available satellites. Based on the minimum requirement of 4 satellites for positioning, the more satellites there are, the smaller the influence of weighting factor on satellite selection priority.

7. The method for GNSS / SINS integrated navigation signal detection and anti-interference under satellite disturbance environment according to claim 6, characterized in that, Step 6 describes adjusting the influence of the inertial navigation system on the receiver's acquisition signal power and tracking threshold using inertial auxiliary loop technology, so that the interference-to-signal ratio meets the system requirements, as detailed below: During inertial-assisted acquisition, the position, velocity, and acceleration information output by the inertial navigation system are used, combined with the satellite's position and velocity information, to calculate the Doppler frequency shift and its resulting frequency offset, code shift, and pseudorange information. The calculated Doppler frequency shift is then... PN code frequency offset τ and code shift The data is transmitted to the numerically controlled oscillator (NCO), the voltage-controlled oscillator (VCC), and the code generator (PN), respectively. Using the time and position provided by GNSS / SINS, the initial values ​​of the code phase and Doppler frequency shift are set to complete the acquisition process.

8. The method for GNSS / SINS integrated navigation signal detection and anti-interference under satellite disturbance environment according to claim 7, characterized in that, The specific structure of the inertial auxiliary loop is as follows: The code ring uses a carrier-assisted second-order delay phase-locked loop (DLL); the carrier ring uses an inertial-assisted third-order phase-locked loop (PLL); a first-order low-pass filter is incorporated into the inertial-assisted section. The loop filter of the third-order phase-locked loop (PLL) is selected in the following form: (32) The external frequency auxiliary deviation is obtained by estimating the speed deviation and clock frequency deviation through the navigation filter. The reference input signal is added, differentiated, and then passed through the inertial filter to obtain the external frequency auxiliary information. The phase error output by the phase detector is the difference between the phase of the reference input signal and the phase of the external phase noise and the output signal of the voltage-controlled oscillator; The phase error is filtered by the loop filter of the third-order phase-locked loop (PLL), added to the external frequency auxiliary information, and integrated to obtain the output signal phase of the voltage-controlled oscillator.

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