Safety measures for 5GS to EPC reselection
By modifying the processing method and integrity protection mechanism of TAU request messages, the problem of inconsistent security context mapping during UE handover in wireless communication systems was resolved, ensuring secure handover from 5GS to EPC and improving the mobility support and reliability of the communication system.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202280033306.X
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2022-05-11
- Filing Date
- 2022-05-12
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-17
- Estimated Expiration
- 2042-05-12
AI Technical Summary
In wireless communication systems, when a UE switches from a first cell to a second cell, existing technologies cannot effectively handle communication inconsistencies caused by inconsistent security context mappings, especially in cases of RLF and EPS TAU retransmission requests.
By modifying the TAU request message processing methods of the network and UE, including integrity protection and verification mechanisms, the consistency of security context mapping is ensured. Different uplink counts are used for integrity protection and verification, and mapped security contexts are derived to support secure handover from 5GS to EPC.
It implements secure handling of 5GS to EPC reselection in the case of RLF and EPS TAU retransmission requests, improving the reliability of mobility support and communication success rate.
Smart Images

Figure CN117322025B_ABST
Abstract
Description
[0001] Cross-references to related applications
[0002] This application claims the benefit and priority of U.S. provisional application S / N. 63 / 187,784, filed May 12, 2021, entitled "Security Handling of 5GS to EPC Reselection", and U.S. non-provisional patent application SN 17 / 662,978, filed May 11, 2022, entitled "Security Handling of 5GS to EPC Reselection", both of which are expressly incorporated herein by reference in their entirety. Technical Field
[0003] This disclosure generally relates to communication systems, and more particularly to security features and security mechanisms employed in communication systems.
[0004] introduction
[0005] Wireless communication systems are widely deployed to provide a variety of telecommunications services such as telephone, video, data, messaging, and broadcasting. Typical wireless communication systems employ multiple access technologies that enable communication with multiple users by sharing available system resources. Examples of such multiple access technologies include Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) systems, Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) systems, Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) systems, Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) systems, Single Carrier Frequency Division Multiple Access (SC-FDMA) systems, and Time Division Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access (TD-SCDMA) systems.
[0006] These multiple access technologies have been adopted in various telecommunications standards to provide a common protocol enabling different wireless devices to communicate at the city, country, region, and even global levels. An example telecommunications standard is 5G New Radio (NR). 5G NR is part of the continuous evolution of mobile broadband, promulgated by the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) to meet new requirements associated with latency, reliability, security, scalability (e.g., with the Internet of Things (IoT), and other requirements. 5G NR includes services associated with enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB), massive machine-type communications (mMTC), and ultra-reliable low latency communications (URLLC). Some aspects of 5G NR can be based on the 4G Long Term Evolution (LTE) standard. There is a need for further improvements to 5G NR technology. These improvements can also be applied to other multiple access technologies and telecommunications standards that adopt them.
[0007] Brief Overview
[0008] The following provides a brief overview of one or more aspects to offer a basic understanding of such aspects. This overview is not an exhaustive summary of all conceived aspects. It neither identifies the key or decisive elements of all aspects nor defines the scope of any or all aspects. Its sole purpose is to present some concepts of one or more aspects in a simplified form as an introduction to the more detailed description that follows.
[0009] In one aspect of this disclosure, methods, computer-readable media, and apparatus for wireless communication are provided. The apparatus may include user equipment (UE). An example apparatus may transmit a first Tracking Area Update (TAU) request to a first network entity. The first TAU request is encoded using a first security context associated with a first radio access technology (RAT), is integrity-protected using a first uplink count based on the first security context, and includes a first set of information including an identifier mapped to a second RAT associated with the first network entity. The example apparatus may also transmit a second TAU request to the first network entity. The second TAU request includes the first set of information and is integrity-protected using a second uplink count. The example apparatus may also derive a mapped security context based on the first security context and at least one of the first uplink count or the second uplink count. Additionally, the example apparatus may communicate with the first network entity based on the mapped security context.
[0010] In one aspect of this disclosure, methods, computer-readable media, and apparatus for wireless communication are provided. The apparatus may include a UE. An example apparatus may transmit a first TAU request to a first network entity when a change is performed from a first cell associated with a first RAT to a connection to a second cell associated with a second RAT different from the first RAT. The first network entity is associated with the second RAT. The first TAU request is encoded using a first security context associated with the first RAT, and the first TAU request is integrity-protected using a first uplink count based on the first security context. The example apparatus may also derive a first integrity key based on the first security context, the first uplink count, and a first mapped security context. Additionally, the example apparatus may transmit a repetition of the first TAU request to the first network entity, the repetition of the first TAU request being integrity-protected using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count. The example apparatus may also derive a second integrity key based on the first security context, the second uplink count, and a second mapped security context. The example apparatus may also receive downlink transmissions from the first network entity. Additionally, the example apparatus may use at least one of the first integrity key and the second integrity key to perform integrity checks on the downlink transmissions. The example device can also set the UE’s master security key when the integrity check of the downlink transmission is successful using the exported integrity key. The master security key is set based on either a first or a second mapped security context used to export the exported integrity key.
[0011] In another aspect of this disclosure, methods, computer-readable media, and apparatus for wireless communication are provided. The apparatus may include a first network entity, such as a Mobility Management Entity (MME). The example apparatus may receive a first TAU request generated by a UE, the first TAU request being encoded using a first security context associated with a first RAT, the first TAU request being integrity-protected using a first uplink count based on the first security context, and the first TAU request including a first set of information, the first set of information including an identifier mapped to a second RAT associated with the first network entity. The example apparatus may also output a first context request for a second network entity associated with the first RAT based on the first TAU request. Additionally, the example apparatus may receive a first mapped security context based on the first context request, the first mapped security context being derived from the first security context and the first uplink count. The example apparatus may also receive a second TAU request, the second TAU request being encoded using the first security context, the second TAU request being integrity-protected using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count, and the second TAU request including a first set of information. The example apparatus may also output a second context request for a second network entity based on the second TAU request. The example device can also receive a second mapped security context based on a second context request, the second mapped security context being derived from the first security context and the second uplink count. Additionally, the example device can transmit downlink messages based on the second mapped security context.
[0012] In another aspect of this disclosure, methods, computer-readable media, and apparatus for wireless communication are provided. The apparatus may include a second network entity, such as an Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF). The example apparatus may receive a first context request, which includes at least a first TAU request generated by a UE, the first TAU request being integrity-protected using a first uplink count, and the first TAU request being encoded using a first security context associated with a first RAT, which is different from a second RAT associated with a first network entity. The example apparatus may also derive a first mapped security context when a first integrity check on the first TAU request is successful. The example apparatus may output a first mapped security context for the first network entity. Additionally, the example apparatus may receive a second context request, which includes at least a second TAU request generated by a UE, the second TAU request being integrity-protected using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count. The example apparatus may also derive a second mapped security context when a second integrity check on the second TAU request is successful. Additionally, the example apparatus may output a second mapped security context for the first network entity.
[0013] In one aspect of this disclosure, a method, computer-readable medium, and apparatus are provided for wireless communication at a first network entity, such as an MME. An example apparatus may receive a first TAU request from a UE, the first TAU request being encoded using a first security context associated with a first RAT, the first TAU request being integrity-protected using a first uplink count based on the first security context, and the first TAU request including a first information set, the first information set including an identifier mapped to a second RAT associated with the first network entity. The example apparatus may also transmit a first context request to a second network entity, the second network entity being associated with the first RAT, based on the first TAU request. Additionally, the example apparatus may receive a first mapped security context from the second network entity based on the first context request, the first mapped security context being derived from the first security context and the first uplink count. Furthermore, the example apparatus may receive a second TAU request from the UE, the second TAU request being encoded using the first security context, the second TAU request being integrity-protected using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count, and the second TAU request including a first information set. The example device can also transmit a second context request to a second network entity based on a second TAU request. The example device can also receive a second mapped security context from the second network entity based on the second context request, the second mapped security context being derived from the first security context and the second uplink count. Additionally, the example device can transmit downlink messages to the UE based on the second mapped security context.
[0014] In another aspect of this disclosure, a method, computer-readable medium, and apparatus for wireless communication at a second network entity (such as an AMF) are provided. An example apparatus may receive a first context request from a first network entity, the first context request including at least a first TAU request generated by a UE, the first TAU request being integrity-protected using a first uplink count, the first TAU request being encoded using a first security context associated with a first RAT, the first RAT being different from a second RAT associated with the first network entity. The example apparatus may also derive a first mapped security context when an integrity check of the first TAU request is successful. Additionally, the example apparatus may transmit the first mapped security context to the first network entity. The example apparatus may also receive a second context request from the first network entity, the second context request including at least a second TAU request generated by a UE, the second TAU request being integrity-protected using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count. Additionally, the example apparatus may derive a second mapped security context when an integrity check of the second TAU request is successful. The example apparatus may also transmit the second mapped security context to the first network entity.
[0015] In another aspect of this disclosure, a method, computer-readable medium, and apparatus for wireless communication at a UE are provided. An example apparatus can transmit a first TAU request to a first network entity. The first TAU request is encoded using a first security context associated with a first RAT, is integrity-protected using a first uplink count based on the first security context, and includes a first information set including an identifier mapped to a second RAT associated with the first network entity. The example apparatus can also derive a first mapped security context based on the first security context and the first uplink count. Additionally, the example apparatus can transmit a second TAU request to the first network entity. The second TAU request is encoded using the first security context, is integrity-protected using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count, and includes the first information set. The example apparatus can also derive a second mapped security context based on the first security context and the second uplink count. Additionally, the example apparatus can communicate with the first network entity based on the second mapped security context.
[0016] In another aspect of this disclosure, a method, computer-readable medium, and apparatus for wireless communication at a UE are provided. An example apparatus can transmit a first TAU request to a first network entity when a change is performed from a first cell associated with a first RAT to a connection to a second cell associated with a second RAT different from the first RAT. The first network entity is associated with the second RAT. The first TAU request is encoded using a first security context associated with the first RAT. The first TAU request is integrity-protected using a first uplink count based on the first security context. The first TAU request includes a first information set, which includes an identifier mapped to the second RAT associated with the first network entity. The example apparatus can also transmit a repeat of the first TAU request to the first network entity, the repeat of the first TAU request including the first information set, the repeat of the first TAU request being integrity-protected using the first uplink count. Additionally, the example apparatus can derive a mapped security context based on the first security context and the first uplink count. The example apparatus can also communicate with the first network entity based on the mapped security context.
[0017] In another aspect of this disclosure, a method, computer-readable medium, and apparatus for wireless communication at a UE are provided. An example apparatus can transmit a first TAU request to a first network entity when a change is performed from a first cell associated with a first RAT to a connection to a second cell associated with a second RAT different from the first RAT. The first network entity is associated with the second RAT. The first TAU request is encoded using a first security context associated with the first RAT, and the first TAU request is integrity protected using a first uplink count based on the first security context. The example apparatus can also derive a first integrity key based on the first security context, the first uplink count, and a first mapped security context. Additionally, the example apparatus can transmit a repetition of the first TAU request to the first network entity, the repetition of the first TAU request being integrity protected using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count. The example apparatus can also derive a second integrity key based on the first security context, the second uplink count, and a second mapped security context. Additionally, the example apparatus can receive downlink transmissions from the first network entity. The example apparatus can also perform integrity checks on the downlink transmissions using at least one of the first integrity key and the second integrity key. Additionally, this example device can set the UE's master security key when the integrity check of the downlink transmission is successfully performed using the derived integrity key, the master security key being set based on the corresponding integrity key.
[0018] To achieve the foregoing and related objectives, these one or more aspects include the features fully described below and specifically pointed out in the claims. Certain illustrative features of these one or more aspects are set forth in detail in the following description and drawings. However, these features indicate only a few of the various ways in which the principles of these aspects may be employed. Brief description of the attached diagram
[0020] Figure 1 This is a diagram illustrating an example of a wireless communication system and access network.
[0021] Figure 2A This is an example illustration of the first frame explaining various aspects of this disclosure.
[0022] Figure 2B This is a diagram illustrating an example of a DL channel within a subframe according to various aspects of this disclosure.
[0023] Figure 2C This is an example illustration of the second frame explaining various aspects of this disclosure.
[0024] Figure 2D This is a diagram illustrating an example of a UL channel within a subframe according to various aspects of this disclosure.
[0025] Figure 3 This is a diagram illustrating an example of a base station and user equipment (UE) in an access network.
[0026] Figure 4 This is a diagram illustrating an example of a wireless communication system and access network comprising a first network node, a second network node, a UE, an evolved packet core (EPC), and a core network (e.g., a 5G core (5GC)) in accordance with the teachings disclosed herein.
[0027] Figure 5 Examples of different security contexts based on the teachings disclosed in this article are described.
[0028] Figure 6 This is an example communication flow depicting idle mode mobility from the first RAT to the second RAT, based on the teachings disclosed herein.
[0029] Figure 7 This is a flowchart of a method for performing wireless communication at a UE based on the teachings disclosed herein.
[0030] Figure 8 This is a flowchart of a method for performing wireless communication at a UE based on the teachings disclosed herein.
[0031] Figure 9 This is a flowchart of a method for performing wireless communication at a UE based on the teachings disclosed herein.
[0032] Figure 10 This is a flowchart of a method for performing wireless communication at a UE based on the teachings disclosed herein.
[0033] Figure 11 This is a diagram illustrating an example of a hardware implementation of the example device based on the teachings disclosed herein.
[0034] Figure 12 This is a flowchart of a method for conducting wireless communication at a network entity in accordance with the teachings disclosed herein.
[0035] Figure 13 This is a flowchart of a method for conducting wireless communication at a network entity in accordance with the teachings disclosed herein.
[0036] Figure 14 This is a flowchart of a method for conducting wireless communication at a network entity in accordance with the teachings disclosed herein.
[0037] Figure 15 This is a flowchart of a method for conducting wireless communication at a network entity in accordance with the teachings disclosed herein.
[0038] Figure 16This is a diagram illustrating an example of the hardware implementation used to demonstrate a network entity.
[0039] Figure 17 This is a diagram illustrating an example of the hardware implementation used to demonstrate a network entity.
[0040] Detailed description
[0041] Any number of wireless networks can be deployed in a given geographical area. Each wireless network may support a specific radio access technology (RAT) and may operate on one or more frequencies. In some examples, the UE may be connected to a first cell associated with a first RAT (such as 5G). The first cell may not be able to provide support to the UE. For example, 5G coverage may not be ubiquitous in some deployment scenarios. In other examples, the first RAT may not be able to provide service, such as voice calls initiated on the first RAT. To provide support to the UE, the UE and the first RAT may support reselection from the first RAT to a second RAT, which may provide support for the service to the UE. For example, to support voice support, the UE and the first cell may support a fallback procedure in which the UE falls back to a second cell associated with the second RAT.
[0042] When a UE falls back from a first cell to a second cell, it can execute a reselection procedure. For example, the UE can execute a 5G to Evolved Packet Core (EPC) reselection procedure. When the UE executes the reselection procedure, it can initiate a TAU procedure to register itself within the tracking area of the second cell and the associated second RAT.
[0043] To provide security for communication across wireless communication systems, integrity protection can be applied to messages exchanged between devices within the wireless communication system. Integrity protection can be based on a security context that includes one or more security keys. In some examples, the security context may include one or more security parameters for authentication, integrity protection, and encryption, and may be identified by a Key Set Identifier (KSI). In some examples, each RAT may be associated with a corresponding security context. To facilitate a reselection from a first cell to a second cell, the network entity of the corresponding RAT may facilitate mapping a first security context associated with one RAT to a second security context associated with another RAT. For example, a network entity associated with 5G may facilitate mapping a 5G security context to an EPC security context. In some examples, mapping a 5G security context to an EPC security context may include deriving the EPC security context using the 5G security context. The EPC security context enables the UE to communicate with the second cell associated with the EPC network after a handover from a first cell to a second cell.
[0044] In some scenarios, a radio link failure (RLF) may occur after the UE establishes a connection with the second cell and transmits a TAU request message. In such examples, the UE can retransmit the TAU request message. However, the mapping from the first security context to the second security context may lead to inconsistencies, which could result in communication failures.
[0045] The examples disclosed herein provide techniques for eliminating inconsistencies in the handling of duplicate TAU request messages as described above. In a first aspect, the disclosed techniques eliminate inconsistencies by modifying how the network handles duplicate TAU request messages. In a second aspect, the disclosed techniques eliminate inconsistencies by modifying how the UE performs integrity protection on TAU request messages. In a third aspect, the disclosed techniques eliminate inconsistencies by modifying how the UE performs message integrity verification.
[0046] The aspects presented in this paper enable devices in wireless communication systems to facilitate secure handling of 5GS to EPC reselection in the case of retransmission requests from RLF and Evolved Packet System (EPS) TAU, thereby facilitating improved mobility support.
[0047] The following detailed description, illustrated with reference to the accompanying drawings, illustrates various configurations but does not represent the only configurations in which the concepts described herein can be practiced. This detailed description includes specific details to provide a thorough understanding of the various concepts. However, these concepts can be practiced without these specific details. In some instances, well-known structures and components are shown in block diagram form to avoid obscuring such concepts.
[0048] Various apparatuses and methods are described below, and are illustrated in the accompanying drawings by various blocks, components, circuits, processes, algorithms, etc. (collectively, “elements”). These elements can be implemented using electronic hardware, computer software, or any combination thereof. Whether such elements are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and the design constraints imposed on the overall system.
[0049] As an example, an element, or any part of an element, or any combination of elements, may be implemented as a "processing system" including one or more processors. Examples of processors include: microprocessors, microcontrollers, graphics processing units (GPUs), central processing units (CPUs), application processors, digital signal processors (DSPs), reduced instruction set computing (RISC) processors, system-on-a-chip (SoCs), baseband processors, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), programmable logic devices (PLDs), state machines, gated logic, discrete hardware circuitry, and other suitable hardware configured to perform the various functionalities described throughout this disclosure. One or more processors in a processing system may execute software. Software (whether referred to as software, firmware, middleware, microcode, hardware description language, or otherwise) should be broadly interpreted as instructions, instruction sets, code, code segments, program code, programs, subroutines, software components, applications, software applications, software packages, routines, subroutines, objects, executables, threads of execution, procedures, functions, or any combination thereof.
[0050] Accordingly, in one or more example aspects, implementations, and / or use cases, the described functionality can be implemented in hardware, software, or any combination thereof. If implemented in software, the functionality can be stored or encoded as one or more instructions or code on a computer-readable medium. Computer-readable media includes computer storage media. Storage media can be any available medium accessible to a computer. As examples, such computer-readable media may include random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM), optical disc storage, magnetic disk storage, other magnetic storage devices, combinations of these types of computer-readable media, or any other medium capable of being used to store computer-executable code in the form of instructions or data structures accessible to a computer.
[0051] While aspects, implementations, and / or use cases are described herein by way of example, additional or different aspects, implementations, and / or use cases may arise in many different arrangements and scenarios. The aspects, implementations, and / or use cases described herein can be implemented across many different platform types, devices, systems, shapes, sizes, and packaging arrangements. For example, aspects, implementations, and / or use cases may arise via integrated chip implementations and other devices based on non-modular components (e.g., end-user devices, vehicles, communication devices, computing devices, industrial equipment, retail / shopping devices, medical devices, AI-enabled devices, etc.). While some examples may or may not be specific to a particular use case or application, broad applicability of the described examples is possible. The scope of aspects, implementations, and / or use cases ranges from chip-level or modular components to non-modular, non-chip-level implementations, and further to aggregated, distributed, or original equipment manufacturer (OEM) devices or systems incorporating one or more technologies described herein. In some practical settings, devices incorporating the described aspects and features may also include additional components and features for implementing and practicing the claimed and described aspects. For example, the transmission and reception of wireless signals must include several components for analog and digital purposes (e.g., hardware components, including antennas, RF chains, power amplifiers, modulators, buffers, processors, interleavers, adders / summers, etc.). The techniques described herein can be implemented in a wide variety of devices, chip-level components, systems, distributed arrangements, aggregated or decomposed components, end-user equipment, etc., of various sizes, shapes, and configurations.
[0052] The deployment of communication systems (such as 5G NR systems) can involve various components or parts arranged in multiple ways. In a 5G NR system or network, network nodes, network entities, network mobility elements, radio access network (RAN) nodes, core network nodes, network elements, or network equipment (such as base stations (BS), or one or more units (or components) performing base station functions) can be implemented in aggregated or decomposed architectures. For example, BS (such as Node B (NB), evolved NB (eNB), NR BS, 5G NB, access point (AP), transmit / receive point (TRP), or cell, etc.) can be implemented as aggregated base stations (also known as self-contained BS or monolithic BS) or decomposed base stations.
[0053] Aggregated base stations can be configured to utilize a radio protocol stack that is physically or logically integrated within a single RAN node. Decentralized base stations can be configured to utilize a protocol stack that is physically or logically distributed across two or more units, such as one or more central or centralized units (CUs), one or more distributed units (DUs), or one or more radio units (RUs). In some respects, the CU can be implemented within a RAN node, and one or more DUs can be co-located with the CU, or alternatively, can be geographically or virtually distributed across one or more other RAN nodes. DUs can be implemented to communicate with one or more RUs. Each of the CU, DU, and RU can be implemented as a virtual unit, namely a virtual central unit (VCU), a virtual distributed unit (VDU), or a virtual radio unit (VRU).
[0054] Base station operation or network design can take into account the aggregation characteristics of base station functionality. For example, decomposed base stations can be used in Integrated Access Backhaul (IAB) networks, Open Radio Access Networks (O-RAN (such as network configurations advocated by the O-RAN Alliance)), or Virtualized Radio Access Networks (vRAN, also known as Cloud Radio Access Networks (C-RAN)). Decomposition can include distributing functionality across two or more units across various physical locations, as well as virtually distributing the functionality of at least one unit, which allows for flexibility in network design. Individual units in a decomposed base station or decomposed RAN architecture can be configured to communicate wirelessly with at least one other unit.
[0055] Figure 1 Figure 100 illustrates an example of a wireless communication system and access network. The illustrated wireless communication system includes a decomposed base station architecture. The decomposed base station architecture may include one or more CUs (e.g., CU 110) that can communicate directly with the core network 120 via a backhaul link, or indirectly with the core network 120 via one or more decomposed base station units (such as a near-real-time (Near-RT) RAN Intelligent Controller (RIC) via an E2 link (e.g., Near-RT RIC 125), or a non-real-time (Non-RT) RIC 115 associated with a Service Management and Orchestration (SMO) framework (e.g., SMO framework 105), or both). CU 110 may communicate with one or more DUs (e.g., DU 130) via a corresponding mid-range link (such as an F1 interface). DU 130 may communicate with one or more RUs (e.g., RU 140) via a corresponding outbound link. RU 140 may communicate with a corresponding UE (e.g., UE 104) via one or more radio frequency (RF) access links. In some implementations, UE 104 can be served by multiple RUs simultaneously.
[0056] Each of the units (i.e., CU (e.g., CU 110), DU (e.g., DU 130), RU (e.g., RU 140), and near-RT RIC (e.g., near-RT RIC 125), non-RT RIC (e.g., non-RT RIC 115), and SMO frame 105) may include or be coupled to one or more interfaces configured to receive or transmit signals, data, or information (collectively, signals) via wired or wireless transmission media. Each of the units, or an associated processor or controller that provides instructions to the communication interfaces of these units, may be configured to communicate with one or more other units via transmission media. For example, these units may include wired interfaces configured to receive or transmit signals to one or more other units over a wired transmission medium. Additionally, these units may include a wireless interface, which may include a receiver, transmitter, or transceiver (such as an RF transceiver) configured to receive or transmit signals over a wireless transmission medium to one or more of the other units, or both.
[0057] In some aspects, the CU 110 can store one or more higher-level control functions. These control functions may include Radio Resource Control (RRC), Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP), Serving Data Adaptation Protocol (SDAP), etc. Each control function can be implemented with an interface configured to communicate signaling with other control functions stored in the CU 110. The CU 110 can be configured to handle user plane functionality (i.e., Central Unit-User Plane (CU-UP)), control plane functionality (i.e., Central Unit-Control Plane (CU-CP)), or a combination thereof. In some implementations, the CU 110 can be logically split into one or more CU-UP units and one or more CU-CP units. When implemented in an O-RAN configuration, the CU-UP units can communicate bidirectionally with the CU-CP units via an interface such as an E1 interface. The CU 110 can be implemented to communicate with the DU 130 for network control and signaling purposes, as needed.
[0058] DU 130 may correspond to a logical unit that includes one or more base station functions to control the operation of one or more RUs. In some aspects, DU 130 may, at least in part, store one or more of the Radio Link Control (RLC) layer, Media Access Control (MAC) layer, and one or more high physical (PHY) layers (such as modules for forward error correction (FEC) encoding and decoding, scrambling, modulation and demodulation, etc.) depending on functional partitioning (such as functional partitioning defined by 3GPP). In some aspects, DU 130 may further store one or more low PHY layers. Each layer (or module) may be implemented with an interface configured to communicate signals with other layers (and modules) stored by DU 130 or with control functions stored by CU 110.
[0059] Lower-layer functionality can be implemented by one or more RUs. In some deployments, the RU 140 controlled by DU 130 can correspond at least partially to main memory RF processing functions or low PHY layer functions (such as performing Fast Fourier Transform (FFT), Inverse FFT (iFFT), digital beamforming, Physical Random Access Channel (PRACH) extraction and filtering, or both, based on functional partitioning (such as lower-layer functional partitioning). In such architectures, RU 140 can be implemented to handle over-the-air (OTA) communication with one or more UEs (e.g., UE 104). In some implementations, the real-time and non-real-time aspects of control and user plane communication with RU 140 can be controlled by the corresponding DU. In some scenarios, this configuration enables the DUs and CU110 to be implemented in a cloud-based RAN architecture (such as vRAN architecture).
[0060] SMO framework 105 can be configured to support RAN deployment and provisioning of both non-virtualized and virtualized network elements. For non-virtualized network elements, SMO framework 105 can be configured to support the deployment of dedicated physical resources for RAN coverage requirements, which can be managed via operation and maintenance interfaces such as the O1 interface. For virtualized network elements, SMO framework 105 can be configured to interact with a cloud computing platform such as Open Cloud (O-Cloud) 190 to perform network element lifecycle management (such as instantiating virtualized network elements) via a cloud computing platform interface such as the O2 interface. Such virtualized network elements may include, but are not limited to, CUs, DUs, RUs, and near-RT RICs. In some implementations, SMO framework 105 can communicate with the hardware aspects of the 4G RAN (such as Open eNB (O-eNB) 111) via the O1 interface. Additionally, in some implementations, SMO framework 105 can communicate directly with one or more RUs via the O1 interface. SMO framework 105 may also include a non-RT RIC 115 configured to support the functionality of SMO framework 105.
[0061] The non-RT RIC 115 can be configured to include logical functions that enable near real-time control and optimization of RAN elements and resources, including artificial intelligence (AI) / machine learning (ML) workflows for model training and updates, or policy-based guided non-real-time control and optimization of applications / features in the near-RT RIC 125. The non-RT RIC 115 can be coupled to or communicate with the near-RT RIC 125 (e.g., via an A1 interface). The near-RT RIC 125 can be configured to include logical functions that enable near real-time control and optimization of RAN elements and resources through data collection and actions via an interface (e.g., via an E2 interface) connecting one or more CUs, one or more DUs, or both, and O-eNBs to the near-RT RIC 125.
[0062] In some implementations, to generate AI / ML models to be deployed in the near-RT RIC 125, the non-RT RIC 115 can receive parameters or external enrichment information from an external server. This information can be utilized by the near-RT RIC 125 and can be received from non-network data sources or network functions at the SMO framework 105 or the non-RT RIC 115. In some examples, the non-RT RIC 115 or the near-RT RIC 125 can be configured to tune RAN behavior or performance. For example, the non-RT RIC 115 can monitor long-term trends and patterns in performance and employ AI / ML models to perform corrective actions via the SMO framework 105 (such as reconfiguration via O1) or via the creation of RAN management policies (such as A1 policies).
[0063] At least one of CU 110, DU 130, and RU 140 may be referred to as base station 102. Therefore, base station 102 may include one or more of CU 110, DU 130, and RU 140 (each component is indicated by a dashed line to indicate that each component may or may not be included in base station 102). Base station 102 provides UE 104 with an access point to core network 120. Base station 102 may include macrocells (high-power cellular base stations) and / or small cells (low-power cellular base stations). Small cells include femtocells, picocells, and microcells. A network that includes both small cells and macrocells may be referred to as a heterogeneous network. A heterogeneous network may also include a Home Evolved B Node (eNB) (HeNB) that can provide service to a restricted group referred to as a Closed Subscriber Group (CSG). The communication link between the RU (e.g., RU 104) and the UE (e.g., UE 104) may include uplink (UL) (also known as reverse link) transmission from UE 104 to RU 140 and / or downlink (DL) (also known as forward link) transmission from RU 140 to UE 104. The communication link may utilize multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) antenna technologies, including spatial multiplexing, beamforming, and / or transmit diversity. These communication links may use one or more carriers. For the total number of carriers used for transmission in each direction, up to [number missing] carriers are allowed. Yx MHz ( x Each carrier allocated in the carrier aggregation (of component carriers) can be used by base station 102 / UE 104 up to [number missing] carriers. Y A spectrum with a bandwidth of MHz (e.g., 5, 10, 15, 20, 100, 400 MHz, etc.). These carriers may or may not be adjacent to each other. Carrier allocation may be asymmetric with respect to DL and UL (e.g., more or fewer carriers may be allocated to DL compared to UL). Component carriers may include primary component carriers and one or more secondary component carriers. The primary component carrier may be referred to as the primary cell (PCell), and the secondary component carriers may be referred to as secondary cells (SCells).
[0064] Some UEs can communicate with each other using device-to-device (D2D) communication (e.g., D2D link 158). D2D communication link 158 can use DL / UL wireless wide area network (WWAN) spectrum. D2D communication link 158 can use one or more sidelink channels, such as the Physical Sidelink Broadcast Channel (PSBCH), Physical Sidelink Discovery Channel (PSDCH), Physical Sidelink Shared Channel (PSSCH), and Physical Sidelink Control Channel (PSCCH). D2D communication can be achieved through a wide variety of wireless D2D communication systems, such as, for example, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi based on the IEEE 802.11 standard, LTE, or NR.
[0065] The wireless communication system may further include a Wi-Fi AP 150 that communicates with UE104 (also referred to as a Wi-Fi station (STA)) via communication link 154 in, for example, 5 GHz unlicensed spectrum. When communicating in unlicensed spectrum, UE104 / Wi-Fi AP 150 may perform a clear channel assessment (CCA) before communication to determine whether the channel is available.
[0066] The electromagnetic spectrum is typically subdivided into various classes, bands, channels, etc., based on frequency / wavelength. In 5G NR, two initial operating bands have been designated as frequency ranges FR1 (410 MHz – 7.125 GHz) and FR2 (24.25 GHz – 52.6 GHz). Although a portion of FR1 is greater than 6 GHz, it is generally (interchangeably) referred to as the “sub-6 GHz” band in various documents and articles. Similar naming issues sometimes arise regarding FR2, although it is different from the Very High Frequency (EHF) band (30 GHz – 300 GHz) designated as the “millimeter wave” band by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), FR2 is generally (interchangeably) referred to as the “millimeter wave” band in various documents and articles.
[0067] The frequencies between FR1 and FR2 are generally referred to as intermediate frequency (IF) bands. Recent 5G NR studies have identified the operating bands of these IF bands as the frequency range designation FR3 (7.125 GHz – 24.25 GHz). Bands falling within FR3 can inherit FR1 and / or FR2 characteristics, thus effectively extending the features of FR1 and / or FR2 into the IF band. Additionally, higher frequency bands are currently being explored to extend 5G NR operation above 52.6 GHz. For example, three higher operating frequency bands have been identified as the frequency range designations FR2-2 (52.6 GHz – 71 GHz), FR4 (71 GHz – 114.25 GHz), and FR5 (114.25 GHz – 300 GHz). Each of these higher frequency bands falls within the EHF band.
[0068] In light of the foregoing, unless otherwise stated, the term "sub-6 GHz" as used herein may broadly refer to frequencies less than 6 GHz, within FR1, or including intermediate frequency band frequencies. Furthermore, unless otherwise stated, the term "millimeter wave" as used herein may broadly refer to frequencies that may include intermediate frequency band frequencies, within FR2, FR4, FR2-2, and / or FR5, or within the EHF band.
[0069] Base station 102 and UE 104 may each include multiple antennas, such as antenna elements, antenna panels, and / or antenna arrays, to facilitate beamforming. Base station 102 may transmit beamformed signals 182 to UE 104 in one or more transmit directions. UE 104 may receive beamformed signals from base station 102 in one or more receive directions. UE 104 may also transmit beamformed signals 184 to base station 102 in one or more transmit directions. Base station 102 may receive beamformed signals from UE 104 in one or more receive directions. Base station 102 / UE 104 may perform beam training to determine the optimal receive and transmit directions for each of base station 102 / UE 104. The transmit and receive directions of base station 102 may be the same or different. The transmit and receive directions of UE 104 may be the same or different.
[0070] Base station 102 may include and / or be referred to as gNB, B-node, eNB, access point, base transceiver station, radio base station, radio transceiver, transceiver function, basic service set (BSS), extended service set (ESS), transmit / receive point (TRP), network node, network entity, network equipment, or any other suitable term. Base station 102 may be implemented as an integrated access and backhaul (IAB) node, relay node, sidelink node, aggregated (monolithic) base station with baseband units (BBU) (including CU and DU) and RU, or as a decomposed base station including one or more of CU, DU, and / or RU. A collection of base stations that may include decomposed and / or aggregated base stations may be referred to as Next Generation (NG) RAN (NG-RAN).
[0071] The core network 120 may include Access and Mobility Management Functions (AMF) (e.g., AMF 161), Session Management Functions (SMF) (e.g., SMF 162), User Plane Functions (UPF) (e.g., UPF 163), Unified Data Management (UDM) (e.g., UDM 164), one or more location servers 168, and other functional entities. AMF 161 is the control node that processes signaling between UE 104 and the core network 120. AMF 161 supports registration management, connection management, mobility management, and other functions. SMF 162 supports session management and other functions. UPF 163 supports packet routing, packet forwarding, and other functions. UDM 164 supports the generation of authentication and key negotiation (AKA) credentials, user identity processing, access authorization, and subscription management. One or more location servers 168 are described as including Gateway Mobile Location Center (GMLC) (e.g., GMLC 165) and Location Management Functions (LMF) (e.g., LMF 166). However, typically, one or more location servers 168 may include one or more location / positioning servers, which may include one or more of GMLC 165, LMF 166, Position Determination Entity (PDE), Serving Mobile Location Center (SMLC), Mobile Location Center (MPC), etc. GMLC 165 and LMF 166 support UE location services. GMLC 165 provides an interface for clients / applications (e.g., emergency services) to access UE location information. LMF 166 receives measurement and assistance information from NG-RAN and UE 104 via AMF 161 to calculate the location of UE 104. NG-RAN may utilize one or more positioning methods to determine the location of UE 104. Positioning UE 104 may involve signal measurement, location estimation, and optional speed calculation based on measurements. Signal measurement may be performed by UE 104 and / or serving base station (e.g., base station 102). The measured signal may be based on one or more of the following: Satellite Positioning System (SPS) 170 (e.g., one or more of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), Global Positioning System (GPS), Non-Terrestrial Network (NTN) or other satellite positioning / location systems), LTE signal, Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) signal, Bluetooth signal, Terrestrial Beacon System (TBS), sensor-based information (e.g., barometric pressure sensor, motion sensor), NR Enhanced Cellular ID (NR E-CID) method, NR signal (e.g., multiple round-trip time (multi-RTT), DL angle of departure (DL-AoD), DL time difference of arrival (DL-TDOA), UL time difference of arrival (UL-TDOA) and UL angle of arrival (UL-AoA) positioning) and / or other systems / signals / sensors.
[0072] Examples of UEs include cellular phones, smartphones, Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) phones, laptop devices, personal digital assistants (PDAs), satellite radios, GPS devices, multimedia devices, video devices, digital audio players (e.g., MP3 players), cameras, game consoles, tablet devices, smart devices, wearable devices, vehicles, electricity meters, air pumps, large or small kitchen appliances, healthcare devices, implants, sensors / actuators, displays, or any other similar functional devices. Some UEs may be referred to as IoT devices (e.g., parking timers, oil pumps, ovens, vehicles, heart monitors, etc.). UE 104 may also be referred to as a station, mobile station, subscriber station, mobile unit, subscriber unit, wireless unit, remote unit, mobile device, wireless device, wireless communication device, remote device, mobile subscriber station, access terminal, mobile terminal, wireless terminal, remote terminal, handheld device, user agent, mobile client, client, or some other suitable term. In some scenarios, the term UE may also apply to one or more accompanying devices, such as in a device constellation arrangement. One or more of these devices may jointly access the network and / or individually access the network.
[0073] Refer again Figure 1 In some aspects, a device communicating with a base station (such as UE 104) may be configured to manage one or more aspects of wireless communication. For example, UE 104 may include a UE security handling component 198 configured to facilitate security handling of 5GS to EPC reselection in the event of retransmission of RLF and EPS TAU requests. In some aspects, the UE security handling component 198 may be configured to transmit a first TAU request to a first network entity, the first TAU request being encoded using a first security context associated with a first RAT, the first TAU request being integrity-protected using a first uplink count based on the first security context, and the first TAU request including a first information set including an identifier mapped to a second RAT associated with the first network entity. The uplink count may indicate the number of uplink messages conveyed. Example UE security handling component 198 may also be configured to transmit a second TAU request to the first network entity, the second TAU request including the first information set, the second TAU request being integrity-protected using a second uplink count. Additionally, the example UE security handling component 198 can be configured to derive a mapped security context based on at least one of a first security context and a first uplink count or a second uplink count. The example UE security handling component 198 can also be configured to communicate with a first network entity based on the mapped security context.
[0074] On the other hand, the UE security handling component 198 can be configured to transmit a first TAU request to a first network entity when a change is performed from a first cell associated with a first RAT to a connection to a second cell associated with a second RAT different from the first RAT. The first network entity is associated with the second RAT. The first TAU request is encoded using a first security context associated with the first RAT, and the first TAU request is integrity protected using a first uplink count based on the first security context. The example UE security handling component 198 can also be configured to derive a first integrity key based on the first security context, the first uplink count, and a first mapped security context. The integrity key can be a key used to perform integrity checks on communications. Additionally, the example UE security handling component 198 can be configured to transmit a duplicate of the first TAU request to the first network entity. The duplicate of the first TAU request is integrity protected using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count. The example UE security handling component 198 can also be configured to derive a second integrity key based on the first security context, the second uplink count, and the second mapped security context. Additionally, the example UE security handling component 198 can be configured to receive downlink transmissions from a first network entity. The example UE security handling component 198 can also be configured to perform an integrity check on the downlink transmission using at least one of a first integrity key and a second integrity key. The integrity check can be performed using the integrity key to verify the integrity of the downlink transmission. Additionally, the example UE security handling component 198 can be configured to set a master security key for the UE when the integrity check on the downlink transmission using the derived integrity key is successful. This master security key is set based on a first or second mapped security context used to derive the derived integrity key. The master security key can be a key used to derive other security keys.
[0075] In some aspects, the UE security handling component 198 can be configured to transmit a first TAU request to a first network entity. The first TAU request can be encoded using a first security context associated with a first RAT. The first TAU request can be integrity protected using a first uplink count based on the first security context, and the first TAU request can include a first set of information, including an identifier mapped to a second RAT associated with the first network entity. The example UE security handling component 198 can also be configured to derive a first mapped security context based on the first security context and the first uplink count. The example UE security handling component 198 can also be configured to transmit a second TAU request to the first network entity. The second TAU request can be encoded using the first security context, the second TAU request can be integrity protected using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count, and the second TAU request can include a first set of information. The example UE security handling component 198 can also be configured to derive a second mapped security context based on the first security context and a second uplink count. The example UE security handling component 198 can also be configured to communicate with the first network entity based on the second mapped security context.
[0076] On the other hand, the UE security handling component 198 may be configured to transmit a first TAU request to a first network entity when a change is performed from a first cell associated with a first RAT to a connection to a second cell associated with a second RAT different from the first RAT. The first network entity may be associated with the second RAT. The first TAU request may be encoded using a first security context associated with the first RAT, the first TAU request may be integrity protected using a first uplink count based on the first security context, and the first TAU request may include a first information set including an identifier mapped to the second RAT associated with the first network entity.
[0077] The example UE security handling component 198 can also be configured to transmit a repeat of the first TAU request to the first network entity. The repeat of the first TAU request may include a first information set, and the repeat of the first TAU request may be protected for integrity using a first uplink count. The example UE security handling component 198 can also be configured to derive a mapped security context based on a first security context and the first uplink count. Additionally, the example UE security handling component 198 can be configured to communicate with the first network entity based on the mapped security context.
[0078] On the other hand, the UE security handling component 198 can be configured to transmit a first TAU request to a first network entity when a change is performed from a first cell associated with a first RAT to a connection to a second cell associated with a second RAT different from the first RAT. The first network entity may be associated with the second RAT. The first TAU request can be encoded using a first security context associated with the first RAT, and the first TAU request can be integrity protected using a first uplink count based on the first security context. The example UE security handling component 198 can also be configured to derive a first integrity key based on the first security context, the first uplink count, and a first mapped security context. The example UE security handling component 198 can also be configured to transmit a duplicate of the first TAU request to the first network entity. The duplicate of the first TAU request can be integrity protected using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count. Additionally, the example UE security handling component 198 can also be configured to derive a second integrity key based on the first security context, the second uplink count, and the second mapped security context. The example UE security handling component 198 can also be configured to receive downlink transmissions from the first network entity. The example UE security handling component 198 can also be configured to perform integrity checks on downlink transmissions using at least one of a first integrity key and a second integrity key. The example UE security handling component 198 can also be configured to set the UE's master security key when the integrity check on the downlink transmission is successful using the derived integrity key. The master security key is set based on the corresponding integrity key.
[0079] In another configuration, the network entity may be configured to manage one or more aspects of wireless communication by facilitating improved mobility support through security procedures for 5GS to EPC reselection in the event of retransmissions requested by RLF and EPS TAU. For example, the network entity may include a network security handling component 199. Various aspects of the network security handling component 199 may be implemented by an MME, an AMF (e.g., AMF 161), and / or a base station (e.g., base station 102).
[0080] The network security handling component 199 can be configured to receive a first TAU request generated by the UE. The first TAU request is encoded using a first security context associated with a first RAT, is integrity-protected using a first uplink count based on the first security context, and includes a first information set, which includes an identifier mapped to a second RAT associated with a first network entity. Additionally, the network security handling component 199 can be configured to output a first context request to a second network entity associated with the first RAT based on the first TAU request. The network security handling component 199 can also be configured to receive a first mapped security context based on the first context request, the first mapped security context being derived from the first security context and the first uplink count. Additionally, the network security handling component 199 can be configured to receive a second TAU request, encoded using the first security context, integrity-protected using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count, and including a first information set. The network security handling component 199 can also be configured to output a second context request to a second network entity based on a second TAU request. Additionally, the network security handling component 199 can be configured to receive a second mapped security context based on the second context request, the second mapped security context being derived from a first security context and a second uplink count. The network security handling component 199 can also be configured to transmit downlink messages based on the second mapped security context.
[0081] On the other hand, the network security handling component 199 can be configured to receive a first context request, which includes at least a first TAU request generated by the UE. The first TAU request is integrity-protected using a first uplink count and encoded using a first security context associated with a first RAT, which is different from a second RAT associated with a first network entity. Additionally, the network security handling component 199 can be configured to export a first mapped security context when a first integrity check on the first TAU request is successful. The network security handling component 199 can also be configured to output a first mapped security context for the first network entity. Additionally, the network security handling component 199 can be configured to receive a second context request, which includes at least a second TAU request generated by the UE. The second TAU request is integrity-protected using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count. The network security handling component 199 can also be configured to export a second mapped security context when a second integrity check on the second TAU request is successful. Additionally, the network security handling component 199 can be configured to output a second mapped security context for the first network entity.
[0082] In some aspects, network security handling component 199 can be configured to receive a first TAU request from a UE. The first TAU request can be encoded using a first security context associated with a first RAT, the first TAU request can be integrity protected using a first uplink count based on the first security context, and the first TAU request can include a first set of information, the first set of information including an identifier mapped to a second RAT associated with a first network entity. Example network security handling component 199 can also be configured to transmit a first context request to a second network entity based on the first TAU request. The second network entity can be associated with the first RAT. Example network security handling component 199 can also be configured to receive a first mapped security context from the second network entity based on the first context request. The first mapped security context can be derived from the first security context and the first uplink count. Additionally, example network security handling component 199 can be configured to receive a second TAU request from a UE. The second TAU request can be encoded using the first security context, the second TAU request can be integrity protected using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count, and the second TAU request can include a first set of information. The example network security handling component 199 can also be configured to transmit a second context request to a second network entity based on a second TAU request. Additionally, the example network security handling component 199 can be configured to receive a second mapped security context from the second network entity based on the second context request. The second mapped security context can be derived from a first security context and a second uplink count. The example network security handling component 199 can also be configured to transmit downlink messages to the UE based on the second mapped security context.
[0083] On the other hand, network security handling component 199 can be configured to receive a first context request from a first network entity, the first context request including at least a first TAU request generated by the UE. The first TAU request may be integrity protected using a first uplink count, and the first TAU request may be encoded using a first security context associated with a first RAT, which may be different from a second RAT associated with the first network entity. Example network security handling component 199 can also be configured to export a first mapped security context when an integrity check of the first TAU request is successful. Example network security handling component 199 can also be configured to transmit the first mapped security context to the first network entity. Additionally, example network security handling component 199 can be configured to receive a second context request from the first network entity. The second context request may include at least a second TAU request generated by the UE, the second TAU request being integrity protected using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count. Example network security handling component 199 can also be configured to export a second mapped security context when an integrity check of the second TAU request is successful. Example network security handling component 199 can also be configured to transmit a second mapped security context to a first network entity.
[0084] The aspects presented in this paper enable devices in wireless communication systems to facilitate secure handling of 5GS to EPC reselection in the case of retransmissions requested by RLF and EPS TAU, thereby facilitating improved mobility support.
[0085] While the following description provides an example for 5G NR (and specifically for 5G to EPC reselection), the concepts described herein can be applied to other similar domains such as LTE, LTE-A, CDMA, GSM and / or other wireless technologies, where the UE can perform a reselection from a cell associated with a first RAT to a second cell associated with a second RAT.
[0086] Figure 2A This is a diagram 200 illustrating an example of the first subframe within the 5G NR frame structure. Figure 2B Figure 230 is an example illustrating the DL channel within a 5G NR subframe. Figure 2C This is a diagram 250 illustrating an example of the second subframe within the 5G NR frame structure. Figure 2D Figure 280 illustrates an example of the UL channel within a 5G NR subframe. The 5G NR frame structure can be Frequency Division Duplex (FDD), where subframes within a specific set of subcarriers (carrier system bandwidth) are dedicated to either DL or UL; or it can be Time Division Duplex (TDD), where subframes within a specific set of subcarriers (carrier system bandwidth) are dedicated to both DL and UL. Figure 2A , 2C In the provided example, the 5G / NR frame structure is assumed to be TDD, where subframe 4 is configured with slot format 28 (mostly DL), where D is DL, U is UL, and F is for flexible use between DL / UL, and subframe 3 is configured with slot format 1 (all UL). Although subframes 3 and 4 are shown as having slot formats 1 and 28, respectively, any particular subframe can be configured with any of the various available slot formats 0-61. Slot formats 0 and 1 are all DL and all UL, respectively. Other slot formats 2-61 include a mixture of DL, UL, and flexible symbols. The UE is configured to have a slot format via the received Slot Format Indicator (SFI) (dynamically configured via DL Control Information (DCI) or semi-statically / statically configured via Radio Resource Control (RRC) signaling). Note that the following description also applies to 5G NR frame structures for TDD.
[0087] Figures 2A-2D The frame structure has been explained, and aspects of this disclosure are applicable to other wireless communication technologies that may have different frame structures and / or different channels. A frame (10 ms) can be divided into 10 equally sized subframes (1 ms). Each subframe may include one or more time slots. Subframes may also include mini-time slots, which may include 7, 4, or 2 symbols. Each time slot may include 14 or 12 symbols, depending on whether the cyclic prefix (CP) is normal or extended. For normal CP, each time slot may include 14 symbols, while for extended CP, each time slot may include 12 symbols. Symbols on the DL can be CP Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) (CP-OFDM) symbols. Symbols on the UL can be CP-OFDM symbols (for high-throughput scenarios) or Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) Extended OFDM (DFT-s-OFDM) symbols (also known as Single Carrier Frequency Division Multiple Access (SC-FDMA) symbols) (for power-constrained scenarios; limited to single-stream transmission). The number of time slots within a subframe is based on the CP and parameter design. The parameter design defines the subcarrier spacing (SCS) and, in effect, the symbol length / duration, which is equal to 1 / SCS.
[0088]
[0089] Table 1
[0090] For a normal CP (14 symbols / slot), different parameter designs µ 0 to 4 allow 1, 2, 4, 8, and 16 slots per subframe, respectively. For an extended CP, parameter design 2 allows 4 slots per subframe. Correspondingly, for both the normal CP and parameter design µ, there are 14 symbols / slot and 2 slots per subframe. µ One time slot / subframe. As shown in Table 1, the subcarrier spacing can be equal to 2.μ 15 kHz, where μ The parameters are designed from 0 to 4. Thus, parameter design µ=0 has a subcarrier spacing of 15 kHz, while parameter design µ=4 has a subcarrier spacing of 240 kHz. Symbol length / duration is inversely correlated with subcarrier spacing. Figures 2A-2D An example of a normal frequency division multiplexing (CP) with 14 symbols per slot and a parameter design of µ=2 with 4 slots per subframe is provided. The slot duration is 0.25 ms, the subcarrier spacing is 60 kHz, and the symbol duration is approximately 16.67 μs. Within the frame set, there may be one or more different bandwidth portions (BWPs) that are frequency divided and multiplexed (see [link to relevant documentation]). Figure 2B Each BWP can have specific parameter designs and CP (normal or extended).
[0091] A resource grid can be used to represent the frame structure. Each time slot includes a resource block (RB) (also known as a physical RB (PRB)) extending for 12 consecutive subcarriers. The resource grid is divided into multiple resource elements (REs). The number of bits carried by each RE depends on the modulation scheme.
[0092] like Figure 2A As explained in the text, some REs carry reference (pilot) signals (RS) for the UE. RS may include demodulation RS (DM-RS) for channel estimation at the UE (indicated as R for a particular configuration, but other DM-RS configurations are possible) and channel state information reference signal (CSI-RS). RS may also include beam measurement RS (BRS), beam refinement RS (BRRS), and phase tracking RS (PT-RS).
[0093] Figure 2BExamples of various DL channels within a subframe of a frame are explained. The Physical Downlink Control Channel (PDCCH) carries the DCI within one or more Control Channel Elements (CCEs) (e.g., 1, 2, 4, 8, or 16 CCEs), each CCE comprising 6 RE Groups (REGs), each REG comprising 12 coherent REs in the OFDM symbols of the RB. The PDCCH within a BWP may be referred to as a Control Resource Set (CORESET). The UE is configured to monitor PDCCH candidates in a PDCCH search space (e.g., a shared search space, a UE-specific search space) during PDCCH monitoring on the CORESET, where the PDCCH candidates have different DCI formats and different aggregation levels. Additional BWPs may be located at higher and / or lower frequencies spanning the channel bandwidth. The Primary Synchronization Signal (PSS) may be located within symbol 2 of a specific subframe of the frame. The PSS is used by the UE 104 to determine subframe / symbol timing and physical layer identity. The Secondary Synchronization Signal (SSS) may be located within symbol 4 of a specific subframe of the frame. The SSS is used by the UE to determine the Physical Layer Cell Identity Group Number and radio frame timing. Based on the Physical Layer Identity and the Physical Layer Cell Identity Group Number, the UE can determine the Physical Cell Identifier (PCI). Based on the PCI, the UE can determine the location of the DM-RS. The Physical Broadcast Channel (PBCH), carrying the Master Information Block (MIB), can logically group with the PSS and SSS to form a Synchronization Signal (SS) / PBCH block (also known as an SS block (SSB)). The MIB provides the number of RBs in the system bandwidth and the System Frame Number (SFN). The Physical Downlink Shared Channel (PDSCH) carries user data, broadcast system information not transmitted via the PBCH (such as System Information Block (SIB)), and paging messages.
[0094] like Figure 2C As explained, some REs carry DM-RS for channel estimation at the base station (indicated as R for a specific configuration, but other DM-RS configurations are possible). The UE can transmit DM-RS for the Physical Uplink Control Channel (PUCCH) and DM-RS for the Physical Uplink Shared Channel (PUSCH). The PUSCH DM-RS can be transmitted in the first or first two symbols of the PUSCH. The PUCCH DM-RS can be transmitted in different configurations depending on whether a short or long PUCCH is being transmitted and on the specific PUCCH format used. The UE can transmit a probe reference signal (SRS). The SRS can be transmitted in the last symbol of a subframe. The SRS can have a comb structure, and the UE can transmit the SRS on one of the combs. The SRS can be used by the base station for channel quality estimation to enable frequency-dependent scheduling on the UL.
[0095] Figure 2DExamples of various UL channels within a subframe of a frame are explained. The PUCCH can be located as indicated in one configuration. The PUCCH carries uplink control information (UCI), such as scheduling requests, channel quality indicators (CQI), precoding matrix indicators (PMI), rank indicators (RI), and hybrid automatic repeat request (HARQ) acknowledgment (ACK) feedback (i.e., one or more HARQ ACK bits indicating one or more ACKs and / or negative ACKs (NACKs)). The PUCCH carries data and may additionally be used to carry buffer status reports (BSR), power clearance reports (PHR), and / or UCIs.
[0096] Figure 3 This is a block diagram illustrating an example of a first wireless device configured to exchange wireless communications with a second wireless device. Figure 3 In the illustrated example, the first wireless device may include base station 310, the second wireless device may include UE 350, and base station 310 may communicate with UE 350 in the access network. Figure 3 As shown, base station 310 includes a transmit processor (TX processor 316), a transmitter 318Tx, a receiver 318Rx, an antenna 320, a receive processor (RX processor 370), a channel estimator 374, a controller / processor 375, and a memory 376. Example UE 350 includes an antenna 352, a transmitter 354Tx, a receiver 354Rx, an RX processor 356, a channel estimator 358, a controller / processor 359, a memory 360, and a TX processor 368. In other examples, base station 310 and / or UE 350 may include additional or replacement components.
[0097] In the DL, Internet Protocol (IP) packets can be provided to the controller / processor 375. The controller / processor 375 implements Layer 3 and Layer 2 functionality. Layer 3 includes the Radio Resource Control (RRC) layer, and Layer 2 includes the Service Data Adaptation Protocol (SDAP) layer, the Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) layer, the Radio Link Control (RLC) layer, and the Media Access Control (MAC) layer. The controller / processor 375 provides RRC layer functionality associated with broadcasting system information (e.g., MIB, SIB), RRC connection control (e.g., RRC connection paging, RRC connection establishment, RRC connection modification, and RRC connection release), inter-Radio Access Technology (RAT) mobility, and measurement configuration of UE measurement reports; PDCP layer functionality associated with header compression / decompression, security (cryptography, cryptographic decoding, integrity protection, integrity verification), and handover support functions; RLC layer functionality associated with upper-layer packet data unit (PDU) delivery, error correction via ARQ, concatenation, segmentation and reassembly of RLC service data units (SDUs), resegmentation of RLC data PDUs, and reordering of RLC data PDUs; and MAC layer functionality associated with mapping between logical channels and transport channels, multiplexing MAC SDUs onto transport blocks (TBs), demultiplexing MAC SDUs from TBs, scheduling information reporting, error correction via HARQ, priority handling, and logical channel priority differentiation.
[0098] The TX processor 316 and RX processor 370 implement Layer 1 functionality associated with various signal processing functions. Layer 1, including the physical (PHY) layer, may include error detection on the transport channel, forward error correction (FEC) decoding / decoding of the transport channel, interleaving, rate matching, mapping to the physical channel, modulation / demodulation of the physical channel, and MIMO antenna processing. The TX processor 316 processes the mapping to the signal constellation based on various modulation schemes (e.g., binary phase shift keying (BPSK), quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK), M-phase shift keying (M-PSK), M-quadrature amplitude modulation (M-QAM)). The decoded and modulated symbols can then be split into parallel streams. Each stream can then be mapped to an OFDM subcarrier, multiplexed with a reference signal (e.g., a pilot) in the time and / or frequency domains, and subsequently combined using an inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT) to produce a physical channel carrying a time-domain OFDM symbol stream. The OFDM streams are spatially precoded to produce multiple spatial streams. The channel estimate from channel estimator 374 can be used to determine coding and modulation schemes and for spatial processing. The channel estimate can be derived from a reference signal transmitted by UE 350 and / or channel condition feedback. Each spatial stream can then be provided to different antennas of antenna 320 via separate transmitters (e.g., transmitter 318Tx). Each transmitter 318Tx can use the corresponding spatial stream to modulate a radio frequency (RF) carrier for transmission.
[0099] In UE 350, each receiver 354Rx receives signals via its corresponding antenna in antenna 352. Each receiver 354Rx recovers the information modulated onto the RF carrier and provides this information to RX processor 356. TX processor 368 and RX processor 356 implement Layer 1 functionality associated with various signal processing functions. RX processor 356 can perform spatial processing on the information to recover any spatial stream destined for UE 350. If multiple spatial streams are destined for UE 350, two or more of these spatial streams can be combined by RX processor 356 into a single OFDM symbol stream. RX processor 356 then uses a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) to transform the OFDM symbol stream from the time domain to the frequency domain. The frequency domain signal consists of a separate OFDM symbol stream for each subcarrier of the OFDM signal. Symbols on each subcarrier, along with a reference signal, are recovered and demodulated by determining the signal constellation points most likely to be transmitted by base station 310. These soft decisions can be based on a channel estimate calculated by channel estimator 358. These soft decisions are then decoded and deinterleaved to recover the original data and control signals transmitted by base station 310 over the physical channel. This data and control signals are then provided to controller / processor 359, which implements layer 3 and layer 2 functionality.
[0100] The controller / processor 359 may be associated with a memory 360 that stores program code and data. The memory 360 may be referred to as a computer-readable medium. In the UL, the controller / processor 359 provides demultiplexing between transport and logical channels, packet reassembly, cipher decoding, header decompression, and control signal processing to recover IP packets. The controller / processor 359 is also responsible for error detection using ACK and / or NACK protocols to support HARQ operation.
[0101] Similar to the functionality described in conjunction with DL transmissions performed by base station 310, controller / processor 359 provides RRC layer functionality associated with system information (e.g., MIB, SIB) capture, RRC connection, and measurement reporting; PDCP layer functionality associated with header compression / decompression and security (cryptography, cryptographic decoding, integrity protection, integrity verification); RLC layer functionality associated with upper-layer PDU transmission, error correction via ARQ, concatenation, segmentation, and reassembly of RLC SDUs, resegmentation of RLC data PDUs, and reordering of RLC data PDUs; and MAC layer functionality associated with mapping between logical channels and transport channels, multiplexing MAC SDUs onto TBs, demultiplexing MAC SDUs from TBs, scheduling information reporting, error correction via HARQ, priority handling, and logical channel priority differentiation.
[0102] The channel estimate derived by the channel estimator 358 from the reference signal or feedback transmitted by the base station 310 can be used by the TX processor 368 to select appropriate coding and modulation schemes and to facilitate spatial processing. The spatial stream generated by the TX processor 368 can be provided to different antennas in the antenna 352 via separate transmitters (e.g., transmitter 354Tx). Each transmitter 354Tx can use the corresponding spatial stream to modulate an RF carrier for transmission.
[0103] UL transmissions are processed at base station 310 in a manner similar to that described in conjunction with the receiver function at UE 350. Each receiver 318Rx receives signals via its corresponding antenna in antenna 320. Each receiver 318Rx recovers the information modulated onto the RF carrier and provides that information to RX processor 370.
[0104] The controller / processor 375 may be associated with a memory 376 that stores program code and data. The memory 376 may be referred to as a computer-readable medium. In UL, the controller / processor 375 provides demultiplexing between transport and logical channels, packet reassembly, cipher decoding, header decompression, and control signal processing to recover IP packets. The controller / processor 375 is also responsible for error detection using ACK and / or NACK protocols to support HARQ operation.
[0105] At least one of the TX processor 368, RX processor 356, and controller / processor 359 can be configured to perform and Figure 1 The UE security handling component 198 integrates various aspects.
[0106] At least one of the TX processor 316, RX processor 370, and controller / processor 375 can be configured to perform operations related to... Figure 1 The network security handling components 199 combine various aspects.
[0107] Figure 4 This is a diagram illustrating an example of a wireless communication system and access network 400, as presented herein, including a first network node 402a, a second network node 402b, a UE 404, an evolved packet core (e.g., EPC 410), and a core network 430 (e.g., a 5G core (5GC)). Various aspects of the first network node 402a and / or the second network node 402b (collectively referred to herein as "network nodes 402a / 402b") can be... Figure 1 The base station 102 and / or its components (such as CU 110, DU130, and / or RU 140) are used to implement it. Various aspects of UE 404 can be implemented by... Figure 1 This is implemented using UE 104.
[0108] exist Figure 4 In the example, the first network node 402a can be configured for 4G LTE (collectively referred to as Evolved Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN)) and can interface with EPC 410 via a first backhaul link 452 (e.g., S1 interface). The second network node 402b can be configured for 5G NR (collectively referred to as Next Generation RAN (NG-RAN)) and can interface with core network 430 via a second backhaul link 454. Among other functions, network nodes 402a / 402b can also perform one or more of the following functions: user data delivery, radio channel cryptography and cryptography decoding, integrity protection, header compression, mobility control functions (e.g., handover, dual connectivity), inter-cell interference coordination, connection establishment and release, load balancing, distribution of Non-Access Stratum (NAS) messages, NAS node selection, synchronization, Radio Access Network (RAN) sharing, Multimedia Broadcast Multicast Service (MBMS), subscriber and equipment tracking, RAN Information Management (RIM), paging, location, and delivery of alarm messages. Network nodes 402a / 402b can communicate with each other directly or indirectly (e.g., via EPC 410 or core network 430) on the third backhaul link 456 (e.g., X2 interface). The first backhaul link 452, the second backhaul link 454, and the third backhaul link 456 can be wired or wireless.
[0109] Network nodes 402a / 402b can wirelessly communicate with UE 404. Each of network nodes 402a / 402b can provide communication coverage for its corresponding geographic coverage area 406. Overlapping geographic coverage areas may exist. Figure 4 In the example, the communication link 408 between network nodes 402a / 402b and UE 404 may include uplink (UL) (also known as reverse link) transmission from UE 404 to the corresponding network node and / or downlink (DL) (also known as forward link) transmission from the corresponding network node to UE 404. Communication link 408 may use MIMO antenna technologies, including spatial multiplexing, beamforming, and / or transmit diversity. These communication links may use one or more carriers.
[0110] EPC 410 may include a mobility management entity (e.g., MME 412), other MMEs 414, a serving gateway 416, a multimedia broadcast multicast service (MBMS) gateway (e.g., MBMS GW 418), a broadcast multicast service center (e.g., BM-SC 420), and a packet data network (PDN) gateway (e.g., PDN gateway 422). MME 412 may communicate with a home subscriber server (e.g., HSS 424). MME 412 is the control node that handles signaling between UE 404 and EPC 410. Generally, MME 412 provides bearer and connection management. All user Internet Protocol (IP) packets are delivered through serving gateway 416, which is itself connected to PDN gateway 422. PDN gateway 422 provides UE IP address allocation and other functions. PDN gateway 422 and BM-SC 420 are connected to IP service 426. IP service 426 may include the Internet, intranet, IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS), PS streaming service, and / or other IP services. BM-SC 420 provides functionality for MBMS user service provisioning and delivery. BM-SC420 can be used as an entry point for content provider MBMS transmissions, to authorize and initiate MBMS bearer services within a Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN), and to schedule MBMS transmissions. MBMS GW 418 can be used to distribute MBMS traffic to network nodes 402a / 402b belonging to a Broadcast-Specific Service Single Frequency Network (MBSFN) area, and can be responsible for session management (start / stop) and collecting eMBMS-related billing information.
[0111] The core network 430 may include access and mobility management functions (e.g., AMF 432), other AMFs 434, session management functions (e.g., SMF 436), and user plane functions (e.g., UPF 438). The AMF 432 may communicate with a unified data management (e.g., UDM 440). The AMF 432 is the control node that handles signaling between the UE 404 and the core network 430. Generally, the AMF 432 provides QoS flow and session management. All user IP packets are delivered via the UPF 438. The UPF 438 provides UE IP address allocation and other functions. The UPF 438 is connected to IP service 442. IP service 442 may include the Internet, intranet, IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS), Packet Switched (PS) Streaming (PSS) service, and / or other IP services.
[0112] exist Figure 4 In the example, MME 412 and / or AMF 432 can be configured to manage one or more aspects of wireless communication by facilitating security procedures for 5GS to EPC reselection in the event of retransmissions requested by RLF and EPS TAU. For example, MME 412 and / or AMF 432 can be configured to facilitate a handover from a 5G network associated with a second network node 402b to an EPS network associated with a first network node 402a. MME 412 and / or AMF 432 may include a network security handling component 497. Various aspects of the network security handling component 497 may be similar to... Figure 1 and / or Figure 3 Network security handling components 199.
[0113] The Non-Access Layer (NAS) forms the highest layer of the control plane between the UE and MME at the radio interface. Protocols as part of the NAS provide support for UE mobility. NAS security is an additional function provided by the NAS to the NAS protocols. For example, NAS security provides integrity protection and encryption for NAS signaling messages.
[0114] Security parameters used for authentication, integrity protection, and encryption may be referred to as a security context and identified by a key set identifier (KSI). Information representing the security context may be stored at the UE and the network serving the UE (e.g., the serving network). Regarding the delivery of NAS signaling messages, the security context may be referred to as a "NAS security context" and includes a key, a key set identifier associated with that key, UE security capabilities (e.g., a set of identifiers corresponding to encryption and integrity algorithms implemented by the UE), an uplink NAS count, and a downlink NAS count. When a security context is activated, the uplink NAS count and downlink NAS count may each be set to zero and may increment sequentially as the corresponding NAS message is delivered. Therefore, the uplink NAS count value indicates the number of uplink NAS messages delivered, and the downlink NAS count value indicates the number of downlink NAS messages delivered associated with the active security context.
[0115] When the UE connects to a 5G network, the 5G security context may include the 5G NAS master security key (K) identified by the key set identifier (ngKSI) in 5G. AMF The 5G NAS master security key may also be referred to herein as the "5G NAS key" or "5G master security key". When a UE connects to an EPS network, the EPS security context may include the EPS NAS master security key (K) identified by the key set identifier (eKSI) used for EPS. ASME The EPS NAS master security key may also be referred to as the "EPS NAS key" or "EPS master security key" in this document.
[0116] Figure 5 Examples of different security contexts are depicted, as presented in this article. For example, Figure 5 The system includes a first security context 500, a second security context 520 associated with the 5G network, and a third security context 540 associated with the EPS network. The security context includes data that can be used for integrity protection of NAS signaling, for example, when transmitting and / or receiving NAS messages. Security context data may be associated with integrity protection of NAS signaling associated with the corresponding RAN. For example, the second security context 520 may include 5G security context data for transmitting and / or verifying 5G NAS messages. The third security context 540 may include EPS security context data for transmitting and / or verifying EPS NAS messages.
[0117] exist Figure 5In the example, the first security context 500 includes a master security key 502 and a KSI 504 associated with the master security key 502. For example, the KSI 504 may indicate the master security key 502. The first security context 500 also includes a UE security capability 506, which may include a set of identifiers corresponding to encryption and integrity algorithms implemented by the UE. For example, the UE security capability 506 may include integrity and encryption keys and associated identifiers of selected integrity and encryption algorithms. The first security context 500 also includes a NAS count pair, which includes an uplink NAS count 508 and a downlink NAS count 510. The uplink NAS count 508 indicates the number of uplink NAS messages communicated, and the downlink NAS count 510 indicates the number of downlink NAS messages communicated associated with the active security context. When the security context is activated, the uplink NAS count 508 and the downlink NAS count 510 may be set to initial values (e.g., may be set to zero). After the NAS count values are set to initial values, the NAS count values may be incremented when corresponding NAS messages are communicated.
[0118] As described above, the second security context 520 includes 5G security context data to facilitate integrity protection of 5G NAS messages. For example, the second security context 520 includes a 5G key 522 (K AMF ), 5G KSI 524 (ngKSI), 5G UE security capabilities 526, 5G uplink NAS count 528, and 5G downlink NAS count 530. The 5G security context data of the second security context 520 may be similar to the security context data of the first security context 500, but can be configured for use in a 5G network.
[0119] The third security context 540 includes EPS security context data to facilitate integrity protection of EPS NAS messages. For example, the third security context 540 includes EPS key 542 (K ASME ), EPS KSI 544 (eKSI), EPS UE security capabilities 546, EPS uplink NAS count 548, and EPS downlink NAS count 550. The EPS security context data of the third security context 540 may be similar to the security context data of the first security context 500, but may be configured for use in the EPS network.
[0120] Security contexts can be associated with states, such as "current" or "non-current." A current security context is the active security context. A non-current security context is a security context that is not currently active (e.g., an inactive security context). Security contexts can also be associated with types, such as "native" or "mapped." Native security contexts include "fully native" or "partially native" security contexts. A security context can have one type and one state at a time. However, the type of a particular security context may change over time. For example, a partially native security context can transform into a fully native security context.
[0121] The native security context is one that has a key (e.g., EPS key K). ASME Or 5G key K AMF The security context is a key created by the master authentication procedure and identified by a native key set identifier (e.g., native eKSI or native ngKSI). For example, the master authentication procedure enables mutual authentication between the UE and the network and provides key material that can be used between the UE and the network in subsequent security procedures. When the UE registers with the network, the UE and the network can execute the master authentication procedure, and when the master authentication procedure succeeds, a native security context can be generated. The UE can store a copy of the native security context, and the network can store a copy of the native security context associated with the UE at a network entity, such as at the MME and / or AMF.
[0122] The native security context may include a native KSI that identifies the native key. The native KSI can be exported during the main authentication procedure and allows the UE and network to identify the native security context without invoking the authentication procedure. Therefore, the native KSI allows the native security context to be reused during subsequent connection establishment between the UE and the network without having to execute the authentication procedure.
[0123] A native security context can be either a partial native security context or a full native security context. A partial native security context is a security context that includes keys (e.g., 5G key 522 or EPS key 542) with associated key set identifiers (e.g., 5G KSI 524 or EPS KSI 544), UE security capabilities, and NAS count pairs (e.g., uplink NAS count value and downlink NAS count value). A partial native security context may be created by the primary authentication and is in a "non-current" state. A full native security context is a security context that includes the security context data of the partial native security context and also includes NAS integrity and encryption keys, as well as associated key set identifiers for the selected NAS integrity and encryption algorithms. A full native security context may be in a "current" state or a "non-current" state.
[0124] A mapped security context is a security context in which a key is derived from a key associated with a different RAN. For example, a mapped 5G security context includes a mapped 5G key (K) derived from an EPS key (e.g., EPS key 542). AMF The mapped EPS security context includes the mapped EPS key (K) derived from the 5G key (e.g., 5G key 522). ASME ).
[0125] A mapped security context may include a mapped key identity system (KSI) of the first network associated with a mapped key derived from a native key of the second network. For example, a mapped 5G security context includes a mapped 5G KSI associated with a mapped 5G key derived from an EPS key of the EPS network. The mapped KSI can be generated at both the UE and the network when the mapped key is derived. Therefore, the mapped KSI can indicate the use of the mapped key.
[0126] In some respects, during reselection from a second network to a first network (e.g., 5GS to EPS reselection), a security context mismatch may occur between the UE and the first network. The number of 5GS to EPS reselection procedures performed in deployment can be high, due to, for example, the non-ubiquitous coverage of 5G in the deployment scenario. Additionally, the 5G network may initially not support IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) voice calls. In such scenarios, for example, a UE camped on a cell associated with a 5G network may be redirected to a cell associated with an EPS network to attempt to establish a voice call.
[0127] Figure 6 An example communication flow 600 between network node 602, UE 604, MME 606, and AMF 608 is explained as presented herein. In the explained example, communication flow 600 facilitates idle-mode mobility from 5GS to EPS. For example, UE 604 may be connected to and / or camped on a first cell associated with a first RAT (e.g., a 5G network) and may be redirected to a second cell associated with a second RAT (e.g., an EPS network or an LTE network). Figure 6 In the example, MME 606 may be associated with EPS network 607, and AMF 608 may be associated with 5G network 609. Example communication flow 600 may be associated with executing a Tracking Area Update (TAU) request procedure after being redirected to a second cell (e.g., EPS network 607) or with an initial attachment procedure of the second cell.
[0128] The various aspects of network node 602 can be determined by Figure 1The base station 102 and / or its components (such as CU, DU, and / or RU) are used to implement this. Various aspects of UE 604 can be implemented by... Figure 1 This is implemented using UE 104. Various aspects of MME 606 can be achieved through... Figure 4 This is achieved using the MME412. Various aspects of the AMF 608 can be implemented using... Figure 1 AMF 161, Figure 4 Implemented using AMF 432 and / or other AMF 434. In Figure 6 In the example, UE 604 communicates with MME 606 via network node 602. For instance, UE 604 may transmit uplink messages received by network node 602, which then forwards the uplink messages to MME 606. In the downlink direction, MME 606 may transmit messages received by network node 602 and subsequently forwarded by network node 602 to UE 604.
[0129] exist Figure 6 In the example, UE 604 is performing a reselection from 5G network 609 to EPS network 607. Therefore, UE 604 is configured with a 5G security context 690, such as... Figure 5 The second security context 520 is the current (or active) 5G security context. UE 604 can derive the mapped EPS security context based on the 5G security context data of the current 5G security context to facilitate communication with MME 606 and EPS network 607.
[0130] like Figure 6 As shown, UE 604 transmits a first TAU request message 610 received by MME 606. UE 604 may transmit the first TAU request message 610 to update the registration of the actual tracking area of UE 604 in EPS network 607. UE 604 may transmit the first TAU request message 610 via EPS NAS message. Therefore, the first TAU request message 610 may include parameters associated with EPS network 607.
[0131] For example, the first TAU request message 610 includes a mapped EPS globally unique temporary UE identity (e.g., mapped EPS GUTI 612) and UE 604's EPS security capabilities, such as... Figure 5EPS UE security capability 546. The mapped EPS GUTI 612 can be derived from the 5G GUTI. When registering with the 5G network 609, UE 604 can be configured to have a 5G GUTI. The 5G GUTI can point to an AMF storing the 5G key associated with UE 604. Therefore, the mapped EPS GUTI 612 can contain information about the AMF with the latest security context of UE 604 in the 5G network 609, as well as the UE's identifier in the AMF. For example, the mapped EPS GUTI 612 can contain the address associated with AMF 608 and a temporary mobile subscription identifier (e.g., TMSI 613) associated with UE 604.
[0132] UE 604 can use 5G security context 690, which is used to derive the 5G GUTI identifier mapped to EPS GUTI 612, to perform integrity protection on the first TAU request message 610. For example, UE 604 can calculate a NAS message authentication code (e.g., NAS-MAC 614) for the first TAU request message 610. UE 604 can calculate NAS-MAC 614 similarly to calculating the NAS-MAC for a 5G NAS message. The uplink NAS count used for integrity protection of the first TAU request message 610 can be the same value as the 5G uplink NAS count (e.g., with...). Figure 5 (The 5G uplink NAS count 528 is the same value). As a result, the uplink NAS count value across communication systems increases. The first TAU request message 610 may include eKSI parameter 616, and UE 604 may include the 5G KSI (ngKSI) corresponding to the 5G security context 690 in the eKSI parameter 616.
[0133] exist Figure 6 In the example, after transmitting the first TAU request message 610, at 618, UE 604 can increment the 5G uplink NAS count of 5G security context 690 by 1.
[0134] At 620, MME 606 can obtain the AMF address of the AMF that stores the 5G security context associated with UE 604. For example, MME 606 can use the mapped EPS GUTI 612 of the first TAU request message 610 to obtain the AMF address of AMF 608.
[0135] like Figure 6As shown, MME 606 can transmit a context request message 622 received by AMF 608. Context request message 622 may include all or part of the information from the first TAU request message 610. For example, context request message 622 may include NAS-MAC 614 and eKSI parameter 616. Context request message 622 may also include a mapped EPS GUTI 612.
[0136] At 630, AMF 608 may identify the 5G NAS security context 692 associated with UE 604, for example, based on context request message 622. AMF 608 may use the 5G KSI included in the eKSI parameter 616 of context request message 622 to identify the 5G NAS security context 692 associated with UE 604.
[0137] At 632, AMF 608 can use 5G NAS security context 692 to verify the first TAU request message 610. AMF 608 can verify the first TAU request message 610 as if it were a 5G NAS message. If AMF 608 successfully verifies the first TAU request message 610, then at 634, AMF 608 can generate a mapped EPS security context 636. For example, AMF 608 can use 5G NAS security context 692 to derive the mapped EPS security context 636. AMF 608 can, for example, use the 5G uplink NAS count derived from the first TAU request message 610 from the 5G key (K). AMF Export the mapped EPS key (K) ASME The mapped EPS security context 636 is derived using the 5G uplink NAS count. For example, UE 604 can use the 5G uplink NAS count to perform integrity protection on the first TAU request message 610. When AMF 608 identifies UE 604's 5G NAS security context 692 and verifies the first TAU request message 610, AMF 608 may have the ability to determine the 5G uplink NAS count.
[0138] AMF 608 can determine the key (K) used for the mapped EPS based on the value of the 5G KSI (ngKSI) taken from context request message 622. ASME The mapped EPS KSI (eKSI) is used. The EPS uplink and downlink NAS count values in the mapped EPS security context 636 can be set to the uplink and downlink NAS count values in the 5G NAS security context 692, respectively. AMF 608 can set the EPS NAS algorithm to the algorithm previously indicated to UE 604 (e.g., during connection establishment or connection re-establishment procedures).
[0139] like Figure 6 As shown, the AMF 608 can output a context response message 638 received by the MME 606. The context response message 638 may include a mapped EPS security context 636. In some examples, the AMF 608 may discard (or erase) the 5G NAS security context 692 used to derive the mapped EPS security context 636 after transmitting the context response message 638. In some examples, the AMF 608 may start a timer after transmitting the context response message 638 and discard the 5G NAS security context 692 after the timer expires.
[0140] exist Figure 6 In the illustrated example, at 640, UE 604 can generate a UE mapped EPS security context 642. For example, UE 604 can derive the UE mapped EPS security context 642 in a manner similar to how AMF 608 derives the mapped EPS security context 636. UE 604 can set the EPS NAS algorithm to one previously received from AMF 608 (e.g., during connection establishment or connection re-establishment procedures). UE 604 can activate the UE mapped EPS security context 642 for processing EPS NAS messages received from MME 606.
[0141] At 650, MME 606 can compare the UE security algorithm with security algorithm information 694. MME 606 can be configured to have security algorithm information 694 via network management. Security algorithm information 694 may include a list of allowed algorithms. Algorithms in security algorithm information 694 can be ordered according to priority. MME 606 can compare the EPS NAS algorithm included in the mapped EPS security context 636 of context response message 638 with security algorithm information 694. At 650, MME 606 can compare security algorithms to determine whether to select another EPS NAS algorithm. If MME 606 determines to perform an algorithm change, MME 606 can select the EPS NAS algorithm with the highest priority from security algorithm information 694 that is also available to UE 604. For example, MME 606 can use the UE's UE security capabilities (such as...) Figure 5 The EPS UE security capability 546) determines which EPS NAS algorithm to select from the security algorithm information 694.
[0142] If MME 606 determines to select a different EPS NAS algorithm, UE 604 and MME 606 may execute a NAS Security Mode Command (SMC) procedure (e.g., NAS SMC procedure 660) to derive a new NAS key using the selected EPS NAS algorithm. At 650, if MME 606 determines not to perform an algorithm change, or after MME 606 and UE 604 execute NAS SMC procedure 660, MME 606 may output a TAU Accept message 662 received by UE 604. MME 606 may output (e.g., transmit or convey) TAU Accept message 662 via an EPS NAS message.
[0143] At 664, UE 604 can perform integrity verification of TAU accept message 662. For example, UE 604 can use the mapped EPS key (K) of the UE mapped EPS security context 642. ASME The UE 604 performs integrity verification on the TAU Accept message 662. If the integrity verification is successful, the UE 604 may transmit the TAU Completion message 666 received by the MME 606. If the integrity verification fails, the UE 604 may discard the TAU Completion message 666.
[0144] As described above, UE 604 can initiate a reselection based on a first cell associated with 5G network 609 and a second cell associated with EPS network 607. Figure 6 The procedure. However, this may occur when the security contexts at UE 604 and MME 606 may not match.
[0145] For example, after establishing a connection with a second cell associated with EPS network 607 and transmitting a first TAU request message 610, UE 604 may experience a radio link failure (RLF). In such an example, UE 604 may retransmit the first TAU request message 610, for example, after establishing a new RRC connection with another cell associated with EPS network 607 or after re-establishing an RRC connection with the second cell. For example, UE 604 may transmit a second TAU request message 670 received by MME 606. The second TAU request message 670 may include the same information as the first TAU request (e.g., the first TAU request message 610).
[0146] However, when transmitting the second TAU request message 670, UE 604 can use an updated 5G NAS uplink count value to perform integrity protection on the second TAU request message 670. For example, the 5G NAS uplink count value used to protect the integrity of the first TAU request message 610 can be 5, and the 5G NAS uplink count value used to protect the integrity of the second TAU request message 670 can be 6.
[0147] In some examples, at 672, when MME 606 receives the second TAU request message 670, MME 606 can be configured to compare the contents of the first TAU request message 610 and the second TAU request message 670. In some examples, when the contents (e.g., information elements) of the first TAU request message 610 and the second TAU request message 670 are the same, MME 606 can discard the second TAU request message 670 and continue execution based on the first TAU request message 610. Figure 6 The TAU request procedure. In such an example, MME 606 may suppress the sending of another context request message to AMF 608 based on the second TAU request message 670.
[0148] It is understandable that suppressing the sending of another context request message may be sufficient in MME-to-EME scenarios, since no security context mapping occurs. Additionally, suppressing the sending of another context request message may be sufficient when performing a reselection from UMTS to EPS, since the freshness of NONCE_UE can be used for context mapping. As used herein, "NONCE_UE" refers to a 32-bit pseudo-random number generated by the UE to facilitate the freshness of the UMTS-to-EPS security mapping. NONCE_UE can be used as input along with an existing security key (such as a 3G security key) to compute the mapped EPS key (K). ASME ').
[0149] However, as Figure 6 As described in the example, when performing a 5G to EPS reselection (e.g., when performing a reselection from 5G network 609 to EPS network 607), AMF 608 can use the 5G NAS uplink count associated with the TAU request message to generate a mapped EPS security context 636 (e.g., in 634). For example, AMF 608 can use the value 5 of the 5G NAS uplink count associated with the first TAU request message 610 to generate the mapped EPS security context 636 that AMF 608 provides to MME 606 via a context response message 638. The mapped EPS security context 636 may include an MME EPS key (K) based on the 5G NAS uplink count. ASME'_MME'). Therefore, the MME 606 can be configured to have an MME EPS key (K) based on a 5G NAS uplink count value of 5. ASME '_MME).
[0150] Similarly, UE 604 can use the same 5G NAS uplink count associated with the TAU request message to generate the UE mapped EPS security context 642 (e.g., in 640). For example, regarding the first TAU request message 610, in 640, UE 604 can generate a context including the first UE EPS key (K). ASME The UE of '_UE' is mapped to EPS security context 642.
[0151] However, after transmitting the second TAU request message 670, at 680, UE 604 may generate a new UE mapped EPS security context 682. The new UE mapped EPS security context 682 may be based at least in part on the 5G NAS uplink count value associated with the second TAU request message 670. For example, the new UE mapped EPS security context 682 may be based on the 5G NAS uplink count value 6 associated with the second TAU request message 670. In such an example, the new UE mapped EPS security context 682 may include the second UE EPS key (K). ASME '_UE2). It is understandable that, since the mapped EPS security context 636 and the new UE's mapped EPS security context 682 can be derived using different 5G NAS uplink count values at AMF 608 and UE 604 respectively, the MME EPS key (K) at MME 606... ASME '_MME) and the second UE EPS key (K ASME '_UE2) can also be different. As a result, due to the mapped EPS key K ASME '_MME、K ASME Unlike UE2, UE 604 may discard EPSNAS messages received from MME 606. That is, because UE 604 and MME 606 are using mismatched mapped EPS security contexts and mapped EPS keys, UE 604 may discard or reject EPS NAS messages from MME 606 (e.g., TAU accept message 662 and / or messages associated with NAS SMC procedure 660) due to inconsistencies in integrity calculations. This scenario may result in service interruption and / or dropped calls.
[0152] The examples disclosed herein provide techniques for eliminating inconsistencies in the handling of duplicate TAU request messages as described above. In a first aspect, the disclosed techniques can remove inconsistencies by modifying how the MME 606 handles duplicate TAU request messages. In a second aspect, the disclosed techniques can eliminate inconsistencies by modifying how the UE 604 performs integrity protection for TAU request messages. In a third aspect, the disclosed techniques can eliminate inconsistencies by modifying how the UE 604 performs integrity verification of EPS NAS messages.
[0153] As described above, when MME 606 receives the second TAU request message 670, if the contents (e.g., information elements) of the first TAU request message 610 and the second TAU request message 670 are identical, MME 606 may discard the second TAU request message 670 and suppress the transmission of another context request message to AMF 608. In the first example aspect, the disclosed technology can remove the aforementioned inconsistency by modifying how the MME handles duplicate TAU request messages.
[0154] For example, MME 606 can be configured to determine whether to send a context request message to AMF 608 when MME 606 is able to obtain the AMF address from the TAU request. That is, as described in 672, MME 606 can determine whether to send a second context request message 674 based on whether MME 606 is able to obtain the AMF address, rather than suppressing the transmission of the second context request message based on the fact that the first TAU request message 610 and the second TAU request message 670 include the same content (e.g., the same information elements). Therefore, if the second TAU request message 670 includes a mapped EPS GUTI (such as mapped EPS GUTI 612) containing the AMF address, then MME 606 can determine to send a second context request message 674 requesting a new mapped EPS security context to AMF 608.
[0155] In such an example, AMF 608 can generate a mapped EPS security context 636 based on the 5G NAS uplink count (e.g., value 6) associated with the second TAU request message 670 included in the second context request message 674. As a result, the mapped EPS security context 636 and the new UE mapped EPS security context 682 can be derived based on the same 5G NAS uplink count (e.g., value 6), which can result in a corresponding mapped EPS key K. ASME '_MME、K ASMEThe same applies to '_UE2'. In some examples, at 684, UE 604 can update its security context from UE-mapped EPS security context 642 to the new UE-mapped EPS security context 682 based on the derivation of the new UE-mapped EPS security context 682 (e.g., at 680).
[0156] In some examples, when the MME 606 receives a mapped EPS security context from the AMF 608, the MME 606 can be configured to update its mapped security context. For instance, in some scenarios, the MME 606 can generate EPS NAS messages for transmission to the UE 604, and can receive a new mapped EPS security context while the transmission of one or more of the generated EPS NAS messages is pending. In such examples, the MME 606 can be configured to discard pending EPS NAS messages that use older mapped EPS security contexts for integrity protection.
[0157] It is understood that as long as the MME 606 can obtain the address used to transmit the second context request message 674, the MME 606 can transmit a context request message requesting a mapped EPS security context. Therefore, in some examples, the address included in the mapped EPS GUTI may correspond to an AMF (e.g., AMF 608). In other examples, the address included in the mapped EPS GUTI of the first TAU request message 610 and the second TAU request message 670 may be mapped to the MME.
[0158] In some examples, MME 606 may receive a second TAU request message 670 with the same information elements before transmitting TAU accept message 662 to UE 604. In some such examples, MME 606 may forward the second TAU request message 670 to AMF 608 (e.g., via a second context request message 674), as described above. In other examples, MME 606 may perform authentication and activate a new native EPS security context to protect subsequent NAS messages to UE 604. For example, MME 606 may determine to perform NAS SMC procedure 660 with UE 604 so that MME 606 and UE 604 use the same EPS key (K). ASME This is used to perform integrity verification of EPS NAS messages.
[0159] In some examples, MME 606 may receive a second TAU request message 670 with the same information elements after transmitting TAU accept message 662 to UE 604. In some such examples, MME 606 may determine to perform authentication and activate a new native EPS security context for protecting subsequent NAS messages to UE 604. For example, MME 606 may determine to perform NAS SMC procedure 660 with UE 604 so that MME 606 and UE 604 use the same EPS key (K ASME This is used to perform integrity verification of EPSNAS messages.
[0160] In some examples, MME 606 may receive a second TAU request message 670 with the same information elements after transmitting TAU accept message 662 and before receiving TAU complete message 666 from UE 604. For aspects other than the inter-system change from N1 mode to S1 mode in idle mode when UE 604 is operating in single-registration mode, MME 606 may retransmit TAU accept message 662. In some such examples, MME 606 may restart a timer (e.g., T3450 timer) if TAU complete message 666 is expected. For aspects of the inter-system change from N1 mode to S1 mode in idle mode when UE 604 is operating in single-registration mode, MME 606 may initiate an authentication procedure to UE 604, followed by execution of a security mode control procedure (e.g., NAS SMC procedure 660) to attempt to use a new partially native EPS security context. If the new partially native EPS security context is successfully used, MME 606 may set the new partially native EPS security context as a fully native EPS security context. The MME 606 can also retransmit the TAU accept message 662 using the (new) fully native EPS security context, and provides integrity protection for the retransmission of the TAU accept message 662. In some examples, the MME 606 can also restart the T3450 timer. In such examples, the retransmission counter associated with the T3450 timer may not increment.
[0161] In some examples, MME 606 may receive a first TAU request message 610 and a second TAU request message 670, and may not have yet sent a TAU acceptance message 662 or a TAU rejection message. If one or more of the information elements in the first TAU request message 610 and the second TAU request message 670 are different, the TAU procedure initiated based on the first TAU request message 610 may be aborted, and a new TAU procedure initiated based on the second TAU request message 670 may proceed (e.g., continue).
[0162] If the information elements in the first TAU request message 610 and the second TAU request message 670 are the same (e.g., not different), then for all aspects of the system-to-system change from N1 mode to S1 mode in idle mode when UE 604 is operating in single-registration mode, the MME 606 may continue the previously initiated TAU procedure (e.g., based on the first TAU request message 610) and discard the second TAU request message 670. That is, the MME 606 may suppress the transmission of a second context request message 674 requesting a newly mapped EPS security context to the AMF 608 based on the second TAU request message 670.
[0163] For all aspects of the system-to-system transition from N1 mode to S1 mode in idle mode when UE 604 is operating in single-registration mode, MME 606 may forward a new TAU request message to AMF 608 (e.g., via another context request message) to perform integrity checks and obtain the latest mapped EPS security context, and continue the previous TAU procedure. For example, MME 606 may forward a second TAU request message 670 to AMF 608 (e.g., via a second context request message 674). As an example, integrity checks may be based on integrity keys, uplink counts, transmission direction (e.g., a 1-bit indicator indicating the downlink direction of transmission), and the payload of the downlink transmission. AMF 608 may verify the second TAU request message 670 (e.g., at 632). AMF 608 may then generate a new mapped EPS security context based on the second TAU request message 670. For example, the new MME EPS security context can be based at least in part on the 5G NAS uplink count (e.g., value 6) associated with the second TAU request message 670. As a result, the MME 606 is provided with a new MME EPS key (e.g., K). ASME The mapped EPS security context 636 of '_MME' can be used with the new UE EPS key (K ASME The new UE (UE2) is mapped to the same EPS security context 682. As a result, when the MME 606 uses the new MME EPS key (e.g., K... ASME When using '_MME' to perform integrity protection on subsequent NAS messages (e.g., TAU accept message 662), at 664, UE 604 can successfully perform integrity verification on subsequently received NAS messages (e.g., TAU accept message 662). In some examples, at 684, UE 604 can update its security context from mapped EPS security context 642 to the new UE mapped EPS security context 682 based on the derivation of the new UE mapped EPS security context 682 (e.g., at 680).
[0164] In some examples, instead of forwarding a second TAU request message 670 containing the same information elements as the first TAU request message 610 to the AMF 608, the MME 606 may determine to initiate an authentication procedure, followed by a security mode control procedure, to use a new partially native EPS security context. If the new partially native EPS security context is successfully used (e.g., NASSMC procedure 660 succeeds), the MME 606 may then set the new partially native EPS security context to a fully native EPS security context, and this fully native EPS security can be used to protect any future NAS messages sent to the UE 604, such as the TAU accept message 662.
[0165] As described above, when UE 604 transmits the first TAU request message 610 and the second TAU request message 670, UE 604 uses the corresponding 5G NAS uplink count to perform integrity protection on the respective TAU request messages. In a second example aspect, the disclosed technique can eliminate inconsistencies by modifying how UE 604 performs integrity protection on TAU request messages. For example, UE 604 can be configured to use the same 5G NAS uplink count value when transmitting two consecutive TAU request messages (such as the first TAU request message 610 and a repetition of the first TAU request message (e.g., the second TAU request message 670)). For example, at 618, UE 604 can skip incrementing the 5G uplink NAS count of 5G security context 690 by 1.
[0166] By transmitting the first TAU request message 610 and the second TAU request message 670 without incrementing the 5G NAS uplink count, the first TAU request message 610 and the second TAU request message 670 can be protected for integrity using the same 5G NAS uplink count value. As a result, the mapped EPS security context 636 generated by AMF 608 (e.g., at 634) and the new UE mapped EPS security context 682 generated by UE 604 (e.g., at 680) can be the same. Therefore, integrity verification performed on subsequent NAS messages received at UE 604 (e.g., at 664) may succeed, and communication between UE 604 and the cell associated with EPS network 607 may continue successfully. In some examples, at 684, UE 604 may update its security context from UE mapped EPS security context 642 to the new UE mapped EPS security context 682 based on the derivation of the new UE mapped EPS security context 682 (e.g., at 680).
[0167] That is, since the 5G NAS uplink count value is the same for the first TAU request message 610 and the second TAU request message 670, the corresponding TAU request messages contain the same content (e.g., the same information elements) and are each protected for integrity using the same 5G NAS uplink count value. In some examples, if MME 606 receives the first TAU request message 610 and the second TAU request message 670, MME 606 may discard the second TAU request message 670 and continue the TAU procedure based on the first TAU request message 610. In other examples where MME 606 does not receive the first TAU request message 610 (e.g., if a radio link failure occurs and network node 602 misses one or more RLC packets containing RRC connection establishment completion information), but MME 606 does receive the second TAU request message 670, MME 606 may use the second TAU request message 670 to perform... Figure 6 The TAU procedure (e.g., requesting a mapped EPS security context from AMF 608). In either scenario, the mapped EPS key (K ASME '_MME、K ASME Since UE 604 and the cell associated with EPS network 607 are the same, communication between UE 604 and the cell associated with EPS network 607 can continue successfully.
[0168] In a third example, the disclosed technique can remove inconsistencies in the duplicate disposal of TAU request messages by modifying how UE 604 performs integrity verification of EPS NAS messages. For example, UE 604 could attempt to perform integrity verification based on different EPS keys (e.g., in 664).
[0169] For example, UE 604 can be based on 5G keys (K AMF The 5G NAS uplink count (e.g., value 5) associated with the first TAU request message 610 is used to derive the UE's first EPS key (K) via the mapped EPS security context 642. ASME '1). UE 604 can then obtain the first EPS key (K ASME '1) Export the first NAS integrity key (NAS_IK1).
[0170] UE 604 can also be based on 5G keys (K AMF The second EPS key (K) of the new UE is derived from the 5G NAS uplink count (e.g., value 6) associated with the second TAU request message 670 and the second EPS security context 682 mapped to the second EPS security context 682. ASME '2). UE 604 can then obtain the second EPS key (K ASME'2) Export the second NAS integrity key (NAS_IK2).
[0171] When UE 604 receives an integrity-protected EPS NAS message from MME 606 (e.g., TAU accept message 662), UE 604 may attempt to perform integrity verification (e.g., in 664) using NAS integrity keys (e.g., NAS_IK1 and NAS_IK2). If one of the NAS integrity keys allows the integrity verification to pass, UE 604 selects the appropriate NAS integrity key and continues communication with the cell associated with EPS network 607 based on that appropriate NAS integrity key. For example, if integrity verification using the first NAS integrity key (NAS_IK1) is successful, UE 604 may use the first EPS key (K... ASME '1) Set as EPS key (K ASME UE 604 can also erase the second EPS key (K). ASME '2) and from the second EPS key (K ASME '2) Any other exported keys. Similarly, if integrity verification using the second NAS integrity key (NAS_IK2) is successful, UE 604 can export the second EPS key (K ASME '2) Set as EPS key (K ASME UE 604 can also erase the first EPS key (K). ASME '1) and from the first EPS key (K ASME '1) Any other exported keys. If integrity verification fails when using two NAS integrity keys (NAS_IK1, NAS_IK2) (for example, neither NAS integrity key successfully performs integrity verification), UE 604 may discard the EPS NAS message.
[0172] It is understood that while the above description provides an example including two TAU request messages, other examples may include any suitable number of TAU request messages. For example, there may be z possible NAS uplink count values (e.g., x, x+1, x+2, ... z). If integrity verification uses the EPS key (K) from the y uplink count y using 5G NAS... ASME The UE 604 can successfully complete the process by exporting the NAS integrity key (NAS_IK_y) derived from 'y), where y is one of z possible NAS uplink count values (e.g., x, x+1, x+2, ... z). The UE 604 can then use the y EPS key (K) to complete the process. ASME 'y) is set as the EPS key (K) ASME ), and erase all other EPS keys (K) ASME') and their respective derived keys.
[0173] Figure 7 This is a flowchart 700 of a wireless communication method. The method can be implemented by a UE (e.g., UE 104, UE 350, UE 404 and / or...). Figure 11 The method can be executed by device 1104. This approach can contribute to improved communication performance by enhancing the security handling of first-cell to second-cell reselection in examples that include retransmissions of RLF and TAU request messages.
[0174] In step 702, the UE transmits a first TAU request to the first network entity, as combined with... Figure 6 The first TAU request message 610 describes this. The first TAU request may use the first security context associated with the first RAT (such as...). Figure 6 The first TAU request can be encoded using the first uplink count based on the first security context (such as 5G security context 690). Figure 5 The 5G uplink NAS count (528) is protected for integrity. The first TAU request may include a first information set, which includes an identifier mapped to a second RAT associated with the first network entity, such as... Figure 6 The mapped EPS GUTI612. The transmission of the first TAU request in 702 can be made by... Figure 11 The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is executed.
[0175] In some examples, when performing a change from connecting to a first cell associated with a first RAT to connecting to a second cell associated with a second RAT, the UE may transmit a first TAU request. For example, when performing a 5GS to EPS reselection, the UE may transmit a first TAU request. The second RAT may be different from the first RAT, and the first network entity may be associated with the second RAT, such as in combination. Figure 6 As described in MME 606, EPS network 607 and 5G network 609.
[0176] In 704, the UE sends a second TAU request to the first network entity, as combined with... Figure 6 The second TAU request message 670 describes this. The second TAU request may include a first set of information, such as in conjunction with... Figure 6 The mapping is described in EPS GUTI 612, NAS-MAC 614, and eKSI parameter 616. The second TAU request can be protected for integrity using a second uplink count. The transmission of the second TAU request in 704 can be... Figure 11 The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is executed.
[0177] In 706, the UE derives the mapped security context based on a first security context and at least one of a first uplink count or a second uplink count, such as by combining... Figure 6 The UE mapped EPS security context 642 and / or the new UE mapped EPS security context 682 are described. The derivation of the mapped security context in 706 can be made by... Figure 11 The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is executed.
[0178] In 708, the UE communicates with the first network entity based on a mapped security context, such as in combination with... Figure 6 The TAU completion message 666 describes this. Communication based on the mapped security context in 714 can be provided by... Figure 11 The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is executed.
[0179] Figure 8 This is a flowchart 800 of a wireless communication method. The method can be implemented by a UE (e.g., UE 104, UE 350, UE 404 and / or...). Figure 11 The method can be executed by device 1104. This approach can contribute to improved communication performance by enhancing the security handling of first-cell to second-cell reselection in examples that include retransmissions of RLF and TAU request messages.
[0180] At 802, the UE transmits a first TAU request to the first network entity, as combined with Figure 6 The first TAU request message 610 describes this. The first TAU request may use the first security context associated with the first RAT (such as...). Figure 6 The first TAU request can be encoded using the first uplink count based on the first security context (such as 5G security context 690). Figure 5 The 5G uplink NAS count (528) is protected for integrity. The first TAU request may include a first information set, which includes an identifier mapped to a second RAT associated with the first network entity, such as... Figure 6 The mapped EPS GUTI612. The transmission of the first TAU request in 802 can be made by... Figure 11 The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is executed.
[0181] In some examples, when performing a change from connecting to a first cell associated with a first RAT to connecting to a second cell associated with a second RAT, the UE may transmit a first TAU request. For example, when performing a 5GS to EPS reselection, the UE may transmit a first TAU request. The second RAT may be different from the first RAT, and the first network entity may be associated with the second RAT, such as in combination. Figure 6As described in MME 606, EPS network 607 and 5G network 609.
[0182] At 804, the UE sends a second TAU request to the first network entity, as combined with Figure 6 The second TAU request message 670 describes this. The second TAU request may include a first set of information, such as in conjunction with... Figure 6 The mapping is described in EPS GUTI 612, NAS-MAC 614, and eKSI parameter 616. The second TAU request can be protected for integrity using a second uplink count. The transmission of the second TAU request in 804 can be... Figure 11 The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is executed.
[0183] In 806, the UE derives the mapped security context based on a first security context and at least one of a first uplink count or a second uplink count, such as by combining... Figure 6 The UE mapped EPS security context 642 and / or the new UE mapped EPS security context 682 are described. The derivation of the mapped security context in 806 can be made by... Figure 11 The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is executed.
[0184] In 814, the UE communicates with the first network entity based on a mapped security context, such as in combination with... Figure 6 The TAU completion message 666 describes this. Communication based on the mapped security context in 814 can be provided by... Figure 11 The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is executed.
[0185] In some examples, the second TAU request in the 804 error may include a duplicate of the first TAU request, and the second uplink count may be the same value as the first uplink count, as in combination. Figure 6 As described in the second aspect, UE 604 removes inconsistencies in duplicated TAU requests by modifying how UE 604 performs integrity protection for TAU request messages. In some examples, the UE may transmit a second TAU request based on the occurrence of a radio link failure. In some examples, a mapped security context may be associated with a second RAT. For example, a mapped security context may be associated with... Figure 6 The UE is associated with mapped EPS security context 642 or the new UE is associated with mapped EPS security context 682.
[0186] In some examples, the second TAU request may include a duplicate of the first TAU request, and the second uplink count in 804 may differ from the first uplink count, and the mapped security context may be the first mapped security context, as combined with... Figure 6 The UE is mapped to the EPS security context 642 as described.
[0187] In some such examples, at 808, the UE can derive a second mapped security context based on a first security context and a first uplink count, such as by combining... Figure 6 The new UE is described by the mapped EPS security context 682. The UE can use the first security context to encode the second TAU request, and the second TAU request can be protected for integrity using a second uplink count. For example, the first TAU request can be protected for integrity using an uplink NAS count value of 5, and the second TAU request can be protected for integrity using an uplink NAS count value of 6. The derivation of the second mapped security context in 808 can be obtained by... Figure 11 The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is executed.
[0188] In 810, the UE can update its security context from the second mapped security context to the first mapped security context based on the derived first mapped security context, such as in combination with... Figure 6 As described in section 684. Updates to the security context of the UE in section 810 can be made by... Figure 11 The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is executed.
[0189] In 812, the UE can discard pending transmissions that are protected for integrity using a second mapped security context after updating the UE's security context. The discarding of pending transmissions in 812 can be done by... Figure 11 The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is executed.
[0190] Figure 9 This is a flowchart 900 of a wireless communication method. The method can be implemented by a UE (e.g., UE 104, UE 350, UE 404 and / or...). Figure 11 The method can be executed by device 1104. This approach can contribute to improved communication performance by enhancing the security handling of first-cell to second-cell reselection in examples that include retransmissions of RLF and TAU request messages.
[0191] In 902, when a change is performed from connecting to a first cell associated with a first RAT to connecting to a second cell associated with a second RAT different from the first RAT, the UE transmits a first TAU request to the first network entity, as combined with Figure 6 The first TAU request message 610 describes this. The first network entity may be associated with the second RAT, as in conjunction with... Figure 7 As described in MME 606 and EPS Network 607. The first TAU request may use the first security context associated with the first RAT (such as... Figure 6 The security context (690) is used for encoding. The first TAU request can be protected for integrity using the first uplink count based on the first security context. The transmission of the first TAU request in 902 can be... Figure 11 The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is executed.
[0192] In 904, the UE derives the first integrity key based on the first security context, the first uplink count, and the first mapped security context, as described in conjunction with the first NAS integrity key (NAS_IK1). For example, the UE may derive it based on the 5G key (K) associated with the first TAU request message 610. AMF The UE's first EPS key (K) is derived from the 5G NAS uplink count (e.g., value 5) and the 5G NAS uplink count (e.g., value 5) mapped to EPS security context 642. ASME '1). The UE can then obtain the first EPS key (K ASME '1) Export the first NAS integrity key (NAS_IK1). The export of the first integrity key in 904 can be done by...' Figure 11 The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is executed.
[0193] At 906, the UE transmits a repeat of the first TAU request to the first network entity, such as in combination with Figure 6 The second TAU request message 670 describes this. The duplication of the first TAU request can be protected for integrity using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count. For example, the first TAU request can be protected for integrity using an uplink NAS count value of 5, and the second TAU request can be protected for integrity using an uplink NAS count value of 6. The transmission of the duplication of the first TAU request at 906 can be... Figure 11 The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is executed.
[0194] In 908, the UE derives the second integrity key based on the first security context, the second uplink count, and the second mapped security context, such as by combining the second EPS key (K). ASME The second NAS integrity key (NAS_IK2) described in '2). For example, the UE may use the 5G key (K) associated with the second TAU request message 670. AMF The second EPS key (K) of the new UE is derived from the 5G NAS uplink count value (e.g., 6) and the 5G NAS uplink count value (e.g., 6) mapped to EPS security context 682. ASME '2). The UE can then obtain the second EPS key (K ASME '2) Export the second NAS integrity key (NAS_IK2). The export of the second integrity key in 908 can be done by...' Figure 11The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is executed.
[0195] In 910, the UE receives downlink transmissions from the first network entity, such as in combination with Figure 6 The TAU receives message 662 as described. Reception of downlink transmissions in 910 can be achieved by... Figure 11 The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is executed.
[0196] In 912, the UE uses at least one of the first integrity key and the second integrity key to perform integrity checks on downlink transmissions, such as combining... Figure 6 As described in section 664. The execution of the 912 integrity check can be performed by... Figure 11 The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is used to perform this.
[0197] In 914, when the integrity check of the downlink transmission is successful using the derived integrity key, the UE sets its master security key. The master security key can be set based on the corresponding integrity key used to successfully perform the integrity check. The setting of the master security key in 914 can be done by... Figure 11 The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is executed.
[0198] Figure 10 This is a flowchart 1000 of a wireless communication method. The method can be implemented by a UE (e.g., UE 104, UE 350, UE 404 and / or...). Figure 11 The method can be executed by device 1104. This approach can contribute to improved communication performance by enhancing the security handling of first-cell to second-cell reselection in examples that include retransmissions of RLF and TAU request messages.
[0199] At 1002, when a change is performed from connecting to a first cell associated with a first RAT to connecting to a second cell associated with a second RAT different from the first RAT, the UE transmits a first TAU request to the first network entity, as combined with Figure 6 The first TAU request message 610 describes this. The first network entity may be associated with the second RAT, as in conjunction with... Figure 7 As described in MME 606 and EPS Network 607. The first TAU request may use the first security context associated with the first RAT (such as... Figure 6 The security context (690) is used for encoding. The first TAU request can be protected for integrity using the first uplink count based on the first security context. The transmission of the first TAU request in 1002 can be carried out by... Figure 11 The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is executed.
[0200] In some examples, at 1004, the UE can derive the first mapped security context based on the first security context and the first uplink count, such as by combining... Figure 6 The UE is described by the mapped EPS security context 642. The derivation of the first mapped security context in 1004 can be obtained from... Figure 11 The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is executed.
[0201] In step 1006, the UE derives the first integrity key based on the first security context, the first uplink count, and the first mapped security context, as described in conjunction with the first NAS integrity key (NAS_IK1). For example, the UE may derive it based on the 5G key (K) associated with the first TAU request message 610. AMF The UE's first EPS key (K) is derived from the 5G NAS uplink count (e.g., value 5) and the 5G NAS uplink count (e.g., value 5) mapped to EPS security context 642. ASME '1). The UE can then obtain the first EPS key (K ASME '1) Export the first NAS integrity key (NAS_IK1). The export of the first integrity key in 1006 can be done by...' Figure 11 The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is executed.
[0202] At 1008, the UE transmits a repeat of the first TAU request to the first network entity, as in combination with... Figure 6 The second TAU request message 670 describes this. Duplicates to the first TAU request can be protected for integrity using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count. For example, the first TAU request can be protected for integrity using an uplink NAS count value of 5, and the second TAU request can be protected for integrity using an uplink NAS count value of 6. The transmission of duplicates of the first TAU request at 1008 can be... Figure 11 The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is executed.
[0203] In 1010, the UE derives the second integrity key based on the first security context, the second uplink count, and the second mapped security context, such as by combining the second EPS key (K). ASME The second NAS integrity key (NAS_IK2) described in '2). For example, the UE may use the 5G key (K) associated with the second TAU request message 670. AMF The second EPS key (K) of the new UE is derived from the 5G NAS uplink count value (e.g., 6) and the 5G NAS uplink count value (e.g., 6) mapped to EPS security context 682. ASME '2). The UE can then obtain the second EPS key (K ASME'2) Export the second NAS integrity key (NAS_IK2). The export of the second integrity key in 1010 can be done by...' Figure 11 The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is executed.
[0204] In 1012, the UE receives downlink transmissions from the first network entity, such as in combination with Figure 6 The TAU receives message 662 as described. Reception of downlink transmissions in 1012 can be achieved by... Figure 11 The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is executed.
[0205] In 1014, the UE uses at least one of the first integrity key and the second integrity key to perform integrity checks on downlink transmissions, such as combining... Figure 6 As described in section 664. The execution of the 1014 integrity check can be performed by... Figure 11 The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is used to perform this.
[0206] In 1016, when the integrity check of downlink transmission is successfully performed using the derived integrity key, the UE sets its master security key. The master security key can be set based on the corresponding integrity key used to successfully perform the integrity check. In 1016, the master security key can be set by... Figure 11 The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is executed.
[0207] In some examples, the UE can subsequently discard information associated with other derived integrity keys after setting the master security key. For example, in 1016, the UE can set the master security key to the first mapped security context. In such examples, when the integrity check of the downlink transmission using the first integrity key is successful, in 1018, the UE can erase the second mapped security context and any keys derived using the second mapped security context. The erasure of the second mapped security context in 1018 can be performed by... Figure 11 The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is executed.
[0208] In other examples, at 1016, the UE can set the primary security key as the second mapped security context. In such examples, when the integrity check of the downlink transmission using the second integrity key succeeds, at 1020, the UE can erase the first mapped security context and any keys derived using the first mapped security context. The erasure of the first mapped security context at 1020 can be achieved by... Figure 11 The UE security handling component 198 of device 1104 is executed.
[0209] Figure 11Figure 1100 illustrates an example of the hardware implementation of device 1104. Device 1104 may be a UE, a component of a UE, or implement UE functionality. In some aspects, device 1104 may include a cellular baseband processor 1124 (also referred to as a modem) coupled to one or more transceivers (e.g., cellular RF transceiver 1122). Cellular baseband processor 1124 may include on-chip memory 1124'. In some aspects, device 1104 may further include one or more Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards 1120 and an application processor 1106 coupled to a Secure Digital Card (SD) card 1108 and a screen 1110. Application processor 1106 may include on-chip memory 1106'. In some aspects, device 1104 may further include a Bluetooth module 1112, a WLAN module 1114, an SPS module 1116 (e.g., a GNSS module), one or more sensor modules 1118 (e.g., barometric pressure sensors / altimeters; motion sensors such as inertial management units (IMUs), gyroscopes, and / or accelerometers; light detection and ranging (LIDAR), radio-assisted detection and ranging (radar), sound navigation and ranging (sonar), magnetometers, audio, and / or other technologies for positioning), an additional memory module 1126, a power supply 1130, and / or a camera 1132. Bluetooth module 1112, WLAN module 1114, and SPS module 1116 may include an on-chip transceiver (TRX) (or in some cases, only a receiver (RX)). Bluetooth module 1112, WLAN module 1114, and SPS module 1116 may include their own dedicated antennas and / or communicate using one or more antennas 1180. Cellular baseband processor 1124 communicates with UE 104 and / or RU associated with network entity 1102 via one or more antennas 1180 through transceivers (e.g., cellular RF transceiver 1122). Cellular baseband processor 1124 and application processor 1106 may each include computer-readable media / memory, such as on-chip memory 1124' and on-chip memory 1106'. Additional memory module 1126 may also be considered computer-readable media / memory. Each computer-readable media / memory (e.g., on-chip memory 1124', on-chip memory 1106', and / or additional memory module 1126) may be non-transient. Cellular baseband processor 1124 and application processor 1106 are each responsible for general processing, including the execution of software stored on the computer-readable media / memory. When executed by cellular baseband processor 1124 / application processor 1106, this software causes cellular baseband processor 1124 / application processor 1106 to perform the various functions described above. The computer-readable medium / storage can also be used to store data manipulated by the cellular baseband processor 1124 / application processor 1106 when executing software.Cellular baseband processor 1124 / application processor 1106 may be a component of UE 350 and may include memory 360 and / or at least one of the following: TX processor 368, RX processor 356, and controller / processor 359. In one configuration, device 1104 may be a processor chip (modem and / or application) and may only include cellular baseband processor 1124 and / or application processor 1106, and in another configuration, device 1104 may be the entire UE (see, for example). Figure 3 (350) and includes an additional module for device 1104.
[0210] As discussed above, the UE security handling component 198 is configured to: transmit a first Tracking Area Update (TAU) request to a first network entity, the first TAU request being encoded using a first security context associated with a first Radio Access Technology (RAT), the first TAU request being integrity protected using a first uplink count based on the first security context, and the first TAU request including a first set of information, the first set of information including an identifier mapped to a second RAT associated with the first network entity; transmit a second TAU request to the first network entity, the second TAU request including the first set of information, the second TAU request being integrity protected using a second uplink count; derive a mapped security context based on the first security context and at least one of the first uplink count or the second uplink count; and communicate with the first network entity based on the mapped security context.
[0211] On the other hand, the UE security handling component 198 can be configured to transmit a first Tracking Area Update (TAU) request to a first network entity when performing a change from a first cell associated with a first Radio Access Technology (RAT) to a second cell associated with a second RAT different from the first RAT. The first network entity is associated with the second RAT. The first TAU request is encoded using a first security context associated with the first RAT, and the first TAU request is protected for integrity using a first uplink count based on the first security context. A first integrity key is derived based on the first security context, the first uplink count, and the first mapped security context. The first network entity is then informed of the change. The system transmits a repeat of the first TAU request, the repeat of the first TAU request being protected for integrity using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count; derives a second integrity key based on a first security context, the second uplink count, and a second mapped security context; receives downlink transmissions from a first network entity; performs an integrity check on the downlink transmissions using at least one of the first integrity key and the second integrity key; and sets the UE's master security key when the integrity check on the downlink transmissions using the derived integrity key is successful, the master security key being set based on either the first mapped security context or the second mapped security context used to derive the derived integrity key.
[0212] The UE security processing component 198 may be located in the cellular baseband processor 1124, the application processor 1106, or both the cellular baseband processor 1124 and the application processor 1106. The UE security processing component may be one or more hardware components specifically configured to implement the stated process / algorithm, implemented by one or more processors configured to execute the stated process / algorithm, stored in a computer-readable medium for implementation by one or more processors, or some combination thereof.
[0213] As shown, device 1104 may include various components configured for various functions. For example, UE security handling components may include those for performing... Figure 7 , Figure 8 , Figure 9 and / or Figure 10 The flowchart shows one or more hardware components for each box of the algorithm.
[0214] In one configuration, device 1104, and in particular cellular baseband processor 1124 and / or application processor 1106, includes means for: transmitting a first Tracking Area Update (TAU) request to a first network entity, the first TAU request being encoded using a first security context associated with a first radio access technology (RAT), the first TAU request being integrity-protected using a first uplink count based on the first security context, and the first TAU request including a first set of information, the first set of information including an identifier mapped to a second RAT associated with the first network entity; transmitting a second TAU request to the first network entity, the second TAU request including the first set of information, the second TAU request being integrity-protected using a second uplink count; deriving a mapped security context based on the first security context and at least one of the first uplink count or the second uplink count; and communicating with the first network entity based on the mapped security context.
[0215] In another configuration, example device 1104 also includes means for transmitting a first TAU request when performing a change from a first cell associated with a first RAT to a second cell associated with a second RAT, the second RAT being different from the first RAT, and a first network entity being associated with the second RAT.
[0216] In another configuration, the second TAU request includes a duplicate of the first TAU request, and the second uplink count is the same as the first uplink count.
[0217] In another configuration, example device 1104 also includes means for transmitting a second TAU request based on the occurrence of a radio link failure.
[0218] In another configuration, the mapped security context is associated with a second RAT.
[0219] In another configuration, the second uplink count is different from the first uplink count, and the mapped security context is the first mapped security context. Example device 1104 also includes means for deriving the second mapped security context based on the first security context and the first uplink count. The second TAU request is encoded using the first security context and is protected for integrity using the second uplink count. The first mapped security context is derived based on the first security context and the second uplink count.
[0220] In another configuration, example device 1104 also includes means for: updating the security context of the UE from a second mapped security context to the first mapped security context based on the derived first mapped security context; and discarding pending transmissions that are protected for integrity using the second mapped security context after updating the security context of the UE.
[0221] In another configuration, the second TAU request includes a repetition of the first TAU request.
[0222] In one configuration, device 1104, and in particular cellular baseband processor 1124 and / or application processor 1106, includes means for: transmitting a first Tracking Area Update (TAU) request to a first network entity when performing a change from a first cell associated with a first radio access technology (RAT) to a second cell associated with a second RAT different from the first RAT, the first network entity being associated with the second RAT, the first TAU request being encoded using a first security context associated with the first RAT, and the first TAU request being integrity protected using a first uplink count based on the first security context; and guiding the first TAU request based on the first security context, the first uplink count, and the first mapped security context. The system generates a first integrity key; transmits a repeat of a first TAU request to a first network entity, the repeat of the first TAU request being integrity protected using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count; derives a second integrity key based on a first security context, the second uplink count, and a second mapped security context; receives downlink transmissions from the first network entity; performs an integrity check on the downlink transmissions using at least one of the first integrity key and the second integrity key; and sets a master security key for the UE when the integrity check on the downlink transmissions using the derived integrity key is successful, the master security key being set based on either the first mapped security context or the second mapped security context used to derive the derived integrity key.
[0223] In another configuration, example device 1104 also includes means for: erasing a second mapped security context and any keys derived using the second mapped security context when an integrity check of a downlink transmission using a first integrity key is successful, wherein the master security key includes the first mapped security context.
[0224] In another configuration, example device 1104 also includes means for: erasing the first mapped security context and any keys derived using the first mapped security context when an integrity check of a downlink transmission using the second integrity key is successful, wherein the master security key includes the second mapped security context.
[0225] In another configuration, example device 1104 also includes means for deriving a first mapped security context based on a first security context and a first uplink count.
[0226] The apparatus may be a UE security handling component 198 in device 1104 configured to perform the functions described by the apparatus. As described above, device 1104 may include a TX processor 368, an RX processor 356, and a controller / processor 359. Thus, in one configuration, the apparatus may be the TX processor 368, the RX processor 356, and / or the controller / processor 359 configured to perform the functions described by the apparatus.
[0227] Figure 12 This is a flowchart 1200 of a wireless communication method. The method may be implemented by a first network entity (e.g., base station 102, or components of base station 102, MME 412, AMF 432, etc.). Figure 16 Network entity 1602 and / or Figure 17 The method is executed by network entity 1760. This approach can contribute to improved communication performance by enhancing the security handling of first-cell to second-cell reselection in examples that include retransmissions of RLF and TAU request messages.
[0228] The first network entity may communicate with the UE and the second network entity. In some examples, the first network entity may include an MME (such as...). Figure 6 MME 606), and the second network entity may include AMF, such as Figure 6 AMF 608.
[0229] At 1202, the first network entity receives the first TAU request generated by the UE, as combined with Figure 6 The first TAU request message 610 describes this. The first TAU request may use the first security context associated with the first RAT (such as...). Figure 6 The first TAU request can be encoded using a first uplink count based on the first security context (such as the 5G NAS uplink count associated with the first TAU request message 610). The first TAU request may include a first information set, which includes an identifier mapped to a second RAT associated with the first network entity, such as in conjunction with... Figure 6 The mapped EPS GUTI 612 is described. The first TAU request in 1202 can be obtained by... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is used to perform this action.
[0230] At 1204, the first network entity outputs a first context request for the second network entity based on the first TAU request, such as in combination with Figure 6 The context request message 622 and AMF 608 describe this. A second network entity may be associated with a first RAT, such as AMF 608 being associated with a 5G network 609. In some examples, the first context request may include an identifier mapped to a second RAT, such as... Figure 6 The first TAU request message 610 is mapped to EPS GUTI 612. In some examples, the first TAU request can be protected for integrity using the first uplink count. The output of the first context request in 1204 can be... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is executed.
[0231] At 1206, the first network entity obtains the first mapped security context based on the first context request, such as in combination with... Figure 6 The mapped EPS security context 636 is described. The first mapped security context can be derived from the first security context and the first uplink count. The first mapped security context can be obtained in 1206 by... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is used to perform this action.
[0232] At 1208, the first network entity receives the second TAU request, as combined with... Figure 6 The second TAU request message 670 describes this. The second TAU request can be encoded using a first security context. The second TAU request can be protected for integrity using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count. For example, the first TAU request can be protected for integrity using an uplink NAS count value of 5, and the second TAU request can be protected for integrity using an uplink NAS count value of 6. The second TAU request may include a first set of information, such as... Figure 6 This is described by the mapped EPS GUTI 612, NAS-MAC 614, and eKSI parameter 616. In some examples, the second TAU request may include a repetition of the first TAU request. The second TAU request can be obtained by... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is used to perform this action.
[0233] At 1210, the first network entity outputs a second context request for the second network entity based on the second TAU request, such as in combination with Figure 6 The second context request message 674 describes this. The output of the second context request in 1210 can be... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is executed.
[0234] In 1212, the first network entity obtains a second mapped security context based on a second context request. The second mapped security context is derived from the first security context and the second uplink count. Obtaining the second mapped security context can be similar to obtaining the first mapped security context, such as by combining... Figure 6 The mapped EPS security context 636 is described. The second mapped security context can be obtained from 1212 by... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is used to perform this action.
[0235] In 1214, the first network entity outputs downlink messages based on the second mapped security context, such as combining... Figure 6 The TAU receives the message described in message 662. The output of the downlink message in 1214 can be obtained from... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is executed.
[0236] Figure 13 This is a flowchart 1300 of a wireless communication method. The method may be implemented by a first network entity (e.g., base station 102, or components of base station 102, MME 412, AMF 432, etc.). Figure 16 Network entity 1602 and / or Figure 17 The method is executed by network entity 1760. This approach can contribute to improved communication performance by enhancing the security handling of first-cell to second-cell reselection in examples that include retransmissions of RLF and TAU request messages.
[0237] The first network entity may communicate with the UE and the second network entity. In some examples, the first network entity may include an MME (such as...). Figure 6 MME 606), and the second network entity may include AMF, such as Figure 6 AMF 608.
[0238] At 1302, the first network entity receives the first TAU request generated by the UE, as combined with Figure 6 The first TAU request message 610 describes this. The first TAU request may use the first security context associated with the first RAT (such as...). Figure 6 The first TAU request can be encoded using a first uplink count based on the first security context (such as the 5G NAS uplink count associated with the first TAU request message 610). The first TAU request may include a first information set, which includes an identifier mapped to a second RAT associated with the first network entity, such as in conjunction with... Figure 6 The mapped EPS GUTI 612 is described. The first TAU request in 1302 can be obtained by... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is used to perform this action.
[0239] In some examples, at 1304, the address of the second network entity can be derived from the identifier mapped to the second RAT, such as in combination with... Figure 6 As described in 620. The derivation of the address of the second network entity in 1304 can be obtained from... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is executed.
[0240] At 1306, the first network entity outputs a first context request for the second network entity based on the first TAU request, such as in combination with Figure 6 The context request message 622 and AMF 608 describe this. A second network entity may be associated with a first RAT, such as AMF 608 being associated with a 5G network 609. In some examples, the first context request may include an identifier mapped to a second RAT, such as... Figure 6 The first TAU request message 610 is mapped to EPS GUTI 612. In some examples, the first TAU request can be protected for integrity using the first uplink count. The output of the first context request in 1306 can be... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is executed.
[0241] At 1308, the first network entity obtains the first mapped security context based on the first context request, such as in combination with... Figure 6The mapped EPS security context 636 is described. The first mapped security context can be derived from the first security context and the first uplink count. The first mapped security context can be obtained from 1308 by... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is used to perform this action.
[0242] At 1310, the first network entity receives the second TAU request, as combined with Figure 6 The second TAU request message 670 describes this. The second TAU request can be encoded using a first security context. The second TAU request can be protected for integrity using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count. For example, the first TAU request can be protected for integrity using an uplink NAS count value of 5, and the second TAU request can be protected for integrity using an uplink NAS count value of 6. The second TAU request may include a first set of information, such as... Figure 6 This is described by the mapped EPS GUTI 612, NAS-MAC 614, and eKSI parameter 616. In some examples, the second TAU request may include a repetition of the first TAU request. The second TAU request can be obtained by... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is used to perform this action.
[0243] In 1312, the first network entity outputs a second context request for the second network entity based on the second TAU request, such as in combination with Figure 6 The second context request message 674 describes this. The output of the second context request in 1312 can be obtained from... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is executed.
[0244] At 1314, the first network entity obtains a second mapped security context based on a second context request. The second mapped security context is derived from the first security context and the second uplink count. Obtaining the second mapped security context can be similar to obtaining the first mapped security context, such as by combining... Figure 6 The mapped EPS security context 636 is described. The second mapped security context can be obtained from 1314 by... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is used to perform this action.
[0245] In 1316, the first network entity outputs downlink messages based on the second mapped security context, such as combining... Figure 6 The TAU receives the message described in message 662. The output of the downlink message in 1316 can be obtained by... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is executed.
[0246] In some examples, at 1318, the first network entity can update its security context from the first mapped security context to the second mapped security context based on obtaining the second mapped security context. At 1318, the update of the first network entity's security context can be... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is used to perform this action.
[0247] Additionally, at 1320, the first network entity may discard pending downlink transmissions protected for integrity using the first mapped security context after updating the security context of the first network entity. The discarding of pending downlink transmissions at 1320 may be accomplished by... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is executed.
[0248] In some examples, the first network entity may receive a second TAU request message with the same information elements at 1310 after outputting the downlink message at 1316 and before receiving the uplink message in response to the downlink message. For example, the first network entity may receive the second TAU request message after outputting the TAU accept message 662 and before receiving the TAU complete message 666.
[0249] In some instances where the first network entity receives the first TAU request at 1302 not based on an inter-system change from N1 mode to S1 mode, the UE is configured to operate in single-registration mode, and the downlink message includes a TAU acceptance message, the first network entity may retransmit the downlink message. In some examples, when the TAU completion message (such as...) Figure 6 When a TAU completion message (666) is expected to originate from the UE, the first network entity may restart the T3450 timer. The first network entity may also skip incrementing the retransmission counter associated with the T3450 timer.
[0250] In some instances where the first network entity receives a first TAU request at 1302 based on the system-to-system change from N1 mode to S1 mode, the UE is configured to operate in single-registration mode, and the downlink message includes a TAU acceptance message, the first network entity may initiate an authentication procedure with the UE. The first network entity may also execute a security mode control procedure to convert the new partially native EPS security context into the current fully native EPS security context. For example, the first network entity may execute a NAS SMC procedure 660 with the UE to convert the partially native EPS security context into a fully native EPS security context to facilitate the communication of EPS NAS messages with the UE.
[0251] In some successful examples of the security mode control procedure, the first network entity can output downlink message duplication, which is integrity protected using the current fully native EPS security context. When the TAU completes a message (such as...) Figure 6 When a TAU completion message (666) is expected to originate from the UE, the first network entity may also restart the T3450 timer. The first network entity may also skip incrementing the retransmission counter associated with the T3450 timer.
[0252] In some examples where the first network entity receives the first TAU request at 1302 not based on an inter-system change from N1 mode to S1 mode, and the UE is configured to operate in single-registration mode, the first network entity may skip the initiation of the TAU procedure based on a second TAU request. The first network entity may also perform integrity protection for downlink messages based on a first mapped security context.
[0253] In some examples where the first network entity receives a first TAU request at 1302 based on an inter-system change from N1 mode to S1 mode, and the UE is configured to operate in single-registration mode, the first network entity may determine to initiate a second TAU procedure. For example, at 1312, the first network entity may output a second context request to the second network entity. The first network entity may also perform integrity protection for downlink messages based on a second mapped security context.
[0254] In some examples, the first network entity may receive a TAU request message and may not have yet sent a TAU accept message or a TAU reject message. If one or more information elements in the TAU request message are different, the TAU procedure initiated based on the first TAU request message may be aborted, and the TAU procedure initiated based on the second TAU request message may proceed (e.g., continue).
[0255] If the information elements in the TAU request messages are the same (e.g., not different), then for all aspects except for the inter-system change from N1 mode to S1 mode in idle mode when the UE is operating in single-registration mode, the first network entity may continue the previously initiated TAU procedure (e.g., based on the first TAU request message) and discard the second TAU request message. That is, the first network entity may suppress the transmission of a second context request message requesting a newly mapped EPS security context to the second network entity based on the second TAU request message.
[0256] For all aspects of the system-to-system transition from N1 mode to S1 mode in idle mode when the UE is operating in single-registration mode, the first network entity may forward a new TAU request message to the second network entity (e.g., via another context request message) to perform an integrity check and obtain the latest mapped EPS security context and continue the previous TAU procedure. For example, the first network entity may forward a second TAU request message to the second network entity (e.g., via a second context request message). The second network entity may verify the second TAU request message. The second network entity may then generate a new mapped EPS security context based on the second TAU request message. For example, the new mapped EPS security context may be based at least in part on the 5G NAS uplink count value (e.g., 6) associated with the second TAU request message. As a result, the first network entity is provided with a new MME EPS key (e.g., K). ASME The mapped EPS security context of '_MME' can be used with the new UE EPS key (K ASME The new MME EPS key (e.g., K_UE2) has the same security context. As a result, when the first network entity uses the new MME EPS key (e.g., K_UE2), the security context is the same. ASME When using '_MME' to perform integrity protection on subsequent NAS messages (e.g., TAU accept messages), the UE can successfully perform integrity verification on subsequently received NAS messages (e.g., TAU accept messages). In some examples, the UE can update its security context from the mapped EPS security context to the newly mapped EPS security context based on the derivation of the new mapped EPS security context.
[0257] Figure 14 This is a flowchart 1400 of a wireless communication method. The method may be implemented by a second network entity (e.g., base station 102, or components of base station 102, MME 412, AMF 432, etc.). Figure 16 Network entity 1602 and / or Figure 17 The method is executed by network entity 1760. This approach can contribute to improved communication performance by enhancing the security handling of first-cell to second-cell reselection in examples that include retransmissions of RLF and TAU request messages.
[0258] The second network entity may communicate with the first network entity. In some examples, the first network entity may include an MME (such as...). Figure 6 MME 606), and the second network entity may include AMF, such as Figure 6 AMF 608.
[0259] At 1402, the second network entity obtains a first context request, which includes at least a first TAU request generated by the UE, such as in combination with Figure 6 The context request message 622 describes this. The first TAU request may use the first security context associated with the first RAT (such as...). Figure 6 The first TAU request can be encoded using a first uplink count based on the first security context (such as the 5G NAS uplink count associated with the first TAU request message 610). The first RAT may differ from the second RAT associated with the first network entity. For example, the first RAT may correspond to 5G network 609, and the second RAT associated with the first network entity may correspond to... Figure 6 The EPS network 607 associated with MME 606. The first context request in 1402 can be obtained by... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is executed.
[0260] At 1404, when the first integrity check of the first TAU request succeeds, the second network entity derives the first mapped security context, as combined with... Figure 6 The first mapped security context is described in 632, 634, and 636. The derivation of the first mapped security context in 1404 can be obtained from... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is used to perform this action.
[0261] At 1406, the second network entity outputs the first mapped security context for the first network entity, such as in combination with... Figure 6 The mapped EPS security context 636 and context response message 638 are described. The output of the first mapped security context at 1406 can be... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is used to perform this action.
[0262] At 1408, the second network entity obtains a second context request, which includes at least a second TAU request generated by the UE, such as in combination with... Figure 6 The second context request message 674, which includes a TAU request, is described. The second TAU request can be protected for integrity using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count. For example, the first TAU request can be protected for integrity using an uplink NAS count value of 5, and the second TAU request can be protected for integrity using an uplink NAS count value of 6. The second context request can be obtained at 1408 by... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is executed.
[0263] At 1410, when the second integrity check on the second TAU request is successful, the second network entity derives the second mapped security context. The aspects of deriving the second mapped security context can be similar to the deriving of the first mapped security context, such as combining... Figure 6 The mappings 632, 634, and 636 of the EPS security context are described. The derivation of the second mapping security context in 1410 can be obtained from... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is used to perform this action.
[0264] At 1412, the second network entity outputs a second mapped security context for the first network entity. Aspects of outputting the second mapped security context can be similar to outputting the first mapped security context, such as combining... Figure 6 The mapped EPS security context 636 and context response message 638 are described. The output of the second mapped security context at 1412 can be... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is used to perform this action.
[0265] Figure 15 This is a flowchart 1500 of a wireless communication method. The method may be implemented by a second network entity (e.g., base station 102, or components of base station 102, MME 412, AMF 432, etc.). Figure 16 Network entity 1602 and / or Figure 17 The method is executed by network entity 1760. This approach can contribute to improved communication performance by enhancing the security handling of first-cell to second-cell reselection in examples that include retransmissions of RLF and TAU request messages.
[0266] The second network entity may communicate with the first network entity. In some examples, the first network entity may include an MME (such as...). Figure 6 MME 606), and the second network entity may include AMF, such as Figure 6 AMF 608.
[0267] At 1502, the second network entity obtains a first context request, which includes at least a first TAU request generated by the UE, such as in combination with... Figure 6 The context request message 622 describes this. The first TAU request may use the first security context associated with the first RAT (such as...). Figure 6 The first TAU request can be encoded using a first uplink count based on the first security context (such as the 5G NAS uplink count associated with the first TAU request message 610). The first RAT may differ from the second RAT associated with the first network entity. For example, the first RAT may correspond to 5G network 609, and the second RAT associated with the first network entity may correspond to... Figure 6 The EPS network 607 associated with the MME 606. The first context request in 1502 can be obtained by... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is executed.
[0268] In some examples, the first context request may further include an identifier mapped to a second RAT, such as Figure 6 The example is mapped to EPS GUTI 612.
[0269] At 1504, when the first integrity check of the first TAU request succeeds, the second network entity derives the first mapped security context, as combined with... Figure 6 The first mapped security context, described in 632, 634, and 636, is derived from 1504. Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is used to perform this action.
[0270] In some examples, the second network entity may perform a first integrity check on the first TAU request based on a first security context, such as in combination with... Figure 6 As described in 632 and 5G NAS security context 692.
[0271] At 1506, the second network entity outputs the first mapped security context for the first network entity, such as in combination with... Figure 6 The mapped EPS security context 636 and context response message 638 are described. The output of the first mapped security context in 1506 can be... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is used to perform this action.
[0272] In some examples, at 1508, the second network entity may initiate a timer after transmitting the first mapped security context. The initiation of the timer at 1508 can be achieved by... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is executed.
[0273] In some examples, at 1510, the second network entity can erase the first mapped security context after the timer expires. The erasure of the first mapped security context at 1510 can be performed by... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is used to perform this action.
[0274] At 1512, the second network entity obtains a second context request, which includes at least a second TAU request generated by the UE, such as in combination with... Figure 6 The second context request message 674, which includes a TAU request, is described. The second TAU request can be protected for integrity using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count. For example, the first TAU request can be protected for integrity using an uplink NAS count value of 5, and the second TAU request can be protected for integrity using an uplink NAS count value of 6. The second context request can be obtained in 1512 by... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is executed.
[0275] In some examples, the second TAU request may include a repetition of the first TAU request.
[0276] In 1514, when the second integrity check on the second TAU request succeeds, the second network entity derives the second mapped security context. The aspects of deriving the second mapped security context can be similar to the deriving of the first mapped security context, such as combining... Figure 6The mappings 632, 634, and 636 of the EPS security context are described. The derivation of the second mapping security context in 1514 can be obtained from... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is used to perform this action.
[0277] In 1516, the second network entity outputs a second mapped security context for the first network entity. Aspects of outputting the second mapped security context can be similar to outputting the first mapped security context, such as combining... Figure 6 The mapped EPS security context 636 and context response message 638 are described. The output of the second mapped security context in 1516 can be... Figure 16 Network security handling components 199 and / or for network entity 1602 Figure 17 The network security handling component 497 of network entity 1760 is used to perform this action.
[0278] Figure 16Figure 1600 illustrates an example of a hardware implementation for network entity 1602. Network entity 1602 may be a BS, a component of a BS, or implement BS functionality. Network entity 1602 may include at least one of CU 1610, DU 1630, or RU 1640. For example, depending on the layer functionality handled by network security handling component 199, network entity 1602 may include CU 1610; both CU 1610 and DU 1630; each of CU 1610, DU 1630, and RU 1640; DU 1630; both DU 1630 and RU 1640; or RU 1640. CU 1610 may include CU processor 1612. CU processor 1612 may include on-chip memory 1612'. In some aspects, additional memory module 1614 and communication interface 1618 may be further included. CU1610 communicates with DU 1630 via a mid-range link (such as an F1 interface). DU 1630 may include a DU processor 1632. DU processor 1632 may include on-chip memory 1632'. In some aspects, DU 1630 may further include an additional memory module 1634 and a communication interface 1638. DU 1630 communicates with RU 1640 via a long-range link. RU 1640 may include an RU processor 1642. RU processor 1642 may include on-chip memory 1642'. In some aspects, RU 1640 may further include an additional memory module 1644, one or more transceivers 1646, an antenna 1680, and a communication interface 1648. RU 1640 communicates with UE 104. On-chip memory (e.g., on-chip memory 1612', on-chip memory 1632', and / or on-chip memory 1642') and / or additional memory modules (e.g., additional memory module 1614, additional memory module 1634, and / or additional memory module 1644) may each be considered as computer-readable medium / memory. Each computer-readable medium / memory may be non-transient. Each of the CU processor 1612, DU processor 1632, and RU processor 1642 is responsible for general processing, including the execution of software stored on the computer-readable medium / memory. When executed by the corresponding processor, the software causes the processor to perform the various functions described above. The computer-readable medium / memory may also be used to store data manipulated by the processor during software execution.
[0279] As discussed above, the network security handling component 199 is configured to: receive a first Tracking Area Update (TAU) request generated by a User Equipment (UE), the first TAU request being encoded using a first security context associated with a first Radio Access Technology (RAT), the first TAU request being protected for integrity using a first uplink count based on the first security context, and the first TAU request including a first set of information, the first set of information including an identifier mapped to a second RAT associated with a first network entity; output a first context request for a second network entity, the second network entity being associated with the first RAT, based on the first TAU request; and based on the first context request... The system receives a first mapped security context, which is derived from a first security context and a first uplink count; receives a second TAU request, which is encoded using the first security context, is protected for integrity using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count, and includes a first information set; outputs a second context request for a second network entity based on the second TAU request; receives a second mapped security context based on the second context request, which is derived from the first security context and the second uplink count; and transmits downlink messages based on the second mapped security context.
[0280] On the other hand, the network security handling component 199 may be configured to receive a first context request, the first context request including at least a first Tracking Area Update (TAU) request generated by a User Equipment (UE), the first TAU request being integrity protected using a first uplink count, the first TAU request being encoded using a first security context associated with a first Radio Access Technology (RAT), the first RAT being different from a second RAT associated with a first network entity; derive a first mapped security context when a first integrity check of the first TAU request is successful; output a first mapped security context for the first network entity; receive a second context request, the second context request including at least a second TAU request generated by the UE, the second TAU request being integrity protected using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count; derive a second mapped security context when a second integrity check of the second TAU request is successful; and output a second mapped security context for the first network entity.
[0281] The network security handling component 199 may be located within one or more processors of one or more of the CU 1610, DU 1630, and RU 1640. The network security handling component 199 may be one or more hardware components specifically configured to implement the stated process / algorithm, implemented by one or more processors configured to execute the stated process / algorithm, stored in a computer-readable medium for implementation by one or more processors, or some combination thereof.
[0282] In one configuration, network entity 1602 may be a first network entity and includes means for: obtaining a first Tracking Area Update (TAU) request generated by a User Equipment (UE), the first TAU request being encoded using a first security context associated with a first Radio Access Technology (RAT), the first TAU request being integrity-protected using a first uplink count based on the first security context, and the first TAU request including a first information set, the first information set including an identifier mapped to a second RAT associated with the first network entity; outputting a first context request for a second network entity, the second network entity being associated with the first RAT, based on the first TAU request; and based on the first context request... A context request is made to obtain a first mapped security context, which is derived from the first security context and a first uplink count; a second TAU request is made, which is encoded using the first security context, is protected for integrity using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count, and includes a first information set; a second context request is made based on the second TAU request to output a second context request for a second network entity; a second mapped security context is made based on the second context request, which is derived from the first security context and the second uplink count; and a downlink message is output based on the second mapped security context.
[0283] In another configuration, the first context request includes an identifier mapped to the second RAT, and the first TAU request is protected for integrity using the first uplink count.
[0284] In another configuration, example network entity 1602 also includes means for deriving the address of the second network entity based on an identifier mapped to the second RAT.
[0285] In another configuration, example network entity 1602 also includes means for: updating the security context of the first network entity from the first mapped security context to the second mapped security context based on obtaining the second mapped security context; and discarding pending downlink transmissions that were protected for integrity using the first mapped security context after updating the security context of the first network entity.
[0286] In another configuration, the second TAU request includes a repetition of the first TAU request.
[0287] In another configuration, the first TAU is not obtained based on the system-to-system change from N1 mode to S1 mode, the UE is configured to operate in single registration mode, and the downlink message includes a TAU acceptance message, and example network entity 1602 also includes means for retransmitting downlink messages.
[0288] In another configuration, example network entity 1602 also includes means for: restarting the T3450 timer when a TAU completion message is expected to come from the UE; and skipping the increment of the retransmission counter associated with the T3450 timer.
[0289] In another configuration, the first TAU request is obtained based on the inter-system change from N1 mode to S1 mode, the UE is configured to operate in single registration mode, and the downlink message includes a TAU acceptance message. The example network entity 1602 also includes means for initiating an authentication procedure and performing a security mode control procedure to convert the new part of the native evolved packet system (EPS) security.
[0290] In another configuration, example network entity 1602 also includes means for: outputting downlink message repetition when the security mode control procedure succeeds, the downlink message repetition being integrity protected using the current fully native EPS security context; restarting the T3450 timer when a TAU completion message is expected from the UE; and skipping the increment of the retransmission counter associated with the T3450 timer.
[0291] In another configuration, the first TAU request is not obtained based on the inter-system change from N1 mode to S1 mode, the UE is configured to operate in single registration mode, and the example network entity 1602 also includes means for: skipping the initiation of TAU procedures based on the second TAU request; and performing integrity protection on downlink messages based on the first mapped security context.
[0292] In another configuration, the first TAU request is obtained based on the inter-system change from N1 mode to S1 mode, the UE is configured to operate in single registration mode, and the example network entity 1602 also includes means for determining to initiate a second TAU procedure, including: outputting a second context request to a second network entity; and performing integrity protection on downlink messages based on a second mapped security context.
[0293] In another configuration, the first network entity includes a mobility management entity (MME), and the second network entity includes an access and mobility management function (AMF).
[0294] In one configuration, network entity 1602 may be a second network entity and includes means for: obtaining a first context request, the first context request including at least a first Tracking Area Update (TAU) request generated by a User Equipment (UE), the first TAU request being integrity protected using a first uplink count, the first TAU request being encoded using a first security context associated with a first Radio Access Technology (RAT), the first RAT being different from a second RAT associated with the first network entity; exporting a first mapped security context when a first integrity check of the first TAU request is successful; outputting the first mapped security context for the first network entity; obtaining a second context request, the second context request including at least a second TAU request generated by the UE, the second TAU request being integrity protected using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count; exporting a second mapped security context when a second integrity check of the second TAU request is successful; and outputting the second mapped security context for the first network entity.
[0295] In another configuration, the first context request further includes an identifier that is mapped to the second RAT.
[0296] In another configuration, the second TAU request includes a repetition of the first TAU request.
[0297] In another configuration, example network entity 1602 also includes means for: initiating a timer after outputting a first mapped security context; and erasing the first mapped security context after the timer expires.
[0298] In another configuration, example network entity 1602 also includes means for performing a first integrity check on a first TAU request based on a first security context.
[0299] In another configuration, the first network entity includes a mobility management entity (MME), and the second network entity includes an access and mobility management function (AMF).
[0300] The apparatus may be a network security handling component 199 in network entity 1602 configured to perform the functions described by the apparatus. As described above, network entity 1602 may include a TX processor 316, an RX processor 370, and a controller / processor 375. Thus, in one configuration, the apparatus may be the TX processor 316, the RX processor 370, and / or the controller / processor 375 configured to perform the functions described by the apparatus.
[0301] Figure 17Figure 1700 illustrates an example of a hardware implementation for network entity 1760. In one example, network entity 1760 may be within core network 120. Network entity 1760 may include network processor 1712. Network processor 1712 may include on-chip memory 1712'. In some aspects, network entity 1760 may further include additional memory module 1714. Network entity 1760 communicates with CU 1702 directly (e.g., via a backhaul link) or indirectly (e.g., via RIC) through network interface 1780. On-chip memory 1712' and additional memory module 1714 may each be considered as computer-readable media / memory. Each computer-readable media / memory may be non-transient. Network processor 1712 is responsible for general processing, including the execution of software stored on the computer-readable media / memory. When executed by the corresponding processor, the software causes the processor to perform the various functions described above. The computer-readable media / memory may also be used to store data manipulated by the processor during software execution.
[0302] As discussed above, the network security handling component 497 is configured to: receive a first Tracking Area Update (TAU) request generated by a User Equipment (UE), the first TAU request being encoded using a first security context associated with a first Radio Access Technology (RAT), the first TAU request being integrity-protected using a first uplink count based on the first security context, and the first TAU request including a first set of information, the first set of information including an identifier mapped to a second RAT associated with a first network entity; output a first context request for a second network entity, the second network entity being associated with the first RAT, based on the first TAU request; and based on the first context request... The system receives a first mapped security context, which is derived from a first security context and a first uplink count; receives a second TAU request, which is encoded using the first security context, is protected for integrity using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count, and includes a first information set; outputs a second context request for a second network entity based on the second TAU request; receives a second mapped security context based on the second context request, which is derived from the first security context and the second uplink count; and transmits downlink messages based on the second mapped security context.
[0303] On the other hand, the network security handling component 497 can be configured to receive a first context request, the first context request including at least a first Tracking Area Update (TAU) request generated by a User Equipment (UE), the first TAU request being integrity protected using a first uplink count, the first TAU request being encoded using a first security context associated with a first Radio Access Technology (RAT), the first RAT being different from a second RAT associated with a first network entity; derive a first mapped security context when a first integrity check of the first TAU request is successful; output a first mapped security context for the first network entity; receive a second context request, the second context request including at least a second TAU request generated by the UE, the second TAU request being integrity protected using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count; derive a second mapped security context when a second integrity check of the second TAU request is successful; and output a second mapped security context for the first network entity.
[0304] Network security handling component 497 may be located within network processor 1712. Network security handling component 497 may be one or more hardware components specifically configured to implement the stated process / algorithm, implemented by one or more processors configured to execute the stated process / algorithm, stored in a computer-readable medium for implementation by one or more processors, or some combination thereof. Network entity 1760 may include various components configured for various functions.
[0305] In one configuration, network entity 1760 may be a first network entity and includes means for: obtaining a first Tracking Area Update (TAU) request generated by a User Equipment (UE), the first TAU request being encoded using a first security context associated with a first Radio Access Technology (RAT), the first TAU request being integrity-protected using a first uplink count based on the first security context, and the first TAU request including a first information set, the first information set including an identifier mapped to a second RAT associated with the first network entity; outputting a first context request for a second network entity, the second network entity being associated with the first RAT, based on the first TAU request; and based on the first... A context request is made to obtain a first mapped security context, which is derived from the first security context and a first uplink count; a second TAU request is made, which is encoded using the first security context, is protected for integrity using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count, and includes a first information set; a second context request is made based on the second TAU request to output a second context request for a second network entity; a second mapped security context is made based on the second context request, which is derived from the first security context and the second uplink count; and a downlink message is output based on the second mapped security context.
[0306] In another configuration, the first context request includes an identifier mapped to the second RAT, and the first TAU request is protected for integrity using the first uplink count.
[0307] In another configuration, example network entity 1760 also includes means for deriving the address of the second network entity based on an identifier mapped to the second RAT.
[0308] In another configuration, example network entity 1760 also includes means for: updating the security context of the first network entity from the first mapped security context to the second mapped security context based on obtaining the second mapped security context; and discarding pending downlink transmissions that were protected for integrity using the first mapped security context after updating the security context of the first network entity.
[0309] In another configuration, the second TAU request includes a repetition of the first TAU request.
[0310] In another configuration, the first TAU is not obtained based on the system-to-system change from N1 mode to S1 mode, the UE is configured to operate in single registration mode, and the downlink message includes a TAU acceptance message, and the example network entity 1760 also includes means for retransmitting downlink messages.
[0311] In another configuration, example network entity 1760 also includes means for: restarting the T3450 timer when a TAU completion message is expected to come from the UE; and skipping the increment of the retransmission counter associated with the T3450 timer.
[0312] In another configuration, the first TAU request is obtained based on the inter-system change from N1 mode to S1 mode, the UE is configured to operate in single registration mode, and the downlink message includes a TAU acceptance message. The example network entity 1760 also includes means for initiating an authentication procedure and performing a security mode control procedure to convert the new part of the native evolved packet system (EPS) security.
[0313] In another configuration, example network entity 1760 also includes means for: outputting downlink message repetition when the security mode control procedure succeeds, the downlink message repetition being integrity protected using the current fully native EPS security context; restarting the T3450 timer when a TAU completion message is expected from the UE; and skipping the increment of the retransmission counter associated with the T3450 timer.
[0314] In another configuration, the first TAU request is not obtained based on the inter-system change from N1 mode to S1 mode, the UE is configured to operate in single registration mode, and the example network entity 1760 also includes means for: skipping the initiation of TAU procedures based on the second TAU request; and performing integrity protection on downlink messages based on the first mapped security context.
[0315] In another configuration, the first TAU request is obtained based on the inter-system change from N1 mode to S1 mode, the UE is configured to operate in single registration mode, and the example network entity 1760 also includes means for determining to initiate a second TAU procedure, including: outputting a second context request to a second network entity; and performing integrity protection on downlink messages based on a second mapped security context.
[0316] In another configuration, the first network entity includes a mobility management entity (MME), and the second network entity includes an access and mobility management function (AMF).
[0317] In one configuration, network entity 1760 may be a second network entity and includes means for: obtaining a first context request, the first context request including at least a first Tracking Area Update (TAU) request generated by a User Equipment (UE), the first TAU request being integrity protected using a first uplink count, the first TAU request being encoded using a first security context associated with a first Radio Access Technology (RAT), the first RAT being different from a second RAT associated with the first network entity; exporting a first mapped security context when a first integrity check of the first TAU request is successful; outputting the first mapped security context for the first network entity; obtaining a second context request, the second context request including at least a second TAU request generated by the UE, the second TAU request being integrity protected using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count; exporting a second mapped security context when a second integrity check of the second TAU request is successful; and outputting the second mapped security context for the first network entity.
[0318] In another configuration, the first context request further includes an identifier that is mapped to the second RAT.
[0319] In another configuration, the second TAU request includes a repetition of the first TAU request.
[0320] In another configuration, example network entity 1760 also includes means for: initiating a timer after outputting a first mapped security context; and erasing the first mapped security context after the timer expires.
[0321] In another configuration, example network entity 1760 also includes means for performing a first integrity check on a first TAU request based on a first security context.
[0322] In another configuration, the first network entity includes a mobility management entity (MME), and the second network entity includes an access and mobility management function (AMF).
[0323] The apparatus may be a network security handling component 497 in network entity 1760 configured to perform the functions described by the apparatus. As described above, network entity 1760 may include network processor 1712. Thus, in one configuration, the apparatus may be network processor 1712 configured to perform the functions described by the apparatus.
[0324] The examples disclosed herein provide techniques for eliminating inconsistencies in the handling of duplicate TAU request messages as described above. For example, the disclosed techniques can remove inconsistencies by modifying how the network handles duplicate TAU request messages. The disclosed techniques can additionally or alternatively remove inconsistencies by modifying how the UE performs integrity protection on TAU request messages. Additionally, the disclosed techniques can remove inconsistencies by modifying how the UE performs integrity verification of the messages.
[0325] It should be understood that the specific order or hierarchy of the boxes in the disclosed process / flowcharts is an explanation of exemplary methods. It should be understood that the specific order or hierarchy of the boxes in these process / flowcharts can be rearranged based on design preferences. Furthermore, some boxes may be combined or omitted. The appended method claims present the elements of the various boxes in an exemplary order and are not limited to the specific order or hierarchy presented.
[0326] The preceding description is provided to enable any person skilled in the art to practice the various aspects described herein. Various modifications to these aspects will readily be understood by those skilled in the art, and the universal principles defined herein may be applied to other aspects. Therefore, the claims are not limited to the aspects described herein, but are to be applied according to the full scope consistent with the language of the claims. References to singular elements do not imply “one and only one” (unless specifically stated so), but rather “one or more.” Terms such as “if,” “when,” and “simultaneously” do not imply an immediate temporal relationship or reaction. That is, these phrases (e.g., “when”) do not imply an immediate action in response to the occurrence of an action or during the occurrence of an action, but only imply that an action will occur when a condition is met, without requiring a specific or immediate temporal constraint for the action to occur. The term “exemplary” is used herein to mean “serving as an example, instance, or illustration.” Any aspect described herein as “exemplary” is not necessarily to be construed as superior to or overriding other aspects. Unless specifically stated otherwise, the term “some / a” refers to one or more. Combinations such as "at least one of A, B, or C", "one or more of A, B, or C", "at least one of A, B, and C", "one or more of A, B, and C", and "A, B, C, or any combination thereof" include any combination of A, B, and / or C, and may include multiple A, multiple B, or multiple C. Specifically, combinations such as "at least one of A, B, or C", "one or more of A, B, or C", "at least one of A, B, and C", "one or more of A, B, and C", and "A, B, C, or any combination thereof" can be only A, only B, only C, A and B, A and C, B and C, or A and B and C, wherein any such combination may contain one or more members of A, B, or C. A set should be interpreted as a set of elements, wherein the number of elements is one or more. Accordingly, for a set X, X will include one or more elements. If the first equipment receives data from or transmits data to the second equipment, data can be received / transmitted directly between the first equipment and the second equipment, or indirectly between the first equipment and the second equipment via a set of equipment. Elements of all aspects described herein, whether present or future, that are structural and functionally equivalent to those of ordinary skill in the art, are expressly incorporated herein by reference and are covered by the claims. Furthermore, nothing disclosed herein is donated to the public, whether or not such disclosure is expressly stated in the claims. The terms “module,” “mechanism,” “element,” “device,” etc., are not necessarily substitutes for the term “apparatus.” Thus, no claim element should be interpreted as an apparatus plus a function unless the element is explicitly stated using the phrase “apparatus for…”.
[0327] As used in this article, the phrase “based on” should not be interpreted as referring to a closed set of information, one or more conditions, one or more factors, etc. In other words, the phrase “based on A” (where “A” can be information, conditions, factors, etc.) should be interpreted as “based on at least A”, unless specifically stated differently.
[0328] The following aspects are illustrative only and may be combined with other aspects or teachings described herein without limitation.
[0329] Aspect 1 is a method for wireless communication at a UE, the method comprising: transmitting a first Tracking Area Update (TAU) request to a first network entity, the first TAU request being encoded using a first security context associated with a first Radio Access Technology (RAT), the first TAU request being integrity protected using a first uplink count based on the first security context, and the first TAU request including a first information set, the first information set including an identifier mapped to a second RAT associated with the first network entity; transmitting a second TAU request to the first network entity, the second TAU request including the first information set, the second TAU request being integrity protected using a second uplink count; deriving a mapped security context based on the first security context and at least one of the first uplink count or the second uplink count; and communicating with the first network entity based on the mapped security context.
[0330] Aspect 2 is the method of aspect 1, further comprising: transmitting a first TAU request when performing a change from a first cell associated with a first RAT to a connection to a second cell associated with a second RAT, the second RAT being different from the first RAT, and the first network entity being associated with the second RAT.
[0331] Aspect 3 is a method of either Aspect 1 or 2, further comprising a second TAU request comprising a duplicate of the first TAU request, and the second uplink count being the same value as the first uplink count.
[0332] Aspect 4 is a method of any of Aspects 1 to 3, further comprising: transmitting a second TAU request based on the occurrence of a radio link failure.
[0333] Aspect 5 is a method of either Aspect 1 or 2, further including associating a mapped security context with a second RAT.
[0334] Aspect 6 is a method of either Aspect 1 or 2, further comprising a second uplink count that is different from a first uplink count, and a mapped security context that is a first mapped security context, the method further comprising: deriving a second mapped security context based on a first security context and a first uplink count, a second TAU request being encoded using the first security context and being protected for integrity using the second uplink count, the first mapped security context being derived based on the first security context and the second uplink count.
[0335] Aspect 7 is a method of either Aspect 1 or 6, further comprising updating the security context of the UE from the second mapped security context to the first mapped security context based on deriving the first mapped security context; and discarding pending transmissions that are protected for integrity using the second mapped security context after updating the security context of the UE.
[0336] Aspect 8 is a method of any of Aspects 1, 6 and 7, further comprising a second TAU request including a repetition of the first TAU request.
[0337] Aspect 9 is an apparatus for wireless communication at a UE, comprising: at least one processor coupled to a memory and configured to implement any of aspects 1 to 8.
[0338] In aspect 10, the apparatus of aspect 9 further includes at least one antenna coupled to the at least one processor.
[0339] The apparatus in aspect 11, aspect 9 or 10 further includes a transceiver coupled to the at least one processor.
[0340] Aspect 12 is a device for wireless communication, including means for implementing any of aspects 1 to 8.
[0341] In aspect 13, the device of aspect 12 further includes at least one antenna coupled to the device to perform the methods of any of aspects 1 to 8.
[0342] In aspect 14, the device of aspect 12 or 13 further includes a transceiver coupled to the device to perform the methods of any of aspects 1 to 8.
[0343] Aspect 15 is a non-transient computer-readable storage medium that stores computer-executable code, wherein when executed, the code causes a processor to perform any of aspects 1 to 8.
[0344] Aspect 16 is a method of wireless communication at a UE, the method comprising: transmitting a first Tracking Area Update (TAU) request to a first network entity when performing a change from a first cell associated with a first radio access technology (RAT) to a second cell associated with a second RAT different from the first RAT, the first network entity being associated with the second RAT, the first TAU request being encoded using a first security context associated with the first RAT, and the first TAU request being integrity protected using a first uplink count based on the first security context; deriving a first integrity key based on the first security context, the first uplink count, and the first mapped security context; and transmitting the first network entity to a first network entity when performing a change from a first cell associated with a first radio access technology (RAT) to a second cell associated with a second RAT different from the first RAT; transmitting a first tracking area update (TAU) request to a first network entity when performing a change from a first cell associated with a first radio access technology (RAT) to a second cell associated with a second RAT different from the first RAT; transmitting a first integrity key to a first network entity when performing a change from a first cell associated with a first RAT ... The network entity transmits a duplicate of the first TAU request, the duplicate of the first TAU request being protected for integrity using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count; derives a second integrity key based on a first security context, the second uplink count, and a second mapped security context; receives downlink transmissions from the first network entity; performs an integrity check on the downlink transmissions using at least one of the first integrity key and the second integrity key; and sets the UE's master security key when the integrity check on the downlink transmissions is successful using the derived integrity key, the master security key being set based on either the first mapped security context or the second mapped security context used to derive the derived integrity key.
[0345] Aspect 17 is a method of aspect 16, further comprising: when the integrity check of the downlink transmission is successful using the first integrity key, erasing the second mapped security context and any keys derived using the second mapped security context, wherein the master security key includes the first mapped security context.
[0346] Aspect 18 is the method of aspect 16, further comprising: when the integrity check of the downlink transmission is successful using the second integrity key, erasing the first mapped security context and any keys derived using the first mapped security context, wherein the master security key includes the second mapped security context.
[0347] Aspect 19 is a method of any of Aspects 16 to 18, further comprising: deriving a first mapped security context based on a first security context and a first uplink count.
[0348] Aspect 20 is an apparatus for wireless communication at a UE, comprising: at least one processor coupled to a memory and configured to implement any of aspects 16 to 19.
[0349] In aspect 21, the apparatus of aspect 20 further includes at least one antenna coupled to the at least one processor.
[0350] In aspect 22, the apparatus of aspect 20 or 21 further includes a transceiver coupled to the at least one processor.
[0351] Aspect 23 is a device for wireless communication, including means for implementing any of aspects 16 to 19.
[0352] In aspect 24, the device of aspect 23 further includes at least one antenna coupled to the device to perform the methods of any of aspects 16 to 19.
[0353] The apparatus of aspect 25, aspect 23 or 24 further includes a transceiver coupled to the apparatus to perform the methods of any of aspects 16 to 19.
[0354] Aspect 26 is a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium that stores computer-executable code, wherein when executed, the code causes a processor to perform any of aspects 16 to 19.
[0355] Aspect 27 is a method for wireless communication at a first network entity, the method comprising: obtaining a first Tracking Area Update (TAU) request generated by a User Equipment (UE), the first TAU request being encoded using a first security context associated with a first Radio Access Technology (RAT), the first TAU request being integrity protected using a first uplink count based on the first security context, and the first TAU request including a first information set, the first information set including an identifier mapped to a second RAT associated with the first network entity; outputting a first context request for a second network entity, the second network entity being associated with the first RAT, based on the first TAU request; and based on the first uplink count... The system requests a first mapped security context, which is derived from the first security context and the first uplink count; obtains a second TAU request, which is encoded using the first security context, is protected for integrity using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count, and includes a first information set; outputs a second context request for a second network entity based on the second TAU request; obtains a second mapped security context, which is derived from the first security context and the second uplink count, based on the second context request; and outputs a downlink message based on the second mapped security context.
[0356] Aspect 28 is the method of aspect 27, further including a first context request including an identifier mapped to a second RAT, and a first TAU request being protected for integrity using a first uplink count.
[0357] Aspect 29 is a method of either Aspect 27 or 28, further comprising deriving the address of the second network entity based on an identifier mapped to the second RAT.
[0358] Aspect 30 is a method of any of Aspects 27 to 29, further comprising: updating the security context of a first network entity from a first mapped security context to a second mapped security context based on obtaining a second mapped security context; and discarding pending downlink transmissions that were protected for integrity using the first mapped security context after updating the security context of the first network entity.
[0359] Aspect 31 is a method of any of Aspects 27 to 30, further comprising a second TAU request including a repetition of the first TAU request.
[0360] Aspect 32 is a method of any of Aspects 27 to 31, further comprising that the first TAU request is not obtained based on an inter-system change from N1 mode to S1 mode, the UE is configured to operate in single registration mode, and the downlink message includes a TAU acceptance message, and the method further comprises: retransmitting the downlink message.
[0361] Aspect 33 is a method of any of Aspects 27 to 32, further comprising: restarting the T3450 timer when a TAU completion message is expected to come from the UE; and skipping the incrementing of the retransmission counter associated with the T3450 timer.
[0362] Aspect 34 is a method of any of Aspects 27 to 31, further comprising obtaining a first TAU request based on an inter-system change from N1 mode to S1 mode, the UE being configured to operate in single registration mode, and the downlink message including a TAU acceptance message, and the method further comprising: initiating an authentication procedure; and performing a security mode control procedure to convert a new partially native evolved packet system (EPS) security context into a current fully native EPS security context.
[0363] Aspect 35 is a method of either Aspect 27 or 34, further comprising outputting a downlink message repeat when the security mode control procedure is successful, the downlink message repeat being integrity protected using the current fully native EPS security context; restarting the T3450 timer when a TAU completion message is expected from the UE; and skipping the incrementing retransmission counter associated with the T3450 timer.
[0364] Aspect 36 is a method of any of Aspects 27 to 31, further comprising that the first TAU request is not obtained based on an inter-system change from N1 mode to S1 mode, the UE is configured to operate in single registration mode, and the method further comprises: skipping the initiation of TAU procedures based on a second TAU request; and performing integrity protection on downlink messages based on a first mapped security context.
[0365] Aspect 37 is a method of any of Aspects 27 to 31, further comprising obtaining a first TAU request based on an inter-system change from N1 mode to S1 mode, the UE being configured to operate in single registration mode, and the method further comprising: determining to initiate a second TAU procedure, including: outputting a second context request to a second network entity; and performing integrity protection of downlink messages based on a second mapped security context.
[0366] Aspect 38 is a method of any of Aspects 27 to 37, further comprising a first network entity including a mobility management entity (MME) and a second network entity including an access and mobility management function (AMF).
[0367] Aspect 39 is an apparatus for wireless communication at a UE, comprising: at least one processor coupled to a memory and configured to implement any of aspects 27 to 38.
[0368] In aspect 40 and aspect 39, the apparatus further includes at least one antenna coupled to the at least one processor.
[0369] The apparatus in aspect 41, aspect 39 or 40 further includes a transceiver coupled to the at least one processor.
[0370] Aspect 42 is a device for wireless communication, including means for implementing any of aspects 27 to 38.
[0371] In aspect 43, the device of aspect 42 further includes at least one antenna coupled to the device to perform the methods of any of aspects 27 to 38.
[0372] The device in aspect 44, aspect 42 or 43 further includes a transceiver coupled to the device to perform the methods of any of aspects 27 to 38.
[0373] Aspect 45 is a non-transient computer-readable storage medium that stores computer-executable code, wherein when executed, the code causes a processor to perform any of aspects 27 to 38.
[0374] Aspect 46 is a method for wireless communication at a second network entity, the method comprising: obtaining a first context request, the first context request including at least a first Tracking Area Update (TAU) request generated by a User Equipment (UE), the first TAU request being integrity protected using a first uplink count, the first TAU request being encoded using a first security context associated with a first Radio Access Technology (RAT), the first RAT being different from a second RAT associated with a first network entity; deriving a first mapped security context when a first integrity check of the first TAU request is successful; outputting the first mapped security context for the first network entity; obtaining a second context request, the second context request including at least a second TAU request generated by the UE, the second TAU request being integrity protected using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count; deriving a second mapped security context when a second integrity check of the second TAU request is successful; and outputting the second mapped security context for the first network entity.
[0375] Aspect 47 is a method of aspect 46, further including a first context request that further includes an identifier mapped to a second RAT.
[0376] Aspect 48 is a method of either Aspect 46 or 47, further comprising a second TAU request including a repetition of the first TAU request.
[0377] Aspect 49 is a method of any of Aspects 46 to 48, further comprising: initiating a timer after outputting the first mapped security context; and erasing the first mapped security context after the timer expires.
[0378] Aspect 50 is a method of any of aspects 46 to 49, further comprising: performing a first integrity check on the first TAU request based on a first security context.
[0379] Aspect 51 is a method of any of Aspects 46 to 50, further comprising a first network entity including a mobility management entity (MME) and a second network entity including an access and mobility management function (AMF).
[0380] Aspect 52 is an apparatus for wireless communication at a UE, comprising: at least one processor coupled to a memory and configured to implement any of aspects 46 to 51.
[0381] In aspect 53, the apparatus of aspect 52 further includes at least one antenna coupled to the at least one processor.
[0382] In aspect 54, aspect 52 or 53, the apparatus further includes a transceiver coupled to the at least one processor.
[0383] Aspect 55 is a device for wireless communication, including means for implementing any of aspects 46 to 51.
[0384] In aspect 56, the device of aspect 55 further includes at least one antenna coupled to the device to perform the methods of any of aspects 46 to 51.
[0385] The apparatus of aspect 57, 55 or 56 further includes a transceiver coupled to the apparatus to perform the methods of any of aspects 46 to 51.
[0386] Aspect 58 is a non-transient computer-readable storage medium that stores computer-executable code, wherein when executed, the code causes a processor to perform any of aspects 46 to 51.
Claims
1. An apparatus for performing wireless communication at a user equipment (UE), comprising: Memory; as well as At least one processor, said at least one processor being coupled to the memory and configured to: A first Tracking Area Update (TAU) request is transmitted to a first network entity. The first TAU request is encoded using a first security context associated with a first Radio Access Technology (RAT). The first TAU request is protected for integrity using a first uplink count based on the first security context. The first TAU request includes a first set of information, which includes an identifier mapped to a second RAT associated with the first network entity. A second TAU request is transmitted to the first network entity. The second TAU request includes the first information set and is protected for integrity using a second uplink count. The mapped security context is derived based on the first security context and at least one of the first uplink count or the second uplink count; as well as Communicating with the first network entity based on the mapped security context Wherein the second TAU request includes a duplicate of the first TAU request, and the second uplink count is the same value as the first uplink count, or The at least one processor coupled to the memory is configured to transmit the second TAU request based on the occurrence of a radio link failure.
2. The apparatus of claim 1, further comprising: At least one antenna coupled to the at least one processor, wherein the at least one processor coupled to the memory is configured to transmit the first TAU request when performing a change from a first cell associated with the first RAT to a second cell associated with the second RAT, the second RAT being different from the first RAT, and the first network entity being associated with the second RAT.
3. The apparatus of claim 2, wherein the mapped security context is associated with the second RAT.
4. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the second uplink count is different from the first uplink count, and the mapped security context is the first mapped security context, and the at least one processor coupled to the memory is further configured to: A second mapped security context is derived based on the first security context and the first uplink count. The second TAU request is encoded using the first security context and protected for integrity using the second uplink count. The first mapped security context is derived based on the first security context and the second uplink count.
5. The apparatus of claim 4, wherein the at least one processor coupled to the memory is further configured to: The security context of the UE is updated from the second mapped security context to the first mapped security context based on the derived first mapped security context; and After updating the security context of the UE, pending transmissions that are protected for integrity using the second mapped security context are discarded.
6. The apparatus of claim 4, wherein the second TAU request comprises a repetition of the first TAU request.
7. An apparatus for performing wireless communication at a user equipment (UE), comprising: Memory; as well as At least one processor, said at least one processor being coupled to the memory and configured to: When a change is performed from a first cell associated with a first radio access technology (RAT) to a second cell associated with a second RAT that is different from the first RAT, a first tracking area update (TAU) request is transmitted to a first network entity associated with the second RAT. The first TAU request is encoded using a first security context associated with the first RAT, and the first TAU request is protected for integrity using a first uplink count based on the first security context. The first integrity key is derived based on the first security context, the first uplink count, and the first mapped security context. A duplicate of the first TAU request is transmitted to the first network entity, and the duplicate of the first TAU request is protected for integrity using a second uplink count that is different from the first uplink count. The second integrity key is derived based on the first security context, the second uplink count, and the second mapped security context. Receive downlink transmissions from the first network entity; The integrity check of the downlink transmission is performed using at least one of the first integrity key and the second integrity key; as well as When the integrity check of the downlink transmission is successful using the exported integrity key, the UE's master security key is set and the first mapped security context and any keys exported using the first mapped security context are erased, or the second mapped security context and any keys exported using the second mapped security context are erased. The master security key is set based on the first mapped security context or the second mapped security context used to export the exported integrity key.
8. The apparatus of claim 7, further comprising: At least one antenna coupled to the at least one processor, The master security key includes the first mapped security context.
9. The apparatus as claimed in claim 7, The master security key includes the second mapped security context.
10. The apparatus of claim 7, wherein the at least one processor coupled to the memory is further configured to: The first mapped security context is derived based on the first security context and the first uplink count.
11. An apparatus for wireless communication at a first network entity, comprising: Memory; as well as At least one processor, said at least one processor being coupled to the memory and configured to: A first Tracking Area Update (TAU) request generated by a User Equipment (UE) is obtained. The first TAU request is encoded using a first security context associated with a first Radio Access Technology (RAT). The first TAU request is protected for integrity using a first uplink count based on the first security context. The first TAU request includes a first set of information, which includes an identifier mapped to a second RAT associated with the first network entity. Based on the first TAU request, output a first context request for a second network entity, which is associated with the first RAT; A first mapped security context is obtained based on the first context request, and the first mapped security context is derived from the first security context and the first uplink count; A second TAU request is obtained, the second TAU request is encoded using the first security context, the second TAU request is protected for integrity using a second uplink count different from the first uplink count, and the second TAU request includes the first information set; Based on the second TAU request, output a second context request for the second network entity; A second mapped security context is obtained based on the second context request, the second mapped security context being derived from the first security context and the second uplink count; as well as The downlink message is output based on the second mapped security context.
12. The apparatus of claim 11, wherein the first context request includes an identifier mapped to the second RAT, and the first TAU request is protected for integrity using the first uplink count.
13. The apparatus of claim 11, further comprising: At least one antenna coupled to the at least one processor, and the at least one processor coupled to the memory are further configured to: The address of the second network entity is derived based on the identifier mapped to the second RAT.
14. The apparatus of claim 11, wherein the at least one processor coupled to the memory is further configured to: Based on obtaining the second mapped security context, the security context of the first network entity is updated from the first mapped security context to the second mapped security context; and After updating the security context of the first network entity, discard pending downlink transmissions that are protected for integrity using the first mapped security context.
15. The apparatus of claim 11, wherein the second TAU request comprises a repetition of the first TAU request.
16. The apparatus of claim 11, wherein the first TAU request is not obtained based on an inter-system change from N1 mode to S1 mode, the UE is configured to operate in single registration mode, and the downlink message includes a TAU acceptance message, and wherein the at least one processor coupled to the memory is further configured to: Resend the downlink message.
17. The apparatus of claim 16, wherein the at least one processor coupled to the memory is further configured to: The T3450 timer is restarted when a TAU completion message is expected to originate from the UE; and Skip incrementing the retransmission counter associated with the T3450 timer.
18. The apparatus of claim 11, wherein the first TAU request is obtained based on an inter-system change from N1 mode to S1 mode, the UE is configured to operate in single registration mode, and the downlink message includes a TAU acceptance message, and wherein the at least one processor coupled to the memory is further configured to: Initiating the authentication process; and The security mode control procedure is executed to convert the new part of the native evolved packet system (EPS) security context into the current fully native EPS security context.
19. The apparatus of claim 18, wherein the at least one processor coupled to the memory is further configured to: When the security mode control procedure succeeds, a downlink message repeat is output, which is protected for integrity using the current fully native EPS security context. The T3450 timer is restarted when a TAU completion message is expected to originate from the UE; and Skip incrementing the retransmission counter associated with the T3450 timer.
20. The apparatus of claim 11, wherein the first TAU request is not obtained based on an inter-system change from N1 mode to S1 mode, the UE is configured to operate in single registration mode, and wherein the at least one processor coupled to the memory is further configured to: Skipping the initiation of the TAU procedure based on the second TAU request; and Integrity protection for the downlink messages is performed based on the first mapped security context.
21. The apparatus of claim 11, wherein the first TAU request is obtained based on an inter-system change from N1 mode to S1 mode, the UE is configured to operate in single registration mode, and wherein the at least one processor coupled to the memory is further configured to: Determining to initiate a second TAU procedure includes: Output the second context request to the second network entity; as well as The downlink messages are protected for integrity based on the second mapped security context.
22. The apparatus of claim 11, wherein the first network entity includes a mobility management entity (MME) and the second network entity includes an access and mobility management function (AMF).
