A secure and efficient message broadcasting method for vehicle platooning communication scenarios

By using a lattice-based hierarchical identity broadcast encryption scheme to replace part of the V2I and V2C communication with vehicle platooning communication, the problems of data confidentiality, privacy protection and communication efficiency in the Internet of Vehicles are solved, achieving efficient and secure data transmission and improving traffic flow and driving experience.

CN118574084BActive Publication Date: 2026-11-10SHANDONG JIANZHU UNIV
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202410765662.1
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-06-14
Publication Date
2026-11-10
Estimated Expiration
2044-06-14

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing vehicle-to-everything (V2X) data communication solutions cannot simultaneously satisfy data confidentiality, privacy protection, and improved communication efficiency. Key generation centers are overburdened, cannot resist quantum attacks, and resources are underutilized, resulting in impaired traffic flow and travel experience.

Method used

Design a lattice-based, hierarchical, identity-based broadcast encryption scheme. Through a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) data communication solution consisting of five entities—a trusted center, a cloud service provider, a roadside unit, a lead vehicle, and follower vehicles—the scheme utilizes V2V communication between unaffiliated members/lead vehicles and the vehicle platoon to replace some V2I and V2C communication, thereby achieving data encryption and decryption.

Benefits of technology

It improves communication efficiency within vehicle platoons, reduces the burden on roadside units and cloud service providers, ensures data confidentiality and privacy protection for platoon members, has good space and computing efficiency, resists quantum attacks, and enhances traffic efficiency and safety.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

This invention proposes a secure and efficient message broadcasting method for vehicle platooning communication scenarios, relating to post-quantum security technology and vehicular network broadcast encryption. The method comprises: a trusted center generating system parameters, a family public key, and a family private key; a lead vehicle, acting as the core of the platoon, applying to the trusted center to form the platoon and obtaining its private key; subsequently, follower vehicles applying to join the platoon and obtaining their private keys from the lead vehicle; when the vehicle platoon communicates with vehicular network entities (such as roadside units, cloud service providers, and other vehicles), the lead vehicle, representing the entire platoon, sends a data request to the vehicular network entity. The sender encrypts the message using a symmetric key and sends the ciphertext to platoon members using key encapsulation technology; platoon members use their own private keys to decrypt the encapsulated ciphertext header, thereby decrypting the message. The proposed solution provides a secure and efficient message broadcasting service for vehicle platoons, reducing storage and computing resource consumption while protecting the identity and privacy of platoon members.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of vehicle network broadcast encryption, specifically relating to a secure and efficient message broadcasting method for vehicle platooning communication scenarios. Background Technology

[0002] With the development of modern transportation, an increasing number of traffic problems, such as traffic congestion and traffic accidents, have received widespread attention from industry and academia. Traffic networking and intelligentization are key to addressing these traffic needs. Vehicle Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) are a crucial tool for realizing traffic networking and intelligentization, playing an increasingly important role in the development of the transportation industry. As a cutting-edge network technology, the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) can support real-time data communication, which is essential for improving traffic efficiency, ensuring data security, and promoting intelligent development. In fact, IoV can support multiple communication modes, providing data communication services through vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I), vehicle-to-cloud (V2C), vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), and vehicle-to-person (V2P) methods.

[0003] Roadside units (Roadside Units) are a crucial component of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication. They transmit traffic data, including traffic conditions, safety warnings, and entertainment information, to vehicles on the road via V2I (Vehicle-to-Infrastructure) communication, effectively improving traffic efficiency, safety, and the driving experience. In fact, achieving vehicle-road cooperation is a vital area of ​​modern transportation. Besides V2I communication, Roadside Units can also actively participate in V2C (Vehicle-to-Consumer) communication as edge computing nodes, effectively reducing the burden on cloud service providers. However, Roadside Units have limited computing and storage resources, making their efficiency a decisive factor in the efficiency of V2X communication. These challenges can easily become performance bottlenecks, especially when handling large-scale data computing and communication demands. Furthermore, Roadside Units are fixed to the roadside, limiting their coverage. Insufficient communication speed or excessive workload on Roadside Units can affect data reception by high-speed vehicles, leading to safety hazards. Therefore, reducing the burden on Roadside Units has become a critical issue that urgently needs to be addressed in V2X communication research.

[0004] Vehicle platooning, a common driving method, offers a potential way to improve the efficiency of roadside units (LSUs). This is because vehicles in the same platoon typically have similar data requests or related tasks, such as emergency notifications, traffic information, weather forecasts, and information on various entertainment activities. This can potentially reduce the number of exchanges between vehicles and LSUs. The lead vehicle in the platoon can request relevant data services from the LSU / cloud service provider, who can then send the data to platoon members via V2I / V2C communication. Furthermore, unjoined vehicles / lead vehicles can also send relevant data to platoon members via V2V communication to coordinate consistent driving behavior. Therefore, the LSU / cloud service provider / vehicle only needs one exchange to serve all platoon members. Clearly, all of these methods conserve the system resources of the roadside unit.

[0005] Besides communication efficiency, data confidentiality and privacy protection are also crucial practical requirements for vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication. In V2X communication, it is essential to effectively protect both the transmitted data and the identity privacy of the requesting vehicles. Otherwise, unpredictable dangers or losses may occur. Therefore, to ensure data confidentiality, senders typically encrypt data before transmission. When considering the confidentiality of communication content between vehicle platoons and roadside units, cloud service providers, or vehicles, we find that broadcast encryption technology is well-suited for platoon-oriented communication scenarios, effectively meeting the requirements for both confidentiality and communication efficiency. Given that platoon members often have similar data requests, such as navigation and weather forecasts, roadside units or cloud service providers can efficiently provide data services to platoon members through broadcast, a one-to-many communication method. Compared to one-to-one communication, this process significantly saves system resources for roadside units or cloud service providers.

[0006] Broadcast encryption technology has been increasingly widely used in vehicle-to-everything (V2X) networks, significantly improving data security. Furthermore, according to the inventors, most currently widely used broadcast encryption schemes in V2X networks employ identity-based encryption, which significantly reduces the burden of managing public key certificates. However, this method also presents a significant problem: an excessive burden on the key generation center. This may negatively impact the overall system's operational efficiency. Therefore, to meet the diverse communication scenarios of vehicle platooning and their demands for both data confidentiality and communication efficiency, a layered identity-based broadcast encryption technology can be adopted as a solution.

[0007] As mentioned above, data confidentiality, privacy protection, and improved data communication efficiency are important practical requirements in vehicle-to-everything (V2X) data communication. However, most existing V2X data communication solutions cannot simultaneously meet these requirements. This is mainly manifested in the following ways: 1) Some existing solutions cannot guarantee the identity privacy of the requesting vehicle during V2X data communication, posing a risk of identity privacy exposure. This could lead to unauthorized access to the data of the requesting vehicle by unauthorized third parties; 2) In existing solutions, V2X system resources are not fully utilized. Many vehicles and roadside units, as potential edge computing nodes, are overlooked, resulting in slow V2X data communication speeds and negatively impacting road traffic flow and travel experience; 3) Currently, most broadcast encryption schemes have public keys, ciphertext length, and encryption / decryption time closely related to the number of receivers. This leads to a significant reduction in space and computational efficiency when the number of receivers is large; 4) They cannot provide long-term security. Most existing solutions are designed based on the difficulty of large integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems, making them vulnerable to quantum attacks. Summary of the Invention

[0008] The purpose of this invention is to provide a secure and efficient message broadcasting method for vehicle platooning communication scenarios by designing a lattice-based, hierarchical, identity-based broadcast encryption scheme, thereby providing a secure and efficient solution for data confidentiality, privacy protection, and improved data communication efficiency in the process of vehicle network data communication.

[0009] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) data communication solution consisting of five entities: a trusted center, a cloud service provider, a roadside unit, a lead vehicle, and a follower vehicle, as follows.

[0010] A secure and efficient message broadcasting method for vehicle platooning communication scenarios includes the following steps:

[0011] Step A, System Establishment Phase: The Trusted Center generates system public parameters and family public keys;

[0012] Step B, Vehicle platoon creation phase: After a free vehicle submits a request to the Trusted Center to form a vehicle platoon and act as the lead vehicle, and sends its identity information, the Trusted Center will generate a private key for it based on its identity information and return it to the lead vehicle.

[0013] Step C, Joining the Follower Vehicle: Based on the vehicle platooning information list provided by the cloud service provider, the free vehicle submits a joining request to the lead vehicle that it wants to join the platoon and sends its identity information. After the lead vehicle agrees, it will generate a private key for the free vehicle based on its identity information and return it to the follower vehicle.

[0014] Step D, Communication between Roadside Unit / Cloud Service Provider and Vehicle Fleet: The lead vehicle, on behalf of the entire vehicle fleet, sends a data request to the roadside unit / cloud service provider. The sender encrypts the message using a symmetric key, and then encapsulates the ciphertext header and ciphertext together with the key encapsulation and sends it to the entire vehicle fleet. After receiving the ciphertext header and ciphertext, the following vehicle decrypts the ciphertext header using its private key to obtain the symmetric key, and then uses the symmetric key to decrypt the ciphertext to recover the original plaintext information.

[0015] Step E, Communication between the unmanned vehicle / lead vehicle and the vehicle platoon: The unmanned vehicle / lead vehicle can use the same encryption method as the roadside unit / cloud service provider to generate broadcast ciphertext for the vehicle platoon. After obtaining the ciphertext, the following vehicle uses its private key to decrypt the ciphertext header to obtain the symmetric key. Then, it uses the symmetric key to decrypt the ciphertext, thereby restoring the original plaintext information.

[0016] Furthermore, step A specifically includes:

[0017] Trusted Center based on system parameters Generate security parameters Randomly select a secure hash function Randomly select vectors , ,set up .

[0018] use Algorithm generation and Trapdoor Therefore, the public key of the trusted center is... The private key is .

[0019] in, A secure hash function whose input is a bit string of 0s and 1s of arbitrary length, and whose output is a string of fixed length.

[0020] Furthermore, step B specifically includes:

[0021] When free vehicle When a vehicle wants to initiate a platoon as the lead vehicle, it sends a request to the Trusted Center; if the Trusted Center approves the free vehicle... The application process for the lead vehicle is as follows: Distribute private key :

[0022] Use hash functions Calculate the hash value of the lead car's identity And randomly select a vector As a formation identifier.

[0023] run Algorithm, Acquisition and will As the lead vehicle The private key.

[0024] Private key via a secure channel Send to the lead car .

[0025] Trusted Center stores on its local machine .

[0026] Navigation vehicle After receiving your private key, you can use the equation as well as This is to verify the correctness of the provided private key.

[0027] Among them, parameters Is running The Gaussian parameters are input during the algorithm. Indicates the location of the formation. It's a timestamp; specifically, it uses... Used to describe formation attributes, such as destination and start time; It can help other vehicles decide whether to join the formation.

[0028] Further, step C specifically includes:

[0029] When free vehicle When it wants to join a vehicle platoon, it accesses the vehicle platoon list from the cloud service provider. And obtain the identity of the lead car Wait for vehicle platooning information, then send it to the lead vehicle. Send a join request; if the lead car Agree to free vehicles The application process for the following vehicle is as follows: Distribute private key :

[0030] Use hash functions Calculate the identity of the following vehicle hash value .

[0031] run Algorithm, Acquisition and will As a follower vehicle The private key.

[0032] Private key via a secure channel Send to following vehicle .

[0033] After the vehicle platoon is formed, the lead vehicle calculates... Then it is sent to the trusted center, where It refers to all the members of the formation.

[0034] Trusted Center will tuple The tuple is sent to the cloud service provider, who then stores it in the vehicle platoon list. In addition, the cloud service provider is notified to update the vehicle platoon list in a timely manner. Information in, such as .

[0035] Among them, parameters Is running The Gaussian parameters input to the algorithm follow the car After receiving your private key, you can use the equation as well as To verify the correctness of the provided private key. It is the sum of the identity hashes of all squad members.

[0036] Furthermore, the communication phase between the roadside unit / cloud service provider and the vehicle platoon in step D includes two phases: data encryption and platoon member decryption, specifically including:

[0037] Data encryption: When roadside unit / cloud service providers need to provide data to vehicle platoons Broadcast message At that time, the operation is as follows:

[0038] set up ,in and All can be found in the vehicle platoon information list Obtained from [the source].

[0039] Random selection symmetric key Samples are drawn from two error distributions respectively. , .

[0040] calculate and ,in and It is A dimensional vector.

[0041] Set ciphertext header and ciphertext Then send ciphertext For all squad members.

[0042] Formation members decrypt: When a formation member vehicle receives a broadcast ciphertext Afterwards, the formation members Through private key To decrypt the ciphertext The operation is as follows:

[0043] Formation members First, check the ciphertext. In To ensure the encryption Legality; if it is consistent with the vehicle platoon information list In If they match, continue with the next step; otherwise, output a terminator. .

[0044] set up And calculate the trapdoor label .

[0045] Call Algorithm, Acquisition and Make , ,in , .

[0046] Verify the two inequalities and Check if it's correct. If correct, continue with the following operation; otherwise, output a terminator. .

[0047] calculate ,if Then output the terminator symbol. ,if Then calculate ,belong Accompanying group ,in It represents an identity matrix.

[0048] decoding To obtain the symmetric key Then further calculations To get information .

[0049] Furthermore, the communication phase between the unauthorized vehicle / leader vehicle and the vehicle formation in step E includes two stages: data encryption and formation member decryption, specifically including:

[0050] Encryption of unauthorized vehicles: When unauthorized vehicles / leader vehicles are encrypted. To vehicle platoon Broadcast message At that time, first start from the vehicle platoon list Read vehicle formation The information, and then calculate Its operation is the same as the specific steps for data encryption in communication between the roadside unit / cloud service provider and the vehicle platoon.

[0051] Encryption of the lead vehicle: To ensure consistent driving behavior, appropriate safe distances, and stable speeds within the vehicle platoon, as well as to handle unexpected situations or events, real-time communication between the vehicles in the platoon is essential. Since the lead vehicle needs to send driving behavior data to all platoon members, to ensure data confidentiality, we can adopt the aforementioned communication protocol between the roadside unit / cloud service provider and the vehicle platoon. Generate ciphertext Its operation is the same as the specific steps for data encryption in communication between the roadside unit / cloud service provider and the vehicle platoon.

[0052] Formation members decrypt: When a formation member vehicle receives a broadcast ciphertext Afterwards, the formation members Through private key To decrypt the ciphertext Its operation is the same as the specific steps for decryption of platoon members in communication between roadside units / cloud service providers and vehicle platoons.

[0053] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows:

[0054] This invention proposes a secure and efficient message broadcasting method for vehicle platooning communication scenarios by designing a lattice-based, hierarchical, and identity-based broadcast encryption scheme. In this method, roadside units / cloud service providers can offer data services to platoon members, while unauthorized members / lead vehicles can assist roadside units and cloud service providers in providing data services to platoon members or coordinating consistent driving behavior within the platoon. In other words, we utilize V2V communication between unauthorized members / lead vehicles and the vehicle platoon to replace some V2I and V2C communication between roadside units / cloud service providers and platoon members, thereby improving communication efficiency and response speed within the platoon and effectively reducing the burden on roadside units and cloud service providers. Therefore, this paper achieves high communication efficiency through vehicle platooning driving modes, effectively improving traffic efficiency, traffic safety, and driving experience.

[0055] This invention proposes a secure and efficient message broadcasting method for vehicle platooning communication scenarios, simultaneously ensuring data confidentiality, protecting the privacy of platoon members, and achieving efficient data communication. Based on this method, security protection against identity selection and chosen-ciphertext attacks is provided during interactions between roadside units / cloud service providers / vehicles and platoon members. Furthermore, the privacy of platoon members is effectively protected during data communication; no one except the lead vehicle can know the identity of any platoon member, making it more suitable for the needs of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication scenarios.

[0056] This invention proposes a secure and efficient message broadcasting method for vehicle platooning communication scenarios, exhibiting excellent space and computational efficiency. Thanks to the advantages of our design tools and scheme, our method achieves constant public and private key sizes and ciphertext length. This characteristic results in low encryption and decryption costs that do not change with the number of receivers, thus ensuring high-efficiency communication performance. Therefore, our scheme demonstrates significant advantages in both storage space efficiency and computational efficiency. Compared with existing broadcast encryption schemes, it significantly conserves system space and computational resources, thereby achieving more efficient resource utilization. Attached Figure Description

[0057] Figure 1 This is a diagram of the model architecture of the present invention;

[0058] Figure 2 This is a flowchart of the present invention.

[0059] Figure 3 This invention is compared with existing results in terms of family public key length;

[0060] Figure 4 This invention compares the solution of this invention with existing solutions in terms of user private key length.

[0061] Figure 5 This is a comparison of the ciphertext length between the present invention and existing results;

[0062] Figure 6 This invention compares the computational efficiency of encryption algorithms with existing solutions.

[0063] Figure 7 This invention compares the computational efficiency of the decryption algorithm with existing solutions.

[0064] Figure 8 This is a radar chart comparing the implementation effects of the present invention with those of existing achievements. Detailed Implementation

[0065] The present invention will now be fully and clearly described in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific implementation examples. These embodiments are based on the technical solutions of the present invention, and it should be understood that the specific embodiments are only for illustrating the present invention and not for limiting the scope of the present invention.

[0066] This invention provides a secure and efficient message broadcasting method for vehicle platooning communication scenarios.

[0067] First, let's explain the following terms:

[0068] Formation communication: In a formation of multiple mobile entities (such as autonomous vehicles, drones, etc.), the process of real-time, accurate, and reliable information exchange and data transmission between these entities is called formation communication. The purpose of formation communication is to ensure that formation members can share information and work collaboratively to achieve common mission objectives.

[0069] Message broadcasting: In a connected vehicle environment, message broadcasting can be seen as a "one-to-many" communication method. For example, when a vehicle detects a dangerous situation ahead (such as road construction, traffic accidents, etc.), it can quickly send this information to other vehicles or infrastructure through message broadcasting.

[0070] Broadcast encryption, in cryptography, refers to a specific encryption method primarily used for transmitting encrypted information to a group of users over an insecure channel. Broadcast encryption allows the sender to choose any set of users to broadcast encrypted information, but only authorized users can decrypt the ciphertext and obtain the correct information. This encryption method has wide applications in digital rights management, pay television, and satellite broadcasting communications.

[0071] Ideal lattice: An ideal lattice is a special type of lattice that is an improvement upon the random lattice. Compared to the random lattice, the ideal lattice can reduce the spatial size of matrices or vectors in the algorithm.

[0072] Ring learning with errors ): The problem is difficult to solve even on quantum computers, providing a secure foundation for lattice-based encryption algorithms. Specifically, let... yes Fixed elements on yes Error vector distribution on yes Such a distribution, in which From Randomly selected from From error distribution (Randomly selected from the list.) The purpose of the decision versions of the problem is to differentiate On A distribution and a uniform distribution.

[0073] The required symbols are explained in this embodiment, as shown in Table 1: Table 1: Symbol Explanation

[0074] This embodiment will illustrate the concepts and design tools involved:

[0075] lattice: A lattice is a space of real numbers middle Linearly independent vectors The set of linear combinations of integers is denoted as . ,in In particular, when The norm (defined as) When the maximum norm in the middle is sufficiently small, Known as a trapdoor basis, it is commonly used as a private key in lattice-based cryptographic algorithms. When considering lattice-based cryptographic designs, the following... Metaspaces are widely used: .

[0076] Discrete Gaussian distribution: Let , For Gaussian parameters, with A Gaussian distribution centered at point 1 can be expressed as: In the grid The discrete Gaussian distribution on is defined as: .

[0077] -Trapdoor: Given , original vector Traps label and identity matrix ,So of - A trapdoor can be defined as... And satisfy .

[0078] Trapdoor generation algorithm ( ): Input a circular vector of elements A non-empty ring element , and one in Distribution on Trapdoor generation algorithm Output a vector of elements in a ring A trapdoor .

[0079] On-ring error learning ( ):set up yes An element on, yes An error distribution on, express Distribution, among which From Randomly selected from From Randomly selected from among them. The decision version of the problem is to distinguish and A uniform distribution on the surface. It is typically used based on... Security proof of the cryptographic algorithm.

[0080] Reverse algorithm for learning errors on rings ( ): Given a Example Oracle ,in It is a very small Gaussian vector, a vector of cyclic elements. ,one The trapdoor label is of Trapdoor , and vector ,in , It is a very small Gaussian vector, and the inverse algorithm for learning errors on the ring. Through oracles get and Then calculate to get and .

[0081] Gaussian sampling algorithm ( ):enter , , Trapdoor A Gaussian parameter and a target element There exists a Gaussian sampling algorithm. It can output a parameter that is The vector of the Gaussian distribution .

[0082] Reverse algorithm for learning errors on rings ( ):enter The trapdoor label is The trapdoor and parameters are of Gaussian distribution, lattice surrogate algorithm Output The trapdoor ,in .

[0083] The system architecture model in this embodiment is as follows: Figure 1 As shown. This embodiment provides a specific implementation plan including five parts: system establishment, vehicle platoon creation, joining of following vehicles, communication between the roadside unit / cloud service provider and the vehicle platoon, and communication between un-platooned vehicles / lead vehicles and the vehicle platoon, as follows. Figure 2 As shown in the diagram. The system establishment module generates system parameters and a master key pair through a trusted center. The vehicle platoon creation module allows free vehicles to apply to become the lead vehicle, and the trusted center generates a private key for each. The follower vehicle joining module allows free vehicles to apply to join the platoon, and the lead vehicle generates a private key for each. The communication module between the roadside unit / cloud service provider and the vehicle platoon uses the lead vehicle to request data on behalf of the platoon, encrypts it using a symmetric key, encapsulates it, and sends it to the platoon; follower vehicles decrypt it using their private keys to obtain the plaintext. The communication module between unaffiliated vehicles / lead vehicles and the vehicle platoon communicates via a V2V protocol, generating broadcast ciphertext for the platoon in a manner similar to that between roadside unit / cloud service providers and the vehicle platoon; platoon vehicles decrypt this ciphertext to obtain the plaintext.

[0084] System setup phase: The trusted center generates system parameters and a master key pair. 1. The trusted center, based on the system parameters... Generate security parameters Randomly select a secure hash function Randomly select vectors , ,set up . 2. Utilize Algorithm generation and Trapdoor Therefore, the public key of the trusted center is... The private key is .

[0085] Vehicle platoon creation phase: Free vehicles Apply to the Trusted Center to become a pilot vehicle. The Trusted Center generates a private key for you based on your identity information. 1. Use a hash function. Calculate the hash value of the lead car's identity And randomly select a vector 1. Used as a formation identifier. 2. Run Algorithm, Acquisition and will As the lead vehicle 3. Transfer the private key through a secure channel. Send to the lead car 4. The trusted center stores locally. .

[0086] Joining a platoon: Independent vehicles request to join the platoon, and the lead vehicle generates a private key for them. 1. Using a hash function. Calculate the identity of the following vehicle hash value 2. Run Algorithm, Acquisition and will As a follower vehicle 3. Transfer the private key through a secure channel. Send to following vehicle 4. After the vehicle platoon is formed, the lead vehicle calculates... Then it is sent to the trusted center, where This refers to all members of the formation. 5. The Trust Center will use tuples. The tuple is sent to the cloud service provider, who then stores it in the vehicle platoon list. In addition, the cloud service provider is notified to update the vehicle platoon list in a timely manner. Information in, such as .

[0087] Communication phase between roadside unit / cloud service provider and vehicle platoon: The lead vehicle, representing the entire platoon, sends a data request to the roadside unit / cloud service provider. The sender encrypts the message using a symmetric key, then encapsulates the ciphertext header and ciphertext together and sends it to the entire platoon. Upon receiving the ciphertext header and ciphertext, the following vehicles decrypt the ciphertext header using their private key to obtain the symmetric key. They then use this symmetric key to decrypt the ciphertext to recover the original plaintext information. 1. Let... ,in and All can be found in the vehicle platoon information list 1. Obtain from [the source]. 2. Randomly select [the source]. symmetric key Samples are drawn from two error distributions respectively. , 3. Calculation and ,in and It is 4. A dimensional vector. (The rest of the text appears to be incomplete and requires further context.) and ciphertext Then send ciphertext To all squad members. 5. Squad Members First, check the ciphertext. In To ensure the encryption The legality. If it's related to the vehicle platooning information list. In If they match, continue with the next step; otherwise, output a terminator. 6. Let... And calculate the trapdoor label 7. Call Algorithm, Acquisition and Make , ,in , 8. Verify the two inequalities. and Check if it's correct. If correct, continue with the following operation; otherwise, output a terminator. 9. Calculate ,if Then output the terminator symbol. ,if Then calculate ,belong Accompanying group ,in This represents an identity matrix. 10. Decoding To obtain the symmetric key Then further calculations To get information .

[0088] Communication between unauthorized vehicles / lead vehicles and the vehicle platoon: Unauthorized vehicles / lead vehicles can use the same encryption method as roadside units / cloud service providers to generate broadcast ciphertext for the vehicle platoon. After obtaining the ciphertext, following vehicles use their private keys to decrypt the ciphertext header to obtain the symmetric key. Then, they use this symmetric key to decrypt the ciphertext, thereby restoring the original plaintext information. 1. Encryption of unauthorized vehicles: When unauthorized vehicles / lead vehicles... To vehicle platoon Broadcast message At that time, first start from the vehicle platoon list Read vehicle formation The information, and then calculate The operation and data encryption steps for communication between the roadside unit / cloud service provider and the vehicle platoon are the same. 2. Navigation vehicle encryption: To ensure consistent driving behavior, appropriate safe distances, and stable speeds within the vehicle platoon, as well as to handle emergencies or unexpected events, real-time communication between the vehicle platoon is necessary. Since the navigation vehicle needs to send driving behavior data to all platoon members, to ensure data confidentiality, we can adopt the aforementioned communication protocol between the roadside unit / cloud service provider and the vehicle platoon to encrypt the data for the vehicle platoon. Generate ciphertext Its operation is the same as the specific steps of data encryption for communication between the roadside unit / cloud service provider and the vehicle platoon. 3. Decryption by platoon members: When a platoon member vehicle receives the broadcast ciphertext... Afterwards, the formation members Through private key To decrypt the ciphertext Its operation is the same as the specific steps for decryption of platoon members in communication between roadside units / cloud service providers and vehicle platoons.

[0089] The solution presented in this embodiment has the following improvements:

[0090] This invention describes our method using algorithms for system establishment, vehicle platoon creation, follower vehicle addition, communication between roadside units / cloud service providers and vehicle platoons, and communication between unregistered vehicles / lead vehicles and vehicle platoons. Using this method, data communication between roadside units / cloud service providers / unregistered vehicles / lead vehicles and vehicle platoons can be supported. In fact, the method designed in this invention can also be used for communication between various vehicle-to-everything (V2X) entities and vehicle platoons, such as communication between a trusted center and vehicle platoons, and communication between humans and vehicle platoons. The specific implementation process simply involves replacing the trusted center or human with the roadside units / cloud service providers / unregistered vehicles / lead vehicles described in this invention.

[0091] The solution provided in this embodiment has the following three functions:

[0092] 1. Ensuring the confidentiality of communication data. This invention employs a layered, identity-based broadcast encryption technique to ensure the confidentiality of communication data during the message broadcast phase by achieving ciphertext indistinguishability under chosen identity and chosen ciphertext attacks. More specifically, we have demonstrated that the proposed message broadcast scheme is secure for V2I, V2C, and V2V communication processes in the aforementioned vehicle-to-everything (V2X) network, preventing communication data from being obtained or tampered with by any third party, thus avoiding harm caused by leakage or tampering.

[0093] 2. Protection of the privacy of platoon member vehicles. The layered, identity-based broadcast encryption technology used in this invention can protect the privacy of platoon member vehicles. The encrypted communication will not reveal the identity information of any platoon member, and the data access privacy of platoon members will not be seen by other vehicle-to-everything (V2X) entities, effectively preventing damage caused by the leakage of identity privacy.

[0094] 3. Improve the efficiency of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) data communication. The efficiency of V2X data communication should meet the actual needs of V2X. The layered, identity-based broadcast encryption used in this invention achieves low storage space consumption and high computational efficiency in a secure and efficient message broadcasting method for vehicle platooning communication scenarios. The family public key, member private keys, and ciphertext length are fixed, and the encryption and decryption times are independent of the number of vehicles in the platoon and do not increase with the number of vehicles. Therefore, optimizing storage space and computational efficiency is particularly important when the number of vehicle platoon members is large. The secure and efficient message broadcasting method for vehicle platooning communication scenarios designed in this invention can effectively improve data communication efficiency.

[0095] Security justification for this embodiment:

[0096] Under the random oracle model, the algorithm involved in this invention can achieve ciphertext indistinguishability under identity-choice and ciphertext-choice attacks, and protect the privacy of vehicle identities among convoy members. Because the scheme is designed using lattice cryptography tools, the design of this invention has resistance to quantum attacks.

[0097] The key idea behind the ciphertext indistinguishability proof is summarized as follows: Assume there exists an adversary whose probability of successfully breaking the ciphertext indistinguishability of this invention is... The target vehicle set for the attack is Then this enemy can be used to solve the problem. The problem involves a decision-making version of the problem. The simulation process is as follows: In query phase 1, the adversary adaptively issues hash queries, proxy queries, and decryption queries, and the challenger answers these queries. Once the adversary decides to stop query phase 1, the adversary initiates a challenge. In reality, the challenge faced by the adversary is to differentiate between a... The distribution is a random distribution, where Embedded in the distribution Difficult problems. This process is essentially the adversary solving them. A decision-making version of a difficult problem. The challenger randomly chooses one of two distributions. The challenger runs an encryption algorithm to generate the challenge ciphertext and returns it to the adversary. Finally, the adversary outputs its guess; if the guess is correct, the challenger has successfully distinguished the ciphertext. Distribution and random distribution.

[0098] The security proof approach for vehicle identity privacy protection is briefly summarized as follows: In this invention, the encrypted data will not reveal the identity information of the vehicle platoon members. It should be noted that for encrypted... In other words, It can be considered random, and the identity information of any squad member cannot be determined from it. Furthermore, attackers also cannot obtain... Retrieve the identity information of a specific squadron member or Only the sum of the hash values ​​of all squad members' identities can be known. It can also be considered random. Therefore, even if the ciphertext is attacked by an adversary, the true identity of the convoy members cannot be confirmed from the ciphertext, thus ensuring that the privacy of the vehicle convoy members is fully protected.

[0099] Functional demonstration of this embodiment:

[0100] 1. Comparison of the functions of the present invention and related comparative literature: As shown in Table 2, the secure and efficient message broadcasting method of the present invention for vehicle platooning communication scenarios has advantages in terms of security level and resistance to quantum attacks, and is more in line with the data communication needs of vehicle networking.

[0101] Wherein, [1] Zhong H, Zhang S, Cui J, et al. Broadcast encryption scheme for V2I communication in VANETs[J]. IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, 2021, 71(3): 2749-2760. [2] Zhang J, Su S, Zhong H, et al. Identity-based Broadcast Proxy Re-encryption for Flexible Data Sharing in VANETs[J]. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 2023. [3] Jinman Z, Qin C. Hierarchical identity-based broadcast encryption scheme on lattices[C] / / 2011 Seventh International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security. IEEE, 2011: 944-948. [4] Yang C, Zheng S, Wang L, et al. Hierarchical identity-based broadcast encryption scheme from LWE[J]. Journal of Communications and Networks, 2014, 16(3): 258-263. [5] Zhang X, Xu C, Xue J. Efficient multi-receiver identity-based signcryption from lattice assumption[J]. International Journal of Electronic Security and Digital Forensics, 2018, 10(1): 20-38. [6] Wang F, Wang J, Shi S.Efficient datasharing with privacy preservation over lattices for secure cloud storage[J]. IEEE Systems Journal, 2021, 16(2): 2507-2517. [7] Tang Y, Ba Y, Li L, et al. Lattice-based public-key encryption with conjunctive keyword search in multi-user setting for IIoT[J]. Cluster Computing, 2022, 25(4): 2305-2316. [8] Zhao Y, Wang Y, Liang Y, et al. Identity-based broadcast signcryption scheme for vehicular platoon communication[J]. IEEE Transactions on IndustrialInformatics, 2022. [9] Zhao Y, Yu H, Yang Y, et al. Flexible and Secure Cross-Domain Signcrypted Data Authorization in Multi-Platoon Vehicular Networks[J]. IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, 2023;. Table 2: Functional Comparison

[0102] in Represents the length of the family public key. Represents the length of the user's private key. This represents the length of the ciphertext. IND-CCA indicates indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attacks, while IND-CPA indicates indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attacks.

[0103] 2. Space efficiency analysis of the proposed solution: As shown in Table 3, the family public key length, user private key length, and ciphertext length are fixed and will not increase with the number of vehicles. Therefore, this method can effectively save bandwidth and computing resources in the vehicle network, making it more adaptable to the complex and ever-changing vehicle network environment; Table 3: Comparison of Space Efficiency of Schemes .

[0104] 3. Comparison of computational efficiency of the scheme designed in this invention: As shown in Table 4, compared with other related methods, the secure and efficient message broadcasting method designed in this invention for vehicle platooning communication scenarios has no impact on computational efficiency due to changes in the number of vehicle platooning members, thus forming a potential computational advantage. Table 4: Comparison of computational efficiency

[0105] Functional verification of this embodiment:

[0106] After setting specific values ​​for each parameter, we can use detailed data analysis to demonstrate the advantages of this invention over other comparative solutions in terms of storage space and computational efficiency. For this comparison, we set the following parameter values. The specific results are as follows:

[0107] Comparison of this invention with relevant prior art in terms of family public key length: such as Figure 3 As shown, the vehicle-to-everything (V2X) data communication scheme designed in this invention has a significant advantage in family public key length compared to other schemes. Therefore, this invention is more suitable for V2X communication scenarios.

[0108] Comparison of this invention with relevant comparative literature regarding user private key length: e.g. Figure 4 As shown, the vehicle-to-everything (V2X) data communication scheme designed in this invention has a significant advantage in user private key length compared to other schemes. Therefore, this invention is more suitable for V2X communication scenarios.

[0109] Comparison of the ciphertext length between this invention and relevant prior art: such as Figure 5 As shown, the vehicle-to-everything (V2X) data communication scheme designed in this invention has a significant advantage in ciphertext length compared to other comparative schemes. Therefore, this invention has an advantage in ciphertext length, saving space resources.

[0110] Comparison of this invention with relevant comparative literature in terms of encryption algorithms: such as Figure 6 As shown, the vehicle network data communication scheme designed in this invention has high computational efficiency in the data encryption stage, which has obvious advantages compared with other schemes.

[0111] Comparison of the decryption algorithm between this invention and relevant comparative literature: such as Figure 7 As shown, the vehicle network data communication scheme designed in this invention has high computational efficiency during the vehicle user decryption stage, which has obvious advantages compared with other schemes.

[0112] Radar chart comparing the effectiveness of this invention with existing achievements: (See figure) Figure 8 As shown, the vehicle network data communication solution designed in this invention is more powerful, and can achieve message broadcasting safely and efficiently while protecting the identity and privacy of convoy members.

[0113] This invention is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It will be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, as well as combinations of blocks in the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, special-purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, generate instructions for implementing the flowchart. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in one or more boxes.

[0114] The specific embodiments described above are merely preferred embodiments of the present invention and do not limit the present invention. For those skilled in the art, the present invention can have various modifications and variations. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A secure and efficient message broadcasting method for vehicle platooning communication scenarios, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: Step 1: Taking the communication of vehicle platoons in the Internet of Vehicles as the research background, a model for communication between other entities and vehicle platoons in the Internet of Vehicles was constructed, including a trusted center, cloud service provider, roadside unit, lead vehicle and follower vehicle; Step 2: System Establishment Phase: The Trusted Center generates system public parameters, family public key, and family private key; Step 3: Vehicle platoon creation phase: After an independent vehicle submits a request to the Trusted Center to form a vehicle platoon and act as the lead vehicle, and sends its identity information, the Trusted Center will generate a private key for it based on its identity information and return it to the lead vehicle. Step 4: Joining the Follower Vehicle: Based on the vehicle platooning information list provided by the cloud service provider, the free vehicle submits a joining request to the lead vehicle that it wants to join the platoon and sends its identity information. After the lead vehicle agrees, it will generate a private key for the free vehicle based on its identity information and return it to the follower vehicle. Step 5: Communication phase between roadside unit or cloud service provider and vehicle platoon: The lead vehicle sends a data request to the roadside unit or cloud service provider on behalf of the entire vehicle platoon. The sender encrypts the message using a symmetric key, and then packages the ciphertext header and ciphertext together with the key encapsulation and sends it to the entire vehicle platoon. After receiving the ciphertext header and ciphertext, the following vehicle decrypts the ciphertext header using its private key to obtain the symmetric key, and then uses the symmetric key to decrypt the ciphertext to recover the original plaintext information. The specific steps for communication between the roadside unit or cloud service provider and the vehicle platoon include: Data encryption: When roadside units or cloud service providers need to provide data to vehicle platoons Broadcast message At that time, the operation is as follows: set up ,in and From the vehicle platoon information list Obtain from; Random selection symmetric key Samples are drawn from two error distributions respectively. , ; calculate and ,in and It is A dimensional vector; Set cipherhead and ciphertext Then send ciphertext To all squad members; Formation members decrypt: When a formation member vehicle receives a broadcast ciphertext Afterwards, the formation members via private key To decrypt the ciphertext The operation is as follows: Formation members First, check the ciphertext. In To ensure the encryption Legality; if it is consistent with the vehicle platoon information list In If they match, continue with the next step; otherwise, output a termination symbol. ; set up And calculate the trapdoor label ,in - A trapdoor is defined as: given , original vector Traps label and identity matrix ,So of -The trapdoor is And satisfy ; Call Algorithm, Acquisition and Make , ,in , ; Verify the two inequalities and Check if it's correct. If correct, continue with the following operation; otherwise, output a terminator. ; calculate ,if Then output the terminator symbol. ,if Then calculate ,belong Accompanying group ,in This represents an identity matrix; decoding To obtain the symmetric key Then further calculations To get information ; Step 6: Communication phase between unauthorized vehicles or lead vehicles and vehicle platoons: Unauthorized vehicles or lead vehicles can use the same encryption method as roadside units or cloud service providers to generate broadcast ciphertext for vehicle platoons. After obtaining the ciphertext, the following vehicles use their private keys to decrypt the ciphertext header to obtain the symmetric key. Then, they use the symmetric key to decrypt the ciphertext and restore the original plaintext information. The specific steps for communication between the unauthorized vehicle or lead vehicle and the vehicle formation include: Encryption of unauthorized vehicles: When unauthorized vehicles or lead vehicles are encrypted. To vehicle platoon Broadcast message At that time, first look at the vehicle platoon list Read vehicle formation The information, and then calculate Its operation is the same as the specific steps of data encryption for communication between roadside units or cloud service providers and vehicle platoons; Lead vehicle encryption: To ensure consistent driving behavior, appropriate safe distances, and stable speeds within the vehicle platoon, as well as to handle unexpected situations or events, real-time communication between the vehicles in the platoon is essential. Since the lead vehicle needs to send driving behavior data to all platoon members, to ensure data confidentiality, we employ the aforementioned communication protocol between the roadside unit or cloud service provider and the vehicle platoon. Generate ciphertext Its operation is the same as the specific steps of data encryption for communication between roadside units or cloud service providers and vehicle platoons; Formation members decrypt: When a formation member vehicle receives a broadcast ciphertext Afterwards, the formation members via private key To decrypt the ciphertext Its operation is the same as the specific steps for decryption of platoon members in communication between roadside units or cloud service providers and vehicle platoons.

2. The secure and efficient message broadcasting method for vehicle platooning communication scenarios as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The specific steps for establishing the system include: Trusted Center based on system parameters Generate security parameters Randomly select a secure hash function Randomly select vectors , ,set up ; use Algorithm generation and Trapdoor Therefore, the public key of the trusted center is... The private key is ; in, A secure hash function whose input is a bit string of 0s and 1s of arbitrary length, and whose output is a string of fixed length.

3. The secure and efficient message broadcasting method for vehicle platooning communication scenarios as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The specific steps for creating the vehicle platoon include: When free vehicle When a vehicle wants to initiate a platoon as the lead vehicle, it sends a request to the Trusted Center; if the Trusted Center approves the free vehicle... The application process for the lead vehicle is as follows: Distribute private key : Use hash functions Calculate the hash value of the lead car's identity And randomly select a vector As a formation identifier; run Algorithm, Acquisition and will As the lead vehicle The private key; Private key via a secure channel Send to the lead car ; Trusted Center stores on its local machine ; Navigation vehicle After receiving their private key, they can use the equation as well as To verify the correctness of the provided private key; Among them, parameters Is running The Gaussian parameters are input during the algorithm. Indicates the location of the formation. It's a timestamp; using To describe formation attributes, destination, and start time; To help other vehicles decide whether to join the formation.

4. The secure and efficient message broadcasting method for vehicle platooning communication scenarios as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The specific steps for the accompanying vehicle to join include: When free vehicle When it wants to join a vehicle platoon, it accesses the vehicle platoon list from the cloud service provider. And obtain the identity of the lead car Wait for vehicle platooning information, then send it to the lead vehicle. Send a join request; if the lead car Agree to free vehicles The application process for the following vehicle is as follows: Distribute private key ; Use hash functions Calculate the identity of the following vehicle hash value ; run Algorithm, Acquisition and will As a follower vehicle The private key; Private key via a secure channel Send to following vehicle ; After the vehicle platoon is formed, the lead vehicle calculates... Then it is sent to the trusted center, where It refers to all the squadron members; Trusted Center will tuple The tuple is sent to the cloud service provider, who then stores it in the vehicle platoon list. In addition, the cloud service provider is notified to update the vehicle platoon list in a timely manner. Information in ; Among them, parameters Is running The Gaussian parameters input to the algorithm follow the car After receiving their private key, they can use the equation as well as To verify the correctness of the provided private key. It is the sum of the identity hashes of all squad members.

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