Key transmission methods, devices, base stations, and key generation centers

Abstract

This application provides a key transmission method, apparatus, base station, and key generation center, relating to the field of communication technology. The method includes: when a terminal needs to switch from a first base station to a second base station, using the public-private key pair of the first base station and the public key of the second base station to signify a communication key, obtaining ciphertext corresponding to the communication key, wherein the communication key is used to signify communication data; and sending the ciphertext to the second base station. This achieves secure transmission during base station handover using a certificate-free public key signing method, solving the problems of numerous key transmission interactions and cumbersome certificate management in existing solutions.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to a key transmission method, apparatus, base station and key generation center. Background Technology

[0002] The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) defines the Xn interface for use between base stations. Therefore, when a terminal needs to hand over to a base station, the source base station needs to transmit key materials to the target base station, requiring the establishment of a secure channel. 3GPP protocols specify that the Xn interface uses either Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) or Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) as its security mechanism. If IPsec is used to establish a secure channel in primary mode, at least three interactions are required. Similarly, DTLS requires a handshake to generate a session key, also requiring at least three interactions. Both IPsec and DTLS rely on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificates for two-way authentication, making certificate management complex. Summary of the Invention

[0003] This application provides a key transmission method, apparatus, base station, and key generation center, which solves the problems of numerous interactions and cumbersome certificate management in the current key transmission process.

[0004] Firstly, to achieve the above objectives, embodiments of this application provide a key transmission method applied to a first base station, comprising:

[0005] When a terminal needs to switch from the first base station to the second base station, the public-private key pair of the first base station and the public key of the second base station are used to signify the communication key to obtain the ciphertext corresponding to the communication key, wherein the communication key is used to signify the communication data.

[0006] The encrypted message is sent to the second base station.

[0007] Optionally, the method further includes:

[0008] The public key of the second base station is obtained from the bulletin board of the Key Generation Center (KGC) by means of subscription or query. The bulletin board stores the IDs of multiple base stations and the current public keys of the multiple base stations.

[0009] Optionally, the method includes:

[0010] Send the ID of the first base station to KGC;

[0011] Receive the partial private key corresponding to the ID of the first base station, the system public parameters of the security system, and the master key of the security system sent by the KGC;

[0012] A public-private key pair for the first base station is generated based on the ID of the first base station, the partial private key, the system public parameters, and the master key.

[0013] The public and private key pairs of the first base station are updated based on their lifecycle.

[0014] Optionally, the public-private key pair is generated based on the ID of the first base station, the partial private key, the system public parameters, and the master key, including:

[0015] Based on the ID of the first base station and the publicly available system parameters, a first secret value for the first base station is randomly generated;

[0016] Generate the private key in the public-private key pair based on the partial private key and the first secret value;

[0017] The public key in the public-private key pair is generated based on the first secret value, the system public parameters, and the master key.

[0018] Optionally, the ID of the first base station is sent to the KGC, including any of the following:

[0019] Before the first base station is deployed, send the ID of the first base station to the KGC;

[0020] After the first base station is deployed, the ID of the first base station is sent to the KGC.

[0021] Optionally, based on the lifecycle of the public-private key pair of the first base station, the public-private key pair of the first base station is updated, including:

[0022] At the end of the lifecycle of the public-private key pair of the first base station, a second secret value of the first base station is randomly generated based on the ID of the first base station and the publicly available parameters of the system.

[0023] Update the private key in the public-private key pair of the first base station based on the partial private key and the second secret value;

[0024] The public key in the public-private key pair of the first base station is updated based on the second secret value, the system public parameters, and the master key.

[0025] Optionally, after updating the public-private key pair based on its lifecycle, the method further includes:

[0026] Send the updated public key to KGC.

[0027] Secondly, to achieve the above objectives, embodiments of this application provide a key transmission method applied to a second base station, comprising:

[0028] Receive ciphertext sent by the first base station;

[0029] Based on the public-private key pair of the second base station and the public key of the first base station, the ciphertext is decrypted to obtain the communication key corresponding to the ciphertext, wherein the communication key is used to decrypt communication data.

[0030] Optionally, the method further includes:

[0031] The public key of the first base station is obtained from the KGC's bulletin board by means of subscription or query. The bulletin board stores the IDs of multiple base stations and the current public keys of the multiple base stations.

[0032] Optionally, the method further includes:

[0033] Send the ID of the second base station to KGC;

[0034] Receive the partial private key corresponding to the ID of the second base station, the system public parameters of the security system, and the master key of the security system sent by the KGC;

[0035] Based on the ID of the second base station, the partial private key, the system public parameters, and the master key, a public-private key pair for the second base station is generated;

[0036] The public and private key pairs of the second base station are updated based on their lifecycle.

[0037] Optionally, after updating the public-private key pair of the second base station based on its lifecycle, the method further includes:

[0038] Send the updated public key to KGC.

[0039] Thirdly, to achieve the above objectives, embodiments of this application provide a key transmission method applied to KGC, comprising:

[0040] Receive the ID sent by the base station; wherein the base station is either the first base station or the second base station;

[0041] Based on the ID, the system public parameters of the security system, and the master key of the security system, a partial private key for the base station is generated;

[0042] Send the partial private key, the system public parameters, and the master key to the base station.

[0043] Optionally, the method further includes:

[0044] Based on the security parameters, the system public parameters and the master key are generated.

[0045] Optionally, the method further includes:

[0046] Receive the updated public key sent by the base station;

[0047] Based on the updated public key, update the public key of the base station stored in the KGC's bulletin board.

[0048] Optionally, the method further includes at least one of the following:

[0049] Based on the base station ID and the public key corresponding to the base station ID stored in the bulletin board, send the public key of the second base station to the first base station;

[0050] Based on the base station ID and the public key corresponding to the base station ID stored in the bulletin board, the public key of the first base station is sent to the second base station, wherein the bulletin board is deployed on the KGC.

[0051] Fourthly, to achieve the above objectives, embodiments of this application provide a key transmission device applied to a first base station, comprising:

[0052] The signature module is used to signify the communication key using the public-private key pair of the first base station and the public key of the second base station when the terminal needs to switch from the first base station to the second base station, so as to obtain the ciphertext corresponding to the communication key, wherein the communication key is used to signify the communication data.

[0053] The first sending module is used to send the ciphertext to the second base station.

[0054] Fifthly, to achieve the above objectives, embodiments of this application provide a key transmission device applied to a second base station, comprising:

[0055] The first receiving module is used to receive ciphertext sent by the first base station;

[0056] The decryption module is used to decrypt the ciphertext based on the public-private key pair of the second base station and the public key of the first base station to obtain the communication key corresponding to the ciphertext, wherein the communication key is used to decrypt communication data.

[0057] Sixthly, to achieve the above objectives, embodiments of this application provide a key transmission device applied to a KGC, comprising:

[0058] The first receiving module is used to receive the ID sent by the base station; wherein the base station is either the first base station or the second base station.

[0059] The first generation module is used to generate a partial private key for the base station based on the ID, the system public parameters of the security system, and the master key of the security system.

[0060] The first sending module is used to send the partial private key, the system public parameters, and the master key to the base station.

[0061] Seventhly, to achieve the above objectives, embodiments of this application provide a base station, which is a first base station, including a processor and a transceiver; the transceiver receives and transmits data under the control of the processor, wherein:

[0062] The transceiver is used to, when the terminal needs to switch from the first base station to the second base station, use the public-private key pair of the first base station and the public key of the second base station to signify the communication key and obtain the ciphertext corresponding to the communication key, wherein the communication key is used to signify the communication data.

[0063] The processor is used to send the ciphertext to the second base station.

[0064] Eighthly, to achieve the above objectives, embodiments of this application provide a base station, which is a second base station, including a processor and a transceiver; the transceiver receives and transmits data under the control of the processor, wherein:

[0065] The transceiver is used to receive ciphertext sent by the first base station;

[0066] The processor is used to decrypt and signify the ciphertext based on the public-private key pair of the second base station and the public key of the first base station to obtain a communication key corresponding to the ciphertext, wherein the communication key is used to signify the communication data.

[0067] Ninthly, to achieve the above objectives, embodiments of this application provide a key generation center, including a processor and a transceiver; the transceiver receives and transmits data under the control of the processor, wherein:

[0068] The transceiver is used to receive the ID sent by the base station; wherein the base station is a first base station or a second base station;

[0069] The processor is used to generate a partial private key for the base station based on the ID, the system public parameters of the security system, and the master key of the security system;

[0070] The transceiver is used to send the partial private key, the system public parameters, and the master key to the base station.

[0071] In a tenth aspect, to achieve the above objectives, embodiments of this application provide a base station, including a transceiver, a processor, a memory, and a program stored in the memory and executable on the processor; wherein, when the processor executes the program, it implements the key transmission method as described in the first aspect, or implements the key transmission method as described in the second aspect.

[0072] Eleventhly, to achieve the above objectives, embodiments of this application provide a key generation center, including a transceiver, a processor, a memory, and a program stored in the memory and executable on the processor; wherein, when the processor executes the program, it implements the key transmission method as described in the third aspect.

[0073] In a twelfth aspect, to achieve the above objectives, embodiments of this application provide a readable storage medium having a program or instructions stored thereon, wherein the program or instructions, when executed by a processor, implement the key transmission method as described in the first aspect, or implement the key transmission method as described in the second aspect, or implement the key transmission method as described in the third aspect.

[0074] The beneficial effects of the above technical solution in this application are as follows:

[0075] The key transmission method of this application, in the first case where a terminal needs to switch from a first base station to a second base station, uses the public-private key pair of the first base station and the public key of the second base station to signify the communication key, obtaining ciphertext corresponding to the communication key, wherein the communication key is used to signify communication data; secondly, the first base station sends the ciphertext to the second base station. Thus, it achieves the transmission of key materials using certificate-free public-key signing, ensuring secure transmission during base station switching and solving the problems of numerous key transmission interactions and cumbersome certificate management in existing solutions. Attached Figure Description

[0076] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the existing NR-RAN handover process;

[0077] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the existing Xn interface switching security mechanism;

[0078] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of an NTN scenario;

[0079] Figure 4 This is one of the flowcharts illustrating the key transmission method according to an embodiment of this application;

[0080] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the communication key signing process in an embodiment of this application.

[0081] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the update of the public-private key pair in an embodiment of this application;

[0082] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the decryption and signing of ciphertext in an embodiment of this application;

[0083] Figure 8 This is a second schematic flowchart of the key transmission method according to an embodiment of this application;

[0084] Figure 9 This is the third flowchart illustrating the key transmission method according to an embodiment of this application;

[0085] Figure 10 This is one of the structural schematic diagrams of the key transmission device according to an embodiment of this application;

[0086] Figure 11 This is a second schematic diagram of the key transmission device according to an embodiment of this application;

[0087] Figure 12 This is the third schematic diagram of the key transmission device according to an embodiment of this application;

[0088] Figure 13 This is one of the structural schematic diagrams of a base station according to an embodiment of this application;

[0089] Figure 14 This is a second schematic diagram of the base station structure according to an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0090] To make the technical problems, technical solutions and advantages of this application clearer, a detailed description will be provided below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.

[0091] It should be understood that the phrase "one embodiment" or "an embodiment" throughout the specification means that a specific feature, structure, or characteristic related to the embodiment is included in at least one embodiment of this application. Therefore, "in one embodiment" or "in an embodiment" appearing throughout the specification does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment. Furthermore, these specific features, structures, or characteristics can be combined in any suitable manner in one or more embodiments.

[0092] In the various embodiments of this application, it should be understood that the sequence number of each process described below does not imply the order of execution. The execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of this application.

[0093] In addition, the terms "system" and "network" are often used interchangeably in this article.

[0094] In the embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that "B corresponding to A" means that B is associated with A, and B can be determined based on A. However, it should also be understood that determining B based on A does not mean determining B solely based on A; B can also be determined based on A and / or other information.

[0095] Before describing the embodiments of this application, the relevant technical points will be explained first:

[0096] I. 5th Generation (5G) New Radio (NR) Process:

[0097] The handover process for Radio Access Network (NR) devices includes a preparation phase, an execution phase, and a completion phase. The first two phases do not require the involvement of the 5G Core Network (5GC), meaning messages are exchanged directly between the 5G base station and NR node (NR Node B, gmb). In the handover completion phase, the target gNB triggers the release of resources on the source gNB. Figure 1 This describes a handover scenario where neither the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) nor the User Plane Function (UPF) changes. The specific handover process is as follows: Figure 1 As shown below, Figure 1 The key processes in the process will be described here, but steps that are not closely related to the switching mechanism will not be described in detail here.

[0098] (a) Pre-switch phase:

[0099] User data is exchanged between the UE, the source gNB, and the UPF entity;

[0100] 0. AMF provides mobility control information;

[0101] 1. The user equipment (UE) interacts with the source base station for measurement, control, and reporting.

[0102] Specifically, this step allows the UE to upload a measurement report based on the base station's configuration.

[0103] 2. The source gNB makes a switchover decision;

[0104] Specifically, this step allows the source gNB to decide on the handover based on the Measurement Report and Radio Resource Management (RRM) information.

[0105] 3. The source gNB sends a handover request message to the target gNB;

[0106] Specifically, this step transmits a transparent Radio Resource Control (RRC) container to the source base station, which includes at least the target cell ID, KgNB*, the UE's Cell Radio Network Temporary Identifier (C-RNTI) in the source gNB, and RRM configuration information. During handover, the key KgNB used between the UE and the target gNB, based on the key (referred to as KgNB*), is derived from the currently active KgNB or from the NH parameters. If KgNB* is derived from the currently active KgNB, it is called a horizontal key export and is indicated to the UE with no NCC increase; if KgNB* is derived from the NH parameters, it is called a vertical key export and is indicated to the UE with an increased NCC. Finally, after exporting the new KgNB, KRRCint, KRRCenc, KUPint, and KUPenc are exported based on the KgNB.

[0107] 4. Target gNB access control; specifically, this step involves the target gNB controlling and allowing the UE to access the network.

[0108] 5. The target gNB sends a handover request acknowledgement message to the source gNB;

[0109] Specifically, this step can be as follows: the target gNB prepares for the L1 / L2 layer handover and sends a handover request acknowledgement to the source gNB, which includes a transparent container that will be sent as an RRC message to the terminal to perform the handover.

[0110] Switch execution phase

[0111] 6. Radio Access Network (RAN) handover startup

[0112] Among them, such as Figure 1As shown, this step includes the source gNB transferring buffered data and new data from the UPF, and the UE separating from the old cell and synchronizing with the new cell;

[0113] Specifically, this step includes: the source gNB sending a Radio Resource Control Reconfiguration (RRCReconfiguration) message to the UE to trigger a Uu handover. This message contains at least the target cell ID, the new C-RNTI, and the target gNB's security algorithm identifier. If it is not a Dual Active Protocol Stack (DAPS) handover, the source gNB stops transmitting data to the UE, and forwards the data sent by the UPF entity to the target gNB, which then caches the data.

[0114] 7a. Early Status Transfer;

[0115] 7. Serial Number Status Transfer;

[0116] Here, since steps 7a and 7 have little impact on understanding the switching mechanism, they can be ignored.

[0117] Afterwards, the UPF sends user data to the source gNB, and the source gNB forwards the received user data to the target gNB;

[0118] The target gNB buffers user data obtained from the source gNB;

[0119] 8. RAN handover complete; among which, such as Figure 1 As shown, this step includes:

[0120] 8a. The target gNB sends a Handover Success message to the source gNB;

[0121] 8b. The source gNB sends a sequence number state transition message to the target gNB;

[0122] Afterwards, the terminal sends an RRC Reconfiguration Complete message to the target gNB to complete the RRC handover process. At this point, the terminal and the target gNB can begin transmitting data.

[0123] Switching to completion phase

[0124] 9. The target gNB sends a PATH SWITCH REQUEST message to the AMF entity;

[0125] Here, the PATH SWITCH REQUEST message is used to trigger 5GC to switch the downlink (DL) data path to the target gNB and establish an NG-C interface instance for the target gNB.

[0126] 10. Path transformation within UPF(s)

[0127] Specifically, this step may include the 5GC switching the DL data path to the target gNB. The UPF entity sends one or more end marker messages to the source gNB on the old path of each PDU session / tunnel, and can then release any user plane (U-plane) / transport network layer (TNL) resources to the source gNB.

[0128] 11. The AMF entity returns a PATH SWITCH REQUEST acknowledgment message to the target gNB.

[0129] 12. The target gNB sends a UE Context Release message to the source gNB;

[0130] Specifically, this step involves the target gNB sending a UE context release (UE CONTEXT RELEASE) message when it receives a PATH SWITCH REQUEST confirmation message from the AMF, notifying the source gNB of a successful handover. The source gNB can then release the radio resources and control plane resources associated with the UE context.

[0131] II. Security mechanisms for switching the Xn interface, such as Figure 2 As shown, the process of switching security mechanisms includes the following steps:

[0132] 1. Update the key of the source gNB / ng-eNB; specifically: the source gNB / ng-eNB calculates KNG-RAN* according to either horizontal key derivation or vertical key derivation. If the source gNB / ng-eNB has an unused {NH, NCC} pair, then vertical key derivation will be performed.

[0133] 2. The source gNB / ng-eNB sends the updated key to the target gNB / ng-eNB. Specifically, it forwards {KNG-RAN*, NCC} to the target gNB / ng-eNB.

[0134] Furthermore, the target gNB / ng-eNB treats the received KNG-RAN* as the KgNB. The target gNB / ng-eNB then associates the received NCC value with the KgNB.

[0135] 3. The target gNB / ng-eNB sends a handover command (HO command) message to the UE through the source gNB / ng-eNB; specifically, the HO command message carries the received NCC.

[0136] 4. UE updates key. Specifically, the UE updates the key based on the received HO command message.

[0137] 5. The UE sends an RRC reconfiguration complete message to the target gNB / ng-eNB.

[0138] 6. The target gNB / ng-eNB sends an NG Application Protocol (NGAP) PATH SWITCH REQUEST message to the AMF entity. Specifically, this message is sent when the target gNB / ng-eNB has completed the handover signaling with the UE.

[0139] Furthermore, upon receiving the NGAP PATH SWITCH request, the AMF entity should increment its locally stored NCC value by 1 and calculate the new NH according to Annex A.10; specifically, the AMF entity should use the KAMF from the currently active 5G Non-Standalone (NAS) security context to calculate the new NH.

[0140] 7. The AMF sends an NGAP PATH SWITCH REQUEST ACK message to the target gNB / ng-eNB. Specifically, this message carries the newly calculated {NH, NCC} of the AMF entity.

[0141] 8. The {NH, NCC} received by the target gNB / ng-eNB storage is used for the next handover, and existing but unused {NH, NCC} pairs from other storage are deleted.

[0142] III. Non-Terrestrial Networks (NTN) Scenarios

[0143] 3GPP NTN proposed an architecture for base station satellite navigation (such as...) Figure 3 As shown in the figure, during base station handover, there will be users switching between ground base stations and satellite base stations. According to the 3GPP definition, the Xn interface is used between base stations. When handover is required, the source base station needs to transmit key materials to the target base station. Therefore, a secure channel needs to be established. The relevant 3GPP protocols stipulate that the security mechanism of the Xn interface adopts IPsec or DTLS. Both of these mean that certificates need to be configured between the base stations to complete two-way authentication.

[0144] As mentioned earlier, when switching between terrestrial and satellite base stations, establishing a secure channel using IPsec requires at least three interactions in primary mode. Similarly, DTLS requires a handshake to generate a session key, also involving at least three interactions. Both IPsec and DTLS rely on PKI certificates for two-way authentication, making certificate management cumbersome and unsuitable for onboard processing. Furthermore, the wireless air interface link used for switching from a terrestrial base station to a satellite base station differs from the fiber optic link established between terrestrial base stations, making it vulnerable to theft or tampering. In short, existing mechanisms applied to NTN base station handover scenarios suffer from excessive interactions, complex certificate management, and a lack of protection during the negotiation process.

[0145] The key transmission method, apparatus, base station, and key generation center of this application will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0146] like Figure 4 As shown in the embodiment of this application, a key transmission method is provided. This method is applied to a first base station, wherein the first base station is, for example, the source base station of a terminal. The method includes:

[0147] Step 401: When the terminal needs to switch from the first base station to the second base station, the public-private key pair of the first base station and the public key of the second base station are used to sign the communication key to obtain the ciphertext corresponding to the communication key, wherein the communication key is used to sign the communication data.

[0148] Here, it should be noted that the communication key includes, for example, KNG-RAN* calculated using either a horizontal or vertical key derivation method, and the NCC value. That is, when the terminal switches from the first base station to the second base station, the first base station needs to send {KNG-RAN*, NCC} to the second base station. In this case, the first base station uses a signature-based encryption method to ensure the secure transmission of the communication key. Specifically, as follows... Figure 5 As shown, the first base station inputs the content to be transmitted ({KNG-RAN*, NCC}), the public key of the first base station, the private key of the first base station, and the public key of the second base station into the signcrypt algorithm / signcrypt algorithm module to complete the signcrypt of the content to be transmitted and obtain the ciphertext X.

[0149] Step 402: Send the encrypted message to the second base station.

[0150] The key transmission method of this application, in the first case where the terminal needs to switch from a first base station to a second base station, uses the public-private key pair of the first base station and the public key of the second base station to signify the communication key, obtaining ciphertext corresponding to the communication key, wherein the communication key is used to signify communication data; secondly, the first base station sends the ciphertext to the second base station. In this way, key materials are transmitted using certificate-free public-key signing, ensuring secure transmission during base station handover and solving the problems of numerous key transmission interactions and cumbersome certificate management in existing solutions.

[0151] It should be noted that, in the embodiments of this application, the first base station and the second base station can be two base stations in an NTN scenario. For example, the first base station can be a terrestrial base station and the second base station can be a satellite-based base station; or, the first base station can be a satellite-based base station and the second base station can be a terrestrial base station. Of course, the first base station and the second base station can also both be terrestrial base stations or both be satellite-based base stations.

[0152] Furthermore, as an optional implementation, the method also includes:

[0153] The public key of the second base station is obtained from the bulletin board of the Key Generation Center (KGC) by means of subscription or query. The bulletin board stores the IDs of multiple base stations and the current public keys of multiple base stations.

[0154] Here, the bulletin board can also be referred to as a public panel. This means that a public panel can be deployed on the ground-based KGC (Kidney Controller Hub) according to the design specifications to store the IDs and public keys of each base station. Specifically, the storage format for the IDs and public keys of each base station may include, for example, blockchain or mapping tables. Furthermore, the bulletin board also stores information such as the validity period of the public keys given to the base stations. For example, an example of the public keys of each base station stored in the bulletin board is shown in Table 1 below:

[0155] Table 1

[0156] Index Identifier (ID) Public key Validity period (lifetime) 1 JZ001 XXX 2023-8-15 2 JZ002 YYY 2023-8-16

[0157] Each base station can obtain the public keys of other base stations through subscription or query. Specifically, taking the subscription method as an example, each base station can subscribe to the public keys of other base stations from the KGC. After receiving the updated public key, the KGC will store the received public key in the bulletin board and send the updated public key to the base stations that have subscribed to these public keys. Taking the query method as an example, when base station A needs to obtain the public key of base station B, base station A sends a request to the KGC to obtain the public key of base station B. Based on the request, the KGC sends the public key of base station B to base station A.

[0158] Furthermore, as an optional implementation, the method also includes:

[0159] Send the ID of the first base station to KGC;

[0160] The system receives a partial private key corresponding to the ID of the first base station, the system public parameters of the security system, and the master key of the security system sent by the KGC. In other words, the KGC will generate parameters such as a partial private key, system public parameters, and master key of the first base station based on the ID of the first base station, and send these generated parameters to the first base station.

[0161] Based on the ID of the first base station, a portion of the private key, the publicly available system parameters, and the master key, a public-private key pair for the first base station is generated; specifically, this step can generate the public and private keys in the public-private key pair based on a key generation algorithm.

[0162] Based on the lifecycle of the public-private key pair of the first base station, the public-private key pair of the first base station is updated; this step of updating the public-private key pair based on its lifecycle further improves the security of key transmission.

[0163] In this optional implementation, the first base station generates a public-private key pair based on a portion of the private key generated by the KGC, and updates the public-private key pair according to its lifecycle to enable the use of the latest public-private key pair for signing the communication key. This improves the security of communication key transmission.

[0164] As an optional implementation, a public-private key pair is generated based on the ID of the first base station, a portion of the private key, the system's public parameters, and the master key, including:

[0165] Based on the ID of the first base station and the publicly available system parameters, a first secret value for the first base station is randomly generated. This step can utilize a user secret value generation algorithm to generate the first secret value. Specifically, the ID of the first base station and the publicly available system parameters can be input into the user secret value generation algorithm (model) to output the first secret value.

[0166] Based on the partial private key and the first secret value, generate the private key in the public-private key pair; this step can use a user private key generation algorithm (model) to generate the private key in the public-private key pair of the first base station. A specific example of this step is: input the partial private key and the first secret value into the user private key generation algorithm (model) to output the private key of the first base station.

[0167] Based on the first secret value, the system public parameters, and the master key, generate the public key in the public-private key pair. Specifically, this step can use a user public key generation algorithm (model) to generate the public key in the public-private key pair of the first base station. A specific example of this step is: input the first secret value, the system public parameters, and the master key into the user public key generation algorithm (model) to output the public key.

[0168] It should be noted that the algorithms involved in this optional implementation can be existing algorithms. That is, this optional implementation generates the public and private keys in the public-private key pair based on existing algorithms and the above parameters.

[0169] As a specific implementation, the ID of the first base station is sent to the KGC, including any of the following:

[0170] Before the first base station is deployed, send the ID of the first base station to the KGC;

[0171] After the first base station is deployed, send the ID of the first base station to the KGC.

[0172] Here, it's important to clarify two approaches. First, before the first base station is deployed, it sends its ID to the KGC. The KGC can then generate a partial private key based on this ID, and the first base station uses this partial private key to generate a public-private key pair. This method can be called the pre-generation method, where the first base station generates its public-private key pair before actual deployment. Specifically, the first base station has already registered its ID with the KGC to generate a partial private key before being put into use. The second base station then generates its public and private keys after obtaining this partial private key. This method is suitable when the base station ID remains unchanged. Second, after the first base station is deployed, it sends its ID to the KGC. The KGC can then generate a partial private key based on this ID, and the first base station uses this partial private key to generate a public-private key pair. This method can be called the post-generation method, where the first base station registers its ID to generate a partial private key after actual deployment, and then generates its own public and private keys. This method is suitable when the ID is determined only after deployment is complete.

[0173] As an optional implementation, the public-private key pair of the first base station is updated based on its lifecycle, including:

[0174] When the public-private key pair of the first base station ends its lifecycle, a second secret value for the first base station is randomly generated based on the ID of the first base station and the publicly available system parameters. This step is similar to the process of generating the first secret value described above, and will not be repeated here.

[0175] Update the private key in the public-private key pair of the first base station based on the partial private key and the second secret value;

[0176] Update the public key in the public-private key pair of the first base station based on the second secret value, the system public parameters, and the master key.

[0177] It should be noted that in this optional implementation, the process of updating the private key and public key in the public-private key pair is similar to the process of generating the private key and public key in the public-private key pair described above. Both are based on the corresponding key generation algorithm to generate a new key in order to update the original key. The specific update process will not be described in detail here.

[0178] Furthermore, as an optional implementation, after updating the public-private key pair based on its lifecycle, the method also includes:

[0179] The updated public key is sent to KGC. This ensures that KGC updates the public key of the first base station stored in the bulletin board, so that the bulletin board always stores the latest public key of the first base station.

[0180] Below, in conjunction with Figure 6 The update process of the public-private key pair in the embodiments of this application will be described as follows:

[0181] When the first base station detects that the lifespan of the public-private key pair is 0, it triggers a key update process. The first base station selects a new secret value and completes key derivation based on the new secret value. Specifically, the new secret value and the ID of the first base station are input into the public key algorithm to output the public key; the new secret value, the ID of the first base station, and part of the private key of the first base station are input into the private key algorithm to output the private key; then, the ID of the first base station, the lifespan, and the output public key are published in the bulletin board so that the bulletin board can store the latest public key and validity period of the first base station.

[0182] like Figure 7 As shown in the embodiments of this application, a key transmission method is also provided, applied to a second base station, including:

[0183] Step 701: Receive the ciphertext sent by the first base station; here, the ciphertext is the ciphertext after the first base station uses the public-private key pair of the first base station and the public key pair of the second base station to sign the communication key when the terminal switches from the first base station to the second base station; therefore, the first base station should be the source base station (Source gNB) of the terminal, and the second base station should be the target base station (Target gNB) of the terminal.

[0184] Step 702: Based on the public-private key pair of the second base station and the public key of the first base station, the ciphertext is decrypted and decrypted to obtain the communication key corresponding to the ciphertext. The communication key is used to decrypt communication data. The process of the second base station decrypting the ciphertext to obtain the communication key in this step is the reverse process of the first base station decrypting the communication key to obtain the ciphertext.

[0185] As mentioned earlier, the communication key includes, for example, KNG-RAN* calculated using either a horizontal key derivation method or a vertical key derivation method, and an NCC value. Figure 8 As shown, the process of the second base station decrypting the ciphertext is as follows: The second base station inputs the ciphertext, its public key, its private key, and the first base station's public key into the unsigncrypt verification algorithm module to decrypt the ciphertext and output the communication key. It should be noted that specifically, when verification succeeds, a plaintext message (i.e., the communication key) is output; when verification fails, an error message is returned.

[0186] The key transmission method of this application embodiment firstly involves a second base station receiving ciphertext sent by a first base station; secondly, the second base station decrypts and signs the ciphertext using its public-private key pair and the public key of the first base station to obtain a communication key corresponding to the ciphertext. This communication key is used to sign communication data. Thus, the communication key is transmitted using certificateless public key signing, which ensures the security of the base station handover process and allows the second base station to securely obtain the communication key for subsequent communication with the terminal, thereby enhancing communication security.

[0187] Furthermore, as an optional implementation, the method also includes:

[0188] The public key of the first base station is obtained from the KGC bulletin board by means of subscription or query. The bulletin board stores the IDs of multiple base stations and the current public keys of multiple base stations.

[0189] It should be noted that in this optional implementation, the process by which the second base station obtains the current public key of the first base station is similar to the process by which the first base station obtains the current public key of the second base station, and will not be repeated here.

[0190] Furthermore, as an optional implementation, the method also includes:

[0191] Send the ID of the second base station to KGC;

[0192] The system receives a partial private key corresponding to the ID of the second base station, the system public parameters of the security system, and the master key of the security system sent by the KGC. In other words, the KGC will generate parameters such as a partial private key, system public parameters, and master key of the second base station based on the ID of the second base station, and send these generated parameters to the second base station.

[0193] Based on the ID of the second base station, a portion of the private key, the system's public parameters, and the master key, a public-private key pair for the second base station is generated. Specifically, this step can generate the public and private keys in the public-private key pair based on a key generation algorithm.

[0194] The public-private key pair of the second base station is updated based on its lifecycle.

[0195] Specifically, based on the second base station's ID, a portion of the private key, system public parameters, and the master key, a public-private key pair is generated, including:

[0196] Based on the ID of the second base station and the publicly available system parameters, a third secret value for the second base station is randomly generated. This step can utilize a user secret value generation algorithm to generate the third secret value. Specifically, the ID of the second base station and the publicly available system parameters can be input into the user secret value generation algorithm (model) to output the third secret value.

[0197] Based on the partial private key and the third secret value, generate the private key in the public-private key pair. This step can use a user private key generation algorithm (model) to generate the private key in the public-private key pair of the second base station. A specific example of this step is: input the partial private key, the third secret value and the ID of the first base station into the user private key generation algorithm (model) to output the private key of the second base station.

[0198] Based on the third secret value, the system public parameters, and the master key, generate the public key in the public-private key pair. Specifically, this step can utilize a user public key generation algorithm (model) to generate the public key in the public-private key pair of the second base station. A specific example of this step is: input the third secret value, the system public parameters, and the master key into the user public key generation algorithm (model) to output the public key.

[0199] Specifically, the ID of the second base station is sent to the KGC, including any of the following:

[0200] Before deploying the second base station, send the ID of the second base station to the KGC;

[0201] After the second base station is deployed, send the ID of the second base station to the KGC.

[0202] Here, it's important to clarify two approaches. First, before the second base station is deployed, it sends its ID to the KGC. The KGC can then generate a partial private key based on this ID, and the second base station uses this partial private key to generate a public-private key pair. This method can be called the pre-generation method, where the public-private key pair is generated before actual deployment. Specifically, the second base station has already registered its ID with the KGC to generate a partial private key before being put into use. After obtaining this partial private key, the second base station generates its public and private keys. This method is suitable when the base station ID remains unchanged. Second, after the second base station is deployed, it sends its ID to the KGC. The KGC can then generate a partial private key based on this ID, and the second base station uses this partial private key to generate its public and private key pair. This method can be called the post-generation method, where the second base station uses its ID to register and generate a partial private key after actual deployment, and then generates its own public and private keys. This method is suitable when the ID is determined only after deployment is complete.

[0203] Specifically, based on the lifecycle of the public-private key pair of the second base station, the public-private key pair of the second base station is updated, including:

[0204] At the end of the lifecycle of the public-private key pair of the second base station, a fourth secret value of the second base station is randomly generated based on the ID of the second base station and the publicly available system parameters; this step is similar to the process of generating the third secret value mentioned above, and will not be repeated here.

[0205] Update the private key in the public-private key pair of the second base station based on a portion of the private key and the fourth secret value;

[0206] Update the public key in the public-private key pair of the second base station based on the fourth secret value, the system public parameters, and the master key.

[0207] It should be noted that in this optional implementation, the process of updating the private key and public key in the public-private key pair is similar to the process of generating the private key and public key in the public-private key pair described above. Both are based on the corresponding key generation algorithm to generate a new key in order to update the original key. The specific update process will not be described in detail here.

[0208] As an optional implementation, after updating the public-private key pair of the second base station based on its lifecycle, the method further includes:

[0209] The updated public key is sent to KGC. This ensures that KGC updates the public key of the second base station stored in the bulletin board, guaranteeing that the bulletin board always displays the latest public key of the second base station.

[0210] like Figure 9As shown in the embodiments of this application, a key transmission method is also provided, applied to KGC, including:

[0211] Step 901: Receive the ID sent by the base station; wherein the base station is either the first base station or the second base station; here, the base station can send the ID before or after deployment;

[0212] Step 902: Generate a partial private key for the base station based on the ID, the publicly available parameters of the security system, and the master key of the security system. Specifically, this step may involve inputting the ID, system parameters, and master key into a user partial key generation algorithm (model) to output a partial private key corresponding to the ID of the base station.

[0213] Step 903: Send a portion of the private key, system public parameters, and master key to the base station.

[0214] In this embodiment, the KGC first receives the ID sent by the base station, then generates a partial private key for the base station based on the ID, the system public parameters of the security system, and the master key of the security system. Finally, it sends the partial private key, the system public parameters, and the master key to the base station. In this way, the base station registers its ID on the KGC so that the KGC can generate parameters such as the partial private key of the base station. This enables the base station to generate a public-private key pair based on these parameters, thereby enabling the base station to perform signature-encrypted transmission of communication keys based on public-private key pair information, ensuring the security of the base station handover process.

[0215] Furthermore, as an optional implementation, the method also includes:

[0216] Based on the security parameters, generate the system's public parameters and master key. Specifically, this step may involve taking the security parameters as input values ​​and the system parameters as input values ​​to build an algorithm (model) to output the system's public parameters and master key.

[0217] Furthermore, as an optional implementation, the method also includes:

[0218] Receive the updated public key sent by the base station;

[0219] Update the base station's public key stored in the KGC bulletin board based on the updated public key.

[0220] In other words, after updating the public and private key pair based on the key lifecycle, the base station needs to send the updated public key to the KGC so that the KGC's bulletin board always stores the latest public key of each base station. This allows other base stations to obtain the latest public key of the base station and to sign the communication key based on the public key and other parameters, thus ensuring the security of the base station handover process.

[0221] Furthermore, as an optional implementation, the method also includes at least one of the following:

[0222] Based on the base station ID and the public key corresponding to the base station ID stored in the bulletin board, send the public key of the second base station to the first base station;

[0223] Based on the base station ID and the public key corresponding to the base station ID stored in the bulletin board, the public key of the first base station is sent to the second base station, wherein the bulletin board is deployed on the KGC.

[0224] It should be noted that KGC can send the public key of the second base station to the first base station or send the public key of the first base station to the second base station based on a request or subscription. That is, when sending a public key based on a request: KGC sends the public key of the second base station to the first base station when it receives a request message from the first base station requesting the public key of the second base station, or KGC sends the public key of the first base station to the second base station when it receives a request message from the second base station requesting the public key of the first base station. When sending a public key based on a subscription: after the first / second base station sends a subscription message to KGC, KGC updates the public key in the bulletin board and then sends the updated public key to the first / second base station.

[0225] The following provides examples illustrating the process by which KGC generates a partial key based on the base station's ID, and the process by which the base station generates a public-private key pair:

[0226] (a) Determine the system's public parameters and master key:

[0227] Assuming k is a given security parameter, and IG is a BDH parameter generator with input k; then: running IG on input k produces the output.<G1、G2、e> G1 and G2 are sets of prime numbers of order q and e: G1 × G2 → G2; choose an arbitrary generator P ∈ G1; from Z* q A master key s is randomly selected, and P0 = sP; a cryptographic hash function H1 is selected: {0, 1}. * →G1 * H2: G2 → {0, 1} n , where n is the bit length of the plaintext (communication key). The system's public parameters are params =<G1、G2、e、n、P、P0、H1、H2> The master key is s∈Z* q The message space M = {0, 1} * The ciphertext space C = G1 × {0, 1} * Among them, Z* q Represents an integer.

[0228] (ii) Generating a portion of the base station's private key:

[0229] First, the identity ID of base station A is obtained using the cryptographic hash function H1. A ∈{0,1}* Encrypt to obtain the encrypted ID A This step can be represented as: Q A =H1(ID) A )∈G1 * ;

[0230] Secondly, based on the encrypted ID A Given the master key s, generate a partial private key; where this step can be represented as: D A =sQ A ∈G1 * .

[0231] Afterwards, base station A can use e(D) A ,P)=e(Q A P0) verifies the correctness of the received partial private key.

[0232] (III) Setting secret values ​​for base stations:

[0233] Base station A can generate a secret value based on a secret value generation algorithm, for example, by using the ID... A The system's publicly available parameters are input into the secret value generation algorithm to obtain the secret value, which can be represented as: x A

[0234] ∈Z* q ;

[0235] (iv) The base station generates a public-private key pair:

[0236] First, base station A uses partial private key D. A and secret value x A Generate a (complete) private key; where the private key can be represented as: S A =x A D A =x A s Q A ∈G1 * ;

[0237] Secondly, base station A calculates the corresponding public key based on the secret value; specifically, P... A = <X A Y A >, where X A =x A P, Y A =x A P0 = x A s P.

[0238] like Figure 10 As shown in the illustration, this application also provides a key transmission device applied to a first base station, comprising:

[0239] The signature module 1001 is used to signify the communication key using the public-private key pair of the first base station and the public key of the second base station when the terminal needs to switch from the first base station to the second base station, so as to obtain the ciphertext corresponding to the communication key, wherein the communication key is used to signify the communication data.

[0240] The first sending module 1002 is used to send the ciphertext to the second base station.

[0241] Optionally, the device further includes:

[0242] The acquisition module is used to obtain the public key of the second base station from the bulletin board of the Key Generation Center (KGC) by means of subscription or query. The bulletin board stores the IDs of multiple base stations and the current public keys of the multiple base stations.

[0243] Optionally, the device further includes:

[0244] The second sending module is used to send the ID of the first base station to the KGC;

[0245] The first receiving module is used to receive the partial private key corresponding to the ID of the first base station, the system public parameters of the security system, and the master key of the security system sent by the KGC.

[0246] The generation module is used to generate a public-private key pair for the first base station based on the ID of the first base station, the partial private key, the system public parameters, and the master key.

[0247] The update module is used to update the public-private key pair of the first base station based on the lifecycle of the public-private key pair of the first base station.

[0248] Optionally, the generation module includes:

[0249] The first generation submodule is used to randomly generate a first secret value for the first base station based on the ID of the first base station and the publicly available system parameters.

[0250] The second generation submodule is used to generate the private key in the public-private key pair based on the partial private key and the first secret value;

[0251] The third generation submodule is used to generate the public key in the public-private key pair based on the first secret value, the system public parameters, and the master key.

[0252] Optionally, the second sending module is specifically configured to perform any of the following:

[0253] Before the first base station is deployed, send the ID of the first base station to the KGC;

[0254] After the first base station is deployed, the ID of the first base station is sent to the KGC.

[0255] Optionally, the update module includes:

[0256] A generation submodule is used to randomly generate a second secret value for the first base station based on the ID of the first base station and the system public parameters at the end of the lifecycle of the public-private key pair of the first base station.

[0257] The first update submodule is used to update the private key in the public-private key pair of the first base station according to the partial private key and the second secret value;

[0258] The second update submodule is used to update the public key in the public-private key pair of the first base station according to the second secret value, the system public parameters and the master key.

[0259] Optionally, the device further includes:

[0260] The third sending module is used to send the updated public key to KGC after the update module updates the public-private key pair based on its lifecycle.

[0261] It should be noted that the key transmission device provided in this application embodiment can implement all the method steps implemented in the key transmission method embodiment applied to the first base station, and can achieve the same technical effect. Here, the parts that are the same as those in the method embodiment and the beneficial effects will not be described in detail.

[0262] like Figure 11 As shown in the illustration, this application also provides a key transmission device applied to a second base station, comprising:

[0263] The first receiving module 1101 is used to receive ciphertext sent by the first base station;

[0264] The decryption module 1102 is used to decrypt the ciphertext according to the public-private key pair of the second base station and the public key of the first base station to obtain the communication key corresponding to the ciphertext, wherein the communication key is used to decrypt communication data.

[0265] Optionally, the device further includes:

[0266] The acquisition module is used to obtain the public key of the first base station from the KGC's bulletin board by means of subscription or query, wherein the bulletin board stores the IDs of multiple base stations and the current public keys of the multiple base stations.

[0267] Optionally, the device further includes:

[0268] The first sending module is used to send the ID of the second base station to the KGC;

[0269] The second receiving module is used to receive the partial private key corresponding to the ID of the second base station, the system public parameters of the security system, and the master key of the security system sent by the KGC.

[0270] The generation module is used to generate a public-private key pair for the second base station based on the ID of the second base station, the partial private key, the system public parameters, and the master key.

[0271] The update module is used to update the public-private key pair of the second base station based on the lifecycle of the public-private key pair of the second base station.

[0272] Optionally, the device further includes:

[0273] The second sending module is used to send the updated public key to KGC after the update module updates the public-private key pair of the second base station based on the lifecycle of the public-private key pair of the second base station.

[0274] It should be noted that the key transmission device provided in this application embodiment can implement all the method steps implemented in the key transmission method embodiment applied to the second base station, and can achieve the same technical effect. Here, the parts that are the same as those in the method embodiment and the beneficial effects will not be described in detail.

[0275] like Figure 12 As shown in the illustration, this application also provides a key transmission device applied to a KGC, comprising:

[0276] The first receiving module 1201 is used to receive the ID sent by the base station; wherein the base station is either the first base station or the second base station.

[0277] The first generation module 1202 is used to generate a partial private key for the base station based on the ID, the system public parameters of the security system, and the master key of the security system.

[0278] The first sending module 1203 is used to send the partial private key, the system public parameters, and the master key to the base station.

[0279] Optionally, the device further includes:

[0280] The second generation module is used to generate the system public parameters and the master key based on security parameters.

[0281] Optionally, the device further includes:

[0282] The second receiving module is used to receive the updated public key sent by the base station;

[0283] The update module is used to update the public key of the base station stored in the bulletin board of the KGC according to the updated public key.

[0284] Optionally, the device further includes a second transmitting module for performing at least one of the following:

[0285] Based on the base station ID and the public key corresponding to the base station ID stored in the bulletin board, send the public key of the second base station to the first base station;

[0286] Based on the base station ID and the public key corresponding to the base station ID stored in the bulletin board, the public key of the first base station is sent to the second base station, wherein the bulletin board is deployed on the KGC.

[0287] It should be noted that the key transmission device provided in this application embodiment can implement all the method steps implemented in the key transmission method embodiment applied to KGC, and can achieve the same technical effect. Here, the parts that are the same as those in the method embodiment and the beneficial effects will not be described in detail.

[0288] like Figure 13 As shown in the illustration, this application embodiment also provides a base station, which is a first base station, including a processor 1300 and a transceiver 1310; the transceiver 1310 receives and transmits data under the control of the processor 1300, wherein:

[0289] The transceiver 1310 is used to, when the terminal needs to switch from the first base station to the second base station, use the public-private key pair of the first base station and the public key of the second base station to sign the communication key to obtain the ciphertext corresponding to the communication key, wherein the communication key is used to sign the communication data.

[0290] The processor 1300 is used to send the ciphertext to the second base station.

[0291] Optionally, the transceiver 1310 is further configured to obtain the public key of the second base station from the bulletin board of the key generation center KGC by means of subscription or query, wherein the bulletin board stores the IDs of multiple base stations and the current public keys of the multiple base stations.

[0292] Optionally, the transceiver 1310 is further configured to: send the ID of the first base station to the KGC; and receive a portion of the private key corresponding to the ID of the first base station, the system public parameters of the security system, and the master key of the security system sent by the KGC.

[0293] The processor 1300 is further configured to generate a public-private key pair for the first base station based on the ID of the first base station, the partial private key, the system public parameters, and the master key; and to update the public-private key pair for the first base station based on the lifecycle of the public-private key pair.

[0294] Optionally, when the processor 1300 generates the public-private key pair based on the ID of the first base station, the partial private key, the system public parameters, and the master key, it specifically performs the following:

[0295] Based on the ID of the first base station and the publicly available system parameters, a first secret value for the first base station is randomly generated;

[0296] Generate the private key in the public-private key pair based on the partial private key and the first secret value;

[0297] The public key in the public-private key pair is generated based on the first secret value, the system public parameters, and the master key.

[0298] Optionally, when the transceiver 1310 is used to send the ID of the first base station to the KGC, it is specifically used for any of the following:

[0299] Before the first base station is deployed, send the ID of the first base station to the KGC;

[0300] After the first base station is deployed, the ID of the first base station is sent to the KGC.

[0301] Optionally, when the processor 1300 updates the public-private key pair of the first base station based on the lifecycle of the public-private key pair, it specifically performs the following:

[0302] At the end of the lifecycle of the public-private key pair of the first base station, a second secret value of the first base station is randomly generated based on the ID of the first base station and the publicly available parameters of the system.

[0303] Update the private key in the public-private key pair of the first base station based on the partial private key and the second secret value;

[0304] The public key in the public-private key pair of the first base station is updated based on the second secret value, the system public parameters, and the master key.

[0305] Optionally, after the processor 1300 updates the public-private key pair based on its lifetime, the transceiver 1310 is also used to send the updated public key to the KGC.

[0306] It should be noted that the base station provided in this application embodiment can implement all the method steps implemented in the key transmission method embodiment applied to the first base station, and can achieve the same technical effect. Here, the parts that are the same as those in the method embodiment and the beneficial effects will not be described in detail.

[0307] This application embodiment also provides a base station, which is a second base station, including a processor and a transceiver; the transceiver receives and transmits data under the control of the processor, wherein:

[0308] The transceiver is used to receive ciphertext sent by the first base station;

[0309] The processor is used to decrypt and signify the ciphertext based on the public-private key pair of the second base station and the public key of the first base station to obtain a communication key corresponding to the ciphertext, wherein the communication key is used to signify the communication data.

[0310] Optionally, the transceiver is further configured to obtain the public key of the first base station from the KGC's bulletin board by means of subscription or query, wherein the bulletin board stores the IDs of multiple base stations and the current public keys of the multiple base stations.

[0311] Optionally, the transceiver is further configured to: send the ID of the second base station to the KGC; and receive a portion of the private key corresponding to the ID of the second base station, the system public parameters of the security system, and the master key of the security system sent by the KGC.

[0312] The processor is further configured to: generate a public-private key pair for the second base station based on the ID of the second base station, the partial private key, the system public parameters, and the master key; and update the public-private key pair for the second base station based on the lifecycle of the public-private key pair.

[0313] Optionally, after the processor updates the public-private key pair of the second base station based on the lifecycle of the public-private key pair, the transceiver is further configured to send the updated public key to the KGC.

[0314] It should be noted that the base station provided in this application embodiment can implement all the method steps implemented in the above-mentioned key transmission method embodiment applied to the second base station, and can achieve the same technical effect. Here, the parts that are the same as those in the method embodiment and the beneficial effects will not be described in detail.

[0315] This application embodiment also provides a key generation center, including a processor and a transceiver; the transceiver receives and sends data under the control of the processor, wherein:

[0316] The transceiver is used to receive the ID sent by the base station; wherein the base station is a first base station or a second base station;

[0317] The processor is used to generate a partial private key for the base station based on the ID, the system public parameters of the security system, and the master key of the security system;

[0318] The transceiver is used to send the partial private key, the system public parameters, and the master key to the base station.

[0319] Optionally, the processor is further configured to: generate the system public parameters and the master key based on security parameters.

[0320] Optionally, the transceiver is further configured to receive an updated public key sent by the base station;

[0321] The processor is also configured to update the public key of the base station stored in the bulletin board of the KGC according to the updated public key.

[0322] Optionally, the transceiver is also configured to perform at least one of the following:

[0323] Based on the base station ID and the public key corresponding to the base station ID stored in the bulletin board, send the public key of the second base station to the first base station;

[0324] Based on the base station ID and the public key corresponding to the base station ID stored in the bulletin board, the public key of the first base station is sent to the second base station, wherein the bulletin board is deployed on the KGC.

[0325] It should be noted that the key transmission device provided in this application embodiment can implement all the method steps implemented in the key transmission method embodiment applied to KGC, and can achieve the same technical effect. Here, the parts that are the same as those in the method embodiment and the beneficial effects will not be described in detail.

[0326] like Figure 14 As shown, this application embodiment also provides a base station, including a transceiver 1410, a processor 1400, a memory 1420, and a program or instructions stored in the memory 1420 and executable on the processor 1400; when the processor 1400 executes the program or instructions, it implements the key transmission method applied to the first base station, or implements the key transmission method applied to the second base station.

[0327] The transceiver 1410 is used to receive and send data under the control of the processor 1400.

[0328] Among them, Figure 14In this context, the bus architecture may include any number of interconnected buses and bridges, specifically linking various circuits together, represented by one or more processors (processor 1400) and memory (memory 1420). The bus architecture may also link together various other circuits such as peripheral devices, voltage regulators, and power management circuits, which are well known in the art and therefore will not be described further herein. The bus interface provides an interface. The transceiver 1410 may be multiple elements, including transmitters and receivers, providing a unit for communicating with various other devices over a transmission medium. The processor 1400 is responsible for managing the bus architecture and general processing, and the memory 1420 may store data used by the processor 1400 during operation.

[0329] This application embodiment also provides a key generation center, including a transceiver, a processor, a memory, and a program stored in the memory and executable on the processor; wherein, when the processor executes the program, it implements the key transmission method applied to KGC as described above, and can achieve the same technical effect, so it will not be described again here to avoid repetition.

[0330] An embodiment of this application provides a readable storage medium storing a program or instructions. When the program or instructions are executed by a processor, they implement the key transmission method applied to a first base station as described above, or implement the key transmission method applied to a second base station as described above, or implement the steps in the key transmission method applied to a KGC as described above, and achieve the same technical effect. To avoid repetition, these will not be described again here.

[0331] The processor is the processor in the electronic device described in the above embodiments. The readable storage medium includes computer-readable storage media, such as computer read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disk, or optical disk.

[0332] In this embodiment, the module can be implemented in software so that it can be executed by various types of processors. For example, an identified executable code module may include one or more physical or logical blocks of computer instructions, which may be constructed as objects, procedures, or functions. Nevertheless, the executable code of the identified module does not need to be physically located together, but may include different instructions stored in different bits, which, when logically combined, constitute the module and achieve the module's intended purpose.

[0333] In practice, an executable code module can be a single instruction or many instructions, and can even be distributed across multiple different code segments, different programs, and across multiple memory devices. Similarly, operational data can be identified within the module and can be implemented in any suitable form and organized within any suitable type of data structure. This operational data can be collected as a single dataset or distributed across different locations (including different storage devices), and can exist, at least in part, solely as electronic signals within the system or network.

[0334] The above description is the preferred embodiment of this application. It should be noted that for those skilled in the art, several improvements and modifications can be made without departing from the principles described in this application, and these improvements and modifications should also be considered within the scope of protection of this application.

Claims

1. A key transmission method, characterized in that, Applied to the first base station, including: Send the ID of the first base station to the key generation center KGC; Receive the partial private key corresponding to the ID of the first base station, the system public parameters of the security system, and the master key of the security system sent by the KGC; Generating a public-private key pair for the first base station based on its ID, the partial private key, the system public parameters, and the master key includes: randomly generating a first secret value for the first base station based on its ID and the system public parameters; generating a private key in the public-private key pair based on the partial private key and the first secret value; and generating a public key in the public-private key pair based on the first secret value, the system public parameters, and the master key. When a terminal needs to switch from the first base station to the second base station, the public-private key pair of the first base station and the public key of the second base station are used to signify the communication key to obtain the ciphertext corresponding to the communication key, wherein the communication key is used to signify the communication data. The encrypted message is sent to the second base station.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method further includes: The public key of the second base station is obtained from the bulletin board of the Key Generation Center (KGC) by means of subscription or query. The bulletin board stores the IDs of multiple base stations and the current public keys of the multiple base stations.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method includes: The public and private key pairs of the first base station are updated based on their lifecycle.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Send the ID of the first base station to KGC, including any of the following: Before the first base station is deployed, send the ID of the first base station to the KGC; After the first base station is deployed, the ID of the first base station is sent to the KGC.

5. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, Based on the lifecycle of the public-private key pair of the first base station, the public-private key pair of the first base station is updated, including: At the end of the lifecycle of the public-private key pair of the first base station, a second secret value of the first base station is randomly generated based on the ID of the first base station and the publicly available parameters of the system. Update the private key in the public-private key pair of the first base station based on the partial private key and the second secret value; The public key in the public-private key pair of the first base station is updated based on the second secret value, the system public parameters, and the master key.

6. The method according to claim 3 or 5, characterized in that, Based on the lifecycle of the public-private key pair, after updating the public-private key pair, the method further includes: Send the updated public key to KGC.

7. A key transmission method, characterized in that, Applied to the second base station, including: Send the ID of the second base station to the key generation center KGC; Receive the partial private key corresponding to the ID of the second base station, the system public parameters of the security system, and the master key of the security system sent by the KGC; Based on the ID of the second base station, the partial private key, the system public parameters, and the master key, a public-private key pair for the second base station is generated; this includes: randomly generating a third secret value for the second base station based on the ID of the second base station and the system public parameters; generating the private key in the public-private key pair based on the partial private key and the third secret value; and generating the public key in the public-private key pair based on the third secret value, the system public parameters, and the master key. Receive ciphertext sent by the first base station; Based on the public-private key pair of the second base station and the public key of the first base station, the ciphertext is decrypted to obtain the communication key corresponding to the ciphertext, wherein the communication key is used to decrypt communication data.

8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that, The method further includes: The public key of the first base station is obtained from the KGC's bulletin board by means of subscription or query. The bulletin board stores the IDs of multiple base stations and the current public keys of the multiple base stations.

9. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that, The method further includes: The public and private key pairs of the second base station are updated based on their lifecycle.

10. The method according to claim 9, characterized in that, After updating the public-private key pair of the second base station based on its lifecycle, the method further includes: Send the updated public key to KGC.

11. A key transmission method, characterized in that, Applied to the Key Generation Center (KGC), including: Receive the ID sent by the base station; wherein the base station is either the first base station or the second base station; Based on the ID, the system public parameters of the security system, and the master key of the security system, a partial private key for the base station is generated; The partial private key, the system public parameters, and the master key are sent to the base station; wherein the partial private key, the system public parameters, and the master key are used to generate a public-private key pair for the base station, and the generation process of the public-private key pair includes: randomly generating a secret value for the base station based on the base station ID and the system public parameters; generating the private key in the public-private key pair based on the partial private key and the secret value; and generating the public key in the public-private key pair based on the secret value, the system public parameters, and the master key.

12. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that, The method further includes: Based on the security parameters, the system public parameters and the master key are generated.

13. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that, The method further includes: Receive the updated public key sent by the base station; Based on the updated public key, update the public key of the base station stored in the KGC's bulletin board.

14. The method according to claim 13, characterized in that, The method further includes at least one of the following: Based on the base station ID and the public key corresponding to the base station ID stored in the bulletin board, send the public key of the second base station to the first base station; Based on the base station ID and the public key corresponding to the base station ID stored in the bulletin board, the public key of the first base station is sent to the second base station, wherein the bulletin board is deployed on the KGC.

15. A key transmission device, characterized in that, Applied to the first base station, including: The second sending module is used to send the ID of the first base station to the key generation center KGC; The first receiving module is used to receive the partial private key corresponding to the ID of the first base station, the system public parameters of the security system, and the master key of the security system sent by the KGC. A generation module is configured to generate a public-private key pair for the first base station based on the ID of the first base station, the partial private key, the system public parameters, and the master key; wherein, the generation module includes: a first generation submodule, configured to randomly generate a first secret value for the first base station based on the ID of the first base station and the system public parameters; a second generation submodule, configured to generate the private key in the public-private key pair based on the partial private key and the first secret value; and a third generation submodule, configured to generate the public key in the public-private key pair based on the first secret value, the system public parameters, and the master key. The signature module is used to signify the communication key using the public-private key pair of the first base station and the public key of the second base station when the terminal needs to switch from the first base station to the second base station, so as to obtain the ciphertext corresponding to the communication key, wherein the communication key is used to signify the communication data. The first sending module is used to send the ciphertext to the second base station.

16. A key transmission device, characterized in that, Applied to the second base station, including: The first sending module is used to send the ID of the second base station to the key generation center KGC; The second receiving module is used to receive the partial private key corresponding to the ID of the second base station, the system public parameters of the security system, and the master key of the security system sent by the KGC. A generation module is configured to generate a public-private key pair for the second base station based on the ID of the second base station, the partial private key, the system public parameters, and the master key, including: randomly generating a third secret value for the second base station based on the ID of the second base station and the system public parameters; generating the private key in the public-private key pair based on the partial private key and the third secret value; and generating the public key in the public-private key pair based on the third secret value, the system public parameters, and the master key. The first receiving module is used to receive ciphertext sent by the first base station; The decryption module is used to decrypt the ciphertext based on the public-private key pair of the second base station and the public key of the first base station to obtain the communication key corresponding to the ciphertext, wherein the communication key is used to decrypt communication data.

17. A key transmission device, characterized in that, Applied to the Key Generation Center (KGC), including: The first receiving module is used to receive the ID sent by the base station; wherein the base station is either the first base station or the second base station. The first generation module is used to generate a partial private key for the base station based on the ID, the system public parameters of the security system, and the master key of the security system. A first sending module is configured to send the partial private key, the system public parameters, and the master key to the base station; wherein the partial private key, the system public parameters, and the master key are used to generate a public-private key pair for the base station, and the generation process of the public-private key pair includes: randomly generating a secret value for the base station based on the base station ID and the system public parameters; generating the private key in the public-private key pair based on the partial private key and the secret value; and generating the public key in the public-private key pair based on the secret value, the system public parameters, and the master key.

18. A base station, wherein the base station is a first base station, comprising a processor and a transceiver; the transceiver receives and transmits data under the control of the processor, characterized in that: The transceiver is used to: send the ID of the first base station to the KGC; and receive a partial private key corresponding to the ID of the first base station, system public parameters of the security system, and master key of the security system sent by the KGC. The processor is further configured to generate a public-private key pair for the first base station based on the ID of the first base station, the partial private key, the system public parameters, and the master key, including: randomly generating a first secret value for the first base station based on the ID of the first base station and the system public parameters; generating a private key in the public-private key pair based on the partial private key and the first secret value; and generating a public key in the public-private key pair based on the first secret value, the system public parameters, and the master key. The transceiver is used to, when the terminal needs to switch from the first base station to the second base station, use the public-private key pair of the first base station and the public key of the second base station to signify the communication key and obtain the ciphertext corresponding to the communication key, wherein the communication key is used to signify the communication data. The processor is used to send the ciphertext to the second base station.

19. A base station, wherein the base station is a second base station, comprising a processor and a transceiver; the transceiver receives and transmits data under the control of the processor, characterized in that: The transceiver is used to: send the ID of the second base station to the KGC; and receive a partial private key corresponding to the ID of the second base station, system public parameters of the security system, and the master key of the security system sent by the KGC. The processor is configured to: generate a public-private key pair for the second base station based on the ID of the second base station, the partial private key, the system public parameters, and the master key; including: randomly generating a third secret value for the second base station based on the ID of the second base station and the system public parameters; generating the private key in the public-private key pair based on the partial private key and the third secret value; and generating the public key in the public-private key pair based on the third secret value, the system public parameters, and the master key. The transceiver is used to receive ciphertext sent by the first base station; The processor is used to decrypt and signify the ciphertext based on the public-private key pair of the second base station and the public key of the first base station to obtain a communication key corresponding to the ciphertext, wherein the communication key is used to signify the communication data.

20. A key generation center, comprising a processor and a transceiver; the transceiver receiving and transmitting data under the control of the processor, characterized in that: The transceiver is used to receive the ID sent by the base station; wherein the base station is a first base station or a second base station; The processor is used to generate a partial private key for the base station based on the ID, the system public parameters of the security system, and the master key of the security system; The transceiver is used to send the partial private key, the system public parameters, and the master key to the base station; wherein, the partial private key, the system public parameters, and the master key are used to generate a public-private key pair for the base station, and the generation process of the public-private key pair includes: randomly generating a secret value for the base station based on the base station ID and the system public parameters; generating the private key in the public-private key pair based on the partial private key and the secret value; and generating the public key in the public-private key pair based on the secret value, the system public parameters, and the master key.

21. A base station, comprising a transceiver, a processor, a memory, and a program stored in the memory and executable on the processor; characterized in that, When the processor executes the program, it implements the key transmission method as described in any one of claims 1 to 6, or implements the key transmission method as described in any one of claims 7 to 10.

22. A key generation center, comprising a transceiver, a processor, a memory, and a program stored in the memory and executable on the processor; characterized in that, When the processor executes the program, it implements the key transmission method as described in any one of claims 11 to 14.

23. A readable storage medium having a program or instructions stored thereon, characterized in that, When the program or instructions are executed by the processor, they implement the key transmission method as described in any one of claims 1 to 6, or implement the key transmission method as described in any one of claims 7 to 10, or implement the key transmission method as described in any one of claims 11 to 14.

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