A station door safety protection method and device based on a train control system and a medium

Abstract

The application relates to a station door safety protection method and device based on a train control system, and a medium, the train control system is a CTCS2+ATO train control system, linkage control of train doors and platform doors is realized through a train control center, a temporary speed limit server and a vehicle-mounted device, in the case that a train stops at a platform and platform doors are not normally closed, the vehicle-mounted device prevents the train from moving unexpectedly by receiving H codes or HU codes and braking. When the train is in an automatic driving mode, if HU codes are received after the train stops on a platform track, maximum normal braking is output to prevent the train from moving unexpectedly due to the fact that platform doors are not normally closed when the train stops at the platform. Compared with the prior art, the application has the advantages of high safety, high operation efficiency and wide application range.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of CTCS2+ATO level train control systems, and in particular to a platform door safety protection method, equipment and medium based on a train control system. Background Technology

[0002] The CTCS2+ATO train control system is an intercity railway signaling system independently developed based on the mature high-speed rail CTCS-2 level train control system, with the addition of ATO (Automatic Train Operation) functionality. This system integrates the characteristics of high-speed rail and metro train control technologies, meeting the operational requirements of intercity trains with a maximum speed of 200 km / h while achieving a minimum tracking interval of 3 minutes.

[0003] Platform screen doors are installed on platforms to protect the safety of stations and tracks. These doors prevent passengers from falling onto the tracks and ensure that trains do not collide with tracks due to accidental passenger entry. Under normal circumstances, when a train is stopped on the platform in automatic driving mode, the platform screen doors should be closed and locked to ensure the safety of passengers and the train. However, in certain situations, such as platform screen door system malfunctions, human error, or external interference, the platform screen doors may fail to close properly, leading to a series of safety issues.

[0004] Chinese patent application CN116409348A discloses a control method for the safety protection and linkage of flexible train platform screen doors in rail transit. This method collects train information through a data acquisition unit, processes it on a server, and sends it to the control system module. A train control and analysis unit analyzes the train status and generates control signals to the platform screen door system to open and close the doors. A platform boarding and alighting analysis unit monitors the boarding and alighting status and sends a feedback signal to the signaling system, triggering a door closing command. A safety protection unit monitors information transmission throughout the process to ensure safety. However, this patent application does not consider the safety protection of platform screen doors in cases where they cannot close due to unforeseen circumstances or where the automatic driving system fails, posing a safety hazard. Therefore, how to further improve the safety of train platform screen door protection has become a technical problem that needs to be solved. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The purpose of this invention is to overcome the defects of the prior art by providing a platform door safety protection method, equipment and medium based on a train control system. The system achieves linkage control between the train door and the platform door through the train control center, temporary speed limit server and on-board equipment. When the train stops at the platform and the platform door is not closed properly, the on-board equipment receives the H code or HU code and brakes to prevent the train from moving unexpectedly.

[0006] The objective of this invention can be achieved through the following technical solutions:

[0007] According to a first aspect of the present invention, a platform door safety protection method based on a train control system is provided. The train control system is a CTCS2+ATO train control system, which includes a TCC (Train Control Center), a TSRS (Temporary Speed ​​Restriction Server), and on-board equipment. The TCC is responsible for controlling the track circuit of the platform track to send H code or HU code according to the status of the platform door.

[0008] When the platform door is in an abnormally open state:

[0009] If the TCC outputs an opening command to the platform door system, it controls the track circuit of the corresponding platform track to send a HU code.

[0010] If the TCC does not send an opening command to the platform door system, it controls the track circuit of the corresponding platform track to send an H code.

[0011] If the TCC is powered on and restarted, it will control the track circuit of the corresponding platform track to send a HU code.

[0012] As a preferred technical solution, when the train is in AM (Automatic Mode), if a HU code is received after the train stops on the platform track, the maximum service brake is output to prevent the train from moving unexpectedly if the platform doors are not properly closed when the train stops at the platform.

[0013] Furthermore, when the onboard equipment exits AM mode or receives a permission code, the train control system's onboard equipment automatically releases the maximum service braking.

[0014] As a preferred technical solution, if the train control system does not receive feedback on the closing status from the platform door after sending a closing command to the platform door, it determines that the platform door is in an abnormal opening state.

[0015] As a preferred technical solution, when the on-board equipment receives the H code sent by the track circuit of the platform track, it immediately applies emergency braking to stop or stops motionless on the track; when the on-board equipment receives the HU code sent by the track circuit of the platform track, the authorized endpoint of the movement is at the exit signal.

[0016] Furthermore, the mobile authorization endpoint is the safety protection point of the Automatic Train Protection System (ATPSS). The APSS will prevent the train from crossing the signal. Once it does, the APSS will trigger emergency braking.

[0017] Furthermore, the location of the safety protection point is provided with a safety margin to eliminate system errors, including positioning errors, and to prevent the train head from passing the signal. The distance is calculated based on the system's own positioning error; if the system's positioning error is large, the positioning error distance is large, and vice versa.

[0018] As a preferred technical solution, the on-board equipment is responsible for the linkage control between the vehicle door and the platform door. The on-board equipment issues an opening or closing command, which passes through TSRS and TCC to the platform door system to perform the opening or closing operation in coordination with the vehicle door.

[0019] As a preferred technical solution, the TSRS performs validity verification on the temporary speed limit operation command and then distributes the command to the relevant TCC for execution.

[0020] According to a second aspect of the present invention, an electronic device is provided, including a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and the processor executes the program to implement the method described thereon.

[0021] According to a third aspect of the present invention, a computer-readable storage medium is provided having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the method described thereon.

[0022] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0023] (1) Improved safety of platform door protection function: Through the integrated control of the train control system, the train can be safely braked under the dual faults of platform door failure and automatic train operation device failure.

[0024] (2) Balancing driving safety and operational efficiency: While ensuring safety, the brakes are automatically released when conditions are met so that the train can continue to run. The operational efficiency of the train is taken into account, and the impact on normal operation is reduced through precise braking control.

[0025] (3) Wide range of applications: This technical solution is applicable to rail transit lines that use the CTCS2+ATO train control system, such as national railways, urban rail transit, and municipal rail transit. Attached Figure Description

[0026] Figure 1 The flowchart shows the process by which the TCC controls the track circuit of the platform track to send H or HU codes based on the status of the platform doors.

[0027] Figure 2 Example diagram of a code issuance scenario where a train stops at the platform but the platform doors are not properly closed;

[0028] Figure 3This is a flowchart illustrating the linkage control of train doors and platform doors via the CTCS2+ATO train control system. Detailed Implementation

[0029] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some, not all, of the embodiments of the present invention. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort should fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0030] This embodiment discloses a platform door safety protection method based on a train control system. The train control system is a CTCS2+ATO train control system, which includes a TCC (Train Control Center), a TSRS (Temporary Speed ​​Restriction Server), and on-board equipment. The TCC is responsible for controlling the track circuit of the platform track to send H code or HU code according to the status of the platform door, so as to brake the train and prevent the train from moving unexpectedly when the platform door is not closed.

[0031] like Figure 1 As shown, when the platform screen door is in an abnormal open state:

[0032] If the TCC outputs an opening command to the platform door system, it controls the track circuit of the corresponding platform track to send a HU code.

[0033] If the TCC does not send an opening command to the platform door system, it controls the track circuit of the corresponding platform track to send an H code.

[0034] If the TCC is powered on and restarted, it will control the track circuit of the corresponding platform track to send a HU code.

[0035] When the train is in AM (Automatic Mode), if a HU code is received after the train stops on the platform track, the maximum service brake is applied to prevent the train from moving unexpectedly if the platform doors are not properly closed when the train stops at the platform. When the onboard equipment exits AM mode or receives a permission code, the train control system automatically releases the maximum service brake.

[0036] If the train control system does not receive feedback on the closing status of the platform door after sending a closing command to the platform door, such as a platform door malfunction or a fault in the interface circuit between the train control system and the platform door, the platform door is determined to be in an abnormal opening state.

[0037] When the onboard equipment receives an H code from the track circuit of the platform track, it immediately applies emergency braking to stop or remains stationary on the track; when it receives a HU code from the track circuit of the platform track, the authorized movement endpoint is at the exit signal.

[0038] like Figure 2 The diagram illustrates how onboard equipment prevents train movement by receiving a HU code and applying the brakes when the platform doors are not properly closed while the train is stopped at a station. The code transmission sequence is HU→JC→JC→HU, where HU indicates timely braking, JC is used for track occupancy checks, and the automatic train protection system handles the code loss as a failure. EOA represents the end point of the train travel permission.

[0039] Furthermore, the designated endpoint for the movement authorization is a safety protection point of the Automatic Train Protection (ATP) system. The ATP system prevents the train from overtaking the signal; if it does, the ATP system will trigger emergency braking. The safety protection point has a safety margin to compensate for system errors, including positioning errors, and to prevent the train front from overtaking the signal. Its distance is calculated based on the system's own positioning error; a larger positioning error results in a larger positioning error distance, and vice versa. Figure 2 The example given is 290m, which is the distance from the train to the predicted safety protection point, and 10m is the safety margin.

[0040] The onboard equipment is responsible for the linkage control between the train doors and the platform doors. The linkage control process is as follows: Figure 3 As shown, the onboard equipment issues an opening or closing command, which passes through the TSRS and TCC to the platform door system to perform the opening or closing operation in coordination with the train door, ensuring the synchronization of the train door and the platform door when the train stops.

[0041] The following is Figure 3 The detailed steps of the process are as follows: During the opening or closing of the doors, the onboard equipment first issues an opening or closing command to the doors and sends the opening or closing command, as well as train stopping and stable information, to the TSRS. Upon receiving the command from the onboard equipment, the doors open or close. The TSRS receives the instruction from the onboard equipment, verifies its validity, and then sends it to the TCC. The TCC drives the door opening / closing relay to open or close the platform screen doors in tandem, and feeds back the status of the platform screen doors to the onboard equipment via the TCC and TSRS. The TSRS, based on the temporary speed limit operation command, verifies its validity and then distributes the command to the relevant TCC for execution.

[0042] The electronic device of this invention includes a central processing unit (CPU), which can perform various appropriate actions and processes according to computer program instructions stored in read-only memory (ROM) or loaded from a storage unit into random access memory (RAM). The RAM may also store various programs and data required for device operation. The CPU, ROM, and RAM are interconnected via a bus. Input / output (I / O) interfaces are also connected to the bus.

[0043] Multiple components in the device are connected to the I / O interface, including: input units such as keyboards and mice; output units such as various types of displays and speakers; storage units such as disks and optical discs; and communication units such as network interface cards (NICs), modems, and wireless transceivers. The communication unit allows the device to exchange information / data with other devices through computer networks such as the Internet and / or various telecommunications networks.

[0044] The processing unit performs the various methods and processes described above, such as the methods of the present invention. For example, in some embodiments, the methods of the present invention may be implemented as computer software programs tangibly contained in a machine-readable medium, such as a storage unit. In some embodiments, part or all of the computer program may be loaded and / or installed on the device via ROM and / or a communication unit. When the computer program is loaded into RAM and executed by the CPU, one or more steps of the methods of the present invention described above may be performed. Alternatively, in other embodiments, the CPU may be configured to execute the methods of the present invention by any other suitable means (e.g., by means of firmware).

[0045] The functions described above in this document can be performed, at least in part, by one or more hardware logic components. For example, exemplary types of hardware logic components that can be used, without limitation, include: Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs), Application Standard Products (ASSPs), System-on-Chip (SoCs), Complex Programmable Logic Devices (CPLDs), and so on.

[0046] The program code used to implement the methods of the present invention can be written in any combination of one or more programming languages. This program code can be provided to a processor or controller of a general-purpose computer, special-purpose computer, or other programmable data processing device, such that when executed by the processor or controller, the program code causes the functions / operations specified in the flowcharts and / or block diagrams to be implemented. The program code can be executed entirely on the machine, partially on the machine, as a standalone software package partially on the machine and partially on a remote machine, or entirely on a remote machine or server.

[0047] In the context of this invention, a machine-readable medium can be a tangible medium that may contain or store a program for use by or in conjunction with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device. A machine-readable medium can be a machine-readable signal medium or a machine-readable storage medium. Machine-readable media can include, but are not limited to, electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor systems, apparatus, or devices, or any suitable combination of the foregoing. More specific examples of machine-readable storage media include electrical connections based on one or more wires, portable computer disks, hard disks, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), optical fibers, portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), optical storage devices, magnetic storage devices, or any suitable combination of the foregoing.

[0048] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any person skilled in the art can easily conceive of various equivalent modifications or substitutions within the technical scope disclosed in the present invention, and these modifications or substitutions should all be covered within the scope of protection of the present invention. Therefore, the scope of protection of the present invention should be determined by the scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A platform door safety protection method based on a train control system, wherein the train control system is a CTCS2+ATO train control system, the system comprising a train control center, a temporary speed limit server, and onboard equipment, characterized in that, The train control center is responsible for controlling the track circuit of the platform track to send H code or HU code according to the status of the platform doors. When the platform door is in an abnormally open state: If the train control center outputs an opening command to the platform door system, it controls the track circuit of the corresponding platform track to send a HU code. If the train control center does not send an opening command to the platform door system, it will control the track circuit of the corresponding platform track to send an H code. If the train control center is powered on and restarted, it will control the track circuit of the corresponding platform track to send a HU code.

2. The platform door safety protection method based on a train control system according to claim 1, characterized in that, When the train is in automatic driving mode, if a HU code is received after the train stops on the platform track, the maximum service braking is output to prevent the train from moving unexpectedly if the platform doors are not closed properly when the train stops at the platform.

3. The platform door safety protection method based on a train control system according to claim 1, characterized in that, When the on-board device exits autonomous driving mode or receives a permission code, the on-board device automatically reduces the maximum service braking.

4. The platform door safety protection method based on a train control system according to claim 1, characterized in that, If the train control system does not receive feedback on the closing status from the platform door after sending a closing command to the platform door, it determines that the platform door is in an abnormal opening state.

5. A platform door safety protection method based on a train control system according to claim 1, characterized in that, When the onboard equipment receives an H code from the track circuit of the platform track, it immediately applies emergency braking to stop or remains stationary on the track; when the onboard equipment receives a HU code from the track circuit of the platform track, the authorized endpoint of movement is at the exit signal.

6. A platform door safety protection method based on a train control system according to claim 5, characterized in that, The designated endpoint for the movement authorization is the safety protection point of the Automatic Train Protection System (ATPS). Once the train crosses the safety protection point, the APS will trigger emergency braking.

7. A platform door safety protection method based on a train control system according to claim 6, characterized in that, The location of the safety protection point is provided with a safety margin to eliminate system errors, including positioning errors.

8. A platform door safety protection method based on a train control system according to claim 7, characterized in that, The distance of the safety margin is calculated based on the system's own positioning error.

9. A platform door safety protection method based on a train control system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The onboard equipment is responsible for the linkage control between the train doors and the platform doors. It issues opening and closing commands through the onboard equipment, which pass through the temporary speed limit server and the train control center to the platform door system to execute the opening and closing operations in coordination with the train doors.

10. A platform door safety protection method based on a train control system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The temporary speed limit server verifies the validity of the temporary speed limit operation command and then distributes the command to the relevant train control center for execution.

11. An electronic device comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, characterized in that, When the processor executes the program, it implements the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 10.

12. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When the program is executed by the processor, it implements the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 10.

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