User equipment, electronic equipment, wireless communication method and storage medium
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202380030464.4
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2022-04-22
- Filing Date
- 2023-04-14
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-08
AI Technical Summary
In user equipment roaming scenarios, the authentication of user equipment to the service network in the existing technology relies on implicit authentication, resulting in low network security, and sequence number desynchronization may trigger replay attacks and violate location confidentiality.
The physical layer key is determined through the wireless channel characteristics between the user equipment and the service network, explicit authentication is performed, and the second random number in the home network is used to generate authentication parameters to avoid replay attacks caused by sequence number desynchronization.
It improves the security of the network, prevents attackers from forging identities to deceive user equipment, avoids replay attacks caused by serial number desynchronization, and enhances the location confidentiality of user equipment.
Smart Images

Figure CN118923141A_ABST
Abstract
Description
User equipment, electronic equipment, wireless communication method, and storage medium
[0001] This application claims priority to the Chinese patent application filed with the China Patent Office on April 22, 2022, with application number 202210428623.3 and invention name “User Equipment, Electronic Device, Wireless Communication Method and Storage Medium”, the entire contents of which are incorporated by reference into this application. Technical Field
[0002] Embodiments of the present disclosure generally relate to the field of wireless communications, and more particularly, to user equipment, electronic devices, wireless communication methods, and computer-readable storage media. More particularly, the present disclosure relates to a user equipment in a wireless communication system, an electronic device in a core network of a home network (HN) in the wireless communication system, an electronic device in a core network of a serving network (SN) in the wireless communication system, a wireless communication method performed by a user equipment in the wireless communication system, a wireless communication method performed by an electronic device in a core network of a home network in the wireless communication system, a wireless communication method performed by an electronic device in a core network of a serving network in the wireless communication system, and a computer-readable storage medium. Background Art
[0003] When roaming, the user equipment may be located outside the service range of the HN, and then the SN provides services to the user equipment.
[0004] In the aforementioned roaming scenario, existing standards use implicit authentication for user equipment (UE) authentication of the SN. This means that if the negotiated key is successfully used in the subsequent authentication process, the UE is considered to have authenticated the SN. This also means that network security depends heavily on key verification in subsequent processes, which can easily lead to security risks.
[0005] Furthermore, in the above-mentioned roaming scenario, in the existing standard, in order to synchronize the user device with the HN, the SQN mechanism is used, that is, the user device and the HN respectively save the SQN (Sequence Number). In this case, if the SQN synchronization between the user device and the HN is lost, the attacker can implement a replay attack. Specifically, the attacker can capture a legitimate authentication request message in advance, which includes a message pair sent by the network to the victim. When the attacker wants to check the location of the victim in a specific area, the captured authentication request message can be replayed. After receiving the replayed authentication token and authentication request message, the victim can send a synchronization failure message, and other user devices can send a MAC (Message Authentication Code) verification failure message. In this way, the attacker can determine whether the victim exists in a specific area based on the difference in the returned messages, which violates the unlinkability and location confidentiality of the user device.
[0006] Therefore, it is necessary to propose a technical solution to optimize the authentication process in a scenario where user equipment is roaming.
[0007] Inventions can also
[0008] This section provides a general summary of the disclosure, and is not a comprehensive disclosure of its full scope or all of its features.
[0009] The present disclosure aims to provide a user equipment, an electronic device, a wireless communication method, and a computer-readable storage medium to optimize the authentication process in a scenario where the user equipment is roaming.
[0010] According to one aspect of the present disclosure, a user equipment is provided, comprising a processing circuit configured to: determine a physical layer key based on characteristics of a wireless channel between the user equipment and a serving network; receive a serving network message authentication code and a home network authentication token from the serving network; determine an authentication parameter based on the physical layer key and the home network authentication token; and authenticate the serving network based on the authentication parameter and the serving network message authentication code.
[0011] According to another aspect of the present disclosure, an electronic device in a service network is provided, comprising a processing circuit configured to: receive a home network authentication token from a home network; determine a service network message authentication code based on a physical layer key determined by wireless channel characteristics between a user device and the service network; and send the service network message authentication code and the home network authentication token to the user device, so that the user device determines authentication parameters based on the physical layer key and the home network authentication token, and authenticates the service network based on the authentication parameters and the service network message authentication code.
[0012] According to another aspect of the present disclosure, an electronic device in a home network is provided, comprising a processing circuit configured to: generate a second random number; determine a home network authentication token based on a long-term key between the electronic device and a user device and the second random number; and send the home network authentication token and the second random number to a serving network, so that the serving network determines a serving network message authentication code based on the second random number and sends the serving network message authentication code and the home network authentication token to the user device.
[0013] According to another aspect of the present disclosure, a wireless communication method performed by a user equipment is provided, comprising: determining a physical layer key based on characteristics of a wireless channel between the user equipment and a service network; receiving a service network message authentication code and a home network authentication token from the service network; determining authentication parameters based on the physical layer key and the home network authentication token; and authenticating the service network based on the authentication parameters and the service network message authentication code.
[0014] According to another aspect of the present disclosure, a wireless communication method performed by an electronic device in a service network is provided, comprising: receiving a home network authentication token from a home network; determining a service network message authentication code based on a physical layer key determined by wireless channel characteristics between a user device and the service network; and sending the service network message authentication code and the home network authentication token to the user device, so that the user device determines authentication parameters based on the physical layer key and the home network authentication token, and authenticates the service network based on the authentication parameters and the service network message authentication code.
[0015] According to another aspect of the present disclosure, a wireless communication method performed by an electronic device in a home network is provided, comprising: generating a second random number; determining a home network authentication token based on a long-term key between the electronic device and a user device and the second random number; and sending the home network authentication token and the second random number to a serving network, so that the serving network determines a serving network message authentication code based on the second random number and sends the serving network message authentication code and the home network authentication token to the user device.
[0016] According to another aspect of the present disclosure, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, comprising executable computer instructions, which, when executed by a computer, enable the computer to perform the wireless communication method according to the present disclosure.
[0017] According to another aspect of the present disclosure, a computer program is provided. When the computer program is executed by a computer, the computer is caused to perform the wireless communication method according to the present disclosure.
[0018] Using the user device, electronic device, wireless communication method, and computer-readable storage medium disclosed herein, the user device can authenticate the SN based on authentication parameters and a serving network message authentication code. This allows the user device to explicitly authenticate the SN, which improves network security compared to implicit authentication. Furthermore, the user device authenticates the SN using a physical layer key. Because the physical layer key is generated based on the characteristics of the wireless channel between the user device and the SN, it cannot be copied by an attacker. This means an attacker cannot forge the SN's identity to deceive the user device, thereby improving network security. Furthermore, the electronic device in the home network (HN) uses a second random number to determine a home network authentication token. The user device then uses this home network authentication token to recover the second random number, which is then used to generate authentication parameters. The authentication parameters and the serving network message authentication code are then used to authenticate the SN. This eliminates the need to store the SQN between the HN and the user device, thereby preventing replay attacks caused by SQN desynchronization. In summary, the user device, electronic device, wireless communication method, and computer-readable storage medium disclosed herein can optimize the authentication process in roaming scenarios, thereby improving network security.
[0019] Further areas of applicability will become apparent from the description provided herein.The description and specific examples in this summary are intended for purposes of illustration only and are not intended to limit the scope of the present disclosure. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0020] The drawings described herein are for illustrative purposes only of selected embodiments and not all possible implementations, and are not intended to limit the scope of the present disclosure. In the drawings:
[0021] FIG1 is a schematic diagram illustrating an overall network architecture of a user equipment in a roaming scenario according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;
[0022] FIG2 is a block diagram illustrating an example of a configuration of a user equipment according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;
[0023] 3 is a block diagram illustrating an example of a configuration of an electronic device in a service network according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;
[0024] 4 is a block diagram illustrating an example of a configuration of an electronic device in a home network according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;
[0025] 5 is a signaling flow chart illustrating an initialization process of an authentication method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;
[0026] 6 is a signaling flow chart illustrating an authentication process of an authentication method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;
[0027] 7 is a flowchart illustrating a wireless communication method performed by a user equipment according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;
[0028] FIG8 is a flowchart illustrating a wireless communication method performed by an electronic device in a SN according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;
[0029] 9 is a flowchart illustrating a wireless communication method performed by an electronic device in an HN according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;
[0030] FIG. 10 is a block diagram illustrating an example of a server that can implement the electronic device according to the present disclosure.
[0031] FIG11 is a block diagram showing an example of a schematic configuration of a smartphone; and
[0032] FIG. 12 is a block diagram showing an example of a schematic configuration of a car navigation device.
[0033] While the present disclosure is susceptible to various modifications and alternative forms, specific embodiments thereof have been shown by way of example in the drawings and are described in detail herein. It should be understood, however, that the description of specific embodiments herein is not intended to limit the disclosure to the particular forms disclosed, but rather, the disclosure is intended to cover all modifications, equivalents, and alternatives falling within the spirit and scope of the disclosure. It should be noted that throughout the several drawings, corresponding reference numerals indicate corresponding parts. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0034] Examples of the present disclosure will now be described more fully with reference to the accompanying drawings.The following description is merely exemplary in nature and is not intended to limit the present disclosure, application, or uses.
[0035] Example embodiments are provided so that the present disclosure will be exhaustive and will fully convey its scope to those skilled in the art. Numerous specific details such as examples of specific components, devices, and methods are set forth to provide a detailed understanding of the embodiments of the present disclosure. It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that specific details need not be used and that the example embodiments can be implemented in many different forms, none of which should be construed as limiting the scope of the present disclosure. In some example embodiments, well-known processes, well-known structures, and well-known technologies are not described in detail.
[0036] The description will be in the following order:
[0037] 1. Description of the scene;
[0038] 2. User equipment configuration example;
[0039] 3. Configuration examples of electronic devices in the service network;
[0040] 4. Configuration example of electronic devices in the home network;
[0041] 5. Signaling process;
[0042] 6. Method embodiments;
[0043] 7. Application examples.
[0044] <1. Description of the scene>
[0045] Figure 1 is a schematic diagram illustrating the overall network architecture for a user equipment (UE) in a roaming scenario according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. As shown in Figure 1 , a UE (User Equipment) roams outside the service area of a Host (HN), and the SN provides service to the UE. Because the UE and SN communicate over a wireless channel, the channel between them is considered insecure and vulnerable to attack. However, since the SN and HN communicate over an authenticated channel, the channel between them is considered secure.
[0046] Furthermore, in Figure 1 , the UE's USIM (Universal Subscriber Identity Module) can store the SUPI (Subscription Permanent Identifier), and the HN can also store the UE's SUPI. To prevent the SUPI from being leaked over wireless channels, only the SUCI (Subscription Concealed Identifier) generated by encrypting the SUPI is transmitted. Furthermore, the UE and HN can share the UE's long-term key K.
[0047] The present disclosure proposes a user equipment and an electronic device in a wireless communication system, a wireless communication method performed by the user equipment in the wireless communication system, a wireless communication method performed by the electronic device in the wireless communication system, and a computer-readable storage medium for a scenario in which the user equipment roams, so as to optimize the authentication process in the scenario in which the user equipment roams.
[0048] The wireless communication system according to the present disclosure may be a 5G NR communication system. In addition, with the development of technology, the wireless communication system according to the present disclosure may also be a 6G or next-generation communication system. The wireless communication system according to the present disclosure may include a user equipment, a serving network, and a home network.
[0049] The electronic device for the service network and the electronic device for the home network according to the present disclosure can be located in the core network of the service network and the core network of the home network, respectively, and can be implemented as any type of server, such as a tower server, a rack server, and a blade server. The electronic device can be a control module installed on the server (such as an integrated circuit module including a single chip, and a card or blade inserted into a slot of a blade server).
[0050] Furthermore, the service network may include a RAN (Radio Access Network) and an AMF (Access and Mobility Management Function) / SEAF (Security Anchor Function) network element, where the RAN may include a base station device such as a gNB, and the AMF / SEAF network element may be located in the core network of the service network. In other words, the electronic device for the service network according to the present disclosure may be an AMF and / or SEAF network element in the core network of the service network.
[0051] The user equipment according to the present disclosure may be a mobile terminal (such as a smartphone, a tablet personal computer (PC), a notebook PC, a portable game terminal, a portable / dongle-type mobile router, and a digital camera) or an in-vehicle terminal (such as a car navigation device). The user equipment may also be implemented as a terminal that performs machine-to-machine (M2M) communication (also known as a machine-type communication (MTC) terminal). In addition, the user equipment may be a wireless communication module (such as an integrated circuit module including a single chip) installed on each of the above-mentioned terminals.
[0052] <2. User Equipment Configuration Example>
[0053] FIG2 is a block diagram illustrating an example of a configuration of a user equipment 200 according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
[0054] As shown in FIG. 2 , the user equipment 200 may include a physical layer key generation unit 210 , a communication unit 220 , and an authentication unit 230 .
[0055] Here, each unit of user equipment 200 may be included in a processing circuit. It should be noted that user equipment 200 may include either one processing circuit or multiple processing circuits. Furthermore, the processing circuit may include various discrete functional units to perform various functions and / or operations. It should be noted that these functional units may be physical or logical entities, and units with different names may be implemented by the same physical entity.
[0056] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the physical layer key generation unit 210 may determine the physical layer key Kp according to characteristics of a wireless channel between the user equipment 200 and the service network.
[0057] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the user equipment 200 may receive a Serving Network Message Authentication Code (SNMAC) and an Authentication Token (AUTN) of the home network from the serving network through the communication unit 220 .
[0058] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the authentication unit 230 can determine the authentication parameter (to distinguish it from the second authentication parameter and the third authentication parameter described below, the authentication parameter can also be referred to as the first authentication parameter) based on Kp and the home network AUTN, and authenticate the SN based on the authentication parameter and SNMAC.
[0059] It can be seen that according to the user equipment 200 of the embodiment of the present disclosure, the SN can be authenticated based on the authentication parameters and SNMAC. That is, the user equipment 200 can explicitly authenticate the SN. Compared with implicit authentication, explicit authentication can improve the security of the network. Furthermore, the user equipment 200 authenticates the SN by using Kp. Since Kp is generated based on the characteristics of the wireless channel between the user equipment 200 and the SN, it cannot be copied by an attacker, that is, the attacker cannot forge the identity of the SN to deceive the user equipment 200, thereby improving the security of the network. In short, the present disclosure can optimize the authentication process in the scenario where the user equipment 200 is roaming, thereby improving the security of the network.
[0060] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, user equipment 200 and a base station device in the SN may mutually transmit reference signals to estimate the channel between user equipment 200 and the base station device, so that the physical layer key generation unit 210 can determine the physical layer key Kp based on wireless channel characteristics. Wireless channel characteristics include but are not limited to RSS (Received Signal Strength) and CSI (Channel State Information).
[0061] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, as shown in FIG. 2 , the user equipment 200 may further include a storage unit 240 for storing a long-term key K and a physical layer key Kp of the user equipment 200 .
[0062] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the physical layer key generation unit 210 may determine the physical layer key Kp based on wireless channel characteristics using any method known in the art, which is not limited by the present disclosure. For example, the physical layer key generation unit 210 may generate the physical layer key Kp using the four steps of channel measurement, quantization, information negotiation, and privacy amplification.
[0063] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, after the user equipment 200 and the base station device in the SN determine the physical layer key Kp of the user equipment 200, the base station device in the SN may send the physical layer key Kp to the core network in the SN, such as the AMF / SEAF network element in the core network. Specifically, after the physical layer key generation unit 210 generates the physical layer key Kp, the user equipment 200 may send an N1 message (i.e., an access network message) to the base station device in the SN via the communication unit 220. The N1 message includes the SUCI generated by encrypting the SUPI, and may also include information such as access network parameters, message type, and security parameters. Furthermore, the base station device in the SN may send an N2 message to the core network in the SN. The N2 message may include the SUCI and physical layer key Kp of the user equipment 200, as well as information such as N2 parameters, a registration request, and a UE policy container. In this way, the user equipment 200 and the SN share the physical layer key Kp of the user equipment 200.
[0064] According to the embodiments of the present disclosure, Kp is generated based on the characteristics of the wireless channel between user device 200 and the SN. Attackers located elsewhere cannot obtain these characteristics and, therefore, cannot replicate the physical layer key Kp. Furthermore, the physical layer key generation unit 210 can generate the physical layer key Kp each time user device 200 requires connection authentication. This means that the physical layer key Kp used during each authentication is different. Therefore, user device 200 can use this characteristic to determine whether a message has been replayed, thereby mitigating the threat of replay attacks.
[0065] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the authentication unit 230 may determine the second random number R2 generated by the home network according to the home network AUTN.
[0066] Specifically, the authentication unit 230 determines the hidden value CONC of the second random number R2 based on the home network AUTN. Here, the home network AUTN includes the values of CONC and HNMAC (Hone Network Message Authentication Code), so the authentication unit 230 can decompose CONC and HNMAC from the home network AUTN. That is, the authentication unit 230 can determine CONC using formula (1):
[0067] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the authentication unit 230 may further determine an anonymity key AK (Anonymity Key) based on the long-term key K between the user device 200 and the HN. Here, the authentication unit 230 may obtain the value of the long-term key K from the storage unit 240. Further, the user device 200 may receive the first random number R1 generated by the HN from the SN through the communication unit 220, so that the authentication unit 230 may determine the anonymity key AK based on the first random number R1 and the long-term key K. Specifically, the authentication unit 230 may determine the anonymity key AK based on the functional relationship f5 between the anonymity key AK and the first random number R1 and the long-term key K. That is, the authentication unit 230 may determine the anonymity key AK through formula (2): AK = f5(K, R1) (2)
[0068] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the authentication unit 230 can determine the second random number R2 based on the anonymous key AK and the hidden value CONC of the second random number. Specifically, the authentication unit 230 can determine R2 by performing an exclusive OR operation on AK and CONC. That is, the authentication unit 230 can determine R2 by using formula (3):
[0069] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the authentication unit 230 can determine the value of the authentication parameter XSNMAC based on the physical layer key Kp and the second random number R2. The authentication parameter can represent the expected service network message authentication code. For example, the authentication unit 230 can determine the authentication parameter XSNMAC based on the functional relationship f1 between the authentication parameter XSNMAC and the physical layer key Kp and the second random number R2. That is, the authentication unit 230 can determine the authentication parameter XSNMAC using formula (4): XSNMAC=f1(Kp, R2) (4)
[0070] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, after determining the authentication parameter XSNMAC, the authentication unit 230 can authenticate the SN based on the authentication parameter XSNMAC and the SNMAC received from the SN. For example, the authentication unit 230 can authenticate the SN by comparing the authentication parameter XSNMAC with the SNMAC received from the SN. Furthermore, if the authentication parameters XSNMAC and SNMAC are consistent, the authentication unit 230 can determine that the authentication of the SN is successful; if the authentication parameters XSNMAC and SNMAC are inconsistent, the authentication unit 230 can determine that the authentication of the SN is unsuccessful.
[0071] It can be seen that according to the embodiment of the present disclosure, the user equipment 200 can restore the value of R2 from the home network AUTN, and generate the authentication parameter XSNMAC based on the physical layer key Kp and R2, thereby explicitly authenticating the SN based on the authentication parameters XSNMAC and SNMAC.
[0072] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the authentication unit 230 may also determine the HNMAC based on the home network AUTN. For example, the authentication unit 230 may decompose the HNMAC from the home network AUTN using equation (1).
[0073] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the authentication unit 230 may determine the second authentication parameter according to the long-term key K between the user equipment 200 and the HN.
[0074] Specifically, the authentication unit 230 may determine the second authentication parameter XHNMAC based on the first random number R1 and the long-term key K received from the SN. The second authentication parameter XHNMAC may represent the desired home network message authentication code. For example, the authentication unit 230 may determine the second authentication parameter XHNMAC based on the functional relationship f1 between the second authentication parameter XHNMAC, the long-term key K, and the first random number R1. That is, the authentication unit 230 may determine the second authentication parameter XHNMAC using formula (5): XHNMAC=f1(K, R1) (5)
[0075] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the authentication unit 230 can authenticate the HN based on the second authentication parameter XHNMAC and the HNMAC determined based on the home network AUTN. For example, the authentication unit 230 can authenticate the HN by comparing the second authentication parameter XHNMAC with the HNMAC determined based on the home network AUTN. Furthermore, if the second authentication parameter XHNMAC and HNMAC are consistent, the authentication unit 230 can determine that the authentication of the HN is successful; if the authentication parameters XHNMAC and HNMAC are inconsistent, the authentication unit 230 can determine that the authentication of the HN is unsuccessful.
[0076] It can be seen that according to the embodiment of the present disclosure, the user equipment 200 can generate the second authentication parameter XHNMAC according to the long-term key K and R1, thereby authenticating the HN according to the second authentication parameter XHNMAC and the HNMAC decomposed from the home network AUTN.
[0077] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, as shown in FIG2 , the user equipment 200 may further include a security anchor key generation unit 250 for generating a security anchor key K SEAF Specifically, the security anchor key generation unit 250 can determine the security anchor key K according to the first random number R1 received from the SN, the long-term key K between the user equipment 200 and the HN stored in the storage unit 240, and the identification information (SNname) of the SN. SEAF For example, the security anchor key generation unit 250 may generate the security anchor key K according to the identification information of R1, K and SN through KDF (Key Derivation Function). SEAF That is, the security anchor key generation unit 250 can generate the security anchor key K through formula (6): SEAF : K SEAF =KDF(K, R1, SNname) (6)
[0078] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the security anchor key K is generated by the security anchor key generation unit 250. SEAF Afterwards, the security anchor key K SEAF A key for communication is derived for use in communication between the user equipment 200 and the SN.
[0079] It can be seen that according to the embodiment of the present disclosure, the user equipment 200 generates the physical layer key Kp only at each authentication. After the user equipment 200 and the network are successfully authenticated, the user equipment 200 and the SN can use the security anchor key Kp to SEAF Compared with the physical layer security technology that requires the generation of a physical layer key for each communication, the present disclosure can simplify the operation and reduce the difficulty of implementation.
[0080] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, as shown in FIG2 , the user equipment 200 may further include a response value generation unit 260 for generating a response value RES*. Specifically, the response value generation unit 260 may determine the response value RES* based on the first random number R1 received from the SN, the long-term key K between the user equipment 200 and the HN, and the identification information of the SN. For example, the response value generation unit 260 may determine the response value RES* based on the functional relationship f2 between the response value RES* and the long-term key K, the first random number R1, and the identification information (SNname) of the SN. That is, the response value generation unit 260 may determine the response value RES* by using formula (7): RES * =f2(K, R1, SNname) (7)
[0081] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the user equipment 200 may send the response value RES* generated by the response value generation unit 260 to the SN through the communication unit 220, so that the SN can authenticate the user equipment 200. For example, the user equipment 200 may send the response value RES* generated by the response value generation unit 260 to a base station device in the SN through the communication unit 220, and the base station device in the SN then forwards the response value RES* to the core network in the SN, so that the core network in the SN authenticates the user equipment 200.
[0082] As described above, according to the embodiments of the present disclosure, user equipment 200 can explicitly authenticate the SN. Compared to implicit authentication, explicit authentication can improve network security. Furthermore, user equipment 200 authenticates the SN using the physical layer key Kp. Because the physical layer key Kp is generated based on the characteristics of the wireless channel between user equipment 200 and the SN and is regenerated during each authentication, it cannot be copied by an attacker. This means that an attacker cannot forge the identity of the SN to deceive user equipment 200, thereby improving network security. Furthermore, after successful authentication between user equipment 200 and the SN, subsequent communications are performed using a key derived from the security anchor key. This simplifies implementation compared to physical layer security techniques that require the generation of a physical layer key for each communication. Furthermore, user equipment 200 uses a second random number R2 obtained from the home network AUTN to authenticate the SN. This eliminates the need for user equipment 200 to store the SQN, thus preventing replay attacks caused by SQN desynchronization. In summary, according to the present disclosure, user equipment 200 can optimize the authentication process in roaming scenarios, thereby improving network security.
[0083] <3. Configuration Example of Electronic Devices in the Service Network>
[0084] Figure 3 is a block diagram illustrating an example configuration of an electronic device 300 according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. The electronic device 300 may be located in a SN. Specifically, the electronic device 300 may be located in the core network of the SN, and may be an AMF network element and / or a SEAF network element in the core network of the SN. Because the functions of the AMF network element and the SEAF network element are closely related, the present disclosure does not distinguish between the AMF network element and the SEAF network element.
[0085] As shown in FIG. 3 , the electronic device 300 may include a communication unit 310 and a generation unit 320 .
[0086] Here, each unit of electronic device 300 may be included in a processing circuit. It should be noted that electronic device 300 may include either one processing circuit or multiple processing circuits. Furthermore, the processing circuit may include various discrete functional units to perform various functions and / or operations. It should be noted that these functional units may be physical entities or logical entities, and units with different names may be implemented by the same physical entity.
[0087] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the electronic device 300 may receive the home network AUTN from the HN through the communication unit 310 .
[0088] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the generation unit 320 may determine the SNMAC according to the physical layer key Kp determined by the characteristics of the wireless channel between the user equipment and the SN.
[0089] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the electronic device 300 can send SNMAC and the home network AUTN to the user equipment through the communication unit 310, so that the user equipment determines the authentication parameters according to the home network AUTN and the physical layer key Kp, and authenticates the SN according to the authentication parameters and SNMAC.
[0090] As described above, according to the electronic device 300 of the embodiment of the present disclosure, the SNMAC can be determined based on the physical layer key Kp, so that the user equipment authenticates the SN through the SNMAC and the authentication parameters generated based on the physical layer key Kp. Since the physical layer key Kp is generated based on the wireless channel characteristics between the user equipment and the SN, and the physical layer key Kp is regenerated during each authentication, it cannot be copied by an attacker, that is, the attacker cannot forge the identity of the SN to deceive the user equipment, thereby improving the security of the network.
[0091] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the electronic device 300 may receive the physical layer key Kp between the user equipment and the SN from the base station device in the SN via the communication unit 310. Furthermore, as shown in FIG3 , the electronic device 300 may further include a storage unit 340 for storing the physical layer key Kp between the user equipment and the SN.
[0092] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the electronic device 300 may further receive a second random number R2 from the HN via the communication unit 310. Further, the generation unit 320 may determine the SNMAC based on the second random number R2 and the physical layer key Kp. For example, the generation unit 320 may determine the SNMAC based on a functional relationship f1 between the SNMAC, the physical layer key Kp, and the second random number R2. That is, the generation unit 320 may determine the SNMAC using formula (8): SNMAC = f1(Kp, R2) (8)
[0093] As described above, according to the electronic device 300 of the embodiment of the present disclosure, the SNMAC can be determined based on the second random number R2. Thus, the user equipment can use the second random number R2 obtained from the home network AUTN to obtain authentication parameters, and then authenticate the SN based on the authentication parameters and the SNMAC. In this way, the user equipment and the HN do not need to store the SQN, thus avoiding replay attacks caused by SQN desynchronization.
[0094] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the electronic device 300 can receive a response value RES* from the user equipment via the communication unit 310. For example, the electronic device 300 can receive the response value RES* of the user equipment forwarded by the base station device in the SN via the communication unit 310. In addition, the electronic device 300 can also receive a reference value HXRES* of the response value from the HN via the communication unit 310.
[0095] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, as shown in Figure 3, the electronic device 300 may further include an authentication unit 330 for authenticating the user equipment. Specifically, the authentication unit 330 may determine a third authentication parameter based on the response value RES* of the user equipment.
[0096] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the electronic device 300 may receive the first random number R1 from the HN through the communication unit 310, and then the authentication unit 330 may determine the third authentication parameter based on the first random number R1 and the response value RES* of the user device. Specifically, the authentication unit 330 may connect the first random number R1 with the response value RES* of the user device and perform a hash operation to determine the third authentication parameter. That is, the authentication unit 330 may determine the third authentication parameter by the following formula (9): Third authentication parameter = Hash(<R1,RES*> ) (9)
[0097] Among them, Hash represents a hash function, and <> represents a string concatenation operation.
[0098] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the authentication unit 330 can authenticate the user device based on the third authentication parameter and the reference value HXRES* of the response value. Here, the reference value HXRES* of the response value is a value generated by HN by concatenating the first random number R1 and the expected value XRES* of the response value and performing a hash operation, representing the expected value of the third authentication parameter. If the third authentication parameter and the reference value HXRES* of the response value are consistent, the authentication unit 330 may determine that the authentication of the user device is successful. If the third authentication parameter and the reference value HXRES* of the response value are inconsistent, the authentication unit 330 may determine that the authentication of the user device is unsuccessful.
[0099] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, when the authentication unit 330 successfully authenticates the user equipment, the electronic device 300 may forward the response value RES* of the user equipment to the HN via the communication unit 310 for the HN to authenticate the user equipment.
[0100] Thus, the electronic device 300 according to the embodiment of the present disclosure can authenticate the user equipment using the response value RES* of the user equipment, that is, bidirectional authentication between the user equipment and the SN can be achieved, thereby improving the security of the network.
[0101] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the electronic device 300 may also receive the security anchor key K from the HN through the communication unit 310. SEAF , for communication between the SN and the user equipment. Further, the electronic device 300 can use the security anchor key K SEAF Derive a key for communicating with the user's device.
[0102] As described above, the electronic device 300 can receive one or more of the following parameters from the HN through the communication unit 310: the first random number R1, the second random number R2, the home network AUTN, the reference value HXRES* of the response value, the security anchor key K SEAF Optionally, the electronic device 300 may receive an authentication vector (AV) from the HN via the communication unit 310 , wherein the AV includes one or more of the above parameters.
[0103] As described above, according to the electronic device 300 of the embodiment of the present disclosure, the SNMAC can be determined based on the physical layer key Kp and the second random number R2. The user equipment generates authentication parameters based on the physical layer key Kp and the second random number R2 obtained from the home network AUTN, and authenticates the SN based on the authentication parameters and the SNMAC. On the one hand, the physical layer key Kp is generated based on the characteristics of the wireless channel between the user equipment and the SN, and the physical layer key Kp is regenerated during each authentication, so it cannot be copied by an attacker. On the other hand, due to the use of the second random number R2, the user equipment and the HN do not need to save the SQN, avoiding replay attacks caused by the loss of synchronization of the SQN. In addition, the electronic device 300 can achieve two-way authentication between the user equipment and the SN, thereby improving the security of the network.
[0104] <4. Configuration Example of Electronic Devices in the Home Network>
[0105] 4 is a block diagram illustrating a structure of an electronic device 400 in a home network according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. The electronic device 400 may be located in a core network of the HN.
[0106] As shown in FIG. 4 , the electronic device 400 may include a random number generation unit 410 , an authentication token generation unit 420 , and a communication unit 430 .
[0107] Here, each unit of electronic device 400 may be included in a processing circuit. It should be noted that electronic device 400 may include either one processing circuit or multiple processing circuits. Furthermore, the processing circuit may include various discrete functional units to perform various functions and / or operations. It should be noted that these functional units may be physical entities or logical entities, and units with different names may be implemented by the same physical entity.
[0108] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the random number generation unit 410 can generate a second random number R2. Here, the random number generation unit 410 can generate a random number using any method known in the art, which is not limited in the present disclosure.
[0109] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the authentication token generation unit 420 may determine the home network AUTN based on the long-term key K between the electronic device 400 and the user equipment and the second random number R2.
[0110] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the electronic device 400 can send the home network AUTN and the second random number R2 to the SN through the communication unit 430, so that the SN determines the SNMAC according to the second random number R2 and sends the SNMAC and the home network AUTN to the user equipment.
[0111] As described above, according to an embodiment of the present disclosure, electronic device 400 can use the second random number R2 to generate the home network AUTN, so that the user device can use the second random number R2 obtained from the home network AUTN to authenticate the SN. This eliminates the need for electronic device 400 and the user device to store the SQN, preventing replay attacks caused by SQN desynchronization and improving network security.
[0112] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, as shown in FIG4 , the electronic device 400 may further include a storage unit 440 for storing a long-term key K between the user equipment and the electronic device 400 .
[0113] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the authentication token generation unit 420 can determine the anonymous key AK based on the long-term key K. Specifically, the random number generation unit 410 can also generate a first random number R1, and the authentication token generation unit 420 can determine the anonymous key AK based on the long-term key K and the first random number R1. For example, the authentication token generation unit 420 can determine the anonymous key AK based on the functional relationship f5 between the anonymous key AK, the first random number R1, and the long-term key K. That is, the authentication token generation unit 420 can determine the anonymous key AK using the formula (2) described above.
[0114] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the authentication token generation unit 420 can determine the hidden value CONC of the second random number based on the second random number R2 and the anonymous key AK. Specifically, the authentication token generation unit 420 can determine the hidden value CONC of the second random number by performing an exclusive OR operation on the second random number R2 and the anonymous key AK. That is, the authentication token generation unit 420 can determine the hidden value CONC of the second random number by using formula (10):
[0115] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the authentication token generation unit 420 may determine the home network AUTN according to the hidden value CONC of the second random number. For example, the authentication token generation unit 420 may use the hidden value CONC of the second random number as part of the home network AUTN.
[0116] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the authentication token generation unit 420 can determine the HNMAC based on the long-term key K. Specifically, the authentication token generation unit 420 can determine the HNMAC based on the first random number R1 and the long-term key K. For example, the authentication token generation unit 420 can determine the HNMAC based on the functional relationship f1 between the HNMAC, the long-term key K, and the first random number R1. That is, the authentication token generation unit 420 can determine the HNMAC using formula (11): HNMAC=f1(K, R1) (11)
[0117] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the authentication token generation unit 420 may determine the home network AUTN according to the HNMAC. For example, the authentication token generation unit 420 may use the HNMAC as another part of the home network AUTN.
[0118] That is, the authentication token generation unit 420 may determine the home network AUTN based on the HNMAC and the hidden value CONC of the second random number. Specifically, the authentication token generation unit 420 may perform a string concatenation operation on the hidden value CONC of the second random number and HNMAC to determine the home network AUTN.
[0119] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the electronic device 400 can send the home network AUTN generated by the authentication token generation unit 420 to the SN, so that the SN can forward it to the user equipment, so that the user equipment can restore R2 from the home network AUTN and authenticate the SN. The electronic device 400 can also send the second random number R2 generated by the random number generation unit 410 to the SN, so that the SN can generate an SNMAC and send it to the user equipment, so that the user equipment can authenticate the SN using the SNMAC. The electronic device 400 can also send the first random number R1 generated by the random number generation unit 410 to the SN, so that the SN can authenticate the user equipment using the first random number R1, and the SN can also send the first random number R1 to the user equipment, so that the user equipment can authenticate the SN and the HN.
[0120] As described above, with the assistance of the electronic device 400 , explicit authentication of the user equipment to the SN can be achieved.
[0121] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, as shown in FIG4 , the electronic device 400 may further include a security anchor key generation unit 450 for determining a security anchor key K based on the first random number R1 generated by the random number generation unit 410, the long-term key K between the user equipment and the electronic device 400 from the storage unit 440, and the identification information of the SN. SERF , for communication between user equipment and SN.
[0122] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the electronic device 400 may obtain the identification information SNname of the SN from the SN, such as the core network of the SN, through the communication unit 430. Further, the security anchor key generation unit 450 may generate the security anchor key K according to R1, K and the identification information of the SN through KDF. SEAF That is, the security anchor key generation unit 450 can generate the security anchor key K by the formula (6) described above. SEAF .
[0123] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the electronic device 400 may also send the security anchor key generated by the security anchor key generation unit 450 to the SN, such as the core network of the SN, through the communication unit 430 for communication between the SN and the user equipment.
[0124] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, as shown in Figure 4, the electronic device 400 may further include a reference value generation unit 460, which is used to determine a reference value HXRES* of the response value based on the first random number R1 generated by the random number generation unit 410, the long-term key K between the user equipment and the electronic device 400 from the storage unit 440, and the identification information of the SN.
[0125] Specifically, the reference value generation unit 460 can determine the expected response value XRES* based on the first random number R1, the long-term key K, and the identification information of the SN. The expected response value represents the expected value of the response value generated by the user equipment. For example, the reference value generation unit 460 can determine the expected response value XRES* based on the functional relationship f2 between the expected response value XRES* and the long-term key K, the first random number R1, and the identification information (SNname) of the SN. That is, the reference value generation unit 460 can determine the expected response value XRES* using formula (12): XRES * =f2(K, R1, SNname) (12)
[0126] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the reference value generation unit 460 can determine the reference value HXRES* of the response value based on the expected response value XRES* and the first random number R1. Specifically, the reference value generation unit 460 can connect the first random number R1 with the expected response value XRES* and perform a hash operation to determine the reference value HXRES* of the response value. That is, the reference value generation unit 460 can determine the reference value HXRES* of the response value by using the following formula (13): HXRES*=Hash(<R1,XRES*> ) (13)
[0127] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the electronic device 400 may send the reference value HXRES* of the response value to the SN through the communication unit 430 , so that the SN can authenticate the user equipment.
[0128] Thus, according to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the electronic device 400 can send the reference value HXRES* of the response value to the SN, so that the SN can authenticate the user equipment using the reference value HXRES* of the response value. In other words, with the assistance of the electronic device 400, bidirectional authentication can be achieved between the user equipment and the SN, thereby improving network security.
[0129] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the electronic device 400 may receive a response value RES* generated by the user equipment from the SN via the communication unit 430. If the electronic device 400 receives the response value RES* generated by the user equipment sent by the SN, it indicates that the SN has successfully authenticated the user equipment.
[0130] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, as shown in FIG4 , electronic device 400 may further include an authentication unit 470 for authenticating a user device. Here, authentication unit 470 may authenticate the user device based on the response value RES* received from the SN and the expected response value XRES* generated by reference value generation unit 460. For example, if the response value RES* is consistent with the expected response value XRES*, authentication unit 470 deems the user device authenticated successfully; if the response value RES* is inconsistent with the expected response value XRES*, authentication unit 470 deems the user device authenticated unsuccessfully.
[0131] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, when the authentication unit 470 successfully authenticates the user equipment, the electronic device 400 may send a message indicating the authentication success to the SN via the communication unit 430. Furthermore, the electronic device 400 may also send the SUPI of the user equipment to the SN via the communication unit 430.
[0132] As described above, according to the electronic device 400 of the embodiment of the present disclosure, the second random number R2 can be used to generate the home network AUTN, so that the user device uses the second random number R2 obtained from the home network AUTN to authenticate the SN. In this way, the electronic device 400 and the user device do not need to save the SQN, avoiding replay attacks caused by the loss of synchronization of the SQN. In addition, with the assistance of the electronic device 400, explicit authentication of the user device to the SN can be achieved. Compared with implicit authentication, explicit authentication can improve the security of the network. Further, with the assistance of the electronic device 400, two-way authentication between the user device and the SN and two-way authentication between the user device and the HN can be achieved, further improving the security of the network.
[0133] <5. Signaling Process>
[0134] The following describes a signaling flow chart of the authentication method according to the present disclosure in conjunction with Figures 5 and 6. For ease of description, the authentication method of the present disclosure is divided into two parts: an initialization process and an authentication process. In Figures 5 and 6, the UE can be implemented by a user equipment 200. The AMF / SEAF in the SN can be implemented by an electronic device 300, the RAN in the SN can include a base station device, and the RAN in the SN and the AMF / SEAF can communicate using the N2 interface. The HN can include an electronic device 400 in the core network. In addition, the UE and the HN share the UE's long-term key K and the UE's SUPI, and the UE knows the SN's identification information SNname.
[0135] Figure 5 is a signaling flow chart illustrating the initialization process of an authentication method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. As shown in Figure 5, in step S501, the UE and the base station device in the RAN generate a physical layer key Kp based on the characteristics of the wireless channel. In step S502, the UE sends an N1 message to the RAN, which includes the UE's SUCI. In step S503, the RAN sends an N2 message to the AMF / SEAF, which includes the UE's SUCI and the physical layer key Kp. In step S504, the AMF / SEAF sends an N12 message (Authentication Initialization Request message) to the HN, which includes the UE's SUCI and the identification information of the SN. As a result, the UE and SN share the physical layer key Kp, and the HN obtains the identification information of the SN.
[0136] Figure 6 is a signaling flow chart illustrating an authentication process of an authentication method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. As shown in Figure 6, in step S601, the HN generates a first random number R1 and a second random number R2. In step S602, the HN generates AUTN. For example, the HN may use the formula (2) described above to determine the anonymous key AK based on the long-term key K and the first random number R1, use the formula (10) described above to determine the hidden value CONC of the second random number based on the second random number R2 and the anonymous key AK, use the formula (11) described above to determine the HNMAC based on the first random number R1 and the long-term key K, and then determine the home network AUTN based on the HNMAC and the hidden value CONC of the second random number. In step S603, the HN generates a reference value HXRES* for the response value. For example, the HN may use the formula (12) described above to determine the expected response value XRES* based on the first random number R1, the long-term key K, and the identification information of the SN, and then use the formula (13) described above to determine the reference value HXRES* of the response value based on the expected response value XRES* and the first random number R1. In step S604, the HN generates the security anchor key K SEAF For example, HN can use the formula (6) described above to determine the security anchor key K according to the first random number R1, the long-term key K, and the identification information of the SN. SERF. In step S605, the HN sends the generated first random number R1, the second random number R2, the home network AUTN, the reference value of the response value HXRES* and the security anchor key KSEAF to the AMF / SEAF in the SN. For example, the HN can generate an AV based on the above information and send it to the SN. In step S606, the AMF / SEAF generates a SNMAC. For example, the AMF / SEAF can use the formula (8) described above to determine the SNMAC based on the second random number R2 and the physical layer key Kp. In step S607, the AMF / SEAF sends the first random number R1 from the HN, the home network AUTN from the HN, and the generated SNMAC to the RAN. In step S608, the RAN forwards the first random number R1, the home network AUTN, and the SNMAC to the UE. For example, the RAN can send the above information to the UE via AV. In step S609, the UE determines the authentication parameter XSNMAC. For example, the UE may use the formula (1) described above to decompose CONC from the home network AUTN, use the formula (2) described above to determine the anonymous key AK based on the first random number R1 and the long-term key K, use the formula (3) described above to determine the second random number R2 based on the hidden value CONC of the anonymous key AK and the second random number, and then use the formula (4) described above to determine the value of the authentication parameter XSNMAC based on the physical layer key Kp and the second random number R2. In addition, in step S609, the UE also authenticates the SN by comparing the generated XSNMAC with the received SNMAC. In step S610, the UE determines the second authentication parameters XHNMAC and HNMAC. For example, the UE may use the formula (1) described above to decompose HNMAC from the home network AUTN, and use the formula (5) described above to determine the second authentication parameter XHNMAC based on the long-term key K and the first random number R1 received from the SN. In addition, in step S610, the UE authenticates the HN by comparing XHNMAC with HNMAC. When the UE successfully authenticates the HN and SN, in step S611, the UE generates a security anchor key K SEAF For example, the UE can use the formula (6) described above to determine the security anchor key K according to the first random number R1, the long-term key K, and the identification information of the SN. SERF. In step S612, the UE generates a response value RES*. For example, the UE uses the formula (7) described above to determine the response value RES* based on the first random number R1, the long-term key K and the identification information of the SN received from the SN. In step S613, the UE sends the generated response value RES* to the RAN in the SN. In step S614, the RAN forwards the response value RES* to the AMF / SEAF. In step S615, the AMF / SEAF generates a third authentication parameter. For example, the AMF / SEAF uses the formula (9) described above to determine the third authentication parameter based on the first random number R1 and the response value RES* from the UE. In addition, in step S615, the AMF / SEAF also authenticates the UE by comparing the third authentication parameter with the reference value HXRES* of the response value from the HN. If the UE is successfully authenticated in step S615, in step S616, the AMF / SEAF forwards the UE's response value RES* to the HN. In step S617, the HN authenticates the UE by comparing the received response value RES* with the generated expected response value XRES*. If the UE is successfully authenticated in step S617, the HN sends an authentication success message to the AMF / SEAF in step S618, including the UE's SUPI. This completes mutual authentication between the UE and the SN, and between the UE and the HN.
[0137] According to embodiments of the present disclosure, when a UE requires connection authentication, it can perform the initialization process shown in Figure 5 and the authentication process shown in Figure 6 . That is, each authentication requires regenerating the physical layer key Kp. After the current authentication is successful and until the next authentication, the UE and SN can communicate using keys derived from the security anchor key KSEAF. As shown in Figure 6 , the UE performs explicit authentication of the SN, and due to the introduction of the second random number R2 during the authentication process, the SQN is no longer required.
[0138] <6. Method Example>
[0139] Next, a wireless communication method performed by the user equipment 200 according to an embodiment of the present disclosure will be described in detail.
[0140] FIG7 is a flowchart illustrating a wireless communication method performed by the user equipment 200 according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
[0141] As shown in FIG. 7 , in step S710 , a physical layer key is determined based on characteristics of a wireless channel between the user equipment 200 and the service network.
[0142] In step S720, a serving network message authentication code and a home network authentication token are received from the serving network.
[0143] In step S730, authentication parameters are determined according to the physical layer key and the home network authentication token.
[0144] In step S740, the serving network is authenticated according to the authentication parameters and the serving network message authentication code.
[0145] Preferably, determining the authentication parameter comprises: determining a second random number generated by the home network according to the home network authentication token; and determining the authentication parameter according to the physical layer key and the second random number.
[0146] Preferably, determining the second random number comprises: determining a hidden value of the second random number based on the home network authentication token; determining an anonymous key based on a long-term key between the user equipment and the home network; and determining the second random number based on the anonymous key and the hidden value of the second random number.
[0147] Preferably, the wireless communication method further comprises: receiving a first random number from a service network; and determining an anonymous key according to the first random number and a long-term key.
[0148] Preferably, the wireless communication method further comprises: determining a home network message authentication code based on the home network authentication token; determining a second authentication parameter based on a long-term key between the user equipment and the home network; and authenticating the home network based on the second authentication parameter and the home network message authentication code.
[0149] Preferably, determining the second authentication parameter includes: receiving a first random number from a service network; and determining the second authentication parameter according to the first random number and a long-term key.
[0150] Preferably, the wireless communication method further includes: receiving a first random number from the service network; and determining a security anchor key based on the first random number, a long-term key between the user equipment and the home network, and identification information of the service network, for use in communication between the user equipment and the service network.
[0151] Preferably, the wireless communication method further includes: receiving a first random number from a service network; determining a response value based on the first random number, a long-term key between the user equipment and the home network, and identification information of the service network; and sending the response value to the service network for the service network to authenticate the user equipment.
[0152] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the subject that executes the above method may be the user equipment 200 according to an embodiment of the present disclosure, and therefore all the embodiments regarding the user equipment 200 in the foregoing text are applicable hereto.
[0153] Next, a wireless communication method performed by the electronic device 300 in the SN according to an embodiment of the present disclosure will be described in detail.
[0154] FIG8 is a flowchart illustrating a wireless communication method performed by the electronic device 300 in the wireless communication system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
[0155] As shown in FIG8 , in step S810 , a home network authentication token is received from a home network.
[0156] In step S820, a serving network message authentication code is determined according to a physical layer key determined by characteristics of a wireless channel between the user equipment and the serving network.
[0157] In step S830, the serving network message authentication code and the home network authentication token are sent to the user equipment, so that the user equipment determines the authentication parameters according to the physical layer key and the home network authentication token, and authenticates the serving network according to the authentication parameters and the serving network message authentication code.
[0158] Preferably, the wireless communication method further comprises: receiving a second random number from the home network; and determining a serving network message authentication code according to the second random number and a physical layer key.
[0159] Preferably, the wireless communication method further comprises: receiving a response value from the user equipment; determining a third authentication parameter based on the response value; receiving a reference value of the response value from the home network; and authenticating the user equipment based on the third authentication parameter and the reference value of the response value.
[0160] Preferably, the wireless communication method further comprises: receiving a first random number from the home network; and determining a third authentication parameter according to the first random number and the response value.
[0161] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the subject that executes the above method may be the electronic device 300 according to an embodiment of the present disclosure, and therefore all the embodiments regarding the electronic device 300 in the foregoing text are applicable hereto.
[0162] Next, a wireless communication method performed by the electronic device 400 in the HN according to an embodiment of the present disclosure will be described in detail.
[0163] FIG9 is a flowchart illustrating a wireless communication method performed by the electronic device 400 in the wireless communication system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
[0164] As shown in FIG9 , in step S910 , a second random number is generated.
[0165] In step S920 , a home network authentication token is determined according to the long-term key between the electronic device 400 and the user equipment and the second random number.
[0166] In step S930, the home network authentication token and the second random number are sent to the serving network, so that the serving network determines a serving network message authentication code according to the second random number and sends the serving network message authentication code and the home network authentication token to the user equipment.
[0167] Preferably, determining the home network authentication token comprises: determining an anonymity key based on the long-term key; determining a hidden value of the second random number based on the second random number and the anonymity key; and determining the home network authentication token based on the hidden value of the second random number.
[0168] Preferably, determining the anonymous key comprises: generating a first random number; and determining the anonymous key according to the first random number and the long-term key.
[0169] Preferably, determining the home network authentication token comprises: determining a home network message authentication code based on a long-term key; and determining the home network authentication token based on the home network message authentication code and a hidden value of a second random number.
[0170] Preferably, determining the home network message authentication code comprises: generating a first random number; and determining the home network message authentication code based on the first random number and a long-term key.
[0171] Preferably, the wireless communication method further comprises: generating a first random number; and determining a security anchor key according to the first random number, the long-term key and identification information of the service network, for use in communication between the user equipment and the service network.
[0172] Preferably, the wireless communication method further comprises: generating a first random number; determining a reference value of the response value according to the first random number, the long-term key and identification information of the service network; and sending the reference value of the response value to the service network for the service network to authenticate the user equipment.
[0173] Preferably, determining the reference value of the response value includes: determining an expected response value according to the first random number, the long-term key and identification information of the service network; and determining the reference value of the response value according to the expected response value and the first random number.
[0174] Preferably, the wireless communication method further comprises: receiving a response value generated by the user equipment from the service network; and authenticating the user equipment according to the response value and an expected response value.
[0175] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the subject that executes the above method may be the electronic device 400 according to an embodiment of the present disclosure, and therefore all the embodiments regarding the electronic device 400 in the foregoing text are applicable hereto.
[0176] <7. Application Examples>
[0177] The technology of the present disclosure can be applied to various products.
[0178] For example, the electronic device 300 and the electronic device 400 can be implemented as any type of server, such as a tower server, a rack server, and a blade server. The electronic device 300 and the electronic device 400 can be a control module installed on the server (such as an integrated circuit module including a single chip, and a card or blade inserted into a slot of a blade server).
[0179] The user equipment 200 may be implemented as a mobile terminal (such as a smartphone, a tablet personal computer (PC), a notebook PC, a portable game terminal, a portable / dongle-type mobile router, and a digital camera) or an in-vehicle terminal (such as a car navigation device). The user equipment may also be implemented as a terminal that performs machine-to-machine (M2M) communication (also known as a machine-type communication (MTC) terminal). In addition, the user equipment may be a wireless communication module (such as an integrated circuit module including a single chip) installed in each of the above user equipment.
[0180] <About server application examples>
[0181] 10 is a block diagram illustrating an example of a server 1000 that can implement the electronic device 300 and the electronic device 400 according to the present disclosure. The server 1000 includes a processor 1001 , a memory 1002 , a storage device 1003 , a network interface 1004 , and a bus 1006 .
[0182] The processor 1001 may be, for example, a central processing unit (CPU) or a digital signal processor (DSP), and controls the functions of the server 1000. The memory 1002 includes a random access memory (RAM) and a read-only memory (ROM), and stores data and programs executed by the processor 1001. The storage device 1003 may include a storage medium such as a semiconductor memory and a hard disk.
[0183] The network interface 1004 is a wired communication interface for connecting the server 1000 to the wired communication network 1005. The wired communication network 1005 may be a core network such as an evolved packet core (EPC) or a packet data network (PDN) such as the Internet.
[0184] The bus 1006 connects the processor 1001, the memory 1002, the storage device 1003, and the network interface 1004 to each other. The bus 1006 may include two or more buses each having a different speed (such as a high-speed bus and a low-speed bus).
[0185] In the server 1000 shown in FIG10 , the generation unit 320 and the authentication unit 330 described in FIG3 , the random number generation unit 410, the authentication token generation unit 420, the security anchor key generation unit 450, the reference value generation unit 460, and the authentication unit 470 described in FIG4 may be implemented by the processor 1001, and the communication unit 310 described in FIG3 and the communication unit 430 described in FIG4 may be implemented by the network interface 1004. For example, the processor 1001 may execute instructions stored in the memory 1002 or the storage device 1003 to perform functions such as generating a serving network message authentication code, authenticating a user equipment, generating a random number, generating a home network authentication token, generating a security anchor key, generating a reference value for a response value, and authenticating the user equipment.
[0186] <Application examples for terminal devices>
[0187] (First application example)
[0188] 11 is a block diagram showing an example of a schematic configuration of a smartphone 1100 to which the technology of the present disclosure can be applied. The smartphone 1100 includes a processor 1101, a memory 1102, a storage device 1103, an external connection interface 1104, a camera 1106, a sensor 1107, a microphone 1108, an input device 1109, a display device 1110, a speaker 1111, a wireless communication interface 1112, one or more antenna switches 1115, one or more antennas 1116, a bus 1117, a battery 1118, and an auxiliary controller 1119.
[0189] The processor 1101 may be, for example, a CPU or a system on a chip (SoC), and controls the functions of the application layer and other layers of the smartphone 1100. The memory 1102 includes RAM and ROM, and stores data and programs executed by the processor 1101. The storage device 1103 may include storage media such as semiconductor memories and hard disks. The external connection interface 1104 is an interface for connecting external devices (such as memory cards and universal serial bus (USB) devices) to the smartphone 1100.
[0190] The camera 1106 includes an image sensor (such as a charge coupled device (CCD) and a complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS)) and generates a captured image. The sensor 1107 may include a group of sensors such as a measurement sensor, a gyroscope sensor, a geomagnetic sensor, and an acceleration sensor. The microphone 1108 converts the sound input to the smartphone 1100 into an audio signal. The input device 1109 includes, for example, a touch sensor, a keypad, a keyboard, a button, or a switch configured to detect a touch on the screen of the display device 1110, and receives an operation or information input from the user. The display device 1110 includes a screen (such as a liquid crystal display (LCD) and an organic light emitting diode (OLED) display) and displays an output image of the smartphone 1100. The speaker 1111 converts the audio signal output from the smartphone 1100 into sound.
[0191] The wireless communication interface 1112 supports any cellular communication scheme (such as LTE and LTE-Advanced) and performs wireless communication. The wireless communication interface 1112 may generally include, for example, a BB processor 1113 and an RF circuit 1114. The BB processor 1113 may perform, for example, encoding / decoding, modulation / demodulation, and multiplexing / demultiplexing, and perform various types of signal processing for wireless communication. Meanwhile, the RF circuit 1114 may include, for example, a mixer, a filter, and an amplifier, and transmit and receive wireless signals via an antenna 1116. The wireless communication interface 1112 may be a chip module on which the BB processor 1113 and the RF circuit 1114 are integrated. As shown in FIG11 , the wireless communication interface 1112 may include multiple BB processors 1113 and multiple RF circuits 1114. Although FIG11 shows an example in which the wireless communication interface 1112 includes multiple BB processors 1113 and multiple RF circuits 1114, the wireless communication interface 1112 may also include a single BB processor 1113 or a single RF circuit 1114.
[0192] In addition, in addition to the cellular communication scheme, the wireless communication interface 1112 can support other types of wireless communication schemes, such as a short-range wireless communication scheme, a near-field communication scheme, and a wireless local area network (LAN) scheme. In this case, the wireless communication interface 1112 may include a BB processor 1113 and an RF circuit 1114 for each wireless communication scheme.
[0193] Each of the antenna switches 1115 switches the connection destination of the antenna 1116 between a plurality of circuits (eg, circuits for different wireless communication schemes) included in the wireless communication interface 1112 .
[0194] Each of the antennas 1116 includes a single or multiple antenna elements (such as multiple antenna elements included in a MIMO antenna) and is used for transmitting and receiving wireless signals via the wireless communication interface 1112. As shown in FIG11 , the smartphone 1100 may include multiple antennas 1116. Although FIG11 shows an example in which the smartphone 1100 includes multiple antennas 1116, the smartphone 1100 may also include a single antenna 1116.
[0195] In addition, the smartphone 1100 may include an antenna 1116 for each wireless communication scheme. In this case, the antenna switch 1115 may be omitted from the configuration of the smartphone 1100.
[0196] A bus 1117 connects the processor 1101, memory 1102, storage device 1103, external connection interface 1104, camera 1106, sensor 1107, microphone 1108, input device 1109, display device 1110, speaker 1111, wireless communication interface 1112, and auxiliary controller 1119. A battery 1118 supplies power to the various blocks of the smartphone 1100 shown in FIG. 11 via feeders, which are partially illustrated as dashed lines. The auxiliary controller 1119 operates the minimum necessary functions of the smartphone 1100, for example, in sleep mode.
[0197] In the smartphone 1100 shown in FIG11 , the physical layer key generation unit 210, the authentication unit 230, the security anchor key generation unit 250, and the response value generation unit 260 described in FIG2 may be implemented by the processor 1101 or the auxiliary controller 1119. At least a portion of the functions may also be implemented by the processor 1101 or the auxiliary controller 1119. For example, the processor 1101 or the auxiliary controller 1119 may execute instructions stored in the memory 1102 or the storage device 1103 to perform the functions of generating a physical layer key, authenticating a serving network, authenticating a home network, generating a security anchor key, and generating a response value.
[0198] (Second application example)
[0199] 12 is a block diagram showing an example of a schematic configuration of a car navigation device 1220 to which the technology of the present disclosure can be applied. The car navigation device 1220 includes a processor 1221, a memory 1222, a global positioning system (GPS) module 1224, a sensor 1225, a data interface 1226, a content player 1227, a storage medium interface 1228, an input device 1229, a display device 1230, a speaker 1231, a wireless communication interface 1233, one or more antenna switches 1236, one or more antennas 1237, and a battery 1238.
[0200] The processor 1221 may be, for example, a CPU or an SoC, and controls a navigation function and other functions of the car navigation device 1220. The memory 1222 includes a RAM and a ROM, and stores data and programs executed by the processor 1221.
[0201] The GPS module 1224 uses GPS signals received from GPS satellites to measure the position (such as latitude, longitude, and altitude) of the car navigation device 1220. The sensor 1225 may include a group of sensors such as a gyroscope sensor, a geomagnetic sensor, and an air pressure sensor. The data interface 1226 is connected to, for example, the vehicle network 1241 via a terminal not shown, and acquires data generated by the vehicle (such as vehicle speed data).
[0202] The content player 1227 reproduces content stored in a storage medium (such as a CD or DVD) inserted into the storage medium interface 1228. The input device 1229 includes, for example, a touch sensor, button, or switch configured to detect a touch on the screen of the display device 1230, and receives an operation or information input from the user. The display device 1230 includes a screen such as an LCD or OLED display and displays an image of a navigation function or reproduced content. The speaker 1231 outputs the sound of the navigation function or the reproduced content.
[0203] The wireless communication interface 1233 supports any cellular communication scheme (such as LTE and LTE-Advanced) and performs wireless communications. The wireless communication interface 1233 may generally include, for example, a BB processor 1234 and an RF circuit 1235. The BB processor 1234 may perform, for example, encoding / decoding, modulation / demodulation, and multiplexing / demultiplexing, and perform various types of signal processing for wireless communication. Meanwhile, the RF circuit 1235 may include, for example, a mixer, a filter, and an amplifier, and transmit and receive wireless signals via an antenna 1237. The wireless communication interface 1233 may also be a chip module on which the BB processor 1234 and the RF circuit 1235 are integrated. As shown in FIG12 , the wireless communication interface 1233 may include multiple BB processors 1234 and multiple RF circuits 1235. Although FIG12 shows an example in which the wireless communication interface 1233 includes multiple BB processors 1234 and multiple RF circuits 1235, the wireless communication interface 1233 may also include a single BB processor 1234 or a single RF circuit 1235.
[0204] In addition, in addition to the cellular communication scheme, the wireless communication interface 1233 can support other types of wireless communication schemes, such as short-range wireless communication schemes, near field communication schemes, and wireless LAN schemes. In this case, for each wireless communication scheme, the wireless communication interface 1233 can include a BB processor 1234 and an RF circuit 1235.
[0205] Each of the antenna switches 1236 switches a connection destination of the antenna 1237 between a plurality of circuits included in the wireless communication interface 1233 , such as circuits for different wireless communication schemes.
[0206] Each of the antennas 1237 includes a single or multiple antenna elements (such as multiple antenna elements included in a MIMO antenna) and is used for transmitting and receiving wireless signals via the wireless communication interface 1233. As shown in FIG12, the car navigation device 1220 may include multiple antennas 1237. Although FIG12 shows an example in which the car navigation device 1220 includes multiple antennas 1237, the car navigation device 1220 may also include a single antenna 1237.
[0207] In addition, the car navigation device 1220 may include an antenna 2137 for each wireless communication scheme. In this case, the antenna switch 1236 may be omitted from the configuration of the car navigation device 1220.
[0208] The battery 1238 supplies power to the respective blocks of the car navigation device 1220 shown in Fig. 12 via a feeder line, which is partially shown as a dotted line in the figure. The battery 1238 accumulates the power supplied from the vehicle.
[0209] In the car navigation device 1220 shown in FIG12 , the physical layer key generation unit 210, authentication unit 230, security anchor key generation unit 250, and response value generation unit 260 described in FIG2 may be implemented by the processor 1221. At least a portion of the functions may also be implemented by the processor 1221. For example, the processor 1221 may execute instructions stored in the memory 1222 to perform the functions of generating a physical layer key, authenticating a serving network, authenticating a home network, generating a security anchor key, and generating a response value.
[0210] The technology of the present disclosure can also be implemented as an in-vehicle system (or vehicle) 1240 including a car navigation device 1220, an in-vehicle network 1241, and one or more blocks in a vehicle module 1242. The vehicle module 1242 generates vehicle data (such as vehicle speed, engine speed, and fault information) and outputs the generated data to the in-vehicle network 1241.
[0211] The preferred embodiments of the present disclosure are described above with reference to the accompanying drawings, but the present disclosure is of course not limited to the above examples. Those skilled in the art may obtain various changes and modifications within the scope of the appended claims, and it should be understood that these changes and modifications will naturally fall within the technical scope of the present disclosure.
[0212] For example, the units shown in dotted boxes in the functional block diagrams shown in the accompanying drawings all indicate that the functional units are optional in the corresponding device, and the various optional functional units can be combined in an appropriate manner to achieve the required functions.
[0213] For example, a plurality of functions included in one unit in the above embodiments may be implemented by separate devices. Alternatively, a plurality of functions implemented by a plurality of units in the above embodiments may be implemented by separate devices, respectively. In addition, one of the above functions may be implemented by a plurality of units. Needless to say, such a configuration is included in the technical scope of the present disclosure.
[0214] In this specification, the steps described in the flowchart include not only processing executed in time series in the order described, but also processing executed in parallel or individually rather than necessarily in time series. In addition, even in the steps processed in time series, it goes without saying that the order can be changed as appropriate.
[0215] Although the embodiments of the present disclosure have been described in detail above with reference to the accompanying drawings, it should be understood that the embodiments described above are merely illustrative of the present disclosure and are not intended to limit the present disclosure. Those skilled in the art will appreciate that various modifications and variations can be made to the above embodiments without departing from the spirit and scope of the present disclosure. Therefore, the scope of the present disclosure is solely defined by the appended claims and their equivalents.
Claims
1. A user equipment comprising a processing circuit configured to: determining a physical layer key according to characteristics of a wireless channel between the user equipment and the service network; receiving a serving network message authentication code and a home network authentication token from the serving network; determining an authentication parameter based on the physical layer key and the home network authentication token; as well as The serving network is authenticated according to the authentication parameter and the serving network message authentication code.
2. The user equipment according to claim 1, wherein The processing circuit is further configured to: determining a second random number generated by the home network based on the home network authentication token; and The authentication parameter is determined according to the physical layer key and the second random number.
3. The user equipment according to claim 2, wherein: The processing circuit is further configured to: determining a hidden value of the second random number based on the home network authentication token; determining an anonymity key based on a long-term key between the user equipment and the home network; as well as A second random number is determined based on the anonymity key and a hidden value of the second random number.
4. The user equipment according to claim 3, wherein: The processing circuit is further configured to: receiving a first random number from the serving network; and The anonymity key is determined according to the first random number and the long-term key. The user equipment according to claim 1 , wherein: The processing circuit is further configured to: determining a home network message authentication code based on the home network authentication token; determining a second authentication parameter based on a long-term key between the user equipment and the home network; as well as The home network is authenticated based on the second authentication parameter and the home network message authentication code. to authenticate. The user equipment according to claim 5 , wherein: The processing circuit is further configured to: receiving a first random number from the serving network; and The second authentication parameter is determined according to the first random number and the long-term key.
7. The user equipment according to claim 1, wherein: The processing circuit is further configured to: receiving a first random number from the serving network; and A security anchor key is determined according to the first random number, a long-term key between the user equipment and the home network, and identification information of the serving network, for use in communication between the user equipment and the serving network.
8. The user equipment according to claim 1, wherein: The processing circuit is further configured to: receiving a first random number from the serving network; determining a response value according to the first random number, a long-term key between the user equipment and the home network, and identification information of the serving network; as well as The response value is sent to the service network so that the service network can authenticate the user equipment.
9. An electronic device in a service network, comprising a processing circuit configured to: receiving a home network authentication token from the home network; determining a serving network message authentication code according to a physical layer key determined by characteristics of a wireless channel between the user equipment and the serving network; and The serving network message authentication code and the home network authentication token are sent to the user equipment, so that the user equipment determines authentication parameters according to the physical layer key and the home network authentication token, and authenticates the serving network according to the authentication parameters and the serving network message authentication code.
10. The electronic device according to claim 9, wherein The processing circuit is further configured to: receiving a second random number from the home network; and The serving network message authentication code is determined according to the second random number and the physical layer key.
11. The electronic device according to claim 9, wherein The processing circuit is further configured to: receiving a response value from the user equipment; determining a third authentication parameter according to the response value; receiving a reference value of a response value from the home network; as well as The user equipment is authenticated according to the third authentication parameter and a reference value of the response value.
12. The electronic device according to claim 11, wherein The processing circuit is further configured to: receiving a first random number from the home network; and The third authentication parameter is determined according to the first random number and the response value.
13. An electronic device in a home network, comprising a processing circuit configured to: generating a second random number; determining a home network authentication token based on a long-term key between the electronic device and the user equipment and the second random number; as well as The home network authentication token and the second random number are sent to a serving network, so that the serving network determines a serving network message authentication code according to the second random number and sends the serving network message authentication code and the home network authentication token to the user equipment.
14. The electronic device according to claim 13, wherein The processing circuit is further configured to: determining an anonymity key based on the long-term key; determining a hidden value of the second random number based on the second random number and the anonymity key; and The home network authentication token is determined based on a hidden value of the second random number.
15. The electronic device according to claim 14, wherein The processing circuit is further configured to: generating a first random number; and The anonymity key is determined according to the first random number and the long-term key.
16. The electronic device according to claim 14, wherein The processing circuit is further configured to: determining a home network message authentication code based on the long-term key; and The home network authentication token is determined based on the home network message authentication code and a hidden value of the second random number.
17. The electronic device according to claim 16, wherein: The processing circuit is further configured to: generating a first random number; and The home network message authentication code is determined based on the first random number and the long-term key.
18. The electronic device according to claim 13, wherein The processing circuit is further configured to: generating a first random number; and A security anchor key is determined according to the first random number, the long-term key, and the identification information of the serving network, for use in communication between the user equipment and the serving network.
19. The electronic device according to claim 13, wherein The processing circuit is further configured to: generating a first random number; determining a reference value of a response value according to the first random number, the long-term key, and identification information of the serving network; as well as The reference value of the response value is sent to the service network, so that the service network can authenticate the user equipment.
20. The electronic device according to claim 19, wherein The processing circuit is further configured to: determining an expected response value according to the first random number, the long-term key, and the identification information of the serving network; and A reference value of the response value is determined according to the expected response value and the first random number.
21. The electronic device according to claim 20, wherein The processing circuit is further configured to: receiving a response value generated by the user equipment from the serving network; and The user equipment is authenticated according to the response value and the expected response value.
22. A wireless communication method performed by a user equipment, comprising: determining a physical layer key according to characteristics of a wireless channel between the user equipment and the service network; receiving a serving network message authentication code and a home network authentication token from the serving network; determining an authentication parameter based on the physical layer key and the home network authentication token; as well as The serving network is authenticated according to the authentication parameter and the serving network message authentication code.
23. The wireless communication method according to claim 22, wherein: Determining the authentication parameters includes: determining a second random number generated by the home network based on the home network authentication token; and The authentication parameter is determined according to the physical layer key and the second random number.
24. The wireless communication method according to claim 23, wherein: Determining the second random number includes: determining a hidden value of the second random number based on the home network authentication token; determining an anonymity key based on a long-term key between the user equipment and the home network; and A second random number is determined based on the anonymity key and a hidden value of the second random number.
25. The wireless communication method according to claim 24, wherein: The wireless communication method further includes: receiving a first random number from the serving network; and The anonymity key is determined according to the first random number and the long-term key.
26. The wireless communication method according to claim 22, wherein: The wireless communication method further includes: determining a home network message authentication code based on the home network authentication token; determining a second authentication parameter based on a long-term key between the user equipment and the home network; and The home network is authenticated according to the second authentication parameter and the home network message authentication code.
27. The wireless communication method according to claim 26, wherein: Determining the second authentication parameter includes: receiving a first random number from the serving network; and The second authentication parameter is determined according to the first random number and the long-term key.
28. The wireless communication method according to claim 22, wherein: The wireless communication method further includes: receiving a first random number from the serving network; and A security anchor key is determined according to the first random number, a long-term key between the user equipment and the home network, and identification information of the serving network, for use in communication between the user equipment and the serving network.
29. The wireless communication method according to claim 22, wherein: The wireless communication method further includes: receiving a first random number from the serving network; determining a response value according to the first random number, a long-term key between the user equipment and the home network, and identification information of the serving network; and The response value is sent to the service network so that the service network can authenticate the user equipment.
30. A wireless communication method performed by an electronic device in a service network, comprising: receiving a home network authentication token from the home network; determining a serving network message authentication code based on a physical layer key determined by characteristics of a wireless channel between the user equipment and the serving network; as well as The serving network message authentication code and the home network authentication token are sent to the user equipment, so that the user equipment determines authentication parameters according to the physical layer key and the home network authentication token, and authenticates the serving network according to the authentication parameters and the serving network message authentication code.
31. The wireless communication method according to claim 30, wherein: The wireless communication method further includes: receiving a second random number from the home network; and The serving network message authentication code is determined according to the second random number and the physical layer key.
32. The wireless communication method according to claim 30, wherein: The wireless communication method further includes: receiving a response value from the user equipment; determining a third authentication parameter according to the response value; receiving a reference value of a response value from the home network; and The user equipment is authenticated according to the third authentication parameter and a reference value of the response value.
33. The wireless communication method according to claim 32, wherein: The wireless communication method further includes: receiving a first random number from the home network; and The third authentication parameter is determined according to the first random number and the response value.
34. A wireless communication method performed by an electronic device in a home network, comprising: generating a second random number; determining a home network authentication token based on a long-term key between the electronic device and the user equipment and the second random number; as well as The home network authentication token and the second random number are sent to a serving network, so that the serving network determines a serving network message authentication code according to the second random number and sends the serving network message authentication code and the home network authentication token to the user equipment.
35. The wireless communication method according to claim 34, wherein: Determining the home network authentication token includes: determining an anonymity key based on the long-term key; determining a hidden value of the second random number based on the second random number and the anonymity key; and The home network authentication token is determined based on a hidden value of the second random number.
36. The wireless communication method according to claim 35, wherein: Determining the anonymity key includes: generating a first random number; and The anonymity key is determined according to the first random number and the long-term key.
37. The wireless communication method according to claim 35, wherein: Determining the home network authentication token includes: determining a home network message authentication code based on the long-term key; and The home network authentication token is determined based on the home network message authentication code and a hidden value of the second random number.
38. The wireless communication method according to claim 37, wherein: Determining the home network message authentication code includes: generating a first random number; and The home network message authentication code is determined based on the first random number and the long-term key.
39. The wireless communication method according to claim 34, wherein: The wireless communication method further includes: generating a first random number; and A security anchor key is determined according to the first random number, the long-term key, and the identification information of the serving network, for use in communication between the user equipment and the serving network.
40. The wireless communication method according to claim 34, wherein: The wireless communication method further includes: generating a first random number; determining a reference value of a response value according to the first random number, the long-term key, and identification information of the service network; and The reference value of the response value is sent to the service network, so that the service network can authenticate the user equipment.
41. The wireless communication method according to claim 40, wherein: The reference values for determining the response value include: determining an expected response value according to the first random number, the long-term key, and the identification information of the serving network; and A reference value of the response value is determined according to the expected response value and the first random number.
42. The wireless communication method according to claim 41, wherein: The wireless communication method further includes: receiving a response value generated by the user equipment from the serving network; and The user equipment is authenticated according to the response value and the expected response value.
43. A computer-readable storage medium comprising executable computer instructions, which, when executed by a computer, cause the computer to perform the wireless communication method according to any one of claims 22 to 42.
