Internet of Things anonymous mutual authentication key negotiation method based on block chain

Through non-interactive Schnorr signature technology and zero-knowledge proof combined with elliptic curve cryptography and smart contract management key information, the challenges of security, efficiency and anonymity in IoT device authentication are solved, and an efficient and secure identity is achieved Verification and key negotiation, suitable for IoT devices with limited resources.

CN118944865APending Publication Date: 2024-11-12CHONGQING UNIV OF POSTS & TELECOMM
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202410918409.5
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-07-10
Publication Date
2024-11-12

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

IoT devices face problems such as cyber attacks, high computing costs, high storage and management costs and limited resources during the authentication process. Existing blockchain-based authentication methods are difficult to balance security, efficiency and anonymity. .

Method used

Using non-interactive Schnorr signature technology and zero-knowledge proof combined with elliptic curve cryptography, smart contracts manage key information to ensure anonymity and privacy protection, and achieve secure authentication and key negotiation between IoT devices with limited resources.

Benefits of technology

It realizes efficient and secure authentication and key negotiation in IoT scenarios with limited resources, reduces computing complexity and storage costs, enhances the security and reliability of communication, and can update and revoke keys in a timely manner, preventing attack.

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Abstract

The invention belongs to the field of Internet of Things identity authentication, and relates to a mutual authentication key negotiation method based on a block chain. Comprising the following steps: S1) initialization: firstly, selecting parameters by an equipment manufacturer, creating a century file containing configuration parameters, and issuing public system parameters; s2) the device and the server send a registration request, and the manufacturer uploads the generated information to the smart contract for later query and revocation; s3) identity verification is interactively operated by registered equipment and a server, and zero-knowledge proof and signature are combined; and S4) when information is leaked, key updating can be requested. And if a suspicious behavior of the equipment is found, direct revocation can be performed. The invention provides an Internet of Things anonymous mutual authentication method based on a block chain, which can realize the balance between safety and efficiency, reduce the calculation cost and improve the attack resistance, and can be effectively applied to an identity authentication scene.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of Internet of Things identity authentication, and relates to an anonymous mutual authentication key negotiation method based on blockchain. Background Art

[0002] IoT stands for the interconnection of all things, providing the ability to collect and generate data. IoT has grown rapidly due to the full deployment of devices and the popularity of communication technologies. It is reported that the number of connected devices in IoT has grown exponentially in the past decade. These devices are widely used in various fields such as education, business, government, and healthcare, providing a wide range of services for human life, such as smart cities, intelligent transportation systems, smart grids, and smart medical systems.

[0003] Although the Internet of Things provides a wealth of features, advantages and opportunities, it is also accompanied by security and privacy issues. One of the major challenges facing the Internet of Things, which is composed of heterogeneous, homogeneous and ubiquitous IoT devices, is still cyber attacks. For example, communication between smart consumer devices is usually carried out through insecure public channels, which is very vulnerable to various security and privacy threats. Attackers may exploit this vulnerability to intercept and eavesdrop on communications between real devices, that is, to implement man-in-the-middle attacks. In addition, during the authentication process, malicious attackers may eavesdrop and steal the sender's credential data to make the receiver mistakenly believe that the data comes from the original sender. There are also a variety of attacks such as forged identity attacks and replay attacks that will seriously endanger the security of the authentication process.

[0004] Blockchain technology offers more possibilities for network security because it has an architecture that supports decentralization and peer-to-peer network structures. For this reason, blockchain-based authentication methods are more suitable for privacy protection. For example, transaction data in a blockchain is generally stored in a distributed ledger that is recorded on all network nodes. This ensures the auditability and immutability of all transactions, because any attempt to access or modify data will be detected and rejected by the blockchain. In addition, blockchain-based authentication methods can also be applied to the security authentication of IoT devices. For example, to prevent attacks such as man-in-the-middle attacks and key hijacking attacks, blockchain-based key management and authentication can be used to issue and revoke specific keys. Even so, most blockchain-based authentication and key management methods still face challenges such as computational overhead, communication costs, and internal attacks.

[0005] Considering factors such as cost, the ability to resist attacks, and scenario limitations, blockchain-based authentication methods are facing many challenges. Some methods consider that one of the effective features to prevent attackers from obtaining device information is anonymity, and apply pseudonyms in the authentication method, but at the same time, it also increases storage and management costs. Some methods use third-party assistance to reduce the computing cost of the device, but this is not suitable for bilateral authentication of IoT devices. Some methods use pre-computation methods to reduce the computing cost of the authentication process, but this does not reduce the total computing cost. At the same time, the authentication method also needs to defend against common attacks, such as replay attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, identity forgery attacks, etc. In addition, some methods use biometric information to achieve identity authentication, which has limitations in some common scenarios.

[0006] IoT devices need to consider the limitations of limited resources while meeting the communication security requirements. Therefore, it is very meaningful to design an authentication method that can meet the requirements of anonymity, high efficiency and security in the IoT environment. Summary of the invention

[0007] In view of the above challenges and difficulties, the purpose of the present invention is to provide an anonymous mutual authentication key negotiation method for the Internet of Things based on blockchain. The present invention focuses on the Internet of Things scenario with limited resources, and designs a system model and an identity authentication method in combination with blockchain technology. First, the initialization is performed. The equipment manufacturer (EM) selects parameters such as a secure and collision-resistant universal one-way hash function and a cyclic additive group G. Then EM creates a Genesis file containing configuration parameters and publishes public system parameters. The second stage is the registration stage, which is assumed to be run in a secure environment. The registration stage is performed interactively by the Internet of Things device user (EU) or the server user (SU) and the equipment manufacturer. In this stage, the non-interactive Schnorr signature technology is mainly used. The EU and SU first send a registration request, and then EM uploads the generated EU and SU information to the smart contract for subsequent query, update and revocation. The third stage is the identity authentication and key negotiation stage, which is interactively run by the registered EU and SU. This process uses Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) to ensure that the EU has taken the correct steps in the communication, ensures the security, integrity and credibility of the communication, and knows the random number generated at the beginning. The signature is used to provide identity authentication and ensure the security of communication. These two mechanisms together ensure that the communication between the EU and the SU is secure and reliable. In addition, if the information of the EU or SU is leaked, a key update can be requested. When an update event occurs in the EU, the EM updates the information by calling the update function of the smart contract. It is worth noting that all information must be updated when the key is updated to prevent linkability. If the EM finds suspicious behavior of the device, it can directly send a revocation transaction and delete the corresponding information from the smart contract.

[0008] The security of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is based on the assumed difficulty of the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). Compared with Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), which is based on the mathematical difficulty of factoring large integers, the ECC-based method has the characteristics of smaller keys, lower computational complexity, and shorter operand length. ECDLP problem definition: Let E be an elliptic curve over a finite field Fp, points R and S are points of order q on G, and find an integer R such that R=rS. There is no known effective algorithm that can solve this problem in polynomial time, that is, ECDLP is a difficult problem in ECC and one of the security foundations of modern public key cryptosystems (such as elliptic curve encryption and elliptic curve digital signature algorithms). Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) is a key exchange protocol based on elliptic curves, which is used to securely exchange keys over insecure channels. The core idea of ​​ECDH is to use the difficulty of ECDLP to ensure the security of key exchange. The security of the present invention is based on the discrete logarithm problem in the elliptic curve group and the Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption (DDH).

[0009] During the registration phase, the non-interactive Schnorr signature technology is used, which is an efficient and secure signature scheme that is particularly suitable for scenarios with limited resources and the need for fast verification. Non-interactive Schnorr signature on message m: randomly select r, the prover generates a commitment R = rP, and uses the Fiat-Shamir heuristic transformation to calculate the challenge c = H(R, m), and then calculates the response s = r + cx, where the signature σ = (R, s). Finally, the verifier checks whether sP = R + cX holds. In addition, at this stage, the EM uploads the generated EU and SU information to the smart contract.

[0010] Zero-knowledge proof is a cryptographic method in which one party (the prover) can prove to another party (the verifier) ​​that a statement is true without revealing any information other than the validity of the statement itself. In the authentication and key agreement phases, the blockchain mainly plays the role of providing trust assistance for authentication. In addition, ZKP is used to ensure that the EU has taken the correct steps in the communication, ensures the security, integrity and credibility of the communication, and knows the random number generated at the beginning. The signature σ tIt is used to provide authentication for EU identity and ensure the security of communication. These two mechanisms together ensure that the communication between EU and SU is safe and reliable.

[0011] If the information of EU or SU is leaked, a key update can be requested. When an update event occurs in EU, EM updates the information by calling the smart contract update function. It is worth noting that all information should be updated when the key is updated to prevent linkability. If EM finds suspicious behavior from EU or SU, it can directly send a revocation transaction and delete the corresponding information entry from the smart contract. In addition, if EU or SU wants to leave the blockchain network, it can send a revocation request to EM, and EM will revoke the requester's key information accordingly by calling the smart contract revocation function.

[0012] Therefore, the present invention proposes an anonymous mutual authentication key negotiation method for the Internet of Things based on blockchain, which can be effectively applied in the Internet of Things scenario with limited resources to achieve an effective balance between security and efficiency.

[0013] In order to achieve the above object, the present invention provides the following technical solutions:

[0014] A blockchain-based anonymous mutual authentication key negotiation method for the Internet of Things, the method comprising the following steps:

[0015] Step 1) Initialization;

[0016] Step 2) Register using non-interactive Schnorr signature technology (hashing the challenge to eliminate the need for interaction);

[0017] Step 3) Use blockchain technology and zero-knowledge proof technology for identity authentication and key negotiation to ensure anonymity and privacy protection;

[0018] Step 4) mainly implements updates and revocations by calling smart contracts.

[0019] Further, the step 1) specifically comprises the following steps:

[0020] Step 11) Before registering the identity, the EM selects the parameters. First, a secure and collision-resistant universal one-way hash function is selected, and then the finite field F p Select a cyclic additive group G with base point P and prime order q on the elliptic curve E. Randomly select s←Z based on the elliptic curve encryption algorithm q As the master private key of EM, Z q is a multiplication cyclic group. Correspondingly, the EM master public key P is calculated pub =s·P.

[0021] Step 12) Blockchain initialization: EM creates a genesis file containing configuration parameters. EM will not publish s, but only publish public system parameters, namely the hash function H1 used, the elliptic curve E used, and the EM public key P pub , that is, param = (G, P, q, H1, Ppub).

[0022] Further, the step 2) specifically includes the following steps:

[0023] Step 21) SU → EM: {ID w , X w}, SU first randomly selects part of the private key x w ←Z q And calculate the partial public key X w =x w P, sends identity information and public key information to EM as a registration request.

[0024] Step 22) EM → SU: {σ w ,h w , PK w}, when receiving a registration request, EM first checks the ID w Has it been registered before? If it has been registered, terminate. Otherwise, continue. Randomly select part of the private key y w ←Z q And calculate the partial public key Y w =y w ·P, h w =H1(ID w ||X w ||P pub ||Y w ), signature key σ w =s+h w y w , PK w =σ w ·P, PID w =H1(PK w ) as the password. Next, set an expiration time ET for the server w , and then call updateBCSC(NULL, bytes32 PID, bytes32 publicKey, uint32 expirationTime) to set (PID w , E.T. w , Y w ) is uploaded to the smart contract. Finally, the calculated PK w ,h w and σ w Send to SU.

[0025] Step 23) SU first calculates PID w =H1(PK w ), by calling queryBCSC(bytes32 PID) to get (PID w , E.T. w , Y w ), by checking σ w P=PK w =P pub +h w Y w After verification, SU will securely store x w , X w , Y w , σ w , PID w ,h w And other related information. So far, SU registration is completed.

[0026] The registration process for EU is similar to that for SU, and specifically includes the following steps:

[0027] Step 24) EU → EM: {ID a , X a ,h x}, EU randomly selects h x , x a ←Z q , and calculate X a =x a P, sends a registration request to EM.

[0028] Step 25) EM→EU: {σ a ,h a , PK a}, where EM randomly selects y a ←Zq, calculate Y a =y a ·P, h a =H1(ID a ||X a ||P pub ||Y a ||h x ), signature key σ a =s+h a y a +y a , PK a =σ a ·P, PID a =H1(PK a ) as the password. EM also sets an expiration time ET for EU a , and (PIDa , E.T. a , Y a ) is uploaded to the smart contract. Finally, the calculated PK w ,h w and σ w Sent to EU.

[0029] Step 26) EU calculates PID a =H1(PK a ), call the query function to get (PID a , E.T. a , Y a ), check σ a P=PK a =P pub +h a Y a +Y a Is it true? After verification, EU will safely store x a , X a , Y a , σ a , PID a ,h a And other related information. So far, EU registration is completed.

[0030] Further, the step 3) specifically includes the following steps:

[0031] Step 31) EU→SU: {Hello Message, A, ts}, EU randomly selects r1, r2, r3, r4∈Z q , and calculate A = r1·X a .

[0032] Step 32) SU→EU: {W, h w ,pid w , σ z , t i}, if |t s -t s ’ |≤Δt, SU randomly selects r5∈Z q , calculate W = r5·X w , I g =H1(A||W),pid w =PK w ⊕I g , σ z =I g ·σ w +r5·x w Then W, h w ,pid w , σz , t i Sent to SU, where t i is the current timestamp, and Δt is the predefined threshold.

[0033] Step 33) EU→SU: {P1, P2, P3, T1, T2, s1, s2, σ t , t j}. If |t i -t i ’ |≤Δt, EU first calculates I g =H1(A||W), get PK w =pid w ⊕Ig, then EU calculates PID w =H1(PK w ), if the result of calling the query function to check the validity is "0", the user is determined to be invalid. Otherwise, if the returned ET w If it has not expired, check σ z P = I g ·P pub +I g ·h w ·Y w +W is true. If not, the session is terminated immediately; if true, EU calculates the session key K s =H1(r1x a W), calculate P1 = r2Y a , P2=r2P pub , P3=r2h a Y a , I a =H1(A||P1||P2||P3||T1||T2||W), σ t =I a r2σ a +r1 x a Then define two commitments T1=r3P pub and T2 = r4P1 to prove its knowledge of r2, and then calculate the ZKP response s1 = r2I a +r3,s2=h a I a +r4. Later, it is up to SU to verify these ZKP responses.

[0034] In this process, ZKP is mainly used to ensure that EU has taken the correct steps in the communication, ensure the security, integrity and credibility of the communication, and know the r2 generated at the beginning. tIt is used to provide authentication for EU identity and ensure the security of communication. These two mechanisms together ensure that the communication between EU and SU is safe and reliable.

[0035] Step 34) If |t j -t j ’ |≤Δt, SU calculates I a =H1(A||P1||P2||P3||T1||T2||W) and then check σ t P = I a ·P1+I a ·P2+I a Is P3+A true? If true, continue to check s1 P pub =I a P 2+ T1、s2 P1 P=I a P3+T2 is established to verify these ZKP responses. If established, calculate the session key K s ’ =H1(r5·x w A), verify K s ’ =H1(r5·x w ·A)=H1(r5·x w ·r1·X a )=H1(r5·X w ·r1·x a )=H1(r1x a W)=K s Is it established? If so, mutual authentication is successful.

[0036] Further, the step 4) specifically comprises the following steps:

[0037] Step 41) If the information of EU or SU is leaked, a key update can be requested. When an update event occurs in EU, EM calls the smart contract updateBCSC(oldPID a , PID a , E.T. a ) to update the information. It is worth noting that when the key is updated, all information must be updated to prevent linking.

[0038] If EM finds suspicious behavior from EU (or SU), it can directly send a revocation transaction and delete the entry (PID a , Y a , E.T. a). In addition, if EU or SU wants to leave the blockchain network, they can send a revocation request to EM, and EM will revoke the requester's key information accordingly by calling the smart contract revokeBCSC(PID).

[0039] Beneficial effects:

[0040] 1. The proposed initialization phase combined with elliptic curve cryptography can ensure the security of subsequent key exchange with smaller keys, lower computational complexity and shorter operation length.

[0041] 2. Register EU and SU through non-interactive Schnorr signature technology. Non-interactive Schnorr signature technology is an efficient and secure signature method, especially suitable for scenarios with limited resources and requiring fast verification.

[0042] 3. The blockchain technology is used to provide trust assistance, and zero-knowledge proof is combined to ensure the security, integrity and credibility of communications. This ensures that the communication process for mutual identity authentication is safe and reliable.

[0043] 4. Use smart contracts to manage key information, mainly by mapping the EU or SU's public key to the transaction identity in the blockchain through smart contracts. Among them, only registered users can query information, and both the update function and the revocation function can only be called by the EM, ensuring that the new transaction identity is mapped to the corresponding public key and revoked in time when malicious behavior is detected. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0044] In order to make the purpose, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more clear, the present invention will be described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, wherein:

[0045] Figure 1 The overall working steps diagram

[0046] Figure 2 System model diagram

[0047] Figure 3 Process diagram of the registration phase for server user SU

[0048] Figure 4 EU registration process diagram for IoT device users

[0049] Figure 5 Diagram of the mutual authentication and key negotiation process between EU and SU DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0050] The preferred embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0051] The present invention proposes an anonymous mutual authentication key negotiation method for the Internet of Things based on blockchain, such as Figure 3 It is a process diagram of the server user SU registration phase of the present invention. Figure 4 This is a diagram of the registration process of the Internet of Things device user EU of the present invention, Figure 5 The diagram shows the mutual authentication and key negotiation process between EU and SU. Figure 3 , 4 As shown in the working process diagram of 5, the method comprises the following steps:

[0052] Step 1: Initialization, EM first selects parameters such as a secure and collision-resistant universal one-way hash function and a cyclic additive group G. Then EM creates a genesis file containing configuration parameters and publishes public system parameters.

[0053] Step 2: Assume that the registration phase is run in a secure environment. The registration phase is performed interactively by the EU or SU and the EM. In this phase, the non-interactive Schnorr signature technology is mainly used. The EU and SU send the registration request first, and then the EM uploads the generated IoT device and server information to the smart contract for subsequent query, update and revocation.

[0054] Step 3: The authentication and key agreement phase is interactively run by the registered EU and SU. This process uses zero-knowledge proof to ensure that the EU has taken the correct steps in the communication, ensures the security, integrity and credibility of the communication, and knows the random number generated at the beginning. The signature is used to provide identity authentication and ensure the security of communication. These two mechanisms together ensure that the communication between the EU and SU is secure and reliable.

[0055] Step 4: If the information of EU or SU is leaked, a key update can be requested. When an update event occurs in EU, EM updates the information by calling the update function of the smart contract. It is worth noting that all information must be updated when the key is updated to prevent linkability. If EM finds suspicious behavior of the device, it can directly send a revocation transaction and delete the corresponding information from the smart contract.

[0056] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solution of the present invention rather than to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the preferred embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that the technical solution of the present invention can be modified or replaced by equivalents without departing from the purpose and scope of the technical solution, which should be included in the scope of the claims of the present invention.

Claims

1. Anonymous mutual authentication key negotiation method for IoT based on blockchain The following steps are involved: S1) Initialization; S2) Registration is done using non-interactive Schnorr signature technology that uses challenge hashing to eliminate the need for interaction; S3) uses blockchain technology and zero-knowledge proof technology (Zero-Knowledge Proof, ZKP) for identity authentication and key negotiation to ensure anonymity and privacy protection; S4) is mainly updated and revoked by calling smart contracts.

2. According to the blockchain-based anonymous mutual authentication key negotiation method for the Internet of Things according to claim 1: in step S1 The following steps are involved: Step S11) Before registering the identity, the equipment manufacturer (EM) selects parameters. First, a secure and collision-resistant universal one-way hash function is selected, and then a cyclic additive group G with a base point P and a prime order q is selected on the elliptic curve E over the finite field Fp. Based on the elliptic curve encryption algorithm, s←Z is randomly selected. q As the master private key of EM, Z q is a multiplication cyclic group. Correspondingly, the EM master public key P is calculated pub =s·P. Step 12) Blockchain initialization: EM creates a genesis file containing configuration parameters. EM will not publish s, but only publish public system parameters, namely the hash function H used. 1 , the elliptic curve E and EM public key P used pub , that is, param = (G, P, q, H 1 , P pub ).

3. According to the blockchain-based anonymous mutual authentication key negotiation method for the Internet of Things according to claim 1: in step S2 The following steps are involved: Step 21) SU → EM: {ID w , X w }, the server user (Server User, SU) first randomly selects part of the private key x w ←Z q And calculate the partial public key X w =x w P, sends identity information and public key information to EM as a registration request. Step 22) EM → SU: {σ w ,h w , PK w }, when receiving a registration request, EM first checks the ID w Has it been registered before? If it has been registered, terminate. Otherwise, continue. Randomly select part of the private key y w ←Z q And calculate the partial public key Y w =y w ·P, h w =H 1 (ID w ||X w ||P pub ||Y w ), signature key σ w =s+h w y w , PK w =σ w ·P, PID w =H 1 (PK w ) as the password. Next, set an expiration time ET for the server w , and then call updateBCSC(NULL, bytes32 PID, bytes32publicKey, uint32 expirationTime) to set (PID w , E.T. w , Y w ) is uploaded to the smart contract. Finally, the calculated PK w ,h w and σ w Send to SU. Step 23) SU first calculates PID w =H 1 (PK w ), by calling queryBCSC(bytes32 PID) to get (PID w , E.T. w , Y w ), by checking σ w P=PK w =P pub +h w Y w After verification, SU will securely store x w , X w , Y w , σ w , PID w ,h w So far, the registration of server user SU is completed. The registration process of an IoT device user (Equipment User, EU) is similar to the registration process of a server user SU, and specifically includes the following steps: Step 24) EU → EM: {ID a , X a ,h x }, EU randomly selects h x , x a ←Z q , and calculate X a =x a P, sends a registration request to EM. Step 25) EM→EU: {σ a ,h a , PK a }, where EM randomly selects y a ←Z q , calculate Y a =y a ·P, h a =H 1 (ID a ||X a ||P pub ||Y a ||h x ), signature key σ a =s+h a y a +y a , PK a =σ a ·P, PID a =H 1 (PK a ) as the password. EM also sets an expiration time ET for EU a , and (PID a , E.T. a , Y a ) is uploaded to the smart contract. Finally, the calculated PK w ,h w and σ w Sent to EU. Step 26) EU calculates PID a =H 1 (PK a ), call the query function to get (PID a , E.T. a , Y a ), check σ a P=PK a =P pub +h a Y a +Y a Is it true? After verification, EU will safely store x a , X a , Y a , σ a , PID a ,h a And other related information. So far, EU registration is completed.

4. According to the blockchain-based anonymous mutual authentication key negotiation method for the Internet of Things according to claim 1: in step S3 The following steps are involved: Step 31) EU→SU: {Hello Message, A, t s }, EU randomly selects r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 ∈Z q , and calculate A = r 1 ·X a . Step 32) SU→EU: {W, h w ,pid w , σ z , t i }, if |t s -t s ’ |≤Δt, SU randomly selects r 5 ∈Z q , calculate W = r 5 ·X w , I g =H 1 (A||W), pid w =PK w ⊕I g , σ z =I g ·σ w +r 5 ·x w Then W, h w ,pid w , σ z , t i Sent to SU, where t i is the current timestamp, and Δt is the predefined threshold. Step 33) EU → SU: {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , T 1 , T 2 ,s 1 ,s 2 , σ t , t j }. If |t i -t i ’ |≤Δt, EU first calculates I g =H 1 (A||W), get PK w =pid w ⊕I g Then EU calculates PID = H 1 (PK w ), if the result of calling the query function to check the validity is "0", the user is determined to be invalid. Otherwise, if the returned ET w If it has not expired, check σ z P = I g ·P pub +I g ·h w ·Y w +W is true. If not, the session is terminated immediately; if true, EU calculates the session key K s =H 1 (r 1 x a W), calculate P 1 =r 2 Y a , P 2 =r 2 P pub , P 3 =r 2 h a Y a , I a =H 1 (A||P 1 ||P 2 ||P 3 ||T 1 ||T 2 ||W),σ t =I a r 2 σ a +r 1 x a Then define two promises T 1 =r 3 P pub and T 2 =r 4 P 1 To prove that he knows r 2 Then calculate the ZKP response s 1 =r 2 I a +r 3 ,s 2 =h a I a +r 4 . Later, it is up to the SU to verify these ZKP responses. Step 34) If |t j -t j ’ |≤Δt, SU calculates I a =H 1 (A||P 1 ||P 2 ||P 3 ||T 1 ||T 2 ||W) and then check σ t P = I a ·P 1 +I a ·P 2 +I a ·P 3 +A is true, if true, continue to check s 1 P pub =I a P 2 +T 1 、s 2 P 1 P=I a P 3 +T 2 If true, the session key K is calculated. s ’ =H 1 (r 5 ·x w A), verify K s ’ =H 1 (r 5 ·x w ·A)=H 1 (r 5 ·x w ·r 1 ·X a )=H 1 (r 5 ·X w ·r 1 ·x a )=H 1 (r 1 x a W)=K s Is it established? If so, mutual authentication is successful.

5. The anonymous mutual authentication key negotiation method for the Internet of Things based on blockchain according to claim 1: Step S4 The following steps are involved: Step 41) If the information of EU or SU is leaked, a key update can be requested. When an update event occurs in EU, EM calls the smart contract updateBCSC(oldPID a , PID a , E.T. a ) to update the information. It is worth noting that when the key is updated, all information must be updated to prevent linking. If EM finds suspicious behavior from EU (or SU), it can directly send a revocation transaction and delete the entry (PID a , Y a , E.T. a ). In addition, if EU or SU wants to leave the blockchain network, they can send a revocation request to EM, and EM will revoke the requester's key information accordingly by calling the smart contract revokeBCSC(PID).