Two-factor authentication method and system

By using biological information and digital signatures in a two-factor authentication scheme, combined with fuzzy extractor and public key encryption technology, the problems of replay attacks and malicious server attacks in the existing technology are solved, and higher security and efficiency are achieved. Meet the authentication needs of users.

CN118944900AActive Publication Date: 2024-11-12SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202310523190.4
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2023-05-10
Publication Date
2024-11-12
Estimated Expiration
2043-05-10

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing two-factor authentication scheme cannot withstand replay attacks and malicious server attacks, and is low in efficiency and insufficient security, which cannot meet users' high security and high efficiency needs.

Method used

A two-factor authentication scheme based on biological information and digital signatures is adopted to randomly generate challenges through the server to resist replay attacks, use a fuzzy extractor to protect biometric information, and the digital signature public key encryption protects private key information to realize two-factor authentication.

Benefits of technology

It significantly improves the security and efficiency of authentication, can effectively defend against replay attacks and malicious server attacks, and meets users' high security and high efficiency needs.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention relates to the technical field of computer security, and discloses a two-factor authentication method and system, the method is a two-factor authentication technology based on biological information and digital signatures, and a public key encryption scheme of the digital signatures and a fuzzy extractor are used for protecting the biological information to realize an authentication process. And the method has the capability of resisting replay attacks and malicious server attacks. Specifically, according to the scheme, a server randomly generates a challenge number to resist a replay attack; and malicious user attacks are resisted by using two-factor authentication of a biological authentication factor and a private key authentication factor. Meanwhile, according to the scheme, a fuzzy extractor is used for protecting biological characteristic information of the user, a public key encryption scheme of digital signature is used for protecting private key information of the user, and therefore malicious server attacks are resisted. According to the method and the device, the authentication safety and the authentication efficiency are remarkably improved, and the requirements of the user can be better met.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of computer security technology, and in particular to identity authentication technology. Background Art

[0002] This section is intended to provide a background or context to the embodiments of the present application as recited in the claims. The description herein is not admitted to be prior art as disclosed by virtue of its inclusion in this section.

[0003] Two-factor authentication schemes refer to authentication schemes that use two different authentication factors to verify the identity of a user. Usually, the two factors include the user's physical characteristics (such as fingerprints, facial recognition, iris scans, etc.) and a secret factor (such as a password, private key, etc.). In a two-factor authentication scheme, the user needs to provide both factors at the same time to pass the identity authentication. Compared with single-factor authentication, two-factor authentication schemes are more secure because an attacker needs to obtain two different factors at the same time to successfully impersonate a user.

[0004] The following further introduces the two-factor authentication solution in the prior art.

[0005] See also Figure 1 The user registers with the server. In the registration phase, the user first calls the homomorphic encryption key generation algorithm to generate a pair of public and private keys (pk, sk) ← HE.KeyGen(1 λ ), collect the user's facial information feature vector Γ=(Γ1,…,Γ k ). Then call the homomorphic encryption algorithm for each bit to get c i =(α i ,β i )←HE.Enc(pk,Γ i ). Combine ID with ciphertext c1,…,c k And the public key pk is sent to the server, which stores it.

[0006] In the authentication phase, the BlindESED algorithm is used to represent the blind squared Euclidean distance algorithm.

[0007] See also Figure 2 , when a user wants to authenticate, the following steps are performed:

[0008] Step 1: First, sample the facial biometrics to obtain Γ′=(Γ1′,…,Γ k ′), the user's ID, and C i ′=(α i ,β i )←HE.Enc(pk,Γ i ′) is sent to the server.

[0009] Step 2: The server receives C i 'After that, r0 and r1 are uniformly randomly generated and the blind squared Euclidean distance calculation algorithm is called to obtain the second-order ciphertext S * =(α * ,β * ) is sent to the user.

[0010] Step 3: User receives S * After that, call the decryption algorithm s * ←HE.Dec(sk,S * ) is sent to the server.

[0011] Step 4: The server will * Calculate the threshold s and compare it with the standard threshold to determine whether the authentication is passed.

[0012] However, the above solution has the following technical problems:

[0013] Unable to resist replay attacks: A malicious user can pass the authentication by replaying the first message without knowing the user's facial feature vector, so this scheme cannot prevent replay attacks.

[0014] Weak security model: This scheme only considers "honest but curious" servers and cannot prevent attacks from malicious servers. The server can replace S with its stored ciphertext C in the second step of the authentication phase. * It is sent to the user for decryption, so that the server can obtain the user's facial feature vector, thus breaking the security.

[0015] Low efficiency: This scheme uses a quadratic homomorphic encryption scheme, which has low encryption and decryption efficiency, so it may face efficiency issues in practical applications.

[0016] Therefore, the above solution has low security and low efficiency and cannot well meet the needs of users. Summary of the invention

[0017] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a two-factor authentication method and system to solve the problems raised in the above background technology.

[0018] The present application discloses a two-factor authentication method, comprising:

[0019] Step A: In the initialization phase, the system calls the initialization algorithm of the signature algorithm and sets the system parameters;

[0020] Step B: During the user registration phase, the user calls the key generation algorithm of the signature algorithm to generate a first pair of public and private keys according to the system parameters, samples his / her own biometric features, calls the generation algorithm of the fuzzy extractor to operate the biometric authentication factor w to generate public auxiliary information and a character string, uses the character string as a random number of the key generation algorithm of the signature algorithm to generate a second pair of public and private keys, sends the first pair of public and private keys and the public key of the second pair of public and private keys to the server for storage, and stores the private key of the first pair of public and private keys and the public auxiliary information in the user device;

[0021] Step C: During the user authentication phase, the server sends a random number to the user, and obtains two signatures based on the random number. The server authenticates the two signatures with the public key stored therein.

[0022] In a preferred embodiment, in step A, the server first calls the initialization algorithm of the signature algorithm to generate pp SIG , and pp SIG As the system parameter pp 2fa to set it up.

[0023] In a preferred embodiment, in step B, user id c Call the key generation algorithm of the signature algorithm (vk1, sk1) ← SIG.KeyGen(pp SIG ) generates a pair of public and private keys, and samples its own biometric features w←Sample(W), then calls the fuzzy extractor generation algorithm (R,P)←FE.Gen(w) on the biometric authentication factor w to obtain public auxiliary information P and string R; uses string R to generate another pair of public and private keys (vk2,sk2)←SIG.KeyGen(pp;R); c , vk1, vk2 are sent to the server, and P, sk1 is stored in the user's device, where id c represents the identity identifier of the user, w represents the user's biometric authentication factor, P is public auxiliary information, R is a character string, vk1 and vk2 represent the public keys generated by the user, and sk1 and sk2 represent the private key authentication factors generated by the user.

[0024] In a preferred example, the private key authentication factor is stored confidentially by the user, and only the user knows its value, which cannot be obtained by others.

[0025] In a preferred example, the biometric authentication factor of the user is one of the following or any combination thereof: a facial image of the user, a fingerprint of the user, or an iris of the user.

[0026] In a preferred embodiment, in step C, the user requests a service from the server, and the server obtains (id c,vk1,vk2) and send a random number r to the user, sample the biometric features to get w′, then call the fuzzy extractor’s regeneration algorithm for w′ and P to generate R′, use R′ as the random number of the key generation algorithm of the signature algorithm, and generate a pair of public and private keys (vk′2,sk′2); for the random number r, call two signature algorithms to get σ1 and σ2 respectively, and send the two signatures σ1 and σ2 to the server. After receiving the signatures σ1 and σ2, the server obtains b1 and b2 respectively. The authentication result is b=b1·b2.

[0027] In a preferred example, if b=1, the authentication succeeds, otherwise the authentication fails.

[0028] In a preferred embodiment, the step C further comprises the following steps:

[0029] The user requests a service from the server and sends a request message (id c ,Request) is sent to the server, and a random number r is sent to the user;

[0030] The server first obtains the user identity identifier id from its database c The corresponding biometric authentication factor w′ and public auxiliary information P, then call the regeneration algorithm of the fuzzy extractor to generate a string R′, use R′ as the random number of the key generation algorithm of the signature scheme, generate a pair of public and private keys (vk′2, sk′2), and call the signature algorithm (sk1, r) for the random number r to get σ1 and the signature algorithm (sk′2, r) to get σ2, and send the two signatures to the server;

[0031] After receiving signatures σ1 and σ2, the server uses the public key authentication factor vk1, message r and σ1 to verify b1, and uses the public key authentication factor vk2, message r and σ2 to verify b2. The authentication result is b=b1·b2.

[0032] The present application discloses a two-factor authentication system, comprising:

[0033] a memory for storing computer executable instructions; and,

[0034] A processor is used to implement the steps in the method described above when executing the computer executable instructions.

[0035] The present application also discloses a computer-readable storage medium in which computer-executable instructions are stored. When the computer-executable instructions are executed by a processor, the steps in the method described above are implemented.

[0036] In the implementation mode of the present application, a two-factor authentication scheme based on biometric information and public key encryption is intended to improve the security and efficiency of authentication. The method is a two-factor authentication technology based on biometric information and digital signatures, in which a public key encryption scheme with digital signatures and a fuzzy extractor are used to protect the biometric information to implement the authentication process, and has the ability to resist replay attacks and malicious server attacks. Specifically, the scheme resists replay attacks by randomly generating challenge numbers through the server; and uses two-factor authentication of biometric authentication factors and private key authentication factors to resist malicious user attacks. At the same time, the scheme uses a fuzzy extractor to protect the user's biometric information, and uses a public key encryption scheme with digital signatures to protect the user's private key information, thereby resisting malicious server attacks. The present application significantly improves the security and efficiency of authentication, and can better meet the needs of users.

[0037] A large number of technical features are recorded in the specification of this application, which are distributed in various technical solutions. If all possible combinations of technical features of this application (i.e., technical solutions) are to be listed, the specification will be too long. In order to avoid this problem, the various technical features disclosed in the above-mentioned invention content of this application, the various technical features disclosed in the various embodiments and examples below, and the various technical features disclosed in the accompanying drawings can be freely combined with each other to form various new technical solutions (these technical solutions are all deemed to have been recorded in this specification), unless the combination of such technical features is technically infeasible. For example, in one example, feature A+B+C is disclosed, and in another example, feature A+B+D+E is disclosed, and features C and D are equivalent technical means that play the same role. Technically, only one can be used, and it is impossible to use them at the same time. Feature E can be combined with feature C technically. Then, the solution of A+B+C+D should not be deemed to have been recorded because it is technically infeasible, and the solution of A+B+C+E should be deemed to have been recorded. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0038] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the user registration stage with the server in the prior art authentication;

[0039] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the authentication stage of a user to a server in the prior art authentication;

[0040] Figure 3 is a flowchart of a two-factor authentication method according to the first implementation mode of the present application;

[0041] Figure 4 Schematic diagram of a two-factor authentication protocol based on biometric signature in a two-factor authentication method according to the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0042] In the following description, many technical details are provided to help readers better understand the present application. However, those skilled in the art can understand that the technical solution claimed in the present application can be implemented even without these technical details and various changes and modifications based on the following embodiments.

[0043] Description of some concepts:

[0044] Authentication factor: The evidence provided by the authenticated party to prove his or her identity is called authentication factor. Authentication factor can be PIN value, password value, physical unclonable function value, inherent biometric features such as fingerprint, face, etc.

[0045] Two-factor authentication: Two-factor authentication refers to the use of two different authentication factors for authentication. Single-factor authentication refers to the use of a single authentication factor for authentication. With the popularity of remote services, people's requirements for security are gradually increasing, and the security strength of single-factor authentication may not meet the requirements. Therefore, two-factor authentication is gradually being considered for application by some authentication schemes. Two-factor authentication is safer than single-factor authentication. Its advantage is that when one of the two authentication factors is obtained by the adversary, the other can still ensure the security of the protocol. In January 2022, the Office of the President of the United States issued a memorandum requiring federal government agencies to meet specific cybersecurity standards, including the use of multi-factor authentication, to strengthen the government's defenses against increasingly complex threat activities.

[0046] Client-server authentication system: There is a user and a server in the system. The user obtains services by using the client device to authenticate to the server. The server authenticates the user's identity by executing the authentication protocol and provides services to the authenticated user.

[0047] Adversary’s attack behavior: According to the nature of the adversary’s attack behavior, it can be divided into two categories.

[0048] (1) Passive attack: The adversary can observe every message or data sent or received in the communication, but cannot update or modify them. For example, eavesdropping is a passive attack.

[0049] (2) Active attack: The adversary can modify, replay, intercept, etc. the messages transmitted in the channel.

[0050] Security Model:

[0051] In the client-server authentication system, based on the role of the adversary and the nature of the above attack behaviors, the adversary can be divided into the following three types:

[0052] (1) Malicious server: A malicious server will target a client and attempt to obtain the user's private information related to the authentication factor through some active or passive attacks;

[0053] (2) Honest but curious server: An honest but curious server will target a certain client and execute the protocol normally, trying to learn the other party's private information from the normal execution of the protocol, but the server will not launch malicious active attacks;

[0054] (3) Malicious users: Malicious users can launch both passive attacks and active attacks on the server, and may even steal some (but not all) of the target user's authentication factors, thereby impersonating the target user to achieve authentication.

[0055] The above three adversaries can be combined to obtain the following two security models and security goals:

[0056] Model 1: The adversary can be a malicious server or a malicious user.

[0057] Model 2: The enemy can be an honest but curious server or a malicious user.

[0058] Security goal: When the adversary is a malicious server / honest but curious server, the goal of two-factor authentication is that the adversary cannot obtain the secret information supporting the user authentication factor; when the adversary is a malicious user, the goal of two-factor authentication is that the adversary cannot impersonate other legitimate users to pass authentication.

[0059] From the definition of the adversary type, we know that model 1 is stronger than 2.

[0060] The specific application scenarios of this application are described in detail below. This application can be applied to scenarios such as e-commerce and online banking, where users obtain services through two-factor authentication. Users must hold two authentication factors at the same time to pass the authentication. When an adversary steals one authentication factor and the other authentication factor is missing, the authentication cannot be passed. Compared with single-factor authentication, two-factor authentication can greatly increase the threshold for authentication and prevent unauthorized users from abusing the rights of authorized users.

[0061] After in-depth research and analysis, the inventor of this application creatively proposed a new two-factor authentication method and system for the technical problems raised in the background technology. This application designs a new and efficient two-factor authentication protocol based on biometric information and signature technology.

[0062] The dual factor in this application is: one authentication factor is the user's biometric information Another authentication factor is the private key sk1 generated by the user's signature.

[0063] The two-factor authentication protocol of this application takes into account a stronger security model (the server initiates a malicious active attack), and the authentication effect to be achieved is as follows:

[0064] 1. Legitimate users have two authentication factors: their own biometric information and signature private key. With the help of these two authentication factors, users can authenticate their identities to the server.

[0065] 2. The adversary steals one authentication factor of the user (it may be the user's biometric authentication factor or the user's signature private key authentication factor, but not both), and the missing other authentication factor can ensure that the adversary cannot impersonate the user to authenticate to the server.

[0066] 3. A malicious server can conduct a malicious active attack, but still cannot obtain any of the user's secret information supporting the authentication factor.

[0067] Therefore, the two-factor authentication of this application is a more secure and efficient identity authentication method, which can effectively defend against malicious attacks. In practical applications, the authentication protocol can be applied to various scenarios, such as identity authentication in the fields of finance, e-commerce, and the Internet of Things.

[0068] In order to make the objectives, technical solutions and advantages of the present application clearer, the implementation methods of the present application will be further described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0069] The first implementation of the present application relates to a two-factor authentication method, the process of which is as follows: Figure 3 As shown, the method comprises the following steps:

[0070] Step 101: In the initialization phase, the system calls the initialization algorithm of the signature algorithm and sets the system parameters;

[0071] Step 102: During the user registration phase, the user calls the key generation algorithm of the signature algorithm to generate a first pair of public and private keys according to the system parameters, samples his / her own biometric features, calls the generation algorithm of the fuzzy extractor to operate the biometric authentication factor w to generate public auxiliary information and a character string, uses the character string as a random number of the key generation algorithm of the signature algorithm to generate a second pair of public and private keys, sends the first pair of public and private keys and the public key of the second pair of public and private keys to the server for storage, and stores the private key of the first pair of public and private keys and the public auxiliary information in the user device;

[0072] Step 103: During the user authentication phase, the server sends a random number to the user, and obtains two signatures based on the random number. The server authenticates the two signatures with the public key stored therein.

[0073] Digital signature schemes are important components in public key cryptography, such as Schnorr signatures. We first introduce the semantics and security of signature schemes. Digital signature schemes include four algorithms, represented by SIG = (SIG.Setup, SIG.Gen, SIG.Sign, SIG.Vrfy).

[0074] Initialization algorithm pp←SIG.Setup(1 λ ): Enter security parameter 1 λ , output the public parameter pp.

[0075] Key generation algorithm (vk, sk)←SIG.Gen(pp): Input the system public parameter pp and output a pair of verification key and signature key (vk, sk).

[0076] Signature algorithm σ←SIG.Sign(sk,m): input signature private key sk and message m output signature

[0077] Verification algorithm 0 / 1←SIG.Vrfy(vk,m,σ): input verification key vk, message m and signature σ, and output verification result 0 / 1.

[0078] For all pp←SIG.Setup(1 λ ), (vk, sk)←SIG.Gen(pp) and m in the message space, we have SIG.Vrfy(vk, m, SIG.Sign(sk, m)) = 1. For any PPT adversary, the probability of successfully forging a signature is negligible.

[0079] Furthermore, the fuzzy extractor consists of two algorithms FE=(FE.Gen, FE.Rep).

[0080] The generation algorithm (R, P)←FE.Gen(w) takes a sample of the input source w∈M and generates public auxiliary information P and a string R;

[0081] The regeneration algorithm R′←FE.Rep(w′,P) takes another sample w′ of the input source and the public auxiliary information P and generates a string R′.

[0082] Correctness means that for all w,w′∈M, the Hamming distance between w and w′ is close enough, and for all (R,P)←FE.Gen(w), we have FE.Rep(w′,P)=R.

[0083] Security means that if M has sufficient minimum entropy, for all (R,P)←FE.Gen(w), then any PPT adversary who sees public auxiliary information will find that P and R are pseudo-random.

[0084] refer to Figure 4 As shown, each step is described in detail below.

[0085] In step 101, the server first calls the signature initialization algorithm to generate pp SIG , and pp SIG As the system parameter pp 2fa to set it up.

[0086] In step 102, during the user registration phase, the user uses the key generation algorithm (vk1, sk1)←SIG.KeyGen(pp SIG ) generates a pair of public and private keys, and samples its own biometric features w←Sample(W), then calls the fuzzy extractor generation algorithm (R,P)←FE.Gen(w) on the biometric authentication factor w to obtain public auxiliary information P and string R; use R to generate another pair of public and private keys (vk2,sk2)←SIG.KeyGen(pp;R); c , vk1, vk2 are sent to the server, and the server updates the database DB: = DB∪{(id c ,vk1,vk2)},P,sk1 is secretly stored in the user device.

[0087] Among them, id c represents the user's identity identifier, w represents the user's biometric authentication factor, which can refer to the user's facial image, fingerprint, iris and other biometric information. P is public auxiliary information, R is a string, vk1 and vk2 represent the public key generated by the digital signature and biometric information respectively, and sk1 and sk2 represent the private key authentication factor generated by the digital signature and biometric information respectively. The private key authentication factor is stored confidentially by the user, and only the user knows its value, and others cannot obtain it.

[0088] In step 103, during the user authentication phase, the user sends a request service (id c ,Request), the server obtains (id c ,vk1,vk2), send a random number r to the user; after receiving the random number r, the user samples the source to get w′, then calls the fuzzy extractor's regeneration algorithm for w′ and P to generate R′, uses R′ as the random number of the key generation algorithm of the signature scheme, and generates the public and private keys (vk′2,sk′2); for the random number r, call the two signature algorithms to get σ1 and σ2 respectively, and send the two signatures σ1, σ2 to the server. After receiving the signatures σ1, σ2, the server obtains b1 and b2 respectively. The authentication result is b=b1·b2.

[0089] Among them, (idc,Request) refers to the request message sent by the user when requesting service from the server, where id c Represents the user's identity, and Request represents the user's request content. r refers to the challenge number randomly generated by the server in the specific step 202 below, which is used to prevent replay attacks. After the client receives r, it generates the string R′ by calling the regeneration algorithm of the fuzzy extractor on w′ and P to generate the public and private keys (vk′2, sk′2) for authentication in subsequent steps. This method can resist replay attacks because malicious attackers cannot know the true challenge number r and thus cannot reuse previous authentication requests. σ1 and σ2 are two signatures obtained by calling the signature algorithm by combining two private key authentication factors and r respectively. b is a Boolean value representing the authentication result. If b is 1, it means the authentication is successful, otherwise it means the authentication fails.

[0090] This step embodies the characteristics of "using a public key encryption scheme with digital signatures to protect user private key information to resist malicious server attacks", "using two-factor authentication of biometric authentication factors and private key authentication factors to resist malicious user attacks", and "using a fuzzy extractor to protect user biometric information".

[0091] Step 103 further includes steps 201-204, which are as follows:

[0092] Step 201: The user requests a service from the server and sends a request message (id c ,Request) is sent to the server;

[0093] Step 202: The server receives the request message (id c ,Request), first retrieve (id c ,vk1,vk2), send a random number r to the user.

[0094] That is, the server first obtains the user identity identifier id from the database c The corresponding two public keys vk1 and vk2, then randomly generate a challenge number r, and the server sends r to the user for the user's subsequent authentication process. The purpose of this step is to prevent replay attacks and use the unforgeability of digital signatures to protect the challenge number r, thereby resisting malicious server attacks.

[0095] Step 203: After receiving the random number r, the user combines the corresponding biometric authentication factor w′ and the public auxiliary information P, and then calls the regeneration algorithm of the fuzzy extractor to generate a string R′, and uses R′ as the random number of the key generation algorithm of the signature scheme to generate a pair of public and private keys (vk′2, sk′2); for the random number r, the signature algorithm (sk1, r) is called to obtain σ1 and the signature algorithm (sk′2, r) is called to obtain σ2, and the two signatures are sent to the server;

[0096] That is to say, after receiving the random number r, the user first uses his own private key authentication factor sk1 to sign r to obtain σ1; then samples his own biometric source to obtain the biometric authentication factor w′, and then uses the fuzzy extractor's regeneration algorithm and the signature scheme's key generation algorithm to obtain the private key authentication factor sk′2, signs r to obtain σ2, and sends σ1 and σ2 to the server.

[0097] This step reflects the use of digital signature public key encryption scheme to protect user private key information, thereby resisting malicious server attacks. In this step, the user uses his own private key authentication factor to sign, and the malicious server cannot know the user's private key authentication factor, and thus cannot attack by replacing the challenge number.

[0098] Furthermore, this step also reflects "using two-factor authentication of biometric authentication factors and private key authentication factors to resist malicious user attacks", in which the user uses his own private key authentication factor to sign and samples his own biological source to obtain the biometric authentication factor, and combines the two factors together for authentication to ensure that the authentication request comes from a legitimate user.

[0099] Step 204: After receiving signatures σ1 and σ2, the server uses the public key authentication factor vk1, message r and σ1 to verify b1, and uses the public key authentication factor vk2, message r and σ2 to verify b2. The authentication result is b=b1·b2.

[0100] That is, the server first uses the public key authentication factor vk1 to verify the challenge number r and the signature σ1 to obtain b1, and then uses the public key authentication factor vk2 to verify the challenge number r and the signature σ2 to obtain b2. The authentication result is b = b1·b2. If b = 1, the authentication is successful; otherwise, the authentication fails.

[0101] Technical effects:

[0102] As mentioned above, the solutions based on homomorphic encryption in the prior art have the following technical problems: they cannot resist replay attacks; they cannot resist attacks from malicious servers; and they are inefficient. Compared with the prior art, the technical solution of the present application can resist replay attacks and attacks from malicious servers, and it is more efficient. The details are as follows:

[0103] First, high security:

[0104] Compared with single-factor authentication, two-factor authentication has higher security strength. If one factor is lost, the other factor can still ensure that the adversary cannot impersonate the user to pass the authentication.

[0105] In the second step, the server uses the fresh number r as a challenge, so each challenge is different. In order to pass the authentication, the adversary must respond correctly to the fresh number, so the adversary cannot replay the message to pass the authentication;

[0106] The adversary only obtains the user's private key authentication factor, but does not have another authentication factor of the user - the biometric feature: in this case, because the adversary does not know the user's biometric information, the security of the fuzzy extractor ensures that it is difficult for the adversary to recover the signature private key. Therefore, due to the unforgeability of the signature, it is difficult to give a valid signature σ2 through the server's authentication.

[0107] The adversary only obtains the user's biometric authentication factor, but does not have the user's other authentication factor - the private key: in this case, due to the unforgeability of digital signatures, it is difficult for the adversary to give a valid signature σ1 through authentication.

[0108] The adversary is a malicious server that does not obtain the target user's secret information: Due to the unforgeability of the signature scheme and the security of the fuzzy extractor, the adversary cannot calculate the target user's secret information.

[0109] Second, good scalability: the scheme can be further expanded to two-way authentication: this protocol implements the authentication of the server to the user, which is a one-way authentication. In the second step of the protocol, the server can sign the random message it sends, and the user verifies the message signature. In this way, the user can authenticate the server, and then realize the authentication of both parties.

[0110] In addition, the embodiment of the present application also provides a two-factor authentication system, which includes a memory for storing computer executable instructions, and a processor; the processor is used to implement the steps in the above-mentioned method implementation when executing the computer executable instructions in the memory. Among them, the processor can be a central processing unit (Central Processing Unit, referred to as "CPU"), or other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (Digital Signal Processor, referred to as "DSP"), Application Specific Integrated Circuit (Application Specific Integrated Circuit, referred to as "ASIC"), etc. The aforementioned memory can be a read-only memory (read-only memory, referred to as "ROM"), a random access memory (random access memory, referred to as "RAM"), a flash memory (Flash), a hard disk or a solid-state hard disk, etc. The steps of the method disclosed in each embodiment of the present invention can be directly embodied as a hardware processor to be executed, or a combination of hardware and software modules in the processor can be executed.

[0111] It should be noted that in the claims and description of this patent, relational terms such as first and second, etc. are only used to distinguish one entity or operation from another entity or operation, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Moreover, the terms "include", "comprise" or any other variants thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, article or device including a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also other elements not explicitly listed, or also includes elements inherent to such process, method, article or device. In the absence of further restrictions, the elements defined by the sentence "including one" do not exclude the existence of other identical elements in the process, method, article or device including the elements.

[0112] All documents mentioned in the present invention are cited as references in this application, just as each document is cited as reference individually. In addition, it should be understood that after reading the above teachings of the present invention, those skilled in the art can make various changes or modifications to the present invention, and these equivalent forms also fall within the scope defined by the claims attached to this application.

Claims

1. A two-factor authentication method, characterized in that: include: Step A: In the initialization phase, the system calls the initialization algorithm of the signature algorithm and sets the system parameters; Step B: During the user registration phase, the user calls the key generation algorithm of the signature algorithm to generate a first pair of public and private keys according to the system parameters, samples his / her own biometric features, calls the generation algorithm of the fuzzy extractor to operate the biometric authentication factor w to generate public auxiliary information and a character string, uses the character string as a random number of the key generation algorithm of the signature algorithm to generate a second pair of public and private keys, sends the first pair of public and private keys and the public key of the second pair of public and private keys to the server for storage, and stores the private key of the first pair of public and private keys and the public auxiliary information in the user device; Step C: During the user authentication phase, the server sends a random number to the user according to the user's request, and calls two signature algorithms based on the random number to obtain two signatures. The server authenticates the two signatures with the public key stored therein.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that In step A, the server first calls the initialization algorithm of the signature algorithm to generate pp SIG , and pp SIG As the system parameter pp 2fa to set it up.

3. The authentication method according to claim 2, characterized in that: In step B, user id c Call the key generation algorithm of the signature algorithm (vk1, sk1) ← SIG.KeyGen(pP SIG ) generates a pair of public and private keys, and samples its own biometric features w←Sample(W), then calls the fuzzy extractor generation algorithm (R, P)←FE.Gen(w) on the biometric authentication factor w to obtain public auxiliary information P and string R; uses string R to generate another pair of public and private keys (vk2, sk2)←SIG.KeyGen(pp; R); c , vk1, vk2 are sent to the server, and P, sk1 is stored in the user's device, where id c represents the identity identifier of the user, w represents the user's biometric authentication factor, P is public auxiliary information, R is a character string, vk1 and vk2 represent the public keys generated by the user, and sk1 and sk2 represent the private key authentication factors generated by the user.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that the private key authentication factor is stored confidentially by the user, and only the user knows its value, which cannot be obtained by others.

5. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The biometric authentication factor of the user is one of the following or any combination thereof: a face image of the user, a fingerprint of the user, and an iris of the user.

6. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that In step C, the user requests a service from the server, and the server obtains (id c , vk1, vk2) and send a random number r to the user, sample the biometric features to get w′, then call the fuzzy extractor's regeneration algorithm for w′ and P to generate R′, use R′ as the random number of the key generation algorithm of the signature algorithm, and generate a pair of public and private keys (vk′2, sk′2); for the random number r, call two signature algorithms to get σ1 and σ2 respectively, and send the two signatures σ1, σ2 to the server. After receiving the signatures σ1, σ2, the server obtains b1 and b2 respectively. The authentication result is b=b1·b2.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that If b=1, the authentication succeeds, otherwise the authentication fails.

8. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that The step C further comprises the following steps: The user requests a service from the server and sends a request message (id c , Request) is sent to the server, and a random number r is sent to the user; The server first obtains the user identity identifier id from its database c The corresponding biometric authentication factor w′ and public auxiliary information P, then call the regeneration algorithm of the fuzzy extractor to generate a string R′, use R′ as the random number of the key generation algorithm of the signature scheme, generate a pair of public and private keys (vk′2, sk′2), and call the signature algorithm (sk1, r) for the random number r to get σ1 and the signature algorithm (sk′2, r) to get σ2, and send the two signatures to the server; After receiving signatures σ1 and σ2, the server uses the public key authentication factor vk1, message r and σ1 to verify b1, and uses the public key authentication factor vk2, message r and σ2 to verify b2. The authentication result is b=b1·b2.

9. A two-factor authentication system, characterized in that: include: A memory for storing computer executable instructions; as well as, A processor, configured to implement the steps in the method according to any one of claims 1 to 8 when executing the computer executable instructions.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores computer-executable instructions, and when the computer-executable instructions are executed by a processor, the steps in the method according to any one of claims 1 to 8 are implemented.

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