Concepts for resuming access to cryptocurrency wallets on remote servers
By hosting cryptocurrency wallets in a trusted execution environment of remote servers and using new password secrets and identity certificate verification mechanisms, existing cryptocurrency wallets are solved and the problem of device loss and human error is achieved, achieving high security of assets and Resilience.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202380029712.3
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2022-03-30
- Filing Date
- 2023-03-27
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-15
AI Technical Summary
Existing cryptocurrency wallets are susceptible to device loss, human error and third-party attack risks, resulting in permanent loss or stolen assets. Smart contract wallets are sensitive to human errors and are difficult to effectively reduce risks.
Propose a 'protected wallet' concept, hosting cryptocurrency wallets in a trusted execution environment of remote servers, ensuring that wallet owners can resume access in the event of device loss or error removal by generating and registering new password secrets, leveraging Signed identity certificate and public key verification mechanism to enhance security.
Effectively reduces the owner risks of cryptocurrency wallets, ensures the security and recovery of assets, reduces losses caused by device loss or incorrect operation, and improves the security of smart contract wallets.
Smart Images

Figure CN118975190A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] Examples relate to concepts for recovering access to a cryptocurrency wallet on a remote server, and in particular, to wallet control apparatus, wallet control methods, and wallet control computer programs, and to wallet service apparatus, wallet service methods, and wallet service computer programs and services that can be used to register new cryptographic secrets at a cryptocurrency wallet hosted in a trusted execution environment on a server. Background Art
[0002] Cryptocurrencies (i.e., currencies that exist digitally and use cryptography to protect transactions, such as on a blockchain) are an area of research and development. Cryptocurrency transactions often involve the use of so-called wallets, which are computer programs for storing and managing cryptographic secrets that can be used to sign cryptocurrency transactions.
[0003] There are different kinds of cryptocurrency wallets. The first type of wallet is called a "custom wallet". In a custom wallet, the owner of the wallet does not rely on a third party to store and operate the private keys that control the assets in the wallet. There are different types of custom wallets, such as hardware wallets (also known as cold storage), web or mobile wallets, and desktop wallets. It is usually possible to recover a lost, stolen or damaged device by using a recovery phrase (usually 24 words) to regenerate the keys. The recovery phrase must be stored in a safe place. Custom wallets can be considered to carry a high risk of permanent loss due to human error. Studies have shown that more than 20% of all Bitcoins (cryptocurrency) are permanently lost, for example, due to the loss of a device or due to human error. This is contrary to the goal of making it easier for people to engage in very complex tasks without having to have extreme mental efforts or live in constant fear of making mistakes.
[0004] The second type of wallet is called a "custom wallet". When using a custom wallet, the owner of the wallet entrusts the storage and operation of the private keys that control the assets in the wallet to a third party. Typically, these third parties (such as large trading markets) do not store assets in individual wallets, but keep them in large pools. In this respect, wallets are more like accounts at a bank. However, custom wallets may be vulnerable to large-scale attacks on custom wallet providers. In addition, the risk of custom wallet providers going bankrupt (sometimes due to large-scale attacks) is not negligible.
[0005] The third type of wallet is called a "smart contract wallet". Assets in a smart contract-based wallet are controlled by an (Ethereum) smart contract. Such smart contract wallets offer many different features, such as multi-signature authorization, rate limits, social recovery (friends can help recover the wallet), temporary locking of the wallet, etc. However, smart contract wallets can be considered to still be quite sensitive to human error (so that the owner of the wallet needs to be well organized). Adaptations of concepts such as smart contracts are growing.
[0006] In Ethereum, transactions (ETH transfers, ERC20 transfers, smart contract calls) are issued with a signature signed by a private key (corresponding to the public key associated with the account). In social recovery, 3 to 5 guardians can change which public key is associated with an account. In turn, the signing key can be used to sign messages that can change the guardian after a delay (usually 1 to 3 days).
[0007] This can be expected to be an improved concept of cryptocurrency wallets that reduces the risks for the wallet's owner. Summary of the invention
[0008] This expectation is solved by the subject-matter of the independent claims.
[0009] Various examples of the present disclosure are based on the discovery that a new type of wallet, called a "shielded (cryptographic) wallet", together with a key recovery mechanism, can be used to provide a cryptocurrency wallet that reduces the risk to the wallet owner. In the proposed concept, a separate wallet for a wallet owner is managed and executed on a remote server in a trusted execution environment. A cryptographic secret stored in the wallet and in a wallet control application (wallet control device) operated by the wallet owner creates a link between the wallet and the wallet control application, and allows the wallet owner to sign instructions for controlling the cryptocurrency wallet from their wallet control application. If the wallet control application is lost, such as when a computer or mobile device used to execute the wallet control application fails or is lost, or when the application is mistakenly removed, access can be restored by authenticating with respect to a wallet service application hosted in a trusted execution environment (e.g., using a government-backed identity scheme) and installing a new (first) cryptographic secret at the wallet, which is then used to verify instructions sent by the wallet control application. In addition, a second cryptographic secret can be installed, which allows the addition of an additional first cryptographic secret, or the replacement of a previously used cryptographic secret. This leads to concepts for crypto wallets where the owner maintains sole control over the crypto wallet and can recover access to the wallet in case the wallet is temporarily lost due to loss or failure of the device or due to erroneous removal of an application. For example, the present disclosure may involve a crypto wallet with a secure enclave that also covers authentication with verifiable certificates.
[0010] Various aspects of the present disclosure relate to a wallet control device. The wallet control device includes a processing circuit configured to register a new first cryptographic secret at a cryptocurrency wallet hosted in a trusted execution environment on a remote server. Registering the new first cryptographic secret includes generating a new first cryptographic secret. Registering the new first cryptographic secret includes authenticating the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet relative to a wallet service application executing in the trusted execution environment of the server. Registering the new first cryptographic secret includes providing control instructions for registering the first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet to the wallet service application executing in the trusted execution environment of the server based on the authentication. The processing circuit is configured to provide instructions for controlling the cryptocurrency wallet to the remote server, the instructions being encrypted and protected based on the first cryptographic secret. Through the authentication, the wallet service application ascertains that the correct owner of the cryptocurrency wallet is attempting to regain access to the wallet, and then regains the access by registering the new first cryptographic secret at the wallet. This enables access to the wallet to be restored when the previously used first cryptographic secret is lost.
[0011] For example, the processing circuit may be configured to register a new first cryptographic secret after a previously used first cryptographic secret is lost. Thus, a new first cryptographic secret may be registered after a previously used first cryptographic secret is lost.
[0012] In some examples, the processing circuit is configured to authenticate the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet using a signed identity certificate, the identity certificate being signed by an independent entity. For example, the independent entity may provide a trust anchor (e.g., a root certificate authority), or be associated with a trust anchor, which may vouch for the authentication of the signed identity certificate. For example, the independent entity may be a government-operated entity, the owner of which obtains the signed identity after personally identifying themselves to the government-operated entity.
[0013] For example, the processing circuitry may be configured to authenticate the owner of the cryptocurrency by signing the control instruction using a private key corresponding to the identity certificate. The signed control instruction may then be verified using the signed identity certificate.
[0014] For example, the processing circuitry may be configured to obtain a signed identity certificate from an independent entity. Thus, the signed identity certificate may be recovered from the independent entity when the signed identity certificate is lost (eg, if a previously used device fails or is lost).
[0015] Authentication with respect to the wallet service application is not necessarily limited to registration of a new first cryptographic secret. Additional high-impact instructions, such as definition or deletion of rate limits, may also be protected via authentication, e.g., as a second factor. For example, the processing circuit is configured to authenticate the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet with respect to the wallet service application executing in the trusted execution environment of the server as a secondary security measure for a subset of instructions for controlling the cryptocurrency wallet.
[0016] In cryptography, there are different approaches. In some examples, an approach called public key authentication is used, which is based on a key pair including a private key and a public key. The private key is usually held by the owner of the key, while the public key can be distributed and can be used to verify the message signed by the private key. For example, the first cryptographic secret can be the private key of the device authorization key pair. The processing circuit can be configured to obtain the public key of the device authorization key pair from the private key of the device authorization key pair. The processing circuit can be configured to include the public key of the device authorization key pair in the control instruction for registering the first cryptographic secret. In other words, after the private key is generated, the corresponding public key (for verifying the instruction signed using the private key) can be transmitted to the wallet (service application) and stored at the wallet for verification of the instruction provided by the wallet control device.
[0017] The control instructions for registering the first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet may include: a first instruction for removing a previously used first cryptographic secret from the cryptocurrency wallet, and a second instruction for registering a new first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet. In other words, the previously used first cryptographic secret may be removed, which may improve security in case a device including the previously used first cryptographic secret is lost.
[0018] In some examples, additional mechanisms may be used to register new devices (in addition to authentication). For example, a device registration cryptographic secret (hereinafter referred to as a "second cryptographic secret") may be used to register a new device (i.e., a wallet control device). When the wallet control device is lost (or when the mobile device including the wallet control device is lost), the second cryptographic secret may also be updated, i.e., in addition to the first cryptographic secret. For example, the processing circuit may be further configured to register a new second cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet, by generating the second cryptographic secret, and based on the authentication, providing a control instruction for registering the second cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet to a wallet service application executed in a trusted execution environment of the server. As will be apparent, the new second cryptographic secret may be registered similarly to the new first cryptographic secret.
[0019] In some examples, two new cryptographic secrets may be registered in the same instruction. For example, the processing circuit may be configured to provide a joint control instruction for registering the first cryptographic secret and the second cryptographic secret at the wallet. Alternatively, independent control instructions may be used. In other words, the processing circuit is configured to provide independent control instructions for registering the first cryptographic secret and the second cryptographic secret at the wallet.
[0020] As outlined above, the second cryptographic secret may be used to register a new device at the wallet. In other words, the second cryptographic secret may be a cryptographic secret used to register a new first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet without requesting additional authentication of the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet relative to the wallet service application. For example, the second cryptographic secret is a private key of a device registration key pair, the processing circuitry is configured to derive a public key of the device registration key pair from the private key of the device registration key pair, and is configured to include the public key of the device registration key pair in the control instruction for registering the second cryptographic secret. In this way, a new (e.g., additional) device may be registered without requesting additional authentication relative to the wallet service application.
[0021] Various examples of the present disclosure relate to corresponding wallet control methods. The wallet control method includes registering a new first cryptographic secret at a cryptocurrency wallet hosted in a trusted execution environment on a remote server. Registering the new first cryptographic secret includes generating a first cryptographic secret. Registering the new first cryptographic secret includes authenticating an owner of the cryptocurrency wallet relative to a wallet service application executing in the trusted execution environment of the server. Registering the new first cryptographic secret includes providing, based on the authentication, to the wallet service application executing in the trusted execution environment of the server, control instructions for registering the first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet. The wallet control method includes providing instructions for controlling the cryptocurrency wallet to the remote server, the instructions being encrypted and protected based on the first cryptographic secret.
[0022] Various examples of the present disclosure relate to corresponding computer programs having program codes for executing the wallet control method when the computer programs are executed on a computer, a processor, or a programmable hardware component.
[0023] Various examples of the present disclosure relate to a mobile device comprising the wallet control device described above.
[0024] Various examples of the present disclosure relate to a wallet service device. For example, the wallet service device may be part of a remote server. The wallet service device includes a processing circuit configured to provide a trusted execution environment. The processing circuit is configured to host a cryptocurrency wallet within the trusted execution environment. The processing circuit is configured to host a wallet service application within the trusted execution environment. The wallet service application is configured to authenticate the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet relative to the wallet service application. The wallet service application is configured to obtain a control instruction for registering a new first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet from a wallet control device. The wallet service application is configured to register the new first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet. The wallet service application is configured to execute an instruction for controlling the cryptocurrency wallet, which is encrypted and protected based on the first cryptographic secret. Therefore, when the wallet control device is authenticated, the new first cryptographic secret is installed in the wallet service application for the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet.
[0025] As outlined in association with the wallet control device, the wallet service application can be configured to authenticate the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet based on a signed identity certificate signed by an independent entity. For example, the signed identity certificate can be used to verify the signature of a control instruction for registering a new first cryptographic secret.
[0026] For example, the trusted execution environment may include a public key of a trust anchor associated with an independent entity, and information about the identity of the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet. For example, the verification of a cryptographic signature may be based on a certificate chain, and the trust anchor is a root certificate of the certificate chain. The wallet service application may be configured to authenticate the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet by verifying the cryptographic signature using the public key of the trust anchor, and by comparing the identity information included in the signed identity certificate with the identity of the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet. For example, the signed identity certificate may include a public key that may be used to verify the cryptographic secret, and the identity information about the identity of the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet.
[0027] As outlined in association with the wallet control means, the control instructions for registering a first cryptographic secret at a cryptocurrency wallet may include: a first instruction to remove a previously used first cryptographic secret from the cryptocurrency wallet, and a second instruction to register a new first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet. The wallet service application may be configured to remove the previously used first cryptographic secret in addition to registering the new first cryptographic secret. In other words, the previously used first cryptographic secret may be removed, which may improve security in case a device including the previously used first cryptographic secret is lost.
[0028] Some instructions may be protected using additional measures, such as using authentication relative to the wallet control application. For example, a subset of instructions for controlling a cryptocurrency wallet may require authentication of the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet as a secondary security measure. The wallet service application may be configured to execute a subset of instructions upon authentication of the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet.
[0029] As outlined in connection with the wallet control means, the first cryptographic secret may be a private key of a device authorization key pair. The control instruction for registering the first cryptographic secret may include a public key of the device authorization key pair. The wallet service application may be configured to store the public key of the device authorization key pair in a cryptocurrency wallet in a trusted execution environment. The public key of the device authorization key pair may subsequently be used to authenticate instructions received from the wallet control means.
[0030] In addition to the first cryptographic secret, a second cryptographic secret may be installed, which second cryptographic secret may be subsequently used to register a new device. For example, the wallet service application may be configured to obtain a control instruction for registering a new second cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet from the wallet control device. The wallet service application may be configured to register the second cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet and verify a subsequent control instruction for registering a new first cryptographic secret based on the second cryptographic secret.
[0031] Similar to the first cryptographic secret, the second cryptographic secret may also be a private key, such as a private key of a device registration key pair. The control instruction for registering the second cryptographic secret may include a public key of the device registration key pair. The wallet application may be configured to store the public key of the device registration key pair in a cryptocurrency wallet in the trusted execution environment. The public key of the device registration key pair may subsequently be used to verify subsequent control instructions for registering a new first cryptographic secret.
[0032] As outlined above, transactions on the cryptocurrency blockchain are signed using a cryptographic key (pair). This cryptographic key (pair) is typically stored within a cryptocurrency wallet. The wallet service application may be configured to store a third cryptographic secret that is used to sign transactions on the cryptocurrency blockchain in the cryptocurrency wallet in the trusted execution environment, and is configured to sign transactions on the cryptocurrency blockchain using the third cryptographic secret.
[0033] Typically, software code running in a trusted execution environment (such as a wallet service application) can be audited by a third party. This can ensure that no data is leaked from the remote server.
[0034] Various examples of the present disclosure relate to corresponding wallet service methods. The wallet service method includes providing a trusted execution environment. The wallet service method includes hosting a cryptocurrency wallet within the trusted execution environment. The wallet service method includes hosting a wallet service application within the trusted execution environment. The wallet service application performs authentication of an owner of the cryptocurrency wallet relative to the wallet service application. The wallet service application performs acquisition of a control instruction for registering a new first cryptographic secret from a cryptocurrency wallet of a wallet control device. The wallet service application performs registration of the new first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet. The wallet service application performs execution instructions for controlling the cryptocurrency wallet, the execution instructions being cryptographically protected based on the first cryptographic secret.
[0035] Various examples of the present disclosure relate to corresponding computer programs having program codes for executing the wallet control method when the computer programs are executed on a computer, a processor, or a programmable hardware component.
[0036] Various examples of the present disclosure relate to a mobile device comprising the wallet control device described above.
[0037] Various examples of the present disclosure relate to a system comprising the wallet control device and the wallet service device introduced above. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0038] Some examples of the apparatus and / or method will be described below by way of example only and with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which
[0039] In the picture
[0040] Figure 1a A block diagram showing an example of a wallet control device;
[0041] Figure 1b A flow chart showing an example of a wallet control method;
[0042] Figure 2a A wallet service device and a system including a wallet service device and a wallet control device are shown.
[0043] A block diagram of an example of a system;
[0044] Figure 2b A flow chart showing an example of a wallet service method;
[0045] Figure 3 A system including a wallet control device and a remote server hosting a cryptocurrency wallet is shown.
[0046] Schematic diagram of the system;
[0047] Figure 4 A schematic diagram showing a remote server hosting a cryptocurrency wallet in a trusted execution environment;
[0048] Figure 5 A schematic diagram showing the contents of a cryptocurrency wallet hosted by a remote server;
[0049] Figure 6 A system including a wallet control device and a remote server hosting a cryptocurrency wallet is shown.
[0050] Schematic diagram of the system;
[0051] Figure 7 Figure 2 shows a cryptographic wallet hosted in a trusted execution environment on a remote server.
[0052] Access how to transfer to other devices of the wallet owner. ;
[0053] Figure 8 Shows how rate limits and other usage controls can be set on remote servers.
[0054] In a cryptocurrency wallet hosted in the Trust Execution Environment;
[0055] Fig. 9 shows that a cryptocurrency wallet hosted in a trusted execution environment on a remote server can
[0056] how it is protected through persistent storage and redundancy; and
[0057] Fig.10The following illustrates possible methods for recovering a computer hosted in a trusted execution environment on a remote server.
[0058] Emergency measures for managed cryptocurrency wallets. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0059] Some examples are now described in more detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. However, other possible examples are not limited to the features of these embodiments described in detail. Other examples may include modifications of features and equivalents and substitutions of features. In addition, the terms used to describe certain examples in this article should not limit other possible examples.
[0060] Throughout the description of the drawings, the same or similar reference numerals represent the same or similar elements and / or features, which may be implemented in the same or modified form while providing the same or similar functions. For clarity, the thickness of lines, layers and / or areas in the drawings may also be exaggerated.
[0061] When "or" is used to combine two elements A and B, this should be understood to disclose all possible combinations, i.e. only A, only B and A and B, unless otherwise explicitly limited in individual cases. As an alternative wording for the same combination, "at least one of A and B" or "A and / or B" can be used. The same applies to combinations of more than two elements.
[0062] If singular forms such as "a", "an", and "the" are used, and the use of only a single element is not explicitly or implicitly defined as mandatory, additional examples may also use seven elements to implement the same functionality. If a function is described below as being implemented using multiple elements, additional examples may use a single element or a single processing entity to implement the same functionality. It should also be understood that the terms "include", "including", "comprise" and / or "comprising" when used describe the presence of specific features, wholes, steps, operations, processes, elements, components and / or groups thereof, but do not exclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, wholes, steps, operations, processes, elements, components and / or groups thereof.
[0063] exist Figures 1a to 2b In the figure, two components of the present disclosure are shown - a wallet control device 110 (and a corresponding wallet control method, a wallet control computer program, and a mobile device 100 including the wallet control device 110) and a wallet service device 210 (and a corresponding wallet service method, a wallet service computer program, and a remote server 200 including the wallet service device 210). As will become apparent, these two components interact with each other. Therefore, the main part of the following introduction will focus on the interaction between these two components.
[0064] Figure 1a 1 shows a block diagram of an example of a wallet control device 110. The wallet control device 110 includes a processing circuit 114 configured to provide the functions of the wallet control device 110. Optionally, the wallet control device 110 further includes a processor for communicating with a remote server 200 (in Figure 2a An interface 112 (eg, interface circuitry) for communicating with other entities (not shown in FIG. 1 ), and / or a storage circuit 116 for storing information. Figure 1a The processing circuit 114 shown in FIG. 1c is coupled to an optional interface 112 and an optional storage circuit 116. For example, the processing circuit 114 can be configured to provide power to the wallet control device 110 together with the interface 112 (for communication) and / or with the storage circuit 116 (for storing and retrieving information). For example, the wallet control device 110 can be part of a computer system, such as a personal computer, a tablet computer, or a smart phone. Specifically, the wallet control device can be part of a mobile device 100, such as a tablet computer or a smart phone. The power supply of the wallet control device can be provided as software, such as a wallet control application executed by a corresponding computer system.
[0065] The processing circuit 114 is configured to Figure 2a 14. The processing circuit 114 is configured to register a new first cryptographic secret at a cryptocurrency wallet hosted in a trusted execution environment 220 on a server (shown in FIG. 14 ). Registering the new first cryptographic secret includes generating the first cryptographic secret. Registering the new first cryptographic secret includes authenticating the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet relative to a wallet service application executing in the trusted execution environment of the server. Registering the new first cryptographic secret includes providing, based on the authentication, to the wallet service application executing in the trusted execution environment of the server, control instructions for registering the first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet. The processing circuit 114 is configured to provide instructions for controlling the cryptocurrency wallet to the remote server, the instructions being cryptographically protected based on the first cryptographic secret.
[0066] Figure 1b A flow chart of an example of a corresponding wallet control method is shown. The wallet control method includes registering 10 a new first cryptographic secret at a cryptocurrency wallet hosted in a trusted execution environment of a remote server. Registering the new first cryptographic secret includes generating 12 the first cryptographic secret. Registering the new first cryptographic secret includes authenticating 14 an owner of the cryptocurrency wallet relative to a wallet service application executing in the trusted execution environment of the server. Registering the new first cryptographic secret includes providing 16 control instructions for registering the first cryptographic secret to the wallet service application executing in the trusted execution environment of the server based on the authentication. The wallet control method includes providing 18 instructions for controlling the cryptocurrency wallet to the remote server, the instructions being cryptographically protected based on the first cryptographic secret.
[0067] Figure 2a is a block diagram of an example of a wallet service device 210. The wallet service device 210 includes a processing circuit 214 configured to provide the functionality of the wallet service device 210. Optionally, the wallet service device 210 further includes an interface 212 (e.g., an interface circuit) for communicating with other entities such as the wallet control device 110 or the mobile device 100, and / or a storage circuit 216 for storing information. Figure 1a The processing circuit 214 shown in FIG. 1c is coupled to an optional interface 212 and an optional storage circuit 216. For example, the processing circuit 214 can be configured to provide power to the wallet control device 210 together with the interface 212 (for communication) and / or with the storage circuit 116 (for storing and retrieving information). For example, the wallet control device 210 can be part of a computer system, such as a server. The functions of the wallet service device can be provided or controlled via software, for example, by a wallet service application and / or an application for controlling a trusted execution environment.
[0068] The processing circuit 214 is configured to provide a trusted execution environment 220. The processing circuit 214 is configured to host a cryptocurrency wallet within the trusted execution environment. The processing circuit 214 is configured to host a wallet service application 230 within the trusted execution environment. The wallet service application 230 is configured to authenticate the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet with respect to the wallet service application. The wallet service application 230 is configured to obtain a control instruction for registering a new first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet from the wallet control device. The wallet service application 230 is configured to register the new first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet. The wallet service application 230 is configured to execute an instruction for controlling the cryptocurrency wallet, the instruction being cryptographically protected based on the first cryptographic secret.
[0069] Figure 2a It is further shown that the server 200 includes a wallet service device 210 . Figure 2a A system including a wallet service device 210 and a wallet control device 110 is further shown. For example, the server 200 includes the wallet service device 210 and the mobile device 100 includes the wallet control device 110 .
[0070] Figure 2bA flow chart of an example of a corresponding wallet service method is shown. The wallet service method comprises providing 20 a trusted execution environment. The wallet service method comprises hosting 22 a cryptocurrency wallet within the trusted execution environment. The wallet service method comprises hosting 24 a wallet service application within the trusted execution environment. The wallet service application performs, with respect to the wallet service application, an act of authenticating 24a the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet, obtaining 24b a control instruction for registering a new first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet from a wallet control device, registering 24c the new first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet, and executing 24d an instruction for controlling the cryptocurrency wallet, the instruction being cryptographically protected based on the first cryptographic secret.
[0071] On the one hand, the features of the wallet control device, the wallet control method, the wallet control computer program and the mobile device, and the features of the wallet service device, the wallet service method, the wallet service computer program and the server will be introduced in more detail with respect to the wallet control device and the wallet service device. The features introduced in relation to the wallet control device and the wallet service device can be similarly included in the wallet control method, the wallet control computer program and the mobile device, and the wallet service method, the wallet service computer program and the server, respectively.
[0072] The proposed concept is directed to registering a new first cryptographic secret at a cryptocurrency wallet hosted in a trusted execution environment on a remote server 200. Such a scenario may occur after initialization of the cryptocurrency wallet. For example, during initialization of the cryptocurrency wallet, a corresponding cryptographic secret may be generated by the wallet control device and transmitted to the remote server for storage in the cryptocurrency wallet. After the initialization of the cryptocurrency wallet, if the corresponding cryptographic secret is lost, for example due to loss or malfunction of the device or due to incorrect operation of the wallet control device or the device, then the proposed concept may be used to store a new first cryptographic secret in the wallet, for example, replacing a previously used first cryptographic secret. For example, the processing circuitry of the wallet control device may be configured to register a new first cryptographic secret after loss of a previously used first cryptographic secret.
[0073] In the proposed concept, the cryptocurrency wallet is stored in a trusted execution environment of a server. Therefore, the wallet service device is configured to provide such a trusted execution environment, such as making it available, controlling or making it accessible. There are various implementations of the trusted execution environment. The trusted execution environment may also be referred to as a secure area, for example. Typically, a trusted execution environment is an execution environment that is encapsulated (i.e., shielded) from other processes executed on a processing circuit that provides a trusted execution environment. Specifically, a process executed outside a specific trusted execution environment may not be able to read or write data or code contained in the trusted execution environment. Specifically, in the proposed concept, the contents of the wallet and the wallet service application may not be accessible from outside the trusted execution environment, for example, except for an interface for updating the wallet service application. For example, the software code of the wallet service application executed in the trusted execution environment may be audited by a third party. It may be updated using the interface cited above, which may be encrypted and protected. The contents of the wallet may remain shielded within the trusted execution environment at any time.
[0074] In various examples of the present disclosure, public-private key cryptography is used. In other words, the private key of a cryptographic key pair is used to sign something (e.g., an instruction or a certificate of identity), and the corresponding public key can be used to verify the signature. On the other hand, the public key of a cryptographic key pair can be used to encrypt a piece of information, and the private key can be used to decrypt the piece of information.
[0075] For example, the first cryptographic secret (and the second cryptographic secret to be described below) may be a key of a cryptographic key pair. For example, the first cryptographic secret may be a private key of a device authorization key pair. Typically, the device authorization key pair may be used to sign and verify control instructions issued by the wallet control device to the wallet. The private key may belong to the wallet control device and may be used to sign the control instruction, while the public key may be stored in the cryptocurrency wallet. Therefore, the processing circuit of the wallet control device may be configured to generate a device authorization key pair having a private key and a public key. For example, the processing circuit of the wallet control device may be configured to obtain the public key of the device authorization key pair from the private key of the device authorization key pair. The processing circuit of the wallet control device may be configured to transmit the public key to the wallet service application for storage in the cryptocurrency wallet. For example, the processing circuit of the wallet control device may be configured to include the public key of the device authorization key pair in the control instruction for registering the first cryptographic secret. In other words, the control instruction for registering the first cryptographic secret may include the public key of the device authorization key pair.
[0076] In the proposed concept, in case of authentication of the wallet control device, a new first cryptographic secret is registered at the cryptocurrency wallet and thus the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet is registered with respect to the wallet service application executed within the trusted execution environment. This authentication can be made secure by the fact that the entity performing the authentication, i.e. the wallet service application is executed within the trusted execution environment, so that the operation of the program code for processing the authentication on the server side is protected within the trusted execution environment.
[0077] Many variations are now possible for authentication schemes (for wallet recovery). For example, the control circuitry of the wallet control device may be configured to authenticate the wallet service application by providing a signed identity certificate to a remote server (e.g., Figure 6 The wallet service application can be configured to authenticate the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet based on the aforementioned identity certificate. For example, the signed identity certificate can be signed by an independent entity such as a government agency (e.g., an entity associated with a trust anchor, i.e., an entity having the ability to sign an identity certificate that can be verified by the trust anchor). For example, Figure 6 As shown, the signed identity certificate may be provided by an instruction (e.g., a control instruction or an authentication instruction for registering a new first cryptographic secret) signed by a private key 650 linked to the identity certificate 640 (and providing a signed identity certificate with the signed instruction). On the wallet service application side, the trusted execution environment may include a public key of a trust anchor associated with an independent entity, and information about the identity of the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet. The wallet service application may be configured to authenticate the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet by verifying the cryptographic signature (based on the control instruction or previously authenticated instruction) using the public key of the trust anchor, and by comparing the identity information included in the signed identity certificate with the identity of the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet. The wallet control device may receive the signed identity certificate from the independent entity. For example, the processing circuit of the wallet control device may be configured to obtain the signed identity certificate from the independent entity.
[0078] For example, authentication based on a signed identity certificate can be similar to authentication performed according to transport layer security (TLS). TLS is a cryptographic protocol used to provide communication security for communications occurring on a computer network (e.g., between a network server and a network browser). In TLS, a server provides an identity certificate to a client, including the name of the server, a reference to a trusted certificate authority (CA) that guarantees the authenticity of the certificate, and the public key of the server. The client encrypts a first encrypted message including a random number using the public key of the server, which can be decrypted using the private key of the server. The random number can now be used for encryption of a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, which results in a session key for subsequent communications. As mentioned above, the identity certificate provided by the server includes a reference to a trusted CA that guarantees the authenticity of the certificate. Therefore, a certificate chain from the identity certificate to the trusted CA is formed. In many cases, the CA is not used as a root CA or an intermediate CA by the application. Therefore, in order to verify the authenticity of the certificate, the client follows the certificate chain to an intermediate CA that also provides a similar identity certificate, which may include a reference to another intermediate CA or a root CA. Therefore, the certificate chain is extended to another intermediate CA or to the root CA. Once the certificate chain reaches the root CA, the certificate chain is complete. CAs are usually organized in a hierarchical tree structure, which all link back to the root CA at the top of the tree. The public key associated with the signing key of the pre-root CA is called a trust anchor. The trust anchor is usually hard-coded in the entity that needs to authenticate another party, which is why it is called a trust anchor. For example, the public key of the root CA can be stored in the client's "Trusted Root CA" store and used as a trust anchor for the verification process. The client can traverse the certificate chain to the root CA to verify the authenticity of the identity certificate.
[0079] In the proposed concept, a similar scheme can be used, where the wallet control device assumes the role of a server (server of the TLS scheme) and the remote server assumes the role of a client (server of the TLS scheme). For example, the wallet control device can generate or obtain a private key of the owner of the wallet, which is then registered by a government agency associated with the used trust anchor. The government agency can sign the private key registered with the government agency and thereupon generate an identity certificate (identifying the owner with the owner's public key and an identifier, such as a passport number, and referencing the trust anchor). The wallet control device can use the private key to sign the control instruction for registering a new first cryptographic secret. The remote server can now use the signed identity certificate, which is guaranteed by the trust anchor, to verify that the instruction issued by the wallet control device was issued by the owner of the identity certificate. SSI is a more modern adaptation of this scheme, which exploits blockchain technology.
[0080] For example, the remote server may automatically verify the signed identity certificate. For example, the wallet service application may be configured to obtain the identity certificate from the wallet control device. As outlined above, the signature of the signed identity certificate may be obtained from the trust anchor. In this case, the wallet service application may be configured to verify the identity certificate based on the public key of the trust anchor (and based on the stored credentials 655 of the wallet owner, as in Figure 6 The wallet service application may be configured to authenticate the owner relative to the wallet service application based on the owner's signed identity certificate and based on information about the identity of the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet stored in the cryptocurrency wallet (e.g., the wallet owner's credentials / identification number 655). As outlined above, the verification of the cryptographic signature is based on a certificate chain, where the trust anchor is the root certificate of the certificate chain.
[0081] In order to register a new first cryptographic secret at a cryptocurrency wallet, a control instruction is generated, optionally signed, and transmitted. In contrast to other instructions for controlling a wallet, this instruction is not signed with a first cryptographic secret (e.g., a private key of a device authorization key pair) because the previously used first cryptographic secret (known to the cryptocurrency wallet) is lost. For example, the control instruction may remain unsigned, or the control instruction may be signed with a private key associated with an identity certificate of the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet (e.g., for authentication). For example, the control instruction may instruct the cryptocurrency wallet to register a new first cryptographic secret (and specifically, a public key of a device authorization key pair) at the wallet. In addition, the control instruction may instruct the cryptocurrency wallet to remove the previously used first cryptographic secret from the cryptocurrency wallet (i.e., the public key of the previously used device authorization key pair). In other words, the control instruction for registering a first cryptographic secret at a cryptocurrency wallet may include: a first instruction for removing a previously used first cryptographic secret from the cryptocurrency wallet, and a second instruction for registering a new first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet. Once the control instruction is generated and optionally signed, the control instruction is transmitted to a remote server. In this context, the term signed means that a cryptographic key is used to generate a digital signature based on the control instruction (e.g., based on a hash value of the control instruction, including the public key of a device authorization key pair), and which can be used to verify that a) the control instruction has not been tampered with, and b) the control instruction has been signed by an entity associated with the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet (and is therefore authorized to issue the control instruction).
[0082] In the remote server, and specifically at the cryptocurrency wallet within the trusted execution environment, the control instruction can be verified (if signed), and the public key of the device authorization key pair can be extracted from the control instruction and stored in the cryptocurrency wallet. For example, the wallet service application can be configured to verify the signed control instruction for registering the first cryptographic secret based on the signed identity certificate for authentication. The wallet service application can be configured to extract the public key of the device authorization key pair from the control instruction. For example, the wallet service application can be configured to store the public key of the device authorization key pair at the cryptocurrency wallet in the trusted execution environment. For example, in some cases, for example, if the control instruction for registering the first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet includes an instruction for removing a previously used first cryptographic secret, the wallet service application can be configured to remove the previously used first cryptographic secret in addition to registering the new first cryptographic secret.
[0083] If the registration of the new first cryptographic secret is successful, the remote server may inform the wallet control device of the successful registration. For example, the processing circuitry of the wallet control device may be configured to obtain a response from the remote server in response to the control instruction for registering the first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet. For example, if the private key of the device registration key pair matches the public key of the device registration key pair stored in the cryptocurrency wallet, i.e., if the control instruction signed by the private key of the device registration key pair can be verified using the public key of the device registration key pair stored in the cryptocurrency wallet, the response may include a confirmation of the cryptocurrency wallet. Thus, the wallet service application may be configured to provide a response to the wallet control device upon successful registration of the new first cryptographic secret.
[0084] Once the new first cryptographic secret is installed in the wallet, the new first cryptographic secret may be used to sign subsequent instructions for controlling the cryptocurrency wallet. The processing circuitry of the wallet control device is configured to provide (subsequent) instructions for controlling the cryptocurrency wallet to the first remote server, the instructions being cryptographically protected based on the first cryptographic secret. For example, the instructions may be cryptographically signed using the new first cryptographic secret (e.g., a private key of a device authorization key pair).
[0085] In some examples, a second cryptographic secret may also be registered at a cryptocurrency wallet. This second cryptographic secret is a cryptographic secret used to register a new first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet without requesting additional authentication of the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet relative to the wallet service application. For example, once the second cryptographic secret is registered at the cryptocurrency wallet, an additional (or replacement) first cryptographic secret may be registered at the cryptocurrency wallet by signing a control instruction for registering the first cryptographic secret corresponding to the second cryptographic secret.
[0086] To register the second cryptographic secret at the wallet, the processing circuit may be configured to generate the second cryptographic secret and, based on the authentication, provide a control instruction for registering the second cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet to a wallet service application executing in a trusted execution environment in the server. For example, the processing circuit may be configured to provide a joint control instruction for registering the first cryptographic secret and the second cryptographic secret at the wallet, or may be configured to provide independent control instructions for registering the first cryptographic secret and the second cryptographic secret at the wallet. At the remote server, the wallet service application may be configured to obtain a control instruction for registering a new second cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet from the wallet control device to register the second cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet, and verify a subsequent control instruction for registering the new first cryptographic secret based on the second cryptographic secret. As will be apparent, the process for registering a new second cryptographic secret may be implemented similarly to the registration of a new first cryptographic secret.
[0087] Similar to the first cryptographic secret, the second cryptographic secret can also be part of a cryptographic key pair. For example, the second cryptographic secret is the private key of the device registration key pair. For example, the device registration key pair can be used to register a new device authorized to control a cryptocurrency wallet. During the initialization of the wallet, an original device registration key pair can be generated, wherein the private key (i.e., the second cryptographic secret) is stored in the wallet control device. In order to register a new second cryptographic secret, a new private key (i.e., the second cryptographic secret) of the device registration key pair can be generated, and a new public key can be obtained from the new private key of the device registration key pair. The public key of the device registration key pair can be stored at the cryptocurrency wallet so that the public key can be used by a server (e.g., a cryptocurrency wallet) to verify subsequent control instructions for registering the first cryptographic secret. For example, the public key of the device registration key pair can be included in the control instruction for registering the new second cryptographic secret. Therefore, the control instruction for registering the second cryptographic secret can include the public key of the device registration key pair. The wallet service application can be configured to store the public key of the device registration key pair in the cryptocurrency wallet in the trusted execution environment.
[0088] More detailed descriptions of the wallet control device, wallet control method, wallet control computer program, wallet service device, wallet service method, wallet service computer program and system will be provided later. Figures 3 to 10 Given. Figures 3 to 10 In the embodiment, the wallet control device is represented as a "wallet application (Wallet App)" 352 (in FIG. 2, Figure 7 ) or "Crypto Wallet". It can be included in the mobile device 350 (Figures 2 and Figure 7 ) or personal computer 710 ( Figure 7 The remote server is denoted as “Wallet Support Service”.
[0089] The interface 112 and the interface 212 of the wallet control device 110 and / or the wallet service device 210 may correspond to one or more outputs and / or outputs for receiving and / or transmitting information in digital (bit) values according to a specified code within a module, between modules, or between modules of different entities. For example, the interface 112 and the interface 212 of the wallet control device 110 and / or the wallet service device 210 may include an interface circuit configured to receive and / or transmit information.
[0090] For example, the processing circuit 114 and the processing circuit 214 of the wallet control device 110 and / or the wallet service device 210 may be implemented using one or more processing units, one or more processing devices, any processing tool (such as a processor, a computer, or a programmable hardware component that can be operated with corresponding adapted software). In other words, the described functions of the processing circuit 114 and the processing circuit 214 of the wallet control device 110 and / or the wallet service device 210 may also be implemented using software, which is then executed on one or more programmable hardware components. These hardware components may include a general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor (DSP), a microcontroller, etc. For example, at least the processing circuit 214 of the wallet service device 210 may be suitable for providing a trusted execution environment, such as Intel Software Guard Extensions, AMD Platform Security Processor or Secure Encrypted Virtualization, ARM TrustZone, or RISC-V MultiZone.
[0091] For example, the storage circuit 116 and the storage circuit 216 of the wallet control device 110 and / or the wallet service device 210 may include at least one element of the group of computer-readable storage media (such as magnetic or optical storage media), such as a hard disk drive, a flash memory, a floppy disk, a random access memory (RAM), a programmable read-only memory (PROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), an electronically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), or a network memory.
[0092] In combination with the proposed concept or one or more examples described above or below (e.g., Figures 3 to 10 ), mentioning more details and aspects of the wallet control device, wallet service device, remote server, wallet control method, wallet service method, system and computer program. The wallet control device, wallet service device, remote server, wallet control method, wallet service method, system and computer program may include one or more additional optional features corresponding to one or more aspects of the proposed concept or one or more examples described above or below.
[0093] exist Figures 1a to 2b In the 2013 paper, core functionality denoted as the concept of a "shielded (crypto) wallet" has been introduced. This wallet is a new wallet type, which can be suitable for users without well-organized ordinary, non-technical knowledge. For example, it can be set up as a (paid) service that frees users from worrying about the loss of their keys. It can provide a simple, uncomplicated user experience, e.g. with minimal user configuration for recovery. If possible, it can be implemented as a custom wallet, while carrying a reduced security risk of (large-scale) attacks.
[0094] The proposed concept comprises three components - a remote server which can be a cloud service using secure enclave technology (like Intel SGX) to store wallet assets (private keys) in a way that the cloud provider cannot access the wallet assets. This makes the proposed concept customizable. The wallet can be operated by the user from a wallet control device (second component) hosted by a mobile phone, from which signed wallet instructions are sent to the wallet in the cloud which executes the wallet instructions.
[0095] Optionally, an external authentication infrastructure outside of the control of the cloud service may be used for wallet access and / or recovery. For example, an SSI (Self-Sovereign Identity) infrastructure may be used. For example, an SSI key may be used, for which the user has registered with a government agency, and for which the user receives a verifiable certificate of credentials. Alternatively, other forms of authentication infrastructure may be used to access government websites, banking services, etc. In order to verify the verifiable credentials used for authentication, the cloud service may configure trust anchors ideally within a secure zone. These may be updated via software updates.
[0096] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of a system including a wallet control device (wallet application 352) and a remote server hosting a cryptocurrency wallet 330 is shown. Figure 3 A wallet support service with a secure enclave 310 (trusted execution environment) is shown. The secure enclave shields the cloud owner from operations in the secure zone (enabling custom cryptocurrency wallets to be implemented). The secure enclave can isolate a small kernel of security-sensitive code (such as a wallet service application) from the operating system and main software stack. It can provide strong protection against attacks. Within the secure enclave, a separate user wallet 330 stores asset keys.
[0097] To reclaim access to the wallet 330, the proposed concept may use a renewable form of authentication. For example, government-surrendered SSI certificates 320 may be used for authentication. These certificates 320 may be held by the owner and stored in the wallet 330 within the secure area 310. In this context, "renewable" means that the wallet owner may lose the authentication secret (e.g., a private key linked to an authentication certificate issued by an SSI run by a government agency), generate a new authentication secret, register it with the government agency, which will provide a new SSI certificate (signed identity certificate) signed by the government agency.
[0098] The challenge of secure zones is that the code may have to be regularly upgraded for new features and security and other (hot) fixes. To this end, a mechanism may be used that forces the cloud provider to involve an independent auditor 340 to apply any changes to the code. The independent auditor 340 can verify the soundness of the code running in the secure zone and control the upgrade process of the code. In other words, the software code running in a trusted execution environment can be audited by a third party. Although this breaks the self-customization nature of the proposed concept to a certain extent, it should be guaranteed that the wallet keys cannot be accessed by anyone involved in the daily operation of the cloud service.
[0099] Figure 3 A mobile device 350 of an owner having a wallet application 352 (wallet control means) is shown. The wallet application 352 contains two private keys - a private key 360 and a public key 365 of a device authorization key pair and a private key 370 of a device registration key pair. The wallet application 352 uses the private key 360 of the device authorization key pair to add a signature 356 to an instruction 354 for performing a wallet operation. The wallet 330 includes a public key 365 and a public key 375 of a device authorization and device registration key pair. The wallet 330 further includes a private key 380 and a public key 385 of a wallet (blockchain) key pair for performing operations on a blockchain 390. In other words, the wallet service application may be configured to store a third cryptographic secret (e.g., a wallet key pair, a private key of a wallet key pair, or a seed key of a hierarchical deterministic (HD) scheme for generating a private key for signing transactions on a blockchain) for signing transactions on a cryptocurrency blockchain 390 in a cryptocurrency wallet in a trusted execution environment. For example, the wallet service application may be configured to sign transactions on a cryptocurrency blockchain using the third cryptographic secret.
[0100] Typically, the private key of a corresponding public / private key pair can be used to sign messages, data structures, etc. The public key of the corresponding public / private key pair can be used when verifying whether a signature was created using the corresponding private key. To send crypto assets, the private key of a wallet key pair can be used to sign transactions on a cryptocurrency blockchain, where the private key of a wallet key pair is a cryptographic code used as a secret password that allows a user to sign cryptocurrency transactions and transfer funds to another cryptocurrency address.
[0101] exist Figure 4 , the properties of a trusted execution environment (secure area) and the contents of a cryptocurrency wallet according to an example are shown in more detail. Figure 4 A schematic diagram of a remote server hosting a cryptocurrency wallet in a trusted execution environment (secure enclave) 410 is shown.
[0102] Figure 4 A secure enclave 310 with a cryptocurrency wallet is shown. In various examples, the wallet service operator cannot access the wallet keys (stored in the secure enclave) and cannot initiate arbitrary operations with the wallet keys. The code running in the secure enclave is highly protected code, for example, a small kernel with only critical functional fragments of code. This can mitigate security risks caused by large software stacks with zero-day vulnerabilities.
[0103] The wallet support service 410 (provided by a remote server) can be linked to a natural person with "bank-level security" and renewable authentication (such as eID (electronic identity), bank card tokens, etc.).
[0104] Independent auditor 340 can review code running in the secure zone and confirm proper behavior and security. When a software update is due, the running code can switch internal keys to the new version of the code if the new version of the code is signed by the audit service. In addition, independent auditor 340 can approve changes to the trust anchor used for identity certificate verification (in software updates).
[0105] Figure 5 A schematic diagram of the contents of an example of a cryptocurrency wallet hosted by a remote server is shown. The proposed concept can be intended to create a custom wallet hosted by a wallet support service. Therefore, each wallet can be associated with a single user (wallet used at a time). The cryptocurrency wallet can include a device authorization public key 365. A party holding the corresponding private key 360 can issue operations on assets in the wallet. The cryptocurrency wallet can include a device registration public key 375. A party holding the corresponding private key 370 can register / unregister a device that can control the wallet. The cryptocurrency wallet can include a wallet key pair 380; 385 generated by the wallet service at user wallet creation time. The private key of the wallet key pair controls the assets associated with the wallet (by signing blockchain operations).
[0106] Figure 6 A schematic diagram of a system including a wallet control device and a remote server hosting a cryptocurrency wallet is shown. Figure 6 Components that can be used to perform authentication in a secure area (e.g., relative to a wallet support application) are shown. Figure 6 In the example, a trust anchor 610 (regarding a certificate chain) is introduced, which can be a trust anchor for authentication of the wallet owner relative to the remote server. For example, the trust anchor can be a root certificate used across government agencies. Specifically, the trust anchor can be used for wallet recovery. For example, the remote server can use the trust anchor to verify the identity of the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet (e.g., a signed identity certificate). For example, the wallet service application can be configured to store the public key 620 of the trust anchor in a secure area and store information about the identity 655 of the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet in the wallet in the trusted execution environment.
[0107] exist Figure 6 In , the trust anchor 610 is used by a government ID (identification) issuing authority 630 (which may support SSI), which can provide an ID certificate (identity certificate) 640 (with the user's public key), signed by the authority, and a private key 650 to sign the authentication request. The national ID number 655 of the wallet owner is stored in the wallet (at wallet creation time). The authentication request signed by the wallet owner and accompanied by the ID certificate (or SSI proof of identity) can be verified against the trust anchor.
[0108] In the following, we discuss creating a cryptocurrency wallet in the cloud. Figure 3 As shown, the user's cryptographic wallet (wallet control device) on their mobile device includes a device registration private key 370 and a device authorization private key 360 that can be generated in the user's cryptographic wallet / application. The device registration public key 375 and the device authorization public key 365 can be derived from the corresponding private keys and transmitted and stored in the wallet on the wallet support service. The device registration public key 375 stored in the wallet allows the user to access this wallet by registering one of their devices. The device authorization public key 365 allows the user to initialize operations on the assets in the wallet. The wallet key pair 380; 385 that performs blockchain operations is also stored in the wallet. It can be generated in the wallet on the user's device or in a cloud wallet.
[0109] The user's credentials 655 are stored in the cloud wallet. This allows the user to always identify themselves (also after updating the identity credentials). In some examples, the need for authentication may be limited to wallet recovery. Existing bank-standard-level secure renewable authentication (e.g., using SSI proof of identity) can be used to authenticate the user relative to the wallet service application. Authentication relative to the cloud wallet service, and specifically the wallet service application, can be completed in a secure area. For example, the trust anchor can be kept up to date in the secure area to perform authentication work. In other words, the trust anchor can be attributed to the secure area. Otherwise, the proposed concept can become customized. However, keeping the trust anchor in the secure area up to date may pose challenges without undesirable frequent software updates. Alternatively, the trust anchor can be extracted from the blockchain. However, there may be no simple and reliable way to extract the trust anchor from the (public) blockchain. For example, security may depend on a flawless external authentication infrastructure.
[0110] After the corresponding cryptographic keys and pieces of information have been stored in the corresponding entities, the wallet can be declared initialized and ready for use. At this point, the wallet service can ensure that the user can always regain access to the wallet.
[0111] Figure 3 It is further shown how operations are performed on a cryptocurrency wallet hosted in a trusted execution environment of a remote server (i.e., a cloud wallet support service). Instructions 354 to perform wallet operations are signed 356 with a device authorization key 360 (i.e., a first cryptographic secret) and transmitted to the cloud wallet. At the cloud wallet, the device authorization public key 365 is used to verify the signature. The blockchain private key 380 is used to perform blockchain operations.
[0112] In case the crypto wallet / wallet application or crypto wallet application on the owner's device is lost (due to the device being stolen, lost, or the application being removed), access to the cryptocurrency wallet can be restored.
[0113] While the present disclosure relates to how access to a wallet can be restored via a wallet service application, access may also be transferred to a new (or secondary) device without requiring authentication with respect to the wallet service application. Figure 7 Shows how access to a cryptocurrency wallet hosted in a trusted execution environment on a remote server can be transferred to the wallet owner's other devices.
[0114] In some cases, the owner may have multiple devices, such as a mobile device 350 and a computer 710, which may also host a cryptographic wallet application 720. The wallet owner may request the wallet service from one of her devices to access the wallet on another of her devices. The original wallet application may send a signed request containing the public key (of the device authorization key pair) of the new wallet application to the wallet support service. In this case, the previously used public key of the device authorization key pair is not removed but retained with the new public key.
[0115] The proposed shielded wallet may also provide more advanced features such as rate limiting and other usage controls. Figure 8 It is shown how rate limits and other usage controls can be set in a cryptocurrency wallet hosted in a trusted execution environment of a remote server. Rate limits (e.g., a daily maximum amount of transactions) and other usage controls can be imposed (by the wallet) and configured by the user. After authentication (e.g., via a private key 650 signing an authentication request), exceeding the configured limits can be allowed. For example, authentication can be performed outside a secure area.
[0116] For example, the subset of instructions for controlling a cryptocurrency wallet requires a signed identity certificate including the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet (e.g., the instruction may be signed using the private key 650 that signed the authentication request). Thus, the processing circuit is configured to authenticate the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet relative to the wallet service application executing in the trusted execution environment of the server as a secondary security measure for the subset of instructions for controlling the cryptocurrency wallet. For example, the subset of instructions may include instructions for setting a rate limit, instructions for removing or changing a rate limit, instructions for setting a usage control, instructions for removing or changing a usage control, and control instructions for registering a new first cryptographic secret. The processing circuit of the wallet control device may be configured to include the signed identity certificate (e.g., the corresponding instruction is signed using the private key 650 that signed the authentication request) in the subset of instructions for controlling the cryptocurrency wallet. For example, the wallet service application is configured to execute the subset of instructions upon authenticating the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet. For example, the wallet service application may be configured to verify the subset of instructions based on information about the signed identity certificate, based on information about the identity of the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet (and based on the public key of the trust anchor).
[0117] Alternatively, a multi-signature scheme can be used to protect large operations. In this case, the wallet in the secure zone will only proceed with the transaction if the request to perform the transaction is signed by multiple parties. One party can be another person, or another device of the wallet owner.
[0118] Regarding wallet removal, it can be a choice (or user option): a wallet can never be removed without first being emptied (assets transferred to another wallet).
[0119] In the following, some details are given regarding the techniques used to protect wallets stored in a secure area of a remote server. Fig. 9 It shows how a cryptocurrency wallet hosted in a trusted execution environment of a remote server can be protected via persistent storage and redundancy. For the deployment of cloud wallet services, security and backup are important. For this purpose, the "Bank Standard Security Level" can be applied.
[0120] For example, wallet assets can be encrypted and backed up to permanent storage. Fig. 9 It is shown how an encrypted copy 920 of the wallet assets is persistently stored in permanent storage (e.g., storage circuitry 216 of a remote server). Only the secure zone can decrypt (using the global wallet encryption key 910). Wallet support services can be provided by secure hardware 930 (e.g., processing circuitry 214 of a remote server) with embedded encryption keys 90 that support secure zone technology (such as Intel SGX). Redundancy can be created by duplicating both the hardware (with the keys) and the persistent storage with the wallet assets.
[0121] The proposed concept can support emergency measures for the (very unlikely) situation when all CPU (Central Processing Unit) hardware containing the global wallet encryption keys becomes unavailable or destroyed. In such an emergency, all data on the backup becomes inaccessible.
[0122] Fig.10 Emergency measures that can be taken to recover a cryptocurrency wallet hosted in a trusted execution environment of a remote server are shown. For example, a global encryption key 910 (providing access to all wallets) can be split into different parts 1010 (using, for example, Shamir secret sharing) that are handed over to different key officers in the cloud service organization. A very strict process can control the circumstances under which these key parts can be combined 1020 to instantiate a new secure zone 1030 with the reconstructed key. This reconstructed secure zone can now make the data on the backup accessible again, as well as instantiate other secure zones and populate them with the global encryption key.
[0123] The proposed shielded wallet concept may provide easy setup, resistance to human errors (and loss of assets), possibility to set usage controls (daily limits, confirmations for large transactions), decentralized setup, reduced security risks (regarding susceptibility to vulnerabilities, large-scale attacks) and support for different types of assets at the cost of anonymity.
[0124] In general, the proposed concept may be complex to deploy, especially with regard to software updates to the secure zone. This can be ensured by configuring the secure zone (i.e., the software running in the secure zone) such that the secure zone accepts software updates when they are signed by an auditing party. While this may enhance the security of the proposed concept, it may also delay the associated procedures when quick patching (e.g., vulnerabilities) is required.
[0125] To avoid failure of identity certificates (e.g. when a (government) agency makes a mistake and gives an identity certificate to the wrong person), a combination of authentication methods can be used (possibly depending on the amount of value stored in the wallet). To avoid the enclave being compromised and keys being lost, bank-level security procedures can be used to prevent this from happening. To avoid vulnerabilities being introduced into the code running in the enclave, the enclave can be operated with minimal size and the enclave code can be checked by very intensive security reviews.
[0126] In combination with the proposed concept, or one or more examples described above or below (e.g., Figures 1a to 2b ) to mention more details and aspects of the shield wallet concept. The shield wallet concept may include one or more additional optional features corresponding to one or more aspects of the proposed concept, or one or more examples described above or below.
[0127] In the following, some examples are presented:
[0128] (1) A wallet control device 110 includes a processing circuit 114, wherein the processing circuit is configured to:
[0129] The new first cryptographic secret is registered at the cryptocurrency wallet hosted in the trusted execution environment 220 on the remote server 200 by:
[0130] Generate a first cryptographic secret,
[0131] authenticating the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet with respect to the wallet service application executing in the trusted execution environment of the server, and
[0132] providing, based on the authentication, to a wallet service application executing in a trusted execution environment of the server, a control instruction for registering a first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet;
[0133] and
[0134] Instructions for controlling the cryptocurrency wallet are provided to the remote server, the instructions being encrypted and protected based on the first cryptographic secret.
[0135] (2) The wallet control device according to (1), wherein the processing circuit is configured to register a new first cryptographic secret after a previously used first cryptographic secret is lost.
[0136] (3) A wallet control device according to any one of (1) or (2), wherein the processing circuit is configured to authenticate the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet using a signed identity certificate, the identity certificate being signed by an independent entity.
[0137] (4) The wallet control device according to (3), wherein the processing circuit is configured to authenticate the owner of the cryptocurrency by signing the control instruction using a private key corresponding to the identity certificate.
[0138] (5) The wallet control device according to any one of (3) or (4), wherein the processing circuit is configured to obtain a signed identity certificate from an independent entity.
[0139] (6) A wallet control device according to any one of (3) to (5), wherein the processing circuit is configured to authenticate the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet relative to a wallet service application executed in a trusted execution environment of the server as a secondary security measure for a subset of instructions for controlling the cryptocurrency wallet.
[0140] (7) A wallet control device according to any one of (1) to (6), wherein the first cryptographic secret is a private key of a device authorization key pair, the processing circuit is configured to obtain a public key of the device authorization key pair from the private key of the device authorization key pair, and is configured to include the public key of the device authorization key pair in the control instruction for registering the first cryptographic secret.
[0141] (8) A wallet control device according to any one of (1) to (7), wherein the control instruction for registering the first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet includes: a first instruction for removing a previously used first cryptographic secret from the cryptocurrency wallet, and a second instruction for registering a new first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet.
[0142] (9) A wallet control device according to any one of (1) to (8), wherein the processing circuit is further configured to: register a new second cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet by: generating the second cryptographic secret and providing a control instruction for registering the second cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet to a wallet service application executed in a trusted execution environment of the server based on the authentication.
[0143] (10) The wallet control device according to (9), wherein the processing circuit is configured to provide a joint control instruction for registering the first cryptographic secret and the second cryptographic secret at the wallet.
[0144] (11) The wallet control device of (9), wherein the processing circuit is configured to provide independent control instructions for registering the first cryptographic secret and the second cryptographic secret at the wallet.
[0145] (12) A wallet control device according to any one of (9) to (11), wherein the second cryptographic secret is a private key of a device registration key pair, the processing circuit is configured to obtain a public key of the device registration key pair from the private key of the device registration key pair, and is configured to include the public key of the device registration key pair in the control instruction for registering the second cryptographic secret.
[0146] (13) A wallet control device according to any one of (9) to (12), wherein the second cryptographic secret is a cryptographic secret used to register a new first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet without requesting additional authentication of the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet relative to the wallet service application.
[0147] (14) A wallet service device 210 includes a processing circuit 214, wherein the processing circuit is configured to:
[0148] Provide a trusted execution environment;
[0149] Hosting a cryptocurrency wallet within a trusted execution environment; and
[0150] The wallet service application is hosted within the trusted execution environment and is configured as:
[0151] Authenticate the owner of a cryptocurrency wallet relative to the wallet service application,
[0152] obtaining from the wallet control device a control instruction for registering a new first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet,
[0153] Register a new first password secret at a cryptocurrency wallet, and
[0154] Instructions for controlling a cryptocurrency wallet are executed, the instructions being cryptographically protected based on a first cryptographic secret.
[0155] (15) A wallet service device according to (14), wherein the wallet service application is configured to authenticate the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet based on a signed identity certificate, the identity certificate being signed by an independent entity.
[0156] (16) The wallet service device according to (15), wherein the trusted execution environment includes:
[0157] A public key of a trust anchor associated with the independent entity, and information regarding the identity of an owner of the cryptocurrency wallet, wherein the wallet service application is configured to authenticate the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet by verifying the cryptographic signature using the public key of the trust anchor and by comparing the identity information included in the signed identity certificate with the identity of the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet.
[0158] (17) The wallet service device according to (16), wherein the verification of the cryptographic signature is based on a certificate chain, and the trust anchor is a root certificate of the certificate chain.
[0159] (18) The wallet service device of any one of (14) to (17), wherein the control instruction for generating the first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet comprises: a first instruction for removing a previously used first cryptographic secret from the cryptocurrency wallet, and
[0160] The second instructions are for registering a new first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet, the wallet service application being configured to, in addition to registering the new first cryptographic secret, remove a previously used first cryptographic secret.
[0161] (19) A wallet service device according to any one of (14) to (18), wherein a subset of commands for controlling the cryptocurrency wallet to request authentication of the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet is used as a secondary security measure, and the wallet service application is configured to execute the subset of instructions when authenticating the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet.
[0162] (20) A wallet service device according to any one of (14) to (19), wherein the first cryptographic secret is a private key of a device authorization key pair, the control instruction for registering the first cryptographic secret includes a public key of the device authorization key pair, and the wallet service application is configured to store the public key of the device authorization key pair in a cryptocurrency wallet of the trusted execution environment.
[0163] (21) A wallet service device according to any one of (14) to (20), wherein the wallet service application is configured to obtain a control instruction for registering a new second cryptographic secret from the wallet control device, register the second cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet, and verify a subsequent control instruction for registering a new first cryptographic secret based on the second cryptographic secret.
[0164] (22) A wallet service device according to (22), wherein the second cryptographic secret is a private key of a device registration key pair, the private key used to register the second cryptographic secret includes a public key of the device registration key pair, and the wallet service application is configured to store the public key of the device authorization key pair in a cryptocurrency wallet of the trusted execution environment.
[0165] (23) A wallet service device according to (22), wherein the wallet service application is configured to store a third cryptographic secret for signing transactions on a cryptocurrency blockchain in a cryptocurrency wallet in the trusted execution environment, and
[0166] The wallet service device is configured to secretly sign transactions on the cryptocurrency blockchain using a third password. (24) According to any one of (14) to (23), in which
[0167] The software code of the wallet service application executed in the Trust Execution Environment is audited by a third party.
[0168] (25) A system comprising the wallet control device according to any one of (1) to (13) and the wallet service device according to any one of (14) to (24).
[0169] (26) A mobile device comprising the wallet control device according to any one of (1) to (13).
[0170] (27) A server comprising the wallet service device according to any one of (14) to (24).
[0171] (28) A wallet control method, comprising:
[0172] Register 10 new first cryptographic secrets at a cryptocurrency wallet hosted in a trusted execution environment on a remote server by:
[0173] Generate 12 first password secrets,
[0174] authenticating 14 the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet relative to a wallet service application executing in a trusted execution environment of the server, and
[0175] Based on the authentication, providing 16 to a wallet service application executing in a trusted execution environment of the server, a control instruction for registering a first cryptographic secret at a cryptocurrency wallet; and
[0176] Instructions for controlling the cryptocurrency wallet are provided 18 to the remote server, the instructions being cryptographically protected based on a first cryptographic secret.
[0177] (29) A wallet service method, comprising:
[0178] Provide 20 trusted execution environments;
[0179] Hosting 22 cryptocurrency wallets within a trusted execution environment;
[0180] The wallet service application is hosted 24 hours in the trusted execution environment. The wallet service application performs:
[0181] authenticating 24a the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet with respect to the wallet service application, obtaining 24b a control instruction for registering a new first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet from the wallet control device, and
[0182] Executing 24d instructions for controlling a cryptocurrency wallet, the instructions being encrypted and protected based on a first cryptographic secret.
[0183] (30) A computer program having a program code for executing the method of (28) when the computer program is executed on a computer, a processor or a programmable hardware component.
[0184] (31) A computer program having a program code for executing the method of (29) when the computer program is executed on a computer, a processor or a programmable hardware component.
[0185] The aspects and features described with respect to a specific example in the previous examples may also be combined with one or more of the other examples, replacing the same or similar features of the other examples, or additionally introducing features into the other examples.
[0186] The example may further be or relate to a (computer) program, which includes a program code that executes any one or more of the above methods when the program is executed on a computer, a processor, or other programmable hardware components. Therefore, the steps, operations or processes of the different methods in the above methods can also be performed by a programmed computer, a processor or other programmable hardware components. The example can also cover program storage devices, such as digital data storage media, which are machine-readable, processor-readable or computer-readable and encode and / or contain machine-executable, processor-executable or computer-executable programs and instructions. The program storage device may include or be, for example, a digital storage device, a magnetic storage medium such as a disk and a tape, a hard drive or an optically readable digital data storage medium. Other examples may also include a computer, a processor, a control unit, a (field) programmable logic array ((F)PLA), a (field) programmable gate array ((F)PGA), a graphics processor unit (GPU), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), an integrated circuit (IC) or a system on a chip (SoC) system that is programmed to perform the steps of the method described above.
[0187] It should be further understood that the disclosure of several steps, processes, operations or functions disclosed in the specification or claims should not be interpreted as implying that these operations must depend on the described order, unless explicitly stated in a separate case or necessary for technical reasons. Therefore, the foregoing description does not limit the execution of several steps or functions to a specific order. In addition, in other examples, a single step, function, process or operation can include and / or be decomposed into several sub-steps, sub-functions, sub-processes or sub-operations.
[0188] If aspects have been described with respect to a device or system, these aspects should also be understood as descriptions of the corresponding methods. For example, a block, device or functional aspect of a device or system may correspond to a feature of a corresponding method, such as a method step. Therefore, aspects described with respect to a method should also be understood as descriptions of corresponding blocks, corresponding elements, attributes or functional features of the corresponding device or corresponding system.
[0189] The following claims are hereby incorporated into the detailed description, wherein each claim may stand alone as an independent example. It should also be noted that, although in the claims, a dependent claim refers to a particular combination of one or more other claims, other examples may also include a combination of a dependent claim with the subject matter of any other dependent claim or independent claim. Such combinations are hereby explicitly proposed, unless a particular combination is not intentionally stated in a separate case. In addition, features of a claim should also be included in any other independent claim, even if the claim is not directly qualified as dependent on other independent claims.
Claims
1. A wallet control device, comprising a processing circuit, wherein the processing circuit is configured to: Register a new first cryptographic secret with a cryptocurrency wallet hosted in a trusted execution environment on a remote server by: Generate a first cryptographic secret, a wallet service application executing in the trusted execution environment of the server authenticates the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet, and providing, based on the authentication, to the wallet service application executing in the trusted execution environment of the server, control instructions for registering the first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet; and Instructions for controlling the cryptocurrency wallet are provided to the remote server, the instructions being encrypted and protected based on the first cryptographic secret.
2. The wallet control device according to claim 1, wherein: The processing circuit is configured to register the new first cryptographic secret upon loss of a previously used first cryptographic secret.
3. The wallet control device according to claim 1, wherein: The processing circuit is configured to authenticate the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet using a signed identity certificate, the identity certificate being signed by an independent entity.
4. The wallet control device according to claim 3, wherein: The processing circuit is configured to authenticate the owner of the cryptocurrency by signing the control instruction using a private key corresponding to the identity certificate.
5. The wallet control device according to claim 3, wherein: The processing circuit is configured to obtain the signed identity certificate from the independent entity.
6. The wallet control device according to claim 3, wherein: The processing circuit is configured to authenticate the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet by the wallet service application executing in the trusted execution environment of the server as a secondary security measure for a subset of instructions for controlling the cryptocurrency wallet.
7. The wallet control device according to claim 1, wherein: The first cryptographic secret is a private key of a device authorization key pair, the processing circuit is configured to derive a public key of the device authorization key pair from the private key of the device authorization key pair, and the processing circuit is configured to include the public key of the device authorization key pair in the control instruction for registering the first cryptographic secret.
8. The wallet control device according to claim 1, wherein: The control instructions for registering the first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet include: first instructions for removing a previously used first cryptographic secret from the cryptocurrency wallet, and second instructions for registering the new first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet.
9. The wallet control device according to claim 1, wherein: The processing circuit is further configured to register a new second cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet by generating the second cryptographic secret and providing control instructions for registering the second cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet to the wallet service application executed in the trusted execution environment of the server based on authentication.
10. The wallet control device according to claim 9, wherein: The processing circuit is configured to provide joint control instructions for registering the first cryptographic secret and the second cryptographic secret at the wallet.
11. The wallet control device according to claim 9, wherein: The processing circuit is configured to provide independent control instructions for registering the first cryptographic secret and the second cryptographic secret at the wallet.
12. The wallet control device according to claim 9, wherein: The second cryptographic secret is a private key of a device registration key pair, the processing circuit is configured to obtain a public key of the device registration key pair from the private key of the device registration key pair, and the processing circuit is configured to include the public key of the device registration key pair in a control instruction for registering the second cryptographic secret.
13. The wallet control device according to claim 9, wherein: The second cryptographic secret is a cryptographic secret for registering a new first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet without requiring additional authentication of the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet by the wallet service application.
14. A wallet service device, comprising a processing circuit, wherein the processing circuit is configured to: Provide a trusted execution environment; hosting a cryptocurrency wallet within the trusted execution environment; and A wallet service application is hosted within the trusted execution environment, wherein the wallet service application is configured to: authenticating the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet at the wallet service application, obtaining from the wallet control device a control instruction for registering a new first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet, registering said new first cryptographic secret at said cryptocurrency wallet, and Executing instructions for controlling the cryptocurrency wallet, the instructions being encrypted and protected based on the first cryptographic secret.
15. The wallet service device according to claim 14, wherein: The wallet service application is configured to authenticate the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet based on a signed identity certificate, the identity certificate being signed by an independent entity.
16. The wallet service device according to claim 15, wherein: The trusted execution environment comprises: a public key of a trust anchor associated with the independent entity and information about the identity of the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet, wherein the wallet service application is configured to authenticate the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet by verifying a cryptographic signature using the public key of the trust anchor and by comparing identity information included in the signed identity certificate with the identity of the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet.
17. The wallet service device according to claim 16, wherein: The verification of the cryptographic signature is based on a certificate chain, the trust anchor being a root certificate of the certificate chain.
18. A wallet control method, comprising: Register the new first cryptographic secret with a cryptocurrency wallet hosted in a trusted execution environment on a remote server by: Generate a first cryptographic secret, a wallet service application executing in the trusted execution environment of the server authenticates the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet, and providing, based on the authentication, to the wallet service application executing in the trusted execution environment of the server, control instructions for registering the first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet; and providing instructions for controlling the cryptocurrency wallet to the remote server, The instructions are cryptographically protected based on the first cryptographic secret.
19. A computer program having a program code for executing the method of claim 18 when the computer program is executed on a computer, a processor or a programmable hardware component.
20. A wallet service method: Provide a trusted execution environment; hosting a cryptocurrency wallet within the trusted execution environment; and A wallet service application is hosted within the trusted execution environment, the wallet service application executing: authenticating the owner of the cryptocurrency wallet at the wallet service application, obtaining from the wallet control device a control instruction for registering a new first cryptographic secret at the cryptocurrency wallet, The new first cryptographic secret is registered at the cryptocurrency wallet, and instructions for controlling the cryptocurrency wallet are executed, the instructions being cryptographically protected based on the first cryptographic secret.
