Message authentication system comprising network device with secure proxy support

By integrating security modules and network devices in the security proxy device of the vehicle network, and using dedicated and public domain ports for message authentication, the delay and reliability of message authentication in the vehicle network is solved, and more efficient message authentication and trust is achieved Establish.

CN119031367APending Publication Date: 2024-11-26GM GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY OPERATIONS LLC
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202311371570.7
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2023-05-24
Filing Date
2023-10-20
Publication Date
2024-11-26

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing vehicle network has increased latency and the security module cannot detect the attacked processing unit in terms of message authentication, and the dedicated nodes lack message authentication support, resulting in message authentication being unreliable.

Method used

A message authentication system was designed to integrate security modules and network devices in security proxy devices, and use ports of dedicated domains and public domains to authenticate message authentication codes to ensure the authenticity of messages and hop-by-hop The routing method is authenticated.

Benefits of technology

Reduces the latency of the authentication process, improves the reliability of message authentication, prevents the security-impaired processing units from providing misleading source addresses, and enhances trust between dedicated nodes.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

A message authentication system for a network includes: a dedicated communication system including one or more dedicated nodes in electronic communication with each other; a common communication system comprising one or more common nodes in electronic communication with each other; and a secure proxy device electronically connecting the private communication system to the public communication system. The secure proxy device includes a processing unit in electronic communication with the network device. The network device comprises: a security module integrated into a security proxy device; a private domain including one or more unique ports and storing one or more transmit keys for authenticating a message generated by one of the private nodes of the private communication system; and a common domain comprising one or more common ports.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present disclosure relates to a message authentication system for a network, the message authentication system comprising a public communication system, a private communication system and a security proxy device, the security proxy device providing security proxy support by authenticating a message generated by the private communication system before the message is sent to the public communication system Background Art

[0002] The vehicle network can be used to exchange messages between various smart sensors, smart actuators, and electronic control modules that are part of the vehicle. In one example, the vehicle network can include both a dedicated communication system and a public communication system. The dedicated communication system includes one or more dedicated nodes, and the public communication system includes one or more public nodes. Unlike the public communication system, messages exchanged between dedicated nodes that are part of the dedicated communication system do not require authentication.

[0003] In one method, a vehicle network may include a security proxy device that authenticates a message received from a private communication system before it is sent to a public communication system. Specifically, the security proxy device includes a network device that includes a dedicated port, wherein each dedicated port of the network device corresponds to one of the dedicated nodes of the private communication system. Therefore, the security proxy device knows which dedicated node has generated the message. The security proxy device also includes a processing unit such as a central processing unit (CPU) and a security module. The processing unit of the security proxy device receives a message generated by one of the dedicated nodes and forwards the message to the security module. The security module of the security proxy device authenticates the message generated by the dedicated node by creating a message authentication code. The security module will then make the message generated by the dedicated node (which now includes the message authentication code) available to the processing unit of the security proxy device. The processing unit can then resend the message generated by the dedicated node (which now includes the message authentication code) to one or more of the public nodes that are part of the public communication system through the vehicle network. The public node can then check the authenticity of the message based on the message authentication code.

[0004] Adding authentication information to messages received by the security agent from one of the dedicated nodes results in increased end-to-end latency. In addition, the processing unit of the security agent device is responsible for sending a large number of messages between the security module and the network device, which is computationally intensive. In the event that the processing unit of the security agent device is compromised by an attacker, the messages received by the processing unit may be altered in various ways that are undetectable by the security module. As an example, the security module cannot know whether the compromised processing unit of the security agent device has provided a misleading source address for a message that was not actually generated by one of the dedicated nodes.

[0005] Therefore, while vehicle networks achieve their intended purpose, there is a need in the art for an improved method for authenticating messages received from a private communication system. Summary of the invention

[0006] According to several aspects, a message authentication system for a network is disclosed. The message authentication system includes: a dedicated communication system including one or more dedicated nodes that communicate electronically with each other; a public communication system including one or more public nodes that communicate electronically with each other, wherein the public nodes require message authentication; and a security proxy device that electronically connects the dedicated communication system to the public communication system, wherein the security proxy device includes a processing unit that communicates electronically with a network device. The network device includes a security module integrated into the security proxy device. The network device includes a dedicated domain that includes one or more unique ports and stores one or more transmission keys for authenticating a message generated by one of the dedicated nodes of the dedicated communication system, wherein each unique port of the dedicated domain corresponds to one of the dedicated nodes of the dedicated communication system. The network device includes a public domain that includes one or more public ports, wherein the one or more public ports of the public domain communicate electronically with one or more public nodes of the public communication system.

[0007] On the other hand, dedicated nodes lack support for message authentication.

[0008] In yet another aspect, the security module and the corresponding transmit key of the private domain of the network device generate a message authentication code for a message generated by one of the private nodes of the private communication system that is transmitted to one or more of the public nodes.

[0009] In one aspect, a private domain of a network device stores one or more receive keys, wherein each receive key corresponds to one of the public nodes.

[0010] In another aspect, the security module and the network device's corresponding reception key verify a message authentication code for an incoming message generated by one of the public nodes of the public communication system, the incoming message being sent to one or more of the private nodes.

[0011] In yet another aspect, a private domain of a network device stores a public send key for authenticating messages generated by any of the private nodes.

[0012] In one aspect, each public node of the public communication system comprises a respective security module.

[0013] In another aspect, each public node of the public communication system includes a unique transmit key and a receive key, wherein the receive keys each correspond to one of the private nodes of the private communication system and one of the remaining public nodes that are part of the public communication system.

[0014] In yet another aspect, a corresponding security module and a unique send key that are part of a particular public node generate a message authentication code for a message sent by the particular public node.

[0015] In one aspect, a respective security module and a respective receiving key that is part of the particular public node verify a message authentication code for a message received by the particular public node.

[0016] In another aspect, the dedicated node includes one or more of: a smart sensor, a smart actuator, and an electronic control unit having an input / output (I / O) interface as part of a vehicle.

[0017] In yet another aspect, a public domain of a network device stores a public domain send key that authenticates messages generated by a public node based on a hop-by-hop routing approach that are sent through the network.

[0018] In one aspect, a message authentication system for a network is disclosed. The message authentication system includes: a dedicated communication system including one or more dedicated nodes that communicate electronically with each other; a public communication system including one or more public nodes that communicate electronically with each other, wherein the public nodes require message authentication, and wherein each public node of the public communication system includes a corresponding security module; and a security agent device that electronically connects the dedicated communication system to the public communication system. The security agent device includes a processing unit that communicates electronically with a network device. The network device includes: a security module that is integrated into the security agent device; a dedicated domain that includes one or more unique ports and stores one or more send keys for authenticating a message generated by one of the dedicated nodes of the dedicated communication system, wherein each unique port of the dedicated domain corresponds to one of the dedicated nodes of the dedicated communication system, wherein the security module and the corresponding send keys stored by the dedicated domain of the network device generate a message authentication code for a message generated by one of the dedicated nodes of the dedicated communication system, and the message is sent to one or more of the public nodes. The network device includes a public domain that includes one or more public ports, wherein the one or more public ports of the public domain communicate electronically with one or more of the public nodes of the public communication system.

[0019] In another aspect, a private domain of a network device stores one or more receive keys, wherein each receive key corresponds to one of the public nodes.

[0020] In yet another aspect, the security module and the network device's respective receive keys verify a message authentication code for an incoming message generated by one of the public nodes of the public communication system, the incoming message being sent to one or more of the private nodes.

[0021] In one aspect, a private domain of a network device stores a public send key that authenticates messages generated by any of the private nodes.

[0022] In another aspect, each public node of the public communication system includes a respective security module.

[0023] In yet another aspect, each public node of the public communication system includes a unique transmit key and a receive key, wherein the receive keys each correspond to one of the private nodes of the private communication system and one of the remaining public nodes that are part of the public communication system.

[0024] In one aspect, a corresponding security module and a unique send key that are part of a particular public node generate a message authentication code for a message sent by the particular public node.

[0025] In another aspect, a message authentication system for a network is disclosed. The message authentication system includes: a dedicated communication system, including one or more dedicated nodes that communicate electronically with each other; a public communication system, including one or more public nodes that communicate electronically with each other, wherein the public nodes require message authentication, and wherein each public node of the public communication system includes a corresponding security module; a security proxy device that electronically connects the dedicated communication system to the public communication system. The security proxy device includes a processing unit that communicates electronically with a network device. The network device includes: a security module that is integrated into the security proxy device; a dedicated domain that includes one or more unique ports and stores one or more send keys for authenticating a message generated by one of the dedicated nodes of the dedicated communication system, wherein each unique port of the dedicated domain corresponds to one of the dedicated nodes of the dedicated communication system, wherein the security module and the corresponding send key stored by the dedicated domain of the network device generate a message authentication code for a message generated by one of the dedicated nodes of the dedicated communication system, and the message is sent to one or more of the public nodes. The network device comprises a public domain comprising one or more public ports and storing one or more receiving keys corresponding to one of the public nodes, wherein the one or more public ports of the public domain are in electronic communication with one or more of the public nodes of the public communication system, wherein the security module and the corresponding receiving key of the network device verify a message authentication code for an incoming message generated by one of the public nodes of the public communication system, the incoming message being sent to one or more of the private nodes.

[0026] Further areas of applicability will become apparent from the description provided herein.It should be understood that the description and specific examples are intended for purposes of illustration only and are not intended to limit the scope of the present disclosure. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0027] The drawings described herein are for illustration purposes only and are not intended to limit the scope of the present disclosure in any way.

[0028] Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of a disclosed message authentication system for a network that is part of a vehicle according to an exemplary embodiment, wherein the message authentication system includes a private communication system, a public communication system, and a security agent device;

[0029] Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of another embodiment of a message authentication system according to an exemplary embodiment, wherein the security proxy device includes a lightweight security module; and

[0030] Figure 3 is a diagram illustrating a method for authenticating a message sent to one or more public nodes according to an exemplary embodiment. Figure 2 A process flow diagram of a method of generating a message in one of the dedicated nodes is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0031] The following description is merely exemplary in nature and is not intended to limit the present disclosure, application, or uses.

[0032] refer to Figure 1 , a vehicle 12 including an exemplary message authentication system 14 for a network 16 is illustrated. It should be understood that the vehicle 12 may be any type of vehicle, such as, but not limited to, a car, a truck, a sport utility vehicle, a van, or an RV. The network 16 includes a private communication system 20 and a public communication system 22 that electronically communicate with each other through a secure proxy device 24. The secure proxy device 24 electronically connects the private communication system 20 to the public communication system 22 based on any type of wired or wireless data transmission protocol. It should also be understood that although Figure 1 The network 16 is illustrated as part of the vehicle 12, but these figures are merely exemplary in nature and the message authentication system 14 is not limited to vehicles. In fact, the message authentication system 14 can be used in other networks including public communication systems and private communication systems, such as networks used for industrial automation systems.

[0033] The security proxy device 24 includes a processing unit 30 that is in electronic communication with a network device 32. The processing unit 30 may be, for example, a central processing unit (CPU). As described below, the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 provides security proxy support by authenticating messages generated by the private communication system 20 before sending the messages to the public communication system 22. The network device 32 is any type of switching, routing, or forwarding device that receives and sends messages over a network. Some examples of network devices 32 include, but are not limited to, Ethernet switches or routers that route and forward messages based on Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, where the router includes control plane and data plane functionality. It should be understood that in Figure 1 In the illustrated embodiment, the processing unit 30 of the security proxy device 24 does not play a role in authenticating messages sent to the private communication system 20 and the public communication system 22 , which results in increased computational availability of the processing unit 30 .

[0034] The dedicated communication system 20 includes one or more dedicated nodes 26. In one embodiment, the dedicated node 26 represents a device with limited computing capabilities and lacks support for message authentication. That is, the dedicated node 26 does not include a corresponding security module for generating a message authentication code. Therefore, messages generated by the dedicated node 26 as part of the dedicated communication system 20 do not include a message authentication code. The dedicated node 26 may include, for example, smart sensors, smart actuators, and electronic control units with input / output (I / O) interfaces as part of the vehicle 12.

[0035] The network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 includes a plurality of ports 56, a private domain PR, and a public domain PU. Each port 56 of the network device 32 represents a network connection to the private communication system 20 or the public communication system 22. The private domain PR of the network device 32 includes one or more unique ports 56, wherein each unique port 56 of the private domain PR corresponds to one of the private nodes 26 of the private communication system 20. Each unique port 56 of the private domain PR receives a message from a corresponding private node 26, so the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 knows which private node 26 generated the message. Figure 1 In the non-limiting embodiment shown, the dedicated communication system 20 includes five dedicated nodes N1,1, N1,2, N1,3, N1,4, N1,5, and the dedicated domain PR of the network device 32 includes multiple unique ports P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, each unique port corresponding to one of the dedicated nodes 26 of the dedicated communication system 20.

[0036] The public domain PU of the network device 32 includes one or more public ports 56. The public communication system 22 includes one or more public nodes 28. The public port 56 of the public domain PU of the network device 32 of the security agent device 24 is in electronic communication with one or more public nodes 28 of the public communication system 22. Unlike a unique port that is part of the private domain PR, the public port 56 of the public domain PU of the network device 32 of the security agent device 24 can be shared between more than one public node 28. Figure 1 In the non-limiting embodiment shown, the public communication system 22 includes six public nodes N6,1, N6,2, N6,3, N7,1, N7,2, N7,3. Three nodes N6,1, N6,2, N6,3 are in electronic communication with the corresponding public port P6 of the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24, and the remaining three public nodes N7,1, N7,2, N7,3 are in electronic communication with the corresponding public port P7 of the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24. Figure 1 In the illustrated embodiment, the switching device SW connects the common nodes N7,1, N7,2, N7,3 with the corresponding port P7. The switching device SW may be any type of switch, routing or forwarding device used in a wired or wireless data transmission protocol.

[0037] Unlike the private nodes 26, the public nodes 28 of the public communication system 22 require message authentication. That is, messages communicated between the public nodes 28 as part of the public communication system 22, messages sent from one of the private nodes 26 as part of the private communication system 20 to the public communication system 22, and messages sent from one of the public nodes 28 as part of the public communication system 22 to the private communication system 20 require message authentication codes. Each public node 28 of the public communication system 22 includes a corresponding security module 42 implemented in hardware or software. Each public node 28 of the public communication system 22 also stores a unique transmission key (not shown) and one or more reception keys (not shown) corresponding to the specific public node 28. The reception keys each correspond to one of the private nodes 26 and one of the remaining public nodes 28, which are part of the public communication system 22 that exchanges messages with the public node 28. It should be understood that if one of the private nodes 26 or one of the remaining public nodes 28 never sends a message to a specific public node 28, then the corresponding reception key is not required. For example, if public node N7,1 never sends a message to public node N6,1, public node N6,1 does not store a reception key corresponding to public node N7,1. In addition, if public node 28 receives a message based on a hop-by-hop routing method, the public node will store a reception key (not shown) corresponding to the public domain PU of network device 32. The hop-by-hop routing method is described below.

[0038] The security module 42 and the unique transmission key stored by the specific public node 28 generate a message authentication code for the message sent by the specific public node 28. The security module 42 and the corresponding receiving key as part of the specific public node 28 can also verify the message authentication code for the message received by the specific public node 28. Each message authentication code corresponds to a unique message sent through the network 16. However, it should be understood that in some embodiments, a single message authentication code can be used to authenticate a batch of messages. For example, the public node N6,1 includes a transmission key corresponding to the public node N6,1 and eleven receiving keys corresponding to the dedicated nodes N1,1, N1,2, N1,3, N1,4, N1,5, N1,6 and the remaining public nodes N7,1, N7,2, N7,3, N6,2, N6,3. However, as described above, if one of the remaining public nodes 28 does not send a message to the public node N6,1, the public node N6,1 does not store the receiving key corresponding to the public node 28. In addition, if the public node N6,1 receives the message based on the hop-by-hop routing method, the public node N6,1 will also store the reception key corresponding to the public domain PU of the network device 32, because the public domain PU generates the final message authentication code (MAC) on the hop-by-hop routing path, which is the MAC to be processed by the node N6,1.

[0039] The network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 includes a control plane 34, a data plane 36, and a security module 38. The control plane 34 of the network device 32 virtually defines and configures which ports 56 are part of the private domain PR and the public domain PU of the network device 32. Figure 1 A virtual boundary 40 is shown that separates the private domain PR from the public domain PU. Specifically, a unit external to the network device 32 (e.g., the processing unit 30) sends configuration information to the control plane 34. The configuration information indicates where the virtual boundary 40 is located. Then, the control plane 34 configures the private domain PR and the public domain PU based on the configuration information. Figure 1 In the example shown, the private domain PR includes five private ports P1-P5, and the private domain PU includes two public ports P6 and P7. The data plane 36 performs address decoding and checking of messages, message forwarding, security module interaction, and virtual local area network (VLAN) support.

[0040] like Figure 1 As shown, the security module 38 is integrated into the network device 32. That is, unlike the processing unit 30, the security module 38 is not separate from the network device 32. In one embodiment, the security module 38 of the network device 32 is implemented in hardware. However, it should be understood that the security module 38 can also be implemented in software. It should be understood that the security module 38 of the network device 32 knows which ports 56 of the network device 32 are part of the private domain PR and which ports 56 of the network device 32 are part of the public domain PU.

[0041] In one embodiment, the private domain PR and public domain PU of the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 include tamper-resistant memory. The tamper-resistant memory of the private domain PR of the network device 32 includes a plurality of send key slots 44, wherein each send key slot 44 is configured to store a corresponding send key 48. The number of send key slots 44 is equal to the number of potential private ports that are part of the network device 32, and the send keys 48 stored in the private domain PR of the network device 32 each correspond to one of the private nodes 26. It should be understood that in Figure 1 In the non-limiting embodiment shown, processing unit 30 is also considered a dedicated node 26, resulting in a total of seven potential dedicated ports 56. Figure 1 A transmit key slot 44 is illustrated representing one of the potential dedicated ports. Five of the key slots 44 store transmit keys KP1-KP5 corresponding to dedicated ports P1-P5, and the seventh key slot 44 stores a transmit key KP6 corresponding to processing unit 30. Figure 1 The processing unit 30 of the security proxy device 24 is illustrated as a dedicated node 26, but it should be understood that the processing unit 30 can also be considered a public node 28. Therefore, it should be understood that in an embodiment, the processing unit 30 can exchange messages with the dedicated node 26 of the private communication system 20 and the public node 28 of the public communication system 22.

[0042] although Figure 1 Multiple transmit keys 48 are illustrated, but in another embodiment, the tamper-resistant memory of the private domain PR of the network device 32 stores a common transmit key 48 that authenticates messages generated by any private node 26 that is part of the private communication system 20. In other words, the private domain PR of the network device 32 stores only a single transmit key 48. Thus, the private domain PR of the network device 32 includes one or more transmit keys 48 for authenticating messages generated by one of the private nodes 26 of the private communication system 20.

[0043] In the case where the private domain PR of the network device 32 stores the public send key 48, the network device 32 introduces the node identifier into the payload of the message m sent by one of the private nodes 26 received by the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24, wherein the node identifier indicates the private node 26 that generated the message. The network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 also calculates a message authentication code using the public send key 48 of the message m. The message m is received by one of the public nodes 28 that are part of the public communication system 22, wherein the receiving public node 28 can verify which private node 26 sent the message m by verifying the validity of the message authentication code and checking the node identifier.

[0044] The tamper-resistant memory of the private domain PR of the network device 32 also stores one or more reception keys (not shown), wherein each reception key corresponds to one of the public nodes 28 that are part of the public communication system 22. Figure 1 In the example shown, the private domain PR of the network device 32 stores six reception keys, each corresponding to one of the public nodes N6,1, N6,2, N6,3, N7,1, N7,2, N7,3. The reception keys each verify the message authentication code from the message sent by the corresponding public node 28. As described above, if one of the remaining public nodes 28 never sends a message to the private communication system 20, then the corresponding reception key is not needed.

[0045] The security module 38 and corresponding transmit key 48 generate a message authentication code for a message generated by a private node 26 of the private communication system 20 that is sent to one or more public nodes 28 that are part of the public communication system 22. The security module 38 and corresponding receive key (not shown) of the network device 32 also verify the message authentication code for an incoming message generated by a public node 28 that is part of the public communication system 22 that is sent to one or more private nodes 26 that are part of the private communication system 20.

[0046] exist Figure 1 In the illustrated embodiment, the tamper-proof memory of the public domain PU of the network device 32 stores a public domain send key 50, which is labeled as KPU. The public domain send key 50 authenticates a message generated by the public node 28, which is sent through the network 16 based on the hop-by-hop routing method described below. The tamper-proof memory of the public domain PU of the network device 32 also includes a receive key (not shown), each of which corresponds to one of the public nodes 28. In one embodiment, the public domain PU stores the receive keys corresponding to the public nodes N6,1, N6,2, N6,3, N7,1, N7,2, N7,3. However, as described above, if one of the public nodes 28 never sends a message based on the hop-by-hop routing method, the public domain PU does not store the corresponding receive key. It should be understood that if the security agent device 24 does not perform the hop-by-hop routing method described below, the receive key is not required.

[0047] It will be appreciated that there are several methods for authenticating messages sent over the network 16, and an exemplary method for verifying a message sent by one of the private nodes 26 of the private communication system 20 and received by one of the public nodes 28 of the public communication system 22 will now be described. It should be appreciated that any of the private nodes 26 can be used to send one or more unique messages to one or more of the public nodes 28 of the public communication system 22. In this example, one of the private nodes 26 of the private communication system 20 sends a message m to the network device 32 of the security agent device 24. It should be appreciated that the message m includes a source address and a destination address, wherein the source address indicates which private node 26 generated the message m, and the destination address indicates the public node 28 to which the message m is directed. In this example, the private node N1,1 of the private communication system 20 sends the message m to the unique port P1 of the network device 32, wherein the destination address is the public node N7,1 of the public communication system 22.

[0048] As described above, due to the one-to-one relationship between the dedicated node 26 and the unique port P1 of the network device 32, the network device 32 of the security agent device 24 knows that the dedicated node N1,1 generated the message m. The network device 32 of the security agent device 24 then calculates the message authentication code corresponding to the message m generated by the dedicated node N1,1. Specifically, the security module 38 of the network device 32 of the security agent device 24 calculates the message authentication code using the transmission key KP1 corresponding to the dedicated node N1,1 of the dedicated communication system 20.

[0049] The data plane 36 of the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 then sends the message m including the message authentication code to the public node 28 indicated by the target address. Specifically, in this example, the data plane 36 of the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 sends the message m to the public port P7 of the network device 32, wherein the public port P7 is in electronic communication with the public node P7,1. The security module 42 of the public node 28 (i.e., the public node P7,1) indicated by the target address then verifies the message authentication code associated with the message m using the receiving key corresponding to the private node N1,1. It should be understood that integrating the security module 38 into the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 avoids assigning the message authentication task to the processing unit 30. Therefore, the processing unit 30 of the security proxy device 24 has additional computing availability and can be used for other tasks, and latency is also reduced.

[0050] In another example, one of the dedicated nodes 26 of the dedicated communication system 20 sends a message m intended for another dedicated node 26 that is part of the dedicated communication system 20. Specifically, in this example, the dedicated node N1,1 of the dedicated communication system 20 sends the message m including a source address and a destination address. The source address indicates that the dedicated node N1,1 sent the message m, and the destination address indicates that the message m is intended for the dedicated node N2,1. As described above, messages sent through the dedicated communication system 20 do not require authentication, so the message m does not include a message authentication code. The dedicated node N1,1 of the dedicated communication system 20 sends the message m to the unique port P1, where the network device 32 of the security agent device 24 knows that the dedicated node N1,1 generated the message m.

[0051] The data plane 36 of the network device 32 then checks the source address of the message m to confirm that the unique port P1 receiving the message m is connected to the dedicated node 26 that generated the message. It should be understood that since the message m is sent through the dedicated communication system 20, no message authentication code is required. The data plane 36 of the network device 32 of the security agent device 24 then sends the message m to the dedicated node 26 indicated by the target address. Specifically, in this example, the data plane 36 of the network device 32 of the security agent device 24 sends the message m to the unique port P2 of the network device 32, where the unique port P2 is in electronic communication with the dedicated node N2,1. The dedicated node N2,1 knows that the message m was sent by the dedicated node N1,1 by checking the source address of the message m.

[0052] In another embodiment, one of the public nodes 28 of the public communication system 22 sends a message m to a private node 26 that is part of the private communication system 20. Specifically, in this example, the public node N7,1 of the public communication system 22 sends the message m including a message authentication code to the network device 32. The source address indicates that the public node N7,1 sent the message m, and the destination address indicates that the message m is intended for the private node N1,1. The receiving key (not shown) corresponding to the public node N7,1 stored in the tamper-resistant memory of the private domain PR of the network device 32 verifies the message authentication code of the message m. Specifically, the receiving key corresponding to the public node N7,1 verifies the message authentication code by confirming that the identity of the sender indicated in the frame header of the message m matches the sender indicated by the message authentication code. The network device 32 then confirms that the source address of the message m indicates the correct public node 28 (public node N7,1) that generated the message m. The data plane 36 of the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 then sends the message m without the message authentication code to the private node 26 indicated by the destination address. Specifically, in this example, the data plane 36 of the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 sends the message m to the unique port P1 of the network device 32 , where the unique port P1 is in electronic communication with the dedicated node N1 , 1 .

[0053] In another example, one of the public nodes 28 of the public communication system 22 sends a message m intended for another public node 28 that is part of the public communication system 22. Specifically, in this example, the public node N6,1 of the public communication system 22 sends the message m including the message authentication code to the network device 32. The source address indicates that the public node N6,1 sent the message m, and the destination address indicates that the message m is intended for the public node N7,1. In this example, the public node N6,1 of the public communication system 22 sends the message m to the public port P6 of the network device 32, where the destination address is the public node N7,1 of the public communication system 22.

[0054] The data plane 36 of the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 sends the message m to the public port P7 in electronic communication with the public node N7,1. The public node N7,1 verifies the message authentication code corresponding to the message m through the corresponding security module 42 and the receiving key (not shown) corresponding to the public node N6,1. As described above, the security module 42 and the receiving key corresponding to the public node N6,1 are stored locally in the public node N7,1. Specifically, the receiving key corresponding to the public node N6,1 verifies the message authentication code by confirming that the identity of the sender indicated in the frame header of the message m matches the sender indicated by the message authentication code.

[0055] In another example, one of the public nodes 28 of the public communication system 22 sends a message to another public node in the public nodes 28 that are part of the public communication system 22 based on a hop-by-hop routing method, wherein the message authentication code is verified by the intermediate node. An example of a hop-by-hop routing protocol is a media access control security (MACsec) protocol. The remaining examples above are based on an end-to-end routing method, wherein the intermediate node does not verify the message authentication code.

[0056] In this example, one of the public nodes 28 of the public communication system 22 sends a message m intended for another public node 28 that is part of the public communication system 22 based on a hop-by-hop routing method. Specifically, the public node N6,1 of the public communication system 22 sends the message m including a message authentication code to the network device 32. The source address indicates that the public node N6,1 sent the message m, and the destination address indicates that the message m is intended for the public node N7,1. The public node N6,1 of the public communication system 22 sends the message m to the public port P6 of the network device 32, wherein the destination address is the public node N7,1 of the public communication system 22.

[0057] The network device 32 checks the source address of the message m and determines that the message m is sent by the public node N6,1. Based on this, the network device 32 determines the receiving key (not shown) corresponding to the public node N6,1 to check the authenticity of the message m. Using the receiving key corresponding to the public node N6,1, the network device 32 checks the authenticity of the message m. Then, the network device 32 generates a new message authentication code for the message m through the public domain sending key 50 that is part of the public domain PU of the network device 32. The network device 32 also creates a new frame header for the message m, wherein the frame header indicates that the source address is the security agent device 24 and the destination address is the public node N7,1. The data plane 36 of the network device 32 of the security agent device 24 sends the message m including the new message authentication code to the public port P7 that is in electronic communication with the public node N7,1. The public node N7,1 verifies the new message authentication code corresponding to the message m through the corresponding security module 42 and the receiving key (not shown) corresponding to the public domain PU of the network device 32.

[0058] The present disclosure Figure 1The message authentication system illustrated in the figure provides various technical effects and benefits. Specifically, the processing unit of the security proxy device does not work when authenticating messages sent to the private communication system and the public communication system, which leads to an increase in the computing availability of the processing unit and a reduction in the time delay for sending the authentication message. The message authentication code generated or verified by the security proxy device is processed by a security module embedded in the network device rather than a security module located outside the network device, which leads to improved end-to-end delay. This also prevents a processing unit with compromised security from providing a misleading source address to the security module. The misleading source address indicates that a message that is not generated by one of the dedicated nodes is actually generated by one or more dedicated nodes.

[0059] Figure 2 Another embodiment of a vehicle 212 including an exemplary message authentication system 214 for a network 216 is illustrated. The message authentication system 214 includes a private communication system 220 and a public communication system 222 in electronic communication with each other through a security proxy device 224. The security proxy device 224 includes a processing unit 230, a network device 232, and a security module 238, wherein the processing unit 230 is in electronic communication with both the network device 232 and the security module 238. Figure 1 Unlike the processing unit 30 shown in FIG. 2 , the processing unit 230 of the security proxy device 224 receives a message generated by one of the private nodes 226 that is part of the private communication system 220 from the network device 232 and forwards the message to the security module 238 of the security proxy device 224. The processing unit 230 of the security proxy device 224 also sends the message received from the security module 238 to one or more public nodes 228 that are also part of the public communication system 222. Figure 1 Similar to the illustrated embodiment, the dedicated nodes 226 represent devices with limited computing capabilities and lack support for message authentication, whereas the public nodes 228 require message authentication and each include a corresponding security module 242 .

[0060] The security agent device 224 and the network device 232 both include a private domain PR2 and a public domain PU2, wherein a virtual boundary 240 separates the private domain PR2 from the public domain PU2. The network device 232 of the security agent device 224 includes a lightweight security module 200 and a plurality of ports 256. The lightweight security module 200 is in electronic communication with one or more private nodes 226 of the private communication system 220 and is located within the private domain PR2 of the network device 232. The public domain PU2 of the network device 232 includes one or more public ports P6 and P7, wherein the public ports P6 and P7 are each in electronic communication with one or more public nodes 228 of the private communication system 220.

[0061] The lightweight security module 200 includes one or more unique ports 256, wherein each unique port 256 corresponds to one of the dedicated nodes 226 of the dedicated communication system 220. Figure 2 In the non-limiting embodiment shown, the dedicated communication system 220 includes five dedicated nodes N1,1, N1,2, N1,3, N1,4, N1,5. The dedicated domain PR2 of the lightweight security module 200 includes a plurality of unique ports P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, each of which corresponds to one of the dedicated nodes 226 of the dedicated communication system 220. The lightweight security module 200 of the network device 232 of the security agent device 224 knows which dedicated node 226 generated the message because there is a one-to-one relationship between the dedicated node 226 and the unique port 256 of the lightweight security module 200, wherein each dedicated node 226 that is part of the dedicated communication system 220 is assigned to one of the unique ports 256 of the lightweight security module 200.

[0062] The lightweight security module 200 represents any device implemented in hardware or software that is configured to calculate a message authentication code based on a single send key, such as a lightweight send key KLSMK stored in the private domain PR2 of the security proxy device 224. That is, the functionality of the lightweight security module 200 is limited to calculating a message authentication code and determining a node identifier of a message received from one of the private nodes 226 that are part of the private communication system 220. In other words, the functionality of the lightweight security module 200 is limited to authenticating a message received from one of the private nodes 226 of the private communication system 220 and adding a node identifier thereto, and is simpler than a security module that performs all required cryptographic operations and implements access control policies.

[0063] The dedicated domain PR2 of the security proxy device 224 includes a plurality of transmit key slots 244, wherein each transmit key slot 244 is configured to store a corresponding transmit key 248. The number of transmit key slots 244 is equal to the number of potential dedicated ports of the network device 232, wherein the plurality of transmit keys 248 stored in the dedicated domain PR2 of the security proxy device 224 each corresponds to one of the dedicated nodes 226.

[0064] The private domain PR2 of the security proxy device 224 also stores the lightweight sending key KLSM corresponding to the lightweight security module 200. Figure 2In the illustrated embodiment, the private domain PR2 of the security agent device 224 includes seven send key slots 244 to represent one of the potential private ports and a lightweight send key KLSM. Five key slots 244 store the send keys KP1-KP5 corresponding to the private ports P1-P5, and the seventh key slot 244 stores the lightweight send key KLWM. The private domain PR2 of the security agent device 224 also stores one or more receive keys (not shown), each of which corresponds to one of the public nodes 228 as part of the public communication system 222. It should be understood that the lightweight send key KLSM is inaccessible to the processing unit 230 of the security agent device 224. Therefore, if the processing unit 230 is compromised, the attacker cannot access the lightweight send key KLSM and the send key KP1-KP5 via the processing unit 230.

[0065] The public domain PU2 of the security proxy device 224 stores a public domain send key 250, denoted as KPU, which authenticates messages generated by the public node 228 based on the hop-by-hop routing method and sent through the network 216. The tamper-proof memory of the public domain PU of the network device 232 also includes a receive key (not shown) that also corresponds to the public node 228. In one embodiment, the public domain PU stores the receive keys corresponding to the public nodes N6,1, N6,2, N6,3, N7,1, N7,2, N7,3. However, as described above, if one of the public nodes 228 never sends a message based on the hop-by-hop routing method, then the corresponding receive key is not required.

[0066] Figure 3 is an exemplary process flow diagram illustrating a method 300 for sending a message generated by one of the private nodes 226 of the private communication system 220 to one or more public nodes 228 that are part of the public communication system 222. Figure 2 and Figure 3 , the method 300 starts at block 302. In block 302, the lightweight security module 200 of the network device 232 of the security proxy device 224 receives an original message m generated by one of the private nodes 226 of the private communication system 220, where the original message m is intended for one or more of the public nodes 228 that are part of the public communication system 222. The method 300 may then proceed to block 304.

[0067] In block 304, the lightweight security module 200 of the network device 232 of the security proxy device 224 creates an update message m' including a node identifier, a message authentication code, and the original message m. The node identifier indicates the identity of the dedicated node 226 from which the lightweight security module 200 received the original message m. Specifically, the lightweight security module 200 and the lightweight send key KLSM as part of the dedicated domain PR2 of the security proxy device 224 generate a message authentication code for the update message m'. The method 300 can then proceed to block 306.

[0068] In block 306 , the processing unit 230 of the security proxy device 224 receives the update message m′ from the lightweight security module 200 and sends the update message m′ to the security module 238 of the security proxy device 224 . The method 300 may then proceed to decision block 308 .

[0069] In decision block 308, the security module 238 of the security proxy device 224 and the corresponding received key ( Figure 2 In response to determining that the message authentication code of the update message m' is invalid, the method 300 may terminate. However, in response to determining that the message authentication code of the update message m' is valid, the method 300 may proceed to block 310.

[0070] In block 310, the security module 238 of the security proxy device 224 and the corresponding send key 248 stored in the private domain PR2 of the security proxy device 224 create an update message authentication code of the original message. Specifically, the security module 238 divides the update message m' into the node identifier and the original message m, and then the security module 238 calculates the update message authentication code of the original message by selecting one of the send keys 248 stored in the private domain PR2 of the security proxy device 224 corresponding to the private node 226 indicated by the node identifier.

[0071] In block 312, the processing unit 230 of the security proxy device 224 receives the original message m including the updated message authentication code and sends the original message m including the updated message authentication code to the network device 232. The method 300 may then proceed to block 314.

[0072] In block 314, public domain PU2 of network device 232 sends original message m including the updated message authentication code via one or more of public ports P6, P7 to one or more of public nodes 228 indicated by the target address indicated by original message m. Method 300 may then terminate.

[0073] Figure 2 and Figure 3The disclosed message authentication system illustrated in the figure provides various technical effects and benefits. Specifically, the processing unit of the security proxy device cannot access the lightweight send key. Therefore, in the case of an attack, the processing unit cannot create a misleading source address that indicates that a message that was not generated by one of the dedicated nodes was actually generated by one or more dedicated nodes. The message authentication system also prevents the dedicated nodes from deceiving the security proxy device from each other.

[0074] The processing unit may refer to an electronic circuit, a combinational logic circuit, a field programmable gate array (FPGA), or a combination of some or all of them, or a part of an electronic circuit, a combinational logic circuit, a field programmable gate array (FPGA), such as in a system on a chip. In addition, the controller may be microprocessor-based, such as a computer having at least one processor, memory (RAM and / or ROM), and associated input and output buses. The processor may operate under the control of an operating system residing in the memory. The operating system may manage computer resources so that computer program code embodied as one or more computer software applications (e.g., applications residing in the memory) may have instructions executed by the processor. In an alternative embodiment, the processor may directly execute the application, in which case the operating system may be omitted.

[0075] The description of the present disclosure is merely exemplary in nature, and variations that do not depart from the gist of the present disclosure are intended to be within the scope of the present disclosure. Such variations should not be regarded as a departure from the spirit and scope of the present disclosure.

Claims

1. A message authentication system for a network, the message authentication system comprising: A dedicated communication system comprising one or more dedicated nodes in electronic communication with each other; A public communication system comprising one or more public nodes in electronic communication with each other, wherein the public nodes require message authentication; and a secure proxy device electronically connecting the private communication system to the public communication system, wherein the secure proxy device comprises a processing unit in electronic communication with a network device, and wherein the network device comprises: A security module, integrated into the security proxy device; a private domain comprising one or more unique ports and storing one or more transmission keys for authenticating messages generated by one of the private nodes of the private communication system, wherein each unique port of the private domain corresponds to one of the private nodes of the private communication system; and A public domain includes one or more public ports, wherein the one or more public ports of the public domain are in electronic communication with one or more of the public nodes of the public communication system.

2. The message authentication system according to claim 1, wherein: The dedicated nodes lack support for message authentication.

3. The message authentication system according to claim 1, wherein: The security module and the corresponding transmit key of the private domain of the network device generate a message authentication code for a message generated by one of the private nodes of the private communication system, the message being sent to one or more of the public nodes.

4. The message authentication system according to claim 1, wherein: The private domain of the network device stores one or more reception keys, wherein each reception key corresponds to one of the public nodes.

5. The message authentication system according to claim 4, wherein: The security module and the corresponding reception key of the network device verify a message authentication code for an incoming message generated by one of the public nodes of the public communication system, the incoming message being sent to one or more of the private nodes.

6. The message authentication system according to claim 1, wherein: The private domain of the network device stores a public send key for authenticating messages generated by any of the private nodes.

7. The message authentication system according to claim 1, wherein: Each public node of the public communication system comprises a corresponding security module.

8. The message authentication system according to claim 7, wherein: Each public node of the public communication system comprises a unique transmission key and a reception key, wherein the reception keys respectively correspond to one of the private nodes of the private communication system and one of the remaining public nodes that are part of the public communication system.

9. The message authentication system according to claim 8, wherein: The corresponding security module and the unique transmit key, which are part of a particular public node, generate a message authentication code for a message transmitted by the particular public node.

10. The message authentication system according to claim 9, wherein: The respective security module and a respective reception key that is part of the particular public node verify a message authentication code for a message received by the particular public node.