Message authentication system comprising network device having lightweight security module

By using lightweight security modules in the vehicle network to work in concert with processing units and security modules, we create update messages including node identifiers and message authentication codes, solving the increase in delays and impaired security in the message authentication process in the vehicle network. The problem of this achieves more efficient and reliable message authentication.

CN119031368APending Publication Date: 2024-11-26GM GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY OPERATIONS LLC
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202311376397.X
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2023-05-24
Filing Date
2023-10-20
Publication Date
2024-11-26

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

There is an increase in delay during the message authentication process in the existing vehicle network and the security module cannot detect damage to the processing unit, resulting in unreliable message authentication.

Method used

Use lightweight security module to work in collaboration with processing unit and security module. By creating update messages including node identifiers and message authentication codes, verifying the authenticity of the message, and calculating the updated message authentication code in the security module, avoiding processing The unit directly participates in the certification task.

Benefits of technology

Reduces end-to-end latency, improves the reliability of message authentication, prevents the misleading processing units from providing misleading source addresses, and enhances the computing availability of the system.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

A message authentication system for a network includes: a dedicated communication system including one or more dedicated nodes in electronic communication with each other; a common communication system comprising one or more common nodes in electronic communication with each other; and a secure proxy device that electronically connects the private communication system to the public communication system. The security proxy device includes a processing unit, a security module, and a lightweight security module in electronic communication with one or more dedicated nodes of a dedicated communication system. The lightweight security module generates a message authentication code for a message transmitted by the private communication system to the public communication system.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present disclosure relates to a message authentication system for a network, the network comprising a public communication system, a private communication system and a security agent device, wherein the security agent device comprises a lightweight security module, the lightweight security module generates a message authentication code for a message sent by the private communication system, and the message authentication code is transmitted to the public communication system. Background Art

[0002] The vehicle network can be used to exchange messages between various smart sensors, smart actuators, and electronic control modules that are part of the vehicle. In one example, the vehicle network can include both a private communication system and a public communication system. The private communication system includes one or more private nodes, and the public communication system includes one or more public nodes. Unlike the public communication system, messages exchanged between private nodes that are part of the private communication system do not require authentication.

[0003] In one method, a vehicle network may include a security proxy device that verifies a message received from a private communication system before it is transmitted to a public communication system. Specifically, the security proxy device includes a network device having a dedicated port, each dedicated port of the network device corresponding to one of the dedicated nodes of the private communication system. Therefore, the security proxy device knows which dedicated node generated the message. The security proxy device also includes a processing unit, such as a central processing unit (CPU) and a security module. The processing unit of the security proxy device receives a message generated by one of the dedicated nodes and forwards the message to the security module. The security module of the security proxy device authenticates the message generated by the dedicated node by creating a message authentication code. The security module then makes the message generated by the dedicated node available to the processing unit of the security proxy device, which now includes the message authentication code. The processing unit then retransmits the message generated by the dedicated node to one or more public nodes as part of the public communication system through the vehicle network, which now includes the message authentication code. The public node can then check the authenticity of the message based on the message authentication code.

[0004] Adding authentication information to messages received by the security proxy from one of the dedicated nodes results in increased end-to-end latency. In addition, the processing unit of the security proxy device is responsible for transmitting a large number of messages between the security module and the network device, which is computationally intensive. In the event that the processing unit of the security proxy device is compromised by an attacker, the messages received by the processing unit may be altered in a variety of ways that the security module cannot detect. As an example, the security module cannot know whether a compromised processing unit of the security proxy device has provided a misleading source address for a message that was not actually generated by one of the dedicated nodes.

[0005] Therefore, while vehicle networks achieve their intended purpose, there is a need in the art for an improved method for authenticating messages received from a dedicated communication system. Summary of the invention

[0006] According to several aspects, a message authentication system for a network is disclosed. The message authentication system includes: a private communication system including one or more private nodes in electronic communication with each other; a public communication system including one or more public nodes in electronic communication with each other, wherein the public nodes require message authentication, and a security agent device that electronically connects the private communication system to the public communication system, wherein the security agent device includes a processing unit, a security module, and a lightweight security module that electronically communicates with one or more private nodes of the private communication system. The security agent device performs the following operations: the lightweight security module receives an original message generated by one of the private nodes of the private communication system, wherein the original message is for one or more public nodes that are part of the public communication system. The security agent device creates an updated message including a node identifier and a message authentication code through the lightweight security module. The security agent device retrieves the updated message from the lightweight security module through the processing unit and sends the updated message to the security module. The security agent device verifies the message authentication code of the updated message through the security module. In response to determining that the message authentication code of the updated message is valid, the security agent device creates an updated message authentication code for the original message through the security module. The security agent device receives the original message including the updated message authentication code through the processing unit. The security proxy device transmits the original message and the updated message authentication code to the security proxy device through the processing unit.

[0007] In another aspect, the node identifier indicates the identity of the dedicated node from which the lightweight security module received the original message.

[0008] In yet another aspect, the security module creates an updated message authentication code by dividing the updated message into a node identifier and an original message.

[0009] In yet another aspect, a security proxy device includes a public domain and a private domain, and wherein the private domain of the security proxy device stores a plurality of transmit keys, each transmit key corresponding to one of the private nodes of the private communication system.

[0010] In one aspect, the security module creates the updated message authentication code by selecting one of a plurality of transmit keys stored in a private domain of the security proxy device corresponding to a private node indicated by the node identifier to compute the updated message authentication code for the original message.

[0011] In another aspect, the security proxy device includes one or more public ports for electronically communicating with one or more public nodes of a public communication system.

[0012] In yet another aspect, the lightweight security module includes one or more dedicated ports, wherein each dedicated port corresponds to one of the dedicated nodes of the dedicated communication system.

[0013] In one aspect, the security proxy device transmits the original message and the updated message authentication code to one or more public nodes of the public communication system.

[0014] On the other hand, the security proxy device includes a public domain and a private domain, and the public domain of the security proxy device stores a lightweight sending key corresponding to the lightweight security module.

[0015] In yet another aspect, the lightweight send key is not accessible to the processing unit of the security proxy device.

[0016] In one aspect, a method for transmitting a message through a network by a message authentication system is disclosed. The method includes receiving, by a lightweight security module as part of a security proxy device, an original message generated by a private node as part of a private communication system, wherein the original message is for one or more public nodes as part of a public communication system, wherein the private communication system is electronically connected to the security proxy device of the public communication system and the security proxy device includes a processing unit, a security module and a lightweight security module. The method includes creating, by the lightweight security module, an updated message including a node identifier and a message authentication code. The method includes retrieving, by the processing unit of the security proxy device, the updated message from the lightweight security module and transmitting the updated message to the security module. The method includes: the security module of the security proxy device verifies the message authentication code of the updated message. The method includes: in response to determining that the message authentication code of the updated message is valid, creating, by the security module, an updated message authentication code for the original message. The method includes receiving, by the processing unit of the security proxy device, an original message including the updated message authentication code. Finally, the method includes the processing unit of the security proxy device transmitting the original message and the updated message authentication code to the security proxy device.

[0017] In another aspect, the method includes creating an updated message authentication code by dividing, by a security module of the security proxy device, the updated message into a node identifier and an original message, wherein the node identifier indicates an identity of a dedicated node from which the lightweight security module received the original message.

[0018] In yet another aspect, a security proxy device includes a public domain and a private domain, and wherein the private domain of the security proxy device stores a plurality of transmit keys, each transmit key corresponding to one of the private nodes of the private communication system.

[0019] In one aspect, the method includes computing an updated message authentication code of the original message by selecting one of a plurality of transmit keys stored in a private domain of the secure proxy device corresponding to a private node indicated by the node identifier, thereby creating an updated message authentication code.

[0020] On the other hand, a message authentication system for a network is disclosed. The message authentication system includes: a private communication system, which includes one or more private nodes that communicate electronically with each other; a public communication system, which includes one or more public nodes that communicate electronically with each other, wherein the public nodes require message authentication; and a security agent device that electronically connects the private communication system to the public communication system, wherein the security agent device includes a processing unit, a security module, and a lightweight security module that electronically communicates with one or more private nodes of the private communication system. The security agent device includes a public domain and a private domain, the private domain of the security agent device stores a plurality of transmission keys, each transmission key corresponds to one of the private nodes of the private communication system, and the security agent device performs an original message generated by receiving one of the private nodes of the private communication system through the lightweight security module, wherein the original message is for one or more public nodes that are part of the public communication system. The security agent device creates an updated message including a node identifier and a message authentication code through the lightweight security module, wherein the node identifier indicates the identity of the private node from which the lightweight security module receives the original message. The security agent device retrieves the updated message from the lightweight security module through the processing unit and transmits the updated message to the security module. The security proxy device verifies the message authentication code of the updated message through the security module. In response to determining that the message authentication code of the updated message is valid, the security proxy device divides the updated message into a node identifier and an original message through the security module, and calculates the updated message to create an updated message authentication code for the original message. The authentication code of the original message is verified by selecting one of a plurality of transmission keys stored in a dedicated domain of the security proxy device corresponding to the dedicated node indicated by the node identifier. The security proxy device receives the original message including the updated message authentication code through the processing unit. The security proxy device transmits the original message and the updated message authentication code to the security proxy device through the processing unit.

[0021] In another aspect, the security proxy device includes one or more public ports for electronically communicating with one or more public nodes of a public communication system.

[0022] In yet another aspect, the lightweight security module includes one or more dedicated ports, wherein each dedicated port corresponds to one of the dedicated nodes of the dedicated communication system.

[0023] In one aspect, the security proxy device transmits the original message and the updated message authentication code to one or more public nodes of the public communication system.

[0024] On the other hand, the security proxy device includes a public domain and a private domain, and the public domain of the security proxy device stores a lightweight sending key corresponding to the lightweight security module.

[0025] In yet another aspect, the lightweight send key is not accessible to the processing unit of the security proxy device.

[0026] Further areas of applicability will become apparent from the description provided herein.It should be understood that the description and specific examples are intended for purposes of illustration only and are not intended to limit the scope of the present disclosure. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0027] The drawings described herein are for illustration purposes only and are not intended to limit the scope of the present disclosure in any way.

[0028] Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of a message authentication system for a network as part of a vehicle disclosed according to an exemplary embodiment, wherein the message authentication system includes a private communication system, a public communication system, and a security agent device.

[0029] Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of another embodiment of a message authentication system in which a security proxy device includes a lightweight security module according to an exemplary embodiment; and

[0030] Figure 3 is shown for authentication by Figure 2 A process flow diagram of a method for generating a message in which a dedicated node is shown in FIG. According to an exemplary embodiment, Figure 2 Messages in are transmitted to one or more public nodes. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0031] The following description is merely exemplary in nature and is not intended to limit the present disclosure, application, or uses.

[0032] refer to Figure 1 , a vehicle 12 is shown including an exemplary message authentication system 14 for a network 16. It should be understood that the vehicle 12 can be any type of vehicle, such as, but not limited to, a car, a truck, a sport utility vehicle, a van, or an RV. The network 16 includes a private communication system 20 and a public communication system 22 that are in electronic communication with each other through a secure proxy device 24. The secure proxy device 24 electronically connects the private communication system 20 to the public communication system 22 based on any type of wired or wireless data transmission protocol. It should also be understood that although Figure 1While network 16 is shown as part of vehicle 12, the drawings are merely exemplary in nature and message authentication system 14 is not limited to vehicles. In fact, message authentication system 14 may be used in other networks including public and private communication systems and networks used in industrial automation systems, for example.

[0033] The security proxy device 24 includes a processing unit 30 that is in electronic communication with a network device 32. The processing unit 30 may be, for example, a central processing unit (CPU). As described below, the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 provides security proxy support by verifying messages generated by the private communication system 20 before the messages are transmitted to the public communication system 22. The network device 32 is any type of switching, routing, or forwarding device that receives and transmits messages over a network. Some examples of network devices 32 include, but are not limited to, Ethernet switches or routers that route and forward messages based on Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, wherein the router includes control plane and data plane functionality. It will be appreciated that in the example of Figure 1 In the illustrated embodiment, the processing unit 30 of the security proxy device 24 does not have the role of authenticating messages transmitted to the private communication system 20 and the public communication system 22 , which results in an increased computational availability of the processing unit 30 .

[0034] The dedicated communication system 20 includes one or more dedicated nodes 26. In one embodiment, the dedicated nodes 26 represent devices with limited computing capabilities and lack support for message authentication. That is, the dedicated nodes 26 do not include a corresponding security module for generating a message authentication code. Therefore, messages generated by the dedicated nodes 26 as part of the dedicated communication system 20 do not include a message authentication code. The dedicated nodes 26 may include, for example, smart sensors, smart actuators, and electronic control units with input / output (I / O) interfaces as part of the vehicle 12.

[0035] The network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 includes a plurality of ports 56, a private domain PR, and a public domain PU. Each port 56 of the network device 32 represents a network connection with the private communication system 20 or the public communication system 22. The private domain PR of the network device 32 includes one or more private ports 56, wherein each private port 56 of the private domain PR corresponds to one of the private nodes 26 of the private communication system 20. Each private port 56 of the private domain PR receives a message from the corresponding private node 26. Therefore, the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 knows which private node 26 generated the message. Figure 1 As shown, the dedicated communication system 20 includes five dedicated nodes N1,1, N1,2, N1,3, N1,4, N1,5. The dedicated domain PR of the network device 32 includes a plurality of dedicated ports P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, each corresponding to one of the dedicated nodes 26 of the dedicated communication system 20.

[0036] The public domain PU of the network device 32 includes one or more public ports 56. The public communication system 22 includes one or more public nodes 28. The public port 56 of the public domain PU of the network device 32 of the security agent device 24 is in electronic communication with the one or more public nodes 28 of the public communication system 22. Unlike the dedicated port that is part of the private domain PR, the public port 56 of the public domain PU of the network device 32 of the security agent device 24 can be shared between more than one public node 28. Figure 1 In the non-limiting embodiment shown, the public communication system 22 includes six public nodes N6,1, N6,2, N6,3, N7,1, N7,2, N7,3. Three nodes N6,1, N6,2, N6,3 are in electronic communication with the corresponding public port P6 of the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24, and the remaining three public nodes N7,1, N7,2, N7,3 are in electronic communication with the corresponding public port P7 of the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24. Figure 1 In the illustrated embodiment, the switching device SW connects the public nodes N7,1, N7,2, N7,3 with the corresponding port P7. The switching device SW may be any type of switching, routing or forwarding device used in a wired or wireless data transmission protocol.

[0037] Unlike the private nodes 26, the public nodes 28 of the public communication system 22 require message authentication. That is, messages transmitted between the public nodes 28 as part of the public communication system 22, messages transmitted from one of the private nodes 26 as part of the private communication system 20 to the public communication system 22, and messages transmitted from one of the private nodes 26 as part of the private communication system 20. The public node 28 as part of the public communication system 22 to the node of the private communication system 20 requires a message authentication code. Each public node 28 of the public communication system 22 includes a corresponding security module 42 implemented in hardware or software. Each public node 28 of the public communication system 22 also stores a unique transmission key (not shown) corresponding to the specific public node 28 and one or more receiving keys (not shown). Each receiving key corresponds to one of the private nodes 26 and the remaining public nodes 28, which are part of the public communication system 22 that exchanges messages with the public node 28. It should be understood that if one of the private nodes 26 or one of the remaining public nodes 28 never sends a message to a specific public node 28, then the corresponding receiving key is not required. For example, if public node N7,1 has never sent a message to public node N6,1, public node N6,1 does not store a reception key corresponding to public node N7,1. In addition, if public node 28 receives a message based on a hop-by-hop routing method, the public node will store a reception key (not shown) corresponding to the public domain PU of network device 32. The hop-by-hop routing method is described below.

[0038] The security module 42 and the unique send key stored by the specific public node 28 generate a message authentication code for the message sent by the specific public node 28. The security module 42 and the corresponding receive key as part of the specific public node 28 can also verify the message authentication code of the message received by the specific public node 28. Each message authentication code corresponds to a unique message transmitted through the network 16. However, it should be understood that in some embodiments, a single message authentication code can be used to authenticate a batch of messages. For example, the public node N6,1 includes a send key corresponding to the public node N6,1 and 11 receive keys corresponding to the private nodes N1,1, N1,2, N1,3, N1,4, N1,5, N1,6 and the remaining public nodes N7,1, N7,2, N7,3, N6,2, N6,3. However, as described above, if one of the remaining public nodes 28 does not send a message to the public node N6,1, the public node N6,1 does not store the receive key corresponding to the public node 28. In addition, if the public node N6,1 receives the message based on the hop-by-hop routing method, the public node N6,1 will also store the reception key corresponding to the public domain PU of the network device 32, because the public domain PU generates the last message authentication code (MAC) on the hop-by-hop routing path, which will be processed by the node N6,1.

[0039] The network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 includes a control plane 34, a data plane 36, and a security module 38. The control plane 34 of the network device 32 virtually defines and configures which ports 56 are part of the private domain PR and the public domain PU of the network device 32. Figure 1 A virtual boundary 40 is shown that separates the private domain PR from the public domain PU. Specifically, a unit external to the network device 32 (e.g., the processing unit 30) sends configuration information to the control plane 34. The configuration information indicates where the virtual boundary 40 is located. The control plane 34 then configures the private domain PR and the public domain PU based on the configuration information. Figure 1 In the example shown, the private domain PR includes five private ports P1-P5, and the private domain PU includes two public ports P6 and P7. The data plane 36 performs address decoding and checking of messages, message forwarding, security module interaction, and virtual local area network (VLAN) support.

[0040] like Figure 1 As shown, the security module 38 is integrated into the network device 32. That is, unlike the processing unit 30, the security module 38 is not separate from the network device 32. In one embodiment, the security module 38 of the network device 32 is implemented in hardware. However, it should be understood that the security module 38 can also be implemented in software. It should be understood that the security module 38 of the network device 32 knows which ports 56 of the network device 32 are part of the private domain PR and which ports 56 of the network device 32 are part of the public domain PU.

[0041] In one embodiment, the private domain PR and public domain PU of the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 include tamper-resistant memory. The tamper-resistant memory of the private domain PR of the network device 32 includes a plurality of send key slots 44, wherein each send key slot 44 is configured to store a corresponding send key 48. The number of send key slots 44 is equal to the number of potential private ports that are part of the network device 32, and each send key 48 stored in the private domain PR of the network device 32 corresponds to one of the private nodes 26. It should be understood that in the example Figure 1 In the non-limiting embodiment shown, processing unit 30 is considered a dedicated node 26, resulting in a total of seven potential dedicated ports 56. Therefore, Figure 1 Seven transmit key slots 44 are shown, representing one of the potential dedicated ports. Five of the key slots 44 store transmit keys KP1-KP5 corresponding to dedicated ports P1-P5, and the seventh key slot 44 stores a transmit key KP6 corresponding to processing unit 30. Figure 1The processing unit 30 of the security proxy device 24 is shown as a dedicated node 26, but it should be understood that the processing unit 30 can also be considered a public node 28. Therefore, it should be understood that in an embodiment, the processing unit 30 can exchange messages with the dedicated node 26 of the private communication system 20 and the public node 28 of the public communication system 22.

[0042] Although Figure 1 Multiple transmit keys 48 are shown, in another embodiment, the tamper-resistant memory of the private domain PR of the network device 32 stores a public transmit key 48 that authenticates messages generated by any private node 26 that is part of the communication system 20. In other words, the private domain PR of the network device 32 stores only a single transmit key 48. Therefore, the private domain PR of the network device 32 includes one or more transmit keys 48 for authenticating messages generated by one 26 of the private nodes of the private communication system 20.

[0043] In the case where the private domain PR of the network device 32 stores the public send key 48, the network device 32 introduces a node identifier into the payload of a message m transmitted by one of the private nodes 26, which is received by the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24, wherein the node identifier indicates the private node 26 that generated the message. The network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 also calculates a message authentication code using the public send key 48 of the message m. The message m is received by one of the public nodes 28 that are part of the public communication system 22, wherein the receiving public node 28 can verify which private node 26 sent the message m by verifying the validity of the message authentication code and checking the validity of the message authentication code.

[0044] The tamper-proof memory of the private domain PR of the network device 32 also stores one or more reception keys (not shown), wherein each reception key corresponds to one of the public nodes 28 that are part of the public communication system 22. Figure 1 In the example shown, the private domain PR of the network device 32 stores six reception keys, each corresponding to one of the public nodes N6,1, N6,2, N6,3, N7,1, N7,2, N7,3. Each reception key verifies the message authentication code of the message transmitted from the corresponding public node 28. As mentioned above, if one of the remaining public nodes 28 has never sent a message to the private communication system 20, the corresponding reception key is not needed.

[0045] The security module 38 and the corresponding transmit key 48 generate a message authentication code for a message generated by a private node 26 of the private communication system 20 that is transmitted to one or more public nodes 28 that are part of the public communication system 22. The security module 38 and the corresponding receive key (not shown) of the network device 32 also verify the message authentication code of an incoming message generated by a public node 28 that is part of the public communication system 22 that is transmitted to one or more private nodes 26 that are part of the private communication system 20.

[0046] In such Figure 1 In the illustrated embodiment, the tamper-proof memory of the public domain PU of the network device 32 stores a public domain send key 50 marked as KPU. The public domain send key 50 verifies the message generated by the public node 28, which is transmitted on the network 16 based on the hop-by-hop routing method, as described below. The tamper-proof memory of the public domain PU of the network device 32 also includes receive keys (not shown), each receive key also corresponding to one of the public nodes 28. In one embodiment, the public domain PU stores receive keys corresponding to public nodes N6,1, N6,2, N6,3, N7,1, N7,2, N7,3. However, as described above, if one of the public nodes 28 never sends a message based on the hop-by-hop routing method, the public domain PU does not store the corresponding receive key. It should be understood that if the security agent device 24 does not perform the hop-by-hop routing method described below, the receive key is not required.

[0047] It should be understood that there are a variety of methods for authenticating messages transmitted over the network 16. One exemplary method of verifying a message sent by one of the private nodes 26 of the private communication system 20 and received by one of the public nodes 28 of the public communication system 22 will now be described. It should be understood that any private node 26 may be used to send one or more unique messages to one or more public nodes 28 of the public communication system 22. In this example, one of the private nodes 26 of the private communication system 20 sends a message m to the network device 32 of the security agent device 24. It should be understood that the message m includes a source address and a destination address, wherein the source address indicates which private node 26 generated the message m, and the destination address indicates the public node 28 to which the message m is directed. In this example, the private node N1,1 of the private communication system 20 sends the message m to the private port P1 of the network device 32, wherein the destination address is the public node N7,1 of the public communication system 22.

[0048] As described above, the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 knows that the private node N1,1 generates the message m because there is a one-to-one relationship between the private node 26 and the private port P1 of the network device 32. Then, the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 calculates the message authentication code corresponding to the message m generated by the private node N1,1. Specifically, the security module 38 of the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 calculates the message authentication code using the transmission key KP1 corresponding to the private node N1,1 of the private communication system 20.

[0049] The data plane 36 of the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 then sends the message m including the message authentication code to the public node 28 indicated by the destination address. Specifically, in this example, the data plane 36 of the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 sends the message m to the public port P7 of the network device 32, where the public port P7 is in electronic communication with the public node P7,1. Then, the security module 42 of the public node 28 indicated by the destination address (i.e., the public node P7,1) verifies the message authentication code associated with the message m using the received key corresponding to the private node N1,1. It should be understood that integrating the security module 38 into the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 avoids assigning the message authentication task to the processing unit 30. As a result, the processing unit 30 of the security proxy device 24 has additional computing availability and can be used for other tasks, and the delay is also reduced.

[0050] In another example, one of the dedicated nodes 26 of the dedicated communication system 20 transmits a message m that is addressed to another dedicated node 26 that is part of the dedicated communication system 20. Specifically, in this example, the dedicated node N1,1 of the dedicated communication system 20 transmits the message m that includes a source address and a destination address. The source address indicates that the dedicated node N1,1 transmits the message m, and the destination address indicates that the message m is addressed to the dedicated node N2,1. As described above, messages transmitted through the dedicated communication system 20 do not require authentication, so the message m does not include a message authentication code. The dedicated node N1,1 of the dedicated communication system 20 transmits the message m to the dedicated port P1, where the network device 32 of the security agent device 24 knows that the dedicated node N1,1 generates the message m.

[0051] The data plane 36 of the network device 32 then checks the source address of the message m to confirm that the dedicated port P1 receiving the message m is connected to the dedicated node 26 that generated the message. It should be understood that since the message m is transmitted through the dedicated communication system 20, a message authentication code is not required. The data plane 36 of the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 then transmits the message m to the dedicated node 26 indicated by the destination address. Specifically, in this example, the data plane 36 of the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 transmits the message m to the dedicated port P2 of the network device 32, wherein the dedicated port P2 is in electronic communication with the dedicated node N2,1. The dedicated node N2,1 knows that the message m is sent by the dedicated node N1,1 by checking the source address of the message m.

[0052] In another example, one of the public nodes 28 of the public communication system 22 transmits a message to a private node 26 that is part of the private communication system 20. Specifically, in this example, the public node N7,1 of the public communication system 22 sends a message m including a message authentication code to the network device 32. The source address indicates that the public node N7,1 sent the message m, and the destination address indicates that the message m is sent to the private node N1,1. The receiving key (not shown) corresponding to the public node N7,1 stored in the tamper-proof memory of the private domain PR of the network device 32 verifies the message authentication code of the message m. Specifically, the receiving key corresponding to the public node N7,1 verifies the message authentication code by confirming that the identity of the sender indicated in the frame header of the message m matches the sender indicated by the message authentication code. The network device 32 then confirms that the source address of the message m indicates the correct public node 28 (public node N7,1) that generated the message m. Then, the data plane 36 of the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 transmits the message m without the message authentication code to the private node 26 indicated by the destination address. Specifically, in this example, the data plane 36 of the network device 32 of the security proxy device 24 transmits the message m to the dedicated port P1 of the network device 32 , where the dedicated port P1 is in electronic communication with the dedicated node N1 , 1 .

[0053] In another example, one of the public nodes 28 of the public communication system 22 transmits a message m that is sent to another public node 28 that is part of the public communication system 22. Specifically, in this example, the public node N6,1 of the public communication system 22 sends the message m including the message authentication code to the network device 32. The source address indicates that the public node N6,1 sent the message m, and the destination address indicates that the message m is sent to the public node N7,1. In this example, the public node N6,1 of the public communication system 22 transmits the message m to the public port P6 of the network device 32, where the destination address is the public node N7,1 of the public communication system 22.

[0054] The data plane 36 of the network device 32 of the security agent device 24 transmits the message m to the public port P7 in electronic communication with the public node N7,1. The public node N7,1 verifies the message authentication code corresponding to the message m and the receiving key (not shown) corresponding to the public node N6,1 through the corresponding security module 42. As described above, the security module 42 and the receiving key corresponding to the public node N6,1 are stored locally at the public node N7,1. Specifically, the receiving key corresponding to the public node N6,1 verifies the message authentication code by confirming that the identity of the sender indicated in the frame header of the message m matches the identity of the sender indicated by the message authentication code.

[0055] In another example, one of the public nodes 28 of the public communication system 22 transmits the message to another public node 28 as part of the public communication system 22 based on a hop-by-hop routing method, wherein the message authentication code is verified by the intermediate node. An example of a hop-by-hop routing protocol is the Media Access Control Security (MACsec) protocol. The remaining examples above are based on an end-to-end routing method, wherein the intermediate node does not verify the message authentication code.

[0056] In this example, one of the public nodes 28 of the public communication system 22 transmits a message m addressed to another public node 28 as part of the public communication system 22 based on a hop-by-hop routing method. Specifically, the public node N6,1 of the public communication system 22 transmits the message m including the message authentication code to the network device 32. The source address indicates that the public node N6,1 sent the message m, and the destination address indicates that the message m is addressed to the public node N7,1. The public node N6,1 of the public communication system 22 transmits the message m to the public port P6 of the network device 32, wherein the destination address is the public node N7,1 of the public communication system 22.

[0057] The network device 32 checks the source address of the message m and determines that the message m is sent by the public node N6,1. Based on this, the network device 32 determines the receiving key (not shown) corresponding to the public node N6,1 to check the authenticity of the message m. Using the receiving key corresponding to the public node N6,1, the network device 32 checks the authenticity of the message m. Then, the network device 32 generates a new message authentication code for the message m through the public domain sending key 50 as part of the public domain PU of the network device 32. The network device 32 also creates a new frame header for the message m, wherein the frame header indicates that the source address is the security agent device 24 and the destination address is the public node N7,1. The port P7 of the security agent device 24 of the data plane 36 security agent device 24 of the network device 32 transmits the message m including the new message authentication code to the public port P7 that is in electronic communication with the public node N7,1. The public node N7,1 verifies the new message authentication code corresponding to the message m through the corresponding security module 42 and the receiving key (not shown) corresponding to the public domain PU of the network device 32.

[0058] The Disclosure Figure 1 The message authentication system provides various technical effects and benefits. Specifically, the processing unit of the security proxy device does not have the function of authenticating the messages transmitted to the private communication system and the public communication system, which leads to an increase in the computing availability of the processing unit and a reduction in the delay for transmitting authenticated messages. The message authentication code generated or verified by the security proxy device is processed by a security module embedded in the network device, rather than by a security module outside the network device, which leads to improved end-to-end delay. This can also prevent the processing unit with compromised security from providing misleading source addresses to the security module. The misleading source address indicates that the message generated by one of the dedicated nodes is indeed generated by one or more dedicated nodes.

[0059] Figure 2 Another embodiment of a vehicle 212 including an exemplary message authentication system 214 for a network 216 is shown. The message authentication system 214 includes a private communication system 220 and a public communication system 222 in electronic communication with each other through a security proxy device 224. The security proxy device 224 includes a processing unit 230, a network device 232, and a security module 238, wherein the processing unit 230 is in electronic communication with both the network device 232 and the security module 238. Figure 1 The processing unit 30 shown is different in that the processing unit 30 includes the processing unit 30. Figure 1As shown, the processing unit 230 of the security proxy device 224 receives a message generated by one of the private nodes 226 as part of the private communication system 220 from the network device 232, and forwards the message to the security module 238 of the security proxy device 224. The processing unit 230 of the security proxy device 224 also transmits the message received from the security module 238 to one or more public nodes 228 that are also part of the public communication system 222. Figure 1 In the illustrated embodiment, dedicated nodes 226 represent devices with limited computing capabilities and lack support for message authentication, however, public nodes 228 require message authentication and each public node includes a corresponding security module 242 .

[0060] The security agent device 224 and the network device 232 each include a private domain PR2 and a public domain PU2, wherein a virtual boundary 240 separates the private domain PR2 from the public domain PU2. The network device 232 of the security agent device 224 includes a lightweight security module 200 and a plurality of ports 256. The lightweight security module 200 is in electronic communication with one or more private nodes 226 of the private communication system 220 and is located within the private domain PR2 of the network device 232. The public domain PU2 of the network device 232 includes one or more public ports P6 and P7, wherein the public ports P6 and P7 are each in electronic communication with one or more of the public nodes 228 of the private communication system 220.

[0061] The lightweight security module 200 includes one or more dedicated ports 256, wherein each dedicated port 256 corresponds to one of the dedicated nodes 226 of the dedicated communication system 220. Figure 2 In the non-limiting embodiment shown, the dedicated communication system 220 includes five dedicated nodes N1,1, N1,2, N1,3, N1,4, N1,5. The dedicated domain PR2 of the lightweight security module 200 includes a plurality of dedicated ports P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, each corresponding to one of the dedicated nodes 226 of the dedicated communication system 220. The lightweight security module 200 of the network device 232 of the security agent device 224 knows which dedicated node 226 generated the message because there is a one-to-one relationship between the dedicated node 226 and the dedicated port 256 of the lightweight security module 200, wherein each dedicated node 226 that is part of the dedicated communication system 220 is assigned to one of the dedicated ports 256 of the lightweight security module 200.

[0062] The lightweight security module 200 represents any device implemented in hardware or software that is configured to calculate a message authentication code based on a single send key, such as a lightweight send key KLSM stored in the private domain PR2 of the security proxy device 224. That is, the functionality of the lightweight security module 200 is limited to calculating a message authentication code and determining a node identifier of a message received from one of the private nodes 226 that are part of the private communication system 220. In other words, the functionality of the lightweight security module 200 is limited to verifying and adding a node identifier to a message received from one of the private nodes 226 of the private communication system 220, and is less complex than a security module that performs all required cryptographic operations and enforces access control policies.

[0063] The dedicated domain PR2 of the security proxy device 224 includes a plurality of transmit key slots 244, wherein each transmit key slot 244 is configured to store a corresponding transmit key 248. The number of transmit key slots 244 is equal to the number of potential dedicated ports of the network device 232, wherein the plurality of transmit keys 248 stored in the dedicated domain PR2 of the security proxy device 224 each corresponds to one of the dedicated nodes 226.

[0064] The private domain PR2 of the security proxy device 224 also stores a lightweight sending key KLSM, which corresponds to the lightweight security module 200. Figure 2 In the illustrated embodiment, the private domain PR2 of the security proxy device 224 includes seven send key slots 244 to represent one of the potential private ports and a lightweight send key KLSM. Five of the key slots 244 store the send keys KP1-KP5 corresponding to the private ports P1-P5, and the seventh key slot 244 stores the lightweight send key KLWM. The private domain PR2 of the security proxy device 224 also stores one or more receive keys (not shown), each of which corresponds to one of the public nodes 228 as part of the public communication system 222. It should be understood that the lightweight send key KLSM is an inaccessible proxy device 224 for the security processing unit 230. Therefore, if the processing unit 230 is leaked, the attacker cannot access the lightweight send key KLSM and the send key KP1-KP5 through the processing unit 230.

[0065] The public domain PU2 of the security proxy device 224 stores a public domain send key 250, labeled KPU, which authenticates messages generated by the public node 228 and transmitted on the network 216 based on the hop-by-hop routing method. The tamper-proof memory of the public domain PU of the network device 232 also includes a receive key (not shown) that also corresponds to the public node 228. In one embodiment, the public domain PU stores the receive keys corresponding to the public nodes N6,1, N6,2, N6,3, N7,1, N7,2, N7,3. However, as described above, if one of the public nodes 228 never sends a message based on the hop-by-hop routing method, then the corresponding receive key is not needed.

[0066] Figure 3 is an exemplary process flow diagram illustrating a method 300 for sending a message generated by one of the private nodes 226 of the private communication system 220 to one or more public nodes 228 that are part of the public communication system 222. Figure 2 and Figure 3 , the method 300 begins at block 302. In block 302, the lightweight security module 200 of the network device 232 of the security proxy device 224 receives an original message m generated by one of the private nodes 226 of the private communication system 220, where the original message m is sent to one or more more public nodes 228 that are part of the public communication system 222. The method 300 may then proceed to block 304.

[0067] In block 304, the lightweight security module 200 of the network device 232 of the security proxy device 224 creates an updated message m' including a node identifier, a message authentication code, and the original message m. The node identifier indicates the identity of the dedicated node 226 from which the lightweight security module 200 received the original message m. Specifically, the lightweight security module 200 and the lightweight send key KLSM as part of the dedicated domain PR2 of the security proxy device 224 generate a message authentication code for the updated message m'. Then the method 300 can proceed to block 306.

[0068] In block 306 , the processing unit 230 of the security proxy device 224 retrieves the updated message m′ from the lightweight security module 200 and transmits the updated message m′ to the security module 238 of the security proxy device 224 . The method 300 may then proceed to decision block 308 .

[0069] In decision block 308, the security module 238 of the security proxy device 224 and the corresponding received key ( Figure 2In response to determining that the message authentication code of the updated message m' is invalid, the method 300 may terminate. However, in response to determining that the message authentication code of the updated message m' is valid, the method 300 may proceed to block 310.

[0070] In block 310, the security module 238 of the security proxy device 224 and the corresponding send key 248 stored in the dedicated domain PR2 of the security proxy device 224 create an updated message authentication code for the original message. Specifically, the security module 238 divides the updated message m' into the node identifier and the original message m. Then, the security module 238 calculates the updated message authentication code of the original message by selecting one of the send keys 248 stored in the dedicated domain PR2 of the security proxy device 224 corresponding to the dedicated node 226 indicated by the node identifier.

[0071] In block 312, the processing unit 230 of the security proxy device 224 receives the original message m including the updated message authentication code and transmits the original message m including the updated message authentication code to the network device 232. The method 300 may then proceed to block 314.

[0072] In block 314, the network device 232 public domain PU2 transmits the original message including the updated message authentication code to one or more public nodes 228 indicated by the destination address indicated by the original message via one or more public ports P6, P7. The method 300 may then terminate.

[0073] Figure 2 and Figure 3 The disclosed message authentication system provides various technical effects and benefits. Specifically, the processing unit of the security proxy device cannot access the lightweight send key. Therefore, in the event of an attack, the processing unit cannot create a misleading source address indicating that a message not generated by one of the dedicated nodes is indeed generated by one or more dedicated nodes. The message authentication system can also prevent the dedicated nodes and the security proxy device from deceiving each other.

[0074] The processing unit may refer to an electronic circuit, a combinational logic circuit, a field programmable gate array (FPGA), some or all of the above, such as in a system on a chip, or a part of an electronic circuit, a combinational logic circuit, a field programmable gate array (FPGA). In addition, the controller may be based on a microprocessor, such as a computer having at least one processor, a memory (RAM and / or ROM), and associated input and output buses. The processor may operate under the control of an operating system residing in the memory. The operating system may manage computer resources so that a computer program code embodied as one or more computer software applications (e.g., applications residing in the memory) may have instructions executed by the processor. In an alternative embodiment, the processor may execute the application directly, in which case the operating system may be omitted.

[0075] The description of the present disclosure is merely exemplary in nature, and variations that do not depart from the gist of the present disclosure are intended to fall within the scope of the present disclosure. These variations should not be regarded as departing from the scope and scope of the present disclosure.

Claims

1. A network message authentication system, the message authentication system comprising: A dedicated communication system comprising one or more dedicated nodes in electronic communication with each other; A public communication system comprising one or more public nodes in electronic communication with each other, wherein the public nodes require message authentication; and A security proxy device that electronically connects the private communication system to the public communication system, wherein the security proxy device includes a processing unit, a security module, and a lightweight security module that electronically communicates with one or more private nodes of the private communication system, wherein the security proxy device performs the following operations: receiving, by the lightweight security module, an original message generated by one of the private nodes of the private communication system, wherein the original message is sent to one or more public nodes that are part of the public communication system; Creating, by the lightweight security module, an updated message including a node identifier and a message authentication code; retrieving, by the processing unit, the updated message from the lightweight security module and transmitting the updated message to the security module; verifying, by the security module, a message authentication code of the updated message; In response to determining that the message authentication code of the updated message is valid, creating, by the security module, an updated message authentication code for the original message; receiving, by the processing unit, the original message including the updated message authentication code; and The original message and the updated message authentication code are sent to the security proxy device through the processing unit.

2. The message authentication system according to claim 1, wherein: The node identifier indicates the identity of a dedicated node from which the lightweight security module received the original message.

3. The message authentication system according to claim 2, wherein: The security module creates the updated message authentication code by: The updated message is divided into the node identifier and the original message.

4. The message authentication system according to claim 2, wherein the security proxy device includes a public domain and a private domain, and wherein the private domain of the security proxy device stores a plurality of sending keys, each sending key corresponding to one of the private nodes of the private communication system.

5. The message authentication system according to claim 4, wherein: The security module creates the updated message authentication code by: An updated message authentication code of the original message is calculated by selecting one of a plurality of transmit keys stored in a private domain of the secure proxy device corresponding to the private node indicated by the node identifier.

6. The message authentication system of claim 1, wherein the security proxy device includes one or more public ports in electronic communication with one or more public nodes of the public communication system.

7. The message authentication system of claim 1, wherein the lightweight security module comprises one or more unique ports, wherein each dedicated port corresponds to one of the dedicated nodes of the dedicated communication system.

8. The message authentication system according to claim 1, wherein: The security proxy device transmits the original message and the updated message authentication code to one or more public nodes of the public communication system.

9. The message authentication system according to claim 1, wherein: The security proxy device comprises a public domain and a private domain, and the public domain of the security proxy device stores a lightweight sending key corresponding to the lightweight security module.

10. The message authentication system according to claim 9, wherein: The processing unit of the secure proxy device cannot access the lightweight send key.