Lightweight authentication method for power internet of things based on puf and chebyshev chaotic mapping

Abstract

The application discloses a kind of power internet of things lightweight identity authentication method based on PUF and Chebyshev chaotic mapping, the method includes following two parts: registration stage: device and gateway are registered to RS by secure channel to obtain the authentication parameter required;Authentication stage: terminal device and gateway utilize the authentication parameter of registration and carry out two-way identity authentication and negotiate session key for subsequent use.The PUF and Chebyshev chaotic mapping used in the application have high security and less resource consumption compared with traditional identity authentication scheme.The method utilizes PUF to generate challenge-response pair to realize two-way identity authentication and key agreement, without storing any secret information related to authentication in device memory.At the same time, Chebyshev chaotic mapping is used to protect the transmission of challenge-response pair secret information in non-secure channel, so that physical, machine learning modeling and forgery attacks can be resisted, and the security of the authentication process is ensured.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The application belongs to the field of information security, and relates to a lightweight identity authentication method for power Internet of Things, in particular to a lightweight identity authentication method for power Internet of Things based on PUF and Chebyshev chaotic mapping. BACKGROUND

[0002] With the transformation of society to digitization and intelligence, the wide application of Internet of Things technology in various fields has become an inevitable trend. As an important part of the energy field, power Internet of Things deeply integrates power systems and Internet of Things technology, aiming to realize the intelligentization and automation of power systems and deeply shape the new pattern of the power energy field. Through intelligent sensing and real-time data acquisition, power Internet of Things transforms each link of the power system into a highly manageable and monitorable intelligent node, providing strong support for efficient energy management of the power system.

[0003] The power Internet of Things SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) system is responsible for monitoring, controlling and collecting real-time data of the power system, and is the basis for intelligent management and efficient operation of the power system. With the development of Internet of Things technology, the devices in the field control layer of the power Internet of Things SCADA system grow exponentially, and most of these devices are resource-constrained, deployed in a scattered manner and difficult to monitor, thus being vulnerable to physical, replay and denial-of-service attacks. At the same time, with the increase of exposed interfaces in the SCADA system, attackers may attempt to capture sensitive data in the communication channel and tamper with it, thereby threatening the data security of the power Internet of Things. In order to cope with the above threats, the power Internet of Things needs to introduce an identity authentication scheme suitable for resource-constrained terminal devices to ensure that only authorized users or devices can access sensitive information. Traditional identity authentication schemes are based on symmetric or asymmetric cryptographic algorithms and are not suitable for resource-constrained terminal devices, and there is a problem of storing keys and other secret information in plaintext in the device. When the device is subjected to physical attacks, the attacker can access the device memory to obtain the key and secret information, thereby threatening the data privacy and security. In order to overcome the limitations of existing schemes, the lightweight security primitive PUF is applied to the identity authentication of resource-constrained devices. PUF generates responses based on the process deviation in the device manufacturing process, has unclonability and unpredictability, and any attempt to tamper with the PUF function will result in the PUF being unusable, so it can resist physical attacks, cloning attacks and side-channel attacks.

[0004] The traditional PUF-based identity authentication scheme mainly has the following problems:

[0005] (1) Cannot resist physical attacks and machine learning modeling attacks. Attackers can obtain secret information such as CRPs stored in the memory of the device, simulate the original PUF according to the known CRPs by using a machine learning algorithm, which destroys the unclonability and unpredictability of the PUF.

[0006] (2) Password or fingerprint information is required. Most of the devices in the power internet of things are deployed in remote areas and cannot perform password input and fingerprint recording operations.

[0007] (3) Large computational overhead. The traditional PUF-based identity authentication scheme uses elliptic curve cryptography and symmetric encryption algorithms, which have large computational overhead and are not suitable for resource-constrained power internet of things devices. SUMMARY

[0008] In view of the above problems existing in the traditional PUF-based identity authentication scheme, the present application provides a power internet of things lightweight identity authentication method based on PUF and Chebyshev chaotic mapping, which realizes bidirectional identity authentication and session key negotiation between the gateway and the terminal device, and is suitable for resource-constrained power internet of things devices.

[0009] The purpose of the present application is achieved by the following technical solutions:

[0010] A power internet of things lightweight identity authentication method based on PUF and Chebyshev chaotic mapping comprises the following two parts:

[0011] (1) Registration phase

[0012] In the registration phase, the device and the gateway register with the RS through a secure channel to obtain the required authentication parameters, and the specific registration steps are as follows:

[0013] Step 1: Device D i Select its own identity ID i With temporary identity ID TM And send it to the registration server RS; Gateway GW i Select its own identity And send it to RS;

[0014] Step 2: RS generates random number C i ,C TM ,r,N u ,s, then calculates the pseudo-identity AID i Of D i = h(C i || ID i ), and synchronizes the pseudo-identity AID TM = h(C TM || ID TM ), GWi Pseudo-identity of the device Then calculate D i and GW i share secret W = h(AID i || KID i || s) and Send message {C i , C TM , AID i , AID TM , K} to D i , message {W, KID i} to GW i , wherein: W is the shared secret of the device and the gateway, K is the XOR protection of the shared secret W, K is stored in the device memory, K and W are used for secure transmission of secret value Nu;

[0015] Step 3: D i Get the message, store {AID i , AID TM , K} to the device, take C i and C TM in the message as the input of the PUF function, calculate the response R i and R TM , and send the message {R i , R TM} to RS; GW i safely store the message {KID i , W} to the gateway memory;

[0016] Step 4: RS calculates and sends x, p, publicly, while storing and sends {(C i , R i , AID i ), (C TM , R TM , AID TM )} to GW i , wherein: KID i is the pseudo-identity of the gateway, is the Chebyshev polynomial, x and p are parameters in the Chebyshev polynomial, ranging from negative infinity to positive infinity;

[0017] Step 5: GW i updates the stored information to {KID i , W, (C i , R i , AID i ), (C TM , RTM AID TM});

[0018] (2) Authentication phase

[0019] In the authentication phase, the terminal device and the gateway perform mutual authentication and negotiate a session key for later use by using the authentication parameters obtained in the registration. The specific steps are as follows:

[0020] Step 1: D i generates a random number N d and calculates Then calculate generate a request authentication message and send it to GW i , wherein: The Chebyshev polynomial semi-group property is used, that is, T r (T s (x)) = T s·r (x) = T s (T r (x)), K * is the XOR value of K;

[0021] Step 2.1: GW i After receiving the identity authentication request of D i , first search AID i in the database, if AID i is not in the gateway database, GW i rejects the authentication request of D i , D i uses AID TM to initiate the authentication request again, and GW i will authenticate the device using (C TM , R TM , AID TM ), otherwise read (C i , R i ), and generate a random number N s and a timestamp T s ;

[0022] Step 2.2: GW i calculates

[0023] and generates a message and sends the message to D i , wherein: Nu is a secret value used for authentication, which is a random number; It is a Chebyshev polynomial. The calculation formula here uses the semigroup property of Chebyshev polynomial. XOR value, the purpose is to protect the secret value C i ,N s ,R i ; V0 is the authentication value, used by the device to identify the gateway;

[0024] Step 3.1: D i Check whether the transmission delay is less than Δt, that is, |TT s |<Δt, if it is greater than or equal to Δt, then the authentication is terminated, where: Δt is the baseline value of the transmission delay;

[0025] Step 3.2: D i calculate Get Then calculate V0', if it is equal to V0, D i Then for GW i Authentication is successful, otherwise D i GW i Authentication failed, where: V0' is the authentication value calculated by the device;

[0026] Step 3.3: D i Generate timestamp T u , random number n, calculate C i+1 =h(C i ||N u ), R i+1 =PUF(C i ), V1=h(N s ||SK||T u ), N u '=n, and generates a message And {AID i+1 ,K'} stored in D i , where: C i+1 、R i+1 、AID i+1 , K′, Nu′ are the C i 、R i 、AID i , K, Nu update; SK is the shared key, V1 is used for gateway authentication device;

[0027] Step 4.1: GW i Check whether the transmission delay is less than Δt, that is, |TT u |<Δt, if it is greater than or equal to Δt, then the authentication is terminated;

[0028] Step 4.2: GWi Computing Then compute V1', if equal to V1, then GW i To D i Authentication success, otherwise GW i To D i Authentication failure, wherein: V1' is the authentication value calculated by the gateway;

[0029] Step4.3: GW i Computing C i+1 = h(C i || N u ), AID i+1 = h(AID i || R i || N s ), and

[0030] {(C i+1 , R i+1 , AID i+1 )} are stored in the gateway memory.

[0031] Compared with the prior art, the present application has the following advantages:

[0032] (1) The present application proposes a lightweight anonymous identity authentication method for power Internet of Things, which can realize bidirectional identity authentication and session key negotiation between the gateway and the terminal device without inputting any password or biological information.

[0033] (2) The present application can resist physical and machine learning modeling attacks. The method does not need to store any secret information such as CRP for authentication in the device memory, and at the same time protects the secret information such as CRP transmitted in the non-secure channel by using Chebyshev chaotic mapping.

[0034] (3) The present application is suitable for resource-limited power Internet of Things terminal devices. PUF and Chebyshev chaotic mapping technology is a lightweight security primitive, which can reduce resource consumption while ensuring high security. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0035] Figure 1 is the SCADA system architecture of power Internet of Things.

[0036] Figure 2 is the registration phase of lightweight identity authentication method for power Internet of Things based on PUF and Chebyshev chaotic mapping.

[0037] Figure 3 is the authentication phase of lightweight identity authentication method for power Internet of Things based on PUF and Chebyshev chaotic mapping. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0038] The technical solutions of the present application are further described below in conjunction with the drawings, but are not limited thereto, and any modification or equivalent replacement within the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the present application shall be covered in the protection scope of the present application.

[0039] The present application provides a typical power Internet of Things SCADA system architecture, as shown in Figure 1 The field control layer includes smart meters, RTU and other terminal devices, responsible for field data acquisition and execution of control instructions. The regional monitoring layer includes gateway, PLC, registration server and other devices, responsible for collecting data and uploading to the upper layer server and executing the instructions issued by the central control layer, adjusting the operating parameters of the system. The central control layer is composed of data servers, monitoring centers and other devices, responsible for monitoring and controlling the running state of the system, real-time processing and analysis of data, and then alarm processing and fault diagnosis. The power Internet of Things lightweight identity authentication method based on PUF and Chebyshev chaotic mapping provided by the present application takes the power Internet of Things SCADA system as an example to realize the bidirectional identity authentication between the terminal device and the gateway. The method consists of the following three parties:

[0040] (1) Registration server: located in the regional monitoring layer of the power Internet of Things SCADA system, responsible for the registration of gateway and device, not involved in subsequent identity authentication, and subsequent identity authentication is completed by the gateway and the terminal device.

[0041] (2) Gateway: located in the regional monitoring layer of the power Internet of Things SCADA system, responsible for uploading the data collected by the terminal to the data server or monitoring center of the central control layer.

[0042] (3) Terminal device: located in the field control layer of the power Internet of Things SCADA system, responsible for collecting the data of the field device and transmitting the collected data to the upper gateway.

[0043] The method provided by the present application includes a registration phase and a bidirectional identity authentication phase, and the related symbols are shown in Table 1.

[0044] Table 1 Symbol Description

[0045]

[0046]

[0047] (1) Registration phase

[0048] In the registration phase, the device and the gateway register with the RS through a secure channel to obtain the required authentication parameters, and the specific registration steps are as follows:

[0049] Step1: Di Select own identity ID i With temporary identity ID TM And send it to RS; GW i Select own identity And send it to RS.

[0050] Step2: RS generates random number C i ,C TM ,r,N u ,s, then calculates D i Pseudo identity AID i = h(C i ||ID i ), synchronizes pseudo identity AID TM = h(C TM ||ID TM ), GW i Pseudo identity KID i = h(r||ID GWi ), then calculates D i And the shared secret W of GW i = h(AID i ||KID i ||s) and Send message {C i ,C TM ,AID i ,AID TM ,K} to D i , message {W, KID i} to GW i .

[0051] Step3: D i Get the message, store {AID i ,AID TM ,K} to the device, take C i and C TM in the message as the input of PUF function, calculate the response R i and R TM , and send message {R i ,R TM} to RS; GW i Store {KID i ,W} securely in the gateway memory.

[0052] Step4: RS calculates And x, p, Publicly, while storing And {(C i ,R i ,AIDi ),(C TM ,R TM ,AID TM )}send to GW i .

[0053] Step5: GW i update the storage information as {KID i ,W,(C i ,R i ,AID i ),(C TM ,R TM ,AID TM )}.

[0054] (2) Authentication phase

[0055] In the authentication phase, the terminal device and the gateway perform mutual authentication and negotiate a session key for later use, using the authentication parameters obtained during registration. The specific steps are as follows:

[0056] Step 1: D i generate a random number N d , calculate then calculate generate an authentication request message and send it to GW i .

[0057] Step 2.1: GW i Upon receiving the authentication request from D i , first search for AID i in the database. If AID i is not in the gateway's database, the GW i rejects the authentication request from D i , and D i initiates the authentication request again using AID TM , while the GW i authenticates the device using (C TM , R TM , AID TM ), otherwise read (C i , R i ), and generate a random number N s and a timestamp T s .

[0058] Step 2.2: GW i calculate

[0059] and generate a message and sends the message to D i .

[0060] Step 3.1: D i checks whether the transmission delay is less than Δt, i.e. |T-T s | < Δt, and if it is greater than or equal to Δt, the authentication ends.

[0061] Step 3.2: D i calculates obtains and then calculates V0', and if it is equal to V0, D i authenticates the GW i successfully, otherwise D i authenticates the GW i unsuccessfully.

[0062] Step 3.3: D i generates a timestamp T u , a random number n, calculates C i+1 = h(C i || N u ), R i+1 = PUF(C i ), AID i+1 = h(AID i || R i || N s ), V1 = h(N s || SK || T u ), N u ' = n, and generates the message and stores {AID i+1 , K'} to D i .

[0063] Step 4.1: GW i checks whether the transmission delay is less than Δt, i.e. |T-T u | < Δt, and if it is greater than or equal to Δt, the authentication ends.

[0064] Step 4.2: GW i calculates and then calculates V1', and if it is equal to V1, the GW i authenticates D i successfully, otherwise the GW i authenticates D i unsuccessfully.

[0065] Step 4.3: GW i calculates C i+1 = h(C i||N u ), AID i+1 = h(AID i ||R i ||N s ), and the

[0066] {(C i+1 , R i+1 , AID i+1 )} are stored in the gateway memory.

[0067] Compared with the traditional identity authentication scheme, the PUF and Chebyshev chaotic mapping adopted by the application have high security and smaller resource overhead. The method uses PUF to generate challenge-response pairs to realize two-way identity authentication and key agreement, without storing any secret information about authentication in the device memory. At the same time, Chebyshev chaotic mapping is used to protect the transmission of secret information of challenge-response pairs in the non-secure channel, so that it can resist physical, machine learning modeling and forgery attacks, and ensure the security of the authentication process.

Claims

1. A lightweight identity authentication method for power Internet of Things based on PUF and Chebyshev chaos map, characterized by The method comprises the following two parts: (1) Registration stage During the registration phase, the device and gateway register with the RS through a secure channel to obtain the required authentication parameters. The specific registration steps are as follows: Step 1: Device D i Select your own ID i With temporary identity ID TM And send it to the registration server RS; gateway GW i Choose your own identity and send it to RS; Step 2: RS generates a random number C i ,C TM ,r,N u ,s, then calculate D i Pseudo-identity AID i =h(C i ||ID i ), then synchronize the pseudo identity AID TM =h(C TM ||ID TM ), GW i Fake identity Then calculate D i and GW i The shared secret W = h(AID i ||KID i ||s) and And the message {C i ,C TM ,AID i ,AID TM ,K} sent to D i , message {W,KID i }Send to GW i , where: W is the shared secret between the device and the gateway, K is the XOR protection of the shared secret W; Step 3: D i Get the message, and i ,AID TM ,K} is stored in the device, and the C i and C TM As input to the PUF function, the response R is calculated i and R TM , and the message {R i ,R TM }Send to RS;GW i Send the message {KID i ,W} is securely stored in the gateway memory; Step 4: RS calculation And x,p, Public and stored And {(C i ,R i ,AID i ),(C TM ,R TM ,AID TM )}Send to GW i , where: KID i is the pseudo-identity of the gateway, is a Chebyshev polynomial, x and p are the parameters in the Chebyshev polynomial; Step 5: GW i Update the storage information to {KID i ,W,(C i ,R i ,AID i ),(C TM ,R TM ,AID TM )}; (2) Certification stage During the authentication phase, the terminal device and the gateway use the authentication parameters obtained during registration to perform two-way identity authentication and negotiate a session key for subsequent use. The specific steps are as follows: Step 1: D i Generate a random number N d ,calculate Then calculate Generate a request authentication message And send to GW i ; Step 2.1: GW i Upon receiving D i After the identity authentication request is made, the AID is first searched in the database i , if AID i If it is not in the gateway's database, then GW i Reject D i The authentication request, D i Utilizing AID TM Initiate authentication request again, and GW i Will use (C TM ,R TM ,AID TM ) to authenticate the device, otherwise read (C i ,R i ), and generate a random number N s and timestamp T s ; Step 2.2: GW i calculate and generates a message And send the message to D i , where: Nu is the secret value used for authentication, are Chebyshev polynomials, is the XOR value; V0 is the authentication value; Step 3.1: D i Check whether the transmission delay is less than Δt, that is, |TT s |<Δt, if it is greater than or equal to Δt, then the authentication is terminated, where: Δt is the baseline value of the transmission delay; Step 3.2: D i calculate Get Then calculate V0', if it is equal to V0, D i Then for GW i Authentication is successful, otherwise D i GW i Authentication failed, where V0' is the authentication value calculated by the device; Step 3.3: D i Generate timestamp T u , random number n, calculate C i+1 =h(C i ||N u ), R i+1 =PUF(C i ), AID i+1 =h(AID i ||R i ||N s ), V1=h(N s ||SK||T u ), N u '=n, and generates a message And {AID i+1 ,K'} stored in D i , where: C i+1 、R i+1 、AID i+1 , K′, Nu′ are the C i 、R i 、AID i , K, Nu update; SK is the shared key, V1 is used for gateway authentication device; Step 4.1: GW i Check whether the transmission delay is less than Δt, that is, |TT u |<Δt, if it is greater than or equal to Δt, then the authentication is terminated; Step 4.2: GW i calculate Then calculate V1', if it is equal to V1, then GW i To D i Authentication is successful, otherwise GW i To D i Authentication failed, where V1' is the authentication value calculated by the gateway; Step 4.3: GW i Calculate C i+1 =h(C i ||N u ), AID i+1 =h(AID i ||R i ||N s ), and {(C i+1 ,R i+1 ,AID i+1 )} is stored in the gateway memory.

2. The lightweight identity authentication method for the power Internet of Things based on PUF and Chebyshev chaos mapping according to claim 1 is characterized in that The registration server is located in the regional monitoring layer of the power Internet of Things SCADA system and is responsible for the registration of gateways and devices.

3. The lightweight identity authentication method for the power Internet of Things based on PUF and Chebyshev chaos mapping according to claim 1 is characterized in that The gateway is located at the regional monitoring layer of the power Internet of Things SCADA system, and is responsible for uploading the data collected by the terminal to the data server or monitoring center of the central control layer.

4. The lightweight identity authentication method for the power Internet of Things based on PUF and Chebyshev chaos mapping according to claim 1 is characterized in that The terminal device is located at the field control layer of the power Internet of Things SCADA system, and is responsible for collecting data from field devices and transmitting the collected data to the upper-level gateway.

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