Group management method and device and electronic equipment

By receiving and verifying the signature information of group members in group signature technology, using trap gate generation algorithm and non-interactive zero-knowledge proof, the compatibility and high revocation cost of group signature and decentralized privacy protection are solved, and the problem of high revocation costs of group signature and decentralized privacy protection is achieved. Selfless anonymity, traceability and non-defamability, suitable for a variety of application scenarios.

CN119070998AActive Publication Date: 2024-12-03WUHAN UNIV
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411033564.5
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-07-30
Publication Date
2024-12-03
Estimated Expiration
2044-07-30

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Abstract

The invention relates to a group management method and device and electronic equipment, and the method comprises the steps: receiving the signature information of any group member after a group message is issued; verifying the group message and the signature information to obtain a first verification result, and determining whether a fraud activity exists in the signature process in combination with the first verification result and the group message of the group; and if the fraud activity exists, determining a group member corresponding to the signature information, and adding the group member into a revocation list so as to delete the group member from the group. Therefore, the technical problems that in the related technology, the decentralized privacy protection trend is inconsistent, the combination with the block chain and other technologies is inconvenient, the revocation cost is relatively high, and the tracing is difficult are solved.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of information security technology, and in particular to a group management method, device and electronic device. Background Art

[0002] Digital signature technology is an important cryptographic method used to verify the integrity of messages and prevent forgery. As part of the public key infrastructure, it is widely used in various scenarios in our daily lives. By using the signer's private key and hash function, a digital signature can attach additional information to a message data unit or perform encryption processing, enabling the recipient to verify the source of the data and ensure its integrity and authenticity. According to different application requirements, digital signature technology has developed into various forms, including group signatures, ring signatures, blind signatures, identity-based signatures, etc.

[0003] Group Signatures (GS) is a cryptographic technology that allows any member of a group to sign a message on behalf of the entire group while protecting the identity of the signer from the outside world. Only the group administrator can reveal the identity of the signer when necessary. While protecting privacy, group signature technology ensures the legitimacy and authenticity of the signature, and is widely used in scenarios that require anonymity but trust, such as electronic voting and anonymous transactions. However, since there are group administrators who can trace the identity of users in ordinary group signatures, this is contrary to the trend of decentralized privacy protection and is not convenient to combine with technologies such as blockchain; at the same time, revoking user operations will cause other unrevoked users to update their keys, causing unnecessary additional overhead and hindering its application in large user platforms. On the other hand, complete anonymity makes it very difficult for users to link their historical signatures when needed in the future, which needs to be improved. Summary of the invention

[0004] The present application provides a group management method, device and electronic device to solve technical problems in related technologies, such as being contrary to the trend of decentralized privacy protection, being inconvenient to combine with technologies such as blockchain, and having high revocation costs and difficulty in tracing.

[0005] The first aspect of the present application provides a group management method, comprising the following steps: after publishing a group message, receiving signature information of any group member; verifying the group message and the signature information to obtain a first verification result, and determining whether there is fraudulent activity in the signing process in combination with the first verification result and the group message of the group; if the fraudulent activity exists, determining the group member corresponding to the signature information, and adding the group member to a revocation list to delete the group member from the group.

[0006] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, it also includes: determining the upper limit of the number of group members, the upper limit of the number of events, the hash function and the binary conversion function of the group according to preset security parameters and calculation parameters; initializing group data, and combining the initialized group data, the security parameters, the calculation parameters, the upper limit of the number of group members, the upper limit of the number of events, the hash function and the binary conversion function to output a common parameter set to complete the initialization of the group.

[0007] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, after completing the initialization of the group, it also includes: using a trapdoor generation algorithm to output a group key pair; receiving a locally generated user key pair and a group joining request from a user; combining the group key pair and the user key pair to respond to the user's group joining request, and updating the group information of the group.

[0008] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, after updating the group information of the group, it also includes: receiving a data update request from a group administrator; in response to the data update request, determining whether the revocation list of the group is an empty set; if the revocation list is an empty set, verifying whether the user identifier of each group member in the group has completed the user counter accumulation, obtaining a second verification result, and publishing updated group information based on the second verification result; if the revocation list is not an empty set, using the key corresponding to the identity identifier of the revoked group member in the revocation list as an index, searching for the corresponding user tuple in the registration list of the group, and setting the user tuple to zero to complete the revocation of the group member.

[0009] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, before receiving the signature information of any group member, it also includes: encrypting the relevant group recovery threshold of any group member to obtain an encrypted value; using a hash function to respectively calculate the hash value and pseudonym of any group member; using the hash value, the pseudonym and the encrypted value to generate a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof for verifying any group member; using the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof to obtain the signature information of any group member that meets preset verifiable conditions.

[0010] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, after generating a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof for verifying any one of the group members, it also includes: verifying whether the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof satisfies a preset validity condition; if the preset validity condition is satisfied, using the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof to obtain the signature information of any one of the group members that satisfies the preset verifiable condition.

[0011] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, the verification of the group message and the signature information includes: obtaining the latest accumulated value of the group, and using the latest accumulated value to parse the signature information to obtain signature parameters; using multiple hash functions to verify the signature parameters in sequence, and if the verification is successful, determining whether the revocation list contains any of the group members; if any of the group members is included, determining that the signature information is invalid and terminating the signing process, otherwise, determining whether there is fraudulent activity in the signing process based on the first verification result.

[0012] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, the determination of whether there is fraudulent activity in the signing process by combining the first verification result and the group message of the group includes: obtaining any two signature information within the group; verifying the legitimacy of the two signature information respectively, and if the two signature information are both legal, parsing the two signature information respectively to obtain the pseudonym corresponding to each signature information and the associated group message; determining whether there is the fraudulent activity based on the pseudonym and the group message.

[0013] The second aspect of the present application provides a group management device, including: a first receiving module, used to receive the signature information of any group member after publishing a group message; a first verification module, used to verify the group message and the signature information to obtain a first verification result, and determine whether there is fraudulent activity in the signing process in combination with the first verification result and the group message of the group; a first revocation module, used to determine the group member corresponding to the signature information in the event of the existence of the fraudulent activity, and add the group member to a revocation list to delete the group member from the group.

[0014] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, it also includes: a determination module, used to determine the upper limit of the number of group members, the upper limit of the number of events, the hash function and the binary conversion function of the group according to preset security parameters and calculation parameters; an initialization module, used to initialize group data, and combine the initialized group data, the security parameters, the calculation parameters, the upper limit of the number of group members, the upper limit of the number of events, the hash function and the binary conversion function to output a common parameter set to complete the initialization of the group.

[0015] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, it also includes: an output module, used to output a group key pair using a trapdoor generation algorithm; a second receiving module, used to receive a locally generated user key pair and a group joining request from a user; an update module, used to respond to the user's group joining request in combination with the group key pair and the user key pair, and update the group information of the group.

[0016] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, it also includes: a third receiving module, used to receive a data update request from a group administrator; a judgment module, used to determine whether the revocation list of the group is an empty set in response to the data update request; a second verification module, used to verify whether the user identifier of each group member in the group has completed the user counter accumulation when the revocation list is an empty set, to obtain a second verification result, and to publish updated group information based on the second verification result; a second revocation module, used to search for a corresponding user tuple in the registration list of the group with the key corresponding to the identity identifier of the revoked group member in the revocation list as an index when the revocation list is not an empty set, and to set the user tuple to zero to complete the revocation of the group member.

[0017] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, it also includes: an encryption module, used to encrypt the relevant group recovery threshold of any group member to obtain an encrypted value; a calculation module, used to use a hash function to respectively calculate the hash value and pseudonym of any group member; a generation module, used to use the hash value, the pseudonym and the encrypted value to generate a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof for verifying any group member; a first acquisition module, used to use the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof to obtain the signature information of any group member that meets the preset verifiable conditions.

[0018] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, it also includes: a third verification module, used to verify whether the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof satisfies preset validity conditions; a second acquisition module, used to use the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof to obtain the signature information of any group member that meets the preset verifiable conditions when the preset validity conditions are met.

[0019] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, the first verification module includes: a first acquisition unit, used to obtain the latest accumulated value of the group, and use the latest accumulated value to parse the signature information to obtain signature parameters; a first verification unit, used to use multiple hash functions to verify the signature parameters in sequence, and if the verification is successful, determine whether the revocation list contains any of the group members; a first determination unit, used to determine that the signature information is invalid and terminate the signing process if any of the group members is included, otherwise, determine whether there is fraudulent activity in the signing process based on the first verification result.

[0020] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, the first revocation module includes: a second acquisition unit, used to acquire any two signature information within the group; a second verification unit, used to verify the legitimacy of the two signature information respectively, and if the two signature information are both legal, respectively parse the two signature information to obtain the pseudonym corresponding to each signature information and the associated group message; a second determination unit, used to determine whether the fraudulent activity exists based on the pseudonym and the group message.

[0021] A third aspect of the present application provides an electronic device, comprising: a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor executes the program to implement the group management method as described in the above embodiment.

[0022] A fourth aspect of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium, wherein the computer-readable storage medium stores computer instructions, and the computer instructions are used to enable the computer to execute the group management method as described in the above embodiment.

[0023] A fifth aspect of the present application provides a computer program product, including a computer program, which, when executed, is used to implement the above group management method.

[0024] The embodiment of the present application can receive the signature information of any group member after publishing a group message, and verify the group message and signature information, and determine whether there is fraudulent activity in the signature process based on the first verification result and the group message of the group, so as to determine the group member corresponding to the signature information when there is fraudulent activity, and add the group member to the revocation list to delete the group member from the group. The revocation process has no effect on other unrevoked users, and avoids malicious revocation, meets selfless anonymity, traceability, and non-defamation, and is suitable for scenarios such as the Internet of Things, finance, and digital medicine. Therefore, the technical problems in the related technology that are contrary to the trend of decentralized privacy protection, inconvenient to combine with technologies such as blockchain, and have high revocation costs and are difficult to trace are solved.

[0025] Additional aspects and advantages of the present application will be given in part in the description below, and in part will become apparent from the description below, or will be learned through the practice of the present application. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0026] The above and / or additional aspects and advantages of the present application will become apparent and easily understood from the following description of the embodiments in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, in which:

[0027] Figure 1 A flowchart of a group management method provided according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0028] Figure 2 A flow chart of signature generation according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0029] Figure 3 A signature verification flow chart according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0030] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of the structure of a group management device provided according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0031] Figure 5 It is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided according to an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0032] Embodiments of the present application are described in detail below, and examples of the embodiments are shown in the accompanying drawings, wherein the same or similar reference numerals throughout represent the same or similar elements or elements having the same or similar functions. The embodiments described below with reference to the accompanying drawings are exemplary and are intended to be used to explain the present application, and should not be construed as limiting the present application.

[0033] The following describes the group management method, device and electronic device of the embodiment of the present application with reference to the accompanying drawings. In view of the technical problems such as the high cost of revocation and difficulty in tracing, which are contrary to the trend of decentralized privacy protection, inconvenient to combine with technologies such as blockchain, and the related technologies mentioned in the above background technology, the present application provides a group management method, in which the signature information of any group member can be received after the group message is released, and the group message and the signature information are verified, and whether there is fraudulent activity in the signature process is determined according to the first verification result and the group message of the group, so that when there is fraudulent activity, the group member corresponding to the signature information is determined, and the group member is added to the revocation list to delete the group member from the group, and the revocation process has no effect on other unrevoked users, and avoids malicious revocation, meets selfless anonymity, traceability, and non-defamation, and is suitable for scenes such as the Internet of Things, finance, and digital medicine. Thus, the technical problems such as the high cost of revocation and difficulty in tracing, which are contrary to the trend of decentralized privacy protection, inconvenient to combine with technologies such as blockchain, and the high cost of revocation and difficulty in tracing in the related technologies are solved.

[0034] Specifically, Figure 1 A flowchart of a group management method provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0035] like Figure 1 As shown, the group management method includes the following steps:

[0036] In step S101, after publishing a group message, signature information of any group member is received.

[0037] The method proposed in the embodiment of the present application has the characteristics of lattice-based group signature with user autonomous linking and conditional revocation by verifier. In the embodiment of the present application, it can support users to dynamically join the group, and limit each group member to only sign one message under the same event topic. Otherwise, the revocation condition will be triggered, which will cause the verifier to easily extract the user revocation token and add it to the revocation list; the revocation process has no effect on other unrevoked users. The construction of the embodiment of the present application relies on the Stern-type protocol-based Merkle tree accumulator, and the final signature size is logarithmically related to the group size.

[0038] In the actual implementation process, the embodiment of the present application can receive the signature of any group member in the group after publishing a group message, such as after the group message is updated, so as to perform subsequent signature verification.

[0039] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, it also includes: determining the upper limit of the number of group members, the upper limit of the number of events, a hash function and a binary conversion function of the group based on preset security parameters and calculation parameters; initializing the group data, and combining the initialized group data, security parameters, calculation parameters, the upper limit of the number of group members, the upper limit of the number of events, the hash function and the binary conversion function to output a public parameter set to complete the initialization of the group.

[0040] When a group is initially constructed, the embodiments of the present application can set up an encryption protocol for the group, determine a group signature or threshold signature scheme, and involve various parameters and functions to ensure security and efficiency.

[0041] In the actual execution process, the embodiment of the present application may input parameters: security parameter λ, positive integers n, m, q, p, σ, k, ι, where,

[0042] Among them, λ is a security parameter, which can be used to determine the overall security level of the system, n is a lattice parameter, m is a lattice parameter, p, q are prime numbers, and k is a lattice parameter that satisfies ι is the grid parameter, κ is the grid parameter, and σ is the Gaussian distribution parameter.

[0043] The embodiment of the present application can also limit the group size: set the upper limit of the number of group members to

[0044] N=2 ι =poly(λ),scp∈{0,1} * The upper limit of the quantity is Q, satisfying Q<<p.

[0045] Among them, N is the upper limit of the number of group members, Q is the upper limit of the number of event topics, and scp is the event topic.

[0046] The embodiment of the present application may also define a hash function: Select a hash function H1: H2:

[0047] The embodiment of the present application may also define tool matrices G1, G2, and define a binary conversion function bin:

[0048] in, is an integer vector space of length n, and bin is the binary conversion function bin:

[0049] In the actual implementation process, the group administrator You can initialize the Merkle tree TSetup(pp,gpk)→Τ crt , set all leaf nodes to 0, initialize user counter c = 0, initialize revocation list Initialize the user registration list as reg({[i][grt[i]][upk[i]]} i∈[N] )={[i][0 m ][0 nk ]}. Output the system public parameter set pp = {λ,n,m,q,p,σ,k,N,Q,H1,H2,G1,G2,ι}.

[0050] The above setup phase lays the foundation for subsequent operations such as user registration, signature generation and verification.

[0051] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, after completing the initialization of the group, it also includes: using a trapdoor generation algorithm to output a group key pair; receiving a locally generated user key pair and a group joining request from a user; combining the group key pair and the user key pair to respond to the user's group joining request, and updating the group information of the group.

[0052] After initialization, the embodiment of the present application can be used to create a key generation protocol executed by the group administrator to create a key pair that can be shared by group members to achieve encryption, signing or other security functions. On the user side, each user can independently generate his own pair of keys to achieve encryption and decryption functions in group communication or collaboration while maintaining data security and privacy.

[0053] The embodiment of the present application can realize user joining through interaction between the user and the group administrator, using the group key and the user key, so that the user can formally become a member of the group, and the group status and related parameters are updated accordingly. This process ensures the security and integrity of the group, and also provides the user with necessary authentication information.

[0054] For example, the present application embodiment may adopt the following algorithm:

[0055] GKeyGen(pp,gpk): by group administrator Execute, run (A, T A )←TrapGen(1 n ,1 m ,q,I), output group key pair (gsk,gpk) = (T A ,A),

[0056] UKeyGen(pp,gpk): Executed locally by the user, run (b,T b )←TrapGen(1 n ,q,I), choose x←{0,1} m (x≠0), calculate Output user's key pair (usk, upk) = (T b ,x,b,d).

[0057] Interactively performed by users and group administrators:

[0058] user: sends upk=(b,d) to request to join the group;

[0059] GM: If the request is approved, the user ID is j=bin(c), and the operation is performed. Set usk[j]=(T b ,x,s,j),grt[i]=s is sent to the user; update tree Τ crt Calculate the new accumulated value Tupdate A (j,d)→z new ; Update user counter c+=1; Update user registration list reg=({[j][s][d]}).

[0060] After key verification, the embodiment of the present application can respond to the user's request to join the group and update the group information of the group.

[0061] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, after updating the group information of the group, it also includes: receiving a data update request from a group administrator; in response to the data update request, determining whether the revocation list of the group is an empty set; if the revocation list is an empty set, verifying whether the user identifier of each group member in the group has completed the user counter accumulation, obtaining a second verification result, and publishing updated group information based on the second verification result; if the revocation list is not an empty set, using the key corresponding to the identity identifier of the revoked group member in the revocation list as an index, searching for the corresponding user tuple in the registration list of the group, and setting the user tuple to zero to complete the revocation of the group member.

[0062] Furthermore, the embodiments of the present application can also perform group updates, which are performed by the group administrator to maintain the dynamic state of the group, including removing offending members and updating the public parameters of the group.

[0063] For example, the embodiment of the present application can implement data update based on the following algorithm:

[0064] GUpdate(gpk,gsk): by group administrator implement.

[0065] a. If Then jump to step b. Otherwise, use grt[j]=s as the index, find the corresponding user tuple in the registration list reg, and set the corresponding upk[j]=0 to zero;

[0066] b. For each j, let As evidence i Accumulated to z new , publish group message info new =(z new ,{w j} j∈[c] ).

[0067] The embodiment of the present application implements the GUpdate algorithm, so that the group administrator can ensure the synchronization of the group status, reflect member changes in a timely manner, and maintain the transparency and security of the group by updating the group information. This not only handles the joining and leaving of members, but also maintains the consistency and integrity of the group data.

[0068] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, before receiving the signature information of any group member, it also includes: encrypting the relevant group recovery threshold of any group member to obtain an encrypted value; using a hash function to respectively calculate the hash value and pseudonym of any group member; using the hash value, pseudonym and encrypted value to generate a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof for verifying any group member; using the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof to obtain the signature information of any group member that meets the preset verifiable conditions.

[0069] As a possible implementation method, the process of a user executing a signature in an embodiment of the present application may include: public key encryption, hash function, random number generation, homomorphic encryption, zero-knowledge proof, and signature scheme.

[0070] For example, UCLink(Σ,usk)→Π L : executed by an honest user holding private key x,

[0071] Analysis∑→{(nym1,scp1),…,(nym i ,scp i )}i∈K ,K≤Q,

[0072] calculate

[0073] generate

[0074] Through the above method, the embodiment of the present application can create a zero-knowledge proof, which can show others that the holder knows certain information (such as private key x) and can perform correct calculations based on the information, but at the same time does not disclose specific information details, thereby protecting user privacy.

[0075] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, after generating a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof for verifying any group member, it also includes: verifying whether the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof satisfies preset validity conditions; if the preset validity conditions are satisfied, using the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof to obtain the signature information of any group member that satisfies the preset verifiable conditions.

[0076] In the actual implementation process, the embodiments of the present application can use steps such as analysis of the signature set, verification of the signature and final check to verify whether the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof is valid.

[0077] For example,

[0078] Analysis∑→{(nym1,scp1),…,(nym i ,scp i )} i∈K ,K≤Q,

[0079] Run the signature verification algorithm Verify to check each Σ one by one i The legitimacy of the new ,Σ,RL)=0,returns 0.

[0080] If for SCP exists i =scp j Returns 0.

[0081] calculate Verify ||Δ|| ∞ ≤K+1 is true. If true, output 1 to represent Π L Legal, otherwise output 0.

[0082] In summary, the embodiments of the present application can ensure the integrity of the signature set and the validity of the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof through the above-mentioned verification mechanism.

[0083] In step S102, the group message and the signature information are verified to obtain a first verification result, and the first verification result and the group message of the group are combined to determine whether there is fraudulent activity in the signature process.

[0084] As a possible implementation method, the embodiment of the present application can determine whether there is fraudulent activity in the signing process by verifying the group message and signature information, so as to avoid users in the revocation list from signing or potential violations, such as double-spending or other types of fraudulent activities.

[0085] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, the group message and signature information are verified, including: obtaining the latest accumulated value of the group, and using the latest accumulated value to parse the signature information to obtain signature parameters; using multiple hash functions to verify the signature parameters in turn, and if the verification is successful, determining whether any group member is included in the revocation list; if any group member is included, determining that the signature information is invalid and terminating the signing process, otherwise, determining whether there is fraudulent activity in the signing process based on the first verification result.

[0086] The embodiment of the present application can use a verification algorithm (Verify) to check the validity of the signature and confirm whether the message is correctly signed, while ensuring that the signer is not in the blacklist (revocation list, RL).

[0087] For example, Verify(gpk,pp,info new ,Σ,RL)→1 / 0,

[0088] Download the latest accumulated value z new , analyze Σ, calculate V′=H1(scp),H′=H2(scp||M),

[0089] run Verify proof Π, if it is legal, proceed to step 0, otherwise output 0 and return.

[0090] For each grt[i]→s′ in RL j , check if it exists Returns 0 if it exists.

[0091] The embodiments of the present application can ensure that only legitimate, non-revoked users can successfully verify their signatures, thereby increasing the security and integrity of the system.

[0092] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, determining whether there is fraudulent activity in the signing process in combination with the first verification result and the group message of the group includes: obtaining any two signature information in the group; verifying the legitimacy of the two signature information respectively, and when both signature information are legal, parsing the two signature information respectively to obtain the pseudonym corresponding to each signature information and the associated group message; determining whether there is fraudulent activity based on the pseudonym and the group message.

[0093] The embodiment of the present application can identify and handle potential violations, such as double-spending or other types of fraudulent activities, by processing two signature sets (Σ1, Σ2).

[0094] For example, Extract(Σ1,Σ2)→grt[π * ] / ⊥,

[0095] Run the verification algorithm Verify to verify the legitimacy of Σ1 and Σ2.

[0096] Parse Σ1,Σ2. If nym1=nym2∧M1≠M2, proceed to step 0. Otherwise, output ⊥.

[0097] Run the decryption algorithm PKE.Dec(u1-u2,ct)→grt′[π * ] and give feedback to the group administrator Join RL to remove the offending group member.

[0098] The embodiments of the present application can ensure the legitimacy of the signature while providing a rapid response mechanism to violations to prevent fraud and protect the system from abuse.

[0099] In step S103, if there is fraudulent activity, the group member corresponding to the signature information is determined, and the group member is added to a revocation list to delete the group member from the group.

[0100] In summary, the embodiments of the present application can determine the group member corresponding to the signature information when there is fraudulent activity or signature verification fails, and add the group member to the revocation list to delete the group member from the group.

[0101] Combination Figure 2 and Figure 3 As shown, the working principle of the group management method of the embodiment of the present application is described with an embodiment.

[0102] The group management method of the embodiment of the present application can support users to dynamically join the group, and limit each group member to only sign one message under the same event topic. Otherwise, the revocation condition is triggered, which will cause the verifier to easily extract the user revocation token and add it to the revocation list; the revocation process has no effect on other non-revoked users. The construction of the embodiment of the present application relies on the Stern-like protocol base Merkle tree accumulator, and the final signature size is logarithmically related to the group size.

[0103] Combination Figure 2 and Figure 3 As shown, the solution of the embodiment of the present application can be composed of 10 polynomial time algorithms (Setup, GKeyGen, UKeyGen, Join, GUpdate, Sign, Verify, Extract, UCLink, VLink), where: Figure 2 For the signature generation process, Figure 3 The signature verification process is described in detail as follows:

[0104] (1)Setup(1 λ ): Input security parameter λ, positive integer n,m,q,p,σ,k,ι, where, m=2nk, set the upper limit of group members to N=2 ι =poly(λ),scp∈{0,1} * The upper limit of the number is Q, satisfying Q<<p; select the hash function H3:{0,1} * →{1,2,3} κ ,κ=ω(logλ), tool matrix G1,G2, define binary conversion function bin: Group Administrator Initialize the Merkle tree TSetup(pp,gpk)→Τ crt , set all leaf nodes to 0, initialize user counter c = 0, initialize revocation list Initialize the user registration list as reg({[i][grt[i]][upk[i]]} i∈[N] )={[i][0 m ][0 nk ]}. Output system public parameter set pp = {λ,n,m,q,p,σ,k,N,Q,H1,H2,G1,G2,ι}.

[0105] (2) GKeyGen(pp,gpk): by the group administrator Execute. Run(A,T A )←TrapGen(1 n ,1 m,q,I), output group key pair

[0106] (3) UKeyGen(pp,gpk): Executed locally by the user. Run (b,T b )←TrapGen(1 n ,q,I), choose x←{0,1} m (x≠0), calculate Output your own key pair (usk, upk) = (T b ,x,b,d).

[0107] (4) The user interacts with the group administrator. User sends upk = (b, d) to request to join the group.

[0108] :If the request is approved, the user ID is j=bin(c), and s←SamPre(T A ,A,I,b,σ), Set usk[j]=(T b ,x,s,j),grt[i]=s is sent to the user; update tree Τ crt Calculate the new accumulated value Tupdate A (j,d)→z new ; Update user counter c+=1; Update user registration list reg=({[j][s][d]}).

[0109] (5) GUpdate (gpk, gsk): by group administrator implement.

[0110] a. If Then jump to step 0, otherwise, use grt[j]=s as the index, find the corresponding user tuple in the registration list reg, and set the corresponding upk[j]=0 to zero.

[0111] b. For each j, let As evidence i Accumulated to z new , publish group message info new =(z new ,{w j} j∈[c] ).

[0112] (6)Sign(gpk,pp,usk[π],M∈{0,1} * ,scp,upk[π],grt[π]): executed by user π.

[0113] a. Run PKE.Enc(b,s′) to encrypt grt[π]: randomly select r←{0,1} mk , bin(s)→s′; calculate C1=br T ,

[0114] b. Calculate V = H1(scp), H = H2(scp||M), and run u←SamPre(b,T b ,I,V+H·G1,σ).

[0115] c. Calculation of pseudonyms

[0116] d. Generate a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof protocol Φ to illustrate: (1) hold a valid x,s; (2) the u generated in b is valid; (3) the encryption process of grt[π] is correct; (4) nym,τ is calculated correctly.

[0117] It is divided into the following 3 proof descriptions:

[0118] Π1:

[0119]

[0120] Π3:

[0121]

[0122] The final proof Here, the public input X = (A,u,scp,G1G2,nym,τ,ct,z ne- ,H,V), secret input (s,x,b,d,(j,w j ),r,s·r T ).

[0123] e. Signature sig = (Π, ct, u), the output message-signature pair is Σ = (sig, M, nym, τ, scp).

[0124] (7)Verify(gpk,pp,info new ,Σ,RL)→1 / 0.

[0125] a. Download the latest accumulated value z new , analyze Σ, calculate V′=H1(scp),H′=H2(scp||M),

[0126] b. Run Verify proof Π, if it is legal, proceed to step c, otherwise output 0 and return.

[0127] c. For each grt[i]→s′ in RL j , check if it exists Returns 0 if it exists.

[0128] (8)Extract(Σ1,Σ2)→grt[π * ] / ⊥.

[0129] a. Run the verification algorithm Verify to verify the legitimacy of Σ1 and Σ2.

[0130] b. Analyze Σ1, Σ2. If nym1=nym2∧M1≠M2, proceed to step c. Otherwise, output ⊥.

[0131] c. Run the decryption algorithm PKE.Dec(u1-u2,ct)→grt′[π * ] and give feedback to the group administrator Join RL to remove the offending group member.

[0132] (9)UCLink(Σ,usk)→Π L : Executed by an honest user holding private key x.

[0133] AnalysisΣ→{(nym1,scp1),…,(nym i ,scp i )} i∈K ,K≤Q,

[0134] calculate

[0135] Generate NIZK

[0136] (10)

[0137] AnalysisΣ→{(nym1,scp1),…,(nym i ,scp i )} i∈K ,K≤Q.

[0138] Run the signature verification algorithm Verify to check each Σ one by one i The legitimacy of , if there exists Σ∈Σ,Verify(gpk,pp,info new ,Σ,RL)=0, returns 0.

[0139] If for SCP exists i =scp j Returns 0.

[0140] calculate Verify ||Δ|| ∞ ≤K+1. If true, output 1 to indicate Π L Legal, otherwise output 0.

[0141] In summary, the embodiment of the present application is a management method for a group with user autonomous linking and conditional revocation of the verifier. The embodiment of the present application designs a post-quantum secure group signature scheme with user autonomous linking and conditional revocation of the verifier based on the LWE and LWR difficulty problem assumptions. The security proof and efficiency analysis show that the scheme is suitable for scenarios such as the Internet of Things, finance, and digital medicine, and has good application prospects.

[0142] The signature scheme in the embodiment of the present application complies with selfless anonymity, traceability, and non-defamation, and can protect the privacy of legitimate users. At the same time, in practical applications, it can be used to prevent illegal user behaviors such as "multiple votes for one vote" and "double spending".

[0143] According to the group management method proposed in the embodiment of the present application, after publishing a group message, the signature information of any group member can be received, and the group message and signature information can be verified. According to the first verification result and the group message of the group, it is determined whether there is fraudulent activity in the signature process, so that when there is fraudulent activity, the group member corresponding to the signature information is determined, and the group member is added to the revocation list to delete the group member from the group. The revocation process has no effect on other unrevoked users, and malicious revocation is avoided, which meets the requirements of selfless anonymity, traceability, and non-defamation, and is suitable for scenarios such as the Internet of Things, finance, and digital medicine. Therefore, the technical problems in the related technology that are contrary to the trend of decentralized privacy protection, inconvenient to combine with technologies such as blockchain, and have high revocation costs and are difficult to trace are solved.

[0144] Next, a group management device according to an embodiment of the present application is described with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0145] Figure 4 It is a block diagram of a group management device according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0146] like Figure 4 As shown, the group management device 10 includes: a first receiving module 100 , a first verification module 200 and a first revocation module 300 .

[0147] Specifically, the first receiving module 100 is used to receive signature information of any group member after publishing the group message.

[0148] The first verification module 200 is used to verify the group message and the signature information to obtain a first verification result, and determine whether there is fraudulent activity in the signing process in combination with the first verification result and the group message of the group.

[0149] The first revocation module 300 is used to determine the group member corresponding to the signature information in the event of fraudulent activities, and add the group member to a revocation list to delete the group member from the group.

[0150] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, the group management device 10 further includes: a determination module and an initialization module.

[0151] Among them, the determination module is used to determine the upper limit of the number of group members, the upper limit of the number of events, the hash function and the binary conversion function of the group according to preset security parameters and calculation parameters.

[0152] The initialization module is used to initialize the group data and output a public parameter set in combination with the initialization group data, security parameters, calculation parameters, the upper limit of the number of group members, the upper limit of the number of events, hash functions and binary conversion functions to complete the initialization of the group.

[0153] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, the group management device 10 further includes: an output module, a second receiving module and an updating module.

[0154] The output module is used to output a group key pair using a trapdoor generation algorithm.

[0155] The second receiving module is used to receive a user key pair and a group joining request generated locally from a user.

[0156] The update module is used to respond to the user's request to join the group by combining the group key pair and the user key pair, and to update the group information of the group.

[0157] Optionally, in an embodiment of the present application, the group management device 10 further includes: a third receiving module, a judgment module, a second verification module and a second revocation module.

[0158] The third receiving module is used to receive a data update request from a group administrator.

[0159] The judgment module is used to judge whether the revocation list of the group is an empty set in response to the data update request.

[0160] The second verification module is used to verify whether the user identification of each group member in the group has completed the user counter accumulation when the revocation list is an empty set, obtain a second verification result, and publish updated group information based on the second verification result.

[0161] The second revocation module is used to, when the revocation list is not an empty set, use the key corresponding to the identity identifier of the revoked group member in the revocation list as an index, search for the corresponding user tuple in the group registration list, and set the user tuple to zero to complete the revocation of the group member.

[0162] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, the group management device 10 further includes: an encryption module, a calculation module, a generation module and a first acquisition module.

[0163] The encryption module is used to encrypt the relevant group recovery threshold of any group member to obtain an encrypted value.

[0164] The calculation module is used to calculate the hash value and pseudonym of any group member respectively by using the hash function.

[0165] A generation module for generating non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs for verifying membership of any group using hash values, pseudonyms, and encrypted values.

[0166] The first acquisition module is used to obtain signature information of any group member that meets preset verifiable conditions by using non-interactive zero-knowledge proof.

[0167] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, the group management device 10 further includes: a third verification module and a second acquisition module.

[0168] Among them, the third verification module is used to verify whether the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof meets the preset validity conditions.

[0169] The second acquisition module is used to obtain the signature information of any group member that meets the preset verifiable conditions by using non-interactive zero-knowledge proof when the preset validity conditions are met.

[0170] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, the first verification module 200 includes: a first acquisition unit, a first verification unit and a first determination unit.

[0171] The first acquisition unit is used to acquire the latest accumulated value of the group, and use the latest accumulated value to parse the signature information to obtain the signature parameter.

[0172] The first verification unit is used to verify the signature parameters in sequence by using multiple hash functions, and if the verification is successful, determine whether any group member is included in the revocation list.

[0173] The first determination unit is used to determine that the signature information is invalid and end the current signing process when any group member is included; otherwise, determine whether there is fraudulent activity in the signing process according to the first verification result.

[0174] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present application, the first revocation module 300 includes: a second acquisition unit, a second verification unit and a second determination unit.

[0175] The second acquisition unit is used to acquire any two signature information in the group.

[0176] The second verification unit is used to verify the legitimacy of the two signature information respectively, and when the two signature information are both legal, parse the two signature information respectively to obtain the pseudonym corresponding to each signature information and the associated group message.

[0177] The second determination unit is used to determine whether there is fraudulent activity based on the pseudonym and the group message. It should be noted that the above explanation of the group management method embodiment is also applicable to the group management device of this embodiment, which will not be repeated here.

[0178] According to the group management device proposed in the embodiment of the present application, after publishing a group message, it can receive the signature information of any group member, and verify the group message and signature information, and determine whether there is fraudulent activity in the signature process based on the first verification result and the group message of the group, so as to determine the group member corresponding to the signature information when there is fraudulent activity, and add the group member to the revocation list to delete the group member from the group. The revocation process has no effect on other unrevoked users, and avoids malicious revocation, meets selfless anonymity, traceability, and non-defamation, and is suitable for scenarios such as the Internet of Things, finance, and digital medicine. Therefore, the technical problems in the related technology that are contrary to the decentralized privacy protection trend, inconvenient to combine with technologies such as blockchain, and have high revocation costs and are difficult to trace are solved.

[0179] Figure 5 A schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of the present application. The electronic device may include:

[0180] A memory 501 , a processor 502 , and a computer program stored in the memory 501 and executable on the processor 502 .

[0181] When the processor 502 executes the program, the group management method provided in the above embodiment is implemented.

[0182] Furthermore, the electronic device further comprises:

[0183] The communication interface 503 is used for communication between the memory 501 and the processor 502 .

[0184] The memory 501 is used to store computer programs that can be executed on the processor 502 .

[0185] The memory 501 may include a high-speed RAM memory, and may also include a non-volatile memory (non-volatile memory), such as at least one disk memory.

[0186] If the memory 501, the processor 502 and the communication interface 503 are implemented independently, the communication interface 503, the memory 501 and the processor 502 can be connected to each other through a bus and communicate with each other. The bus can be an Industry Standard Architecture (ISA) bus, a Peripheral Component (PCI) bus or an Extended Industry Standard Architecture (EISA) bus. The bus can be divided into an address bus, a data bus, a control bus, etc. For ease of representation, Figure 5 Only one thick line is used in the diagram, but this does not mean that there is only one bus or only one type of bus.

[0187] Optionally, in a specific implementation, if the memory 501, the processor 502 and the communication interface 503 are integrated on a chip, the memory 501, the processor 502 and the communication interface 503 can communicate with each other through an internal interface.

[0188] The processor 502 may be a central processing unit (CPU), or an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or one or more integrated circuits configured to implement the embodiments of the present application.

[0189] This embodiment also provides a computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored. When the program is executed by a processor, the above group management method is implemented.

[0190] The embodiment of the present application further provides a computer program product, including a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the group management method provided by the embodiment of the present invention.

[0191] In the description of this specification, the description with reference to the terms "one embodiment", "some embodiments", "example", "specific example", or "some examples" etc. means that the specific features, structures, materials or characteristics described in conjunction with the embodiment or example are included in at least one embodiment or example of the present application. In this specification, the schematic representations of the above terms do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Moreover, the specific features, structures, materials or characteristics described may be combined in any one or N embodiments or examples in a suitable manner. In addition, those skilled in the art may combine and combine the different embodiments or examples described in this specification and the features of the different embodiments or examples, without contradiction.

[0192] In addition, the terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only and should not be understood as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly indicating the number of technical features indicated. Therefore, a feature defined as "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include at least one of the features. In the description of this application, "N" means at least two, such as two, three, etc., unless otherwise clearly and specifically defined.

[0193] Any process or method description in a flowchart or otherwise described herein may be understood to represent a module, fragment or portion of code comprising one or N executable instructions for implementing the steps of a custom logical function or process, and the scope of the preferred embodiments of the present application includes alternative implementations in which functions may not be performed in the order shown or discussed, including performing functions in a substantially simultaneous manner or in reverse order depending on the functions involved, which should be understood by technicians in the technical field to which the embodiments of the present application belong.

[0194] The logic and / or steps represented in the flowchart or otherwise described herein, for example, can be considered as an ordered list of executable instructions for implementing logical functions, and can be embodied in any computer-readable medium for use by an instruction execution system, device or apparatus (such as a computer-based system, a system including a processor, or other system that can fetch instructions from an instruction execution system, device or apparatus and execute instructions), or in combination with these instruction execution systems, devices or apparatuses. For the purpose of this specification, "computer-readable medium" can be any device that can contain, store, communicate, propagate or transmit a program for use by an instruction execution system, device or apparatus, or in combination with these instruction execution systems, devices or apparatuses. More specific examples of computer-readable media (a non-exhaustive list) include the following: an electrical connection with one or N wirings (electronic devices), a portable computer disk box (magnetic device), a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable and programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), a fiber optic device, and a portable compact disk read-only memory (CDROM). In addition, the computer-readable medium may even be paper or other suitable medium on which the program is printed, since the program may be obtained electronically by optically scanning the paper or other medium and then editing, interpreting or processing in other suitable ways as necessary and then storing it in a computer memory.

[0195] It should be understood that the various parts of the present application can be implemented by hardware, software, firmware or a combination thereof. In the above-mentioned embodiment, the N steps or methods can be implemented by software or firmware stored in a memory and executed by a suitable instruction execution system. For example, if implemented by hardware, as in another embodiment, it can be implemented by any one of the following technologies known in the art or their combination: a discrete logic circuit having a logic gate circuit for implementing a logic function for a data signal, a dedicated integrated circuit having a suitable combination of logic gate circuits, a programmable gate array (PGA), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), etc.

[0196] A person skilled in the art may understand that all or part of the steps in the method for implementing the above-mentioned embodiment may be completed by instructing related hardware through a program, and the program may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, which, when executed, includes one or a combination of the steps of the method embodiment.

[0197] In addition, each functional unit in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated into a processing module, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into one module. The above-mentioned integrated module may be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of a software functional module. If the integrated module is implemented in the form of a software functional module and sold or used as an independent product, it may also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium.

[0198] The storage medium mentioned above may be a read-only memory, a magnetic disk or an optical disk, etc. Although the embodiments of the present application have been shown and described above, it can be understood that the above embodiments are exemplary and cannot be understood as limiting the present application. A person of ordinary skill in the art may change, modify, replace and modify the above embodiments within the scope of the present application.

Claims

1. A group management method, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: After publishing a group message, receive signature information from any group member; Verifying the group message and the signature information to obtain a first verification result, and determining whether there is fraudulent activity in the signing process in combination with the first verification result and the group message of the group; If the fraudulent activity exists, the group member corresponding to the signature information is determined, and the group member is added to a revocation list to delete the group member from the group.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Also includes: Determine the upper limit of the number of group members, the upper limit of the number of events, the hash function and the binary conversion function of the group according to the preset security parameters and the calculation parameters; Initialize group data, and combine the initialized group data, the security parameters, the calculation parameters, the upper limit of the number of group members, the upper limit of the number of events, the hash function and the binary conversion function to output a public parameter set to complete the initialization of the group.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that After completing the initialization of the group, the method further includes: Output the group key pair using the trapdoor generation algorithm; Receive a locally generated user key pair and a group joining request from the user; The group key pair and the user key pair are combined to respond to the user's request to join the group, and the group information of the group is updated.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that After updating the group information of the group, the method further includes: Receive data update requests from group administrators; In response to the data update request, determining whether a revocation list of the group is an empty set; If the revocation list is an empty set, verifying whether the user identification of each group member in the group has completed the user counter accumulation, obtaining a second verification result, and publishing updated group information based on the second verification result; If the revocation list is not an empty set, the key corresponding to the identity identifier of the revoked group member in the revocation list is used as an index to search for the corresponding user tuple in the registration list of the group, and the user tuple is set to zero to complete the revocation of the group member.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Before receiving the signature information from any group member, it also includes: Encrypting the relevant group recovery threshold of any group member to obtain an encrypted value; Calculate the hash value and pseudonym of any group member respectively by using a hash function; generating a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof for verifying any one of the group members using the hash value, the pseudonym, and the encrypted value; The non-interactive zero-knowledge proof is used to obtain signature information of any group member that meets a preset verifiable condition.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that After generating a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof for verifying any of the group members, the method further comprises: Verifying whether the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof satisfies a preset validity condition; If the preset validity condition is met, the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof is used to obtain the signature information of any group member that meets the preset verifiable condition.

7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The verifying the group message and the signature information includes: Obtaining the latest accumulated value of the group, and using the latest accumulated value to parse the signature information to obtain signature parameters; Verifying the signature parameters in sequence using a plurality of hash functions, and if the verification succeeds, determining whether the revocation list contains any of the group members; If any of the group members is included, it is determined that the signature information is invalid and the signing process is terminated. Otherwise, it is determined whether there is fraudulent activity in the signing process based on the first verification result.

8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The determining whether there is fraudulent activity in the signing process by combining the first verification result and the group message of the group includes: Obtain any two signature information in the group; Verify the legitimacy of the two signature information respectively, and if both signature information are legal, parse the two signature information respectively to obtain the pseudonym corresponding to each signature information and the associated group message; A determination is made as to whether the fraudulent activity exists based on the pseudonym and the group message.

9. A group management device, characterized in that: include: A first receiving module, used to receive signature information of any group member after publishing a group message; A first verification module, configured to verify the group message and the signature information to obtain a first verification result, and determine whether there is fraudulent activity in the signing process in combination with the first verification result and the group message of the group; The first revocation module is used to determine the group member corresponding to the signature information in the event of the fraudulent activity, and add the group member to a revocation list to delete the group member from the group.

10. An electronic device, characterized in that: include: A memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor executes the program to implement the group management method according to any one of claims 1 to 8.

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