Wireless access method

By using personal identification code and manufacturer-specific information elements in wireless access technology for identity verification and key calculation, simplified encrypted transmission establishment is achieved, solving the problems of cumbersome steps and low efficiency in the existing technology, and improving wireless storage Efficiency and support terminal devices without visual input interface.

CN119071775APending Publication Date: 2024-12-03REALTEK SEMICON CORP
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202310622154.3
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2023-05-30
Publication Date
2024-12-03

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing wireless access technology is complicated and time-consuming when establishing an encrypted connection. Especially when the terminal device does not have a visual input interface, it is difficult to select the service set identifier and input password of the access point, resulting in poor efficiency or inability to establish encrypted transmission. .

Method used

The terminal device's personal identification code is obtained through the access point, and the beacon containing the manufacturer's specific information elements are broadcast. The terminal device authenticates based on the identification code, and the access point calculates and transmits the encrypted pre-shared key and group temporary key. , to achieve the establishment of encrypted transmission, only 3 information exchanges are required.

Benefits of technology

Simplifies the wireless access process, reduces the time and resource consumption of encrypted transmission establishment, and the terminal device can quickly complete encrypted transmission without visual input interface, avoids complex association and key negotiation steps in traditional methods, and improves wireless access efficiency.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention provides a wireless access method, which comprises the following steps: (a) an access point obtains a personal identification code of a terminal device and broadcasts a beacon comprising a first manufacturer specific information element; (b) the access point performs terminal identity verification on a second manufacturer specific information element in the detection request from the terminal device according to the personal identification code; (c) when the terminal identity verification succeeds, the access point performs key calculation according to the personal identification code and the probe request to generate a pairwise temporary key, a key encryption key and a group temporary key, and encrypts a pre-shared key and the group temporary key by using the key encryption key; (d) the access point transmits a probe response including a third vendor-specific information element to the terminal device; and (e) the access point installs the pairwise temporary key and the group temporary key.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present disclosure relates to a communication technology, and more particularly to a wireless access method. Background Art

[0002] Current wireless access technologies require complex mechanisms to allow terminal devices and access points to establish encrypted connections. For example, in current Wi-Fi connection technologies, the association phase and the key negotiation phase must be completed before an encrypted connection can be established. The steps to establish an encrypted connection are complicated and time-consuming. Although the establishment of encrypted transmission can be accelerated by adding software or hardware functions, this usually requires a large amount of resources. In addition, when an IoT device wants to establish an encrypted connection with an access point, it is often unable to select the access point's service set identifier and enter a password because it does not have a user visual input interface. Summary of the invention

[0003] The present disclosure provides a wireless access method, comprising: (a) an access point obtains a personal identification code of a terminal device and broadcasts a beacon including a first vendor-specific information element; (b) the access point receives a probe request from the terminal device, which includes a second vendor-specific information element, and performs a terminal identity authentication on the second vendor-specific information element according to the personal identification code; (c) when the terminal identity authentication succeeds, the access point performs a key calculation according to the personal identification code and the probe request to generate a pairwise temporary key, a key encryption key and a group temporary key, and uses the key encryption key to encrypt a pre-shared key and the group temporary key; (d) the access point transmits a probe response including a third vendor-specific information element to the terminal device, wherein the third vendor-specific information element includes an encrypted pre-shared key and an encrypted group temporary key; and (e) the access point installs the pairwise temporary key and the group temporary key to establish encrypted transmission.

[0004] The present disclosure also provides a wireless access method, comprising: (a) a terminal device receives a beacon from an access point, which includes a first vendor-specific information element, and performs a first access point identity authentication on the first vendor-specific information element according to a personal identification code of the terminal device; (b) when the first access point identity authentication succeeds, the terminal device broadcasts a probe request including a second vendor-specific information element; (c) the terminal device receives a probe response from the access point, which includes a third vendor-specific information element, and performs a second access point identity authentication on the third vendor-specific information element according to the personal identification code. authentication, wherein the third vendor-specific information element includes an encrypted pre-shared key and an encrypted group temporary key; (d) when the second access point authentication is successful, the terminal device performs a key calculation based on the personal identification code and the probe response to generate a pairwise temporary key and a key encryption key, and uses the key encryption key to decrypt the encrypted pre-shared key and the encrypted group temporary key; and (e) the terminal device stores the pre-shared key and the service set identifier of the access point, and installs the pairwise temporary key and the group temporary key to establish encrypted transmission. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0005] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram of current wireless access technology.

[0006] Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of a wireless access system disclosed in the present invention.

[0007] Figure 3 In some embodiments, Figure 2 A flowchart showing the detailed steps in one step.

[0008] Figure 4 A schematic diagram illustrating a first vendor specific information element in some embodiments.

[0009] Figure 5 In some embodiments, Figure 2 A flowchart of the detailed steps of another step in a process.

[0010] Figure 6 A schematic diagram illustrating a second vendor specific information element in some embodiments.

[0011] Figure 7 In some embodiments, Figure 2 A flowchart of the detailed steps of another step in a process.

[0012] Figure 8 In some embodiments, Figure 2 A flowchart of the detailed steps of another step in a process.

[0013] Fig. 9A schematic diagram illustrating a third vendor specific information element in some embodiments.

[0014] Fig.10 In some embodiments, Figure 2 A flowchart of the detailed steps of another step in a process.

[0015] Explanation of symbols

[0016] 100: Wireless access system

[0017] STA: terminal device

[0018] AP: Access Point

[0019] PRequest: Probe Request

[0020] PResponse: Probe response

[0021] AURequest: Authentication Request

[0022] AUResponse: Verification Response

[0023] ASRequest: Association Request

[0024] ASResponse: Association Response

[0025] PMK: Pairwise Master Key

[0026] GMK: Group Master Key

[0027] PTK: Pairwise Temporary Key

[0028] GTK: Group Temporary Key

[0029] GTK': Encrypted Group Temporary Key

[0030] PSK: Pre-Shared Key

[0031] PSK': Encrypted Pre-Shared Key

[0032] KEK: Key Encryption Key

[0033] SN: Requester random number

[0034] AN: Validator random number

[0035] GN: Group random number

[0036] msg1: first message

[0037] msg2: second message

[0038] msg3: The third message

[0039] msg4: The fourth message

[0040] MIC1, MIC2, MIC3, MIC, VSIE_MIC: Message integrity verification elements

[0041] SA: Requester Address

[0042] AA: Authenticator Address

[0043] PIN: Personal Identification Number

[0044] SSID: Service Set Identifier

[0045] BCon: Beacon

[0046] VSIE1: First vendor-specific information element

[0047] VSIE2: Second Vendor Specific Information Element

[0048] VSIE3: Third Vendor Specific Information Element

[0049] SNHash: Requester random number hash value

[0050] ANHash: Validator random number hash value

[0051] TG: Tags

[0052] LGTH: Length

[0053] VDROUI: Vendor Organization Unique Identifier

[0054] DS: Device Status

[0055] DC: Device Capability

[0056] S110~S1140B, S210~S2140, S231~S233, S261~S264, S281~S284, S2111~S2114, S2121~S2123: Steps DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0057] Reference Figure 1 , Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of a wireless access technology (eg, Wi-Fi access technology) in an example. Figure 1 As shown, in the wireless access technology of this example, when a terminal device STA (eg, a mobile phone) wants to access an access point AP (eg, a router) for wireless transmission, it will first perform association processing and then perform key negotiation.

[0058] First, the association processing stage includes steps S110 to S160. In step S110, the terminal device STA broadcasts a probe request PRequest to detect whether there is an access point AP around the terminal device STA. In step S120, when the access point AP receives the probe request PRequest, the access point AP transmits a probe response PResponse to the terminal device STA. In this way, the terminal device STA learns the access point AP adjacent to itself according to the received probe response PResponse.

[0059] In step S130, when the terminal device STA receives the detection response PResponse, the terminal device STA sends an authentication request AURequest to the access point AP, thereby requesting identity authentication with the access point AP. In step S140, when the access point AP receives the authentication request AURequest, the access point AP performs identity authentication of the terminal device STA according to the authentication request AURequest, and sends the authentication response AUResponse to the terminal device STA when the authentication is successful, so as to continue the subsequent association process.

[0060] In step S150, when the terminal device STA receives the authentication response AUResponse, the terminal device STA sends an association request ASRequest to the access point AP to inform the access point AP that the terminal device STA wants to join the communication (e.g., data transmission / reception). In step S160, when the access point AP receives the association request ASRequest, the access point AP performs a field detection according to the association request ASRequest, and when the detection is successful, sends an association response ASResponse to the terminal device STA to inform the terminal device STA that it has been allowed to join the communication. After completing step S160, the terminal device STA and the access point AP enter the key negotiation phase.

[0061] Next, the key agreement phase includes steps S170A to S1140B. In step S170A, the terminal device STA generates a pairwise master key PMK in advance and generates a supplicant nonce SN. In step S170B, the access point AP generates a pairwise master key PMK and a group master key GMK in advance and generates an authenticator nonce AN. The pairwise master key PMK is used to generate a pairwise transient key PTK for unicast encryption and decryption, and the group master key GMK is used to generate a group transient key GTK, which is used for multicast encryption and decryption. In step S180, the access point AP uses a unicast method to transmit a first message msg1 to the terminal device STA, wherein the first message msg1 includes the authenticator nonce AN. In step S190 , when the terminal device STA receives the first message msg1 , the terminal device STA generates and stores a pairwise transient key PTK.

[0062] In step S1100 , the terminal device STA uses a unicast method to transmit a second message msg2 to the access point AP, wherein the second message msg2 includes a requester random number SN generated by the terminal device STA and a message integrity code MIC1 of the second message msg2 .

[0063] It is worth noting that the terminal device STA extracts a part of the pairwise temporary key PTK as a key confirmation key (KCK), and uses the key confirmation key to perform a hashing algorithm on the other parts of the field of the second message msg2 that does not include the message integrity verification element MIC1 to generate the message integrity verification element MIC1. In this way, the message integrity verification element MIC1 is added to the second message msg2. The following message integrity verification elements MIC2 to MIC3 are also generated in the same way.

[0064] In step S1110 , when the access point AP receives the second message msg2 , the access point AP generates a pairwise transient key PTK and a group transient key GTK.

[0065] It is worth noting that the access point AP will pre-store the authenticator address AA and perform a hashing algorithm (e.g., PRF-X algorithm) on the group master key GMK, the authenticator address AA and the group nonce GN to generate the group temporary key GTK, wherein the authenticator address AA can be the media access control address (MAC address) of the access point AP.

[0066] In step S1120, the access point AP uses a unicast method to transmit a third message msg3 to the terminal device STA, wherein the third message msg3 includes a message integrity verification element MIC2 of the third message msg3, an encrypted group temporary key GTK', and an instruction to install the group temporary key GTK. In step S1130, when the terminal device STA receives the third message msg3, the terminal device STA uses a unicast method to transmit a fourth message msg4 to the access point AP, wherein the fourth message msg4 includes a message integrity verification element MIC3 of the fourth message msg4.

[0067] In step S1140A, the terminal device STA installs the pairwise transient key PTK and the group transient key GTK. In step S1140B, the access point AP installs the pairwise transient key PTK and the group transient key GTK.

[0068] As mentioned above Figure 1 The wireless access technology shown in FIG. 1 can only establish encrypted transmission after six interactions in the association processing phase (i.e., steps S110 to S160) and four handshakes in the key negotiation phase (i.e., steps S180, S1100, S1120, and S1130). Figure 1 As shown in the example, the terminal device STA and the access point AP need to exchange information 10 times to establish encrypted transmission. Therefore, each establishment of encrypted transmission requires complicated steps and a lot of time, which will greatly reduce the efficiency of establishing encrypted transmission. In addition, when the terminal device STA does not have a user visual input interface, it will be difficult to input the key.

[0069] Compared to Figure 1In the example, the complex steps (up to 10 information exchanges) will lead to poor efficiency of wireless access or failure of wireless access. The present disclosure proposes a wireless access method applicable to a terminal device STA and an access point AP in a wireless access system, which can improve the efficiency of wireless access. In some embodiments, the wireless access method of the present disclosure can complete the establishment of encrypted transmission through a smaller number of information exchanges, for example, only three information exchanges to transmit a beacon, a probe request PRquest, and a probe response PResponse. In addition, when the terminal device STA does not have a user visual input interface, the wireless access method of the present disclosure can still quickly complete the establishment of encrypted transmission, and the detailed method is further described in the following paragraphs.

[0070] Please refer to Figure 2 , Figure 2 FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a wireless access system 100 of the present disclosure. Figure 2 As shown, the wireless access system 100 includes a terminal device STA and an access point AP. The access point AP is used to provide a wireless access function and stores a service set identifier SSID, a pre-shared key PSK, and an authenticator address AA of the access point AP. The terminal device STA wants to wirelessly access the access point AP and stores a supplicant address SA of the terminal device STA and a personal identification number PIN of the terminal device STA. In one embodiment, the personal identification number PIN of the terminal device STA can be set by the manufacturer when manufacturing the terminal device STA.

[0071] In some embodiments, the access point AP may store a password for wireless access, and the password may be preset or user-defined.

[0072] In some embodiments, the authenticator address AA and the requester address SA may be the media access control address of the access point AP and the media access control address of the terminal device STA, respectively. In some embodiments, the terminal device STA may be any electronic device having a wireless transceiver function and supporting the wireless access function of the present disclosure, for example, the terminal device STA may be a mobile device (a mobile phone or a smart watch, etc.) or an Internet of Things (IoT) device, etc., supporting the wireless access function of the present disclosure. The access point AP may be any access point supporting the wireless access function of the present disclosure, for example, a router or a network node supporting the wireless access function of the present disclosure.

[0073] In some embodiments, the personal identification code PIN of the terminal device STA can be a string including any numbers and characters, and the length of the string can be any length, and there is no restriction on the composition of the string and the length of the string. Therefore, compared with the personal identification code of the traditional Wi-Fi protected setup (Wi-Fi protected setup, WPS), since the personal identification code PIN of the terminal device STA of the present disclosure is not limited to the format of the 8-digit decimal string, it will be beneficial for manufacturers to customize the personal identification code, and can also avoid the problem of repeated use due to insufficient number of traditional personal identification codes.

[0074] First, in step S210, the access point AP obtains the personal identification code PIN of the terminal device STA. In some embodiments, the user can input the personal identification code PIN of the terminal device STA that wants to wirelessly access the access point AP in the user visual interface of the access point AP.

[0075] In step S220, the access point AP broadcasts a beacon BCon including a first vendor specific information element (VSIE) VSIE1. In the present embodiment, the first vendor specific information element VSIE1 may include a vendor organizationally unique identifier (vendor OUI), a device status, and a message integrity verification element. In some embodiments, the access point AP may use the personal identification code PIN of the terminal device STA as a passphrase to perform a hashing algorithm on the first vendor specific information element VSIE1 to generate a message integrity verification element of the first vendor specific information element VSIE1. In some embodiments, the hashing algorithm may be HMAC-SHA1.

[0076] It should be noted that all the vendor-specific information elements described in the present disclosure may be custom fields set for packets by the IEEE 802.11 protocol. The custom fields are optional fields provided to manufacturers or users.

[0077] In step S230 , the terminal device STA receives a beacon Bcon from the access point AP, which includes the first vendor specific information element VSIE1 , and performs a first access point identity authentication according to the personal identification code PIN of the terminal device STA and the first vendor specific information element VSIE1 .

[0078] In some embodiments, the first access point identity authentication may be to verify a message integrity verification element of a first vendor specific information element VSIE1 in the beacon BCon.

[0079] Refer to Figure 3 , Figure 3 In some embodiments, Figure 2 Flow chart of the detailed steps of step S230. Figure 3 As shown, step S230 includes steps S231 to S233.

[0080] In step S231, when the terminal device STA receives the beacon BCon, the terminal device STA detects whether the first vendor specific information element VSIE1 exists. In some embodiments, when the first vendor specific information element VSIE1 exists, the process proceeds to step S232A. Otherwise, the process proceeds to step S232B.

[0081] Refer to Figure 4 , Figure 4 A schematic diagram of the first vendor specific information element VSIE1 in some embodiments is shown. For example, Figure 4 As shown, the first vendor specific information element VSIE1 includes a tag TG, a length LGTH and a vendor-defined element content, wherein the vendor-defined element content may include a vendor organization unique identifier VDROUI, a device status DS and a message integrity verification element VSIE_MIC and the like.

[0082] In detail, the tag TG is the tag of the field of the vendor specific information element. The length LGTH is the byte length of the field of the vendor specific information element. The vendor organization unique identifier VDROUI is information related to the device manufacturer of the access point AP. The device status DS is status information indicating that the access point AP is currently in the beacon BCon broadcast phase. The message integrity verification element VSIE_MIC is the integrity verification value of the element content of the field of the vendor specific information element.

[0083] In other words, when the terminal device STA detects that the first vendor specific information element VSIE1 includes the tag TG, the length LGTH, the vendor organization unique identifier VDROUI, the device status DS, and the message integrity verification element VSIE_MIC, the terminal device STA can determine that the first vendor specific information element VSIE1 exists. Otherwise, the terminal device STA determines that the first vendor specific information element VSIE1 does not exist.

[0084] like Figure 3As shown, in step S232A, the terminal device STA uses the message integrity verification element VSIE_MIC and the personal identification code PIN of the first vendor specific information element VSIE1 to verify the integrity of the first vendor specific information element VSIE1. When the integrity verification is successful, it goes to step S233. Otherwise, it goes to step S232B.

[0085] In step S232B, the terminal device STA and the access point AP start to perform the conventional wireless access (eg Figure 1 wireless access technology).

[0086] In some embodiments, the terminal device STA may generate a message integrity verification element for verification based on the first vendor-specific information element VSIE1 and the personal identification code PIN. Then, the terminal device STA may compare the message integrity verification element VSIE_MIC of the first vendor-specific information element VSIE1 and the message integrity verification element for verification. When the terminal device STA determines that the message integrity verification element VSIE_MIC of the first vendor-specific information element VSIE1 and the message integrity verification element for verification are the same (the values ​​are equal), the terminal device STA may determine that the integrity verification of the first vendor-specific information element VSIE1 is successful. Otherwise, the terminal device STA may determine that the integrity verification of the first vendor-specific information element VSIE1 has failed.

[0087] In some embodiments, the terminal device STA may use the personal identification code PIN as a password to perform a hashing algorithm on the data in the first vendor specific information element VSIE1 except the message integrity verification element VSIE_MIC of the first vendor specific information element VSIE1 to generate a message integrity verification element for verification. In some embodiments, the hashing algorithm may be an HMAC-SHA1 algorithm.

[0088] In step S233 , the terminal device STA determines that the first access point identity authentication is successful, and then proceeds to step S240 .

[0089] like Figure 2 As shown, in step S240 , the terminal device STA generates a requester random number SN, and generates a requester random number hash value SNHash according to the requester random number SN and a personal identification code PIN.

[0090] In some embodiments, the terminal device STA may generate a random number as the requester random number SN.

[0091] In some embodiments, the terminal device STA may use the personal identification code PIN as a password to perform a hash algorithm on the requester random number SN to generate a requester random number hash value SNHash. In some embodiments, the hash algorithm may be a SHA1_PRF algorithm.

[0092] In step S250, the terminal device STA may broadcast a probe request PRequest including a second vendor specific information element VSIE2 and a requester address SA of the terminal device STA. In the present embodiment, the second vendor specific information element VSIE2 includes a vendor organization unique identifier, a device status, a device capability, a requester random number SN, a requester random number hash value SNHash, and an integrity verification element of the second vendor specific information element. In some embodiments, the terminal device STA may use a personal identification code PIN as a password to perform a hashing algorithm on the second vendor specific information element VSIE2 to generate a message integrity verification element of the second vendor specific information element VSIE2. In some embodiments, the hashing algorithm may be an HMAC-SHA1 algorithm.

[0093] In step S260 , the access point AP receives the probe request PRequest from the terminal device STA, and performs terminal identity authentication according to the personal identification code PIN of the terminal device STA and the second vendor specific information element VSIE2.

[0094] In some embodiments, the terminal identity authentication may be to verify the message integrity verification element of the second vendor specific information element VSIE2 and the requester random number hash value SNHash.

[0095] Refer to Figure 5 , Figure 5 In some embodiments, Figure 2 Flow chart of the detailed steps of step S260. Figure 5 As shown, step S260 includes steps S261 to S264.

[0096] In step S261, when the access point AP receives the probe request PRequest, the access point AP detects whether the second vendor specific information element VSIE2 exists. In some embodiments, when the second vendor specific information element VSIE2 exists, the process proceeds to step S262A. Otherwise, the process proceeds to step S262B.

[0097] Refer to Figure 6 , Figure 6 FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram showing a second vendor specific information element VSIE2 in some embodiments. Figure 6As shown, the second vendor specific information element VSIE2 includes a tag TG, a length LGTH, a vendor organization unique identifier VDROUI, a device status DS, a device capability DC, a requester random number SN, a requester random number hash value SNHash, and a message integrity verification element VSIE_MIC.

[0098] Compared with the first vendor-specific information element VSIE1, the second vendor-specific information element VSIE2 further includes a requester random number SN and a requester random number hash value SNHash. In addition, the vendor organization unique identifier VDROUI is information related to the device manufacturer of the terminal device STA. The device status DS is status information indicating that the terminal device STA is currently in the detection request PRequest broadcast phase. The device capability DC is capability information indicating that the terminal device STA is currently in the detection request PRequest broadcast phase.

[0099] In other words, when the access point AP detects that the second vendor specific information element VSIE2 includes the tag TG, the length LGTH, the vendor organization unique identifier VDROUI, the device status DS, the device capability DC, the requester random number SN, the requester random number hash value SNHash, and the message integrity verification element VSIE_MIC, the access point AP can determine that the second vendor specific information element VSIE2 exists. Otherwise, the access point AP can determine that the second vendor specific information element VSIE2 does not exist.

[0100] like Figure 5 As shown, in step S262A, the access point AP uses the message integrity verification element VSIE_MIC of the second vendor specific information element VSIE2 and the personal identification code PIN of the terminal device STA to perform integrity verification of the second vendor specific information element VSIE2. When the integrity verification is successful, the process proceeds to step S263. Otherwise, the process proceeds to step S262B.

[0101] In some embodiments, the access point AP may generate a message integrity verification element for verification based on the second vendor specific information element VSIE2 and the personal identification code PIN. Then, the access point AP may compare the message integrity verification element VSIE_MIC of the second vendor specific information element VSIE2 and the message integrity verification element for verification. Then, when the access point AP determines that the message integrity verification element VSIE_MIC of the second vendor specific information element VSIE2 and the message integrity verification element for verification are the same (the values ​​are equal), the access point AP may determine that the integrity verification of the second vendor specific information element VSIE2 is successful. Otherwise, the access point AP may determine that the integrity verification of the second vendor specific information element VSIE2 has failed.

[0102] In some embodiments, the access point AP may use the personal identification code PIN as a password to perform a hashing algorithm on the data in the second vendor specific information element VSIE2 except the message integrity verification element VSIE_MIC of the second vendor specific information element VSIE2 to generate a message integrity verification element for verification. In some embodiments, the hashing algorithm may be an HMAC-SHA1 algorithm.

[0103] In step S262B, the terminal device STA and the access point AP start to perform the conventional wireless access (eg Figure 1 wireless access technology).

[0104] In step S263, the access point AP performs hash verification of the requester random number SN using the requester random number hash value SNHash and the personal identification code PIN of the terminal device STA. If the hash verification succeeds, the process proceeds to step S264. Otherwise, the process proceeds to step S262B.

[0105] In some embodiments, the access point AP may generate a requester random number hash value for verification based on the requester random number SN and the personal identification code PIN. Then, the access point AP may compare the received requester random number hash value SNHash with the requester random number hash value for verification. When the access point AP determines that the requester random number hash value SNHash and the requester random number hash value for verification are the same, the access point AP may determine that the hash verification is successful. Otherwise, the access point AP may determine that the hash verification fails.

[0106] In some embodiments, the access point AP may use the personal identification code PIN as a password to perform a hash algorithm on the requester random number SN to generate a requester random number hash value for verification. In some embodiments, the hash algorithm may be a SHA1_PRF algorithm.

[0107] In step S264 , the access point AP determines that the identity authentication of the terminal device is successful, and then proceeds to step S270 .

[0108] like Figure 2 As shown, in step S270, the access point AP generates an authenticator random number AN, and generates an authenticator random number hash value ANHash according to the authenticator random number AN and the personal identification code PIN of the terminal device STA.

[0109] In some embodiments, the access point AP may generate a random number as the authenticator random number AN.

[0110] In some embodiments, the access point AP may use the personal identification code PIN of the terminal device STA as a password to perform a hash algorithm on the authenticator random number AN to generate an authenticator random number hash value ANHash. In some embodiments, the hash algorithm may be a SHA1_PRF algorithm.

[0111] In step S280, the access point AP performs a first key calculation to generate a pairwise temporary key PTK, a group temporary key GTK, and a key encryption key (KEK) KEK, and uses the key encryption key KEK to encrypt the pre-shared key PSK of the access point AP and the group temporary key GTK. In some embodiments, the key encryption key is used to encrypt the key.

[0112] Refer to Figure 7 , Figure 7 In some embodiments, Figure 2 Flow chart of the detailed steps of step S280. Figure 7 The detailed steps of calculating the first key are described below. Figure 7 As shown, step S280 includes steps S281 to S284.

[0113] In step S281, the access point AP generates a pairwise master key PMK according to the personal identification code PIN of the terminal device STA and the service set identifier SSID of the access point AP. In some embodiments, the access point AP may use the personal identification code PIN of the terminal device STA as a password to perform a hash algorithm on the service set identifier SSID to generate the pairwise master key PMK. In some embodiments, the hash algorithm may be a pdkdf2_SHA1 algorithm.

[0114] In step S282 , the access point AP generates a pairwise temporary key PTK for unicast encryption and decryption according to the pairwise master key PMK, the authenticator address AA, the authenticator random number AN, the supplicant address SA and the supplicant random number SN.

[0115] In some embodiments, the access point AP may use the pairwise master key PMK as a password to perform a hashing algorithm on the requester address SA, the authenticator address AA, the authenticator random number AN, and the requester random number SN to generate a pairwise temporary key PTK for unicast encryption and decryption. In some embodiments, the hashing algorithm may be a SHA1_PRF algorithm.

[0116] In step S283 , if the access point AP has not generated the group temporary key GTK, the access point AP generates the group master key GMK, and generates the group temporary key GTK according to the group master key GMK, the authenticator address AA and the group random number GN.

[0117] The group master key GMK is an auxiliary key used to generate the group temporary key GTK. In some embodiments, the group master key GMK of the access point AP can be a string of all zeros. In some embodiments, the access point AP performs a hashing algorithm on the group master key GMK, the authenticator address AA, and the group random number GN to generate the group temporary key GTK for multicast encryption and decryption. In some embodiments, the hashing algorithm can be a SHA1_PRF algorithm. In some embodiments, the method for generating the group random number GN can be the same as the method for generating the authenticator random number AN and the requester random number SN. The difference between the group random number GN and the authenticator random number AN and the requester random number SN is that the group random number GN is limited to use within the access point AP.

[0118] In step S284, the access point AP extracts a part of the pairwise temporary key PTK as a key encryption key KEK for key encryption and decryption, and uses the key encryption key KEK to encrypt the pre-shared key PSK and the group temporary key GTK of the access point AP, and then enters step S290. For example, when the data length of the pairwise temporary key PTK is 512 bytes, the access point AP may use the 129th to 256th bytes of the pairwise temporary key PTK as the key encryption key KEK. In some embodiments, the access point AP may use the key encryption key KEK as an encryption key to perform an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm on the pre-shared key PSK and the group temporary key GTK to generate an encrypted pre-shared key PSK' and an encrypted group temporary key GTK'.

[0119] like Figure 2 As shown, in step S290, the access point AP transmits a probe response PResponse including a third vendor specific information element VSIE3, a service identifier SSID, and an authenticator address AA to the terminal device STA according to the requester address SA. In this embodiment, the third vendor specific information element VSIE3 includes a vendor organization unique identifier, a device status, a device capability, an authenticator random number AN, an authenticator random number hash value ANHash, an encrypted pre-shared key PSK', an encrypted group temporary key GTK', and a message integrity verification element. In some embodiments, the access point AP may use the personal identification code PIN of the terminal device STA as a password to perform a hashing algorithm on the third vendor specific information element VSIE3 to generate a message integrity verification element of the third vendor specific information element VSIE3. In some embodiments, the hashing algorithm may be an HMAC-SHA1 algorithm.

[0120] In step S2100 , the access point AP installs a pairwise transient key PTK and a group transient key GTK.

[0121] In step S2110 , the terminal device STA receives a probe response Presponse from the access point AP, which includes the third vendor specific information element VSIE3, and performs a second access point identity authentication according to the personal identification code PIN and the third vendor specific information element VSIE3.

[0122] In some embodiments, the second AP identity authentication may be performed by verifying the message integrity verification element VSIE_MIC of the third vendor specific information element VSIE3 and the authenticator random number hash value ANHash.

[0123] Refer to Figure 8 , Figure 8 In some embodiments, Figure 2 Flow chart of the detailed steps of step S2110. Figure 8 As shown, step S2110 includes steps S2111 to S2114.

[0124] In step S2111, when the terminal device STA receives the probe response PResponse, the terminal device STA detects whether the third vendor specific information element VSIE3 exists. In some embodiments, when the third vendor specific information element VSIE3 exists, the process proceeds to step S2112A. Otherwise, the process proceeds to step S2112B.

[0125] Refer to Fig. 9 , Fig. 9 FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram showing a third vendor specific information element VSIE3 in some embodiments. Fig. 9 As shown, the third vendor-specific information element includes a tag TG, a length LGTH, a vendor organization unique identifier VDROUI, a device status DS, a device capability DC, an authenticator random number AN, an authenticator random number hash value ANHash, an encrypted pre-shared key PSK', an encrypted group temporary key GTK', and a message integrity verification element VSIE_MIC.

[0126] Compared with the second vendor specific information element VSIE2, the third vendor specific information element VSIE3 further includes the authenticator random number AN, the authenticator random number hash value ANHash, the encrypted pre-shared key PSK', and the encrypted group temporary key GTK'. In addition, the vendor organization unique identifier VDROUI is information related to the device manufacturer of the access point AP. The device status DS is status information indicating that the access point AP is currently in the detection response PResponse transmission stage. The device capability DC is capability information indicating that the access point AP is currently in the detection response PResponse transmission stage.

[0127] In other words, when the terminal device STA detects that the third vendor specific information element VSIE3 includes the tag TG, the length LGTH, the vendor organization unique identifier VDROUI, the device status DS, the device capability DC, the authenticator random number AN, the authenticator random number hash value ANHash, the encrypted pre-shared key PSK', the encrypted group temporary key GTK', and the message integrity verification VSIE_MIC, the terminal device STA can determine that the third vendor specific information element VSIE3 exists. Otherwise, the terminal device STA can determine that the third vendor specific information element VSIE3 does not exist.

[0128] like Figure 8 As shown, in step S2112A, the terminal device STA uses the message integrity verification element VSIE_MIC and the personal identification code PIN of the third vendor specific information element VSIE3 to verify the integrity of the third vendor specific information element VSIE3. When the integrity verification is successful, the process proceeds to step S2113. Otherwise, the process proceeds to step S2112B.

[0129] In some embodiments, the terminal device STA may use a personal identification code PIN as a password to perform a hashing algorithm on the data in the third vendor specific information element VSIE3 except the message integrity verification element VSIE_MIC of the third vendor specific information element VSIE3 to generate a message integrity verification element for verification. Then, the terminal device STA may compare the message integrity verification element VSIE_MIC of the third vendor specific information element VSIE3 and the message integrity verification element for verification. Then, when the terminal device STA determines that the message integrity verification element VSIE_MIC of the probe response PResponse and the message integrity verification element for verification are the same (the values ​​are equal), the terminal device STA may determine that the integrity verification of the third vendor specific information element VSIE3 is successful. Otherwise, the terminal device STA may determine that the integrity verification has failed.

[0130] In step S2112B, the terminal device STA and the access point AP start to perform the wireless access in the conventional technology (such as Figure 1 wireless access technology).

[0131] In step S2113, the terminal device STA performs hash verification of the authenticator random number AN using the authenticator random number hash value ANHash and the personal identification code PIN. If the hash verification is successful, the process proceeds to step S2114. Otherwise, the process proceeds to step S2112B.

[0132] In some embodiments, the terminal device STA may generate a verifier random number hash value for verification based on the verifier random number AN and the personal identification code PIN. Then, the terminal device STA may compare the received verifier random number hash value ANHash with the verifier random number hash value for verification. When the terminal device STA determines that the verifier random number hash value ANHash and the verifier random number hash value for verification are the same, the terminal device STA may determine that the hash verification is successful. Otherwise, the terminal device STA may determine that the hash verification fails.

[0133] In some embodiments, the terminal device STA uses the personal identification code PIN as a password to perform a hash algorithm on the authenticator random number AN to generate a hash value of the authenticator random number for verification. In some embodiments, the hash algorithm can be a SHA1_PRF algorithm.

[0134] In step S2114 , the terminal device STA determines that the second access point identity authentication is successful, and proceeds to step S2120 .

[0135] like Figure 2 As shown, in step S2120, the terminal device STA performs a second key calculation to generate a pairwise transient key PTK and a key encryption key KEK, and uses the key encryption key KEK to decrypt the encrypted pre-shared key PSK' and the encrypted group transient key GTK'.

[0136] Refer to Fig.10 , Fig.10 In some embodiments, Figure 2 Flowchart of the detailed steps of step S2120. Fig.10 The detailed steps of calculating the second key will be described. Fig.10 As shown, step S2120 includes steps S2121 to S2123.

[0137] In step S2121, the terminal device STA generates a pairwise master key PMK according to the personal identification code PIN and the service set identifier SSID. In some embodiments, the terminal device STA can use the personal identification code PIN as a password to perform a hash algorithm on the service set identifier SSID to generate the pairwise master key PMK. In some embodiments, the hash algorithm can be a pdkdf2_SHA1 algorithm.

[0138] In step S2122 , the terminal device STA generates a pairwise temporary key PTK for unicast encryption and decryption according to the pairwise master key PMK, the authenticator address AA, the authenticator random number AN, the supplicant address SA and the supplicant random number SN.

[0139] In some embodiments, the terminal device STA may use the pairwise master key PMK as a password to perform a hashing algorithm on the requester address SA, the authenticator address AA, the authenticator random number AN, and the requester random number SN to generate a pairwise temporary key PTK for unicast encryption and decryption. In some embodiments, the hashing algorithm may be a SHA1_PRF algorithm.

[0140] In step S2123, the terminal device STA extracts a part of the pairwise transient key PTK as the key encryption key KEK for key encryption and decryption, and uses the key encryption key KEK to decrypt the encrypted pre-shared key PSK' and the encrypted group transient key GTK', and then enters step S2130.

[0141] In some embodiments, the terminal device STA may use the key encryption key KEK as a decryption key to perform an AES algorithm on the encrypted pre-shared key PSK' and the encrypted group temporary key GTK' to obtain the pre-shared key PSK and the group temporary key GTK (ie, decrypt by the AES algorithm).

[0142] like Figure 2 As shown, in step S2130, the terminal device STA stores the service set identifier SSID and the pre-shared key PSK, and installs the pairwise temporary key PTK and the group temporary key GTK. At this time, in step S2140, since the terminal device STA and the access point AP have installed the same pairwise temporary key PTK and the same group temporary key GTK, encrypted transmission can be performed using the pairwise temporary key PTK and the group temporary key GTK.

[0143] Through the above steps, the wireless access method proposed in the present disclosure only needs to input the personal identification code PIN of the terminal device STA at the access point AP, and can use simple three interactions to directly complete the association phase and key negotiation phase of the general wireless access technology, thereby establishing encrypted transmission between the access point AP and the terminal device STA.

[0144] In summary, the wireless access method disclosed in the present invention can establish encrypted transmission after completing three interactions as long as the personal identification code of the terminal device is entered at the access point. In addition, the wireless access method disclosed in the present invention only requires one traditional beacon, one probe request and one probe response to establish encrypted transmission. Furthermore, unlike the traditional methods of generating pairwise master keys, generating message integrity verification elements and verifying hashes, the present invention uses a personal identification code to generate a pairwise master key, a message integrity verification element and a hash value, and uses a personal identification code to verify the message integrity verification element and the hash value, and then uses a manufacturer-specific information element to insert various verification and key information. Such means can shorten the traditionally complex association stage and key negotiation stage to establish encrypted transmission after completing three interactions. When the terminal device does not have a user visual input interface, the wireless access method disclosed in the present invention does not need to enter a password in the terminal device, and can quickly complete the establishment of encrypted transmission. In addition, the terminal device and access point disclosed in the present invention only require the most basic wireless access function (e.g., Wi-Fi) to complete the establishment of encrypted transmission, without further adding hardware or software functions. It is worth noting that the high scalability of the personal identification code proposed in the present disclosure can also avoid the problem of repeated use of traditional personal identification codes due to insufficient number of personal identification codes.

[0145] Although the present invention has been disclosed as above by way of embodiments, it is not intended to limit the present invention. Any person skilled in the art may make some changes and modifications without departing from the concept and scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention shall be determined by the claims.

Claims

1. A wireless access method, comprising: Step (a) an access point obtains a personal identification code of a terminal device and broadcasts a beacon including a first vendor-specific information element; Step (b) the access point receives a probe request from the terminal device, which includes a second vendor-specific information element, and performs a terminal identity authentication on the second vendor-specific information element according to the personal identification code; Step (c) when the terminal identity authentication succeeds, the access point performs key calculation according to the personal identification code and the probe request to generate a pairwise temporary key, a key encryption key and a group temporary key, and uses the key encryption key to encrypt a pre-shared key of the access point and the group temporary key to generate an encrypted pre-shared key and an encrypted group temporary key; Step (d) the access point transmits a probe response including a third vendor specific information element to the terminal device, wherein the third vendor specific information element includes the encrypted pre-shared key and the encrypted group temporary key; as well as Step (e) The access point installs the pairwise temporary key and the group temporary key to establish encrypted transmission.

2. The wireless access method of claim 1 , wherein the second vendor specific information element comprises a message integrity verification element of the second vendor specific information element, a requester random number generated by the terminal device, and a requester random number hash value, wherein step (b) comprises: Step (b1) when receiving the probe request, the access point detects whether the second vendor specific information element exists; Step (b2): when the second vendor specific information element exists, the access point performs an integrity verification of the second vendor specific information element using the message integrity verification element of the second vendor specific information element and the personal identification code; Step (b3) When the integrity verification succeeds, the access point performs a hash verification of the requester random number using the requester random number hash value and the personal identification code; as well as Step (b4) When the hash verification succeeds, the access point determines that the terminal identity authentication is successful.

3. The wireless access method as claimed in claim 2, wherein step (b2) comprises: Step (b21) the access point generates a message integrity verification element for verification according to the second vendor specific information element and the personal identification code; Step (b22) the access point compares the message integrity verification element of the second vendor specific information element with the message integrity verification element for verification; as well as Step (b23) When the message integrity verification element of the second vendor specific information element and the message integrity verification element for verification are the same, the access point determines that the integrity verification of the second vendor specific information element is successful.

4. The wireless access method as claimed in claim 2, wherein step (b3) comprises: Step (b31) the access point generates a requester random number hash value for verification according to the requester random number and the personal identification code; Step (b32) the access point compares the requester random number hash value with the requester random number hash value for verification; as well as Step (b33) When the requester random number hash value and the requester random number hash value used for verification are the same, the access point determines that the hash verification is successful.

5. The wireless access method of claim 1 , wherein the key encryption key is used for key encryption and decryption, the pairwise temporary key is used for unicast encryption and decryption, the group temporary key is used for multicast encryption and decryption, the probe request further includes a requester address of the terminal device, and step (c) comprises: Step (c1) the access point generates a pairwise master key according to the personal identification code and a service set identifier of the access point; Step (c2) the access point generates the pairwise temporary key according to the pairwise master key, a requester address of the terminal device, a verifier address, a verifier random number and a requester random number; Step (c3) The access point generates a group master key, and generates the group temporary key according to the group master key, the authenticator address and a group random number; as well as Step (c4) The access point extracts a portion of the pairwise temporary key as the key encryption key.

6. A wireless access method, comprising: Step (a) a terminal device receives a beacon from an access point, the beacon including a first vendor specific information element, and performs a first access point identity authentication on the first vendor specific information element according to a personal identification code of the terminal device; Step (b) when the first access point identity authentication succeeds, the terminal device broadcasts a probe request including a second vendor specific information element; Step (c) the terminal device receives a probe response from the access point, the probe response including a third vendor-specific information element, and performs a second access point identity authentication on the third vendor-specific information element according to the personal identification code, wherein the third vendor-specific information element includes an encrypted pre-shared key and an encrypted group temporary key; Step (d) when the second access point identity authentication succeeds, the terminal device performs key calculation according to the personal identification code and the probe response to generate a pairwise temporary key and a key encryption key, and uses the key encryption key to decrypt the encrypted pre-shared key and the encrypted group temporary key; as well as Step (e) The terminal device stores the pre-shared key and installs the pairwise temporary key and the group temporary key.

7. The wireless access method of claim 6, wherein the first vendor specific information element further comprises a message integrity verification element of the first vendor specific information element, wherein step (a) comprises: Step (a1) when receiving the beacon, the terminal device detects whether the first vendor-specific information element exists; Step (a2): when the first vendor specific information element exists, the terminal device performs an integrity verification of the first vendor specific information element using the message integrity verification element of the first vendor specific information element and the personal identification code; as well as Step (a3) ​​When the integrity verification succeeds, the terminal device determines that the first access point identity verification succeeds.

8. The wireless access method as claimed in claim 7, wherein step (a2) comprises: Step (a21) the terminal device generates a message integrity verification element for verification according to the first vendor specific information element and the personal identification code; Step (a22) the terminal device compares the message integrity verification element of the first vendor specific information element with the message integrity verification element for verification; as well as In step (a23), when the message integrity verification element of the first vendor specific information element and the message integrity verification element for verification are the same, the terminal device determines that the integrity verification of the first vendor specific information element is successful.

9. The wireless access method of claim 6, wherein the third vendor specific information element comprises a message integrity verification element of the third vendor specific information element, a verifier random number generated by the access point, and a verifier random number hash value, wherein step (c) comprises: Step (c1) when receiving the probe response, the terminal device detects whether the third vendor specific information element exists; Step (c2): when the third vendor specific information element exists, the terminal device performs an integrity verification of the third vendor specific information element using the message integrity verification element of the third vendor specific information element and the personal identification code; Step (c3) When the integrity verification succeeds, the terminal device performs a hash verification of the verifier random number using the verifier random number hash value and the personal identification code; and Step (c4) When the hash verification succeeds, the terminal device determines that the second access point identity verification succeeds.

10. The wireless access method of claim 6, wherein the key encryption key is used for key encryption and decryption, the pairwise temporary key is used for unicast encryption and decryption, the group temporary key is used for multicast encryption and decryption, the probe response further includes a service set identifier and a verifier address of the access point, and step (d) comprises: Step (d1) the terminal device generates a pair of master keys according to the personal identification code and the service set identifier; Step (d2) the terminal device generates the pairwise temporary key according to the pairwise master key, the verifier address, the verifier random number, the requester address and the requester random number; Step (d3) the terminal device extracts a portion of the pairwise temporary key as the key encryption key; as well as Step (d4) The terminal device decrypts the encrypted pre-shared key and the encrypted group temporary key using the key encryption key.