Limited time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control method and system based on observer method

Abstract

The invention relates to the technical field of sliding-mode fault-tolerant safety control, in particular to a finite-time sliding-mode fault-tolerant safety control method and system based on an observer method. The method comprises the following steps: establishing a dynamic model of a discrete information physical system with parameter uncertainty and actuator fault; mathematical modeling is carried out for periodic DoS interference attacks and packet loss, and packet loss conditions are obtained; according to the packet loss condition, combining a dynamic model design state and a fault observer to obtain estimation information; designing a linear sliding mode surface based on estimation information; designing a sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller based on the linear sliding mode surface; on the basis of a sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller, limited-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control is carried out on a discrete information physical system of periodic DoS interference attack and packet loss. According to the invention, the sliding mode control technology and the fault-tolerant control method are combined, and the finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control of the cyber-physical system considering periodic DoS interference attack and packet loss has very important practical significance.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control, and in particular to a finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control method and system based on an observer method. Background Art

[0002] Cyber-physical systems based on communication, computer and control technologies have attracted much attention due to their advanced perception, computing and communication capabilities. As a new type of intelligent system, cyber-physical systems closely integrate physical space and cyber space and are widely used in industrial automation systems and other large-scale infrastructures. Under this structure, the openness of the communication network improves the efficiency of the physical system, but also brings technical challenges in system integration and security. In cyber-physical systems, DoS attacks do not require comprehensive information about the system and can interrupt data transmission, posing a serious threat to the security of cyber-physical systems. Therefore, considering the impact of DoS attacks on the system, the security of cyber-physical systems has received more and more attention.

[0003] In a network environment, in addition to malicious network attacks, inherent factors of wireless channels, such as channel aging and data packet congestion, can also cause random packet loss, leading to system performance degradation or even instability.

[0004] Existing research on sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control issues mainly considers packet loss caused by channel aging, packet congestion, etc., and periodic DoS attacks can also cause packet loss. In addition to packet loss, physical failures may occur in the physical layer of cyber-physical systems, and most research results focus on the infinite behavior of the system. In this regard, there is currently no finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control scheme for cyber-physical systems that considers both periodic DoS interference attacks and packet loss. Summary of the invention

[0005] In order to solve the technical problem that there is no finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control solution for information-physical systems that simultaneously considers periodic DoS interference attacks and packet loss, the embodiment of the present invention provides a finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control method and system based on an observer method. The technical solution is as follows:

[0006] On the one hand, a finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control method based on an observer method is provided, characterized in that the method comprises:

[0007] S1. Build dynamic models of discrete cyber-physical systems with parameter uncertainties and actuator failures;

[0008] S2. Perform mathematical modeling for periodic DoS interference attacks and packet loss to obtain packet loss information;

[0009] S3. According to the packet loss situation, a state observer and a fault observer are designed in combination with the dynamic model to obtain estimation information;

[0010] S4, designing a linear sliding surface based on the estimated information; designing a sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller based on the linear sliding surface;

[0011] S5. Based on the sliding mode fault-tolerant security controller, a finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant security control is performed on a discrete information-physical system with periodic DoS interference attacks and packet loss.

[0012] Optionally, in S1, a dynamic model of a discrete cyber-physical system with parameter uncertainty and actuator failure is established, including:

[0013] A dynamic model of a discrete cyber-physical system with parameter uncertainty and actuator failure is established. The state equation of the dynamic model is shown in the following formula (1):

[0014] (1)

[0015] in, Indicates the status signal, Represents the control input signal, Indicates the measurement output signal; Indicates an actuator failure. represents external disturbance; real matrix It means satisfying The bounded parameter uncertainty of satisfy ; and is a known constant matrix of appropriate dimension.

[0016] Optionally, in S2, mathematical modeling is performed for periodic DoS interference attacks and packet loss to obtain packet loss conditions, including:

[0017] The variables are defined by the following formula (2): , describing the periodic DoS interference attack strategy:

[0018] (2)

[0019] in, is the number of cycles; when When , it indicates the attack dormancy time; when , represents the attack time in the nth cycle; let is the attacker's action cycle, is the duration of the silent period, where is a set of positive integers;

[0020] According to the periodic attack strategy of the DoS attacker, when the attacker is in a dormant state, only the random packet loss caused by the inherent factors of the wireless channel is considered. During the attack period, the DoS attacker selects the interference power to attack the wireless channel according to the total energy he has; therefore, when When the packet loss is caused by the inherent factors of the wireless channel, When the packet loss is caused by periodic DoS attacks.

[0021] make It indicates whether the observer can successfully receive the data packet under the influence of DoS attack and channel inherent factors as shown in the following formula (3):

[0022] (3)

[0023] Replace the lost measurement value with the latest received data to get the actual measurement value :

[0024] (4).

[0025] Optionally, S3, designing a state observer and a fault observer according to the packet loss situation in combination with the dynamic model to obtain estimation information, including:

[0026] Actual measured value , construct the observer as follows:

[0027] (5)

[0028] in, yes The estimated value of yes An estimated value of is the state observer gain matrix to be determined, is the fault observer gain matrix to be determined.

[0029] Optionally, in S4, designing a linear sliding surface based on the estimated information includes:

[0030] A sliding surface function is designed according to the state estimation of the information-physical system, and a reaching law is designed according to the sliding surface function, and then a finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control method based on an observer method is designed.

[0031] Optionally, in S4, designing a sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller based on the linear sliding mode surface includes:

[0032] The design of sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller is shown in equation (6):

[0033] (6)

[0034] in, .

[0035] On the other hand, a finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control system based on an observer method is provided, the system is applied to a finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control method based on an observer method, and the system comprises:

[0036] Dynamic model building module, used to build dynamic models of discrete cyber-physical systems with parameter uncertainties and actuator failures;

[0037] Mathematical modeling module, used to perform mathematical modeling on periodic DoS interference attacks and packet loss to obtain packet loss information;

[0038] An observer design module is used to design a state observer and a fault observer according to the packet loss situation and in combination with the dynamic model to obtain estimation information;

[0039] A sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller design module is used to design a linear sliding surface based on the estimated information; and to design a sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller based on the linear sliding surface;

[0040] The sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control module is used to perform finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control on discrete information-physical systems with periodic DoS interference attacks and packet loss based on the sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller.

[0041] On the other hand, a finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller based on an observer method is provided, and the finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller based on an observer method is used to implement the above-mentioned finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control method based on an observer method.

[0042] On the other hand, a finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control device based on an observer method is provided, and the finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control device based on the observer method comprises: a processor; a memory, wherein computer-readable instructions are stored on the memory, and when the computer-readable instructions are executed by the processor, any one of the above-mentioned finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control methods based on the observer method is implemented.

[0043] On the other hand, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, wherein at least one instruction is stored in the storage medium, and the at least one instruction is loaded and executed by a processor to implement any one of the above-mentioned finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control methods based on the observer method.

[0044] The beneficial effects brought about by the technical solution provided by the embodiment of the present invention include at least:

[0045] In the embodiment of the present invention, a finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control method based on an observer method is provided for an information-physical system with periodic DoS interference attacks and packet loss. An update strategy is proposed by considering the packet loss phenomenon caused by periodic DoS interference attacks and internal channel factors within a unified framework. Then, an observer is designed under the update strategy to estimate the system state and fault information. The sliding surface and the sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller are designed based on the estimated information, which can ensure the finite-time reachability of the sliding surface in the approach phase, and derive the finite-time boundedness of the closed-loop system in the approach phase and the sliding phase. There are no technical problems in the research on the finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control problem of discrete information-physical systems with periodic DoS interference attacks and packet loss. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0046] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings required for use in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative work.

[0047] Figure 1 It is a flow chart of a finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control method based on an observer method provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0048] Figure 2 It is a block diagram of a finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control system based on an observer method provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0049] Figure 3 It is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0050] The technical solution of the present invention is described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0051] In the embodiments of the present invention, words such as "exemplarily" and "for example" are used to indicate examples, illustrations or explanations. Any embodiment or design described as "example" in the present invention should not be interpreted as being more preferred or more advantageous than other embodiments or designs. Specifically, the use of the word "example" is intended to present the concept in a specific way. In addition, in the embodiments of the present invention, the meaning expressed by "and / or" can be both, or it can be either of the two.

[0052] In the embodiments of the present invention, "image" and "picture" can sometimes be used interchangeably. It should be noted that when the difference between them is not emphasized, the meanings they intend to express are the same. "of", "corresponding, relevant" and "corresponding" can sometimes be used interchangeably. It should be noted that when the difference between them is not emphasized, the meanings they intend to express are the same.

[0053] In the embodiments of the present invention, sometimes a subscript such as W1 may be written as a non-subscript such as W1. When the difference is not emphasized, the meanings to be expressed are consistent.

[0054] In order to make the technical problems, technical solutions and advantages to be solved by the present invention more clear, a detailed description will be given below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.

[0055] The embodiment of the present invention provides a finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control method based on an observer method, which can be implemented by a finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control device based on an observer method, and the finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control device based on an observer method can be a terminal or a server. Figure 1 The flowchart of the finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control method based on the observer method is shown in FIG. The processing flow of the method may include the following steps:

[0056] S1. Build dynamic models of discrete cyber-physical systems with parameter uncertainties and actuator failures;

[0057] S2. Perform mathematical modeling for periodic DoS interference attacks and packet loss to obtain packet loss information;

[0058] S3. According to the packet loss situation, a state observer and a fault observer are designed in combination with the dynamic model to obtain estimation information;

[0059] S4, designing a linear sliding surface based on observer estimation information; designing a sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller based on the linear sliding surface;

[0060] S5. Based on the sliding mode fault-tolerant security controller, a finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant security control is performed on a discrete information-physical system with periodic DoS interference attacks and packet loss.

[0061] In a feasible implementation, since the attacker's energy is limited, the DoS jammer needs to replenish energy during the dormant period of each cycle. During this period, only the inherent random packet loss caused by wireless channel attenuation or congestion is considered. First, the periodic DoS jamming attack involves injecting interference signals into the wireless channel, which may cause data loss on the sensor-to-observer channel. Secondly, the packet loss caused by the attack and internal channel factors are considered in a unified framework, and an update strategy is proposed to describe the transmission of the signal from the sensor to the observer. Subsequently, a discrete linear sliding surface is constructed, and the proposed reaching law is used to ensure the finite-time reachability of the sliding surface in the approaching phase. Based on the estimated information, a sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller is designed, and the derived sufficient criterion can ensure that the closed-loop system is stochastically finite-time bounded in the approaching and sliding phases.

[0062] Specifically, S101, establishing a dynamic model of a discrete cyber-physical system with parameter uncertainty and actuator failure;

[0063] In a feasible implementation, in S101, a dynamic model of a discrete cyber-physical system with parameter uncertainty and actuator failure is established, including:

[0064] A dynamic model of a discrete cyber-physical system with parameter uncertainty and actuator failure is established. The state equation of the dynamic model is shown in the following formula (1):

[0065] (1)

[0066] in, Indicates the status signal, Represents the control input signal, Indicates the measurement output signal; Indicates an actuator failure. represents external disturbance; real matrix It means satisfying The bounded parameter uncertainty of satisfy ; and is a known constant matrix of appropriate dimension.

[0067] S102, performing mathematical modeling for periodic DoS interference attacks and packet loss to obtain packet loss conditions;

[0068] In a feasible implementation, even in the absence of malicious attacks from adversaries, due to the limitations of current wireless communication technology, inherent factors such as channel noise and channel fading in the wireless channel may still cause packet loss. The relationship between the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and the symbol error rate (SER) is defined as: ,in, , , Indicates the transmit power, represents additive white Gaussian noise, is a parameter;

[0069] The variables are defined by the following formula (2): , describing the periodic DoS interference attack strategy:

[0070] (2)

[0071] in is the number of cycles; when When , it indicates the attack dormancy time; when , represents the attack time in the nth cycle; let is the attacker's action cycle, is the duration of the silent period, where is a set of positive integers;

[0072] According to the periodic attack strategy of the DoS attacker, when the attacker is in a dormant state, only the random packet loss caused by the inherent factors of the wireless channel is considered. During the attack period, the DoS attacker selects the interference power to attack the wireless channel according to the total energy he has;

[0073] At this time, the channel signal-to-noise ratio becomes the signal-to-noise ratio SINR. At this time, the relationship between SINR and SER is defined as , , is the interference power; based on the relationship between the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and the symbol error rate (SER), the SERP is refined in combination with the new SINR:

[0074] (2-1);

[0075] Formula (2-1) can uniformly represent the impact of inherent packet loss and periodic DoS interference attacks on wireless channels. It indicates whether the observer can successfully receive the data packet under the influence of DoS attack and channel inherent factors as shown in the following formula (3):

[0076] (3)

[0077] Combining equation (2-1) and equation (3), we can get:

[0078]

[0079] in, . Replace the lost measurement value with the latest received data to get the actual measurement value :

[0080] (4).

[0081] S103, designing a state observer and a fault observer according to the packet loss situation and combining the dynamic model to obtain estimation information;

[0082] In a feasible implementation, S103, according to the packet loss situation, a state observer and a fault observer are designed in combination with the dynamic model to obtain estimation information, including:

[0083] Based on actual measurements , construct the observer as follows:

[0084] (5)

[0085] in, yes The estimated value of yes An estimated value of is the state observer gain matrix to be determined, is the fault observer gain matrix to be determined.

[0086] S104, designing a linear sliding surface based on the estimated information; designing a sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller based on the linear sliding surface;

[0087] In a feasible implementation manner, in S104, designing a linear sliding surface based on the estimated information includes:

[0088] Based on the estimated information, the discrete time sliding surface function is selected as shown in the following formula (6-1):

[0089] (6-1)

[0090] in, , is an arbitrary matrix, defined as ensure It's very strange.

[0091] In a feasible implementation manner, in S104, designing a sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller based on the linear sliding mode surface includes:

[0092] Design the following reaching law:

[0093] (6-2)

[0094] in, is the convergence parameter, represents the sampling time, is the switching parameter, About The symbolic function of

[0095] From formula (5), (6-1) and (6-2), we can get:

[0096] (6-3)

[0097] According to the above formula, the sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller is designed as follows:

[0098] (6)

[0099] in, .

[0100] S105. Based on the sliding mode fault-tolerant security controller, a finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant security control is performed on a discrete cyber-physical system with periodic DoS interference attacks and packet loss.

[0101] In a feasible implementation, the designed sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller is used to implement finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control of discrete information-physical systems considering periodic DoS interference attacks and packet loss, thereby ensuring the finite-time reachability of the sliding surface in the approach phase, and at the same time ensuring the finite-time boundedness of the closed-loop system in the approach phase and the sliding phase.

[0102] In the embodiment of the present invention, the finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control problem of the information-physical system under periodic DoS interference attack and packet loss is mainly studied. The periodic DoS interference attack involves injecting interference signals into the wireless channel, which may cause data loss on the sensor-to-observer channel. In addition, the packet loss phenomenon caused by interference attacks and internal channel factors is considered in a unified framework, and an update strategy is proposed to describe the transmission of signals from the sensor to the observer. A discrete-time sliding surface is constructed, and the finite-time reachability of the sliding surface is guaranteed in the approaching stage by using the proposed convergence law. On this basis, a sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller is designed to ensure that the closed-loop system has random finite-time boundedness in both the arrival motion stage and the sliding motion stage. Therefore, the present invention provides a finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control method for information-physical systems under periodic DoS interference attacks and packet loss.

[0103] Figure 2 3 is a block diagram of a finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control system 300 based on an observer method according to an exemplary embodiment. The system is used for a finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control method based on an observer method. Figure 2The system includes a dynamic model building module 310, a mathematical modeling module 320, an observer design module 330, a sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller design module 340 and a sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control module 350. Among them:

[0104] A dynamic model building module 310 is used to build a dynamic model of a discrete cyber-physical system with parameter uncertainty and actuator failure;

[0105] Mathematical modeling module 320, used for performing mathematical modeling on periodic DoS interference attack and packet loss to obtain packet loss situation;

[0106] An observer design module 330 is used to design a state observer and a fault observer according to the packet loss situation and in combination with the dynamic model to obtain estimation information;

[0107] A sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller design module 340 is used to design a linear sliding surface based on the estimated information; and to design a sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller based on the linear sliding surface;

[0108] The sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control module 350 is used to perform finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control on discrete information-physical systems subject to periodic DoS interference attacks and packet loss based on the sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller.

[0109] Optionally, the dynamic model building module 310 is used to build a dynamic model of a discrete cyber-physical system with parameter uncertainty and actuator failure, and the state equation of the dynamic model is shown in the following formula (1):

[0110] (1)

[0111] in, Indicates the status signal, Represents the control input signal, Indicates the measurement output signal; Indicates an actuator failure. represents external disturbance; real matrix It means satisfying The bounded parameter uncertainty of satisfy ; and is a known constant matrix of appropriate dimension.

[0112] Optionally, the mathematical modeling module 320 is used to define the variable by the following formula (2): , describing the periodic DoS interference attack strategy:

[0113] (2)

[0114] in, is the number of cycles; when When , it indicates the attack dormancy time; when , represents the attack time in the nth cycle; let is the attacker's action cycle, is the duration of the silent period, where is a set of positive integers;

[0115] According to the periodic attack strategy of the DoS attacker, when the attacker is in a dormant state, only the random packet loss caused by the inherent factors of the wireless channel is considered. During the attack period, the DoS attacker selects the interference power to attack the wireless channel according to the total energy he has; therefore, when When the packet loss is caused by the inherent factors of the wireless channel, When the packet loss is caused by periodic DoS attacks.

[0116] make It indicates whether the observer can successfully receive the data packet under the influence of DoS attack and channel inherent factors as shown in the following formula (3):

[0117] (3)

[0118] Replace the lost measurement value with the latest received data to get the actual measurement value :

[0119] (4).

[0120] Optionally, an observer design module 330 is used to measure the actual value , construct the observer as follows:

[0121] (5)

[0122] in, yes The estimated value of yes An estimated value of is the state observer gain matrix to be determined, is the fault observer gain matrix to be determined.

[0123] Optionally, the sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller design module 340 is used to design a sliding surface function based on the state estimation of the information-physical system, design a reaching law based on the sliding surface function, and then design a finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control method based on the observer method.

[0124] Optionally, the sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller design module 340 is used to design a sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller as shown in the following formula (6):

[0125] (6)

[0126] in, .

[0127] In an embodiment of the present invention, a finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant security control problem of an information-physical system with periodic DoS interference attacks and packet loss is addressed. By injecting periodic high-energy interference signals into the wireless channel, the periodic attack strategy that affects data transmission is studied. Under the condition of limited energy, the packet loss problem caused by channel inherent factors and periodic DoS interference attacks is considered. On this basis, the finite-time reachability of the sliding surface in the approaching stage is analyzed using the proposed approaching law. In addition, the designed sliding mode fault-tolerant security control law can ensure that the obtained closed-loop system is randomly finite-time bounded in both the approaching stage and the sliding stage.

[0128] Figure 3 is a structural diagram of a finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control device based on an observer method provided by an embodiment of the present invention, such as Figure 3 As shown, the finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control device based on the observer method may include the above Figure 2 The finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control system based on the observer method is shown. Optionally, the finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control device 410 based on the observer method may include a first processor 2001 .

[0129] Optionally, the finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control device 410 based on the observer method may further include a memory 2002 and a transceiver 2003 .

[0130] The first processor 2001, the memory 2002 and the transceiver 2003 may be connected via a communication bus.

[0131] Combine the following Figure 3 The components of the finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control device 410 based on the observer method are specifically introduced:

[0132] The first processor 2001 is the control center of the finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control device 410 based on the observer method, and can be a processor or a general term for multiple processing elements. For example, the first processor 2001 is one or more central processing units (CPUs), or an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or one or more integrated circuits configured to implement the embodiment of the present invention, such as one or more microprocessors (digital signal processors, DSPs), or one or more field programmable gate arrays (field programmable gate arrays, FPGAs).

[0133] Optionally, the first processor 2001 may execute various functions of the finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control device 410 based on the observer method by running or executing a software program stored in the memory 2002 and calling data stored in the memory 2002 .

[0134] In a specific implementation, as an embodiment, the first processor 2001 may include one or more CPUs, such as Figure 3 CPU0 and CPU1 are shown in FIG.

[0135] In a specific implementation, as an embodiment, the finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control device 410 based on the observer method may also include multiple processors, such as Figure 3 The first processor 2001 and the second processor 2004 are shown in FIG. Each of these processors may be a single-core processor (single-CPU) or a multi-core processor (multi-CPU). The processor here may refer to one or more devices, circuits, and / or processing cores for processing data (e.g., computer program instructions).

[0136] The memory 2002 is used to store the software program for executing the solution of the present invention, and is controlled to be executed by the first processor 2001. The specific implementation method can refer to the above method embodiment, which will not be repeated here.

[0137] Optionally, the memory 2002 may be a read-only memory (ROM) or other types of static storage devices that can store static information and instructions, a random access memory (RAM) or other types of dynamic storage devices that can store information and instructions, or an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), a compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM) or other optical disc storage, optical disc storage (including compressed optical disc, laser disc, optical disc, digital versatile disc, Blu-ray disc, etc.), a magnetic disk storage medium or other magnetic storage device, or any other medium that can be used to carry or store the desired program code in the form of instructions or data structures and can be accessed by a computer, but is not limited thereto. The memory 2002 may be integrated with the first processor 2001, or may exist independently, and may be accessed through the interface circuit ( Figure 3 (not shown) is coupled to the first processor 2001, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present invention.

[0138] The transceiver 2003 is used to communicate with a network device or a terminal device.

[0139] Optionally, the transceiver 2003 may include a receiver and a transmitter ( Figure 3 The receiver is used to implement a receiving function, and the transmitter is used to implement a sending function.

[0140] Optionally, the transceiver 2003 may be integrated with the first processor 2001, or may exist independently, and communicate with the first processor 2001 through the interface circuit ( Figure 3 (not shown) is coupled to the first processor 2001, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present invention.

[0141] It should be noted that Figure 3 The structure of the finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control device 410 based on the observer method shown in the figure does not constitute a limitation on the router. The actual knowledge structure identification device may include more or fewer components than shown in the figure, or combine certain components, or arrange the components differently.

[0142] In addition, the technical effects of the finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control device 410 based on the observer method can refer to the technical effects of the finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control method based on the observer method described in the above method embodiment, and will not be repeated here.

[0143] It should be understood that the first processor 2001 in the embodiment of the present invention may be a central processing unit (CPU), and the processor may also be other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSP), application specific integrated circuits (ASIC), field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. A general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor or the processor may also be any conventional processor, etc.

[0144] It should also be understood that the memory in the embodiments of the present invention may be a volatile memory or a non-volatile memory, or may include both volatile and non-volatile memories. Among them, the non-volatile memory may be a read-only memory (ROM), a programmable read-only memory (PROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), or a flash memory. The volatile memory may be a random access memory (RAM), which is used as an external cache. By way of example and not limitation, many forms of random access memory (RAM) are available, such as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), double data rate synchronous dynamic random access memory (DDR SDRAM), enhanced synchronous dynamic random access memory (ESDRAM), synchronous link DRAM (SLDRAM), and direct rambus RAM (DR RAM).

[0145] The above embodiments can be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware (such as circuits), firmware or any other combination. When implemented by software, the above embodiments can be implemented in whole or in part in the form of a computer program product. The computer program product includes one or more computer instructions or computer programs. When the computer instructions or computer programs are loaded or executed on a computer, the process or function described in the embodiment of the present invention is generated in whole or in part. The computer can be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device. The computer instructions can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium. For example, the computer instructions can be transmitted from one website, computer, server or data center to another website, computer, server or data center by wired (such as infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.). The computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium that can be accessed by a computer or a data storage device such as a server or data center that contains one or more available media sets. The available medium can be a magnetic medium (for example, a floppy disk, a hard disk, a tape), an optical medium (for example, a DVD), or a semiconductor medium. The semiconductor medium can be a solid-state hard disk.

[0146] It should be understood that the term "and / or" in this article is only a description of the association relationship of associated objects, indicating that there can be three relationships. For example, A and / or B can represent: A exists alone, A and B exist at the same time, and B exists alone. A and B can be singular or plural. In addition, the character " / " in this article generally indicates that the associated objects before and after are in an "or" relationship, but it may also indicate an "and / or" relationship. Please refer to the context for specific understanding.

[0147] It should be understood that in various embodiments of the present invention, the size of the serial numbers of the above-mentioned processes does not mean the order of execution. The execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of the present invention.

[0148] Those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that the units and algorithm steps of each example described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are performed in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Professional and technical personnel can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered to be beyond the scope of the present invention.

[0149] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed on multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment.

[0150] In addition, each functional unit in each embodiment of the present invention may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit.

[0151] If the functions are implemented in the form of software functional units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or the part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product, which is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions for enabling a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the methods described in various embodiments of the present invention.

[0152] The above is only a specific embodiment of the present invention, but the protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any person skilled in the art can easily think of changes or substitutions within the technical scope disclosed by the present invention, which should be included in the protection scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention should be based on the protection scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control method based on an observer method, characterized in that: The method comprises: S1. Build dynamic models of discrete cyber-physical systems with parameter uncertainties and actuator failures; S2. Perform mathematical modeling for periodic DoS interference attacks and packet loss to obtain packet loss information; S3. According to the packet loss situation, a state observer and a fault observer are designed in combination with the dynamic model to obtain estimation information; S4, designing a linear sliding surface based on the estimated information; designing a sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller based on the linear sliding surface; S5. Based on the sliding mode fault-tolerant security controller, a finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant security control is performed on a discrete information-physical system with periodic DoS interference attacks and packet loss.

2. The finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control method based on the observer method according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In S1, a dynamic model of a discrete cyber-physical system with parameter uncertainty and actuator failure is established, including: A dynamic model of a discrete cyber-physical system with parameter uncertainty and actuator failure is established. The state equation of the dynamic model is shown in the following formula (1): （1） in, Indicates the status signal, Represents the control input signal, Indicates the measurement output signal; Indicates an actuator failure. represents external disturbance; real matrix It means satisfying The bounded parameter uncertainty of satisfy ; and is a known constant matrix of appropriate dimension.

3. The finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control method based on the observer method according to claim 2 is characterized in that: In S2, mathematical modeling is performed for periodic DoS interference attacks and packet loss to obtain packet loss conditions, including: The variable is defined by the following formula (2): , describing the periodic DoS interference attack strategy: (2) in, is the number of cycles; when When , it indicates the attack dormancy time; when , represents the attack time in the nth cycle; let is the attacker's action cycle, is the duration of the silent period, where is a set of positive integers; According to the periodic attack strategy of the DoS attacker, when the attacker is in a dormant state, only the random packet loss caused by the inherent factors of the wireless channel is considered. During the attack period, the DoS attacker selects the interference power to attack the wireless channel according to the total energy he has; therefore, when When the packet loss is caused by the inherent factors of the wireless channel, When, the packet loss is caused by periodic DoS attacks; make It indicates whether the observer can successfully receive the data packet under the influence of DoS attack and channel inherent factors as shown in the following formula (3): (3) Replace the lost measurement value with the latest received data to get the actual measurement value : (4)。 4. The finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control method based on the observer method according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The S3, according to the packet loss situation, designs a state observer and a fault observer in combination with the dynamic model to obtain estimation information, including: Based on actual measurements , construct the observer as follows: (5) in, yes The estimated value of yes An estimated value of is the state observer gain matrix to be determined, is the fault observer gain matrix to be determined.

5. The finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control method based on the observer method according to claim 4 is characterized in that: In S4, a linear sliding surface is designed based on the estimated information, including: A sliding surface function is designed according to the state estimation of the information-physical system, and a reaching law is designed according to the sliding surface function, and then a finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control method based on an observer method is designed.

6. The finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control method based on the observer method according to claim 5 is characterized in that: In S4, designing a sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller based on the linear sliding mode surface includes: The design of sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller is shown in equation (6): (6) in, .

7. A finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control system based on an observer method, wherein the finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control system based on an observer method is used to implement the finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control method based on an observer method as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that: The system comprises: Dynamic model building module, used to build dynamic models of discrete cyber-physical systems with parameter uncertainties and actuator failures; Mathematical modeling module, used to perform mathematical modeling on periodic DoS interference attacks and packet loss to obtain packet loss information; An observer design module is used to design a state observer and a fault observer according to the packet loss situation and in combination with the dynamic model to obtain estimation information; A sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller design module is used to design a linear sliding surface based on the estimated information; and to design a sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller based on the linear sliding surface; The sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control module is used to perform finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control on discrete information-physical systems with periodic DoS interference attacks and packet loss based on the sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller.

8. A finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller based on an observer method, characterized in that: The finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety controller based on the observer method is used to implement the finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control method based on the observer method as described in any one of claims 1-6.

9. A finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control device based on an observer method, characterized in that: The finite-time sliding mode fault-tolerant safety control device based on the observer method comprises: processor; A memory having computer-readable instructions stored thereon, wherein when the computer-readable instructions are executed by the processor, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6 is implemented.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores program codes, which can be called by a processor to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6.

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