Method, apparatus and computer program product for wireless communication

Abstract

A method, an apparatus, and a computer program product for wireless communication are provided. The method includes: receiving, by a wireless communication terminal, a broadcast signal from a wireless communication node; and transmitting, by the wireless communication terminal to the wireless communication node, a secure data packet encrypted based on at least one of the broadcast signal and / or locally stored information.

Description

[0001] This document relates generally to wireless communications, and more particularly to fifth generation (5G) or sixth generation (6G) wireless communications.

[0002] Connectionless transmission is a wireless transmission technology that directly transmits data packets in an idle or inactive state. It can reduce the transmission overhead of occasional small data packets. However, before transmission, the security mechanism needs to establish some security-related contexts, which limits the practical application of connectionless transmission.

[0003] The present disclosure relates to methods, apparatus, and computer program products for secure communications.

[0004] One aspect of the present disclosure relates to a wireless communication method. In an embodiment, the wireless communication method includes: receiving a broadcast signal from a wireless communication node by a wireless communication terminal; and transmitting a secure data packet encrypted based on at least one of the following to the wireless communication node by the wireless communication terminal: the broadcast signal and / or locally stored information.

[0005] Another aspect of the present disclosure relates to a wireless communication method. In an embodiment, the wireless communication method includes: transmitting a broadcast signal by a wireless communication node to a wireless communication terminal; and receiving, by the wireless communication node, a secure data packet encrypted based on at least one of the following from the wireless communication terminal: the broadcast signal / or locally stored information.

[0006] Another aspect of the present disclosure relates to a wireless communication method. In an embodiment, the wireless communication method includes: transmitting, by a core network node to a wireless communication node, information for decrypting a security data packet, wherein the security data packet includes a ciphertext encrypted based on at least one of the following: a broadcast signal and / or locally stored information, and wherein the information includes at least one of the following: an encryption key for encryption of the ciphertext or an integrity protection key of a message authentication code (MAC) for the ciphertext, a subscription permanent identifier (SUPI), plaintext decrypted from the ciphertext by a wireless communication terminal, or a positive or negative confirmation indicating whether the security data packet is successfully demodulated.

[0007] Another aspect of the present disclosure relates to a wireless communication terminal. In an embodiment, the wireless communication terminal includes a communication unit and a processor. The processor is configured to: receive a broadcast signal from a wireless communication node; and transmit to the wireless communication node a secure data packet encrypted based on at least one of: the broadcast signal and / or locally stored information.

[0008] Another aspect of the present disclosure relates to a wireless communication node. In an embodiment, the wireless communication node includes a communication unit and a processor. The processor is configured to: transmit a broadcast signal to a wireless communication terminal; and receive a secure data packet encrypted based on at least one of the following from the wireless communication terminal: the broadcast signal and / or locally stored information.

[0009] Another aspect of the present disclosure relates to a core network node. In an embodiment, the wireless communication node includes a communication unit and a processor. The processor is configured to: transmit information for decrypting a security data packet to the wireless communication node, wherein the security data packet includes a ciphertext encrypted based on at least one of the following: a broadcast signal and / or locally stored information, and wherein the information includes at least one of the following: an encryption key for encryption of the ciphertext or an integrity protection key for a message authentication code MAC for the ciphertext, a subscription permanent identifier SUPI, a plaintext decrypted from the ciphertext by a wireless communication terminal, or a positive confirmation or a negative confirmation indicating whether the security data packet is successfully demodulated.

[0010] Various embodiments may preferably implement the following features.

[0011] Preferably, encryption is performed without using context information from earlier transmissions.

[0012] Preferably, the broadcast signal includes at least one of the following: a synchronization signal, a resource allocation indication, a paging message or a connectionless security parameter.

[0013] Preferably, the security data packet includes at least one of the following: an identifier of the wireless communication terminal, a ciphertext, a message authentication code (MAC) of the ciphertext, a public key of the wireless communication terminal, a subscription concealed identifier (SUCI), SUCI-MAC (Subscription Concealed Identifier Message Authentication Code) or a home network (HN) public key indicator.

[0014] Preferably, the identifier of the wireless communication terminal includes at least one of the following: a subscription permanent identifier SUPI, SUCI, a value of ng-5G-S-TMSI-Part1 (next generation-5G-Shorten-Temporary MobileSubscriber Identity-Part1, the first part of the next generation 5G short temporary mobile subscriber identity), a random number, or a resume identity (resumeIdentity) value.

[0015] Preferably, said secure data packet has integrity protection based on at least one of: said broadcast signal and / or said locally stored information.

[0016] Preferably, at least one of an encryption key used for encryption of the ciphertext or an integrity protection key used for MAC of the ciphertext is derived based on a long-term key and a connectionless security parameter.

[0017] Preferably, the shared key is generated based on the public key of the wireless communication terminal, the private key of the wireless communication terminal and the HN public key, and wherein at least one of the encryption key for encryption of the ciphertext or the integrity protection key for the MAC of the ciphertext is derived based on the shared key.

[0018] Preferably, the ciphertext in the security data packet is encrypted based on the HN public key.

[0019] Preferably, the pair of public key and private key of the wireless communication terminal is generated for encryption of ciphertext.

[0020] Preferably, the wireless communication terminal receives a positive acknowledgement or a negative acknowledgement indicating whether the safety data packet was successfully demodulated.

[0021] Preferably, the safety data packet is transmitted by backscattering the excitation signal.

[0022] Preferably, the wireless communication node transmits at least one of the following to the core network node: an identifier of the wireless communication terminal, a connectionless security parameter, the security data packet, a public key of the wireless communication terminal, a subscription hidden identifier SUCI, or a subscription hidden identifier-message authentication code SUCI-MAC.

[0023] Preferably, the wireless communication node receives at least one of the following from the core network node: an encryption key used for encryption of a ciphertext, an integrity protection key used for a MAC of the ciphertext, a subscription permanent identifier SUPI, a plaintext decrypted from the ciphertext, or a positive confirmation or a negative confirmation indicating whether the security data packet is successfully demodulated.

[0024] Preferably, the wireless communication node receives connectionless security parameters from a core network node.

[0025] Preferably, the encryption key received from the core network node is used to decrypt the ciphertext received from the wireless communication terminal.

[0026] Preferably, the integrity protection key received from the core network node is used to generate a MAC for performing integrity check on the ciphertext received from the wireless communication terminal.

[0027] Preferably, the wireless communication node transmits a positive confirmation or a negative confirmation to the wireless communication terminal indicating whether the security data packet is successfully demodulated in response to receiving another positive confirmation or a negative confirmation from the core network node, receiving the plaintext of the ciphertext of the security data packet, or the ciphertext of the security data packet being successfully demodulated based on the encryption key received from the core network node.

[0028] Preferably, the core network node receives at least one of the following: an identifier of the wireless communication terminal, a connectionless security parameter, the security data packet, a public key of the wireless communication terminal, a subscription hidden identifier SUCI, or SUCI-MAC.

[0029] Preferably, the core network node derives at least one of the following according to the long-term key and the connectionless security parameter: the encryption key used for encryption of the ciphertext or the integrity protection key used for MAC of the ciphertext.

[0030] Preferably, the core network node derives a shared key based on the home network HN public key, the HN private key and the public key of the wireless communication terminal, and wherein the shared key is used to derive at least one of the following: the encryption key used for encryption of the ciphertext or the integrity protection key used for the MAC of the ciphertext.

[0031] Preferably, the shared key is used to derive keys to check the integrity of the SUCI and to decrypt the SUCI.

[0032] Preferably, the core network node decrypts the ciphertext according to the HN private key.

[0033] Preferably, the locally stored information includes at least one of the following: information stored in a universal subscriber identity module (USIM), a transmission session count maintained by both the wireless communication terminal and the core network, or information that the wireless communication terminal can obtain in an idle state or an inactive state.

[0034] The exemplary embodiments disclosed herein are intended to provide features that will become apparent by reference to the following description when combined with the accompanying drawings. According to various embodiments, exemplary systems, methods, devices, and computer program products are disclosed herein. However, it should be understood that these embodiments are presented by way of example and not limitation, and it will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art who have read this disclosure that various modifications may be made to the disclosed embodiments while remaining within the scope of this disclosure.

[0035] Therefore, the present disclosure is not limited to the exemplary embodiments and applications described and illustrated herein. In addition, the specific order and / or hierarchy of steps in the methods disclosed herein are merely exemplary methods. Based on design preferences, the specific order or hierarchy of steps of the disclosed methods or processes can be rearranged while remaining within the scope of the present disclosure. Therefore, it will be understood by those of ordinary skill in the art that the methods and techniques disclosed herein present various steps or actions in an example order, and unless otherwise expressly stated, the present disclosure is not limited to the specific order or hierarchy presented.

[0036] The above and other aspects and embodiments thereof are described in more detail in the drawings, the description and the claims.

[0037] Figure 1 A diagram illustrating secure communication according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown.

[0038] Figure 2 A diagram showing a UE (user equipment) identifier according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown.

[0039] Figure 3 A diagram illustrating secure communication according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown.

[0040] Figure 4 A diagram illustrating secure communication according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown.

[0041] Figure 5 A diagram illustrating secure communication according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown.

[0042] Figure 6 A diagram illustrating secure communication according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown.

[0043] Figure 7 A diagram illustrating secure communication according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown.

[0044] Figure 8 A diagram illustrating secure communication according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown.

[0045] Fig. 9 A schematic diagram of a wireless communication terminal according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown.

[0046] Fig.10 A schematic diagram of a wireless communication node according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown.

[0047] It is expected that the IoT (Internet of Things) of the future will have a large number of occasional short data packet transmissions, which require a large amount of access and scheduling resources. In some embodiments, a contention-based grant-free technology can be used to directly transmit short data packets without establishing a connection or context, which reduces the overhead of scheduling. However, security requirements limit the efficiency of connectionless transmission, because authentication and context information are still required before transmission. Therefore, in some methods, it is necessary to establish a security-related context before a secure connectionless transmission, which makes the efficiency of connectionless transmission lower. An embodiment of the present invention provides a secure connectionless transmission.

[0048] Example 1

[0049] Figure 1 FIG. 1 shows a diagram of secure communication according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. Figure 1 As shown, the process includes the following steps.

[0050] 1. The BS (base station) transmits broadcast information to idle or inactive UEs. The broadcast information includes at least one of the following: a synchronization signal, a resource allocation indication, and / or a connectionless security parameter. The connectionless security parameter may include a random number used as a session identifier.

[0051] 2. The UE uses the long-term key K and the received connectionless security parameters to generate the connectionless encryption key K CLenc and the integrity protection key K CLint . K CLenc is used to encrypt plaintext (or raw data bits) into ciphertext, K CLint is used to generate a MAC (message authentication code) for integrity protection. The UE transmits a data packet including a UE identifier, a ciphertext and a MAC to the BS. In some embodiments, Figure 2 As shown, the UE identifier may include at least one of the following:

[0052] SUPI (Subscription Persistent Identifier);

[0053] The combination of UE public key, SUCI (Subscription Hidden Identifier) ​​and SUCI-MAC (Subscription Hidden Identifier-Message Authentication Code);

[0054] The value of ng-5G-S-TMSI-Part1;

[0055] Random numbers; and / or

[0056] The resumeIdentity value.

[0057] In an embodiment, the UE identifier may not include the UE public key if the UE public key is placed in another field of the data packet.

[0058] In an embodiment, when the UE is not in an inactive state, the UE identifier may not include a recovery flag.

[0059] 3. The BS transmits the UE identifier and connectionless security parameters to the core network.

[0060] 4. The core network obtains the long-term key K (e.g., from user data management (UDM)) based on the UE identifier, and generates a connectionless encryption key K with the UE. CLenc and the integrity protection key K CLint The connectionless encryption key K is generated in the same way CLenc and the integrity protection key K CLint The core network transmits K to the BS CLenc and K CLint .

[0061] 5.BS uses K CLint to regenerate the MAC and check whether the regenerated MAC is the same as the MAC received from the UE. If the regenerated MAC is the same as the MAC received from the UE, the BS uses K CLenc The ciphertext received from the UE is decrypted to obtain the plaintext. In some embodiments, a CRC (cyclic redundancy code) can be used to further check whether the plaintext is valid. If the plaintext is successfully decrypted or demodulated, the BS sends an ACK (positive acknowledgement) to the UE. Otherwise, the BS sends a NACK (negative acknowledgement) to the UE. In some embodiments, the operation of sending an ACK or NACK can be omitted.

[0062] In some embodiments, the UE may also be a backscattering node, which backscatters the excitation signal to transmit a data packet.

[0063] Example 2

[0064] Figure 3 FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram showing another process according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. Figure 3 As shown, the procedure includes the following steps.

[0065] 1. The core network transmits a paging message and connectionless security parameters to the BS. The connectionless security parameters may include a random number used as a session identifier.

[0066] 2. The BS transmits broadcast information to idle or inactive UEs. The broadcast information includes at least one of the following: a synchronization signal, a resource allocation indication, a paging message, and / or a connectionless security parameter.

[0067] 3. The UE uses the long-term key K and the received connectionless security parameters to generate the connectionless encryption key K CLenc and the integrity protection key K CLint . K CLenc is used to encrypt plaintext (or raw data bits) into ciphertext, and K CLint It is used to generate a MAC (Message Authentication Code) for integrity protection. The UE transmits a data packet including a UE identifier, a ciphertext and a MAC to the BS. The UE identifier can be determined by referring to the above embodiments and will not be described in detail herein.

[0068] 4. The BS forwards the UE identifier to the core network.

[0069] 5. The core network obtains the long-term key K based on the UE identifier and generates a connectionless encryption key K with the UE CLenc and the integrity protection key K CLint The connectionless encryption key K is generated in the same way CLenc and the integrity protection key K CLint The core network transmits K to the BS CLenc and K CLint .

[0070] 6.BS uses K CLint to regenerate the MAC and check whether the regenerated MAC is the same as the MAC received from the UE. If the regenerated MAC is the same as the MAC received from the UE, the BS uses K CLenc The ciphertext received from the UE is decrypted to obtain the plaintext. In some embodiments, a CRC (cyclic redundancy code) can be used to further check whether the plaintext is valid. If the plaintext is successfully decrypted or demodulated, the BS sends an ACK (positive acknowledgement) to the UE. Otherwise, the BS sends a NACK (negative acknowledgement) to the UE. In some embodiments, the operation of sending an ACK or NACK can be omitted.

[0071] In some embodiments, the UE may also be a backscattering node, which backscatters the excitation signal to transmit a data packet.

[0072] Example 3

[0073] Figure 4FIG. 1 shows a diagram of secure communication according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. Figure 4 As shown, the process includes the following steps.

[0074] Steps 1 to 3 in Example 3 are the same as Steps 1 to 3 in Example 1 and will not be repeated herein.

[0075] 4. The core network obtains the long-term key K based on the UE identifier and generates a connectionless encryption key K with the UE CLenc and the integrity protection key K CLint The connectionless encryption key K is generated in the same way CLenc and the integrity protection key K CLint The core network uses K CLint To regenerate the MAC, and check whether the regenerated MAC is the same as the MAC received from the UE. If the regenerated MAC is the same as the MAC received from the UE, the core network uses K CLenc The ciphertext received from the UE is decrypted to obtain the plaintext. In some embodiments, a CRC (cyclic redundancy code) can be used to further check whether the plaintext is valid. If the plaintext is successfully decrypted or demodulated, the core network sends an ACK to the BS. Otherwise, the core network sends a NACK to the BS. In some embodiments, the operation of sending an ACK or NACK can be omitted.

[0076] 5. If the core network transmits ACK to the BS, the BS transmits ACK to the UE. If the core network transmits NACK to the BS, the BS transmits NACK to the UE.

[0077] In some embodiments, the UE may also be a backscattering node, which backscatters the excitation signal to transmit a data packet.

[0078] Example 4

[0079] Figure 5 FIG. 1 shows a diagram of secure communication according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. Figure 5 As shown, the process includes the following steps.

[0080] 1. The BS transmits broadcast information to idle or inactive UEs. The broadcast information includes at least one of the following: a synchronization signal and / or a resource allocation indication.

[0081] 2. The UE generates a pair of UE public key and UE private key. The UE uses the UE public key, UE private key and home network (HN) public key to generate a shared key. The shared key is used to derive the encryption key K CLenc and the integrity protection key K CLint . K CLenc is used to encrypt plaintext (or raw data bits) into ciphertext, KCLint It is used to generate a MAC (Message Authentication Code) for integrity protection. The UE transmits a data packet including the UE public key, ciphertext and MAC to the BS.

[0082] 3. BS forwards the UE public key to the core network.

[0083] 4. The core network uses the home network public key, home network private key and UE public key to generate a shared key. The shared key is used to derive the encryption key K CLenc and the integrity protection key K CLint The core network transmits K to the BS CLenc and K CLint .

[0084] 5.BS uses K CLint to regenerate the MAC and check whether the regenerated MAC is the same as the MAC received from the UE. If the regenerated MAC is the same as the MAC received from the UE, the BS uses K CLenc The ciphertext received from the UE is decrypted to obtain the plaintext. In some embodiments, a CRC (cyclic redundancy code) can be used to further check whether the plaintext is valid. If the plaintext is successfully decrypted or demodulated, the BS sends an ACK (positive acknowledgement) to the UE. Otherwise, the BS sends a NACK (negative acknowledgement) to the UE. In some embodiments, the operation of sending an ACK or NACK can be omitted.

[0085] In some embodiments, the UE may also be a backscattering node, which backscatters the excitation signal to transmit a data packet.

[0086] Example 5

[0087] Figure 6 FIG. 1 shows a diagram of secure communication according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. Figure 6 As shown, the process includes the following steps.

[0088] 1. The BS transmits broadcast information to idle or inactive UEs. The broadcast information includes at least one of the following: a synchronization signal and / or a resource allocation indication.

[0089] 2. The UE generates a pair of UE public key and UE private key. The UE uses the UE public key, UE private key and home network public key to generate a shared key. The shared key is used to derive the encryption key K CLenc and the integrity protection key K CLint . K CLenc is used to encrypt plaintext (or raw data bits) into ciphertext, K CLintIt is used to generate MAC (Message Authentication Code) for integrity protection. The UE transmits a data packet including the UE public key, SUCI, SUCI-MAC, ciphertext and MAC to the BS.

[0090] 3. The BS forwards the UE public key, SUCI and SUCI-MAC to the core network.

[0091] 4. The core network uses the home network public key, home network private key and UE public key to generate a shared key. The shared key is used to derive the key to check the integrity of the SUCI and to decrypt the SUCI. The shared key is also used to derive the encryption key K CLenc and the integrity protection key K CLint The core network transmits K to the BS CLenc , K CLint and SUPI.

[0092] 5.BS uses K CLint to regenerate the MAC and check whether the regenerated MAC is the same as the MAC received from the UE. If the regenerated MAC is the same as the MAC received from the UE, the BS uses K CLenc The ciphertext received from the UE is decrypted to obtain the plaintext. In some embodiments, a CRC (cyclic redundancy code) can be used to further check whether the plaintext is valid. If the plaintext is successfully decrypted or demodulated, the BS sends an ACK (positive acknowledgement) to the UE. Otherwise, the BS sends a NACK (negative acknowledgement) to the UE. In some embodiments, the operation of sending an ACK or NACK can be omitted.

[0093] In some embodiments, the UE may also be a backscattering node, which backscatters the excitation signal to transmit a data packet.

[0094] Example 6

[0095] Figure 7 FIG. 1 shows a diagram of secure communication according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. Figure 7 As shown, the process includes the following steps.

[0096] 1. The BS transmits broadcast information to idle or inactive UEs. The broadcast information includes at least one of the following: a synchronization signal and / or a resource allocation indication.

[0097] 2. The UE encrypts the plaintext (or raw data bits) into ciphertext using the home network public key. The UE transmits a data packet including the home network public key indicator and the ciphertext to the BS. In some embodiments, the home network public key indicator is optional.

[0098] 3. BS forwards the data packet to the core network.

[0099] 4. The core network decrypts the ciphertext into plaintext using the home network private key. In some embodiments, a CRC (cyclic redundancy code) can be used to further check whether the plaintext is valid. If the plaintext is successfully decrypted or demodulated, the core network sends an ACK to the BS. Otherwise, the core network sends a NACK to the BS. In some embodiments, the operation of sending an ACK or NACK can be omitted.

[0100] 5. If the core network transmits ACK to the BS, the BS transmits ACK to the UE. If the core network transmits NACK to the BS, the BS transmits NACK to the UE.

[0101] In some embodiments, the UE may also be a backscattering node, which backscatters the excitation signal to transmit a data packet.

[0102] Example 7

[0103] Figure 8 FIG. 1 shows a diagram of secure communication according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. Figure 8 As shown, the process includes the following steps.

[0104] 1. The BS transmits broadcast information to idle or inactive UEs. The broadcast information includes at least one of the following: a synchronization signal and / or a resource allocation indication.

[0105] 2. The UE encrypts the plaintext (or original data bits) into ciphertext using the home network public key. The UE transmits a data packet including the UE identifier and the ciphertext to the BS. The UE identifier can be determined by referring to the above embodiments and will not be described in detail herein.

[0106] 3. BS forwards the data packet to the core network.

[0107] 4. The core network uses the home network private key to decrypt the ciphertext into plaintext. The core network transmits the plaintext to the BS. In some embodiments, this transmission operation can be omitted.

[0108] 5. In the BS, CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Code) can be used to further check whether the plaintext is valid. If the plaintext is successfully decrypted or demodulated, the BS sends an ACK to the UE. Otherwise, the BS sends a NACK to the UE. In some embodiments, the operation of sending an ACK or NACK can be omitted.

[0109] In some embodiments, the UE may also be a backscattering node, which backscatters the excitation signal to transmit a data packet.

[0110] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, a wireless communication method performed by a user equipment (UE) is provided. The method includes: receiving a broadcast signal including at least one of the following from a base station (BS): a synchronization signal, a resource allocation indication, a paging message and / or a connectionless security parameter; generating an encrypted security data packet without using context information in an earlier transmission or using only broadcast information; and transmitting the security data packet to the BS.

[0111] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the security data packet includes information other than the UE identifier.

[0112] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the security data packet also has integrity protection without using context information in earlier transmissions or only using broadcast information.

[0113] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, a key derivation process is provided: before generating a security data packet, an encryption key K is derived from a long-term key K and a connectionless security parameter. CLenc and the integrity protection key K CLint at least one of .

[0114] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, a key derivation process is provided: before generating a security data packet, the UE uses the UE public key, the UE private key and the home network public key to generate a shared key, and the shared key is used to derive the encryption key K CLenc and the integrity protection key K CLint at least one of .

[0115] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the encryption uses a home network public key.

[0116] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the secure transmission data includes at least one of the following: a home network public key indicator, a UE public key indicator and / or a UE identifier. The UE identifier may be a SUPI, a SUCI, an ng-5G-S-TMSI-Part1, a random number, or a recovery identifier.

[0117] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the wireless communication method includes: generating a UE public key and a private key pair before generating transmission data.

[0118] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the wireless communication method includes: monitoring a positive acknowledgement or a negative acknowledgement after transmitting data.

[0119] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the UE transmits a data packet by backscattering an excitation signal.

[0120] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, a wireless communication method includes: receiving a broadcast signal from a wireless communication node (e.g., BS) by a wireless communication terminal (e.g., UE); and transmitting a secure data packet encrypted based on at least one of the following to the wireless communication node by the wireless communication terminal: the broadcast signal and / or locally stored information.

[0121] In an embodiment, the encrypted security data packet may be the above-mentioned data packet with ciphertext. In an embodiment, the locally stored information includes at least one of the following: information stored in a universal subscriber identity module (USIM), a transmission session count maintained by both the wireless communication terminal and the core network, and / or information that the wireless communication terminal can obtain in an idle state or in an inactive state. In an embodiment, the locally stored information may be the above-mentioned long-term key, UE public key, UE private key, or HN public key.

[0122] In an embodiment, by using the above wireless communication method, encryption of a secure data packet may be performed without using context information from earlier transmissions.

[0123] In an embodiment, the secure data packet may have integrity protection (eg, the MAC described above). In an embodiment, the integrity protection is also performed based on at least one of: a broadcast signal and / or locally stored information.

[0124] In an embodiment, by using the above wireless communication method, integrity protection of a secure data packet may be performed without using context information from earlier transmissions.

[0125] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, a wireless communication method includes: transmitting a broadcast signal by a wireless communication node to a wireless communication terminal; and receiving, by the wireless communication node, a secure data packet encrypted based on at least one of the following from the wireless communication terminal: the broadcast signal and / or locally stored information.

[0126] The details in this regard can be determined by referring to the above embodiments.

[0127] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, a wireless communication method includes: transmitting information for decrypting a security data packet by a core network node to a wireless communication node, wherein the security data packet includes a ciphertext encrypted based on at least one of the following: a broadcast signal and / or locally stored information, and wherein the information includes at least one of the following: an encryption key used for encrypting the ciphertext or an integrity protection key of a message authentication code MAC used for the ciphertext, a subscription permanent identifier (SUPI), plaintext decrypted from the ciphertext by a wireless communication terminal, or a positive confirmation or negative confirmation indicating whether the security data packet is successfully demodulated.

[0128] In an embodiment, the core network node receives at least one of the following: an identifier of the wireless communication terminal, a connectionless security parameter, a security data packet, a public key of the wireless communication terminal, a subscription hidden identifier SUCI or SUCI-MAC (ie, MAC of SUCI).

[0129] The details in this regard can be determined by referring to the above embodiments.

[0130] Fig. 9 A schematic diagram of a wireless communication terminal 30 (e.g., a terminal node or terminal device) according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is provided. The wireless communication terminal 30 may be a user equipment (UE), a remote UE, a relay UE, a mobile phone, a laptop computer, a tablet computer, an e-book, or a portable computer system, and is not limited thereto. The wireless communication terminal 30 may include a processor 300 such as a microprocessor or an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a storage unit 310, and a communication unit 320. The storage unit 310 may be any data storage device storing program code 312, and the program code 312 may be accessed and executed by the processor 300. Embodiments of the storage code 312 include but are not limited to a subscriber identity module (Subscriber Identity Module, SIM), a read-only memory (Read-Only Memory, ROM), a flash memory, a random access memory (Random-Access Memory, RAM), a hard disk, and an optical data storage device. The communication unit 320 may be a transceiver and is used to send and receive signals (e.g., messages or data packets) according to the processing results of the processor 300. In one embodiment, the communication unit 320 sends and receives signals via at least one antenna 322.

[0131] In an embodiment, the storage unit 310 and the program code 312 may be omitted, and the processor 300 may include a storage unit having stored program code.

[0132] The processor 300 may implement any of the steps in the exemplary embodiments on the wireless communication terminal 30 , for example, by executing the program code 312 .

[0133] The communication unit 320 may be a transceiver. Alternatively or additionally, the communication unit 320 may combine a transmitting unit and a receiving unit configured to transmit and receive signals to and from a wireless communication node, respectively.

[0134] In some embodiments, the wireless communication terminal 30 may be used to perform the above-mentioned UE operations. In some embodiments, the processor 300 and the communication unit 320 perform the above-mentioned operations in cooperation. For example, the processor 300 performs the operations and sends or receives signals, messages and / or information through the communication unit 320.

[0135] Fig.10 A schematic diagram of a wireless communication node 40 (e.g., a network device) according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is provided. The wireless communication node 40 may be a satellite, a base station (BS), a gNB (next generation NodeB), a gNB-DU (distributed unit), a gNB-CU (centralized unit), a network entity, a Mobility Management Entity (MME), a Serving Gateway (S-GW), a Packet Data Network (PDN) Gateway (P-GW), a Radio Access Network (RAN), a Next Generation RAN (NG-RAN), a data network, a core network, a communication node in a core network, or a Radio Network Controller (RNC), and is not limited herein. In addition, the wireless communication node 40 may include (execute) at least one network function, such as access and mobility management function (AMF), session management function (SMF), user place function (UPF), policy control function (PCF), application function (AF), etc. The wireless communication node 40 may include a processor 400 (such as a microprocessor or ASIC), a storage unit 410, and a communication unit 420. The storage unit 410 may be any data storage device that stores program code 412 accessed and executed by the processor 400. Examples of the storage unit 412 include, but are not limited to, a SIM, a ROM, a flash memory, a RAM, a hard disk, and an optical data storage device. The communication unit 420 may be a transceiver and is used to transmit and receive signals (e.g., messages or data packets) according to the processing results of the processor 400. In an example, the communication unit 420 transmits and receives signals via at least one antenna 422.

[0136] In an embodiment, the storage unit 410 and the program code 412 may be omitted. The processor 400 may include a storage unit having stored program code.

[0137] Processor 400 may implement any of the steps described in the exemplary embodiments on wireless communication node 40 , for example, via executing program code 412 .

[0138] The communication unit 420 may be a transceiver. Alternatively or additionally, the communication unit 420 may combine a sending unit and a receiving unit configured to send signals, messages or information to a wireless communication node or a wireless communication terminal and receive signals, messages or information from a wireless communication node or a wireless communication terminal, respectively.

[0139] In some embodiments, the wireless communication node 40 may be used to perform the operations of the BS or core network (e.g., core network node) described above. In some embodiments, the processor 400 and the communication unit 420 perform the operations described above in collaboration. For example, the processor 400 performs the operations and sends or receives signals through the communication unit 420.

[0140] Although various embodiments of the present disclosure have been described above, it should be understood that these embodiments are presented only by way of example, and not by way of limitation. Similarly, each diagram may depict an example architecture or configuration, and these example architectures or configurations are provided to enable those of ordinary skill in the art to understand the exemplary features and functions of the present disclosure. However, these people will understand that the present disclosure is not limited to the example architectures or configurations shown, but can be implemented using various alternative architectures and configurations. In addition, as will be understood by those of ordinary skill in the art, one or more features of an embodiment may be combined with one or more features of another embodiment described herein. Therefore, the breadth and scope of the present disclosure should not be limited by any of the above-described exemplary embodiments.

[0141] It should also be understood that any reference to an element using names such as "first", "second" etc. herein does not generally limit the quantity or order of these elements. Rather, these names may be used herein as a convenient means of distinguishing two or more elements or two or more instances of an element. Therefore, reference to a first element and a second element does not mean that only two elements are used, or that the first element must be before the second element in some way.

[0142] In addition, it should be understood by those skilled in the art that various different technologies and techniques may be used to represent information and signals. For example, data, instructions, commands, information, signals, bits and symbols such as those referenced in the above description may be represented by voltage, current, electromagnetic waves, magnetic fields or magnetic particles, optical fields or optical particles, or any combination thereof.

[0143] Those skilled in the art should also understand that any of the various illustrative logical blocks, units, processors, means, circuits, methods, and functions described in conjunction with the various aspects disclosed herein may be implemented by electronic hardware (e.g., digital implementations, analog implementations, or a combination of the two), firmware, various forms of programs or design codes containing instructions (for convenience, may be referred to herein as "software" or "software units"), or any combination of these technologies.

[0144] In order to clearly illustrate this interchangeability of hardware, firmware and software, various illustrative components, blocks, units, circuits and steps are generally described above according to their functions. Whether this function is implemented in hardware, firmware or software or a combination of these technologies depends on the specific application and the design constraints imposed on the overall system. The technician can implement the described functions in various ways for each specific application, but such implementation decisions will not lead to deviations from the scope of this disclosure. According to various embodiments, processors, devices, components, circuits, structures, machines, units, etc. can be configured to perform one or more functions in the functions described herein. As used herein with respect to a specified operation or function, the term "configured to" or "configured for" refers to a processor, device, component, circuit, structure, machine, unit, etc. that is physically constructed, programmed and / or arranged to perform a specified operation or function.

[0145] Further, it should be understood by those skilled in the art that the various illustrative logic blocks, units, devices, components and circuits described herein may be implemented in or performed by an integrated circuit (IC), which may include a general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor (DSP), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (FPGA) or other programmable logic device or any combination thereof. The logic blocks, units and circuits may also include antennas and / or transceivers to communicate with various components within a network or within a device. The general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor, but alternatively, the processor may be any conventional processor, controller or state machine. The processor may also be implemented as a combination of computing devices, for example, a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, a combination of multiple microprocessors, a combination of one or more microprocessors combined with a DSP core, or a combination of any other suitable configurations for performing the functions described herein. If implemented in software, these functions may be stored as one or more instructions or codes on a computer-readable medium. Therefore, the steps of the method or algorithm disclosed herein may be implemented as software stored on a computer-readable medium.

[0146] Computer-readable media include computer storage media and communication media, including any media that can transfer a computer program or code from one location to another. Storage media can be any available media that a computer can access. For example, but not limited to, such computer-readable media can include RAM, ROM, EEPROM, CD-ROM or other optical disk storage devices, magnetic disk storage devices or other magnetic storage devices, or any other media that can be used to store the desired program code in the form of instructions or data structures and can be accessed by a computer.

[0147] In this document, the term "unit" used herein refers to software, firmware, hardware, and any combination of these elements for performing the associated functions described herein. In addition, for the purpose of discussion, various units are described as discrete units; however, it is obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art that two or more units can be combined to form a single unit that performs the associated functions according to the embodiments of the present disclosure.

[0148] In addition, memory or other storage devices and communication components may be used in embodiments of the present disclosure. It will be understood that, for the purpose of clarity, the above description has described embodiments of the present disclosure with reference to different functional units and processors. However, it will be apparent that any suitable functional distribution may be used between different functional units, processing logic elements or domains without detracting from the present disclosure. For example, functions shown as being performed by separate processing logic elements or controllers may be performed by the same processing logic element or controller. Therefore, references to specific functional units are merely references to suitable means for providing the described functions, without indicating a strict logical or physical structure or organization.

[0149] Various modifications to the embodiments described in this disclosure will be apparent to those skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein may be applied to other embodiments without departing from the scope of this disclosure. Therefore, this disclosure is not intended to be limited to the embodiments shown herein, but should be given the broadest scope consistent with the novel features and principles disclosed herein as described in the following claims.

Claims

1. A wireless communication method, comprising: Receiving, by a wireless communication terminal, a broadcast signal from a wireless communication node; as well as The wireless communication terminal transmits to the wireless communication node a secure data packet encrypted based on at least one of: a broadcast signal and locally stored information.

2. The wireless communication method according to claim 1, wherein: The locally stored information includes at least one of the following: information stored in a universal subscriber identity module USIM, a transmission session count maintained by both the wireless communication terminal and a core network, or information that the wireless communication terminal can obtain in an idle state or an inactive state.

3. The wireless communication method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein: The broadcast signal includes at least one of the following: a synchronization signal, a resource allocation indication, a paging message or a connectionless security parameter.

4. The wireless communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein: The security data packet includes at least one of the following: an identifier of the wireless communication terminal, a ciphertext, a message authentication code MAC of the ciphertext, a public key of the wireless communication terminal, a subscription hidden identifier SUCI, SUCI-MAC or a home network HN public key indicator.

5. The wireless communication method according to claim 4, wherein: The identifier of the wireless communication terminal includes at least one of the following: a subscription permanent identifier SUPI, SUCI, a value of ng-5G-S-TMSI-Part1, a random number, or a value of a recovery identifier.

6. The wireless communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein: The secure data packet has integrity protection based on at least one of: the broadcast signal and the locally stored information.

7. The wireless communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, wherein: At least one of an encryption key used for encryption of the ciphertext or an integrity protection key used for a MAC of the ciphertext is derived based on the long-term key and the connectionless security parameter.

8. The wireless communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, wherein: The shared key is generated based on the public key of the wireless communication terminal, the private key of the wireless communication terminal and the HN public key, and wherein at least one of the encryption key for encryption of the ciphertext or the integrity protection key for the MAC of the ciphertext is derived based on the shared key.

9. The wireless communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, wherein: The ciphertext in the security data packet is encrypted based on the HN public key.

10. The wireless communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 9, wherein: The pair of public key and private key of the wireless communication terminal is generated for encryption of ciphertext.

11. The wireless communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 10, wherein: The wireless communication terminal receives a positive acknowledgement or a negative acknowledgement indicating whether the safety data packet was successfully demodulated.

12. The wireless communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 11, wherein: The safety data packet is transmitted by backscattering the excitation signal.

13. A wireless communication method, comprising: Transmitting a broadcast signal from a wireless communication node to a wireless communication terminal; as well as A secure data packet encrypted based on at least one of: a broadcast signal and locally stored information is received by the wireless communication node from the wireless communication terminal.

14. The wireless communication method according to claim 13, wherein: The wireless communication node transmits at least one of the following to the core network node: an identifier of the wireless communication terminal, a connectionless security parameter, the security data packet, a public key of the wireless communication terminal, a subscription hidden identifier SUCI, or a subscription hidden identifier-message authentication code SUCI-MAC.

15. The wireless communication method according to claim 13 or 14, wherein: The wireless communication node receives at least one of the following from the core network node: an encryption key used for encryption of a ciphertext, an integrity protection key used for a MAC of the ciphertext, a subscription permanent identifier SUPI, plaintext decrypted from the ciphertext, or a positive confirmation or a negative confirmation indicating whether the security data packet is successfully demodulated.

16. The wireless communication method according to any one of claims 13 to 15, wherein: The wireless communication node receives connectionless security parameters from a core network node.

17. The wireless communication method according to any one of claims 13 to 16, wherein: The encryption key received from the core network node is used to decrypt the ciphertext received from the wireless communication terminal.

18. The wireless communication method according to any one of claims 13 to 17, wherein: The integrity protection key received from the core network node is used to generate a MAC for performing integrity check on the ciphertext received from the wireless communication terminal.

19. The wireless communication method according to any one of claims 13 to 18, wherein: The wireless communication node transmits a positive confirmation or a negative confirmation to the wireless communication terminal indicating whether the security data packet is successfully demodulated in response to receiving another positive confirmation or a negative confirmation from the core network node, receiving the plain text of the ciphertext of the security data packet, or the ciphertext of the security data packet being successfully demodulated based on the encryption key received from the core network node.

20. The wireless communication method according to any one of claims 13 to 19, wherein: The broadcast signal includes at least one of the following: a synchronization signal, a resource allocation indication, a paging message or a connectionless security parameter.

21. The wireless communication method according to any one of claims 13 to 20, wherein: The security data packet includes at least one of the following: an identifier of the wireless communication terminal, a ciphertext, a message authentication code MAC of the ciphertext, a public key of the wireless communication terminal, a subscription hidden identifier SUCI, SUCI-MAC or a home network HN public key indicator.

22. The wireless communication method according to claim 21, wherein: The identifier of the wireless communication terminal includes at least one of the following: a subscription permanent identifier SUPI, SUCI, a value of ng-5G-S-TMSI-Part1, a random number, or a value of a recovery identifier.

23. The wireless communication method according to any one of claims 13 to 22, wherein: The secure data packet has integrity protection based on at least one of: the broadcast signal and the locally stored information.

24. A wireless communication method, comprising: Transmitting, by a core network node to a wireless communication node, information for decrypting a secure data packet, wherein the secure data packet includes ciphertext encrypted based on at least one of: a broadcast signal and locally stored information, and wherein: The information includes at least one of the following: an encryption key used for encryption of the ciphertext or an integrity protection key of a message authentication code MAC used for the ciphertext, a subscription permanent identifier SUPI, a plaintext decrypted from the ciphertext by the wireless communication terminal, or a positive confirmation or a negative confirmation indicating whether the security data packet is successfully demodulated.

25. The wireless communication method according to claim 24, wherein: The core network node receives at least one of the following: an identifier of the wireless communication terminal, a connectionless security parameter, the security data packet, a public key of the wireless communication terminal, a subscription hidden identifier SUCI, or SUCI-MAC.

26. The wireless communication method according to claim 24 or 25, wherein: The core network node derives at least one of the following according to the long-term key and the connectionless security parameter: the encryption key used for encryption of the ciphertext or the integrity protection key used for MAC of the ciphertext.

27. The wireless communication method according to claim 24 or 25, wherein: The core network node derives a shared key based on the home network HN public key, the HN private key and the public key of the wireless communication terminal, and wherein the shared key is used to derive at least one of the following: the encryption key used for encryption of the ciphertext or the integrity protection key used for the MAC of the ciphertext.

28. The wireless communication method according to claim 27, wherein: The shared key is used to derive keys to check the integrity of the SUCI and to decrypt the SUCI.

29. The wireless communication method according to claim 24 or 25, wherein: The core network node decrypts the ciphertext according to the HN private key.

30. A wireless communication terminal, comprising: Communication unit; as well as A processor configured to: receive a broadcast signal from a wireless communication node; and transmitting to the wireless communication node a secure data packet encrypted based on at least one of: the broadcast signal and locally stored information.

31. The wireless communication terminal according to claim 30, wherein: The processor is further configured to execute the wireless communication method according to any one of claims 2 to 12.

32. A wireless communication node, comprising: Communication unit; as well as A processor configured to: transmit a broadcast signal to a wireless communication terminal; and receiving from the wireless communication terminal a secure data packet encrypted based on at least one of: the broadcast signal and locally stored information.

33. The wireless communication node of claim 32, wherein: The processor is further configured to perform the wireless communication method according to any one of claims 14 to 23.

34. A core network node, comprising: Communication unit; as well as A processor is configured to: transmit information for decrypting a security data packet to a wireless communication node, wherein the security data packet includes a ciphertext encrypted based on at least one of the following: a broadcast signal and locally stored information, and wherein the information includes at least one of the following: an encryption key used for encryption of the ciphertext or an integrity protection key of a message authentication code MAC used for the ciphertext, a subscription permanent identifier SUPI, a plaintext decrypted from the ciphertext by a wireless communication terminal, or a positive confirmation or a negative confirmation indicating whether the security data packet is successfully demodulated.

35. The wireless communication node of claim 34, wherein: The processor is further configured to perform the wireless communication method according to any one of claims 25 to 29.

36. A computer program product, comprising a computer-readable program medium, wherein the computer-readable program medium stores codes, which, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to implement the wireless communication method according to any one of claims 1 to 29.

Images