Access authentication method, communication device and storage medium

Abstract

The invention discloses an access authentication method, a communication device and a storage medium, and relates to the technical field of communication. The method comprises the following steps: receiving an access authentication request from user equipment, wherein the access authentication request comprises user authentication information of the user equipment and a ground identity of a ground station requested to be accessed by the user equipment; after verifying that the user equipment is legal according to the access authentication request, sending a first access response message to the user equipment, and sending a second access response message to the ground station based on the first secure channel, so that the user equipment and the ground station negotiate a first session key together, the first session key is used for constructing a second secure channel shared between the ground station and the user equipment, so that the efficiency of the whole access authentication process is improved while the security of the whole access authentication process is ensured.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to an access authentication method, a communication device and a storage medium. Background Art

[0002] The space-ground integrated network refers to the integration of space-based networks and ground-based networks to achieve extensive network coverage and data exchange systems, thus forming an important infrastructure for efficient communications on a global scale. For example, in the space-ground integrated network, the satellite communication system in the space segment and the ground network infrastructure in the ground segment are combined to form a large-scale heterogeneous communication network with seamless global connection and high integration, providing users with a wider range of communication coverage to achieve low-cost services such as communication, navigation, and positioning, as well as high-cost services such as cloud computing and big data at ground stations.

[0003] At present, in the integrated space-ground network, when user equipment needs to access the ground station based on satellite to obtain the services of the ground station, since multiple types of nodes including ground stations, satellites and users are involved, the entire access authentication process is often inefficient due to the complex authentication process and high-latency communication environment.

[0004] Therefore, how to ensure the security of the entire access authentication process while also improving the efficiency of the entire access authentication process is a problem that urgently needs to be solved. Summary of the invention

[0005] The present application provides an access authentication method, a communication device and a storage medium, which are used to ensure the security of the entire access authentication process while also improving the efficiency of the entire access authentication process.

[0006] In a first aspect, an access authentication method is provided, which is applied to a satellite, and the method includes:

[0007] Receiving an access authentication request from a user device; wherein the access authentication request includes user authentication information of the user device and a ground identity of the user device requesting access to a ground station;

[0008] After verifying that the user equipment is legitimate according to the access authentication request, sending a first access response message to the user equipment, and sending a second access response message to the ground station based on the first security channel;

[0009] Among them, the first access response message and the second access response message are used for the user equipment and the ground station to generate a first session key, and the first session key is used to construct a second security channel shared by the ground station and the user equipment; the first security channel is a security channel shared by the satellite and the ground station.

[0010] In some embodiments, before receiving the access authentication request from the user equipment, the method further includes:

[0011] Sending a pre-negotiation request to the ground station; wherein the pre-negotiation request includes satellite authentication information of the satellite and a first timestamp used to characterize when the satellite generates the pre-negotiation request;

[0012] Receiving a pre-negotiation request response sent by the ground station; wherein the pre-negotiation request response is sent by the ground station after verifying that the satellite is legitimate based on the satellite authentication information and the first timestamp, and the pre-negotiation request response includes the ground authentication information of the ground station, a second timestamp used to indicate that the ground station generates the pre-negotiation request response, and a valid timestamp used to indicate that access to the ground station is allowed;

[0013] After the ground station is verified to be legitimate based on the ground authentication information, the second timestamp, and the valid timestamp, a second session key is generated based at least on the ground authentication information, the second timestamp, and a shared domain key obtained from the NCC; wherein the shared domain key is generated using CRT, and the second session key is used to construct the first secure channel.

[0014] Through the above-mentioned pre-negotiation mechanism between the satellite and the ground station, the ground station and the satellite are allowed to complete mutual authentication and session key negotiation before the user device actually accesses, and establish a corresponding secure channel based on the negotiated session key for secure data interaction between the satellite and the ground station. Compared with the one-way one-to-one authentication path of the existing technology, this not only reduces the authentication burden of the user device during subsequent access, but also significantly reduces the time delay of the access authentication process.

[0015] In some embodiments, the user authentication information is generated by the user equipment based on the user registration information and system public parameters provided by the NCC, and the user authentication information includes at least: a third timestamp used to characterize when the user equipment generates the access authentication request, a temporary identity related to the user equipment, a first temporary public key, a first authentication factor, and a first authentication hash value between the user equipment and the ground station, wherein the first authentication hash value is calculated based on at least the user registration information and the ground identity; the verifying that the user equipment is legitimate according to the access authentication request includes:

[0016] When it is verified that the third timestamp is valid, calculating the pseudo identity of the user equipment based on at least the temporary identity, the third timestamp, and the shared domain key;

[0017] calculating a second authentication hash value of the user device based at least on the pseudo-identity;

[0018] Calculating a first authentication hash factor of the user device based at least on the pseudo identity, the ground identity, the third timestamp, the shared domain key, and the system public parameter;

[0019] If the first verification value calculated based on the second authentication hash value and the first authentication hash factor is equal to the second verification value calculated based on the first authentication factor, it is verified that the user equipment is legitimate.

[0020] In the above manner, since the user device uses a strategy combining a pseudo identity and a shared domain key to enhance the anonymity and privacy protection of the user device, this mechanism not only prevents the leakage of the user's real identity, but also ensures that the access authentication request sent by the user device is not stolen by unauthorized nodes.

[0021] In some embodiments, the first access response message includes at least a second authentication factor, the second timestamp, the valid timestamp, a satellite identity and a second temporary public key associated with the satellite, a third temporary public key associated with the ground station in the ground authentication information, and a fourth timestamp used to indicate that the first access response message and the second access response message are sent simultaneously; wherein the second authentication factor is generated based on at least the third authentication factor associated with the ground station in the ground authentication information;

[0022] The second access response message includes at least a fourth authentication factor, the pseudo identity, the first temporary public key, the third timestamp, and the fourth timestamp; wherein the fourth authentication factor is generated based on at least the first authentication hash value and the shared domain key.

[0023] In some embodiments, a first domain key update message is received from an NCC; wherein the first domain key update message includes at least a fifth timestamp, a domain key update signature, an NCC identity related to the NCC, and a fourth temporary public key, used to represent when the NCC generates the first domain key update message, the domain key update signature is generated by the NCC based on a new shared domain key and a secret reconstruction value, and the secret reconstruction value is calculated based on the CRT;

[0024] When it is verified that the fifth timestamp is valid, determining the new shared domain key based on the domain key update signature;

[0025] If the third verification value calculated based on the new shared key is equal to the fourth verification value calculated based on the NCC identity, the fourth temporary public key and the fifth timestamp, a second domain key update message is sent to the ground station and the user equipment respectively; wherein the second domain key update message includes at least the first domain key update message, the sixth timestamp at which the satellite generates the second domain key update message, a new temporary public key related to the satellite, and a new authentication factor.

[0026] Through the above method, the security and effective update of the shared domain key can be guaranteed even when the nodes change dynamically. Based on the domain key update signature and verification protocol, it is ensured that all authorized nodes can receive new and verifiable new shared domain keys to prevent the old shared domain keys from being used without authorization, thereby enhancing the overall security and reliability of the integrated space-ground network.

[0027] In some embodiments, the method further comprises:

[0028] In a set time period, N access authentication requests sent by the user equipment are received; wherein the N access authentication requests are used to request access to the ground station, and N is an integer greater than 1;

[0029] When it is verified that the N access authentication requests are all valid according to respective timestamps in the N access authentication requests, calculating, according to the N access authentication requests, N authentication hash values ​​and N authentication hash factors associated with the user equipment for each of the N access authentication requests;

[0030] Performing a legality check on the N access authentication requests according to the N authentication hash values ​​and the N authentication hash factors;

[0031] If it is verified that the N access authentication requests are all valid, the first access response message is sent to the user equipment, and a second access response message is sent to the ground station based on the first security channel.

[0032] Through the above method, a multi-level efficient batch verification mechanism can be implemented, so that the satellite can efficiently process a large number of access authentication requests from user equipment, reducing the satellite resources required to verify a large number of access authentication requests.

[0033] In a second aspect, an access authentication method is provided, which is applied to a user equipment, and the method includes:

[0034] Sending an access authentication request to the satellite; wherein the access authentication request includes user authentication information of the user equipment and a ground identity of the user equipment requesting access to a ground station;

[0035] A first access response message is received from the satellite; wherein the first access response message is sent by the satellite after verifying that the user equipment is legitimate based on the access authentication request; when the first access response message is verified to be valid, a first session key is calculated based at least on the first access response message; wherein the first session key is used to establish a second secure channel shared by the ground station and the user equipment.

[0036] In some embodiments, the user authentication information is generated by the user equipment based on the user registration information and system public parameters provided by the NCC, and the user authentication information includes at least: a third timestamp used to characterize that the user equipment generates the access authentication request, a temporary identity of the user equipment, a first temporary public key, a first authentication factor, and a first authentication hash value between the user equipment and the ground station, wherein the first authentication hash value is calculated based on at least the user registration information and the ground identity;

[0037] The first access response message includes at least a second authentication factor, a second timestamp, a valid timestamp, a satellite identity and a second temporary public key related to the satellite, a third temporary public key related to the ground station in ground authentication information, and a fourth timestamp used to represent the sending of the first access response message; wherein the ground authentication information, the second timestamp, and the valid timestamp are obtained by the satellite from the ground station, the second authentication factor is generated based on at least the third authentication factor related to the ground station in the ground authentication information, and the valid timestamp is used to represent the timestamp for allowing access to the ground station.

[0038] In some embodiments, verifying that the first access response message is valid includes:

[0039] When it is verified that the fourth timestamp and the valid timestamp are both valid, calculating an authentication hash value and an authentication hash factor associated with the ground station, and calculating an authentication hash value and an authentication hash factor associated with the satellite;

[0040] If the fifth verification value calculated based on the authentication hash value and authentication hash factor associated with the ground station, and the authentication hash value and authentication hash factor associated with the satellite, is equal to the sixth verification value calculated based on the second authentication factor, then the first access response message is verified to be valid.

[0041] In some embodiments, the method further comprises:

[0042] receiving a second domain key update message from the satellite; wherein the second domain key update message at least includes the first domain key update message, the sixth timestamp when the satellite sends the second domain key update message, a new temporary public key related to the satellite, and a new authentication factor; the first domain key update message is sent by the NCC to the satellite, and at least includes: a fifth timestamp used to represent when the NCC sends the first domain key update message, a domain key update signature, an NCC identity related to the NCC, and a fourth temporary public key, wherein the domain key update signature is generated by the NCC based on a new shared domain key and a secret reconstruction value, and the secret reconstruction value is calculated based on the CRT;

[0043] When it is verified that the second domain key update message is valid, the new shared domain key is determined based on the domain key update signature.

[0044] In a third aspect, an access authentication method is provided, which is applied to a ground station, and the method includes:

[0045] receiving a second access response message sent by the satellite from a first security channel; wherein the first security channel is a security channel shared by the satellite and the ground station; and the second access response message is sent by the satellite after verifying that the user equipment is legitimate based on an access authentication request sent by the user equipment;

[0046] After verifying that the second access response message is valid, a first session key is calculated based at least on the second access response message; wherein the first session key is used to construct a second secure channel shared by the ground station and the user equipment.

[0047] In some embodiments, before receiving the second access response message sent by the satellite from the first safety channel, the method further includes:

[0048] Receiving a pre-negotiation request sent by the satellite; wherein the pre-negotiation request includes satellite authentication information of the satellite and a first timestamp used to characterize when the satellite generates the pre-negotiation request;

[0049] If the satellite is verified to be legitimate based on the satellite authentication information and the first timestamp, a pre-negotiation request response is sent to the satellite; wherein the pre-negotiation request response includes ground authentication information of the ground station, a second timestamp used to indicate that the ground station generates the pre-negotiation request response, and a valid timestamp used to indicate that access to the ground station is allowed.

[0050] In some embodiments, the method further comprises:

[0051] receiving a second domain key update message from the satellite; wherein the second domain key update message at least includes the first domain key update message, the sixth timestamp when the satellite sends the second domain key update message, a new temporary public key related to the satellite, and a new authentication factor; the first domain key update message is sent by a network control center NCC to the satellite, and at least includes: a fifth timestamp used to represent when the NCC sends the first domain key update message, a domain key update signature, an NCC identity related to the NCC, and a fourth temporary public key, the domain key update signature is generated by the NCC based on a new shared domain key and a secret reconstruction value, and the secret reconstruction value is calculated based on the Chinese remainder theorem CRT;

[0052] When it is verified that the second domain key update message is valid, the new shared domain key is determined based on the domain key update signature.

[0053] In a fourth aspect, a satellite is provided, comprising:

[0054] The receiving module is used to receive an access authentication request from a user device; wherein the access authentication request includes user authentication information of the user device and a ground identity of the user device requesting to access a ground station.

[0055] A sending module is used to send a first access response message to the user equipment after the verification module verifies that the user equipment is legitimate according to the access authentication request, and to send a second access response message to the ground station based on a first security channel; wherein the first access response message and the second access response message are used for the user equipment and the ground station to generate a first session key, and the first session key is used to construct a second security channel shared by the ground station and the user equipment; the first security channel is a security channel shared by the satellite and the ground station.

[0056] In a fifth aspect, a user equipment is provided, including:

[0057] A sending module, configured to send an access authentication request to a satellite; wherein the access authentication request includes user authentication information of the user equipment and a ground identity of the user equipment requesting to access a ground station;

[0058] A receiving module, configured to receive a first access response message from the satellite; wherein the first access response message is sent by the satellite after verifying that the user equipment is legitimate based on the access authentication request;

[0059] A session key calculation module is used to calculate a first session key based at least on the first access response message after verifying that the first access response message is valid; wherein the first session key is used to construct a second security channel shared by the ground station and the user equipment.

[0060] In a sixth aspect, a ground station is provided, comprising:

[0061] A receiving module, configured to receive a second access response message sent by the satellite from a first security channel; wherein the first security channel is a security channel shared by the satellite and the ground station; and the second access response message is sent by the satellite after verifying that the user equipment is legitimate based on an access authentication request sent by the user equipment;

[0062] A session key calculation module is used to calculate a first session key based at least on the second access response message after verifying that the second access response message is valid; wherein the first session key is used to construct a second security channel shared by the ground station and the user equipment.

[0063] In a seventh aspect, an access authentication system is provided, including a satellite, a user equipment, and a ground station;

[0064] The satellite is used to perform the method as described in any one of the first aspects;

[0065] The user equipment is used to perform the method as described in any one of the second aspects;

[0066] The ground station is used to execute the method as described in any one of the third aspects.

[0067] In an eighth aspect, a communication device is provided, including:

[0068] A memory for storing a computer program; a processor for implementing any one of the method steps in the first aspect when executing the computer program stored in the memory.

[0069] In a ninth aspect, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, wherein a computer program is stored in the computer-readable storage medium, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the method steps described in any one of the first aspects are implemented.

[0070] In the embodiment of the present application, during the entire process of the user equipment accessing the ground station via the satellite, the beneficial effects are as follows:

[0071] When the satellite receives an access authentication request from a user device, first, the user device is verified to be legitimate based on the access authentication request. When the user device is verified to be legitimate, the user device can simultaneously send a first access response message and send a second access response message to the ground station based on the first security channel. Compared with the prior art, there is no need to perform one-to-one authentication of a one-way path, and three-party mutual authentication between the user device, the satellite and the ground station can be achieved, thereby improving the authentication efficiency of the entire access authentication process; secondly, the first security channel is a security channel shared by the satellite and the ground station to ensure the security of the two access response messages during the transmission process; the first access response message and the second access response message are used for the user device and the ground station to generate a first session key, and the first session key is used to construct a second security channel shared by the ground station and the user device to ensure that the ground station and the user device will not be tampered with or known by the satellite when performing data interaction, thereby ensuring the security of the entire access authentication process.

[0072] For each of the above-mentioned aspects from the second to the eighth aspects and the technical effects that may be achieved by each of the aspects, please refer to the above-mentioned description of the technical effects that can be achieved by the first aspect or various possible schemes in the first aspect, and no further details will be given here. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0073] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of an application scenario to which the embodiments of the present application are applicable is exemplified;

[0074] Figure 2 The following is a schematic diagram of signaling interaction when an NCC registers a user equipment provided by an embodiment of the present application;

[0075] Figure 3 The following is a schematic diagram of signaling interaction when an NCC registers a satellite according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0076] Figure 4 The following is a schematic diagram of signaling interaction when an NCC registers a ground station according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0077] Figure 5 A signaling interaction diagram for establishing a secure channel between a satellite and a ground station provided in an embodiment of the present application is exemplarily shown;

[0078] Figure 6 The following is a flowchart of a satellite access authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present application;

[0079] Figure 7 The following is a flowchart of an access authentication method on a user equipment side provided by an embodiment of the present application;

[0080] Figure 8The following is a flowchart of an access authentication method on a ground station side provided by an embodiment of the present application;

[0081] Fig. 9 The following is a schematic diagram of signaling interaction of a complete access authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present application;

[0082] Fig.10 The schematic diagram of the structure of a satellite provided by an embodiment of the present application is exemplarily shown;

[0083] Fig.11 The following is a schematic diagram showing the structure of a user equipment provided by an embodiment of the present application;

[0084] Fig.12 The schematic diagram of the structure of a ground station provided by an embodiment of the present application is exemplarily shown;

[0085] Fig.13 A schematic diagram of the structure of a communication device provided in an embodiment of the present application is exemplified. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0086] In order to make the purpose, technical scheme and advantages of the present application clearer, the technical scheme in the embodiment of the present application will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiment of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiment is only a part of the embodiment of the present application, rather than all the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in the field without making creative work are within the scope of protection of the present application. In the absence of conflict, the embodiments in the present application and the features in the embodiments can be arbitrarily combined with each other. In addition, although the logical order is shown in the flow chart, in some cases, the steps shown or described can be performed in an order different from that here.

[0087] The terms "first" and "second" in the specification and claims of the present application and the above-mentioned drawings are used to distinguish different objects, rather than to describe a specific order. In addition, the term "comprising" and any of their variations are intended to cover non-exclusive protection. For example, a process, method, system, product or device comprising a series of steps or units is not limited to the listed steps or units, but optionally also includes steps or units that are not listed, or optionally also includes other steps or units inherent to these processes, methods, products or devices. "Multiple" in the present application can mean at least two, for example, two, three or more, and the embodiments of the present application are not limited.

[0088] The following is a description of exemplary embodiments of the present application in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, including various details of the embodiments of the present application to facilitate understanding, which should be considered as merely exemplary. Therefore, those of ordinary skill in the art should recognize that various changes and modifications can be made to the embodiments described herein without departing from the scope of the present application. Similarly, for the sake of clarity and conciseness, the description of well-known functions and structures is omitted in the following description. It should be noted that in the embodiments of the present application, certain software, components, models and other existing solutions in the industry may be mentioned, which should be considered as exemplary, and their purpose is only to illustrate the feasibility of the implementation of the technical solution of the present application, but it does not mean that the applicant has or will necessarily use the solution.

[0089] In order to better understand the embodiments of the present application, the technical terms involved in the embodiments of the present application are first explained below.

[0090] (1) Elliptic Curve E p (a,b): elliptic curve E p (a,b) represents the finite prime field F p On, by equation y 2 =x 3 +ax+b is a type of curve defined by elliptic curves used in elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). While providing a high level of security, it can use smaller key length ellipses than other types of keys.

[0091] (2) Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) is a number theory theorem, also known as the modular theorem. In the embodiments of the present application, CRT can be used to select a set of coprime secret values ​​for the distribution and update of domain keys.

[0092] (3) Biometric fuzzy extraction function Gen(·) / Rep(·): Gen(·) is a biometric key probability generation function, which is used to input biometrics and output a biometric key and a public auxiliary string; Rep(·) is a biometric key reconstruction function, which is used to re-input biometrics and a public auxiliary string and output a biometric key. When the error between the re-input biometric and the original biometric is less than a threshold, the biometric key that is the same as the original biometric key can be output.

[0093] (4) User Equipment (UE) is a device that can provide voice and / or data connectivity to users, including: handheld terminal devices with wireless connection functions, vehicle-mounted terminal devices, etc. For example, terminals include but are not limited to: mobile phones, tablet computers, laptops, PDAs, mobile internet devices (MID), wearable devices, virtual reality (VR) devices, augmented reality (AR) devices, wireless terminal devices in industrial control, wireless terminal devices in unmanned driving, wireless terminal devices in smart grids, wireless terminal devices in transportation safety, wireless terminal devices in smart cities, or wireless terminal devices in smart homes, etc.

[0094] (5) A domain key is a key shared within a specific range of nodes. In the embodiment of the present application, the domain key is used to ensure dynamic joining and revocation of each node.

[0095] The following is a brief introduction to the application scenarios to which the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application can be applied. It should be noted that the application scenarios introduced below are only used to illustrate the embodiments of the present application and are not limited. In specific implementation, the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of the present application can be flexibly applied according to actual needs.

[0096] Figure 1 The following is a schematic diagram of an application scenario to which the present application embodiment is applicable. Figure 1 As shown, the scenario includes a user device 101, a satellite 102, and a ground station (GS) 103, which are respectively connected to a network control center (NCC) 100. It should be noted that in actual application scenarios, the number of user devices, satellites, and ground stations may be greater. Figure 1 The relevant description is made by taking user equipment 101, satellite 102, and ground station 103 as an example.

[0097] As a trusted manager in the space-ground integrated network, NCC 100 can be responsible for the operation, maintenance, control and management of the space-ground integrated network. For example, NCC 100 can be responsible for key tasks such as generating system key parameters, system public parameters, key update and management, and can register user equipment 101, satellite 102, and ground station 103 respectively, so as to allocate corresponding key parameters and other information to them, so as to provide the basis for security authentication of each node in the space-ground integrated network.

[0098] The user equipment 101 has the ability to establish communication and bandwidth channels with the satellite 102, and can request access to the ground station 103 through the satellite 102 and obtain corresponding services (such as ground bandwidth, entertainment, and augmented reality, etc.).

[0099] The satellite 102 may be a space segment access point operating in a predetermined satellite orbit, and establish a connection between the user equipment 101 and the ground station 102 through a satellite-to-ground link.

[0100] As a node that provides ground network services to users, the ground station 103 can provide users with broadband, communication, augmented reality (AR) and other services through satellite-to-ground links.

[0101] In some embodiments, during the initialization phase, the NCC 100 is responsible for creating and distributing necessary key parameters and configurations to ensure the basis for secure authentication of each node in the ground-ground network, which may specifically include the following process:

[0102] First, use the elliptic encryption algorithm to select the system's secure elliptic curve. For example, E p (a,b):y 2 =x 3 +ax+bmod p; where a,b∈F p (F p represents the private key range), and 4a 3 +27b 2 mod P≠0, where P is based on E p (a,b) A base point is selected to generate public and private keys, as well as to select a secure hash function h(·) and a biometric fuzzy extraction function (Gen(·)\Rep(·))

[0103] Then, based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem CRT, n mutually prime secret values ​​CRTS = {x 1 ,x 2 ,x 3 ,…,x n}; where x i ∈F q , q≥4p, and then calculate the secret reconstruction value based on the n mutually prime secret values. The secret reconstruction value satisfies the following expression:

[0104]

[0105] in, var i =xm i ×ym i , xm i ×ym i ≡1modxi ; Represents the product of n mutually prime secret values, var i The share coefficient that represents the i-th coprime secret value, ym i 、xm i The auxiliary modulus representing the i-th mutually prime secret value.

[0106] Secondly, in F p A system private key (s ncc ), and based on this ncc Calculate the system public key of the NCC100 (e.g., PK ncc =s ncc ·P); in F p Select a satellite private key (s sat ), and based on this sat Calculate the satellite public key (e.g., PK sat =s sat ·P); in F p Select a ground private key (s) for the ground station 103 gs ), and based on this gs Calculate the ground public key of the ground station 103 (for example, PK gs =s gs ·P); in F p Select a user private key (s) for the user device 101 u ), and based on this u Calculate the user public key (eg, PK u =s u ·P).

[0107] Then, an initial shared domain key (k d ), and safely store the above parameters And publish the system public parameters pubparams = {ID ncc ,E p (a,b),P,PK ncc ,PK sat ,PK gs ,PK u ,h}.

[0108] In the present application embodiment, k d As a domain key shared by all legitimate and authorized nodes in the system, it can prevent the pseudo-identity from being obtained by unauthorized nodes and prevent unauthorized nodes from verifying the validity of the access authentication request of the user device. In addition, k dIt can also be used to verify whether the node is a valid node. Illegal nodes will be delisted by the NCC and will not be able to obtain updated k d .

[0109] In other embodiments, to ensure that k d The freshness, validity and integrity of the domain key can also be guaranteed, and the domain key can be generated and updated in real time, which may include the following process:

[0110] Assume that in the user equipment (U 1 ), Satellite (L 2 ) and ground station (GS 3 ) is revoked by the NCC, and the user equipment (U n+1 ), Satellite (L n+2 ), and ground station (GS n+3 ) is an example of a newly registered node.

[0111] First, for the newly registered node U n+1 , L n+2 GS n+3 , NCC randomly selects a coprime secret value {x 1 ,x 2 ,x 3 ,…,x n}x that are relatively prime n+1 、x n+2 、x n+3 , where x n+1 、x n+2 、x n+3 Likewise mutually beneficial.

[0112] Secondly, NCC calculation xm i ×ym i ≡1 modx i , var i =xm i ×ym i ;Where, i=n+1,n+2,n+3, Represents the product of coprime secret values, var i The share coefficient that represents the i-th coprime secret value, ym i 、xm i The auxiliary modulus representing the i-th mutually prime secret value.

[0113] Then, the NCC calculates the new secret reconstruction value (eg, μ'=μ'+var n+1 +var n+2 +var n+3 ).

[0114] Furthermore, for the revoked node U1 , L 2 GS 3 , NCC obtained the U 1 , L 2 GS 3 Calculated secret share coefficient var 1 , var 2 , var 3 , then calculate the secret reconstruction value μ'=μ'-var 1 -var 2 -var 3 ;

[0115] Finally, NCC p Randomly select a NCC temporary private key (r ncc ), and based on this r ncc Calculate the temporary public key of NCC (for example, P ncc =r ncc P), new shared domain key (e.g. And generate a domain key update signature based on the new shared domain key and the secret reconstruction value (for example, ) for subsequent distribution and use.

[0116] In an embodiment of the present application, a dynamic key management mechanism based on CRT is introduced, so that when nodes are dynamically added and revoked, the shared domain key can be updated in real time, thereby ensuring the flexibility and security of the integrated space-ground network.

[0117] In some embodiments, during the registration phase, NCC 100 may register user equipment 101, satellite 102, and ground station 103 respectively, so as to facilitate the deployment of each node in the celestial integrated network. Figure 2 , Figure 3 , Figure 4 Explain them separately.

[0118] Figure 2 The following is a schematic diagram of signaling interaction when an NCC registers a user equipment provided by an embodiment of the present application.

[0119] 201: The user equipment sends a message carrying a user ID (ID i ) and ground station identification (ID k ) user registration request.

[0120] In this step, the user equipment may be Figure 1 The user equipment 101 and NCC shown may be Figure 1 The NCC100 shown in the figure, the user registration request is used to instruct the NCC to i and IDk Register the user device.

[0121] 202: After receiving the above user registration request, the NCC randomly assigns n to the user device. 1 Pseudo-identities, forming a pseudo-identity group

[0122] In other embodiments, the NCC may also search in the database based on the user identifier to determine whether the user equipment has been registered before. If not, step 202 is executed. If yes, other operations may be performed based on the historical registration record of the user equipment.

[0123] 203: NCC calculates the authentication hash value (d i,m ), authentication factor(s i,m ), and the authentication hash value between each pseudo-identity and the ground station (a i,m ), and randomly select an unused user coprime secret value (x i ), calculate the authentication hash factor (rc i ).

[0124] In some embodiments, the d i,m 、s i,m 、a i,m rc i Satisfy the following expressions respectively:

[0125] d i,m =h(PID i,m ,ID ncc ,PK u );

[0126] s i,m =s u +d i,m s ncc ;

[0127] a i,m =h(PID i,m ,a u-k ,PK u ), a u-k =h(ID k ,s k ,P K u);

[0128]

[0129] Among them, the ID ncc is the identity of NCC, a u-kRepresents the secret hash value between the ground station and the user equipment calculated by NCC. The meanings of other parameters can be found in the previous text and will not be repeated here.

[0130] 204: NCC stores user ID and pseudo identity group ({ID i ,PIDS i}), and sends a user registration response message to the user equipment.

[0131] In this step, the user registration response message may include at least the following: (collectively referred to as user registration information of the user device)

[0132] 205: After receiving the user registration response message, the user equipment verifies the user registration response message. If the user registration response message is found to be valid, the corresponding user login operation is performed.

[0133] In some embodiments, when the following equation is satisfied, the satellite registration response message is verified to be valid.

[0134]

[0135] in, The authentication hash factor parsed by the user device, d' i,m =h(PID i,m ,ID ncc ,PK u ), for each pseudo identity PID i,m ∈PIDS i , the parsed authentication hash value.

[0136] In some embodiments, performing a user login operation may include the following process:

[0137] In response to entering a login password (PW i ) and biometrics (BIO i ) user operation, calculate the biometric key and the biometric key public string (for example, (σ i ,v i )=Gen(BIO i )), password biometric authentication factors (e.g., RPW i =h(PW i ,σ i )), user coprime secret value derived value (for example, ), user-shared domain key derived value (e.g., ), user login verification code (for example, ver i =h(DX i ,DKi ,x i ,k d )); and for each pseudo identity PID im ∈PIDS i , pseudo-derived values ​​(e.g., ), login authentication factors (e.g. ), login authentication hash value (for example, ), pseudo user login verification code (for example, ver i,m =h(DPID i,m ,DS i,m ,DA i,m ,PID i,m ,x i ,s i,m ,a i,m ,v i )), σ i is the biometric key, RPW i is the password biometric verification factor. Finally, each parameter Stored in the device for later use.

[0138] In the present application embodiment, the above Figure 2 In the user device registration process shown, the elliptic curve cryptography mechanism is adopted, combined with the dual verification method of biometrics and pseudo-identity, which greatly enhances the security and privacy of user devices in the integrated space-ground network. Through the innovation of key management and user verification methods, the security of device login, data transmission and node authentication in the integrated space-ground network is ensured.

[0139] Figure 3 The following is a schematic diagram of signaling interaction when an NCC registers a satellite according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0140] 301: The satellite sends a message carrying the satellite ID (ID j ) satellite registration request.

[0141] In this step, the satellite can be Figure 1 As shown in satellite 102, NCC can be Figure 1 The NCC 100 shown in the satellite registration request is used to instruct the NCC to j Register the satellite.

[0142] In other embodiments, the NCC may also search in the database based on the satellite identifier to determine whether the satellite has been registered before. If not, step 302 is executed. If yes, other operations may be performed based on the historical registration record of the satellite.

[0143] 302: After receiving the satellite registration request, the NCC calculates the satellite authentication hash value (d j ), authentication factor(s j ), and randomly selects an unused satellite coprime secret value (x j ), calculate the satellite's authentication hash factor (rc j ).

[0144] In some embodiments, the d j 、s j rc j Satisfy the following expressions respectively:

[0145] d j =h(ID j ,ID ncc ,PK sat );

[0146] s j =s sat +d j ·s ncc ;

[0147] rc j =h(pubparams,k d ,s j ,x j )……(3)

[0148] It should be noted that the meanings of the above parameters can be found in the previous text and will not be repeated here.

[0149] 303: NCC sends a packet to the satellite carrying {pubparams,k d ,s j ,x j ,rc j} satellite registration response message.

[0150] 304: After receiving the satellite registration response message, the satellite performs a validity check on the satellite registration response message. If the satellite registration response message is found to be valid, {pubparams, k d ,s j ,x j ,rc j}.

[0151] In some embodiments, when the following equation is satisfied, the satellite registration response message is verified to be valid.

[0152] s j P=PK sat +d j '·PK ncc , and rcj '=rc j ……(4)

[0153] Among them, d j '=h(ID j ,ID ncc ,PK sat ) is the authentication hash value parsed by the satellite, rc j '=h(pubparams,k d ,s j ,x j ), which is the authentication hash factor parsed by the satellite.

[0154] Figure 4 The following is a schematic diagram of signaling interaction when an NCC provides for ground station registration according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0155] 401: The ground station sends a message to the NCC containing the ground station ID (ID k ) ground station registration request.

[0156] In this step, the ground station can be Figure 1 The ground station 103 shown, NCC can be Figure 1 In the NCC 100 shown, the ground station registration request is used to instruct the NCC to register the ground station based on the ground station identifier.

[0157] 402: After receiving the ground station registration request, the NCC calculates the ground station's authentication hash value (d k ), authentication factor(s k ), and randomly selects an unused ground station coprime secret value (x k ), calculate the ground station's authentication hash factor (rc k ).

[0158] In some embodiments, the d k 、s k rc k Satisfy the following expressions respectively:

[0159] d k =h(ID k ,ID ncc ,PK gs );

[0160] s k =s gs +d k ·s ncc ;

[0161] rc k =h(pubparams,kd ,s k ,x k )……(5)

[0162] In other embodiments, the NCC may also search in the database based on the ground station identifier to determine whether the ground station has been registered before. If not, execute 402. If yes, perform other operations based on the historical registration record of the ground station.

[0163] 403: NCC sends a message to the ground station carrying {pubparams,k d ,s k ,x k ,rc k} ground registration response message.

[0164] 404: After receiving the ground registration response message, the ground station verifies the ground registration response message. If the ground registration response message is found to be valid, {pubparams, k d ,s k ,x k ,rc k}.

[0165] In some embodiments, when the following equation is satisfied, the ground registration response message is verified to be valid.

[0166] s k P=PK gs +d' k ·PK ncc , and rc' k =rc k ……(6)

[0167] Among them, d' k =h(ID k ,ID ncc ,PK gs ) is the authentication hash value parsed by the ground station, rc' k =h(pubparams,k d ,s k ,x k ), which is the authentication hash factor parsed by the ground station.

[0168] In the above registration phase, when the NCC registers the user equipment, satellite, and ground station respectively, registration interaction can be performed through a secure channel to avoid malicious attacks.

[0169] In other embodiments, based on the above Figure 1In the scenario shown, when the signal of satellite 102 covers ground station 103, before user equipment 101 requests to access ground station 103, it can negotiate with the ground station in advance to establish a secure channel between the satellite and the ground station, so as to reduce the authentication overhead and delay when the user accesses the ground station. Figure 5 As shown, a signaling interaction diagram for establishing a secure channel between a satellite and a ground station provided in an embodiment of the present application is exemplarily shown, and the process includes the following steps:

[0170] 501: Satellite at F p A satellite temporary private key (r j ), based on the r j Calculate the satellite’s temporary public key (R j ), authentication hash factor (d 1 ), authentication factor (a 1 ) and sends a message to the ground station carrying {ID j ,R j ,a 1 ,t 1} pre-negotiation request.

[0171] In some embodiments, the R j d 1 、a 1 Satisfy the following expressions respectively:

[0172] R j =r j ·P;

[0173] d 1 =h(ID j ,ID k ,PK ncc ,PK sat ,R j ,k d ,t 1 );

[0174] a 1 =s j +d 1 r j …(7)

[0175] Among them, t 1 Indicates the first timestamp of the satellite generating the pre-negotiation request; j It represents the authentication factor obtained by the satellite from the NCC during the registration phase. The meanings of other parameters can be found in the previous text and will not be repeated here.

[0176] 502: After receiving the pre-negotiation request, the ground station may perform a validity check on the pre-negotiation request. If the pre-negotiation request is found to be valid, a pre-negotiation request response is sent to the satellite.

[0177] In some embodiments, performing a validity check on the pre-negotiation request may include the following process:

[0178] When the first timestamp is verified to be valid, check whether equation a is satisfied. 1 P=PK sat +d j '·PK ncc +d' 1 ·R j If yes, it indicates that the satellite is a legitimate node and is not a node revoked by the NCC (which can be confirmed by the initial shared domain key). If no, it indicates that the satellite is an unauthorized node or the content in the pre-negotiation request has been tampered with during the satellite-to-ground link transmission, and subsequent operations are terminated.

[0179] In some implementations, d j '、d' 1 The following expressions can be satisfied:

[0180] d j '=h(ID j ,ID ncc ,PK sat ), d' 1 =h(ID j ,ID k ,PK ncc ,PK sat ,R j ,k d ,t 1 )…(8)

[0181] Among them, d j 'Characterizes the ground station to calculate the authentication hash value about the satellite, d' 1 It represents the authentication hash factor calculated by the ground station about the satellite. The meaning of other parameters can be found in the previous text and will not be repeated here.

[0182] In some other embodiments, whether the first timestamp is valid is determined by: if the difference between the first timestamp and the current timestamp is less than or equal to an acceptable time difference range, it indicates that the first timestamp is active and the first timestamp is determined to be valid; otherwise, it indicates that the first timestamp is invalid and subsequent access authentication is terminated.

[0183] In some embodiments, sending a pre-negotiation request response to a satellite may include the following process:

[0184] Ground station at F p A temporary private key (r k ), and based on this r k Calculate the temporary public key of the ground station (Rk ), authentication hash factor (d 2 ), authentication factor (a 2 ), and the session key (Key k-j ), and then send a signal to the satellite with at least {ID k ,R k ,a 2 ,t exp ,t 2}'s pre-negotiation request response.

[0185] In some embodiments, the R k d 2 、a 2 、Key k-j Satisfy the following expressions respectively:

[0186] R k =r k ·P;

[0187] d 2 =h(ID j ,ID k ,PK ncc ,PK gs ,R k ,R j ,k d ,t exp ,t 2 );

[0188] a 2 =s k +d 2 r k ;

[0189] Key k-j =h(ID j ,ID k ,PK sat ,PK gs ,r k ·R j ,k d ,t 1 ,t 2 )…(9)

[0190] Among them, t 2 A second timestamp indicating that the ground station generates a pre-negotiation request response; k Represents the authentication factor obtained by the ground station from the NCC during the registration phase; exp The valid timestamp that indicates the access permission to the ground station, i.e. the ground station only authorizes the access permission at t exp Before allowing satellites to pass a 2Two-way authentication with future user devices. k-j Used to build a shared security channel between the ground station and the satellite (i.e., the first security channel below); the meanings of other parameters can be referred to the previous description and will not be repeated here.

[0191] 503: After receiving the pre-negotiation request response, the satellite verifies the pre-negotiation request response. If the pre-negotiation request response is found to be valid, the satellite calculates the session key (Key j-k ).

[0192] In some embodiments, performing a validity check on the pre-negotiation request response may include the following process:

[0193] When it is verified that the second timestamp and the valid timestamp are both valid, check whether equation a is satisfied. 2 P=PK gs +d' k ·PK ncc +d' 2 ·R k ; If yes, it indicates that the ground station is a legitimate node and is not a node revoked by the NCC; if no, it indicates that the ground station is an unauthorized node or the pre-negotiation request response is tampered with during the satellite-to-ground link transmission process, and subsequent operations are terminated.

[0194] In some implementations, d' k , d' 2 The following expressions can be satisfied:

[0195] d' k =h(ID k ,ID ncc ,PK gs );

[0196] d' 2 =h(ID j ,ID k ,PK ncc ,PK gs ,R k ,R j ,k d ,t exp ,t 1 );

[0197] Key j-k =h(ID j ,ID k ,PK sat ,PK gs ,r j ·R k ,k d ,t 1,t 2 )....(10)

[0198] Among them, d' k Characterizes the satellite to calculate the authentication hash value about the ground station; d' 2 Characterizes the satellite to calculate the authentication hash factor about the ground station; Key j-k Represents the session key calculated by the satellite and shared with the ground station. j-k With Key k-j It is used to build a shared security channel between the ground station and the satellite (i.e., the first security channel below). The meanings of other parameters can be found in the previous text and will not be repeated here.

[0199] In some other embodiments, determining whether the second timestamp is valid may be that if the difference between the second timestamp and the current timestamp is less than or equal to an acceptable time difference range, it indicates that the second timestamp is active and the second timestamp is determined to be valid; otherwise, it indicates that the second timestamp is invalid and subsequent access authentication is terminated to determine whether the valid timestamp can determine whether the current timestamp is before the valid timestamp.

[0200] In an embodiment of the present application, through the pre-negotiation mechanism between the above-mentioned satellite and the ground station, the ground station and the satellite are allowed to complete mutual authentication and session key negotiation before the user device actually accesses, and establish a corresponding secure channel based on the negotiated session key for secure data interaction between the satellite and the ground station. Compared with the one-way one-to-one authentication path of the prior art, this not only reduces the authentication burden of the user device during subsequent access, but also significantly reduces the time delay of the access authentication process.

[0201] In the present application embodiment, based on the above Figure 1 In the scenario shown, when a user requests to access a ground station via a satellite and obtains corresponding services, a domain negotiation mechanism is proposed. The satellite and the ground station authenticate each other in advance, negotiate a shared session key between the two, establish a corresponding secure channel, and exchange an authentication parameter with a valid timestamp. While ensuring the security of the entire access process, the access authentication steps are effectively integrated and simplified, and the authentication overhead and latency are also reduced.

[0202] To further illustrate the technical solution provided by the embodiment of the present application, this is described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific implementation methods. Although the embodiment of the present application provides the method operation steps as shown in the following embodiments or drawings, more or fewer operation steps may be included in the method based on routine or no creative labor. In the steps where there is no necessary causal relationship logically, the execution order of these steps is not limited to the execution order provided by the embodiment of the present application. The method may be executed or executed in parallel in the actual processing process or when the device is executed in accordance with the method sequence shown in the embodiment or drawings.

[0203] Figure 6 The flowchart of a satellite access authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present application is shown as an example. Figure 1 The satellite 102 shown in the figure is used to ensure the security of the entire access authentication process while also improving the efficiency of the entire access authentication process. Figure 6 As shown, the process includes the following steps:

[0204] 601: Receive an access authentication request from a user equipment, where the access authentication request includes user authentication information of the user equipment and a ground identity of the user equipment requesting to access a ground station.

[0205] In this step, the ground identity may refer to the ground station identifier (ID k ).

[0206] In some embodiments, the user authentication information is generated by the user equipment based on the user registration information and system public parameters provided by the NCC, and the user authentication information at least includes a third timestamp (t 3 ), a temporary identity associated with the user device (TID i ), the first temporary public key (R i ), the first authentication factor (a 3 ), and the first authentication hash value (a i-k ), the first authentication hash value is calculated based on at least the user registration information and the ground identity.

[0207] In some embodiments, the TID calculated by the user equipment i , R i 、a i-k 、a 3 Satisfy the following expressions respectively:

[0208]

[0209] R i =r i ·P, r i∈F p ;

[0210] a i-k =h(PID i,m ,ID j ,ID k ,R i ,a i,m ,t 3 );

[0211] a 3 =s i,m +d 3 r i ;

[0212] d 3 =h(PID i,m ,ID j ,ID k ,PK ncc ,PK sat ,PK gs ,R i ,a i-k ,k d ,t 3 )…(11)

[0213] Among them, d 3 It is the authentication hash factor calculated by the user equipment during the access authentication process. The meanings of other parameters can be referred to the previous description and will not be repeated here.

[0214] In an embodiment of the present application, the user device uses a strategy combining a pseudo identity and a shared domain key to enhance the anonymity and privacy protection of the user device. This mechanism not only prevents the leakage of the user's real identity, but also ensures that the access authentication request sent by the user device is not stolen by unauthorized nodes.

[0215] In some embodiments, before receiving the access authentication request from the user equipment, the method further includes: sending a pre-negotiation request to the ground station; wherein the pre-negotiation request includes satellite authentication information of the satellite (for example, the above Figure 5 ID in j ,R j ,a 1 ), and a first timestamp used to characterize when the satellite generates a pre-negotiation request, and receiving a pre-negotiation request response sent by the ground station, wherein the pre-negotiation request response is a pre-negotiation request response sent by the ground station based on the satellite authentication information and the first timestamp (t 1 ) After verifying that the satellite is legitimate, the pre-negotiation request response includes the ground authentication information of the ground station (for example, the above Figure 5 ID in k ,R k ,a 2), a second timestamp (t 2 ), and a valid timestamp (t exp ); when the ground station is verified to be legitimate based on the ground authentication information, the second timestamp, and the valid timestamp, at least based on the ground authentication information, the second timestamp, and the NCC (such as Figure 1 The shared domain key (ie, the initial shared domain key mentioned above) obtained by the NCC100 shown in FIG. 1 generates a second session key (ie, the Key j-k With Key k-j ); the shared domain key is generated by CRT, and the second session key is used to build a first secure channel shared by the satellite and the ground station; so that the satellite and the ground station can complete mutual authentication in advance before the user equipment accesses, reducing the authentication overhead and delay when the user equipment accesses. The specific interaction process can be referred to Figure 5 , and will not be described again here.

[0216] In other embodiments, before receiving the access authentication request from the user equipment, the satellite may also register with the NCC to facilitate the subsequent access authentication with the user equipment and the ground station without the participation of the NCC. The specific registration process can refer to the above Figure 2 The relevant description will not be repeated here.

[0217] 602: After verifying that the user equipment is legitimate according to the access authentication request, a first access response message is sent to the user equipment, and a second access response message is sent to the ground station based on the first security channel.

[0218] In this step, the first access response message and the second access response message are used for the user equipment and the ground station to generate a first session key, and the first session key is used to build a second security channel shared by the ground station and the user equipment.

[0219] In some embodiments, verifying that the user equipment is legitimate according to the access authentication request may include the following process:

[0220] First, when it is verified that the third timestamp is valid, a pseudo identity of the user device is calculated based on at least the temporary identity, the third timestamp, and the shared domain key;

[0221] Furthermore, the satellite computes the pseudo identity (PID' i,m ) can satisfy the following expression:

[0222] PID' i,m =TID i ⊕h(ID j ,k d ,t 3 )…(12)

[0223] In other embodiments, determining whether the third timestamp is valid may be that if the difference between the third timestamp and the current timestamp is less than or equal to an acceptable time difference range, it indicates that the third timestamp is active, and the third timestamp is determined to be valid.

[0224] Secondly, calculating a second authentication hash value of the user device based on at least the pseudo-identity;

[0225] Further, the satellite calculates a second authentication hash value (d') associated with the user equipment. i,m ) can satisfy the following expression:

[0226] d' i,m =h(PID' i,m ,ID ncc ,PK u )…(13)

[0227] Then, based on at least the pseudo identity, the ground identity, the third timestamp, the shared domain key, and the system public parameter, a first authentication hash factor of the user device is calculated;

[0228] Furthermore, the satellite calculates a first authentication hash factor (d') associated with the user equipment. 3 ), which satisfies the following expression:

[0229] d' 3 =h(PID' i,m ,ID j ,ID k ,PK ncc ,PK sat ,PK gs ,R i ,k d ,t 3 )…(14)

[0230] Finally, if the first verification value calculated based on the second authentication hash value and the first authentication hash factor is equal to the second verification value calculated based on the first authentication factor, it is verified that the user device is legitimate.

[0231] Furthermore, if a 3 P=PK u +d' i,m ·PK ncc +d' 3 ·R i If it is established, the user device is verified to be legal. 3 The calculation result of P represents the first verification value, PK u +d' i,m ·PK ncc +d'3 ·R i The calculation result represents the second verification value.

[0232] In some embodiments, the first access response message includes at least a second authentication factor (a 4 ), the second timestamp (t 2 ), effective timestamp (t exp ), satellite identity associated with the satellite (i.e., ID j ) and the second temporary public key (i.e. R k ), the third temporary public key related to the ground station in the ground authentication information (R k ), and a fourth timestamp for indicating that the first access response message and the second access response message are sent simultaneously; wherein the second authentication factor is at least based on the third authentication factor related to the ground station in the ground authentication information (i.e., the a negotiated in the pre-negotiation mechanism in the foregoing text); 2 ) generated by

[0233] Furthermore, the second authentication factor (a 4 ) satisfies the following expression:

[0234] a 4 =a 2 +s j +d 4 r j ;

[0235] d 4 =h(PID' i,m ,ID j ,ID k ,PK ncc ,PK sat ,PK gs ,R k ,R j ,k d ,t 4 )…(15)

[0236] Among them, d 4 It represents the authentication hash factor calculated by the satellite for the user equipment in the process of sending the first access response message. The meanings of other parameters can be referred to the above description and will not be repeated here.

[0237] In some embodiments, the second access response message includes at least a fourth authentication factor (a 5 ), pseudo-identity (i.e., the PID in the previous text i,m ), the first temporary public key (i.e., R i ), the third timestamp (t 3 ), the fourth timestamp (t 4); wherein the fourth authentication factor is generated based on at least the first authentication hash value and the shared domain key.

[0238] Furthermore, the fourth authentication factor (a 5 ) satisfies at least the following expressions:

[0239] a 5 =h(ID j ,ID k ,R k ,R i ,a i-k ,k d ,t 4 )…(16)

[0240] The meaning of each parameter can be found in the previous description and will not be repeated here.

[0241] In other embodiments, when the satellite receives N access authentication requests sent by the user equipment in a set time period, a multi-level efficient batch verification mechanism can be implemented, so that the satellite can efficiently process a large number of access authentication requests from the user equipment, thereby reducing the satellite resources required to verify a large number of access authentication requests. The specific process is as follows:

[0242] First, within a set time period, N access authentication requests are received from a user device; wherein the N access authentication requests are used to request access to a ground station, and N is an integer greater than 1.

[0243] Secondly, when it is verified that the N access authentication requests are all valid according to the respective timestamps in the N access authentication requests, N authentication hash values ​​and N authentication hash factors of the N access authentication requests related to the user equipment are calculated according to the N access authentication requests;

[0244] Then, the N access authentication requests are verified to be legitimate according to the N authentication hash values ​​and the N authentication hash factors;

[0245] Finally, if it is verified that the N access authentication requests are all valid, a first access response message is sent to the user equipment, and a second access response message is sent to the ground station based on the first security channel.

[0246] For example, suppose N access authentication requests are ARs = [AR 1 ,AR 2 ,…,AR n1 ]; among them, AR i = <TID i ,ID k ,PK i ,a i-k ,a i,3 ,t i,3>, first, for each access authentication request, check the timestamp t i,3 Validity; Then, for each access authentication request, calculate the respective pseudo identity (for example, ), and based on their respective pseudo-identities, calculate their respective authentication hash values ​​(e.g., d' i,m =h(PID' i,m ,ID ncc ,PK u )), and their respective authentication hash factors (d' 3 =h(PID' i,m ,ID j ,ID k ,PK ncc ,PK sat ,PK gs ,PK i ,k d ,t 3 )), if (Σa i,3 )·P=n·PK u +(Σd' i,m )·PK ncc +Σd' 3 ·PK i , it is verified that the N access authentication requests are all valid, indicating that the user equipment sending the ARs is legal and the ARs has not been tampered with during the transmission process. A first access response message can be sent to the user equipment, and a second access response message can be sent to the ground station based on the first security channel.

[0247] In other embodiments, when the NCC needs to update the initial shared domain key to ensure the freshness, integrity and legitimacy of the domain key in real time, when the satellite receives the first domain key update message from the NCC, it can use its own key to generate a second domain key update message and send it to the ground station and user equipment within the signal coverage of the satellite, which may specifically include the following process:

[0248] First, a first domain key update message from an NCC is received, where the first domain key update message includes at least a fifth timestamp (t 5 ), domain key update signature (γ), NCC identity associated with NCC (i.e., ID ncc ) and the fourth temporary public key (i.e., P ncc ), the domain key update signature is generated by NCC based on the new shared domain key and the secret reconstruction value, and the secret reconstruction value CRT is calculated. The generation process of the domain key update signature can be referred to in detail. Figure 1 The relevant description is given in , and will not be repeated here.

[0249] Secondly, when the fifth timestamp is verified to be valid, a new shared domain key (eg, ).

[0250] Then, if the third verification value calculated based on the new shared key (for example, ) is equal to the fourth verification value (eg, PK ncc +h(ID ncc ,PK ncc ,PK u ,PK sat ,PK gs ,P ncc ,t 5 )·P ncc ), then send a second domain key update message to the ground station and the user equipment respectively; wherein the second domain key update message at least includes the first domain key update message ({ID ncc ,γ,P ncc ,t 5}), the satellite generates a sixth timestamp (t 6 ), a new temporary public key associated with the satellite (PP j ) and the new authentication factor (a 6 ).

[0251] Furthermore, the PP j 、a 6 Satisfy the following expressions respectively:

[0252] PP j =rr j ·P,rr j ∈F p ;

[0253] a 6 =s j +d 5 ·rr j , d 5 =h(ID ncc ,γ,PK ds ,PP j ,t 5 ,t 6 )…(17)

[0254] Among them, d 5 Characterizes the authentication hash factor that is recalculated by the satellite during the domain key update mechanism.

[0255] In the embodiment of the present application, the above-mentioned domain name update mechanism is used to ensure that the shared domain key can be securely and effectively updated even when the nodes change dynamically. Based on the domain key update signature and verification protocol, it is ensured that all authorized nodes can receive new and verifiable new shared domain keys, preventing the old shared domain keys from being used without authorization, thereby enhancing the overall security and reliability of the space-ground integrated network.

[0256] In the present application embodiment, based on the above Figure 6 In the method shown, when the satellite receives an access authentication request from a user device, first, the user device is verified to be legitimate based on the access authentication request. When the user device is verified to be legitimate, the user device can simultaneously send a first access response message and send a second access response message to the ground station based on the first security channel. Compared with the prior art, there is no need to perform one-to-one authentication of a one-way path, and three-party mutual authentication between the user device, the satellite and the ground station can be achieved, thereby improving the authentication efficiency of the entire access authentication process; secondly, the first security channel is a security channel shared by the satellite and the ground station to ensure the security of the two access response messages during transmission; the first access response message and the second access response message are used for the user device and the ground station to generate a first session key, and the first session key is used to construct a second security channel shared by the ground station and the user device to ensure that the ground station and the user device will not be tampered with or known by the satellite when performing data interaction, thereby ensuring the security of the entire access authentication process.

[0257] Figure 7 The flowchart of an access method on the user equipment side provided by an embodiment of the present application is exemplarily shown. The process can be Figure 1 The user equipment 101 shown in FIG. 1 is used to ensure the security of the entire access authentication process while also improving the efficiency of the entire access authentication process. Figure 7 As shown, the process includes the following steps:

[0258] 701: Send an access authentication request to the satellite.

[0259] In this step, the satellite can be Figure 1 For the satellite 102 shown, the access authentication request includes user authentication information of the user equipment and the ground identity of the ground station for which the user equipment requests to access.

[0260] In some embodiments, the user authentication information is generated by the user equipment based on the user registration information and system public parameters provided by the NCC, and the user authentication information at least includes a third timestamp (t 3 ), a temporary identity associated with the user device (TID i ), the first temporary public key (R i), the first authentication factor (a 3 ), and the first authentication hash value (a i-k ), the first authentication hash value is calculated based on at least the user registration information and the ground identity.

[0261] It should be noted that the specific calculation process of the various parameters included in the above user authentication information can refer to the above 601 related description, and will not be repeated here.

[0262] In other embodiments, before the user equipment sends an access authentication request to the satellite, it may also register and interact with the NCC so that it can subsequently implement access authentication with the satellite and ground station without the participation of the NCC. The specific process can be referred to above. Figure 3 The relevant description will not be repeated here.

[0263] In some other embodiments, when sending an access authentication request to a satellite, a login verification may also be performed, specifically:

[0264] In response to entering a new login password (PW' i ) and biometrics (BIO' i ), perform login verification according to the new login password, biometrics and login authentication information; when the user device login verification is successful, send the access authentication request to the satellite to ensure that the user is a legitimate user holding the user device, and that the device's login authentication parameters are complete, have not been tampered with and are valid.

[0265] Further, the new login password and the biometrics and login authentication information are used for login verification, which can be: Calculate σ' i =Rep(BIO' i ,v i ), RPW' i =h(PW' i ,σ' i ), Among them, σ' i is the recalculated biometric key, RPW' i To recalculate the biometric authentication factor of the password, based on the biometric fuzzy technology, a reconstruction function (e.g., Rep(BIO' i ,v i )=σ' i ), x' i is the parsed user coprime key value, k' d Share the domain key for the resolved user; then verify the equality (ver i =h(DX i ,DK i,x' i ,k' d )) is true, if so, confirm the command PW' entered by the user i and BIO' i Correct, and the parsed k' d and x' i Also correct; Next, randomly select an unused pseudo-identity login group in the database; for example, And calculate the relevant And verify the equation (ver i,m =h(DPID' i,m ,DS i,m ,DA i,m ,PID' i,m ,s' i,m ,a' i,m ,v i )) is true, if so, confirm the relevant login authentication parameters (for example, DPID i,m ,DS i,m ,ver i,m ) is intact and has not been tampered with, and PID' i,m ,s' i,m ,a' i,m correct.

[0267] 702: Receive a first access response message from a satellite.

[0268] In this step, the first access response message is sent by the satellite after verifying that the user equipment is legitimate based on the access authentication request.

[0269] In some embodiments, the first access response message includes at least a second authentication factor (a 4 ), the second timestamp (t 2 ), effective timestamp (t exp ), satellite identity associated with the satellite (i.e., ID j ) and the second temporary public key (i.e. R k ), the third temporary public key related to the ground station in the ground authentication information (R k ), and a fourth timestamp for indicating that the first access response message and the second access response message are sent simultaneously; wherein the second authentication factor is at least based on the third authentication factor related to the ground station in the ground authentication information (i.e., the a negotiated in the pre-negotiation mechanism in the foregoing text); 2 ) generated by

[0270] It should be noted that the specific calculation process of the parameters included in the first access response message can refer to the relevant description of 602 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0271] 703: After the first access response message is verified, a first session key is calculated based at least on the first access response message.

[0272] In this step, the first session key may be used to construct a second secure channel shared by the ground station and the user equipment.

[0273] In some embodiments, verifying that the first access response message is valid may include the following process:

[0274] After checking the fourth timestamp (t 4 ) and the effective timestamp (t exp ) are valid, calculate the authentication hash value (d') associated with the ground station k ) and the authentication hash factor (d' 2 ), and calculate the satellite-related authentication hash value (d j ') and the authentication hash factor (d' 2 ); if the fifth verification value calculated based on the authentication hash value and authentication hash factor related to the ground station, and the authentication hash value and authentication hash factor related to the satellite, is equal to the sixth verification value calculated based on the second authentication factor, then the first access response message is verified, which also indicates that both the satellite and the ground station are legal.

[0275] For example, when it is verified that the current timestamp does not reach the valid timestamp, and the difference between the current timestamp and the fourth timestamp is less than or equal to the acceptable time difference range, the following are calculated respectively:

[0276] d′ k =h(ID k ,ID ncc ,PK gs );

[0277] d′ j =h(ID j ,ID ncc ,PK sat );

[0278] d′ 2 =h(ID j ,ID k ,PK ncc ,PK gs ,R k ,R j ,k d ,t exp ,t 2 );

[0279] d' 4 =h(PID i,m ,ID j ,ID k ,PK ncc ,PK sat ,PK gs ,R k ,R j ,k d ,t 4 ).....(17)

[0280] If a 4 P=PK gs +PK sat +(d' k +d j ')·PK ncc +d' 2 ·R k +d' 4 ·R j , it indicates that both the satellite and the ground station are legal, and that the content of the first access response message is complete; where a 4 The calculation result of P represents the fifth verification value, PK gs +PK sat +(d' k +d j ')·PK ncc +d' 2 ·R k +d' 4 ·R j The calculation result represents the sixth verification value.

[0281] In some embodiments, the first session key calculated by the user device may satisfy the following expression:

[0282] Key i-k =h(PID i,m ,ID j ,ID k ,PK sat ,PK gs ,PK u ,r i ·R k ,k d ,t 2 ,t 3 ,t 4 )…(18)

[0283] It should be noted that the meaning of each parameter can be found in the previous text and will not be repeated here.

[0284] In other embodiments, after the satellite updates the shared domain key, it may also promptly inform the user equipment so that the user equipment updates the shared domain key, which may specifically include the following process:

[0285] Receive a second domain key update message from the satellite; wherein the second domain key update message at least includes the first domain key update message (i.e., the ID ncc ,γ,P ncc ,t 5 ), the sixth timestamp (t 6 ), a new temporary public key associated with the satellite (PP j ,) and the new authentication factor (a 6 ); the first domain key update message is sent by the NCC to the satellite, and at least includes: a fifth timestamp used to represent when the NCC sends the first domain key update message, a domain key update signature, an NCC identity related to the NCC, and a fourth temporary public key, the domain key update signature is generated by the NCC based on the new shared domain key and the secret reconstruction value, and the secret reconstruction value is calculated based on the CRT; when it is verified that the second domain key update message is valid, the new shared domain key is determined based on the domain key update signature.

[0286] In some embodiments, if the following equation is satisfied, then the second domain key update message is verified to be valid:

[0287] a 6 P=PK sat +d j ·PK ncc +d′ 5 ·PP j ;

[0288]

[0289] in; d′ 5 =h(ID ncc ,γ,PK ds ,PP j ,t 5 ,t 6 ), d j =h(ID j ,ID ncc ,PK sat ) to ensure that the received second domain key update message has not been tampered with and that the new shared domain key obtained by the user equipment is correct; in addition, the meaning of the above parameters can be referred to the previous description and will not be repeated here.

[0290] It should be noted that the specific calculation process of each parameter in the second domain key update message can refer to the relevant description in the above 602, and will not be repeated here.

[0291] In the embodiment of the present application, during the entire process of the user equipment accessing the ground station via the satellite, the beneficial effects are as follows:

[0292] First, the user device sends an access authentication request to the satellite. After the satellite verifies that the user device is legitimate based on the access authentication request, there is no need to wait for the satellite and the ground station to perform mutual authentication interaction. The satellite can directly feedback the first access response message to the user device. Compared with the prior art, there is no need to perform one-to-one authentication of a one-way path, and three-party mutual authentication between the user device, the satellite and the ground station can be achieved, thereby improving the authentication efficiency of the entire access authentication process. Secondly, the first session key can be calculated based on at least the first access response message, so as to facilitate the construction of a second security channel shared between the ground station and the user device based on the first session key, so as to ensure that the data interaction between the ground station and the user device will not be tampered with or known by the satellite, thereby ensuring the security of the entire access authentication process.

[0293] Figure 8 The flowchart of an access authentication method on the ground station side provided by an embodiment of the present application is exemplified. The process can be Figure 1 The ground station 103 shown in FIG. 1 is used to ensure the security of the entire access authentication process while also improving the efficiency of the entire access authentication process. Figure 8 As shown, the process includes the following steps:

[0294] 801: Receive a second access response message sent by a satellite from a first safety channel, where the first safety channel is a safety channel shared by the satellite and a ground station.

[0295] In some embodiments, the second access response message is sent by the satellite after verifying that the user equipment is legitimate based on the access authentication request sent by the user equipment.

[0296] In some embodiments, in some embodiments, the second access response message includes at least a fourth authentication factor (a 5 ), pseudo-identity (i.e., the PID in the previous text i,m ), the first temporary public key (i.e., R i ), the third timestamp (t 3 ), the fourth timestamp (t 4 ); wherein the fourth authentication factor is at least based on the first authentication hash value (a i-k ), the shared domain key is generated, please refer to the above expression (16) for details, which will not be repeated here.

[0297] In some other embodiments, before receiving the second access response message sent by the satellite from the first safety channel, the method further includes:

[0298] A pre-negotiation request is received from a satellite, the pre-negotiation request including satellite authentication information of the satellite and a first timestamp used to characterize when the satellite generates the pre-negotiation request; if the satellite is verified to be legitimate based on the satellite authentication information and the first timestamp, a pre-negotiation request response is sent to the satellite; wherein the pre-negotiation request response includes ground authentication information of the ground station, a second timestamp used to characterize that the ground station generates the pre-negotiation request response, and a valid timestamp used to characterize that access to the ground station is allowed, so that subsequent satellites can verify that the ground station is legitimate based on the ground authentication information, the second timestamp, and the valid timestamp, and then at least based on the ground authentication information, the second timestamp, and the NCC (such as Figure 1 The shared domain key (i.e., the initial shared domain key described above) obtained by the NCC100 shown in FIG. 1 generates a second session key for building a first secure channel shared by the satellite and the ground station, so that the satellite and the ground station complete mutual authentication in advance before the user equipment accesses, thereby reducing the authentication overhead and delay when the user equipment accesses. For the specific interaction process, please refer to Figure 5 , and will not be described again here.

[0299] In other embodiments, after the satellite updates the shared domain key, it may also promptly inform the ground station so that the ground station updates the shared domain key, which may specifically include the following process:

[0300] Receive a second domain key update message from the satellite; wherein the second domain key update message at least includes the first domain key update message (i.e., the ID ncc ,γ,P ncc ,t 5 ), the sixth timestamp (t 6 ), a new temporary public key associated with the satellite (PP j ,) and the new authentication factor (a 6 ); the first domain key update message is sent by the NCC to the satellite, and at least includes: a fifth timestamp used to represent when the NCC sends the first domain key update message, a domain key update signature, an NCC identity related to the NCC, and a fourth temporary public key, the domain key update signature is generated by the NCC based on the new shared domain key and the secret reconstruction value, and the secret reconstruction value is calculated by the CRT; when it is verified that the second domain key update message is valid, the new shared domain key is determined based on the domain key update signature.

[0301] In some embodiments, if the following equation is satisfied, then the second domain key update message is verified to be valid:

[0302] a 6 P=PKsat +d j ·PK ncc +d′ 5 ·PP j ;

[0303]

[0304] in; d′ 5 =h(ID ncc ,γ,PK ds ,PP j ,t 5 ,t 6 ), d j =h(ID j ,ID ncc ,PK sat ) to ensure that the received second domain key update message has not been tampered with and that the new shared domain key obtained by the ground station is correct; in addition, the meaning of the above parameters can be referred to the previous description and will not be repeated here.

[0305] In other embodiments, before the ground station receives the second access response message from the satellite, it may also register and interact with the NCC, so that access authentication with the user equipment and the ground station can be achieved without the participation of the NCC. The specific registration process can refer to the above Figure 4 The relevant description will not be repeated here.

[0306] 802: When it is verified that the second access response message is valid, a first session key is calculated based at least on the second access response message.

[0307] The first session key is used to establish a second secure channel shared by the ground station and the user equipment.

[0308] In some embodiments, verifying that the second access response message is valid may include the following process:

[0309] When it is verified that both the third timestamp and the fourth timestamp are valid, if the following equation is satisfied, it is verified that the second access response message is valid, which also indicates that the user equipment is legal:

[0310] a 5 =h(ID j ,ID k ,PK k ,PK i ,a' i-k ,k d ,t 4 )……(twenty one)

[0311] Among them, a' i-k=h(PID i,m ,ID j ,ID k ,PK i ,a' i, ' m ,t 3 ), used to represent the authentication hash value associated with the ground station and the satellite calculated by the user equipment, a' i, ' m =h(PID i,m ,ID k ,a u-k ,PK u ) is used to represent the authentication hash value related to the ground station calculated by the user equipment. The meaning of other parameters can be referred to the previous description and will not be repeated here.

[0312] In some embodiments, if the above equation (21) holds true, it indicates that the ground station has confirmed that the user device is a legitimate device based on the secret hash value and the shared domain key, and the parameters related to the user device have not been tampered with or replaced by the satellite or other devices during the transmission process.

[0313] In some embodiments, the first session key calculated by the ground station may satisfy the following expression:

[0314] Key k-i =h(PID i,m ,ID j ,ID k ,PK sat ,PK gs ,PK u ,r i ·R k ,k d ,t 2 ,t 3 ,t 4 )…(twenty two)

[0315] It should be noted that the meanings of the above parameters can be found in the previous description and will not be repeated here.

[0316] In the embodiment of the present application, during the entire process of the user equipment accessing the ground station via the satellite, the beneficial effects are as follows:

[0317] First, a second access response message sent by the satellite is received from a first security channel. The first security channel is a security channel shared by the satellite and the ground station. Compared with the prior art, the process of mutual authentication between the ground station and the satellite can be omitted, thereby improving the efficiency of the entire access authentication process and ensuring the security and integrity of data transmission between the ground station and the satellite. Secondly, when it is verified that the second access response message is valid, a first session key is calculated at least based on the second access response message. The first session key is used to construct a second security channel shared by the user device and the ground station to ensure that data interaction between the ground station and the user device will not be tampered with or known by the satellite, thereby ensuring the security of the entire access authentication process.

[0318] Based on the above Figure 6 , Figure 7 , Figure 8 , Fig. 9 The following is a schematic diagram of signaling interaction of a complete access authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present application. It should be noted that the following user equipment may be Figure 1 The user equipment 101 shown, the satellite may be Figure 1 Satellite 102 is shown, and the ground station can be Figure 1 The ground station 103 is shown. Fig. 9 As shown, the following steps may be included:

[0319] 901: The user equipment sends a signal carrying {TID i ,ID k ,R i ,a i-k ,a 3 ,t 3} access authentication request.

[0320] 902: After receiving the access authentication request, the satellite performs a legality verification on the user equipment based on the access authentication request.

[0321] 903: After the satellite verifies that the user equipment is legitimate, it sends a message carrying {ID j ,R k ,R j ,a 4 ,t exp ,t 2 ,t 4}, and sends a first access response message carrying {PID i,m ,R i ,a 5 ,t 3 ,t 4}'s second access response message.

[0322] 904a: The user equipment verifies the validity of the first access response message, and after verifying that the first access response message is valid, calculates the Key shared with the ground station. i-k .

[0323] 904b: The ground station verifies the validity of the second access response message, and after verifying that the second access response message is valid, calculates the Key shared with the user equipment. k-i .

[0324] 905: The ground station and the user equipment are based on the key k-i =Key i-k A shared second safety channel is established so that the user equipment can obtain services and data of the ground station through the second safety channel.

[0325] It should be noted that the meaning and calculation process of the above parameters can be found in the previous text and will not be repeated here.

[0326] In an embodiment of the present application, during the mutual authentication process among the user equipment, the satellite and the ground station, when the satellite receives the access authentication request of the user equipment and verifies that the user equipment is legitimate, it can send respective access response messages to the ground station and the user equipment respectively. Based on the first security channel shared by the ground station and the satellite, and the second security channel shared by the ground station and the user equipment, the entire access authentication process can be effectively integrated without the need for one-to-one authentication of a one-way path, thereby simplifying the authentication steps and reducing communication overhead and processing time. The established security channel is only for use by both parties without the participation of a third party, thereby ensuring the security of the entire access authentication process.

[0327] Based on the same technical concept, a satellite is also provided in an embodiment of the present application, which can implement the method flow of the access authentication method on the satellite side in the embodiment of the present application.

[0328] Fig.10 The schematic diagram of the structure of a satellite provided by an embodiment of the present application is exemplarily shown. Fig.10 As shown, the satellite includes a receiving module 1001 , a checking module 1002 , and a sending module 1003 .

[0329] The receiving module 1001 is used to receive an access authentication request from a user equipment; wherein the access authentication request includes user authentication information of the user equipment and a ground identity of the user equipment requesting to access a ground station.

[0330] The sending module 1003 is used to send a first access response message to the user equipment after the verification module 1002 verifies that the user equipment is legitimate according to the access authentication request, and send a second access response message to the ground station based on a first security channel; wherein the first access response message and the second access response message are used for the user equipment and the ground station to generate a first session key, and the first session key is used to construct a second security channel shared by the ground station and the user equipment; the first security channel is a security channel shared by the satellite and the ground station.

[0331] Based on the same technical concept, a user device is also provided in an embodiment of the present application, and the user device can implement the method flow of the access authentication method on the user device side in the embodiment of the present application.

[0332] Fig.11 The following is a schematic diagram showing the structure of a user equipment provided by an embodiment of the present application. Fig.11 As shown, the user equipment includes a sending module 1101, a receiving module 1102, and a session key calculation module 1103.

[0333] The sending module 1101 is used to send an access authentication request to the satellite; wherein the access authentication request includes the user authentication information of the user equipment and the ground identity of the user equipment requesting to access the ground station.

[0334] The receiving module 1102 is configured to receive a first access response message from the satellite; wherein the first access response message is sent by the satellite after verifying that the user equipment is legitimate based on the access authentication request.

[0335] The session key calculation module 1103 is used to calculate a first session key shared with the ground station based at least on the first access response message after verifying that the first access response message is valid; wherein the first session key is used to construct a second security channel shared between the ground station and the user equipment.

[0336] Based on the same technical concept, a ground station is also provided in an embodiment of the present application, which can implement the method flow of the above-mentioned access method on the ground station side in the embodiment of the present application.

[0337] Fig.12 The structural diagram of a ground station provided by an embodiment of the present application is exemplarily shown. Fig.12 As shown, the ground station includes a receiving module 1201 and a session key calculation module 1202.

[0338] The receiving module 1201 is used to receive a second access response message sent by the satellite from a first security channel; wherein the first security channel is a security channel shared by the satellite and the ground station; and the second access response message is sent by the satellite after verifying that the user equipment is legitimate based on the access authentication request sent by the user equipment.

[0339] The session key calculation module 1202 is used to calculate a first session key based at least on the second access response message after verifying that the second access response message is valid; wherein the first session key is used to construct a second security channel shared by the ground station and the user equipment.

[0340] It should be noted here that the above-mentioned device provided in the embodiment of the present application can implement all the method steps in the above-mentioned method embodiment and can achieve the same technical effect. The parts and beneficial effects of this embodiment that are the same as the method embodiment will not be described in detail here.

[0341] Based on the same technical concept, a communication device is also provided in an embodiment of the present application, and the electronic device can realize the respective functions of the aforementioned satellite, user equipment, and ground station.

[0342] Fig.13 A schematic diagram of the structure of a communication device provided in an embodiment of the present application is exemplified.

[0343] At least one processor 1301, and a memory 1302 connected to the at least one processor 1301. The specific connection medium between the processor 1301 and the memory 1302 is not limited in the embodiment of the present application. Fig.13 In the example, the processor 1301 and the memory 1302 are connected via the bus 1300. The bus 1300 is Fig.13 The bus 1300 is represented by a bold line, and the connection between other components is only for schematic illustration and is not intended to be limiting. The bus 1300 can be divided into an address bus, a data bus, a control bus, etc. For ease of representation, Fig.13 Only one thick line is used in the figure, but it does not mean that there is only one bus or one type of bus. Alternatively, the processor 1301 can also be called a controller, and there is no limitation on the name.

[0344] In the embodiment of the present application, the memory 1302 stores instructions that can be executed by at least one processor 1301. The at least one processor 1301 can execute a data processing method discussed above by executing the instructions stored in the memory 1302. The processor 1301 can implement Fig.10 , Fig.11 , Fig.12 The functions of each module in the device shown.

[0345] Among them, the processor 1301 is the control center of the device, which can use various interfaces and lines to connect the various parts of the entire control device, and monitor the device as a whole by running or executing instructions stored in the memory 1302 and calling the data stored in the memory 1302, the various functions of the device and processing data.

[0346] In the embodiment of the present application, the processor 1301 may include one or more processing units, and the processor 1301 may integrate an application processor and a modem processor, wherein the application processor mainly processes an operating system, a user interface, and application programs, and the modem processor mainly processes wireless communications. It is understandable that the modem processor may not be integrated into the processor 1301. In some embodiments, the processor 1301 and the memory 1302 may be implemented on the same chip, and in some embodiments, they may also be implemented separately on separate chips.

[0347] The processor 1301 may be a general-purpose processor, such as a central processing unit (CPU), a digital signal processor, an application-specific integrated circuit, a field programmable gate array or other programmable logic device, a discrete gate or transistor logic device, or a discrete hardware component, and may implement or execute the methods, steps, and logic block diagrams disclosed in the embodiments of the present application. A general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor or any conventional processor, etc. The steps of an access authentication method disclosed in the embodiments of the present application may be directly embodied as being executed by a hardware processor, or may be executed by a combination of hardware and software modules in the processor.

[0348] Memory 1302, as a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium, can be used to store non-volatile software programs, non-volatile computer executable programs and modules. Memory 1302 may include at least one type of storage medium, such as flash memory, hard disk, multimedia card, card-type memory, random access memory (RandomAccess Memory, RAM), static random access memory (Static RandomAccess Memory, SRAM), programmable read-only memory (Programmable Read Only Memory, PROM), read-only memory (Read Only Memory, ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory, EEPROM), magnetic memory, disk, optical disk, etc. Memory 1302 is any other medium that can be used to carry or store a desired program code in the form of an instruction or data structure and can be accessed by a computer, but is not limited thereto. The memory 1302 in the embodiment of the present application can also be a circuit or any other device that can realize a storage function, for storing program instructions and / or data.

[0349] By programming the processor 1301, the code corresponding to the access authentication method described in the above embodiment can be fixed into the chip, so that the chip can execute the code when running. Figure 6 , Figure 7 , Figure 8 The embodiment shown is an access authentication method. How to design and program the processor 1301 is a technology well known to those skilled in the art and will not be described in detail here.

[0350] It should be noted here that the above-mentioned communication device provided in the embodiment of the present application can implement all the method steps implemented in the above-mentioned method embodiment, and can achieve the same technical effect. The parts and beneficial effects that are the same as the method embodiment in this embodiment will not be described in detail here.

[0351] Based on the same technical concept, an embodiment of the present application provides a computer storage medium, the computer storage medium includes: a computer program code, when the computer program code is executed on a computer, the computer executes any one of the access authentication methods discussed above. Since the principle of solving the problem by the above-mentioned computer storage medium is similar to that of an access authentication method, the implementation of the above-mentioned computer storage medium can refer to the implementation of the method, and the repeated parts will not be repeated.

[0352] In the specific implementation process, the computer storage medium may include: Universal Serial Bus Flash Drive (USB), mobile hard disk, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disk or optical disk, and other storage media that can store program codes.

[0353] Based on the same technical concept, the embodiment of the present application also provides a computer program product, which includes: computer program code, when the computer program code is run on a computer, the computer executes any one of the access authentication methods discussed above. Since the principle of solving the problem by the above computer program product is similar to that of an access authentication method, the implementation of the above computer program product can refer to the implementation of the method, and the repeated parts will not be repeated.

[0354] The computer program product may employ any combination of one or more readable media. The readable medium may be a readable signal medium or a readable storage medium. The readable storage medium may be, for example, but not limited to, an electrical, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor system, device or device, or any combination thereof. More specific examples (non-exhaustive list) of readable storage media include: an electrical connection with one or more conductors, a portable disk, a hard disk, a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), an optical fiber, a portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), an optical storage device, a magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination thereof.

[0355] The method in the present application can be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, firmware or any combination thereof. When implemented by software, it can be implemented in whole or in part in the form of a computer program product. The computer program product includes one or more computer programs or instructions. When the computer program or instruction is loaded and executed on a computer, the process or function described in the present application is executed in whole or in part. The computer can be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, a network device, a user device, a core network device, an OAM or other programmable device.

[0356] The computer program or instructions may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium, for example, the computer program or instructions may be transmitted from one website, computer, server or data center to another website, computer, server or data center by wired or wireless means. The computer-readable storage medium may be any available medium that can be accessed by a computer or a data storage device such as a server or data center that integrates one or more available media. The available medium may be a magnetic medium, such as a floppy disk, a hard disk, or a magnetic tape; it may also be an optical medium, such as a digital video disk; it may also be a semiconductor medium, such as a solid-state drive. The computer-readable storage medium may be a volatile or non-volatile storage medium, or may include both volatile and non-volatile types of storage media.

[0357] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the embodiments of the present application may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present application may adopt the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment in combination with software and hardware. Moreover, the present application may adopt the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage and optical storage, etc.) that contain computer-usable program code.

[0358] The present application is described with reference to the flowcharts and / or block diagrams of the methods, devices (systems), and computer program products according to the embodiments of the present application. It should be understood that each process and / or box in the flowchart and / or block diagram, as well as the combination of the processes and / or boxes in the flowchart and / or block diagram, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device to generate a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device generate instructions for implementing the processes in the flowchart and / or block diagram. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that has the functions specified in one or more boxes.

[0359] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to work in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture including an instruction device, which implements the process Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A function specified in one or more boxes.

[0360] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device so that a series of operating steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions for implementing the process. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps for the functions specified in one or more boxes.

[0361] Obviously, those skilled in the art can make various changes and modifications to the present application without departing from the spirit and scope of the present application. Thus, if these modifications and variations of the present invention fall within the scope of the claims of the present application and their equivalents, the present application is also intended to include these modifications and variations.

Claims

1. An access authentication method, characterized in that: Applied to a satellite, the method comprises: Receiving an access authentication request from a user device; wherein the access authentication request includes user authentication information of the user device and a ground identity of the user device requesting access to a ground station; After verifying that the user equipment is legitimate according to the access authentication request, sending a first access response message to the user equipment, and sending a second access response message to the ground station based on the first security channel; Among them, the first access response message and the second access response message are used for the user equipment and the ground station to generate a first session key, and the first session key is used to construct a second security channel shared by the ground station and the user equipment; the first security channel is a security channel shared by the satellite and the ground station.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Before receiving the access authentication request from the user equipment, the method further includes: Sending a pre-negotiation request to the ground station; wherein the pre-negotiation request includes satellite authentication information of the satellite and a first timestamp used to characterize when the satellite generates the pre-negotiation request; Receiving a pre-negotiation request response sent by the ground station; wherein the pre-negotiation request response is sent by the ground station after verifying that the satellite is legitimate based on the satellite authentication information and the first timestamp, and the pre-negotiation request response includes the ground authentication information of the ground station, a second timestamp used to indicate that the ground station generates the pre-negotiation request response, and a valid timestamp used to indicate that access to the ground station is allowed; When the ground station is verified to be legitimate based on the ground authentication information, the second timestamp, and the valid timestamp, a second session key is generated based at least on the ground authentication information, the second timestamp, and a shared domain key obtained from the network control center NCC; wherein the shared domain key is generated using the Chinese Remainder Theorem CRT, and the second session key is used to construct the first secure channel.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The user authentication information is generated by the user equipment based on the user registration information and system public parameters provided by the NCC, and the user authentication information at least includes: a third timestamp used to characterize when the user equipment generates the access authentication request, a temporary identity related to the user equipment, a first temporary public key, a first authentication factor, and a first authentication hash value between the user equipment and the ground station, wherein the first authentication hash value is calculated based on at least the user registration information and the ground identity; The verifying that the user equipment is legitimate according to the access authentication request includes: When it is verified that the third timestamp is valid, calculating the pseudo identity of the user equipment based on at least the temporary identity, the third timestamp, and the shared domain key; calculating a second authentication hash value of the user device based at least on the pseudo-identity; Calculating a first authentication hash factor of the user device based at least on the pseudo identity, the ground identity, the third timestamp, the shared domain key, and the system public parameter; If the first verification value calculated based on the second authentication hash value and the first authentication hash factor is equal to the second verification value calculated based on the first authentication factor, it is verified that the user equipment is legitimate.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The first access response message includes at least a second authentication factor, the second timestamp, the valid timestamp, a satellite identity and a second temporary public key related to the satellite, a third temporary public key related to the ground station in the ground authentication information, and a fourth timestamp used to indicate that the first access response message and the second access response message are sent simultaneously; wherein the second authentication factor is generated based on at least the third authentication factor related to the ground station in the ground authentication information; The second access response message includes at least a fourth authentication factor, the pseudo identity, the first temporary public key, the third timestamp, and the fourth timestamp; wherein the fourth authentication factor is generated based on at least the first authentication hash value and the shared domain key.

5. The method according to any one of claims 2 to 4, characterized in that: The method further comprises: receiving a first domain key update message from an NCC; wherein the first domain key update message includes at least a fifth timestamp used to indicate when the NCC generates the first domain key update message, a domain key update signature, an NCC identity related to the NCC, and a fourth temporary public key, the domain key update signature is generated by the NCC based on a new shared domain key and a secret reconstruction value, and the secret reconstruction value is calculated based on the CRT; When it is verified that the fifth timestamp is valid, determining the new shared domain key based on the domain key update signature; If the third verification value calculated based on the new shared key is equal to the fourth verification value calculated based on the NCC identity, the fourth temporary public key and the fifth timestamp, a second domain key update message is sent to the ground station and the user equipment respectively; wherein the second domain key update message includes at least the first domain key update message, the sixth timestamp at which the satellite generates the second domain key update message, a new temporary public key related to the satellite, and a new authentication factor.

6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that: The method further comprises: In a set time period, N access authentication requests sent by the user equipment are received; wherein the N access authentication requests are used to request access to the ground station, and N is an integer greater than 1; When it is verified that the N access authentication requests are all valid according to respective timestamps in the N access authentication requests, calculating, according to the N access authentication requests, N authentication hash values ​​and N authentication hash factors associated with the user equipment for each of the N access authentication requests; Performing a legality check on the N access authentication requests according to the N authentication hash values ​​and the N authentication hash factors; If it is verified that the N access authentication requests are all valid, the first access response message is sent to the user equipment, and a second access response message is sent to the ground station based on the first security channel.

7. An access authentication method, characterized in that: Applied to user equipment, the method comprises: Sending an access authentication request to the satellite; wherein the access authentication request includes user authentication information of the user equipment and a ground identity of the user equipment requesting access to a ground station; receiving a first access response message from the satellite; wherein the first access response message is sent by the satellite after verifying that the user equipment is legitimate based on the access authentication request; After verifying that the first access response message is valid, a first session key is calculated based on the first access response message; wherein the first session key is used to establish a second security channel shared between the ground station and the user equipment.

8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that The user authentication information is generated by the user equipment based on the user registration information and system public parameters provided by the network control center NCC, and the user authentication information at least includes: a third timestamp used to characterize that the user equipment generates the access authentication request, a temporary identity of the user equipment, a first temporary public key, a first authentication factor, and a first authentication hash value between the user equipment and the ground station, wherein the first authentication hash value is calculated based on at least the user registration information and the ground identity; The first access response message includes at least a second authentication factor, a second timestamp, a valid timestamp, a satellite identity and a second temporary public key related to the satellite, a third temporary public key related to the ground station in ground authentication information, and a fourth timestamp used to represent the sending of the first access response message; wherein the ground authentication information, the second timestamp, and the valid timestamp are obtained by the satellite from the ground station, the second authentication factor is generated based on at least the third authentication factor related to the ground station in the ground authentication information, and the valid timestamp is used to represent the timestamp for allowing access to the ground station.

9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that The verifying that the first access response message is valid includes: When it is verified that the fourth timestamp and the valid timestamp are both valid, calculating an authentication hash value and an authentication hash factor associated with the ground station, and calculating an authentication hash value and an authentication hash factor associated with the satellite; If the fifth verification value calculated based on the authentication hash value and authentication hash factor associated with the ground station, and the authentication hash value and authentication hash factor associated with the satellite, is equal to the sixth verification value calculated based on the second authentication factor, then the first access response message is verified to be valid.

10. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that The method further comprises: receiving a second domain key update message from the satellite; wherein the second domain key update message at least includes the first domain key update message, the sixth timestamp when the satellite sends the second domain key update message, a new temporary public key related to the satellite, and a new authentication factor; the first domain key update message is sent by a network control center NCC to the satellite, and at least includes: a fifth timestamp used to represent when the NCC sends the first domain key update message, a domain key update signature, an NCC identity related to the NCC, and a fourth temporary public key, the domain key update signature is generated by the NCC based on a new shared domain key and a secret reconstruction value, and the secret reconstruction value is calculated based on the Chinese remainder theorem CRT; When it is verified that the second domain key update message is valid, the new shared domain key is determined based on the domain key update signature.

11. An access authentication method, characterized in that: Applied to a ground station, the method comprises: receiving a second access response message sent by the satellite from a first security channel; wherein the first security channel is a security channel shared by the satellite and the ground station; and the second access response message is sent by the satellite after verifying that the user equipment is legitimate based on an access authentication request sent by the user equipment; After verifying that the second access response message is valid, a first session key is calculated based at least on the second access response message; wherein the first session key is used to construct a second secure channel shared by the ground station and the user equipment.

12. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that Before receiving the second access response message sent by the satellite from the first safety channel, the method further includes: Receiving a pre-negotiation request sent by the satellite; wherein the pre-negotiation request includes satellite authentication information of the satellite and a first timestamp used to characterize when the satellite generates the pre-negotiation request; If the satellite is verified to be legitimate based on the satellite authentication information and the first timestamp, a pre-negotiation request response is sent to the satellite; wherein the pre-negotiation request response includes ground authentication information of the ground station, a second timestamp used to indicate that the ground station generates the pre-negotiation request response, and a valid timestamp used to indicate that access to the ground station is allowed.

13. The method according to claim 12, characterized in that The method further comprises: receiving a second domain key update message from the satellite; wherein the second domain key update message at least includes the first domain key update message, the sixth timestamp when the satellite sends the second domain key update message, a new temporary public key related to the satellite, and a new authentication factor; the first domain key update message is sent by a network control center NCC to the satellite, and at least includes: a fifth timestamp used to represent when the NCC sends the first domain key update message, a domain key update signature, an NCC identity related to the NCC, and a fourth temporary public key, the domain key update signature is generated by the NCC based on a new shared domain key and a secret reconstruction value, and the secret reconstruction value is calculated based on the Chinese remainder theorem CRT; When it is verified that the second domain key update message is valid, the new shared domain key is determined based on the domain key update signature.

14. A communication device, characterized in that: include: Memory, used to store computer programs; A processor, for implementing the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, or executing the method according to any one of claims 7 to 10, or executing the method according to any one of claims 11 to 13, when executing the computer program stored in the memory.

15. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, it implements the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, or executes the method according to any one of claims 7 to 10, or executes the method according to any one of claims 11 to 13.

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