Quantum security traceable time domain privacy protection method and device
By using the temporary unique identity logo for anonymous protection by the sender during offline transactions, and under the supervision of the central agency, the offline transaction can be traced back trading. Safety and efficiency balance.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411369733.2
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-09-29
- Publication Date
- 2025-01-21
AI Technical Summary
The prior art cannot regulate anonymous identities when the sender and the receiver trade offline, resulting in the inability to achieve traceable regulatory requirements of the central organization.
The sender sends the long-term unique identity to the central agency, generates keys for different regions and stores them in the cryptographic devices of the sender and the receiver. The sender calculates the temporary unique identity based on the long-term unique identity, regional key and time period. Identification for anonymity protection during offline transactions and for traceability supervision when linked to a central authority.
In the offline trading scenario of the sender and the receiving party, anonymous protection is achieved, and the traceable supervision of the sender of offline transactions is not regulated when the central institution is connected to the central institution.
Smart Images
Figure CN119341740A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the field of data security technology, and in particular to a quantum-safe traceable time-domain privacy protection method and device. Background Art
[0002] In the digital age, senders and receivers need to protect the anonymity of their transaction identities when conducting digital asset transactions. If necessary, the central agency needs to supervise the anonymous identities in real name to achieve the central traceable supervision requirements. The current main technical solution is to use blockchain and asymmetric cryptography to achieve anonymous supervision of senders and receivers when both senders and receivers are online transactions, and the transaction identities are anonymized for each transaction.
[0003] However, anonymous identities cannot be monitored if both the sender and the receiver are unable to connect online to a central authority for a period of time. Summary of the invention
[0004] In view of the above analysis, the embodiments of the present invention aim to provide a traceable time-domain privacy protection method and device to solve the problem that anonymous identities in existing offline transactions cannot be supervised.
[0005] On the one hand, an embodiment of the present invention provides a traceable time-domain privacy protection method, including: a sender sends a long-term unique identity to a central agency, so that the central agency obtains a unique identity table; the central agency generates keys for different regions and sends the keys for different regions to the corresponding senders and receivers respectively and stores the keys for different regions in cryptographic devices of the sender and the receiver; when the sender conducts offline transactions with multiple different receivers in different regions and in different time periods, the sender calculates a temporary unique identity based on its long-term unique identity, the keys for the regions to which it belongs and the time periods for the regions to which it belongs; and the sender uses the temporary unique identity to conduct offline transactions with multiple different receivers, wherein the central agency performs traceability supervision on previous offline transactions between the sender and the receiver.
[0006] The beneficial effects of the above technical solution are as follows: in offline transaction scenarios between senders and receivers, the same temporary unique identity is used within a certain time and domain to anonymously protect the sender identity of multiple offline transactions, taking into account the actual transaction scenarios and transaction frequencies. Moreover, after the sender and receiver are linked to the central agency, the sender of the offline transaction can be traceably supervised.
[0007] Based on a further improvement of the above method, the sender calculates the temporary unique identity according to its long-term unique identity, the key of the region to which it belongs and the time period of the region to which it belongs, further including calculating the temporary unique identity by the following formula:
[0008] TID i,j =PRF(Key_FD i , ID, t j ),
[0009] Among them, TID i,j PRF(Key_FD i , ID i , t j ) is a pseudo-random function constructed using symmetric cryptography and has quantum computing resistance; ID is the long-term unique identity of the sender; Key_FD i is the key of the ith region; and t j is the j-th time period, and i and j are both positive integers greater than or equal to 1.
[0010] Based on the further improvement of the above method, the traceable time domain privacy protection method also includes: the sender sets the time period according to the transaction frequency and the regional scope, wherein the temporary unique identity identifiers of the same time period are set to be the same; and the temporary unique identity identifiers of different time periods are set to be different.
[0011] Based on the further improvement of the above method, the sender uses the temporary unique identity to conduct offline transactions with multiple different recipients further including: the sender uses the same temporary unique identity to conduct offline transactions with the multiple different recipients in the same area and the same time period; the sender uses different temporary unique identity to conduct offline transactions with the multiple different recipients in the same area and different time periods; the sender uses different temporary unique identity to conduct offline transactions with the multiple different recipients in different areas and the same time period; or the sender uses different temporary unique identity to conduct offline transactions with the multiple different recipients in different areas and different time periods.
[0012] Based on the further improvement of the above method, before the sender uses the temporary unique identity to conduct offline transactions with multiple different receivers, the central agency generates a domain name d i , and then the domain name d i Send to the sender; or the sender generates the domain name d of the i-th zone i , and then the domain name d i Sent to the central agency.
[0013] Based on the further improvement of the above method, the traceability supervision of the previous offline transaction between the sender and the receiver by the central institution further includes: when the sender is in the jth time period t in the i-th area j During the offline transaction with multiple different recipients, the central agency uses the root key Root_Key, the domain name d of the i-th region i , the jth time period t j And different long-term unique identifiers in the unique identifier table calculate multiple temporary unique identifiers to be verified; the current temporary unique identifier TID used in the offline transaction process i,j Compare with multiple temporary unique identities to be verified respectively; when the current temporary unique identity TID is used in the offline transaction process i,j If the unique identifier is the same as any one of the multiple temporary unique identifiers to be verified, the unique identifier table is used to obtain the current temporary unique identifier TID i,j A corresponding long-term unique identity identifier is used to determine the identity of the sender based on the long-term unique identity identifier.
[0014] Based on the further improvement of the above method, the central agency generates the key Key_FD for different regions i It further includes: the central agency generates a root key Root_Key using a physical noise source or a quantum noise source, according to the domain name d of the i-th region i Calculate the key Key_FD of the i-th region using the root key Root_Key i :
[0015] Key_FD i =PRF(Root_Key, d i ),
[0016] Among them, PRF(Root_Key, d i ) is a pseudo-random function constructed using symmetric cryptography and has the ability to resist quantum computing.
[0017] On the other hand, an embodiment of the present invention provides a traceable time-domain privacy protection device, including: a long-term identity identification module, which is used to send a long-term unique identity identification to a central agency through a sender, so that the central agency obtains a unique identity identification table; a regional key generation module, which generates keys for different regions through the central agency and sends the keys for the different regions to the corresponding senders and receivers respectively; a regional key storage module, which is used to store the keys for different regions in the cryptographic devices of the sender and the receiver; a temporary identity identification module, which is used when the sender conducts offline transactions with multiple different receivers in different regions and in different time periods, the sender calculates a temporary unique identity identification based on its long-term unique identity identification, the key of the region to which it belongs, and the time period of the region to which it belongs; a transaction module, in which the sender uses the temporary unique identity identification to conduct offline transactions with multiple different receivers; and a traceability supervision module, which performs traceability supervision on previous offline transactions between the sender and the receiver through the central agency.
[0018] Based on the further improvement of the above device, the temporary identity module further comprises calculating the temporary unique identity by the following formula:
[0019] TID i,j =PRF(Key_FD i , ID, t j ),
[0020] Among them, TID i,j PRF(Key_FD i , ID, t j ) is a pseudo-random function constructed using symmetric cryptography and has quantum computing resistance; ID is the long-term unique identity of the sender; Key_FD i is the key of the ith region; and t j is the j-th time period, and i and j are both positive integers greater than or equal to 1.
[0021] Based on the further improvement of the above device, the traceability supervision module further includes a temporary identity determination submodule, a comparison submodule and a real identity determination submodule, wherein the temporary identity determination submodule, when the sender is in the i-th area in the j-th time period t j During the offline transaction with multiple different recipients, the central agency uses the root key Root_Key, the domain name d of the i-th region i , the jth time period t jand calculating multiple temporary unique identities to be verified from different long-term unique identities in the unique identity table; the comparison submodule is used to compare the current temporary unique identity TID used in the offline transaction process i,j The real identity determination submodule is used to compare the current temporary unique identity TID used in the offline transaction process. i,j If the unique identifier is the same as any one of the multiple temporary unique identifiers to be verified, the unique identifier table is used to obtain the current temporary unique identifier TID i,j A corresponding long-term unique identity identifier is used to determine the identity of the sender based on the long-term unique identity identifier.
[0022] Compared with the prior art, the present invention can achieve at least one of the following beneficial effects:
[0023] 1. In offline transaction scenarios between senders and receivers, the same temporary unique identity is used within a certain time and domain to protect the sender identity of multiple transactions anonymously, taking into account the actual transaction scenario and transaction frequency. After the sender and receiver are linked to the central agency, the sender of the offline transaction can be traceably supervised.
[0024] 2. Use quantum-safe symmetric cryptography technology to achieve the idea of phased anonymity combined with time domain. Specifically, within a certain area and a period of time, the same temporary identity is used for offline transactions to avoid using different temporary identities for each offline transaction. It can be achieved by only using symmetric cryptography technology to quickly calculate the temporary identity, which can be used for a period of time. It achieves a good balance between security and efficiency, and also meets actual application needs. For example, users are unlikely to frequently conduct offline transactions in a region within a period of time.
[0025] 3. Through phased offline anonymous transactions combined with time domain, the offline transaction process is simplified under the premise of anti-quantum computing security, thereby improving offline transaction efficiency.
[0026] In the present invention, the above-mentioned technical solutions can also be combined with each other to achieve more preferred combination solutions. Other features and advantages of the present invention will be described in the subsequent description, and some advantages can become obvious from the description, or can be understood by practicing the present invention. The purpose and other advantages of the present invention can be realized and obtained through the contents particularly pointed out in the description and the drawings. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0027] The drawings are only for the purpose of illustrating particular embodiments and are not to be considered limiting of the present invention. Like reference symbols denote like components throughout the drawings.
[0028] Figure 1 It is a diagram showing the principle of the existing group signature technology;
[0029] Figure 2 is a flowchart of a traceable time domain privacy protection method according to an embodiment of the present invention;
[0030] Figure 3 is the sender and the receiver in the i-th region in time period t according to the embodiment of the present invention j An illustration of inner k ratio transactions; and
[0031] Figure 4 4 is a block diagram of a traceable time-domain privacy protection device according to an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0032] The preferred embodiments of the present invention are described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, wherein the accompanying drawings constitute a part of this application and are used together with the embodiments of the present invention to illustrate the principles of the present invention, but are not used to limit the scope of the present invention.
[0033] refer to Figure 2 A specific embodiment of the present invention discloses a traceable time domain privacy protection method, including: in step S201, a sender sends a long-term unique identity to a central agency, so that the central agency obtains a unique identity table, specifically, the central agency generates a unique identity table according to the long-term unique identities from multiple senders; in step S202, the central agency generates keys for different regions and sends the keys for different regions to the corresponding senders and receivers respectively and stores the keys for different regions in the cryptographic devices of the sender and the receiver; in step S203, when the sender conducts offline transactions with multiple different receivers in different regions and in different time periods, the sender calculates a temporary unique identity according to its long-term unique identity, the key of the region to which it belongs and the time period of the region to which it belongs; and in step S204, the sender conducts offline transactions with multiple different receivers using the temporary unique identity, wherein the central agency monitors the traceability (traceability means that the central agency can obtain the long-term unique identity of the sender through calculation based on known relevant information) of previous offline transactions between the sender and the receiver.
[0034] Compared to online transactions (where both the sender and the receiver can connect to the central agency online in real time), during offline transactions, the sender and the receiver cannot connect to the central agency online for a period of time, but the sender and the receiver can conduct transactions ( Figure 3The two dotted lines represent that both the sender and the receiver cannot connect to the central agency online, but the solid lines represent that both parties can conduct transactions normally without being able to connect to the central agency online), and after a period of time, the sender or the receiver can connect to the central agency online. During the offline transaction, the sender is protected by staged anonymity (that is, staged anonymity is to use the sender's temporary unique identifier to process multiple transactions within a certain period of time and domain).
[0035] Compared with the prior art, the traceable time domain privacy protection method provided in this embodiment uses the same temporary unique identity to anonymously protect the sender identity of multiple transactions (i.e., phased anonymity) in a certain time and domain in offline transaction scenarios between senders and receivers, taking into account the actual transaction scenarios and transaction frequencies. Moreover, after the sender and receiver are linked to the central agency, the transaction sender can be traceably supervised.
[0036] In the following, reference Figure 2 , each step in the traceable time domain privacy protection method according to an embodiment of the present invention is described in detail.
[0037] In step S201, the sender sends the long-term unique identity to the central agency so that the central agency can obtain the unique identity table. For example, the sender may include one or more senders. When multiple senders send multiple long-term unique identities (for example, identity card numbers, mobile phone numbers or WeChat accounts) to the central agency, the central agency stores the multiple long-term unique identities as a unique identity table to facilitate the calculation of multiple temporary unique identities to be verified in the subsequent traceability supervision process and match them with the temporary unique identities used by the sender during the transaction.
[0038] In step S202, the central agency generates keys for different regions and sends the keys for different regions to the corresponding sender and receiver respectively and stores the keys for different regions in the cryptographic devices of the sender and receiver.
[0039] Specifically, the central agency generates the key Key_FD for different regions. i It further includes: the central agency generates a root key Root_Key by using a physical noise source, a quantum noise source, etc., and generates a root key Root_Key according to the root key Root_Key and the domain name d of the i-th region. i Calculate the key Key_FD for the i-th region i :
[0040] Key_FD i =PRF(Root_Key, d i ),
[0041] Among them, PRF(Root_Key, d i ) is a pseudo-random function constructed using symmetric cryptography and has anti-quantum computing capabilities. For example, regions include regions belonging to different streets, communities, or science and technology parks in a city, regions belonging to different cities in a province, or regions belonging to different time zones in a continent.
[0042] In step S203, when the sender conducts offline transactions with multiple different receivers in different regions and in different time periods, the sender calculates a temporary unique identity based on its long-term unique identity, the key of the region to which it belongs, and the time period of the region to which it belongs.
[0043] Specifically, the sender calculates the temporary unique identity according to its long-term unique identity, the key of the region to which it belongs, and the time period of the region to which it belongs, further including calculating the temporary unique identity by the following formula:
[0044] TID i,j =PRF(Key_FD i , ID, t j ),
[0045] Among them, TID i,j PRF(Key_FD i , ID, t j ) is a pseudo-random function constructed using symmetric cryptography and has quantum computing resistance; ID is the long-term unique identity of the sender; Key_FD i is the key of the ith region; and t j is the j-th time period, and i and j are both positive integers greater than or equal to 1.
[0046] The sender sets the time period according to the transaction frequency and the area range, wherein the temporary unique identity identifiers for the same time period are set to be the same; and the temporary unique identity identifiers for different time periods are set to be different.
[0047] In step S204, the sender uses the temporary unique identity to conduct offline transactions with multiple different receivers, wherein the previous offline transactions between the sender and the receivers are traceably supervised by a central agency.
[0048] The sender uses a temporary unique identity to conduct offline transactions with multiple different receivers further including: the sender uses the same temporary unique identity to conduct offline transactions with multiple different receivers in the same area and the same time period; the sender uses different temporary unique identities to conduct offline transactions with multiple different receivers in the same area and different time periods; the sender uses different temporary unique identities to conduct offline transactions with multiple different receivers in different areas and the same time period; or the sender uses different temporary unique identities to conduct offline transactions with multiple different receivers in different areas and different time periods. For example, domains cannot be linked: the same sender corresponds to different temporary unique identities in different domains, and different time periods within a domain cannot be linked: the same sender corresponds to different temporary unique identities in different time periods.
[0049] Specifically, before the sender uses the temporary unique identity to conduct offline transactions with multiple different receivers, the process also includes: generating a domain name d of the i-th region by the central agency. i , and then change the domain name d i Sent to the sender; or the sender generates the domain name d of the i-th zone i , and then change the domain name d i Sent to the central agency.
[0050] The traceability supervision of the previous offline transaction between the sender and the receiver by the central agency further includes: when the sender is in the jth time period t in the i-th zone j During the offline transaction with multiple different recipients, the central agency uses the root key Root_Key, the domain name d of the i-th region i , the jth time period t j And different long-term unique identifiers in the unique identifier table calculate multiple temporary unique identifiers to be verified; the current temporary unique identifier TID used in the offline transaction process i,j The current temporary unique identity TID used in the transaction is compared with multiple temporary unique identity identifiers to be verified. i,j If it is the same as any of the multiple temporary unique identities to be verified, use the unique identity table to obtain the current temporary unique identity TID i,j The corresponding long-term unique identifier is used to determine the identity of the sender based on the long-term unique identifier.
[0051] refer to Figure 4A specific embodiment of the present invention discloses a traceable time domain privacy protection device, including: a long-term identity module 401, which is used to send a long-term unique identity to a central agency through a sender, so that the central agency obtains a unique identity table; a regional key generation module 402, which generates keys of different regions through a central agency and sends the keys of different regions to the corresponding senders and receivers respectively; a regional key storage module 403, which is used to store the keys of different regions in the cryptographic devices of the sender and the receiver; a temporary identity module 404, which is used when the sender performs offline transactions with multiple different receivers in different regions and different time periods, and the sender calculates a temporary unique identity according to its long-term unique identity, the key of the region to which it belongs, and the time period of the region to which it belongs; a transaction module 405, in which the sender performs offline transactions with multiple different receivers using the temporary unique identity; and a traceability supervision module 406, which performs traceability supervision on previous offline transactions between the sender and the receiver through a central agency. In this way, the sender and the receiver can be linked to the central agency and the previous offline transactions can be traceably supervised while the sender is anonymous.
[0052] The temporary identity module 404 is further configured to calculate a temporary unique identity using the following formula:
[0053] TID i,j =PRF(Key_FD i , ID, t j ),
[0054] Among them, TID i,j PRF(Key_FD i , ID, t j ) is a pseudo-random function constructed using symmetric cryptography and has quantum computing resistance; ID is the long-term unique identity of the sender; Key_FD i is the key of the ith region; and t j is the j-th time period, and i and j are both positive integers greater than or equal to 1.
[0055] The traceability supervision module 406 also includes a temporary identity determination submodule, a comparison submodule and a real identity determination submodule, wherein the temporary identity determination submodule, when the sender is in the i-th area in the j-th time period t j During the offline transaction with multiple different recipients, the central agency uses the root key Root_Key, the domain name d of the i-th region i , the jth time period t jand different long-term unique identifiers in the unique identifier table to calculate multiple temporary unique identifiers to be verified; a comparison submodule is used to compare the current temporary unique identifier TID used in the offline transaction process i,j The real identity determination submodule is used to compare the current temporary unique identity TID used in the offline transaction process. i,j If it is the same as any of the multiple temporary unique identities to be verified, use the unique identity table to obtain the current temporary unique identity TID i,j The corresponding long-term unique identifier is used to determine the identity of the sender based on the long-term unique identifier.
[0056] In the following, reference Figure 2 and Figure 3 , the traceable time domain privacy protection method according to an embodiment of the present invention is described in detail by way of a specific example.
[0057] Multiple users form a group, which consists of a group administrator and several group members. The group administrator generates his own private key and a shared group public key, and issues a signature private key to each group member. With this private key, group members can generate signatures for any message. When verifying the signature, the verifier only needs to use the message and the shared group public key to verify the validity of the signature. If necessary, the group administrator can reveal the identity of the signer. The principle of group signature technology is as follows Figure 1 As shown in the figure, group signatures have five main features: (1) Unforgeability: Only group members can sign on behalf of the group; (2) Anonymity: Given a valid group signature for a message, it is computationally difficult for anyone other than the group administrator to distinguish who the real signer is; (3) Traceability: The group administrator can use the valid group signature to trace the identity of the signer; (4) No false accusation: Neither the group administrator nor other group members can make a valid group signature and then impose it on other members; (5) Anti-collusion: Even if several members collude, they cannot produce a valid group signature, making it impossible for the group administrator to confirm the identity of the signer.
[0058] The process of digital asset transactions between senders and receivers under offline conditions is as follows: When the sender and receiver use digital assets such as digital currency to buy and sell (for example, the sender pays for the receiver's goods and the receiver receives the money), the sender's identity is protected, but the receiver's identity is not protected. Therefore, the receiver only needs to receive the payment when trading with the sender.
[0059] For example, refer to Figure 3 , a typical two-party transaction is a buy-sell transaction, where the sender uses digital currency to purchase the receiver's goods:
[0060] 1. The sender sends a long-term unique ID such as an ID number to the central agency through a secure channel;
[0061] 2. The central agency securely stores the long-term unique identity ID of different senders and obtains the ID of different senders i surface;
[0062] 3. The central agency uses physical noise sources, quantum noise sources, etc. to generate the root key Root_Key, according to different domain names d i Calculate the keys for different regions:
[0063] Key_FD i =PRF(Root_Key, d i ),
[0064] PRF is a pseudo-random function constructed using symmetric cryptography technology, and the domain name is d i It can be generated by a central agency and then securely sent to the sender, or it can be generated by the sender and securely sent to the central agency;
[0065] 4. The central agency sends the generated keys Key_FD of different domains through a secure channel. i Cryptographic devices (such as cryptographic modules) distributed to senders and receivers;
[0066] 5. The sender and receiver's cryptographic devices store Key_FD in a secure manner i ;
[0067] 6. When the sender is in the i-th domain j When a transaction is conducted with multiple different recipients within a time period (e.g., the sender purchases the recipient's goods using digital currency), the sender calculates a temporary unique identity TID. i,j =PRF(Key_FD i , ID, t j ), where PRF is a pseudo-random function constructed using symmetric cryptography technology, t j It can be set according to transaction frequency and domain scope.
[0068] The calculation formula for the temporary unique identity is: i , ID, t j Calculation is performed, PRF is a pseudo-random function in cryptography.
[0069] When the area is under the jurisdiction of Binhu Road Subdistrict, the area cannot access the Internet all day due to base station construction and other reasons (the payment tools of users and stores cannot be connected to the bank online in real time). At this time, users in this area (senders) will go to different stores (receivers) to buy goods in different time periods (such as changing TID every 1 hour).
[0070] Example 1: User A1 goes to store B1 at 8am and uses TID 11 Buy groceries with the identity of .
[0071] Example 2: User A1 also uses TID when he goes to store B2 at 8:30 in the morning 11 to buy medicine under the identity of .
[0072] Example 3: After 9 o'clock, user A1 uses TID 12 I went to B3 store to get a haircut as an employee.
[0073] Example 4: User A2 uses TID at 10:20 23 I went to B4 store to have dinner as a .
[0074] Because the time periods are different, the TID calculated according to the formula 11 and TID 12 No, this allows user A1 to use different temporary identities in different time periods and use digital assets such as digital currency to trade in different stores. At the same time, the different TIDs generated can also be used as security materials for transactions between both parties, such as TID being used as an input factor for generating other transaction keys.
[0075] 7. The sender is in the ith domain j During transactions with multiple different receivers within a time period, the sender will use TID i,j As a temporary unique identity, multiple transactions are carried out continuously offline with the recipient. The temporary unique identity can also be used as a security material for transactions between the two parties.
[0076] For example, user A1 purchases goods at three stores B1, B2, and B3, where the transactions of B1 and B2 are made between 8:00 and 9:00, and the same TID is used. 11 The temporary identity is used for transactions, but after nine o'clock, according to the above assumption, it is changed every hour (the time can be set by the sender or the central agency), so the transaction between A1 and B3 after nine o'clock uses the temporary identity TID 12 Make a transaction.
[0077] Central Agency Supervision
[0078] When the sender is in the i-th domain j During the transaction with multiple different recipients within a time period, if the transaction based on the temporary unique identity is risky, the central agency can conduct retrospective supervision as follows: The central agency i,j ,Root_Key,d i ,t j, and the sender's unique long-term ID i Table, use PRF function, use different IDs to calculate the matching TID, if the match is successful, the sender's long-term unique identity is obtained, and then the sender's true identity is determined.
[0079] For example, refer to Figure 3 , For the sender and receiver in the i-th domain d i Medium time period t j After the offline transaction is completed and the sender and receiver are linked to the central agency, the central agency can perform traceability supervision on the sender.
[0080] For example, the central agency uses the formula TID i,j =PRF(Root_Key, d i , ID, t j ), keep trying to calculate, such as for TID 56 , the central agency in order to find the TID 56 To find out who the real identity behind this temporary identity is, the central agency will look up the real identity list maintained by the central agency (step 2), starting with the first real identity, and put each real identity into the above formula to calculate (because the central agency knows the TID 56 , Root_Key, d5, t6), to see if the calculated TID is equal to TID 56 If they are equal, the real identity is found, such as the 8th real identity, so the real identity of this temporary identity is determined.
[0081] This technical solution is designed using symmetric cryptographic technology taking into account actual transaction scenarios and transaction frequencies, and uses the same temporary unique identity identifier to anonymously protect the identity of the sender of multiple transactions within a certain time and domain.
[0082] In the offline transaction scenario between the sender and the receiver, quantum-safe symmetric cryptographic technology is used (the pseudo-random function constructed using symmetric cryptographic technology can resist quantum security. From the perspective of cryptographic security analysis, quantum computers will not pose a fatal security threat to symmetric cryptography, but will pose a fatal security threat to the traditional use of asymmetric cryptography to achieve anonymity. Therefore, the point of the present invention is to provide a method that does not use asymmetric cryptography and other technologies, but uses symmetric cryptography technology to achieve anonymity and also has quantum security) and a phased anonymity idea combined with time domain (the traditional practice is to use asymmetric cryptography for anonymous protection for each transaction. The operation time of asymmetric cryptography is longer than that of symmetric cryptography, resulting in a longer transaction time for each transaction. In this application, the same temporary identity is used for transactions in a certain area and a period of time to avoid using a temporary identity for each transaction. It can be achieved that only the temporary identity needs to be quickly calculated using symmetric cryptography technology and can be used for a period of time, which achieves a good balance between security and efficiency. It also meets the actual application requirements, such as users are unlikely to frequently conduct offline transactions in an area within a period of time). The solution is simpler and more efficient under quantum computing security.
[0083] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that all or part of the processes of the above-mentioned embodiments can be implemented by instructing related hardware through a computer program, and the program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, wherein the computer-readable storage medium is a disk, an optical disk, a read-only storage memory, or a random access memory, etc.
[0084] The above description is only a preferred specific implementation manner of the present invention, but the protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any changes or substitutions that can be easily conceived by any technician familiar with the technical field within the technical scope disclosed by the present invention should be covered within the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims
1. A traceable time domain privacy protection method, characterized in that: include: The sender sends the long-term unique identity to the central agency, so that the central agency obtains the unique identity table; The central agency generates keys for different regions and sends the keys for different regions to the corresponding sender and receiver respectively and stores the keys for different regions in the cryptographic devices of the sender and receiver; When the sender conducts offline transactions with multiple different receivers in different regions and time periods, the sender calculates a temporary unique identity based on its long-term unique identity, the key of the region to which it belongs, and the time period of the region to which it belongs; as well as The sender uses the temporary unique identity to conduct offline transactions with multiple different receivers, wherein the central agency performs traceability supervision on previous offline transactions between the sender and the receivers.
2. The traceable time domain privacy protection method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The sender further calculates the temporary unique identity according to its long-term unique identity, the key of the region to which it belongs, and the time period of the region to which it belongs, including calculating the temporary unique identity by the following formula: TID i,j =PRF(Key_FD i ,ID,t j ), Among them, TID i,j PRF(Key_FD i , ID, t j ) is a pseudo-random function constructed using symmetric cryptography and has quantum computing resistance; ID is the long-term unique identity of the sender; Key_FD i is the key of the ith region; and t j is the j-th time period, and i and j are both positive integers greater than or equal to 1.
3. The traceable time domain privacy protection method according to claim 2 is characterized in that: Also includes: The sender sets the time period according to the transaction frequency and the area range. The temporary unique identity identifiers for the same time period are set to be the same; and the temporary unique identity identifiers for different time periods are set to be different.
4. The traceable time domain privacy protection method according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The sending party uses the temporary unique identity to conduct offline transactions with multiple different receiving parties, further comprising: The sender performs offline transactions with the multiple different receivers using the same temporary unique identity in the same area and within the same time period; The sender performs offline transactions with the multiple different receivers using different temporary unique identities in different time periods in the same area; The sender performs offline transactions with the multiple different receivers using different temporary unique identities in different areas and within the same time period; or The sender performs offline transactions with the multiple different receivers using different temporary unique identities in different areas and during different time periods.
5. The traceable time domain privacy protection method according to claim 2, characterized in that: Before the sender uses the temporary unique identity to conduct offline transactions with multiple different receivers, the following steps are also included: The domain name d of the i-th zone is generated by the central agency i , and then the domain name d i sent to the sender; or The domain name d of the i-th zone is generated by the sender i , and the domain name d i Sent to the central agency.
6. The traceable time domain privacy protection method according to claim 5, characterized in that: The traceability supervision of the previous offline transaction between the sender and the receiver by the central institution further includes: When the sender is in the i-th area in the j-th time period t j During the offline transaction with multiple different recipients, the central agency uses the root key Root_Key, the domain name d of the i-th region i , the jth time period t j and calculating a plurality of temporary unique identifiers to be verified from different long-term unique identifiers in the unique identifier table; The current temporary unique identity TID used in the offline transaction process i,j Compare with multiple temporary unique identifications to be verified respectively; The current temporary unique identity TID used during offline transactions i,j If the unique identifier is the same as any one of the multiple temporary unique identifiers to be verified, the unique identifier table is used to obtain the current temporary unique identifier TID i,j A corresponding long-term unique identity identifier is used to determine the identity of the sender based on the long-term unique identity identifier.
7. The traceable time domain privacy protection method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The central agency generates the key Key_FD for different regions i It further includes: the central agency generates a root key Root_Key using a physical noise source or a quantum noise source, according to the domain name d of the i-th region i Calculate the key Key_FD of the i-th region using the root key Root_Key i : Key_FD i =PRF(Root_Key,d i ), Among them, PRF(Root_Key, d i ) is a pseudo-random function constructed using symmetric cryptography and has the ability to resist quantum computing.
8. A traceable time domain privacy protection device, characterized in that: include: A long-term identity module, used to send a long-term unique identity to a central agency through a sender, so that the central agency obtains a unique identity table; A regional key generation module generates keys for different regions through the central organization and sends the keys for different regions to corresponding senders and receivers respectively; A regional key storage module, used for storing keys of different regions in the cryptographic devices of the sender and the receiver; A temporary identity module, used for when the sender conducts offline transactions with multiple different receivers in different areas and different time periods, the sender calculates a temporary unique identity based on its long-term unique identity, the key of the area to which it belongs, and the time period of the area to which it belongs; A transaction module, wherein the sender uses the temporary unique identity to conduct offline transactions with multiple different receivers; as well as The traceability supervision module performs traceability supervision on previous offline transactions between the sender and the receiver through the central agency.
9. The traceable time domain privacy protection device according to claim 8, characterized in that: The temporary identity module further comprises calculating the temporary unique identity by the following formula: TID i,j =PRF(Key_FD i ,ID,t j ), Among them, TID i,j PRF(Key_FD i , d i , ID i , t j ) is a pseudo-random function constructed using symmetric cryptography and has quantum computing resistance; ID is the long-term unique identity of the sender; Key_FD i is the key of the ith region; and t j is the j-th time period, and i and j are both positive integers greater than or equal to 1.
10. The traceable time domain privacy protection device according to claim 9, characterized in that: The traceability supervision module also includes a temporary identity determination submodule, a comparison submodule and a real identity determination submodule, wherein: The temporary identity determination submodule, when the sender is in the jth time period t in the i-th area j During the offline transaction with multiple different recipients, the central agency uses the root key Root_Key, the domain name d of the i-th region i , the jth time period t j and calculating a plurality of temporary unique identifiers to be verified from different long-term unique identifiers in the unique identifier table; The comparison submodule is used to compare the current temporary unique identity TID used in the offline transaction process i,j Compare with multiple temporary unique identifications to be verified respectively; The real identity determination submodule is used to determine the current temporary unique identity TID used in the offline transaction process. i,j If the unique identifier is the same as any one of the multiple temporary unique identifiers to be verified, the unique identifier table is used to obtain the current temporary unique identifier TID i,j A corresponding long-term unique identity identifier is used to determine the identity of the sender based on the long-term unique identity identifier.