Internet of vehicles trusted access authentication method based on block chain

Abstract

The invention relates to an Internet of Vehicles trusted access authentication method based on a block chain, and belongs to the technical field of network security. The trusted access authentication method based on the block chain is provided for a specific Internet of Vehicles scene, node network access cross-domain identity authentication in a distributed Internet of Vehicles environment is effectively realized through data initialization, registration, cross-domain authentication and data verification, the security problems of privacy disclosure and the like are solved, and the security of the node network access cross-domain identity authentication in a distributed Internet of Vehicles environment is improved. The problems of CA node single-point failure and multi-CA mutual trust in some scenes in a traditional identity authentication mode are avoided, and meanwhile, the security and privacy of data sharing between vehicles are improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of network security technology, and specifically relates to a blockchain-based Internet of Vehicles trusted access authentication method. Background Art

[0002] With the development of information technology, vehicles have gradually achieved a leapfrog development from mechanization to informatization. In particular, with the continuous upgrading of key technical facilities and communication technologies, vehicles have expanded their original functions and presented networking characteristics and trends. In the context of the Internet of Vehicles, the vehicle's on-board equipment effectively utilizes all vehicle dynamic information in the information network platform through wireless communication technology, provides different functional services during vehicle operation, and can activate vehicle functions efficiently, dynamically and collaboratively. The Internet of Vehicles has four basic characteristics: 1) The vehicle-connected network is a three-dimensional, multi-layered, and limited network system; 2) The vehicle-connected network is a large heterogeneous network with multiple nodes and large link differences; 3) The network topology structure changes regularly and dynamically; 4) The business types are diverse and the distribution range is wide. In a specific scenario, the networking relationship of vehicles can also be flexibly broken up and accessed at will to achieve on-demand networking, achieve a larger range and wider interconnection, and support the performance required for specific scenarios.

[0003] The development and application of vehicle networking technology, while continuously expanding the functional dimensions, also increases its exposure, exposing vehicles to multiple malicious attacks from the network electromagnetic space, and its security issues may have a catastrophic impact on users. In the above specific scenario, during the reconstruction of the original networking relationship of the vehicle, the vehicle needs to dynamically access the new network. Confirmation of the legitimacy of the vehicle, that is, the identity authentication of the vehicle, is the key to be solved in this scenario.

[0004] At present, the Internet of Vehicles system generally adopts an authentication mechanism based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). However, this mechanism has defects such as centralized authentication nodes, difficulty in cross-domain authentication, and problems such as mutual trust among multiple CAs. Especially in certain scenarios, authentication nodes are vulnerable to physical damage or network attacks, which may lead to the risk of single point failure. If the central server is attacked, the entire authentication system will face the risk of paralysis. The failure of the identity authentication mechanism may lead to increased data security risks, failure of device control, and service interruption. In addition, the multi-party platforms involved in cross-domain collaboration will question the credible authority of third-party institutions, which will lead to a decline in user trust and serious losses.

[0005] The introduction of blockchain technology, based on its decentralized characteristics, can efficiently and securely confirm the identity of vehicles connected to the network and establish a trust relationship between communication nodes in the Internet of Vehicles. This is of great significance for the reconstruction of vehicle networks and the performance of their business functions, which is mainly reflected in the following aspects:

[0006] First, based on blockchain technology as the core, the network structure of the Internet of Vehicles application is changed from centralized to decentralized or multi-center, which can effectively eliminate the traditional node authentication’s dependence on central agencies, reduce the single point failure problem faced by device identity authentication in specific Internet of Vehicles environments, reduce the time cost of vehicle networking, and improve authentication efficiency.

[0007] Second, the distributed ledger using blockchain technology can enhance the data reliability of communications between vehicle networking systems. Any tampering with the data can be discovered immediately, thereby effectively resisting malicious attacks, greatly improving the security of the system, and effectively solving the limitations of limited computing power and small storage capacity of vehicles in specific scenarios.

[0008] In order to solve the shortcomings of access security and system stability in the current vehicle temporary networking scenarios, it is necessary to improve cross-domain access capabilities and add new technologies and new means to meet the needs of flexible, fast and adaptable vehicle networking development. Summary of the invention

[0009] 1. Technical issues to be resolved

[0010] The present invention aims to solve the following security issues: privacy leakage in specific Internet of Vehicles scenarios, and to avoid single-point failure of CA nodes and mutual trust issues among multiple CAs in traditional identity authentication methods in certain scenarios.

[0011] (II) Technical solution

[0012] In order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention provides a blockchain-based Internet of Vehicles trusted access authentication method, comprising the following steps:

[0013] Step 1: Initialization: The trusted authority TA initializes the vehicle self-organizing network, which is the vehicle network, generates global parameters by running a function, the global parameters include public parameters and a master key, and distributes these global parameters to the roadside unit RSU through a secure channel;

[0014] Step 2: Register based on global parameters: RSU registers at TA and obtains the signature of the identity for vehicle authentication; when requesting registration, the vehicle generates a pseudonym based on the real identity, generates a signature according to the specified hash function, and attaches a secret random number; after receiving the registration request, TA writes the signature into the blockchain and attaches the signature information to indicate that the write operation is completed by TA; the vehicle verifies the information by verifying the signature, and at the same time, encrypts the data generated by the vehicle entity;

[0015] Step 3: Cross-domain handover authentication: When a vehicle enters the network across domains, cross-domain handover authentication information is generated, and the vehicle requests authentication and group keys from the target RSU; the RSU authenticates the vehicle identity through the signature pre-written in the blockchain, and verifies the validity and legality of the vehicle; after the verification, the RSU sends a group of legally authenticated vehicles in the domain to the TA to apply for a new group key; in terms of data storage, the RSU sorts the data exchanged between vehicles, stores large-capacity data in the cloud storage system, and performs hash calculation on the data to generate a unique ID for storage on the chain;

[0016] Step 4: Data verification: TA verifies the authentication information of a group of legal vehicles in the domain submitted by RSU, and generates random number information containing the verification key for the vehicles that have passed the verification; the authentication information and data access information generated when the vehicle enters the network across domains are encrypted data, and the random number distributed by TA is decrypted by the secret random number submitted in step 2, and the integrity of the random number is confirmed by verifying the key information in the generated information; the data access information contains the data access policy, and the data accessor can only perform decryption operations on the data access attribute set that meets the conditions, and the data can be obtained after decryption.

[0017] The present invention also provides a blockchain-based Internet of Vehicles structure designed based on the method.

[0018] (III) Beneficial effects

[0019] The present invention proposes a blockchain-based trusted access authentication method for specific Internet of Vehicles scenarios. Through data initialization, registration, cross-domain authentication and data verification, it effectively realizes cross-domain identity authentication of nodes in a distributed Internet of Vehicles environment, solves the security issues such as privacy leakage it faces, avoids the single point failure of CA nodes and the mutual trust problems of multiple CAs in traditional identity authentication methods in certain scenarios, and improves the security and privacy of data sharing between vehicles. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0020] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the cross-domain trusted authentication architecture of the Internet of Vehicles based on blockchain involved in the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0021] In order to make the purpose, content and advantages of the present invention more clear, the specific implementation methods of the present invention are further described in detail below in conjunction with the drawings and examples.

[0022] Traditional identity authentication for Internet of Vehicles systems generally adopts an authentication mechanism based on public key infrastructure (PKI). The core is the CA among the three entities of the Internet of Vehicles (trusted center CA, roadside unit RSU, and on-board unit OBU). When RSU or OBU joins the network, they must submit a registration application to CA. Before communication, they also need to verify each other's identities to ensure that the identity authentication is successful and the message is reliable before communication can continue. This method is difficult to meet the special requirements of the Internet of Vehicles for privacy protection and authentication efficiency. In this method, the central node has heavy tasks and cannot be proxied, which can easily become a bottleneck for the operation of the entire system. Once the central node is attacked maliciously, especially in specific scenarios, the central node faces multiple threats such as network and physical attacks, which may lead to single point failure and affect the use of all entity digital certificates. In addition, the data in the Internet of Vehicles requires a large amount of data collection and transmission, which will cause authentication difficulties in cross-domain scenarios.

[0023] In order to solve the above problems, the present invention combines blockchain technology to design a blockchain-based Internet of Vehicles architecture, which logically divides the Internet of Vehicles into a node layer, an operation layer, and a functional layer. The node layer is a vehicle node, including a roadside unit, an on-board unit, etc., to realize the interaction between the Internet of Vehicles and the external environment and provide network services for vehicles. The node layer performs identity trust authentication in the operation layer, and sends the collected data to the operation layer to determine whether to incentivize; the operation layer implements the operation mechanism using the operation layer authentication mechanism and incentive mechanism and other operation mechanisms to implement the authorized node to join or exit, and define the form and amount of rewards; the functional layer includes a trusted institution TA and a blockchain, which is responsible for the trusted authentication and data storage of the terminal nodes. This method uses the technology of the alliance chain to build a decentralized Internet of Vehicles network, promote authentication and data sharing between vehicles, and provide vehicle services more efficiently.

[0024] Furthermore, the present invention provides a blockchain-based vehicle networking cross-domain access authentication method, comprising the following steps:

[0025] Step 1: System initialization. The trusted authority TA initializes the vehicle self-organizing network, which is the vehicle network, generates global parameters by running functional functions, including public parameters and master keys, and distributes these global parameters to the roadside unit RSU through a secure channel;

[0026] Step 2: Register based on global parameters. The RSU registers at the TA and obtains the signature of the identity for the vehicle to authenticate; when requesting registration, the vehicle generates a pseudonym based on the real identity, generates a signature according to the specified hash function, and attaches a secret random number; after receiving the registration request, the TA writes the signature into the blockchain and attaches the signature information to indicate that the write operation is completed by the TA; the vehicle verifies the information by verifying the signature. At this stage, the data generated by the vehicle entity (vehicle node) is also encrypted.

[0027] Step 3: Cross-domain handover authentication. When a vehicle joins the network across domains, cross-domain handover authentication information is generated, and the vehicle requests authentication and group keys (i.e., group session keys) from the target RSU; the RSU authenticates the identity of the vehicle through the signature pre-written in the blockchain, as well as verifies the validity and legality; after the verification, the RSU sends a group of legally authenticated vehicles in the domain to the TA to apply for a new group key. In this stage, in terms of data storage, the RSU sorts the data exchanged between vehicles, stores large-capacity data (preset data greater than a certain capacity) in the cloud storage system, and performs hash calculations on the data to generate a unique ID for storage on the chain, in order to reduce data sharing overhead and facilitate data traceability.

[0028] Step 4: Data verification. TA verifies the authentication information of a group of vehicles that are legally authenticated in the domain submitted by RSU, and generates random number information containing the verification key for the vehicles that have passed the verification. The authentication information and data access information generated when the vehicle enters the network across domains are encrypted data. The random number distributed by TA is decrypted by the secret random number submitted in step 2, and the integrity of the random number is confirmed by verifying the key information in the generated information. The data access information contains the data access policy. Only for the data access attribute set that meets the conditions can the data accessor perform the decryption operation, and the data can be obtained after decryption.

[0029] For details, refer to Figure 1 The present invention provides a blockchain-based vehicle networking cross-domain access authentication method, which specifically includes the following steps:

[0030] Step 1: System initialization.

[0031] The process of generating public parameters by a trusted authority TA is as follows:

[0032] TA chooses a large prime number p and defines it in a finite field F p Elliptic curve E(F p ), and E(F p ) is a generator P of order q, where q is also a large prime number; E(F p ) and the point θ at infinity form an additive group G.

[0033] TA selects a random number As its private key, and keep it secret, the corresponding public key is P pub =s·P. Choose a secure one-way hash function h2:G→{0,1} * , The superscript * indicates that 0 is not included. TA sets the public parameters params = {p, q, E (Fp ),P,P pub ,h i} is published in the blockchain, i=0,1,2,3,4.

[0034] Step 2: Register.

[0035] When the RSU is deployed, it will first generate a public key and a private key. The TA will generate a signature for its public key, and the vehicle will verify the legitimacy of the RSU identity through the signature. i Before identity registration, the public parameters params published by TA and the hash function used by the specified vehicle will be obtained from the blockchain. The registration process of step 2 is as follows:

[0036] Step 2.1: RSU selects a random number As the private key, the corresponding public key is pk rsu =pk rsu The registration request information RID is sent through a trusted channel or a session key preset when deploying the RSU. rsu , pk rsu Send it to TA for registration; after receiving the request information, TA signs it and selects a random number Calculate U = up,

[0037] sig=sh0(RID rsu ,pk rsu ,U)+u

[0038] sig is the signature information. RSU regularly broadcasts information {rsu, RID rsu ,pk rsu ,U,sig}, the vehicle authenticates the RSU identity through the broadcast information, and the rsu identifies that the information is a RSU identity signature broadcast information.

[0039] Step 2.2: The i-th vehicle V i Use the specified hash function to calculate its own hash value CH i , V i Choose three different random numbers Calculate Y i =x i P,

[0040]

[0041] RID i For vehicle V i Real ID; Yes i The hash value function of the corresponding vehicle;

[0042] Vehicle V i The collision private key of the hash function is sk CH =(k i ,x i ), the corresponding hash public key is pk CH =(P,Y i ).

[0043] V i Select random number Calculate D i =d i P, and calculate the vehicle V i Pseudonymous (anonymous) PID i :

[0044]

[0045] Function variables

[0046] Hash value hash = h3 (RID i ,d i ,CH i ,T Curr )

[0047] T Curr is the timestamp of a time point, V i Send a registration request message REQ={PID i ,CH i ,D i ,Q i ,hash,T Curr ).

[0048] Step 2.3: After receiving the vehicle request message REQ, TA performs the following operations:

[0049] TA verifies timestamp T Curr , if |T Curr '-T Curr |≤ΔT holds, calculation:

[0050]

[0051] T Curr ' is the timestamp of another time point;

[0052] Calculate the hash value hash'=h3(RID i ',d i ',CH i ',T Curr ) is compared with the hash value. If they are equal, the execution continues. Otherwise, the request is rejected. i' is the vehicle V i A hash value at another point in time.

[0053] After completing the above calculations and verifications, TA creates a transaction and sends data i ={CH i ,T exp}Write into the block, T exp Indicates the expiration time of vehicle registration. i ,d i ,CH i}Sign σ=Sig(h3(RID i ,CH i ,d i )) and put the signature σ in the block, let the block be identified as TXID i TA sends the information {TXID i ,RID i ,CH i ,d i} is written to the server, and the access rights to the information are only enjoyed by TA. TA uses d i Calculate the symmetric encryption key and convert {TXID i ,σ,h4(TXID i ,σ,T exp )} Encrypted transmission to V i , which is the encrypted value is an encryption function. TA sends the response information RES = {PID i ,cip} is issued to the vehicle.

[0054] V i After receiving the message RES from TA, the PID in the message i Determine whether it is your own response information by TXID i Find the specified block, use σ to index the corresponding entry in the block, and get CH i And compare it with the locally stored value. If they are consistent, the signature σ in the block confirms that it is TA who sent the CH i Written into the blockchain. If V is not found i Your own CH i , then V i Resend the request message to TA.

[0055] Step 3: Cross-domain switching authentication phase

[0056] Vehicle V iWhen driving into the target RSU domain, it authenticates its identity through the signature broadcast by the RSU. After the verification is passed, it submits a request for cross-domain authentication and group key application.

[0057] Vehicle V i After receiving the broadcast information, the RSU identifier is used to know that this is the identity signature information generated by the TA for the RSU. i Calculate according to the following formula to verify the identity of RSU. If the equation is established, then V i Complete the one-way identity authentication for RSU.

[0058] sig·P=h0(RID rsu ,pk rsu ,U)P pub +U

[0059] Vehicle V i After completing the one-way authentication of the RSU, select a random number Calculate B i =a i P,

[0060] A i =a i Y i

[0061]

[0062] γ i =h3(PID i ,A i ,TXID i ,σ,T Curr )

[0063] Let r i =a i γ i , then the corresponding m i =k i -r i x i . The request information HOREQ = {HO, PID i ,m i ,A i ,B i ,RT i ,T Curr} is sent to RSU, HO indicates that the request information is a cross-domain handover authentication request. The reversible lossless compression algorithm COM() expands the two parts to be XORed to the same number of bits by filling bits 0, and then transmits the result.

[0064] After receiving the request information, RSU learns through HO that the request information is a cross-domain handover authentication request and first verifies the timestamp |T Curr '-T Curr |≤ΔT is valid, if valid then calculate:

[0065]

[0066] Among them, DeCOM() represents the decompression algorithm, and RSU uses TXID i And σ index to obtain the information data in the specified block i ={CH i ,T exp}, read T exp Determine whether its registration time has expired. If not, determine whether the vehicle has a malicious behavior record based on the vehicle violation list maintained by TA. If there is no malicious behavior record, the hash value CH i Determine whether the following equation is true. If the equation is true, then RSU has a i The identity verification is successful; otherwise, the RSU fails to authenticate the vehicle and rejects the request.

[0067] m i P+h3(PID i ,A i ,TXID i ,σ,T Curr )A i =CH i

[0068] In RSU, the vehicle V i After successful completion of authentication, RSU and vehicle V i Mutual authentication is achieved. Afterwards, RSU submits to TA a set of legal and valid vehicles {V1,…,V t}{{PID1,TXID1},…,{PID t ,TXID t}Request a group session key.

[0069] Step 4: Data verification, the specific steps are as follows:

[0070] TA uses the information submitted by RSU to quickly make effective and illegal judgments on this group of vehicles. i The stored secret value d i Calculate the polynomial f(x), set the random number calculate:

[0071] ρ i =h1(PID i ,h2(sDi ))

[0072]

[0073] GSKACK=H4(e,T Curr )

[0074] Where mod is the modulus operation, TA converts the information GSKRESP = {gsk, a t-1 ,…,a0,GSKACK,T Curr}Broadcasted by RSU in its domain, gsk is the group session key.

[0075] Vehicle V i After receiving the GSKRESP broadcast information, the gsk identifier is used to know that the broadcast information is about group key distribution. Verify the timestamp | T Curr '-T Curr |≤ΔT, if valid, construct the polynomial f(x)' and calculate:

[0076] f(x)'=x t +a t-1 x t-1 +…+a1x+a0

[0077] ρ′ i =h1(PID i ,h2(d i P pub ))

[0078] e'=f(ρ' i )'

[0079] Determine whether the following equation holds true. If they are equal, receive e' and calculate the group session key. If they are not equal, continue to collect broadcast information or request again.

[0080] H4(e',T Curr )=H4(e,T Curr )

[0081] Aiming at the characteristics of limited vehicle communication bandwidth and node resources in specific scenarios, the present invention introduces a verifiable random function to reduce the high communication complexity caused by the need for a blockchain-based trusted authentication system to rely on multiple rounds of communication between all nodes, so as to adapt to vehicle networking applications in specific scenarios. Ordinary nodes, voting nodes, consensus nodes, and backup nodes are set. Ordinary nodes become voting nodes after real-name authentication. The backup node is responsible for updating local information based on the information transmitted by the master node. The consensus node and the master node are extracted from the consensus node via an identity extraction algorithm. After each round of consensus is completed, the reputation of all consensus nodes is accumulated.

[0082] The consensus algorithm process is summarized as follows:

[0083] (1) When the RSU completes the encryption and pre-decryption operations, it broadcasts the information to the entire network. The master node is responsible for collecting and organizing it and broadcasting the message for verification;

[0084] (2) After receiving the broadcast message, the consensus node verifies the identity of the master node, and verifies the integrity and authenticity of the message. After verification, the signature sends the result of the message judgment to the master node;

[0085] (3) When the master node receives 2f+1 reply messages, it determines the final verification result of the message, and finally packages all the data and broadcasts the verified data information, and the consensus is completed.

[0086] The above is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention. It should be pointed out that for ordinary technicians in this technical field, several improvements and modifications can be made without departing from the technical principles of the present invention. These improvements and modifications should also be regarded as the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A blockchain-based Internet of Vehicles trusted access authentication method, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: Step 1: Initialization: The trusted authority TA initializes the vehicle self-organizing network, which is the vehicle network, generates global parameters by running a function, the global parameters include public parameters and a master key, and distributes these global parameters to the roadside unit RSU through a secure channel; Step 2: Register based on global parameters: RSU registers at TA and obtains the signature of the identity for vehicle authentication; When requesting registration, the vehicle generates a pseudonym based on its real identity, generates a signature based on a specified hash function, and attaches a secret random number; After receiving the registration request, TA writes the signature into the blockchain and attaches the signature information to indicate that the writing operation is completed by TA; The vehicle verifies the information by verifying the signature and encrypts the data generated by the vehicle entity; Step 3: Cross-domain handover authentication: When the vehicle enters the network across domains, cross-domain handover authentication information is generated, and the vehicle requests authentication and group key from the target RSU; RSU authenticates the vehicle identity through the signature pre-written in the blockchain, and verifies the validity and legality of the vehicle. After the verification, RSU sends a group of legally authenticated vehicles in the domain to TA to apply for a new group key. In terms of data storage, RSU sorts the data exchanged between vehicles, stores large-capacity data in the cloud storage system, and performs hash calculation on the data to generate a unique ID for storage on the chain. Step 4: Data verification: TA verifies the authentication information of a group of vehicles that are legally authenticated within the domain submitted by RSU, and generates random number information containing the verification key for the vehicles that have passed the verification; the authentication information and data access information generated when the vehicle enters the network across domains are encrypted data, and the random number distributed by TA is solved by the secret random number submitted in step 2, and the integrity of the random number is confirmed by verifying the key information in the generated information; Data access information includes data access policies. Data accessors can only perform decryption operations on data that meets the data access attribute set, and can obtain data only after decryption.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that In step 1, the process of the trusted authority TA generating public parameters is as follows: TA chooses a large prime number p and defines it in a finite field F p Elliptic curve E(F p ), and E(F p ) is a generator P of order q, where q is also a large prime number; E(F p ) and the point θ at infinity form an additive group G; TA selects a random number As its private key, and keep it secret, the corresponding public key is P pub =s·P; Select a secure one-way hash function h0: h1: h2:G→{0,1} * , h3: h4: The superscript * indicates that 0 is not included; TA sets the public parameters params = {p, q, E (F p ),P,P pub ,h i } is published in the blockchain, i=0,1,2,3,4.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that In step 2, when the RSU is deployed, it first generates a public key and a private key, and the TA generates a signature for the public key. The vehicle verifies the legitimacy of the RSU identity through the signature. The vehicle V i Before identity registration, obtain the public parameters params published by TA and the hash function used by the specified vehicle from the blockchain.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The registration process for step 2 is as follows: Step 2.1: RSU selects a random number As the private key, the corresponding public key is pk rsu =sk rsu , register the request information RID through a trusted channel or a session key preset when deploying the RSU rsu , pk rsu Send it to TA for registration; after receiving the request information, TA signs it and selects a random number Calculate U = up, sig=sh0(RID rsu ,pk rsu ,U)+u sig is the signature information. RSU regularly broadcasts information {rsu, RID rsu ,pk rsu ,U,sig}, the vehicle authenticates the RSU identity through the broadcast information, and the rsu identifies that the information is a RSU identity signature broadcast information; Step 2.2: The i-th vehicle V i Use the specified hash function to calculate its own hash value CH i , V i Choose three different random numbers Calculate Y i =x i P, Among them, RID i For vehicle V i Real ID; Yes i The hash value function of the corresponding vehicle; Vehicle V i The collision private key of the hash function is sk CH =(k i ,x i ), the corresponding hash public key is pk CH =(P,Y i ); V i Select random number Calculate D i =d i P, and calculate the vehicle V i Pseudonymous PID i : PID i =RID i ⊕h2(d i P pub ) Function variable Q i =d i ⊕h0(RID i ,d i P pub ) Hash value hash = h3 (RID i ,d i ,CH i ,T Curr ) Among them, T Curr is the timestamp of a time point, V i Send a registration request message REQ={PID i ,CH i ,D i ,Q i ,hash,T Curr ); Step 2.3: After receiving the vehicle request message REQ, TA performs the following operations: TA verifies timestamp T Curr , if |T Curr '-T Curr |≤ΔT holds, calculation: RID i '=PID i ⊕h2(sD i ) d i '=Q i ⊕h0(RID i ,sD i ) Among them, T Curr ' is the timestamp of another time point; calculate the hash value hash' = h3 (RID i ',d i ',CH i ',T Curr ) is compared with the hash value. If they are equal, the execution continues. Otherwise, the request is rejected. i ' is the vehicle V i The hash value at another point in time; After completing the above calculations and verifications, TA creates a transaction and sends data i ={CH i ,T exp }Write into the block, T exp Indicates the expiration time of vehicle registration; for information {RID i ,d i ,CH i }Sign σ=Sig(h3(RID i ,CH i ,d i )) and put the signature σ in the block, let the block be identified as TXID i ;TA sends the information {TXID i ,RID i ,CH i ,d i } is written to the server, and the access rights to the information are only enjoyed by TA; TA uses d i Calculate the symmetric encryption key and convert {TXID i ,σ,h4(TXID i ,σ,T exp )} Encrypted transmission to V i , which is the encrypted value is an encryption function; TA responds to the message RES = {PID i ,cip} is issued to the vehicle; V i After receiving the message RES sent by TA, the PID in the message RES is i Determine whether it is your own response information by TXID i Find the specified block, use σ to index the corresponding entry in the block, and get CH i And compare it with the locally stored value; if they are consistent, the signature σ in the block confirms that it is the CH sent by TA i Written into the blockchain, if V is not found i Your own CH i , then V i Resend the request message to TA.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that In step 3, at the vehicle V i When driving into the target RSU domain, the identity is authenticated through the signature broadcast by the RSU. After the verification is passed, a request is submitted to it for cross-domain authentication and group key application; Vehicle V i After receiving the broadcast information, the RSU identifier is used to know that this is the identity signature information generated by the TA for the RSU. i Calculate according to the following formula to verify the identity of RSU. If the following equation is true, then V i Complete one-way identity authentication for RSU; sig·P=h0(RID rsu ,pk rsu ,U)P pub +U Vehicle V i After completing the one-way authentication of the RSU, select a random number calculate: B i =a i P; TO i =a i AND i RT i =COM(TXID i ,σ)⊕h2(a i pk rsu ) c i =h3(PID i ,A i ,TXID i ,s,T Curr ) Let r i =a i γ i , then the corresponding m i =k i -r i x i ; Request information HOREQ = {HO, PID i ,m i ,A i ,B i ,RT i ,T Curr } is sent to RSU, HO indicates that the request information is an inter-domain handover authentication request, wherein the reversible lossless compression algorithm COM() expands the two parts to be XORed to the same number of bits by filling bits 0, and then transmits the result; After receiving the request information, RSU learns through HO that the request information is a cross-domain handover authentication request and first verifies the timestamp |T Curr '-T Curr |≤ΔT is valid, if valid then calculate: (TXID i ,σ)=DeCOM(RT i ⊕h2(B i sk rsu )) Among them, DeCOM() represents the decompression algorithm, and RSU uses TXID i And σ index to obtain the information data in the specified block i ={CH i ,T exp }, read T exp Determine whether its registration time has expired; if not, determine whether the vehicle has a malicious behavior record based on the vehicle violation list maintained by TA; if there is no malicious behavior record, read the hash value CH i Determine whether the following equation is true. If the equation is true, then RSU has a i The identity verification is successful; otherwise, the RSU fails to authenticate the vehicle and rejects the request; m i P+h3(PID i ,A i ,TXID i ,σ,T Curr )A i =CH i In RSU, the vehicle V i After successful completion of authentication, RSU and vehicle V i Mutual authentication is achieved; then, RSU submits to TA a set of legal and valid vehicles in the domain {V1,…,V t }{{PID1,TXID1},…,{PID t ,TXID t }Request a group session key.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that The specific steps of step 4 are as follows: TA uses the information submitted by RSU to make a valid and illegal judgment on this group of vehicles. After judging that the vehicle is legal, it uses the vehicle V i The stored secret value d i Calculate the polynomial f(x), set the random number calculate: r i =h1(PID i ,h2(sD i )) GSKACK=H4(e,T Curr ) Where mod is the modulus operation, TA converts the information GSKRESP = {gsk, a t-1 ,…,a0,GSKACK,T Curr }Broadcasted by RSU in its domain, gsk is the group session key; Vehicle V i After receiving the GSKRESP broadcast information, the gsk identifier is used to know that the broadcast information is about group key distribution; verify the timestamp |T Curr '-T Curr |≤ΔT, if valid, construct the polynomial f(x)' and calculate: f(x)'=x t +a t-1 x t-1 +…+a1x+a0 ρ′ i =h1(PID i ,h2(d i P pub )) e'=f(ρ' i )' Determine whether the following equation holds. If they are equal, receive e' and calculate the group session key. If they are not equal, continue to collect broadcast information or re-request: H4(e',T Curr )=H4(e,T Curr )。 7. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that The method is applied in the field of network security technology.

8. A blockchain-based Internet of Vehicles structure designed based on the method described in any one of claims 1 to 7.

9. The vehicle networking structure as claimed in claim 8, characterized in that: The Internet of Vehicles is logically divided into the node layer, operation layer and functional layer. The node layer is the vehicle node, including roadside units and on-board units, which realize the interaction between the Internet of Vehicles and the external environment and provide network services for the vehicle; the node layer performs trusted identity authentication in the operation layer, and sends the collected data to the operation layer to determine whether to incentivize; the operation layer uses the operation layer authentication mechanism and incentive mechanism to implement the addition or exit operation of authorized nodes, and define the form and amount of rewards; the functional layer includes the trusted organization TA and blockchain, which is responsible for trusted authentication and data storage of the end nodes.

10. The vehicle networking structure according to claim 9, characterized in that: The vehicle networking structure is applied in the field of network security technology.

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