No-3GPP access authentication

Abstract

Various embodiments provide methods and related devices for non-3GPP access authentication. According to one embodiment, a method performed by a user equipment (UE) includes sending a request message for access authentication to a radio access node in a radio access network, the request message including a hidden identification of the UE in a decorated network access identifier (NAI) format in which the hidden identification of the UE is not in the decorated NAI format. A user name of the hidden identification of the UE in the NAI format is cascaded with a visited public land mobile network, VPLMN, identifier of the VPLMN serving the UE.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] Embodiments of the present disclosure relate generally to wireless communications, and more particularly to non-3GPP access authentication in communication networks, particularly fifth generation (5G) systems (5GS). Background Art

[0002] Non-seamless wireless local area network (WLAN) offload (NSWO) is an optional capability for user equipment (UE) supporting WLAN radio access (which is also considered non-3GPP access). TS23.501v18.2.2 clause 4.2.15 defines the architecture for supporting NSWO authentication in 5GS.

[0003] When connected to a WLAN access network, a UE supporting NSWO can route specific data flows via the WLAN access network without passing through the 5G core (5GC). These specific data flows are identified using the UE routing selection policy (URSP) configuration for NSWO or the UE local configuration defined in TS23.503v 18.2.0. For these data flows, the UE uses a local IP address assigned by the WLAN access network, and no IP address reservation is provided between the WLAN and the next generation radio access network (NG-RAN).

[0004] To perform NSWO, the UE needs to obtain a local IP address from the WLAN access network and does not need to be connected to a non-3GPP interworking function (N3IWF), an evolved packet data gateway (ePDG), or a trusted non-3GPP gateway function (TNGF). If the WLAN access network is configured to require 5G system (5GS)-based access authentication of the UE to connect to the WLAN access network, the UE will perform the authentication process of NSWO in the 5GS defined in TS 33.501v18.2.0 Section 4.2.15 and Annex S. After successful authentication, the UE is not considered to have entered the 5GS registered state. The UE can send and receive services that do not pass through the 5GC and are not controlled by the 5GC.

[0005] The non-3GPP access network can be connected to multiple public land mobile networks (PLMNs) for 5G NSWO via the SWa' interface. In a roaming scenario, the UE can reach the home PLMN (HPLMN) via a WLAN access network connected to more than one visited PLMN (VPLMN). Therefore, the UE should be able to indicate a specific selected VPLMN when roaming (e.g., using the decorated network access identifier (NAI) of 5G NSWO), through which the NSWO request should be sent to the HPLMN.

[0006] UE connected to the WLAN access network using a 5GS certificate (as in TS23.501v18.2.0 Figure 4 .2.15-1) can also connect to the 5GC, for example, to establish a protocol data unit (PDU) session. For example, by performing 5GS registration via an untrusted non-3GPP access procedure (using N3IWF), or through interworking between an ePDG connected to an evolved packet core (EPC) and a 5GS (using ePDG) as defined in TS23.502v18.2.0, the UE can connect to the 5GC via another access type (such as NG-RAN) or via the same WLAN access network.

[0007] When the UE is connected to a WLAN access network (e.g., using a 5GS certificate) and uses an untrusted non-3GPP access procedure, the UE can perform non-seamless WLAN offloading of part or all data services to the WLAN access network, sending the services outside the IPSec tunnel encapsulation with a non-seamless WLAN offload indication defined in the URSP rules.

[0008] The UE may use the Registration procedure for Trusted Non-3GPP Access defined in Section 4.12a.2.2 of TS23.502v18.2.0 and then determine to send some traffic outside the IPSec tunnel established with the TNGF (which will be affected by non-seamless WLAN offload). Note that the UE cannot first connect to a WLAN access network using a 5GS certificate without performing a 5GS registration and then perform a 5GS registration on that WLAN access network using the Trusted Non-3GPP Access procedure without first releasing the WLAN and then establishing a new WLAN association according to the Registration procedure for Trusted Non-3GPP Access defined in Section 4.12a.2.2 of TS23.502v18.2.0.

[0009] When a UE decides to use 5G NSWO to connect to a WLAN access network (using its 5GS credentials, but not registered to 5GS), the Network Access Identifier (NAI) format of 5G NSW shall be used. The NAI format for 5G NSWO is defined in TS23.003v18.2.0.

[0010] Decorated NAI format for Subscription Hidden Identifier (SUCI)

[0011] The decorated NAI SHOULD take the form of a NAI and SHOULD have the form "homerealm!username@otherrealm" as described in IETF RFC 4282, section 2.7.

[0012] The realm part of the decorated NAI consists of "otherrealm", see IETF draft 2486-bisRFC 4282. "Homerealm" refers to the realm specified in TS23.003 clause 14.2, using the HPLMN ID ("homeMCC" + "homeMNC"). "Otherrealm" is a realm constructed using the VPLMN ID ("visitedMCC" + "visitedMNC") of the PLMN selected as a result of WLAN PLMN selection (see 3GPP TS 24.234v12.2.0).

[0013] The username portion format of the root NAI shall conform to IETF RFC 4187 when using Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) authentication, and shall conform to IETF RFC 4186 when using EAP Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) authentication. When the username portion of the decorated NAI includes an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), it shall be constructed following the same steps as specified for the root NAI in TS 23.003 v18.2.0, section 14.3.

[0014] Therefore, the decorated NAI will take the following form:

[0015] "wlan.mnc <homemnc>.mcc <homemcc>.3gppnetwork.org!0 <imsi>@wlan.mnc <visitedmnc>.mcc <visitedmcc>.3gppnetwork.org

[0016] ” for EAP AKA authentication, and

[0017] "wlan.mnc <homemnc>.mcc <homemcc>.3gppnetwork.org!1 <imsi>@wlan.mnc<visited

[0018] MNC>.mcc <visitedmcc>.3gppnetwork.org", used for EAP SIM authentication.

[0019] For example, for EAP AKA authentication, assuming that the IMSI is 234150999999999 (MCC=234, MNC=15), and the PLMN ID of the selected PLMN is MCC=610, MNC=71, the format of the decorated NAI is "wlan.mnc015.mcc234.3gppnetwork.org!0234150999999999@wlan.mnc071.mcc610.3gppnetwork.org".

[0020] Note that the "otherrealm" specified in this disclosure is resolved by the WLAN Access Node (AN). If the WLAN AN cannot access the GRX, the WLAN AN should resolve the realm by other means, such as a static lookup table, a private local DNS server that acts as an authoritative name server for the subdomain.

[0021] NAI for 5G NSWO

[0022] When the UE decides to use 5G NSWO to connect to a WLAN access network (using its 5GS certificate, but not registered to the 5GS), the NAI format for 5G NSWO in non-roaming scenarios shall be used. The NAI format for 5G NSWO in non-roaming scenarios is defined in TS23.003v18.2.0, clause 28.7.9.2. In this case, the NAI fields are different from the fields defined for use during 5G registration via trusted non-3GPP access to the 5G Core Network (CN) (defined in TS23.003v18.2.0, clause 28.7.6) or when a N5CW device accesses the 5GCN via a trusted non-3GPP access to the 5GCN (see clause 28.7.7 of TS23.003v18.2.0).

[0023] In the 5G NSWO use case, the UE shall use the NAI in the following format:

[0024] - <username>@5gc-nswo.mnc <mnc>.mcc <mcc>.3gppnetwork.org", for PLMN;

[0025] - <username>@5gc-nswo.nid <nid>.mnc <mnc>.mcc <mcc>.3gppnetwork.org” for Standalone Non-Public Network (SNPN).

[0026] In the above use case, a) the username part is defined in clause 28.7.3 of TS23.003v18.2.0; b) the tag "5gc-nswo" in the realm part indicates that the NAI is for 5GNSWO. For PLMN, <mnc>and <mcc>Identifies the PLMN, and for the SNPN, <nid> 、 <mnc>and <mcc>Identifies the SNPN to which the UE attempts to connect via 5G NSWO as described in 3GPP TS 23.501 v18.2.0 clause 4.2.15.

[0027] Decorative NAI for 5G NSWO

[0028] The decorated NAI for 5G NSWO in roaming scenarios shall be of the NAI form defined in TS23.003 18.2.0 clause 28.7.9.1, where "Homerealm" and "otherrealm" shall be preceded by the tag "5gc NSWO".

[0029] Therefore, the decorated NAI will take the following form:

[0030] "5gc-nswo.mnc <homemnc>.mcc <homemcc>.3gppnetwork.org!

[0031] <username of SUCI in NAIformat>@5gc-nswo.mnc <visitedmnc>.mcc <visitedmcc>.3gppnetwork.org”.

[0032] For example, assuming IMSI 2341509999999999, with MCC=234, MNC=15, and MSISN=09999999999, routing indicator 678, home network public key identifier 27, null scheme and visited PLMN ID (MCC=610, MNC=71), then

[0033] - The NAI format of SUCI for 5G NSWO takes the following form:

[0034] "type0.rid678.schid0.userid09999999999@5gc-nswo.mnc015.mcc2

[0035] 34.3gppnetwork.org";

[0036] - The decorated NAI format for SUCI for 5G NSWO roaming takes the following form:

[0037] "5gc-nswo.mnc015.mcc234.3gppnetwork.org!type0.rid678.schid0.

[0038] userid09999999999@5gc-nswo.mnc071.mcc610.3gppnetwork.org”.

[0039] However, the decorated NAI with VPLMN information may be attacked and modified by a man-in-the-middle (MiTM), and the UE will be deceived to access the malicious WLAN AN. For example, the malicious WLAN AN may broadcast PLMN IDx. The UE may be deceived to connect to the malicious WLAN AN and initiate the NSWO authentication process using the decorated SUCI (PLMN IDx or serving network (SN) name = PLMNx). Since the decorated SUCI contains the unprotected VPLMN identifier (ID) / SN name, the malicious WLAN AN may modify the SN name = PLMNy (or home PLMN) that the HPLMN trusts more. The HPLMN then identifies the VPLMN via the decorated SUCI (PLMNy) and allows registration / authentication. After a successful NSWO authentication, the malicious WLAN AN will be trusted by the UE, and the malicious WLAN AN may launch many attacks, such as eavesdropping, impersonation, tampering, etc. Summary of the invention

[0040] This summary is intended to introduce a simplified concept of subnet configuration and a process for implementing subnet operation, particularly in subnet identification. This summary is not intended to identify key features or essential features of the claimed subject matter, nor is it intended to be used to limit the scope of the claimed subject matter.

[0041] In view of the above spoofing and MiTM attacks, it is proposed in the present disclosure to concatenate the VPLMN ID with the username in the decorated NAI so that it will also be considered for SUCI hiding at the UE and it will be available in the output of the protection scheme for hiding the plaintext UE identifier. In the Unified Data Management (UDM) / SIDF (Subscription Identifier De-concealing Function), SUCI de-concealing is also performed and the VPLMN ID is obtained. The VPLMN obtained from the hidden part of the SUCI is compared with the plaintext VPLMN information in the decorated NAI or with the Serving Network Name (SNN) information from the NSWO Function (NSWOF). If the plaintext of the decorated NAI is modified by MiTM, the hidden part will be used for further key derivation and AKA challenge for NSWO authentication. Alternatively, the UDM / Authentication Server Function (AUSF) can reject the authentication / registration request.

[0042] According to a first aspect of the present disclosure, a user equipment (UE) is provided. The UE includes at least one processor and at least one memory storing instructions, and when the instructions are executed by one or more processors, the UE sends a request message for access authentication to a wireless access node in a wireless access network, and the request message includes a hidden identity of the UE in a decorated NAI format, and in the decorated NAI format, a user name of the hidden identity of the UE in the NAI format is concatenated with a VPLMN identifier of a VPLMN serving the UE.

[0043] According to a second aspect of the present disclosure, a first network entity is provided. The first network entity includes at least one processor and at least one memory storing instructions, and when the instructions are executed by one or more processors, the first network entity: receives a first message from a wireless access node in a wireless access network, the first message including a hidden identity of a UE to be authenticated in a decorated NAI format, in which a user name of the hidden identity of the UE in the NAI format is concatenated with a VPLMN identifier of a VPLMN serving the UE, obtains the VPLMN identifier from a domain part of the hidden identity, and sends a request message for authentication to a network entity for an authentication server function, the request message including the hidden identity of the UE and the obtained VPLMN identifier.

[0044] According to a third aspect of the present disclosure, a second network entity is provided. The second network entity includes at least one processor and at least one memory storing instructions, and when the instructions are executed by one or more processors, the second network entity: receives a request message for an authentication certificate from a network entity for an authentication server function, the request message including a hidden identity of a UE to be authenticated in a decorated NAI format, in which a user name of the hidden identity of the UE in the NAI format is concatenated with a VPLMN identifier of a VPLMN serving the UE; de-hides the hidden identity of the UE to obtain a VPLMN identifier and a first identity of the UE; determines whether the de-hidden VPLMN identifier is the same as the VPLMN identifier in the domain part of the hidden identity of the UE; and in response to determining that the de-hidden VPLMN identifier is the same as the VPLMN identifier in the domain part, sends a response message to the authentication to the network entity for the authentication server function, the response message including the generated authentication vector and the first identity of the UE.

[0045] According to a fourth aspect of the present disclosure, a method performed by a UE is provided. The method includes sending a request message for access authentication to a wireless access node in a wireless access network, the request message including a hidden identity of the UE in a decorated NAI format, in which a user name of the hidden identity of the UE in the NAI format is concatenated with a VPLMN identifier of a VPLMN serving the UE.

[0046] According to a fifth aspect of the present disclosure, a method performed by a first network entity is provided. The method comprises: receiving a first message from a wireless access node in a wireless access network, the first message comprising a hidden identity of a UE to be authenticated in a decorated NAI format, in which a user name of the hidden identity of the UE in the NAI format is concatenated with a VPLMN identifier of a VPLMN serving the UE, obtaining the VPLMN identifier from a domain part of the hidden identity, and sending a request message for authentication to a network entity for an authentication server function, the request message comprising the hidden identity of the UE and the obtained VPLMN identifier.

[0047] According to a sixth aspect of the present disclosure, a method performed by a second network entity is provided. The method includes: receiving a request message for an authentication certificate from a network entity for an authentication server function, the request message including a hidden identity of a UE to be authenticated in a decorated NAI format, in which a user name of the hidden identity of the UE in the NAI format is concatenated with a VPLMN identifier of a VPLMN serving the UE; de-hiding the hidden identity of the UE to obtain the VPLMN identifier and the first identity of the UE; determining whether the de-hidden VPLMN identifier is the same as the VPLMN identifier in the domain part of the hidden identity of the UE; and in response to determining that the de-hidden VPLMN identifier is the same as the VPLMN identifier in the domain part, sending a response message to the authentication to the network entity for the authentication server function, the response message including the generated authentication vector and the first identity of the UE.

[0048] According to a seventh aspect of the present disclosure, a UE is provided, the UE comprising a component for performing any step of the method according to the fourth aspect.

[0049] According to an eighth aspect of the present disclosure, there is provided a first network entity, the first network entity comprising a component for performing any step of the method according to the fifth aspect.

[0050] According to a ninth aspect of the present disclosure, there is provided a second network entity, the second network entity comprising a component for executing any step of the method according to the sixth aspect.

[0051] According to the tenth aspect of the present disclosure, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, on which instructions are stored. When the instructions are executed by at least one processor, the at least one processor executes any method according to any one of the fourth aspect, the fifth aspect and the sixth aspect.

[0052] According to an eleventh aspect of the present disclosure, a computer program product is provided, which includes instructions, which when executed by at least one processor, causes the at least one processor to perform any method according to any one of the fourth aspect, the fifth aspect and the sixth aspect.

[0053] It should be understood that the invention summary is not intended to determine the key or essential features of the embodiments of the present disclosure, nor is it intended to limit the scope of the present disclosure. Other features of the present disclosure will become easily understood through the following description. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0054] Some example embodiments will now be described with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:

[0055] Figure 1 is a flow chart illustrating a method performed by a UE according to some embodiments of the present disclosure;

[0056] Figure 2 is a schematic diagram illustrating SUCI hiding based on Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) at a UE according to some embodiments of the present disclosure;

[0057] Figure 3 is a flow chart illustrating a method performed by a first network entity according to some embodiments of the present disclosure;

[0058] Figure 4 is a flow chart illustrating a method performed by a second network entity according to some embodiments of the present disclosure;

[0059] Figure 5 is a schematic diagram illustrating SUCI de-hiding based on ECIES in a home environment according to some embodiments of the present disclosure;

[0060] Figure 6 The coding of the 5GMM cause information element is schematically shown;

[0061] Figure 7 Schematically illustrates a signaling sequence diagram of non-3GPP access authentication according to some embodiments of the present disclosure;

[0062] Figure 8 An exemplary structural block diagram of a UE according to some embodiments of the present disclosure is shown; and

[0063] Fig. 9 An exemplary structural block diagram of a network entity according to some embodiments of the present disclosure is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0064] Some example embodiments will now be described more fully hereinafter with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which some but not all embodiments are shown. Indeed, example embodiments may take many different forms and should not be construed as limited to the embodiments described herein; rather, these embodiments are provided so that this disclosure will satisfy applicable legal requirements. Like reference numerals refer to like elements throughout.

[0065] In the following description and claims, unless defined otherwise, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this disclosure belongs.

[0066] In this disclosure, references to "one embodiment," "an embodiment," and "an example embodiment," etc. indicate that the described embodiment may include a particular feature, structure, or characteristic, but not every embodiment must include the particular feature, structure, or characteristic. Furthermore, such phrases do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment. Furthermore, when a particular feature, structure, or characteristic is described in conjunction with an example embodiment, it is considered that it is within the knowledge of a person skilled in the art to affect such feature, structure, or characteristic in conjunction with other embodiments, whether or not explicitly described.

[0067] It should be understood that although the terms "first" and "second" etc. can be used to describe various elements in this article, these elements should not be limited by these terms. These terms are only used to distinguish one element from another element. For example, without departing from the scope of the exemplary embodiment, the first element can be referred to as the second element, and similarly, the second element can be referred to as the first element. As used herein, the term "and / or" includes any and all combinations of one or more of the listed terms.

[0068] The terms used herein are only used to describe specific embodiments and are not intended to limit the example embodiments. As used herein, the singular forms "a", "an" and "the" also include the plural forms, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. It is further understood that the terms "comprises", "comprising", "has", "having", "includes" and / or "including" when used herein specify the presence of stated features, elements and / or components, etc., but do not preclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, elements, components and / or combinations thereof.

[0069] As used in this application, the term "circuitry" may refer to one, more, or all of the following:

[0070] (a) a pure hardware circuit implementation (such as an implementation using only analog and / or digital circuitry), and

[0071] (b) a combination of hardware circuitry and software such as (where applicable):

[0072] (i) a combination of analog and / or digital hardware circuits and software / firmware, and

[0073] (ii) any portion of hardware processor(s) (including digital signal processor(s)) with software, software and memory(s) that work together to enable a device (such as a mobile phone or server) to perform various functions, and

[0074] (c) Hardware circuit(s) and / or processor(s), such as microprocessor(s) or portion(s) of microprocessor(s), that require software (e.g., firmware) to operate, but which may not be present when the software is not required for operation.

[0075] This definition of circuitry applies to all uses of the term in this application, including in any claims. As another example, as used in this application, the term circuitry also covers an implementation of only a hardware circuit or processor (or multiple processors) or a portion of a hardware circuit or processor and its accompanying software and / or firmware. For example, if applicable to a particular claim element, the term circuitry also covers a baseband integrated circuit or processor integrated circuit for a mobile device, or a similar integrated circuit in a server, cellular network device, or other computing or network device.

[0076] As used herein, the term "communication network" refers to a network that complies with any suitable communication standard, such as Long Term Evolution (LTE), Advanced LTE (LTE-A), Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA), High Speed ​​Packet Access (HSPA), Narrowband Internet of Things (NB-IoT), New Radio (NR), etc. In addition, the communication between the terminal device and the network device in the communication network can be performed according to any suitable generation of communication protocol, including but not limited to the first generation (1G), second generation (2G), 2.5G, 2.75G, third generation (3G), fourth generation (4G), 4.5G, 5G, future sixth generation (6G) communication protocol, and / or any other protocol currently known or to be developed in the future. The embodiments of the present disclosure can be applied to various communication systems. In view of the rapid development of communication, there will certainly be future types of communication technologies and systems that can embody the present disclosure. The scope of the present disclosure should not be considered to be limited to the above-mentioned system.

[0077] As used herein, the term "user equipment (UE)" refers to any terminal device that can access a communication network and receive services therefrom. As an example and not limitation, a UE may be a combination of a Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) / Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card and a Mobile Equipment (ME).

[0078] As used herein, the term "network entity" refers to any entity used to implement or support network functions in a communication network. A network entity may be implemented in a physical network node or in a virtual network node that performs functions through logical resources in more than one physical network node.

[0079] As described above, the decorated NAI with VPLMN information may be attacked and modified by a man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack, and thus the UE may be deceived to access a malicious WLAN AN.

[0080] Therefore, an embodiment of the present disclosure proposes an improved non-3GPP access authentication solution. In an embodiment, VPLMN information is concatenated with a user name in a decorated NAI format, especially for 5G NSWO authentication, so that the UE can be protected from access by malicious WLAN AN.

[0081] Figure 1 A flow chart of a method 100 performed by a UE according to some embodiments of the present disclosure is shown. In the figure, optional steps are shown in dashed boxes.

[0082] like Figure 1 As shown, at block 110, the UE sends a request message for access authentication to a wireless access node in the wireless access network. The request message may include the hidden identity of the UE in a novel protected decorated NAI format. In this protected decorated NAI format, the user name of the hidden identity of the UE in the NAI format is concatenated with the VPLMN identifier of the VPLMN serving the UE, as shown below. In some embodiments, the hidden identity of the UE may be the SUCI of the UE.

[0083] As mentioned above, the regular decorated NAI format is as follows:

[0084] Homerealm ！ username @ Otherrealm

[0085] or

[0086] Visitedrealm ！ Homerealm ！ username @ Otherrealm

[0087] In some embodiments, the protected decoration NAI format may be as follows:

[0088] Homerealm ！ Username concatenated with VPLMN ID @ Otherrealm

[0089] or

[0090] Visitedrealm ！ Homerealm ！ Username concatenated with VPLMN ID @ Otherrealm

[0091] In some embodiments, the protected decorated NAI format and NAI format may be used for 5G NSWO. As described above, the conventional decorated NAI for 5G NSWO adopts the NAI form defined in TS23.00318.2.0 Section 28.7.9.1, where "Homerealm" and "otherrealm" shall be preceded by the "5gc-nswo" tag. In some embodiments, the protected decorated NAI format for 5G NSWO may take the following form:

[0092] "5gc-nswo.mnc <homemnc>.mcc <homemcc>.3gppnetwork.org!

[0093] <username of SUCI in NAI format concatenated with VPLMNID>@5gc-nswo.mnc <visitedmnc>.mcc <visitedmcc>.3gppnetwork.org”.

[0094] For example, assuming IMSI 234150999999999, where MCC=234, MNC=15, and MSISN=0999999999, the routing indicator is 678, the home network public key identifier is 27, the empty scheme and the visited PLMN ID (MCC=610, MNC=71), the NAI format of the SUCI of 5GNSWO is: "type0.rid678.schid0.userid0999999999@5gc-nswo.mnc015.mcc234.3gppnetwork.org", and 5G The format of the protected decorated NAI for SUCI for NSWO roaming is: "5gc-nswo.mnc015.mcc234.3gppnetwork.org!type0.rid678.schid0.userid09999999999071610@5gc-nswo.mnc071.mcc610.3gppnetwork.org".

[0095] In some embodiments of the present disclosure, the wireless access network may be any non-3GPP access network, such as a WLAN access network, and the wireless access node may be any non-3GPP access node, such as a WLAN access point. In some embodiments, the request message for access authentication may be an EAP ID response message.

[0096] In some embodiments, before sending at block 110, at block 105, the UE may generate a hidden identity of the UE by encrypting the first identity of the UE concatenated with the VPLMN identifier. In some embodiments, the first identity of the UE may be the SUPI of the UE. In some embodiments, the encryption may be based on ECIES.

[0097] Figure 2 The SUCI hiding based on ECIES at the UE according to some embodiments of the present disclosure is schematically illustrated. Figure 2 As shown, at operation 1, the UE generates a key pair (temporary public key and private key) using a key pair generation primitive. At operation 2, based on the Diffie-Hellman primitive, a shared key element is derived from the public key of the home network (HN) and the generated temporary private key. Subsequently, at operation 3, a key derivation function KDF is used to generate key data K of a length including an encryption key (EK) + an initial counter block (ICB) + a MAC key. Using the derived keys EK and ICB, at operation 4, symmetric encryption is performed to encrypt a plaintext block (SUPI concatenated with a VPLMN ID), thereby generating a ciphertext value. Then, at operation 5, the UE uses a tag operation of the MAC scheme to calculate a tag for the ciphertext of the SUPI concatenated with the VPLMN ID using the generated MAC key.

[0098] Figure 3 A flow chart illustrating a method 200 performed by a first network entity according to some embodiments of the present disclosure is shown. In some embodiments, the first network entity may be a NSWO function (NSWOF) in a core network (eg, a 5G core (5GC) network).

[0099] like Figure 3 As shown, at block 310, the first network entity receives a first message from a radio access node in a radio access network. The first message includes a hidden identity of a UE to be authenticated in a protected decorated NAI format, in which a user name of the hidden identity of the UE in the NAI format is concatenated with a VPLMN identifier of a VPLMN serving the UE. The details of the protected decorated NAI format have been given in the above description and will be omitted here. In some embodiments, the hidden identity of the UE may be a SUCI of the UE.

[0100] At block 320, the first network entity obtains the VPLMN identifier from the realm portion of the hidden identity. As described above, the realm portion "otherwarem" of the protected decorated NAI format of the SUCI is constructed using the plaintext VPLMN identifier, so the first network entity can obtain the VPLMN identifier from the realm portion.

[0101] Then at block 330, the first network entity sends a request message for authentication to a network entity for an authentication server function (AUSF), the request message including the hidden identity of the UE and the obtained VPLMN identifier. In some embodiments, the request message for authentication may be a Nausf_UE_Authentication authentication request.

[0102] Figure 4 A flow chart illustrating a method performed by a second network entity according to some embodiments of the present disclosure is shown. In some embodiments, the second network entity may be a UDM in a core network, such as a 5GC network. In the figure, optional steps are shown in dashed boxes.

[0103] like Figure 4 As shown, at block 410, the second network entity receives a request message for an authentication certificate from a network entity for an authentication server function (AUSF). The request message for the authentication certificate includes a hidden identity of a UE to be authenticated in a protected decorated NAI format, in which a user name of the hidden identity of the UE in the NAI format is concatenated with a VPLMN identifier of a VPLMN serving the UE. The details of the protected decorated NAI format have been given in the above description and will be omitted here. In some embodiments, the hidden identity of the UE may be a SUCI of the UE.

[0104] After receiving the request message from the AUSF, at block 420, the second network entity de-hides the hidden identity of the UE to obtain the VPLMN identifier and the first identity of the UE. In some embodiments, the second network entity may decrypt the hidden identity of the UE to obtain the first identity concatenated with the VPLMN identifier, and obtain the VPLMN ID from the concatenated first identity and the VPLMN identifier. In some embodiments, the first identity of the UE may be the SUPI of the UE.

[0105] Figure 5 FIG. 4 illustrates SUCI de-hiding based on ECIES in a home environment according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. Figure 5 As shown, in a home environment, for example at a subscription identifier de-hiding function (SIDF), at operation 1, the received UE temporary public key and the home network's private key are used to generate a temporary shared key. Using the key derivation function, at operation 2, key data K having a length including a decryption key (DK) + an initial counter block ICB + a MAC key is generated. At operation 3, the generated DK and ICB are used to decrypt the ciphertext value (SUCI) using symmetric decryption to obtain a plaintext SUPI concatenated with the VPLMN ID. The temporary MAC key is used for the concatenated ciphertext value of the SUPI and the VPLMN identifier to generate an expected MAC, which is compared with the received MAC, and by this comparison, the integrity of the SUCI is verified. The VPLMN ID can be obtained from the concatenated SUPI and the VPLMN identifier.

[0106] Back to Figure 4 At block 430, the second network entity determines whether the de-hidden VPLMN identifier is the same as the VPLMN identifier in the domain portion of the hidden identity of the UE. At block 440, in response to determining that the de-hidden VPLMN identifier is the same as the VPLMN identifier in the domain portion, the second network entity sends a response message to the AUSF for authentication, the response message including the generated authentication vector and the first identity of the UE.

[0107] Optionally, in some embodiments, the second network entity may send a response message to a network entity for an access and mobility management function (AMF) associated with the UE, the response message including the selected authentication method and the generated authentication vector.

[0108] In some embodiments, if the result of the determination is that the de-hidden VPLMN identifier is the same as the VPLMN identifier in the domain part of the hidden identity of the UE, the second network entity may select EAP AKA prime as the authentication method and generate an authentication vector. The second network entity may then send a corresponding response message to the AUSF and optionally the AMF.

[0109] In some embodiments, at block 450, in response to determining that the de-hidden VPLMN identifier is different from the VPLMN identifier in the domain portion, the second network entity sends a response message indicating a failure cause to the AUSF. The AUSF then forwards the failure cause to the AMF associated with the UE.

[0110] Optionally, in some embodiments, in response to determining that the de-hidden VPLMN identifier is different from the VPLMN identifier in the domain part, the second network entity sends a response message indicating the failure cause to the AMF associated with the UE. The AMF then sends the failure cause ("WLAN AN not allowed") to the UE. This allows the UE to camp on a different WLAN AN.

[0111] In some embodiments, the failure cause may be an untrusted / unallowed WLAN AN and may be indicated in a 5G Mobility Management (5GMM) cause information element. The purpose of the 5GMM cause information element is to indicate why the 5GMM request from the UE was rejected by the network. The encoding of the 5GMM cause information element is as follows: Figure 6 5GMM cause is a type 3 information element with a length of 2 octets. Table 1 shows the cause value and description of the 5GMM cause information element.

[0112] Table 1: 5GMM Cause Information Elements

[0113]

[0114]

[0115]

[0116] Figure 7 The signaling sequence diagram of non-3GPP access authentication according to some embodiments of the present disclosure is schematically shown, in which the Figure 1 , Figure 3 and Figure 4 method.

[0117] In S1, the UE uses a protected decorated NAI format for SUCI for 5G NSWO, where the username is concatenated with the VPLMN ID. The VPLMN identifier is also available in clear text in the "otherwarem" section. The UE's SUPI and the concatenated VPLMN ID are used as input for SUCI hiding.

[0118] In S2, the UE sends an EAP-ID Response to the WLAN AN as a response to the EAP-ID Request received before S1 (not shown in the figure).

[0119] In S3, the WLAN AN sends a SWa protocol message with an EAP-ID response and SUCI to the NSWOF.

[0120] In S4, the NSWOF fills the AN ID in the SUCI with the plain text of the received VPLMN ID.

[0121] In S5, the NSWOF sends a Nausf_UE_Authentication authentication request with SUCI, AN ID and NSWO indicator to the AUSF.

[0122] In S6, the AUSF verifies the AN ID with the allowed serving network. If allowed, in S7, the AUSF sends a Nudm_UE_Authentication request message with SUCI, AN ID and NSWO indicator to the UDM.

[0123] In S8, UDM / SIDF de-hides the VPLMN ID together with the SUPI from the SUCI and obtains the VPLMN identifier from the concatenated SUPI and VPLMN identifier. If the VPLMN ID obtained in the "otherrealm" part is the same as the de-hidden VPLMN ID from the SUCI, UDM selects the EAP-AKA prime for NSWO authentication. Otherwise, the registration will be rejected and UDM will send a new cause to the AMF. The AMF sends a new rejection cause ("WLAN AN is not trusted") to the UE. The UE will not connect to the same WLAN AN, but will camp on a different WLAN AN. The newly introduced causes are as described above.

[0124] In some embodiments, the Nudm_UE_Authentication service operation shall support the request data structure specified in Table 2 and the response data structure and response code specified in Table 3.

[0125] Table 2: Data structures supported by the POST request body on this resource

[0126] Data Types P Cardinality describe AuthenticationInfo Request M 1 Contains the service network name and resynchronization information

[0127] Table 3: Data structures supported by the POST response body on this resource

[0128]

[0129] Reference now Figure 8 , Figure 8 The schematic block diagram of the structure of UE 700 is shown. UE 700 may include at least one processor 701 (such as a data processor (DP)) and at least one memory (MEM) 702 coupled to the at least one processor 701. UE 700 may also include a transmitting unit / receiving unit 703 coupled to the one or more processors 701.

[0130] Processor 701 may be of any type suitable to the local technical environment, and may include one or more of: a general purpose computer, a special purpose computer, a microprocessor, a digital signal processor (DSP), and a processor based on a multi-core processor architecture, as non-limiting examples.

[0131] As non-limiting examples, MEM 702 may be of any type suitable to the local technical environment and may be implemented using any suitable data storage technology, such as semiconductor-based memory devices, magnetic memory devices and systems, optical memory devices and systems, fixed memory and removable memory.

[0132] MEM 702 stores a program (PROG) 704. PROG 704 may include instructions that, when executed on the associated processor 701, enable UE 700 to operate according to embodiments of the present disclosure, such as executing Figure 1 The method 100 shown. The combination of at least one processor 801 and at least one MEM 702 may form a processing circuit system or component 705 suitable for implementing various embodiments of the present disclosure.

[0133] Fig. 9 The schematic structural block diagram of a network entity 800 is shown in FIG. Figure 3 and Figure 4 The network entity 800 may include at least one processor 801 (such as a data processor (DP)) and at least one memory (MEM) 802 coupled to the at least one processor 801. The network entity 800 may also include a sending unit / receiving unit 803 coupled to the one or more processors 801.

[0134] Processor 801 may be of any type suitable to the local technical environment, and may include one or more of: a general purpose computer, a special purpose computer, a microprocessor, a digital signal processor (DSP), and a processor based on a multi-core processor architecture, as non-limiting examples.

[0135] As non-limiting examples, MEM 802 may be of any type suitable to the local technical environment and may be implemented using any suitable data storage technology, such as semiconductor-based memory devices, magnetic memory devices and systems, optical memory devices and systems, fixed memory, and removable memory.

[0136] MEM 802 stores a program (PROG) 804. PROG 804 may include instructions that, when executed on the associated processor 801, enable the network entity 800 to operate according to embodiments of the present disclosure, such as executing Figure 3 , Figure 4 One of the methods 300 and 400 shown. The combination of at least one processor 801 and at least one MEM 802 may form a processing circuit system or component 905 suitable for implementing various embodiments of the present disclosure.

[0137] Various embodiments of the present disclosure may be implemented by a computer program executable by one or more processors, software, firmware, hardware, or a combination thereof.

[0138] In general, various exemplary embodiments may be implemented in hardware or dedicated circuits, software, logic, or any combination thereof. For example, some aspects may be implemented in hardware, while other aspects may be implemented in firmware or software, which may be executed by a controller, microprocessor, or other computing device, but the invention is not limited thereto. Although various aspects of the exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure may be illustrated and described as block diagrams, flow charts, or using some other graphical representation, it is well understood that, as non-limiting examples, the blocks, devices, systems, techniques, or methods described herein may be implemented in hardware, software, firmware, dedicated circuits or logic, general-purpose hardware or controllers, or other computing devices, or some combination thereof.

[0139] Therefore, it should be understood that at least some aspects of the exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure may be practiced in various components, such as integrated circuit chips and modules. Therefore, it should be understood that the exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure may be implemented in a device embodied as an integrated circuit, wherein the integrated circuit may include circuit systems (and possible firmware) for embodying at least one or more of a data processor, a digital signal processor, a baseband circuit system, and a radio frequency circuit system, which are configurable to operate according to the exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure.

[0140] It should be understood that at least some aspects of the exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure may be embodied in computer executable instructions executed by one or more computers or other devices, such as in one or more program modules. Typically, program modules include routines, programs, objects, components, data structures, etc. that perform specific tasks or implement specific abstract data types when executed by a processor in a computer or other device. Computer executable instructions can be stored on a computer-readable medium, such as a non-transitory computer-readable medium, such as a hard disk, an optical disk, a removable storage medium, a solid-state memory, a RAM, etc. Those skilled in the art will appreciate that in various embodiments, the functions of the program modules can be combined or distributed as desired. In addition, the functions may be embodied in whole or in part in firmware or hardware equivalents, such as integrated circuits, field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), etc.

[0141] In addition, although the operations are described in a particular order, this should not be understood as requiring such operations to be performed in the particular order shown or in order or performing all the operations shown to obtain the desired result. In some cases, multitasking and parallel processing may be advantageous. Similarly, although several specific implementation details are included in the above discussion, these should not be interpreted as limitations on the scope of the present disclosure, but rather descriptions of features that may be specific to a particular embodiment. Certain features described in the context of a separate embodiment may also be implemented in combination in a single embodiment. On the contrary, the various features described in the context of a single embodiment may also be implemented in multiple embodiments individually or in any suitable sub-combination.

[0142] The present disclosure includes any novel feature or feature combination explicitly disclosed herein or any summary thereof. When read in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, various modifications and adaptations to the above exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure may become clear to those skilled in the relevant art in view of the above description. However, any and all modifications will still fall within the scope of the non-limiting and exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure.< / visitedmcc> < / visitedmnc> < / homemcc> < / homemnc> < / visitedmcc> < / visitedmnc> < / homemcc> < / homemnc> < / mcc> < / mnc> < / nid> < / mcc> < / mnc> < / mcc> < / mnc> < / nid> < / username> < / mcc> < / mnc> < / username> < / visitedmcc> < / imsi> < / homemcc> < / homemnc> < / visitedmcc> < / visitedmnc> < / imsi> < / homemcc> < / homemnc>

Claims

1. A user equipment UE, comprising: one or more processors; as well as one or more memories storing instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the UE to: A request message for access authentication is sent to a wireless access node in a wireless access network, wherein the request message includes a hidden identity of the UE in a decorated network access identifier NAI format, wherein a user name of the hidden identity of the UE in the NAI format is concatenated with a VPLMN identifier of a visited public land mobile network VPLMN serving the UE.

2. The UE according to claim 1, wherein the UE is further caused to: The hidden identity of the UE is generated by encrypting the first identity of the UE concatenated with the VPLMN identifier.

3. The UE according to claim 2, wherein the first identity of the UE comprises a subscription permanent identifier (SUPI) of the UE, and the hidden identity of the UE comprises a subscription hidden identifier (SUCI) of the UE.

4. The UE according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the decorated NAI format and the NAI format are used for fifth generation 5G non-seamless wireless local area network offload (NSWO).

5. A method performed by a user equipment UE, the method comprising: A request message for access authentication is sent to a wireless access node in a wireless access network, wherein the request message includes a hidden identity of the UE in a decorated network access identifier NAI format, wherein a user name of the hidden identity of the UE in the NAI format is concatenated with a VPLMN identifier of a visited public land mobile network VPLMN serving the UE.

6. The method according to claim 5, further comprising: The hidden identity of the UE is generated by encrypting the first identity of the UE concatenated with the VPLMN identifier.

7. The method according to claim 6, wherein the first identity of the UE comprises a subscription permanent identifier of the UE, and the hidden identity of the UE comprises a subscription hidden identifier of the UE.

8. The method according to any one of claims 5 to 7, wherein the decorated NAI format and the NAI format are used for fifth generation (5G) non-seamless wireless local area network offload (NSWO).

9. A computer readable medium having stored thereon a computer program code, which, when executed on a computer, causes the computer to perform the method according to any one of claims 5 to 8.

10. A first network entity, comprising: one or more processors; as well as one or more memories storing instructions that, when executed on the one or more processors, cause the first network entity to: receiving a first message from a radio access node in a radio access network, the first message comprising a hidden identity of a UE to be authenticated in a decorated network access identifier (NAI) format, wherein a user name of the hidden identity of the UE in the NAI format is concatenated with a VPLMN identifier of a visited public land mobile network (VPLMN) serving the UE; Obtaining the VPLMN identifier from the domain portion of the hidden identity; as well as A request message for authentication is sent to a network entity used for an authentication server function, wherein the request message includes: the hidden identity of the UE and the obtained VPLMN identifier.

11. The first network entity according to claim 10, wherein the hidden identity of the UE comprises a subscription hidden identifier of the UE.

12. The first network entity according to claim 10 or 11, wherein the decorated NAI format and the NAI format are used for 5G non-seamless wireless local area network offload (NSWO).

13. The first network entity according to any one of claims 10 to 12, wherein the first network entity is a NSWO function.

14. A method performed by a first network entity, the method comprising: receiving a first message from a radio access node in a radio access network, the first message comprising a hidden identity of a UE to be authenticated in a decorated network access identifier (NAI) format, wherein a user name of the hidden identity of the UE in the NAI format is concatenated with a VPLMN identifier of a visited public land mobile network (VPLMN) serving the UE; Obtaining the VPLMN identifier from the domain portion of the hidden identity; as well as A request message for authentication is sent to a network entity used for an authentication server function, wherein the request message includes: the hidden identity of the UE and the obtained VPLMN identifier.

15. The method according to claim 14, wherein the hidden identity of the UE comprises a subscription hidden identifier of the UE.

16. The method according to claim 14 or 15, wherein the decorated NAI format and the NAI format are used for 5G non-seamless wireless LAN offload (NSWO).

17. The method according to any one of claims 14 to 16, wherein the first network entity is a NSWO function.

18. A computer readable medium having stored thereon a computer program code, which, when executed on a computer, causes the computer to perform the method according to any one of claims 14 to 17.

19. A second network entity, comprising: one or more processors; as well as one or more memories storing instructions that, when executed on the one or more processors, cause the second network entity to: receiving a request message for an authentication certificate from a network entity for an authentication server function, the request message comprising a hidden identity of a UE to be authenticated in a decorated network access identifier (NAI) format, wherein a user name of the hidden identity of the UE in the NAI format is concatenated with a VPLMN identifier of a visited public land mobile network (VPLMN) serving the UE; De-hiding the hidden identity of the UE to obtain the VPLMN identifier and the first identity of the UE; determining whether the de-hidden VPLMN identifier is the same as the VPLMN identifier in the domain part of the hidden identity of the UE; as well as In response to the determination that the de-hidden VPLMN identifier is the same as the VPLMN identifier in the domain part, a response message to authentication is sent to the network entity for authentication server function, the response message including: the generated authentication vector and the first identity of the UE.

20. The second network entity according to claim 19, wherein the second network entity is configured to de-hide the hidden identity of the UE to obtain the VPLMN identifier and the first identity of the UE by: decrypting the hidden identity of the UE to obtain the first identity concatenated with the VPLMN identifier; and The VPLMN identifier is acquired from the cascaded first identifier and the VPLMN identifier.

21. The second network entity according to claim 19 or 20, wherein the second network entity is further caused to: Sending a response message to a network entity for access and mobility management functions associated with the UE, the response message comprising: The selected authentication method, and the generated authentication vector.

22. The second network entity according to any one of claims 19 to 21, wherein the second network entity is further caused to: In response to the determination that the de-hidden VPLMN identifier is different from the VPLMN identifier in the domain part, a response message indicating a failure cause is sent to the network entity for the authentication server function, and the network entity for the authentication server function further forwards the failure cause to the network entity for the access and mobility management function associated with the UE.

23. The second network entity according to any one of claims 19 to 22, wherein the second network entity is further caused to: In response to determining that the de-hidden VPLMN identifier is different from the VPLMN identifier in the domain part, a response message indicating a failure cause is sent to a network entity for access and mobility management functions associated with the UE, and the network entity for access and mobility management functions associated with the UE further sends the failure cause to the UE.

24. The second network entity of claim 23, wherein the failure cause is indicated in a 5G mobility management cause information element of the response message.

25. The second network entity according to any one of claims 19 to 24, wherein the hidden identity of the UE comprises a subscription hidden identifier of the UE, and the first identity of the UE comprises a subscription permanent identifier of the UE.

26. The second network entity according to any one of claims 19 to 25, wherein the decorated NAI format and the NAI format are used for 5G non-seamless wireless local area network offload (NSWO).

27. The second network entity according to any one of claims 19 to 26, wherein the second network entity is a unified data management (UDM).

28. A method performed by a second network entity, the method comprising: receiving a request message for an authentication certificate from a network entity for an authentication server function, the request message comprising a hidden identity of a UE to be authenticated in a decorated network access identifier (NAI) format, wherein a user name of the hidden identity of the UE in the NAI format is concatenated with a VPLMN identifier of a visited public land mobile network (VPLMN) serving the UE; De-hiding the hidden identity of the UE to obtain the VPLMN identifier and the first identity of the UE; determining whether the de-hidden VPLMN identifier is the same as the VPLMN identifier in the domain part of the hidden identity of the UE; as well as In response to the determination that the de-hidden VPLMN identifier is the same as the VPLMN identifier in the domain part, a response message to authentication is sent to the network entity for authentication server function, the response message including: the generated authentication vector and the first identity of the UE.

29. The method according to claim 28, wherein de-hiding the hidden identity of the UE to obtain the VPLMN identifier and the first identity of the UE comprises: decrypting the hidden identity of the UE to obtain the first identity cascaded with the VPLMN identifier; as well as The VPLMN identifier is acquired from the cascaded first identifier and the VPLMN identifier.

30. The method according to claim 28 or 29, further comprising: A response message is sent to a network entity for access and mobility management functions associated with the UE, the response message including: the selected authentication method and the generated authentication vector.

31. The method according to any one of claims 28 to 30, further comprising: In response to the determination that the de-hidden VPLMN identifier is different from the VPLMN identifier in the domain part, a response message indicating a failure cause is sent to the network entity for authentication server function, and the network entity for authentication server function in turn forwards the failure cause to a network entity for access and mobility management function associated with the UE.

32. The method according to any one of claims 28 to 31, further comprising: In response to the determination that the de-hidden VPLMN identifier is different from the VPLMN identifier in the domain part, a response message indicating a failure cause is sent to a network entity for access and mobility management functions associated with the UE, and the network entity for access and mobility management functions associated with the UE further sends the failure cause to the UE.

33. A method according to claim 32, wherein the failure cause is indicated in a 5G mobility management cause information element of the response message.

34. The method according to any one of claims 28 to 33, wherein the hidden identity of the UE comprises a subscription hidden identifier of the UE, and the first identity of the UE comprises a subscription permanent identifier of the UE.

35. The method according to any one of claims 28 to 34, wherein the decorated NAI format and the NAI format are used for 5G non-seamless wireless local area network offload (NSWO).

36. The method according to any one of claims 28 to 35, wherein the second network entity is a unified data management (UDM).

37. A computer readable medium having stored thereon a computer program code which, when executed on a computer, causes the computer to perform the method according to any one of claims 28 to 36.

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