User identity confusion protection method constructed on alliance chain

Abstract

The invention relates to the technical field of computers, in particular to a user identity confusion protection method constructed on an alliance chain, a user generates a root key pair, a plurality of identities are registered on the alliance chain by using the root key pair, content is signed by using a skuser during registration, and when an alliance chain system receives a user transaction, the user identity confusion protection method constructed on the alliance chain is carried out by using the skuser. The method comprises the following steps: firstly, verifying the signature of a user to ensure that the transaction is really sent and signed by the user with a private key ski, then, determining the real identity of the user according to the association relationship between pk.1. N and pkuser, and verifying other business logics. According to the invention, the same user can use different anonymous identities in different transactions of the alliance chain, so that the situation that related transactions of the user are tracked and positioned due to leakage of historical identities is avoided. And meanwhile, the supervision requirement can be met, and different anonymous identities can be associated by a supervised party.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of computer technology, and in particular to a user identity obfuscation protection method built on an alliance chain. Background Art

[0002] Blockchain technology is a decentralized distributed ledger technology that allows multiple participants to jointly maintain a growing block data record. These blocks are verified by encryption algorithms and linked to the previous block to form an unalterable chain. According to the degree of openness and authority management of participating nodes, blockchain can be divided into public chains and alliance chains. The core nodes of the latter are often built by trusted participants in the system and jointly provide services to the outside world. In the system, participants usually use public key addresses instead of real identities to directly participate in the system. However, since the relevant participants can analyze the historical data of the blocks, they can try to associate the public key address with the user's real identity and further mine other transaction information of the user. This may not only involve the leakage of user privacy, but also the leakage of business secrets of enterprises and institutions. Therefore, the present invention proposes a user identity confusion protection method on the alliance chain system. Summary of the invention

[0003] Based on the technical problems existing in the background technology, the present invention proposes a user identity obfuscation protection method built on a consortium chain, which has the advantage of being unable to infer the association between different transactions of users from the public transaction content, thereby achieving the effect of privacy protection, and solving the problem that the prior art may involve privacy leakage of users and the leakage of commercial secrets of enterprises and institutions.

[0004] The present invention provides the following technical solution: a user identity obfuscation protection method built on a consortium chain, comprising the following steps:

[0005] S1. The smart contract of the alliance chain has a key pair named sk blockchain and pk blockchain ; Among them, pk blockchain It is public, blockchain Only the core nodes and regulators of the alliance chain hold it;

[0006] The user generates a root key pair sk user and pk user , the root key is verified by the alliance chain system and corresponds one-to-one with the user identity;

[0007] S2. The user uses the root key pair in step S1 to register multiple identities on the alliance chain. The registration content is encrypt(pk blockchain ,pk 1..n ), where pk1..n It is a random key pair generated by the user himself (sk 1..n , pk 1..n )'s public key part, when registering, you need to use sk user Sign the content;

[0008] S3. When the alliance chain system receives a user transaction, it first verifies the user's signature to ensure that the transaction is indeed made by the holder of the private key sk i The user issues and signs it, and then, according to pk 1..n and pk user The association relationship determines the user's true identity and performs other business logic verifications.

[0009] Preferably, the nodes of the alliance chain are connected through sk blockchain Decrypt the registration content of step S2 to obtain the user's pk 1..n and pk user The associated relationship.

[0010] Preferably, when signing to participate in the blockchain, users use different (sk i ,pk i) , where (sk i ,pk i ) belongs to (sk 1..n , pk 1..n ).

[0011] The present invention provides a user identity obfuscation protection method built on a consortium chain. For the central node and regulator of the consortium chain, they can still obtain the user's root key pair from the transaction itself, thereby meeting the regulatory requirements.

[0012] For other members of the alliance chain, since they do not have sk blockchain , so it is impossible to get from pk i The user’s root key pair can be inferred from the above, so it is impossible to associate the user’s different transactions. Therefore, it is impossible to infer the association between the user’s different transactions from the public transaction content, thereby achieving the effect of privacy protection. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0013] Figure 1 A flow chart for registering the present invention;

[0014] Figure 2 This is a transaction processing flow chart of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0015] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0016] The present invention provides a technical solution: a user identity obfuscation protection method built on a consortium chain, comprising the following steps:

[0017] like Figure 1 As shown, the smart contract of the alliance chain has a key pair named sk blockchain and pk blockchain ; Among them, pk blockchain It is public. blockchain Only the core nodes and regulators of the alliance chain hold it.

[0018] The user generates a root key pair sk user and pk user The root key has been verified by the alliance chain system and corresponds one-to-one with the user identity.

[0019] The user uses the root key pair mentioned in the above steps to register multiple identities on the alliance chain. The registration content is encrypt(pk blockchain ,pk 1..n ). Here pk 1..n It is a random key pair generated by the user himself (sk 1..n , pk 1..n )'s public key. When registering, you need to use sk user Sign the content.

[0020] The nodes of the alliance chain can be blockchain Decrypt the registration content in the above steps to obtain the user's pk 1..n and pk user The associated relationship.

[0021] When users sign to participate in the blockchain, they use different (sk i ,pk i) , where (sk i ,pk i ) belongs to (sk 1..n , pk 1..n ).

[0022] like Figure 2As shown in the figure, when the alliance chain system receives a user transaction, it first verifies the user's signature to ensure that the transaction is indeed made by the holder of the private key sk i The user issues and signs it. Then, according to pk 1..n and pk user The association relationship determines the user's true identity and performs other business logic verifications.

[0023] Asymmetric encryption algorithm: Asymmetric encryption algorithm is a cryptographic algorithm commonly used in blockchain, which generally includes public key and private key. In blockchain, it is used to ensure transaction security, where the public key is used as the account address and the private key is used to sign the transaction to prove the user's identity. Alternatively, data can be encrypted with the public key, and only the party holding the private key can decrypt it.

[0024] Smart Contracts: Smart contracts are computer programs that automatically execute contract terms and are stored on the blockchain. They are automatically executed when predetermined conditions are met, without the need for intermediaries, ensuring transparency and trust. In the blockchain, smart contracts are used to automate transactions, execute agreements, and process assets, enhancing efficiency and security.

[0025] In the present invention, the user identity privacy protection and user identity supervision problems of the ordinary alliance chain system are solved based on the root key pair scheme. Since the association relationship between different transactions of users cannot be inferred from the public transaction content, privacy protection is achieved, which solves the problem that the existing technology may involve the privacy leakage of users and the leakage of business secrets of enterprises and institutions.

[0026] Compared with the existing ring signature scheme, the root key pair scheme has a wider range of application scenarios. It does not require users to use ring signature technology to achieve privacy protection, and can be applied to alliance chain scenarios that do not support ring signatures. The root key pair scheme is based on asymmetric cryptography algorithms and has better performance than the ring signature algorithm. The root key pair scheme does not require the construction of an additional supervision chain, does not increase the process of data on-chain, and is simpler in implementation.

[0027] The above description is only a preferred specific implementation manner of the present invention, but the protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any technician familiar with the technical field can make equivalent replacements or changes according to the technical scheme and inventive concept of the present invention within the technical scope disclosed by the present invention, which should be covered by the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A user identity obfuscation protection method built on a consortium chain, characterized by: The steps include: S1. The smart contract of the alliance chain has a key pair named sk blockchain and pk blockchain ; Among them, pk blockchain It is public, blockchain Only the core nodes and regulators of the alliance chain hold it; The user generates a root key pair sk user and pk user , the root key is verified by the alliance chain system and corresponds one-to-one with the user identity; S2. The user uses the root key pair in step S1 to register multiple identities on the alliance chain. The registration content is encrypt(pk blockchain ,pk 1..n ), where pk 1..n It is a random key pair generated by the user himself (sk 1..n , pk 1..n )'s public key part, when registering, you need to use sk user Sign the content; S3. When the alliance chain system receives a user transaction, it first verifies the user's signature to ensure that the transaction is indeed made by the holder of the private key sk i The user issues and signs it, and then, according to pk 1..n and pk user The association relationship determines the user's true identity and performs other business logic verifications.

2. According to claim 1, a user identity obfuscation protection method built on a consortium chain is characterized in that: The nodes of the alliance chain are connected through sk blockchain Decrypt the registration content of step S2 to obtain the user's pk 1..n and pk user The associated relationship.

3. According to claim 1, a user identity obfuscation protection method built on a consortium chain is characterized in that: When users sign to participate in the blockchain, they use different (sk i ,pk i) , where (sk i ,pk i ) belongs to (sk 1..n , pk 1..n ).

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